Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves a father, Miguel E.C., and his five minor children. In March 2025, the State of Nevada filed a petition claiming the children needed protection. According to the petition, Miguel made numerous allegations - later found to be false - that the children had been sexually abused by their mother and/or her relatives. The petition said these false claims caused the children to undergo medical examinations and to take part in investigations of their mother and relatives, that Miguel appeared to have coached the children to make the false claims, and that Miguel may have a mental health condition driving his behavior. The children were removed from Miguel's care and placed with their mother. The district court held an evidentiary hearing (a court session where witnesses testify and evidence is presented). Miguel attended and testified. Other witnesses, including detectives who investigated the sexual-abuse allegations, also testified, and documents were introduced. Afterward, the court found that Miguel had abused and neglected the children by causing them mental injury that was not accidental. The court concluded that Miguel coached and coerced the children into making false abuse allegations as a way to try to gain custody, and that this caused the children emotional harm. The court then gave the mother sole custody, ended the agency's custody, gave Miguel supervised parenting time, said any future custody changes would have to go through a regular custody court, and closed the case. On appeal, Miguel argued three main things: that the district court's findings were wrong because the State presented false evidence, that his due process rights were violated because the court made him rush through his testimony, and that the judge was biased against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed. A key reason was a record problem: Miguel filed a certificate stating he was not requesting transcripts of the hearing, so the appeals court never received a written record of what was said. Under Nevada rules, when an appellant does not provide the necessary transcript, the appeals court assumes the missing transcript supports the lower court's decision. Because of that, the court could not meaningfully review Miguel's arguments about the evidence, and it noted that appeals courts do not re-weigh a trial court's decisions about which witnesses to believe. On due process, the court found Miguel had received notice of the hearing, appeared with his lawyer, and testified - and again, without a transcript, the court presumed the record supported how the trial judge handled the time for testimony. On bias, the court found Miguel had not shown the judge relied on outside information or displayed the kind of deep-seated hostility that would make a fair decision impossible. The opinion also addressed a jurisdictional objection from the State. The State argued the appeal should be dismissed because the order with the factual findings was not a final, appealable order. The court rejected that, explaining that the order placing the children with their mother and closing the case resolved everything and was therefore a final appealable order, which also allowed the court to review earlier interlocutory (non-final) decisions.

This case arose from a child-protection proceeding. According to the opinion, a child attempted suicide, and the Clark County Department of Family Services became involved while the child was hospitalized. The Clark County District Attorney's Office then filed a petition alleging the child needed protection because of neglect and because the child faced a threat of harm while in Dawson's care. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Dawson was the person responsible for the child's welfare. The court heard testimony about the suicide attempt and Dawson's actions surrounding it, including her failure to take immediate action after finding the child's suicide note and allowing the child access to a firearm despite the child's mental health difficulties and prior suicide attempts. The district court found it was foreseeable that the child could try to commit suicide on the relevant night and that Dawson exhibited "almost a depraved indifference for this child's wellbeing and safety." While the court found insufficient evidence for the separate threat-of-harm allegation, it concluded the neglect allegation was substantiated and placed the child in Family Services' custody. Dawson asked the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus — an extraordinary court order compelling a lower court to perform a legally required act or correcting an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeals explained that this kind of relief is discretionary and that the person asking for it bears the burden of showing it is warranted. Because placement decisions in dependency cases are entrusted to the district court's discretion, with the child's best interest as the main consideration, Dawson had to show the lower court manifestly abused that discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court of Appeals concluded she did not make that showing. It emphasized that it is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence or the district court's credibility determinations, and it denied the petition.

This case is about whether a child-welfare agency and the children themselves can appeal when a juvenile court dismisses a petition asking the court to protect the children from a parent. The petition here was filed under NRS Chapter 432B, the Nevada law that governs child-protection proceedings. After a hearing, the juvenile court found the abuse and neglect allegations against the father were not proven and threw the case out. CCDFS and the children tried to appeal that dismissal. The problem was a 2012 Nevada Supreme Court decision called In re A.B., which had said that orders coming out of juvenile proceedings involving child custody are not appealable - meaning the only way to challenge them in the Supreme Court was to file a writ of mandamus (a separate, more limited type of court request). The Supreme Court flagged this issue on its own and asked the parties to explain why the appeal should not be tossed out. The Supreme Court took a fresh look at the question and decided that In re A.B. got it wrong on this point. The court explained that Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 3A(b)(1) allows appeals from a "final judgment" entered by a district court, and that an order completely dismissing a child-protection case fits that definition because it ends the case and leaves nothing further for the court to decide. A juvenile court is part of the district court, so its final orders qualify. The father argued that a different rule, NRAP 3A(b)(7), which addresses appeals from certain child-custody orders that do not arise in juvenile court, blocks appeals from juvenile-court custody orders. The court rejected that reading. NRAP 3A(b)(7) by its terms simply does not cover juvenile-court custody orders; it does not strip away the appeal right that NRAP 3A(b)(1) provides for final judgments. The court therefore overruled In re A.B. in part - specifically, the part holding that all child-custody orders arising from juvenile proceedings are unappealable. The court was careful to limit its ruling: only orders that finally resolve NRS Chapter 432B proceedings are appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Interlocutory (mid-case) child-custody orders entered in those proceedings are still not appealable under this rule. Because the order in this case completely ended the child-protection proceedings, it is a final judgment, and the appeal may go forward. The court gave the appellants 60 days to file their opening brief.

J.B. was taken into protective custody two days after his birth and placed by DFS with Becky and Jay Whipple, a "fictive kin" placement (caregivers treated as family even though not biologically related). After paternity was established, the district court at one point ordered J.B. placed with his paternal grandfather. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that placement in 2024. After further proceedings, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and placed J.B. with the Whipples. But as part of that order, the judge also gave the grandfather "significant" visitation rights and said those rights would continue even if the Whipples eventually adopted J.B. DFS asked the Supreme Court to order the visitation portion vacated. The Supreme Court agreed with DFS. Before reaching the merits, the court rejected an argument that DFS lacked "standing" (the legal right to bring the challenge). Because DFS had protective custody of J.B. and Nevada law gives DFS duties over a child's placement while in protective custody, DFS had a sufficient interest to challenge the order. On the merits, the court explained that the statute the district court relied on - NRS 125C.050 - allows grandparents to seek visitation only in specific circumstances, including when a parent's rights have been "relinquished or terminated." Here, although the parents had signed relinquishment paperwork, the relinquishments had not been finalized when the district court entered the order. Because no parental rights had actually been relinquished or terminated yet, the statutory trigger for grandparent visitation under NRS 125C.050 had not been met. The court held the district court therefore could not grant grandparent visitation under that statute and noted that any grandparent visitation in this posture would have to come through the district court's authority under NRS Chapter 432B. The court directed the district court to vacate the visitation portion of the placement order.

Two people, Antwann B. and Jessica B., asked the Court of Appeals of Nevada to step in and stop or override what a lower court (the family division of the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County) was doing in a case involving child welfare under NRS Chapter 432B, which governs the protection of children from abuse and neglect. They filed their request without a lawyer, representing themselves. The type of relief they sought is called an "extraordinary writ" - specifically a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition. A writ of mandamus is a court order forcing a lower court or official to perform a duty the law requires, or to correct an arbitrary or capricious use of discretion. A writ of prohibition is an order stopping a lower court from acting beyond, or without, its jurisdiction (its legal authority to hear the case). The Court of Appeals explained that deciding whether to even consider this kind of petition is entirely within its own discretion, and that the people asking for the writ carry the burden of showing that such relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the documents submitted with it, the court concluded that the petitioners had not shown that extraordinary relief was warranted, and it denied the petition. Because the court denied the petition, it also denied as moot (no longer requiring a decision) an emergency motion the petitioners had filed on October 24, 2025.

Molly L. and Bryan T. divorced in 2014 and shared two children, with Molly having primary physical custody. In 2016, Bryan suffered a serious mental health crisis. After an incident in which Bryan drove off with the children and ended up at a hospital in distress, Molly obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) - a court order keeping Bryan away. The extended TPO required Bryan to stay away until July 18, 2017, or until he completed a psychological evaluation and counseling. Bryan was hospitalized for months, then went to live with his mother in Kansas, and later returned to Nevada believing he was barred from contacting Molly or the children. For several years afterward, Bryan had no contact with S.A.T. According to the opinion, Bryan could not afford the required psychological treatment or an attorney, repeatedly attended free "Ask-a-Lawyer" sessions, tried unsuccessfully to get mediation through the child support case, and reconnected with Molly's adult son Zachary. Meanwhile, Molly took steps that made contact harder: she moved without updating her address in the child support action, cut off ties with Bryan's family, and restricted the children's activities out of fear Bryan might find them. In 2021, Bryan received an inheritance, hired a lawyer, paid off his child support arrears, and completed the psychological evaluation and counseling the TPO had required. Soon after he provided proof of treatment, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. (One child, K.W.T., emancipated and later died by suicide during the proceedings, so the case proceeded only as to S.A.T.) After an evidentiary hearing - including testimony from the doctor who evaluated Bryan that his mental health issues were under control - the district court denied Molly's petition. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court emphasized that a private termination case (one parent trying to terminate the other parent's rights) is different from a state-filed termination case. When the state files, the focus is the child's safety. When one parent files against the other, the child is usually already safe, so courts must look carefully at the petitioning parent's motivations. On abandonment, the Court held Bryan rebutted the presumption: he believed the TPO barred contact until he completed treatment, he could not afford that treatment or a lawyer until 2021, and he repeatedly tried to get help and eventually paid arrears and completed treatment. On neglect, the Court held there was no evidence S.A.T. was inadequately cared for - she was in Molly's care and Bryan paid child support. On "token efforts" - the idea that a parent who barely communicates with a child has shown parental fault - the Court announced a new rule: in private termination actions, courts should disfavor terminating parental rights when the only ground proved is that the parent made only token efforts to communicate with or support the child. The Court reasoned this category is uniquely vulnerable to abuse by a custodial parent who controls access to the child, and that "settled purpose" (the standard for abandonment) is the opposite of "only token efforts." The Court also rejected Molly's argument that Bryan admitted the token-efforts allegation by failing to deny it in his response. Because a responsive pleading is not required in termination cases, an undenied allegation is treated as denied, not admitted, and the underlying facts must still be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the Court declined to address whether Bryan complied with the TPO's mental-health conditions, finding that issue moot because the TPO had long since expired by its own terms.

A parent, Ryne Seeto, tried to appeal a district court decision that placed his child in temporary protective custody. Temporary protective custody is a short-term arrangement under Nevada's child-welfare statutes (NRS Chapter 432B) where a court places a child outside the parent's care while the underlying case continues. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the parent's challenge. Instead, it concluded that it had no authority to hear the appeal at all. Under Nevada law, only certain kinds of district court orders can be appealed - generally, final orders that wrap up a case. A temporary order in a NRS Chapter 432B proceeding is not final, so it cannot be appealed at this stage. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it dismissed the appeal. The court also denied as moot a motion the appellant had filed on September 3, 2025.

