Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves a mother, Richard'dnae C., whose newborn daughter K.C. was taken into state custody by Clark County's child-welfare agency shortly after birth in November 2022. The agency was concerned about the mother's untreated mental illness. The mother had previously lost parental rights to six other children. The agency placed K.C. with a foster family that had already adopted K.C.'s siblings, and gave the mother a "case plan" - a list of things she had to do, like getting mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations and following the recommendations - to try to get her daughter back. She was also given a guardian ad litem to help protect her interests in the legal process. After a trial in July 2024, the family court judge ended the mother's parental rights. The mother appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, arguing the evidence was not strong enough to justify that decision. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. To end someone's parental rights in Nevada, a judge must find by "clear and convincing evidence" both (1) at least one form of "parental fault" and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. The Court reviewed the evidence and concluded the trial judge had enough support for three forms of parental fault: the mother is "unfit" due to her mental illness (she has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder and refuses to take medication or acknowledge her conditions); she failed to make the changes the case plan required (she was uncooperative at psychiatric appointments and did not change her behavior); and she made only "token efforts" to parent (K.C. lived outside her care for 20 consecutive months, she missed visits, and when she did attend she dozed off). The Court also held that termination was in K.C.'s best interest. Nevada law presumes termination is in a child's best interest when the child has been outside the parent's home for 14 of 20 consecutive months, and the mother did not produce evidence to overcome that presumption. The Court noted that K.C. has spent almost her entire life with the foster family that has already adopted her siblings. The Court declined to consider the mother's arguments about her older children, because their cases were resolved in earlier proceedings and were not part of this appeal.

Christina S. and Joshua S. were never married but share two minor children. Christina asked the family court to terminate Joshua's parental rights - that is, to legally end his status as the children's father. The district court refused, finding that ending Joshua's parental rights would not be in the children's best interest. Christina appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. To terminate parental rights in Nevada, a parent must prove two things by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high standard, more than the usual civil burden but less than the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt"): (1) that there is at least one ground of "parental fault," and (2) that termination is in the children's best interest. Because Christina lost on the second prong, the appellate court did not need to reach the first. The court acknowledged that Joshua had serious problems. He was incarcerated at the time of trial for abusing one of the children and Christina, he had a history of domestic abuse, and he continued to minimize that history. On the other hand, the district court found that Joshua had successfully completed supervised and unsupervised visits before incarceration, was assessed as low-risk to reoffend, and was a first-time parent. A licensed clinical social worker, John S. Pacult, evaluated Joshua and concluded that reunification - subject to conditions - was preferable to termination. Christina also already has sole legal and physical custody, so Joshua poses no immediate risk to the children. Christina raised three issues on appeal. First, she objected to Pacult's expert testimony, but the Supreme Court held she could not complain on appeal because she had stipulated to his designation as an expert and did not object when his report was admitted. Under the "invited error" doctrine, a party cannot complain about errors she helped cause. Second, she argued the district court got the best-interest analysis wrong. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding "substantial evidence" supported the district court's careful weighing of the evidence, and noted that Nevada's termination statute is meant to protect children, not punish parents. Third, she argued the district court should have ordered Joshua to pay her attorney fees because he allegedly filed a motion in bad faith to remove her lawyer. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that neither party had litigated unreasonably or vexatiously. The Supreme Court also declined Christina's request to reconsider a recent decision (Matter of L.R.S.) holding that certain statutory considerations and presumptions in NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109 do not apply to private (parent-versus-parent) termination cases.

Molly L. and Bryan T. divorced in 2014 and shared two children, with Molly having primary physical custody. In 2016, Bryan suffered a serious mental health crisis. After an incident in which Bryan drove off with the children and ended up at a hospital in distress, Molly obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) - a court order keeping Bryan away. The extended TPO required Bryan to stay away until July 18, 2017, or until he completed a psychological evaluation and counseling. Bryan was hospitalized for months, then went to live with his mother in Kansas, and later returned to Nevada believing he was barred from contacting Molly or the children. For several years afterward, Bryan had no contact with S.A.T. According to the opinion, Bryan could not afford the required psychological treatment or an attorney, repeatedly attended free "Ask-a-Lawyer" sessions, tried unsuccessfully to get mediation through the child support case, and reconnected with Molly's adult son Zachary. Meanwhile, Molly took steps that made contact harder: she moved without updating her address in the child support action, cut