A father tried to appeal a decision from a Nye County district court in a child-welfare case. In that lower-court decision, the judge agreed with allegations against the father, scheduled the next hearing (a "dispositional hearing," where the court decides what should happen long-term with the children), found that the two children needed protection, and placed them with a state child-welfare agency. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether the lower court was right or wrong. Instead, it concluded that it does not have the power - "jurisdiction" - to hear this particular appeal at all. In Nevada, a person can only appeal to the Supreme Court when a statute or court rule specifically allows that type of appeal. The court found no statute or rule that allows an appeal from this kind of mid-case child-protection order. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits. The court also denied as moot two motions the appellant had filed in September 2025.

This case involves a baby, A.R., who was removed from her parents in 2022 because of neglect and abuse. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) initially placed her with her paternal aunt, Mary. Over time, A.R. also began spending weekends with her maternal grandmother, Ericka. Both relatives loved A.R., wanted to adopt her, and were considered fit caregivers. After the parents' rights were terminated by the court, the district court had to decide where A.R. should live permanently. Both the aunt and the grandmother were good options, and the district court found them "equally situated" in most respects. To break the tie, the court considered DFS's recommendation. DFS preferred the aunt's home because A.R. had developed a close, sibling-like bond with her cousin (the aunt's child), and DFS believed keeping that bond intact was best for A.R. The court placed A.R. with the aunt for adoption, while preserving the grandmother's role through a Post Adoptive Contact Agreement giving her alternating weekend visits and two weeks of summer vacation each year. The grandmother asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in through a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to perform a duty required by law. She argued the district court placed too much weight on DFS's recommendation, did not make sufficient findings, did not hear enough evidence, and improperly favored a "nuclear family" structure. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and denied the petition. It explained that, after parental rights are terminated, a different statute (NRS 128.110) governs placement, and that statute gives the agency holding the child's custody discretion in deciding placement. The district court is not bound by the agency's preference, but it must consider it as part of figuring out what is in the child's best interest, which always remains the paramount concern. Here, the district court did exactly that: it acknowledged it could override DFS, but found DFS's reasoning - protecting A.R.'s bond with her cousin - persuasive. The Supreme Court also concluded that the district court's findings were sufficient and that its decision was not based on a generic preference for "traditional" families but on the specific facts of A.R.'s relationships. Some of the grandmother's other arguments were treated as waived because she did not raise them in the district court.

This case involves a father, Clifford, whose parental rights to his child were terminated by a Nevada district court. Clifford appealed, arguing that the trial court should have appointed him a guardian ad litem - a person assigned by the court to look out for the interests of someone who may not be able to understand or participate in legal proceedings on their own. At the termination trial, Clifford's own attorney asked to withdraw and, before doing so, told the court she believed Clifford needed a guardian ad litem because he did not understand what was happening, did not understand the court process, and did not understand her role as his lawyer. The judge questioned Clifford directly about why his child was not living with him and why he did not seem to understand the case despite having attended most of the hearings. The judge concluded Clifford did not need a guardian ad litem, stating, "I don't know that at this point that he's not competent enough. I just don't think he likes your answers or - or understands what - - what's going on here, not because we haven't explained to him." The trial then went forward with Clifford representing himself, and his parental rights were terminated. The Nevada Supreme Court vacated that termination. Nevada law (NRS 432B.46803(3)) sets out specific factors a district court must consider when deciding whether a parent in a child-protection case is incapacitated and therefore needs a guardian ad litem. The State conceded, and the record confirmed, that the district court never went through those required factors. The Supreme Court said the record actually suggests appointing a guardian ad litem "may have been appropriate," but because the trial court skipped the required analysis, the appellate court could not decide that question itself. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the termination order and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must walk through each factor in NRS 432B.46803(3), determine whether Clifford is incapacitated, and - if he is - appoint a guardian ad litem before holding a new termination trial.

This case is about a mother, identified as Mary W., whose parental rights to her two children were ended by a Nevada family court. After that ruling, Mary asked the court to undo it; the court refused. She then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing herself. The Supreme Court affirmed, meaning the termination stands. Mary raised three main complaints. First, she said she was not properly told when the trial would happen, which she argued violated her right to due process (a constitutional guarantee of fair notice and a chance to be heard). The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that because Mary's address was uncertain, notice was delivered to her adult son and was also published, both methods Nevada law allows when a party's address is unknown. The court also noted that the trial judge told Mary the trial date out loud four times at a November 28, 2023 status hearing, and gave her the date in writing. An earlier report had listed a wrong date, but the court said that mistake did not erase the correct notice she later received. Second, Mary argued that her children were improperly taken from her in the first place, suggesting the removal was tied to her asking for a new caseworker. The court found the record told a different story: Mary had admitted using illicit drugs, the children were living in unsafe conditions (including broken glass and staples on the floor), and Mary was behaving erratically and aggressively when the children were taken into protective custody. Third, Mary challenged the legal conclusions that justified ending her parental rights. Under Nevada law, a court must find both (a) "parental fault" and (b) that termination is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found enough evidence on both points: Mary struggled with substance abuse, refused drug tests, did not complete a treatment program, and did not substantially complete the case plan DFS gave her. The children, meanwhile, had been living with their maternal grandmother, were attached to her, were thriving, and the grandmother wanted to adopt them. Because every one of Mary's arguments failed on the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.

This case arises from a child-welfare proceeding in Clark County. After 19-month-old K.T. died of head trauma and a leg fracture, the mother's boyfriend was arrested and charged with murder and child abuse. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, told investigators she had witnessed the boyfriend abuse K.T. but did not protect the child. Concerned about Bellamy's ability to protect her surviving 4-year-old daughter, A.T., DFS took protective custody of A.T. and the District Attorney filed a petition alleging A.T. was an abused or neglected child. When the case came before the district court, Bellamy entered a "no-contest" plea to the petition. A no-contest plea means the person does not admit the allegations are true but agrees not to fight them; the court then proceeds as if the allegations were admitted. The District Attorney objected, saying Nevada's child-welfare statute (NRS 432B.530) only allows a parent to either admit or deny the allegations, not plead no contest, unless the prosecutor agrees as part of a negotiation. The district judge accepted the plea anyway, made clear there was no deal attached to it (the District Attorney was not giving up the right to use Bellamy's statements in any future criminal case), and treated the plea as the equivalent of an admission for the dependency case. DFS, the District Attorney, and the child asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in by writ - an extraordinary order used when there is no ordinary appeal available. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because rulings under NRS Chapter 432B are not appealable, and the question of whether courts may accept no-contest pleas in these cases is an important legal issue. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners and denied the writ. The majority concluded that NRS 432B.530 says the court must give parties an "opportunity to admit or deny" the allegations, but does not strictly limit them to only those two responses. The majority found the statute ambiguous and looked to its purpose. Because Nevada's child-protection laws are designed to resolve cases quickly - delays harm children waiting for permanency - the majority held that allowing a no-contest plea serves that goal. A no-contest plea avoids a contested evidentiary hearing, lets DFS move forward with services and a reunification plan, and lets a parent avoid admitting to potentially criminal conduct (which could implicate the parent's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The majority also rejected the argument that accepting the plea over the prosecutor's objection violated separation of powers. Charging decisions and plea negotiations belong to the executive branch, but here the district court was not negotiating, not dropping charges, and not giving Bellamy any assurances about a future criminal case. Bellamy pleaded no contest to the entire petition as filed. Three justices dissented. They read the statute as plainly limiting parents to admitting or denying the allegations - nothing more - and would have granted the writ.

This case involves a father asking a Nevada court to permanently end the mother's legal relationship with their young son. The father, Logan, and the mother, Shianna, dated from 2017 to 2019 and had a son, R.A.S., in 2018. After they broke up, Shianna - who was struggling with substance abuse - left R.A.S. in Logan's care so she could enter a 30-day rehabilitation program. When she finished the program in early 2020, she tried to find her son. According to her testimony, Logan had moved to a new home, changed his phone number, and blocked her on the social media account he shared with his now-wife. Logan's stepmother told her she did not have updated contact information. Shianna later relapsed, was placed on probation, absconded, and spent several months in jail in 2022. By the time she was released, she had not seen her son since December 2019. After her release, Shianna moved in with her sister, worked as a nanny, had another child whom she has cared for full time, and later started work as a dental assistant. In June 2023, Logan filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated her rights on four grounds and Shianna appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Court used the opinion to draw an important distinction between two kinds of termination cases. Most termination cases are filed by the state because a child is in danger; in those cases, parents are typically offered services and case plans, and termination is treated as a last resort. Nevada's statutes, however, also allow private individuals - like another parent - to file termination petitions, and the statutes do not distinguish between the two kinds of cases. The Court emphasized that private termination cases involve different motivations and circumstances and instructed district courts to handle them "carefully and with a watchful eye for these distinctions." Applied to Shianna's case, the Court found that none of the four parental fault grounds was supported by substantial evidence. On abandonment, the Court acknowledged that Shianna had not seen her son since 2019, which created a legal presumption of abandonment, but found Shianna had rebutted that presumption: she tried to find Logan and R.A.S. in multiple ways, but Logan had moved, changed his phone, and blocked her online. The Court said it was "difficult to discern what more Shianna could have done." On neglect, the Court explained that neglect is judged by how the parent treats a child while the child is in the parent's care; because R.A.S. was in Logan's care and was being properly cared for, Shianna could not be deemed to have neglected him. On unfitness, the Court held that this concept is closely tied to neglect; for the same reason, the unfitness finding could not stand. On token efforts, the Court found that Shianna's inability to locate Logan and R.A.S. - because Logan had cut off contact - undermined the conclusion that she had made only minimal effort. Because at least one ground of parental fault must be proven, and none was, the Court reversed the termination order without reaching the best-interest analysis or the evidentiary issues.

Two parents tried to appeal a Nevada family court ruling that gave Clark County Family Services temporary custody of their five children. They filed the appeal themselves, without an attorney. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the temporary custody order was right or wrong. Instead, the court explained that it can only hear appeals when a statute or court rule specifically allows them. Because no statute or rule allows an appeal from a temporary custody order entered under Nevada's child welfare statutes (NRS Chapter 432B), the court concluded it had no power - no "jurisdiction" - to consider the appeal at all, and dismissed it. The court also noted a procedural concern about how the State served its motion to dismiss on the parents. The State's certificate of service said the parents were served "and/or" by email, but the rules require that a party consent to email service before it can be used. The court flagged that using "and/or" in a certificate of service is "strongly discouraged" because it leaves the manner of service unclear. Because the appeal was being dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, however, the State's motion to dismiss and the parents' motion for a stay were denied as moot.

This case grew out of a child-welfare investigation. According to the opinion, DFS became involved with Eggleston's family after Laura Rodriguez, the mother of two of Eggleston's children, allegedly expressed suicidal thoughts in December 2014 and was hospitalized on a psychiatric hold due to substance abuse and mental health concerns. Four minor children lived in the home: Eggleston and Rodriguez's two young children (ages 4 and 2 at the time) and two of Rodriguez's children from a prior relationship (ages 11 and 8). A DFS supervisor investigated and, according to the opinion, found a history of inadequate supervision and neglect. The opinion states that Eggleston spent long hours away teaching, admitted leaving most parenting to Rodriguez, and did not actively co-parent even when home. Rodriguez struggled with heavy alcohol and cocaine use. DFS created a "present danger plan" requiring Eggleston and Rodriguez's two adult daughters to provide 24-hour supervision of Rodriguez; all three signed it. After Rodriguez was readmitted to the hospital and the adult daughters said they were returning to college and could no longer supervise, DFS removed the children. They now live with a maternal aunt and uncle in Illinois. Eggleston moved to England during the proceedings. In early 2015, DFS notified Eggleston that the maltreatment allegations against him were "substantiated" - meaning, as defined in the opinion, that a report was investigated and credible evidence of abuse or neglect exists. His name was placed on a central registry. Eggleston appealed within DFS, lost, and then requested a formal administrative hearing. The hearing was delayed for years, largely because of Eggleston's repeated continuance requests, and finally took place over WebEx in September 2020. Eggleston sought another last-minute continuance and asked the hearing officer to disqualify herself. She reserved ruling, then denied both requests. The opinion describes Eggleston frequently interrupting the proceedings, claiming he could not hear despite interruptions showing otherwise, saying he needed to leave to pick up a child, and eventually dropping off the call. The hearing officer proceeded, heard DFS's evidence, and upheld the substantiation. After the district court sent the case back once for the officer to write out the supporting facts more clearly, the officer issued an amended decision, and the district court denied Eggleston's petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first rejected DFS's argument that the case should be thrown out because Eggleston served his petition improperly. The court found that Eggleston properly mailed his petition to the DFS interim director at the correct address on December 29, 2020, satisfying the service rules, so the district court had authority to hear the case. The court then addressed Eggleston's two main arguments. First, it held that Eggleston was given the opportunity required by law to present and challenge evidence, but chose not to participate. The court concluded he had ample time to prepare (five years of delays), was given chances to schedule the hearing, could have presented witnesses, and appeared to understand the proceedings despite claiming connectivity problems. Second, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of maltreatment. It explained that under Nevada law, abuse or neglect can be established when a child lacks proper care, control, or supervision - physical abuse is not required. The investigator's testimony about Rodriguez's substance abuse, Eggleston's absences, his failure to follow the safety plan, and specific incidents (including a child's near-drowning and children hiding in a bathroom from their intoxicated mother) supported the officer's conclusion. The court therefore affirmed.

This case arose out of a child welfare proceeding in Clark County. DFS removed two children from their parents because of ongoing domestic violence and placed them with their paternal aunt. For two months, before the aunt became a licensed foster parent, DFS helped her pay rent. Once she became licensed, she began receiving regular foster care subsidies instead. The children's attorney later asked DFS for additional rental help for the aunt. DFS said no, explaining that the agency does not pay rental deposits. During a hearing on a motion to terminate the parents' rights, the aunt asked the judge for financial help. After learning DFS had earlier paid two months of rent, the district court ordered DFS to pay another $1,000 toward the aunt's rent. DFS asked the judge to reconsider; the judge refused. DFS then went to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking it to throw out the order. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case as a writ petition (an extraordinary request asking a higher court to step in) because DFS had no ordinary right to appeal this kind of mid-case order. On the merits, the court held that no Nevada statute gave the district court the power to order DFS to spend money on rent for a foster parent. The Legislature, the court explained, gave child-welfare agencies like DFS broad discretion to decide how to spend the money the state appropriates to them - the statute even says DFS may use block grant money for child welfare services "without restriction." When the district court ordered DFS to pay rent anyway, it stepped outside its role and into the agency's role. The Supreme Court therefore granted the petition and ordered the district court to vacate (cancel) its rental-assistance order. The court did not decide the constitutional separation-of-powers, due process, or local court rule arguments DFS also raised, because the statutory ruling alone resolved the case.

Ryan and Marie are the divorced parents of three young children. After their 2019 separation, Marie was awarded primary physical and sole legal custody, and a psychologist evaluated Ryan, finding him unfit at the time and recommending therapy followed by gradual reunification with the children. Marie was permitted to relocate with the children to California. Ryan briefly had supervised in-person visits and then weekly virtual visits, but the visits stopped in June 2020 after Marie switched to a paid supervision platform that Ryan said he could not afford. In the years that followed, Ryan continued to seek treatment from multiple mental-health providers, several of whom reported he had made progress and recommended reunification. He sent diapers, wipes, money toward a medical procedure for one of the twins, and a pair of custom sneakers. He also emailed Marie's lawyer asking to see his children. He did not, however, formally move the court to modify custody, and he did not pay court-ordered child support, citing financial difficulties tied in part to a prior felony conviction. In late 2022, Marie filed a petition to terminate Ryan's parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court terminated Ryan's rights, finding he had abandoned and neglected the children and made only "token efforts" to be involved in their lives. The court relied on two statutes: NRS 128.107, which lists factors courts must consider in termination cases, and NRS 128.109, which creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for a long time. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that NRS 128.107 does not apply when the children are in the physical custody of a parent (as opposed to foster care, a relative, or a guardian), and that NRS 128.109 applies only in cases brought under NRS Chapter 432B - the chapter governing child welfare cases involving the State. Because this was a private termination proceeding by one parent against the other, neither statute fit. The court also concluded that the evidence did not support any of the three parental-fault grounds. On abandonment, the court reasoned that the statutory presumption did not apply because the children were placed with Marie by court order, and even if it did, Ryan rebutted it by repeatedly requesting visits, sending gifts and support, and pursuing the treatment recommended by the custody evaluator. The court emphasized that financial inability to pay support cannot itself establish abandonment, and that an unrepresented parent's failure to navigate court procedures cannot be held against them in this context. On neglect, the court noted Marie testified the children were thriving in her care, so Ryan's conduct could not be deemed sufficiently harmful. On token efforts, Ryan's documented therapy, requests for visitation, and gifts were enough to defeat the finding. The court reversed the termination order, instructed the district court to order destruction of the amended birth certificates that had been issued (which had changed the children's last names), and sent the case back for further proceedings. Justice Lee concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's reading of NRS 128.107, arguing the statute should apply whenever the parent whose rights are being considered does not have physical custody, even if the other parent does.

This case asks what happens to a Nevada parent's child-custody rights when she once pleaded guilty to felony child abuse but was later allowed to withdraw that guilty plea after completing probation. Yumila Cardenas-Garcia's six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from her home by Clark County Department of Family Services after the home was found to be unlivable. In a separate criminal case, Cardenas-Garcia pleaded guilty to felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment under NRS 200.508, and a judgment of conviction was entered. Her plea agreement was a so-called "drop-down" agreement: if she successfully completed probation, she could withdraw the felony plea and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor (contributing to the delinquency of a minor). She did complete probation, and the felony plea was withdrawn. A Nevada statute, NRS 432B.555, says that if a court finds a parent has "ever been convicted" of felony child abuse, the court cannot return the child to that parent unless the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child will not suffer physical or psychological harm from being returned. The district court held a hearing while Cardenas-Garcia still had the felony conviction on her record, found she had not met that high burden, and ruled the presumption against reunification applied. After her felony plea was withdrawn, she went back to the district court and asked it to find the statute no longer applied to her. The district court still found she had not rebutted the presumption. Cardenas-Garcia then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - an order from a higher court directing a lower court to do something it is legally required to do. She argued that because her felony conviction had been voided, she should not be treated as ever having been convicted, and the statute's higher burden should not apply. The Supreme Court disagreed and denied the writ. Focusing on the word "ever" in the statute, the majority held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who at any point had a felony child-abuse conviction entered against them, even if that conviction is later withdrawn or voided. The court reasoned that the Legislature's choice of "ever" directs courts to look back at any conviction that was at any point on the record, regardless of its current legal status. The court emphasized, however, that the presumption is not a permanent bar. A parent can keep trying to rebut it as circumstances change, and district courts should "freely grant leave" to present new evidence when a party shows a significant change in circumstances - such as Cardenas-Garcia's successful completion of probation. Justice Bell dissented. She would have held that under existing Nevada precedent, a withdrawn guilty plea is treated as if it never existed, so Cardenas-Garcia legally has no felony conviction at all and the statute should not apply.

This case is about where a young child, identified only as A. St. A., should live while Nevada's child-welfare system handles his case. The Clark County Department of Family Services took the child away from his parents at birth and placed him with a licensed foster family in Nevada. The child's maternal grandmother, Aundrea G., who lives in California, asked to have him placed with her instead. Because Aundrea lives out of state, the Department had to use a process called the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) to evaluate her home. The first ICPC report raised several concerns and only approved her for short-term placement. Based on that report, the district court decided to leave the child with his foster family for the time being. Aundrea then formally moved to have the child placed with her permanently. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and asked the Department to obtain an updated ICPC assessment focused on whether Aundrea was suitable as a long-term adoptive resource. While waiting for that updated report, the district court also held a trial on terminating the parents' rights, but it held off issuing the termination order until the placement question was resolved. After several continuances, the updated report still had not arrived, and the district court ruled that it was in the child's best interest to remain with his foster family. Aundrea asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing a lower court to do what the law requires or to correct an arbitrary or capricious use of discretion. She argued that as a family member she had priority over the foster family under Nevada's child-placement statutes. The Supreme Court denied her petition. The court explained that the specific statute Aundrea relied on, NRS 432B.390(6), applies only to placements during the very early protective-custody stage, before the initial hearing. Because A. St. A.'s case had moved past that stage, a different statute, NRS 432B.550(6), governed. That statute does give a preference to family members, but the preference is not absolute - the district court still has discretion and must focus on the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found that the district court properly considered Aundrea's relationship to the child, the suitability of her home, the child's best interest, and the fact that the foster placement allowed the child to maintain regular visits with his biological siblings, who all lived in Nevada. The court also noted that nothing required the district court to wait indefinitely for an updated ICPC report, especially after multiple continuances had already been granted. Justice Stiglich dissented in a one-line statement and would have granted the petition.

This case involves an appeal from a juvenile court order that placed a child for adoption and put a post-adoption contact agreement into effect. One of the parties, Ericka D., tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Clark County Department of Family Services asked the Supreme Court to throw the appeal out, arguing that the Supreme Court does not have authority to hear an appeal from this kind of order. Nobody opposed that request. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal. Under Nevada's appellate rules, custody orders that come out of juvenile court proceedings cannot be appealed directly. The court noted that a party who wants to challenge such an order generally must seek writ relief - a different kind of request asking a higher court to step in - rather than filing a regular appeal. Because the appeal was dismissed, the court also relieved respondent Mary H.-L. of an earlier directive to retain new counsel or notify the court that she would not be doing so.

This case is about who gets to care for a baby, J.B., whose parents were both incarcerated when he was born. (His parents had been arrested for the homicide of his older sibling.) Because neither parent could care for J.B., Nevada's child-welfare agency had to find someone else to take him in. Shortly after J.B.'s birth, DFS placed him with Becky and Jay Whipple, family friends of J.B.'s grandmother. The Whipples were not licensed foster parents at the time, and the district court signed an order describing them as "Unlicensed Fictive Kin." "Fictive kin," under Nevada law, means a person not related to a child by blood but who has a significant emotional and positive bond with the child. No one objected to that designation when it was made. Months later, after a paternity test confirmed Miles Stano Jr. was J.B.'s father, the father asked that J.B. be sent to live with the paternal grandfather in Illinois. After interstate paperwork was completed (about nine months after J.B. was placed with the Whipples, by which point the Whipples had become licensed foster parents), the district court held a placement hearing. The district court did not take evidence about what was best for J.B. Instead, the judge ruled that, as a matter of law, a blood relative always wins out over an unrelated person in placement decisions, and the judge also reversed course and decided the Whipples were not really fictive kin after all. The court ordered J.B. moved to Illinois. Compounding the issue, J.B.'s court-appointed attorney did not appear at the placement hearing or at the later reconsideration hearing. The Supreme Court noted J.B. was largely without representation throughout the case, even though state law requires that children in these proceedings be represented by counsel. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ and made several rulings. First, it explained that "fictive kin" status is judged from the perspective of both the prospective caregiver and the child. For an infant who cannot yet form relationships, the bond and commitment shown by the adult is what counts; an infant is not excluded from being placed with fictive kin just because the baby has not had time to bond. Second, the Supreme Court held that Nevada law does not put blood relatives ahead of fictive kin. The statute groups them together and prefers either over a foster home, but it does not rank them against each other. The decisive question is the child's best interest, and that requires actual factual findings. Third, the district court should not have proceeded with the placement hearing when J.B.'s attorney was absent and a continuance was being sought. Fourth, the Supreme Court ordered the case reassigned to a different district court judge, citing statements by the original judge that suggested he could not put aside his view that placement with "safe family" is always best. The Supreme Court vacated the placement order, lifted its prior stay, and sent the matter back for new proceedings before a different judge, who must hear evidence and make findings about what is actually in J.B.'s best interest.

A father, identified in court papers as Clifford Allyn J., tried to appeal a Clark County district court order that placed his child, M.J., into protective custody. Protective custody in this context is governed by a Nevada statutory scheme - NRS Chapter 432B - that addresses the protection of children from abuse or neglect. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the father's challenge. Instead, the court explained that the order he was trying to appeal was only a temporary one: it set up custody for the time being and scheduled further proceedings in the district court. Under Nevada law, an appellate court can generally only review final orders, and temporary custody orders entered under NRS Chapter 432B are not considered final. Because the order was not final, the Supreme Court concluded it had no power - no jurisdiction - to hear the appeal, and it dismissed the case. The court also noted that, given the dismissal, it would not act on a motion the State had filed to dismiss the appeal for missed filing deadlines, and it directed the clerk to file the docketing statement that had been received on June 5, 2024.

This case is about whether a Nevada district court was right to permanently end a father's legal relationship with his young son. In Nevada, ending a parent's rights - sometimes called "termination" - requires the state to prove two things by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high level of proof, though not as high as the criminal standard): first, that the parent is at fault in some way the law recognizes, and second, that ending the relationship is in the child's best interest. The child, J.B.J., was placed outside Johney's home essentially from birth and had lived with a maternal relative - alongside four of his siblings who had already been adopted by that relative - for nearly three years by the time of the termination trial. DFS had earlier been involved with Johney's other children, and one of its central concerns was Johney's "protective capacity" - his ability to recognize danger and keep his children safe. DFS gave Johney a chance at trial reunification, but ended it after caseworkers found people in the home with Johney and J.B.J. whom Johney had not first cleared with DFS, as he had been required to do. According to the majority, Johney downplayed this and could not explain why having unvetted strangers around a not-quite-three-year-old could be unsafe. A licensed psychologist who evaluated Johney testified that he was already functioning at his highest level, was "not suited to be the primary child-care provider," and that more services would not improve his parenting. The psychologist also noted that when asked about daycare plans, Johney said a girlfriend could watch the child. There were also unresolved questions about how Johney, who worked nights, would supervise a toddler during the day on only four hours of sleep. The majority concluded that this evidence was enough to support the district court's finding that Johney was an "unfit" parent and that DFS could not reunify the family despite reasonable efforts. Because Nevada law requires only one ground of parental fault, the court did not need to address the other grounds the district court found. On the best-interest question, a Nevada statute creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months pursuant to chapter 432B placement; J.B.J. had been out of the home for nearly his entire life. The majority held Johney did not rebut that presumption, and that the child's bond with the maternal relative who had already adopted four of his siblings supported termination. Justice Lee dissented. She would have reversed, characterizing termination as "an exercise of awesome power that is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty" and arguing that DFS did not carry its heavy burden. She emphasized that Johney had no criminal or drug-abuse history, maintained stable housing and employment, separated from the mother whose care issues had driven prior cases, complied substantially with his case plan, made progress with his therapist, and had progressed from video visits to unsupervised at-home placement before reunification was halted. She also noted DFS produced no evidence that the unvetted individuals in the home were actually a threat, and that Johney testified he had given DFS a name and never received a response.

Amy Gray tried to appeal district court orders that placed her minor children in protective custody under a Nevada statute (NRS Chapter 432B) that governs child welfare proceedings. Before reaching any of her arguments, the Nevada Supreme Court examined whether it had the power - the "jurisdiction" - to hear the appeal at all. The court concluded it did not. The orders Gray challenged were temporary: they set custody on an interim basis and scheduled the case for further proceedings in the lower court. Under prior Nevada Supreme Court precedent, temporary orders in NRS Chapter 432B cases are not considered final decisions, and only final decisions can be appealed at this stage. Because the orders were not appealable, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits. The court also noted that, given the dismissal, it would not act on Gray's pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying filing fees) or her motion for a stay.

A mother, Amy Gray, tried to appeal a district court order that placed her minor child in protective custody under Nevada's child-welfare statutes (NRS Chapter 432B). The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of her challenge. Instead, it concluded it had no power to hear the appeal at this stage. The reason is procedural. The order Gray challenged was a temporary one - it set custody on an interim basis and scheduled the case for further proceedings in the district court. Under longstanding Nevada law, only final orders in this type of case can be appealed; temporary orders cannot. Because the order Gray appealed was temporary rather than final, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court also declined to act on Gray's request to proceed without paying filing fees, noting that the dismissal made that request moot.

This case arises from a child-welfare proceeding in Clark County. E.C., a minor, told a school administrator that her mother's live-in boyfriend - who is also the father of E.C.'s younger brother - had sexually abused her. Child welfare authorities removed E.C. from the home, and the Department of Family Services (DFS) filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect. The petition included allegations of sexual abuse by the boyfriend, the mother's failure to protect E.C., and domestic violence. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found most of the allegations substantiated. The mother, Katherine C., asked the Nevada Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do something it is required to do - telling the district court to dismiss the abuse and neglect petition. Because Nevada law does not allow her to appeal directly from an order substantiating an abuse and neglect petition under NRS Chapter 432B, the Supreme Court agreed to consider her arguments through this writ procedure. Katherine raised three main arguments. First, she argued that the district court violated her due process rights by allowing witnesses to testify about events that happened after E.C. was removed from the home, asserting that the governing statute limits evidence to circumstances at the time of removal. The Supreme Court disagreed, reading the statute alongside a related provision that broadly permits "all relevant and material evidence helpful in determining the questions presented" at adjudicatory hearings. The court also noted that Katherine did not argue she lacked notice or an opportunity to be heard, which is what due process fundamentally requires. Second, Katherine argued that the evidentiary hearing was held more than 30 days after the petition was filed without the required good-cause finding. The Supreme Court noted that the district court's order referenced earlier hearings on February 15, 2023, and July 26, 2023, that Katherine did not include in the record before the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court presumes that missing portions of the record support the lower court's decision, this argument failed. Third, Katherine challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that she failed to protect E.C., and questioned E.C.'s credibility. The Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record - including testimony from E.C., the school counselor, and Katherine's best friend - to support the district court's findings under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Concluding that Katherine had not shown the district court overrode or misapplied the law, or acted unreasonably or with bias, the Supreme Court denied the writ petition.

This case involves an appeal from a Clark County family court order placing two minor children in protective custody under Nevada's child welfare statutes (NRS Chapter 432B). Three appellants - Gregory C., Misha H., and Zachary B. - tried to challenge that order by filing a direct appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the protective custody order was appropriate. Instead, the court concluded it had no authority (no "jurisdiction") to hear the appeal at all. Under Nevada's appellate rules, orders that come out of juvenile court and concern child custody cannot be challenged by a regular appeal. On top of that, temporary orders in NRS 432B cases are not considered "final" - and only final orders are generally appealable. The court explained that a party who wants to challenge this kind of order must instead file a "writ petition" - a separate type of request asking a higher court to order the lower court to act, rather than a standard appeal. Because the appellants filed the wrong type of challenge, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without deciding anything about the underlying custody dispute.

This case concerns a baby boy, D.M.F., who was born exposed to opiates and amphetamines. His parents admitted to methamphetamine use during pregnancy, so they agreed that the paternal grandmother, Yalonda, would care for the twins (D.M.F. and his brother A.F.) as a temporary guardian while they sought drug treatment. CPS investigated, allowed the babies to go home with Yalonda, and approved her as caregiver. About three months later, A.F. died from positional asphyxia after the parents fell asleep with him on a bed. Police and CPS investigated and found no abuse or neglect; the death was ruled a tragic accident. CPS did, however, find that the parents had relapsed on methamphetamine. Yalonda then promised to seek a formal court guardianship over the surviving twin, D.M.F., and CPS once again approved her as caregiver. About a month after A.F.'s death, Yalonda asked the district court to be appointed D.M.F.'s legal guardian. The court granted that petition without objection. Six months later, the district court received an ex parte communication (a behind-the-scenes message) from another judge who had learned of A.F.'s death from CPS records in a separate case. The court appointed an investigator and held a hearing about whether Yalonda had misrepresented things in her petition by not telling the court about A.F.'s death. After the hearing, the court issued an order removing Yalonda as guardian and terminating the guardianship altogether, and referred the matter to CPS. D.M.F., through counsel, appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that a district court does have power, on its own initiative, to remove a guardian and end a guardianship - it does not need someone to file a formal petition first. But the court must follow constitutional and statutory rules. The Supreme Court ruled the district court violated D.M.F.'s due process rights. Due process means a person must get fair notice and a real chance to be heard before the government takes away an important interest. Here, none of the court's orders clearly told D.M.F., Yalonda, or the parents that the court was considering the major step of removing the guardian and ending the guardianship. The investigator's report contained no recommendations, the hearing took no sworn testimony, and the participants were never clearly told what was on the table. The Supreme Court also held the district court abused its discretion. To remove a guardian, the court must find one of the conditions listed in NRS 159A.185(1) and then conduct a "best interests of the child" analysis using the factors in NRS 159A.186(2). To terminate a guardianship, the court must make specific findings under NSRG 10(A) about the child's health, whether a guardianship is still needed, less restrictive alternatives, and best interests. The district court did none of these things. It also relied on factual mistakes - for example, finding A.F. died "only days" before the petition was filed when in reality it was a month before, and finding A.F. died "within a few days" of Yalonda becoming temporary guardian when she had cared for the twins for three months without incident. On the CPS issue, the Supreme Court held the district court did not exceed its authority. Although the district court expressed opinions about what CPS should do, the actual order simply referred the matter to CPS for "action as they deem fit," and that was permissible. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the lower court to reinstate Yalonda as guardian (if she is willing and able). If the district court still wants to consider removal or termination, it must give clear notice, hold a full hearing, and make the findings the statutes require.

Maggie Cox and Jason Roe divorced and shared joint custody of their son, H.R. About seven years later, when H.R. was eleven, Maggie asked the court to give her primary physical custody, saying the boy's behavior toward her had become disrespectful and aggressive, which she blamed partly on Jason. Jason opposed and asked for primary custody himself. The court ordered therapy and a "brief focused assessment" by a therapist, Maureen Zelensky. Zelensky's report suggested Jason was likely engaging in "parental alienation" (a dynamic in which a child becomes excessively hostile toward one parent) and that Maggie likely had anxiety and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder. She recommended keeping the shared week-on-week-off schedule and issuing behavior orders for both parents, which the court adopted. The situation then worsened. On two occasions, police took H.R. into custody for battery against Maggie during her parenting time; H.R. was found to be the primary aggressor both times. The opinion notes that Maggie never called the police—her mother called once and Jason called once—and that once police were called, Nevada law generally requires an arrest and a 12-hour detention. Based on those incidents, Jason filed an emergency motion for sole custody. In March 2021, the court granted it, making findings including that "something wrong with the parent who cannot manage an 11-year-old," that Maggie had called the police (which the record contradicts), and that her behavior was "histrionic." The court sharply restricted Maggie's contact with H.R., limited her to reunification therapy with Dr. Sunshine Collins and six hours of parenting time weekly, and appointed a parenting coordinator and a guardian ad litem, with costs split between the parents. Over the following months, contact between Maggie and H.R. was further restricted. Dr. Collins was outside Maggie's insurance network and Maggie fell behind on payments; Dr. Collins required Maggie to complete individual sessions before joint sessions with H.R. In September 2021, the court granted Jason's objection and ordered Maggie to have no contact with H.R. outside of therapy with Dr. Collins—effectively barring all contact between mother and son. This prevented Maggie from contacting H.R. on his birthday and from sending gifts or cards over the holidays. Learning this midway through a later hearing, the court orally modified the order to let Maggie send cards, texts, or calls. At the end of the March 2022 hearing, the court kept joint legal custody but gave Jason "primary physical custody," finding a substantial change in circumstances (the deteriorating relationship between Maggie and H.R.) and that H.R.'s best interests favored living with Jason. In practice, Maggie received no in-person parenting time—only cards, texts, and calls—and any expansion of her time was left to Dr. Collins's discretion. The court also ordered Maggie to pay $11,365 in attorney fees and costs to Jason as the prevailing party. The Court of Appeals reached a split result. It agreed there was substantial evidence supporting the decision that circumstances had substantially changed and that primary physical custody should go to Jason, so it affirmed that part. But it held the district court went too far in limiting Maggie's parenting time—so far that it effectively awarded Jason sole physical custody without adequate justification, cutting off a mother with no criminal history, no substance-abuse history, and no history of domestic violence from any in-person time with her son for over a year. The court also held the district court improperly handed off its own decision-making authority to Dr. Collins by letting her decide when Maggie could see H.R. in person, and that the final parenting-time order was too vague to enforce because it merely referenced an unwritten oral ruling. The Court of Appeals further concluded the case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand, pointing to statements and findings in the record that could cause a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality. Finally, it vacated the attorney-fee award because the required findings were missing and because part of the underlying order was being reversed.

Jordan Cristos and Sarah Tolagson have two young children together and separated in February 2019. After they split up, the case describes several conflicts between them, including physical altercations in 2019 and 2020, and a 2021 incident at a park. Sarah obtained temporary protection orders in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In the 2020 incident, Jordan entered a nolo contendere plea (a plea in which a defendant does not contest a charge without formally admitting guilt) to a misdemeanor battery charge and was convicted. There was also a separate child dependency case alleging abuse and neglect that was eventually closed after Jordan complied with what Child Protective Services (CPS) recommended. Both parents asked the court for primary physical custody and joint legal custody. After a six-day trial, the district court gave Sarah primary physical custody and set up a "hybrid" joint legal custody arrangement: Sarah handles day-to-day decisions, but Jordan gets access to the children's medical and school records and is to be involved in major and moderate decisions about healthcare, education, and religion. Jordan was also ordered to pay $1,985 per month in child support, and he was given parenting time every weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Jordan appealed. He argued the trial court should not have considered three things: his nolo contendere plea, the closed child dependency case, and a CPS report. The appeals court explained that Jordan did not object to this evidence during the trial, which normally means the argument is given up ("waived"). The court can still review for "plain error," but Jordan did not argue plain error, and even looking at the substance of his complaints, the court found the trial judge's decisions were supported by the evidence. The appeals court also emphasized that it does not re-weigh witness credibility or evidence on appeal. On the child dependency case, Jordan argued the doctrine of issue preclusion (a rule that stops a party from re-litigating an issue already decided) barred the court from considering it. The appeals court found he had not shown the required elements—including that he did not even provide the juvenile court records to support his claim that the case was "dismissed." On legal custody, Jordan argued the court effectively gave Sarah sole legal custody and violated his due process rights. The appeals court disagreed, noting that in a joint legal custody arrangement the parent with the child at the time typically makes day-to-day decisions, and that Jordan still participates in major decisions and has access to records. The court looked at the judge's oral statements to interpret the written order. The one point where Jordan succeeded was the child support amount. Both sides agreed the math was wrong: the correct base obligation is $1,895 per month, not $1,985. The appeals court affirmed everything else but sent the case back solely to fix that clerical error.

This case involves a mother, identified as Sheena B., who lost her parental rights to her child, A.B., after Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) asked a court to permanently end her legal relationship with the child. Sheena had earlier admitted to abuse and neglect of A.B. The trial court agreed with DFS and terminated her rights. She appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking it to undo that decision. The Supreme Court rejected each of her arguments. First, Sheena argued she had ineffective assistance of counsel. The court explained that parents defending against termination petitions do not have an automatic constitutional right to a lawyer, and the appointment of counsel was not constitutionally required here because the case was not complex and did not involve expert testimony. The court also noted she did in fact have a lawyer who advocated for her. Second, Sheena argued the trial court should have considered guardianship instead of termination. The Supreme Court explained that DFS was not pursuing guardianship - it had filed a termination petition - and Nevada law prefers permanent placement and termination once a child has been out of the parent's home for a specified period. Third, Sheena complained that the trial court could not consider her first mental health evaluation because that provider did not respond to DFS's inquiries. The court found no reversible error because DFS obtained a second, more recent mental health assessment that the court did review. Finally, the Supreme Court reviewed whether enough evidence supported the trial court's findings. Under Nevada law, terminating parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one "parental fault" ground, and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. The court found that A.B. had lived outside Sheena's home for more than 14 consecutive months, which under Nevada statute creates a presumption that the parent made only "token efforts" to care for the child. Sheena did not rebut that presumption, in part because the trial court found her testimony not credible. The record also showed she repeatedly relapsed into addiction and lacked the means to care for A.B., supporting an "unfitness" finding. As for the child's best interest, A.B. had bonded with his foster placement, and his health and behavior had improved there. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination.

Dana DeHesa worked for 14 years as a probation officer at the Clark County juvenile detention center. In August 2018, he was assigned to a unit that included a 15-year-old boy, referred to as J.J., who was on suicide watch. According to the opinion, DeHesa and J.J. engaged in "horseplay" - the two playing at slapping each other. When DeHesa went to close the door to J.J.'s room, J.J. stuck out his arm and tried to slap him. Even though DeHesa saw the boy's arm sticking out, he continued to close the door onto the forearm, pressing the door with both arms and his foot three times before letting J.J. pull his arm away. J.J. was injured. Several days later, J.J. told his parents about the incident during a visit. His parents raised concerns with a probation officer on duty. A report was eventually filed, and DFS investigated and "substantiated" - meaning it officially concluded there was enough evidence to support - an allegation of physical abuse. DeHesa appealed within the agency, lost, and then requested a formal administrative hearing. At that hearing, a hearing officer found DeHesa credible when he said the officers and juveniles engaged in horseplay and that he did not intend to hurt the boy. But the hearing officer concluded that intent to injure did not matter under the applicable state regulation, and that DeHesa's actions were "nonaccidental." The officer upheld the finding of abuse. DeHesa then asked the district court to review the decision. He argued two main things: first, that the hearing officer defined "nonaccidental" incorrectly by not requiring an intent to injure; and second, that his constitutional right to fair procedures (called "procedural due process") was violated because he could not use subpoenas to compel witnesses and documents that, he said, would have shown he properly reported the incident and that J.J. had a reason to lie. The district court rejected these arguments and denied his petition. Although DeHesa has since resigned, his name was placed on the Nevada State Central Registry - a state database of substantiated child abuse or neglect reports - which the opinion notes may adversely affect him. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that under the state regulation defining "nonaccidental," what matters is whether a person responsible for a child could reasonably foresee the harmful event - not whether the person intended to cause harm. Because DeHesa saw the boy's arm in the doorway, pressed the door repeatedly, worried about dislocating a shoulder or elbow, and admitted horseplay could be dangerous, the court concluded the injury was foreseeable and therefore nonaccidental. On the subpoena issue, the court explained that the record showed DeHesa never actually asked the hearing officer to issue a subpoena, so he did not preserve the issue for appeal. The court added that even if he had asked, it would not have changed things: the rule allowing subpoenas in regular court cases does not apply in administrative hearings, and Nevada law does not grant administrative agencies general subpoena power. The court also noted that the witness testimony he wanted would not have mattered because the finding of abuse rested on the injury being foreseeable, not on any failure to report. Finally, the court rejected DeHesa's claim that he was unfairly held to a higher standard than a parent would be. The court found the record showed he failed to follow the procedures required of all probation officers during shift changes, so he was held to the standard applicable to probation officers generally.

When Nevada child-welfare authorities remove a child from her parents, state law generally requires the agency to make "reasonable efforts" to reunite the family. One Nevada statute, NRS 432B.393(3)(c), creates an exception: if a parent's rights to a different child (a sibling) were already involuntarily terminated, the agency does not have to keep trying to reunify the family with the new child. In this case, WCHSA removed L.S.C. from her parents in August 2020 and asked the district court to find that, because the parents had lost their rights to L.S.C.'s sibling the year before, the agency was off the hook for reunification efforts. The parents objected, arguing the statute violates their constitutional right to raise their child without fair process. A court master agreed with the parents and found the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it effectively presumes a parent is unfit forever based on a past case, and that this presumption could later be used to terminate parental rights as to the new child under a separate statute, NRS 128.105(1). The district court adopted that recommendation. WCHSA then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an extraordinary order (a writ of mandamus) overturning the district court's constitutional ruling. By the time the Supreme Court considered the petition, the dispute over reunification efforts in this particular family had already been resolved on different grounds, making the case technically "moot." The Supreme Court nonetheless decided to address the constitutional question because it is the kind of issue likely to come up repeatedly but resolve too quickly to ever be reviewed in time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that NRS 432B.393(3)(c) does not violate due process. The court explained that, although parents have a fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of their children, that right is implicated when the state removes children or terminates parental rights — not when the state merely relieves an agency of its duty to provide reunification services. Because the statute does no more than excuse the agency from reunification efforts, it does not infringe on a fundamental right. The court applied the more lenient "rational basis" test and concluded that the statute is rationally connected to Nevada's legitimate interest in keeping children out of dangerous homes and out of long-term foster care. The court noted that the district court had focused on a different statute — NRS 128.105(1), which permits termination of parental rights based in part on a finding under NRS 432B.393(3)(c). The Supreme Court explained that any constitutional concern about presuming parental fault belongs in a challenge to NRS 128.105, not to NRS 432B.393(3)(c). Even though the Supreme Court concluded the district court was wrong on the constitutional question, it denied WCHSA's petition because the underlying dispute had become moot — the agency had already been relieved of reunification efforts on a different basis, so there was nothing left to fix.

This case involves a mother, identified as Natasha F.B., whose parental rights to her minor child were terminated by a Nevada family court. She appealed, arguing that the process was unfair because she was not properly notified about the hearing and did not get a real chance to participate. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the termination. The Department of Family Services (DFS) had been unable to find Natasha's current address - she had stopped communicating with DFS, had been without stable housing for about six months, and had reportedly stayed at times in what was described as a "known drug home." Because DFS could not locate her, it sought permission to give notice through publication (publishing the notice rather than handing it to her in person). Natasha argued that the affidavit DFS filed to support service by publication did not contain all the specific statements required by Nevada's termination-of-parental-rights statute. The court agreed that the affidavit did not strictly track the statute's language, but concluded that DFS had "substantially complied" - meaning it followed the statute closely enough to achieve its purpose. The court also pointed out that Natasha actually knew about the hearing. Her court-appointed attorney was on notice, and Natasha herself texted the child's paternal grandmother during the hearing saying she was on her way. The district court even delayed the hearing to give her more time to show up. She never did. Because she had notice and a chance to be heard but did not appear, the court held there was no due-process violation. On the merits, the court held that there was substantial evidence supporting termination. The child had been placed outside the home for more than 15 consecutive months, Natasha had not provided support or maintained consistent communication with the child, had not participated in reunification services, lacked stable housing, and had refused to address substance abuse issues. Under Nevada law, when a child has lived outside the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months, the parent is presumed to have made only "token efforts" to care for the child, and termination is presumed to be in the child's best interests. Natasha did not rebut those presumptions.

This case involves a dispute over where a child should be placed. Ginger P. asked the family court to place a minor child, C.A., with her. The district court denied that request. Rather than pursue a normal appeal, Ginger P. went directly to the Nevada Supreme Court and asked it to issue what is called a writ of mandamus or prohibition - an extraordinary court order that tells a lower court either to do something it is required to do or to stop doing something it has no authority to do. These writs are not available as a matter of right; the Supreme Court decides whether to get involved. The Supreme Court declined to step in. The court explained that the person asking for a writ has to show that this kind of extraordinary intervention is warranted, and Ginger P. did not make that showing here. The court reviewed the record and concluded that the district court's factual findings about what was in the child's best interest - the central question in a placement decision - were not clearly wrong or arbitrary. Ginger P. also complained that the district court considered her motion to intervene and to be recognized as a "person of special interest" on the same day as the placement hearing. The Supreme Court was not persuaded that this timing justified extraordinary relief, observing that even if she had been recognized as a person of special interest, that status would not have entitled her to conduct discovery or issue subpoenas. A person of special interest is entitled to be notified about plans for the child and to testify at placement hearings, but not to the broader litigation tools available to full parties. The petition was denied, leaving the district court's placement decision in place.

This case involves a mother, identified as Maryann B.N., whose parental rights to two of her children were ended by a Nevada family court. The Nevada Supreme Court was asked to review that decision and decided to leave it in place. The children first came to the attention of the Nevada Department of Family Services in 2016, when a younger sibling was born testing positive for methamphetamine. The Department presented evidence that the mother had been neglecting the children by routinely leaving them with other people to meet their basic needs. The children were placed with a person described as "fictive kin" - someone treated like family even though not biologically related - referred to in the opinion as A.M. After 18 months, a court ordered the children returned to their mother, but the children continued to live mostly with A.M. In February 2020, the children were removed from the mother's care a second time after she reportedly hit one of them in the face and, days later, failed to pick them up from school. The Department again placed the children with A.M. and gave the mother a "case plan" - a list of steps, like addressing mental health, domestic violence, and substance abuse problems - to complete so the children could be safely returned. About a year and a half later, the Department asked the court to terminate her parental rights, and the court agreed. On appeal, the mother argued, among other things, that the Department had not made a real effort to reunite her with her children and that she had not always had a lawyer. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments. It explained that Nevada law allows the reunification-effort requirement to be waived when children are removed, returned, and then removed again because of further abuse or neglect - which is what happened here. It also noted that Nevada law does not give parents an automatic right to a free attorney in termination cases, although the trial court in fact appointed three attorneys for her over the course of the proceedings, and she had a lawyer at trial. The Supreme Court then walked through the legal requirements for terminating parental rights in Nevada: the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, both (1) some fault on the parent's part, and (2) that ending parental rights is in the children's best interest. The court found enough evidence in the record to support both. The mother had ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse problems, made only minimal efforts to engage with services, did not financially support the children while they lived elsewhere, and did not show she could provide stable housing or income. Because the children had lived outside her home for more than 14 of the previous 20 months, Nevada law presumes both that she made only "token efforts" as a parent and that termination is in the children's best interest, and she did not overcome those presumptions. Meanwhile, the children were doing well in A.M.'s home, were bonded to her, and A.M. was prepared to adopt them. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the order ending the mother's parental rights.

This is an appeal by a father whose parental rights to his child, L.I., were ended by a Nevada family court. The child had earlier been found to be neglected under Nevada's child-welfare law (NRS Chapter 432B). After a trial, the judge found the father at fault as a parent — specifically, that he had failed to adjust his circumstances and had made only "token efforts" to address the problems — and concluded the child's best interest was to stay with a family hoping to adopt her. The father, representing himself on appeal, did not challenge the substance of those findings. Instead, he argued that the process was unfair: he said COVID-era jail lockdowns and only a thirty-minute meeting with his lawyer the day before trial left him too little time to prepare. He also argued the trial should have been postponed. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed. On the lawyer issue, the court explained that parents in termination cases do not automatically have a constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Whether they do depends on a balancing test weighing the parent's interests, the State's interests, and the risk that the case will reach a wrong outcome without a lawyer. The court found no special complexity here — there was no expert testimony, the father attended trial and testified, and the key evidence (state child-welfare reports and records of his criminal convictions and incarcerations) was the kind of evidence that would have come in regardless. Because the father had no constitutional right to counsel in this proceeding, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could not succeed. On the broader due-process complaint about pandemic-era limits on attorney access, the court applied a similar three-factor balancing test. It noted that during COVID-19 "[u]nusual, historic circumstances can require unusual, temporary accommodations." The court found the trial judge knew the rules and applied the correct standard of proof, the father had notice, was able to testify, was represented by counsel (with whom he could confer privately even when in custody), and retained his right to appeal. The father did not identify any additional evidence he would have presented with more preparation time. The court also pointed out that the father had stretches of time outside custody when he could have worked with counsel or complied with his case plan but did not. Finally, the court held the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not continuing the trial, especially given prior continuances and the fact that the father had not moved to continue the May 17, 2021, trial date (though he had moved to continue an earlier February 2021 setting).

This case is about when a Nevada family court must hold a full hearing before deciding whether to change which parent has primary physical custody of a child. Caleb Haskins and Lisa Myers divorced in 2012 and have one child, S.H. (now 12). Caleb has primary physical custody and lives in Oregon; Lisa lives in Nevada and has the child during school breaks. In 2020, Lisa did not return S.H. to Caleb after summer break, saying the child had a panic attack at the airport and refused to fly. Caleb asked the court to enforce the custody order; Lisa filed a countermotion asking the court to give her primary physical custody, alleging that Caleb and his current wife were neglecting and verbally abusing the child, denying her parenting time, making the child sleep on a foam mattress in a non-bedroom in an overcrowded house, failing to address dental problems, and assigning the child excessive caregiving duties for other children in the home. The district court ordered Caleb to return the child and allowed both sides 90 days to gather information. After receiving documents and statements from both parents, the district court denied Lisa's motion to change custody without holding an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and the judge weighs evidence). The judge said it was a "close call" but concluded Lisa had not shown enough to justify a hearing, in part because Caleb had submitted an Oregon Child Protective Services report that did not substantiate similar claims. The Court of Appeals reversed. Drawing on a 1993 Nevada Supreme Court decision, Rooney v. Rooney, the court explained that a parent seeking to modify custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if she presents a "prima facie case" - meaning, on the face of her allegations, enough specific facts that, if true, would justify changing custody. The big question the court answered for the first time is: what materials may a judge look at when deciding whether the moving parent has cleared that initial bar? The court's answer has two parts. As a general rule, the judge should look only at the moving parent's properly sworn statements - verified pleadings, affidavits, or declarations - and accept those specific factual allegations as true. The judge should not weigh the other parent's competing evidence or judge anyone's credibility at this stage; that is what the evidentiary hearing itself is for. The narrow exception: if the non-moving parent's evidence "conclusively establishes" that the moving parent's allegations are false, the judge may consider it. Applying that framework, the court held that the district judge made a mistake by weighing Caleb's CPS report and other documents against Lisa's sworn allegations. A CPS report that did not substantiate similar claims does not "conclusively" prove Lisa's allegations are false - evaluating such a report requires credibility findings that belong at a hearing. And even setting the CPS report aside, Lisa's specific allegations (about domestic violence in the home, neglected dental care, deprived parenting time, falling math grades, and the child's living conditions and wishes) tied to Nevada's best-interest factors were enough to require a hearing. The court also held that when a judge denies a custody-modification motion without a hearing, the order must include specific findings and an adequate explanation, not just a conclusory recitation of the legal standard - both to allow appellate review and to help the parents (often self-represented) understand why their motion failed. The case goes back to the district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing, though the court emphasized that the form and scope of that hearing remain within the trial judge's broad discretion.

This case is about what a Nevada judge must consider when one divorced (or separated) parent who already has primary physical custody of a child wants to move with the child out of state, and the other parent objects. Anthony Monahan and Amanda Hogan share a daughter, born in 2012. They originally had joint custody while both lived in Yerington, Nevada. After Hogan's new husband (a Navy officer) was assigned to a base in Fallon, Hogan moved there with the child, and the district court awarded her primary physical custody in 2019. When Hogan's husband was later reassigned to Virginia Beach, Hogan asked the court for permission to relocate with the child to Virginia. Monahan refused to consent, so the court held an evidentiary hearing. Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.007, requires a parent who wants to relocate to clear three threshold hurdles: (1) a sensible, good-faith reason for the move; (2) that the move is in the "best interests of the child"; and (3) that the child and the relocating parent will gain an "actual advantage" from the move. If those are met, the court then weighs six additional relocation factors. The dispute in this appeal centered on hurdle two. The statute uses the phrase "best interests of the child" but does not say what that means or whether the judge must walk through the twelve "best interest" custody factors listed in a separate statute, NRS 125C.0035(4). Monahan argued that the district court had to redo the full twelve-factor custody analysis at the relocation hearing, and that simply pointing back to findings made in earlier custody orders made the analysis "stale." Hogan argued the custody factors had no place in a relocation analysis because she already held primary custody. The Nevada Court of Appeals took a middle path. It held that when a parent who already has primary physical custody seeks to relocate, the trial judge does not have to re-prove custody by mechanically running through every one of the twelve custody best interest factors. But the judge cannot ignore those factors either. The judge should consider the custody best interest factors and any other factors that fit the case, make specific findings on whichever ones are relevant, and tie those findings to the conclusion about whether the move is in the child's best interests. The court also answered a question the parties had not directly briefed: how convinced does the judge need to be? The answer is "preponderance of the evidence" - meaning more likely than not - which is the default standard in Nevada family law unless the Legislature clearly says otherwise. Applying these rules to this case, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court did enough. The judge had previously made detailed best-interest findings (knowing that Hogan's husband might be transferred), incorporated those findings, found that nothing about the proposed move changed them, and made fresh findings about the actual advantages of the Virginia move - better tutoring and educational resources, a better quality of life, and not being separated from a half-sibling. Monahan never identified any specific factor that, if reanalyzed, would have weighed against relocation. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the order allowing the move.

This case involves a child, K.M.S., who was taken into protective custody after authorities determined that her mother had abused or neglected her. The Nevada Department of Family Services (DFS) then filed and proved an abuse-and-neglect petition against the father, Kwame A.S., who was incarcerated at the time. Eventually, the child's paternal grandmother, Asha Colson, asked the court to appoint her as the child's general guardian. After a hearing, the district court granted that request. The father appealed. On appeal, the father raised several arguments. He claimed he did not get notice of the guardianship hearing, but the Nevada Supreme Court found that the record showed he and his court-appointed attorney had been served with a citation listing the hearing date, and his attorney attended the hearing. He argued he was denied a right to counsel, but the court explained that there is generally no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney in a case like this, where the litigant's physical liberty is not at stake. Because there was no right to counsel, his related claim that his attorney performed ineffectively also failed. The father also argued that the trial court forced him to incriminate himself at the abuse-and-neglect trial. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in civil cases only when the testimony could affect a future criminal proceeding, and here the criminal case had already concluded. The court added that judges may draw negative inferences in civil cases when a witness improperly invokes the Fifth Amendment. His double-jeopardy argument was rejected because the underlying matter was civil, not criminal. On the non-constitutional side, the father argued the court should not have made K.M.S. a ward of the juvenile court, that it should have stayed the civil case while his criminal appeal continued, that it improperly excluded evidence (a video and police report he wanted admitted), and that the guardianship itself was wrongly granted. The court found substantial evidence supported the protective-custody finding (the father was incarcerated and had two domestic-violence convictions); a stay was not required because a child's need for permanency and stability outweighed the parent's interest in waiting for criminal proceedings to conclude; the proffered video and police report were inadmissible hearsay because no witness was called to authenticate them; and the father identified no procedural error in the guardianship appointment itself. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order.

This case asks who is allowed to run the trial when the State seeks to permanently sever a parent's legal relationship with her child. In the Eighth Judicial District (Clark County), such trials had often been conducted by a "hearing master" - a court-appointed lawyer (not a judge) who hears evidence, makes findings, and recommends a result to a district judge, who then reviews the record and makes the final decision. The Nevada Supreme Court held that this two-step approach is not allowed for termination of parental rights (TPR) trials. A district judge - not a hearing master - must preside over the trial in the first instance. The underlying facts: Tahja L. was a teenager when she brought her six-month-old daughter L.L.S. to a Department of Family Services (DFS) office, hoping to place her temporarily while Tahja finished high school. DFS instead filed a neglect petition, placed L.L.S. in foster care, and eventually moved to terminate Tahja's parental rights. The case was assigned to a hearing master. L.L.S.'s lawyer objected, arguing that a district judge should hear the trial; Tahja did not join that objection. The juvenile court overruled the objection. After the originally assigned master became a district judge, a different hearing master conducted the trial, recommended termination, and the district judge - after watching the entire video of the trial - terminated Tahja's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, TPR proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B must be conducted by a "court," and although the statutes define "court" to include a hearing master under certain circumstances, that inclusion only works if the master's role is consistent with the Nevada Constitution. The court held that having a master preside over a TPR trial violates a parent's right to procedural due process, because the right at stake - the permanent loss of one's child - is so serious that the parent must present her case directly to the judge who will decide it, not to an intermediary whose findings are then reviewed from a recording. The court applied the three-part federal test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing (1) the parent's interest, (2) the risk that the procedure used will produce a wrong result, and (3) the government's interest in efficiency. The court described a parent's interest in keeping her child as among the strongest interests the law recognizes, comparing termination to a "civil death penalty." It found that having a master, rather than the judge, see witnesses face-to-face increases the risk of error, and that the State's efficiency interests are not significantly served, because the district judge still has to review the entire record. The court also pointed to recent legislative history in which the Eighth Judicial District's Chief Judge told lawmakers the district was specifically seeking new judges to "eliminate the use of hearing masters" in dependency cases. The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back for a new TPR trial before a district judge. Three justices dissented.

This case involves the State's effort to permanently end a father's legal relationship with his young son. Marcus and the child's mother, Dana, were both incarcerated when the child, T.M.R., was an infant. Marcus had pleaded guilty to felony coercion after an incident in which he hit Dana's 100-year-old great-grandmother, Gladys, and damaged her home. With both parents in custody, Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) placed T.M.R. in foster care and eventually petitioned to terminate the parents' rights so the child could be adopted. At trial, the State surprised Marcus by calling Gladys to testify even though it had never formally listed her as a trial witness in the manner Nevada's civil discovery rules normally require. Marcus asked the court to exclude her testimony because she had not been disclosed at least 45 days before trial as required by NRCP 16.2(e)(4). The trial judge ruled that NRCP 16.2's disclosure rules do not apply to termination of parental rights cases and let Gladys testify. After hearing all the evidence, the court terminated Marcus's parental rights. The Nevada Supreme Court used this appeal to clear up an ambiguity in the civil rules. The Court explained that Nevada has three related rules governing when parties must disclose their witnesses: NRCP 16.1 covers most civil cases (but exempts family-court cases), NRCP 16.2 covers divorces and similar matters, and NRCP 16.205 covers paternity and custody disputes between unmarried parents. None of the rules explicitly says it applies to a case to terminate parental rights. Reading the rules together, however, the Court concluded that NRCP 16.2's witness-disclosure rules do apply in termination cases. The Court reasoned that any other reading would allow "trial by ambush" - a surprise witness used against a parent facing what the Court described as "the equivalent of the civil death penalty." So the trial judge was wrong to admit Gladys's testimony without proper notice. But the Supreme Court went on to hold that the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because, even setting Gladys's testimony aside, there was more than enough other evidence to justify ending Marcus's parental rights. That evidence included: T.M.R. had been out of his parents' home for more than 14 months (which under Nevada law creates a legal presumption that termination is in the child's best interests); T.M.R. had bonded with his foster family, who wanted to adopt him; Marcus had failed to make timely progress on the case plan DFS designed to help him reunify with his son; Marcus minimized his drug use and blamed his relapses on Dana; he refused multiple drug tests; and he denied having anger problems despite the underlying violent incident. Because that evidence amply supported the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Marcus's parental rights.

This case involves a teenager, B.A.A.R., who was born in El Salvador in 2001 and fled to the United States in 2018. His aunt, Lucia, took him into her home in Las Vegas and asked a Nevada court to make her his legal guardian. She also asked the court to make a special set of factual findings under a Nevada statute (NRS 3.2203) that would let B.A.A.R. apply to federal immigration authorities for "Special Immigrant Juvenile" (SIJ) status - a federal program that can lead to lawful permanent residency for certain undocumented young people who cannot safely be reunified with a parent. To qualify for SIJ status, federal law requires a state court first to make three findings: (1) the child has been placed in the custody of an individual or agency, (2) reunification with one or both parents is not viable because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar reason, and (3) it is not in the child's best interest to be returned to his country of origin. The state court does not decide whether the child actually gets SIJ status - that is up to federal immigration officials. The state court's job is just to gather the facts. Lucia argued that returning B.A.A.R. to his mother Maria in El Salvador was not viable because Maria allowed B.A.A.R. to be exposed to violence by her live-in boyfriend, Jose, who had physically abused B.A.A.R.'s sister and threatened to kill B.A.A.R. She also argued Maria's poverty meant she could not properly provide for him. The district court refused to make the requested findings. The judge wrote that he would need a "very specific and detailed history of neglect" to find that reunification was not viable based on poverty, and that a lack of financial resources is "never a sufficient basis to terminate the relationship." The judge also pointed out that Maria and Jose had separated months before B.A.A.R. fled. The Court of Appeals reversed for two main reasons. First, the district court used the wrong legal yardstick. By treating the case as if it were a proceeding to terminate a parent's rights, the judge demanded a higher level of proof than the law requires. The Court of Appeals held that someone asking for SIJ predicate findings only has to show those findings are justified by a "preponderance of the evidence" - meaning more likely than not - which is the ordinary standard in civil cases. SIJ findings are not the same as terminating parental rights; they do not cut off the parent-child relationship. Second, the Court of Appeals said the district court appears to have misunderstood what "abuse or neglect" means under the statute. A parent who fails to protect a child from someone else's harmful conduct can themselves be guilty of abuse or neglect under Nevada law. So even though Jose was the one directly threatening B.A.A.R., Maria's failure to intervene could itself qualify. And the fact that Jose had left the home before B.A.A.R. fled does not erase that history - the court must look at the entire history of the parent-child relationship. The case goes back to the district court to reconsider Lucia's request using the correct, lower standard of proof and the proper definition of abuse or neglect.

This case involves a dispute over a guardianship - a legal arrangement in which a court gives one person authority to make decisions for another adult who the court believes cannot manage her own affairs. Eric Wittler filed a petition asking the district court to appoint him as both a temporary and a permanent guardian for his mother, Carmen Gomez Wittler. The district court appointed a temporary guardian almost immediately and later extended that temporary guardianship while a hearing on the permanent guardianship was still pending. Carmen tried to appeal the order that extended the temporary guardianship and refused to dismiss the case. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether the guardianship was justified. Instead, it decided whether it had the power to hear the appeal at all. In Nevada, an appellate court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. The court walked through each argument Carmen offered for why this particular order could be appealed and rejected all of them. First, Carmen argued the order was a "final judgment" - the type of order that wraps up a case and is therefore appealable. The court disagreed because the underlying petition asked for both a temporary and a permanent guardianship, and the order being appealed only addressed the temporary piece; the permanent guardianship question was still open. Second, Carmen argued the order was effectively a preliminary injunction (a court order requiring or forbidding action while a case is pending), which Nevada rules do allow to be appealed. The court rejected that analogy, explaining that temporary guardianships, like temporary child custody orders, are short-term arrangements that the district court keeps reviewing on a regular basis - and Nevada courts have consistently held that such temporary, periodically reviewed orders are not appealable. Third, Carmen pointed to a statute, NRS 159.375(1), that allows appeals from orders granting or revoking "letters of guardianship." The court explained that the order Carmen was appealing did not itself grant or revoke letters of guardianship; it merely extended a previously created temporary arrangement. Finally, Carmen asked the court to hear the appeal because the case raised important public-policy questions, or alternatively to treat her filing as a petition for a writ (an extraordinary court order). The court said it could not stretch its jurisdiction to reach important issues, but noted Carmen remained free to file a separate writ petition under the appellate rules if she wished. Because none of Carmen's theories established appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court did not need to address a separate question of whether the appeal had become moot when a later order granted a general (permanent) guardianship.

This case is about whether a baby in foster care should be presumed to belong with her biological sister, even though that sister has already been adopted by another family. Baby Girl W. was born in October 2017 and was quickly placed in foster care as a child in need of protection. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) decided that adoption was the right long-term plan for her. Baby Girl W. has a 3-year-old biological half-sister named Vivian, who was previously adopted by Amy Mulkern in Massachusetts. DFS itself contacted Amy in early 2018 to ask whether she would adopt Baby Girl W. so the sisters could grow up together. Amy went through the interstate placement process and was approved as a possible placement. But DFS ultimately concluded that Baby Girl W. had bonded with her current foster parents - who are also willing to adopt her - and recommended she stay with them. Amy went to the Nevada district court handling the dependency case. The court allowed Amy and the foster parents to participate as "persons with a special interest," meaning they can recommend a placement and testify at the placement hearing. But the district court also ruled that, because Vivian had been adopted, she was no longer legally Baby Girl W.'s sibling for purposes of a Nevada statute - NRS 432B.550(5)(a) - that tells courts to presume placing siblings together is in a foster child's best interest. The district court therefore decided that presumption did not apply. Amy and Vivian asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing the lower court to do something it is required by law to do. They wanted the Supreme Court to make the district court apply the sibling presumption when deciding where Baby Girl W. should live. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Amy and Vivian on that point. The court explained that Nevada law repeatedly emphasizes keeping siblings together - in initial protective placements, in placements after parental rights are terminated, in adoptions, and in custody decisions. No Nevada statute says that adoption erases sibling status for placement purposes. Because the Legislature has stressed sibling relationships so consistently, the court concluded it would not assume - without clearer instruction - that lawmakers wanted the presumption to vanish the moment one sibling is adopted. The court therefore directed the district court to apply the rebuttable sibling presumption in NRS 432B.550(5) when deciding where to place Baby Girl W. "Rebuttable" means the presumption can still be overcome - the district court can still decide, based on evidence, that placement with the sibling is not in the baby's best interest. The court did not order any other relief, noting that the district court had already considered the Mulkerns' arguments, included Amy as a possible placement, and invited her to participate at the upcoming placement hearing. The court also added a footnote making clear that its ruling does not change separate Nevada rules about confidentiality, visitation, or inheritance after adoption, and does not require DFS to do more than its statutory duty to look for relatives.

This case involves a young child, referred to as E.R., who was removed from her mother's custody at one month old in July 2015 because of neglect. DFS placed her in foster care and tried to find relatives to take her, but found none at first. After more than a year, the child was placed with foster parents Philip R. and Regina R., who wanted to adopt her. About 15 months after the child's initial removal, the child's mother's first cousin, Stephanie R., who lives in Georgia with her husband Joey R., contacted DFS and asked to take the child. By that time, DFS was moving toward terminating the mother's parental rights, which the court did in February 2017. The foster parents had begun adopting the child. DFS then asked the district court to decide whether the child should stay with the foster parents (with whom she was strongly bonded) or be moved to live with the maternal relatives in Georgia. After a hearing, a court master recommended sending the child to the maternal relatives, finding that the family connection was the "overriding consideration," even though the move would cause the child trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. The foster parents and DFS asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed to grant the writs and ordered the case redone. The court explained several things. First, once parental rights are terminated, the rules for placing a child change. Before termination, NRS 432B.550(5) governs placement, and that statute uses mandatory language ("preference must be given") in favor of placing a child with a relative. After termination, however, NRS 128.110(2) governs, and it uses softer, more permissive language ("may give preference") and gives the placement agency more discretion. Second, the maternal relatives' delay in coming forward did not disqualify them. Stephanie did not know the child was in protective custody until October 2016, so she had a reasonable excuse for the delay. Third, and most importantly, even when a familial preference applies, the child's best interest is the main consideration. The Supreme Court found that the hearing master and district court did not adequately weigh the child's best interest. They treated the family connection as automatically controlling and did not make written findings about what was best for this particular child, who was deeply bonded with her foster family and would suffer trauma from another move. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate its placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning a fresh hearing), this time applying NRS 128.110(2), giving appropriate weight to the child's best interest, and considering DFS's discretion in deciding placement.

This case concerns where a young child, E.R., should live. DFS removed E.R. from her mother's custody when she was one month old because of neglect. After efforts to reunify mother and child failed, the mother's parental rights were terminated in February 2017, and the foster parents who had cared for E.R. since September 2016 began the process of adopting her. About 15 months after E.R. was first removed, a maternal cousin in Georgia (Stephanie R.) contacted DFS and asked to have E.R. placed with her and her husband. After interstate-placement approval and an evidentiary hearing, a court master recommended moving E.R. to Georgia, reasoning that the "family connection is the overriding consideration" even though the child was strongly bonded to the foster parents and another removal would cause her trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. DFS and the foster parents asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court used the wrong statute. While the case was working through reunification, NRS 432B.550(5) governed placement and gave a strong preference to placing the child with relatives. But once parental rights were terminated, a different statute, NRS 128.110(2), took over. That statute uses softer language: the agency "may" prefer relatives, and "shall, if practicable" keep siblings together. So the agency's discretion and the child's best interest carry more weight at that stage. The Court agreed with the lower court on one point: the maternal cousin had a reasonable excuse for coming forward late because she did not know E.R. was in protective custody, and DFS could have located her earlier. So her delay did not eliminate any familial preference she might have. But the Court found two serious problems with the placement order. First, the master and district court did not make written findings about what was actually in E.R.'s best interest beyond acknowledging the move would traumatize her. Second, by using NRS 432B.550(5) instead of NRS 128.110(2), the courts below did not give appropriate weight to DFS's discretion in choosing placement post-termination, and did not develop the facts about whether placing E.R. with a newer sibling (born to the same mother in April 2017) was actually practicable. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate the placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning the court starts fresh rather than just reviewing the master's work) applying the correct statute and making proper findings about E.R.'s best interest.

This case (captioned as writ petitions but concerning the placement of a minor child, E.R.) decided which relatives-versus-foster-family placement rules apply after a parent's rights have been terminated. In July 2015, Clark County's Department of Family Services (DFS) removed one-month-old E.R. from her mother because of neglect and placed her in foster care. DFS searched for relatives but found none. In September 2016 the child was placed with Philip R. and Regina R., foster parents who were an adoptive resource. About 15 months after the removal, in October 2016, a maternal cousin (Stephanie R.) and her husband in Georgia asked to have the child placed with them; that out-of-state placement was approved in March 2017. In the meantime, in February 2017, the court terminated the mother's parental rights and gave DFS custody with authority to place E.R. for adoption. Despite the child having bonded with the adoptive foster parents, the district court then ordered E.R. removed from that home and placed with the maternal relatives, applying a family-preference statute (NRS 432B.550(5)). The foster parents and DFS asked the Supreme Court for writs to stop that. The Supreme Court reached several conclusions. First, a preference to place a child with family does survive the termination of parental rights - but once rights are terminated, the governing statute is NRS 128.110(2), not NRS 432B.550(5). That difference matters: under NRS 432B.550(5) preference to a suitable relative 'must' be given, while under NRS 128.110(2) the agency 'may' give preference to a relative and 'shall, if practicable' place siblings together. So the district court used the wrong statute. Second, the Court agreed the maternal relatives had a reasonable excuse for coming forward late (about 15 months) because the record supported that they did not know the child was in protective custody, so the delay did not automatically defeat the family preference. Third, and decisively, the Court held the lower court failed its most important job: it did not make written findings about the child's best interest, which is the main consideration in any placement decision, and the hearing master had treated biological/family connection as the 'overriding' factor rather than genuinely weighing the child's best interest. The court also failed to consider the agency's (DFS's) discretion over placement that NRS 128.110(2) provides. The Court granted the writs, directed the district court to vacate the order placing the child with the maternal relatives, and ordered a new trial (trial de novo) applying NRS 128.110(2), with proper weight to the child's best interest and to DFS's discretion.

This case arose after the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) received an anonymous hotline call in April 2010 alleging that Keaundra D.'s infant son, C.L.B., Jr., had been burned on the face. Keaundra told investigators that the burn occurred when her two-year-old daughter, A.D.L., reported that C.L.B., Jr. had "tried to kiss" a hot iron that fell off a dresser while Keaundra was in another room. DFS removed both children from Keaundra's care. One physician who examined the child in person, Dr. Neuman, found "no evidence of abuse." A different doctor, Dr. Mehta, who reviewed only photographs, opined the burn was deliberate. The juvenile court found the injury was nonaccidental and ordered Keaundra to follow a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to get her children back. She maintained housing and a job, kept in touch with DFS, completed parenting classes, and finished a physical-abuse assessment and therapy. Her therapist testified that her risk of reoffending was low and that she showed none of the signs typical of an abusive parent. DFS itself reported that she had "successfully completed her case plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children." But DFS still wanted her parental rights terminated, and the district court still terminated them, for one reason: Keaundra would not admit that she had deliberately held the iron to her son's face. Her case plan required her to "articulate" the "sequence of events" leading to the abuse "as sustained by the Court." Because she insisted the burn was accidental, the court treated her as out of compliance. DFS confirmed at trial that, had Keaundra admitted intentional abuse, it would not have sought termination. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves, not just in criminal trials but in any proceeding where their answers might be used against them in a future criminal case. Admitting that one held a hot iron to a child's face would expose a person to prosecution for child abuse under Nevada law (NRS 200.508). The court held that a parent cannot be forced to choose between admitting a crime and losing her children - that choice is unconstitutionally coercive. The court drew a line: a juvenile court may require a parent to participate in meaningful therapy, even if therapy works better when a parent acknowledges past conduct, and a parent who refuses meaningful therapy may face consequences. But a court cannot require, as a condition of keeping parental rights, that the parent expressly admit to a crime. The court also held that the evidence did not support termination on its own merits. Nevada law presumes termination is in a child's best interest when the child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 consecutive months, and presumes a parent has made only "token efforts" in similar circumstances. The court found Keaundra rebutted both presumptions: she stayed in regular phone contact, her mother brought the children to visit, A.D.L. cried and begged to go home to her mother, Keaundra helped support the children financially, and after the first termination order the children waited 17 months in foster care before being placed with relatives. Without the presumptions, there was not substantial evidence to terminate.

This case asks whether a parent facing the loss of his parental rights in Nevada is entitled to have a jury -- rather than a judge -- decide the case. The Nevada Supreme Court answered no. The Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) removed Jesus F.'s six children from his home in January 2010, citing drug use, safety hazards, and inadequate supervision. The children were placed in protective custody under NRS 432B.330 and lived in various out-of-home placements over the next four years. After the three older children reached adulthood, WCDSS petitioned to terminate Jesus F.'s parental rights as to the three remaining minor children. Jesus F. demanded a jury trial. The district court denied that demand, held a bench trial, and terminated his parental rights. On appeal, Jesus F. argued that both the U.S. Constitution and the Nevada Constitution gave him a right to a jury. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. As to the federal constitution, the Seventh Amendment's civil jury-trial right does not apply to the states, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that due process requires a jury in termination cases. Applying the due-process balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concluded that a bench trial here posed only a minimal risk of an erroneous decision because Jesus F. received notice, appointed counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, and the right to appeal. As to the Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 preserves the right to jury trial as it existed when Nevada's Constitution was adopted in 1864. Termination of parental rights actions did not exist in 1864 -- they were created by the Nevada Legislature in 1975 -- and the Legislature has not granted a jury-trial right in such proceedings. The court also noted that requiring jury trials would slow family courts, undermine the children's anonymity, and require structural changes that several Nevada family courts are not equipped to make. The court observed that the majority of states deny jury trials in termination cases. The court also upheld the termination on the merits. Under NRS 128.109, when a child has been placed outside the home for 14 of any consecutive 20 months, the law presumes that the parent has made only token efforts and that termination is in the child's best interest. The district court found that Jesus F. did not rebut the presumption and that there were five separate grounds of parental fault. The Supreme Court held those findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.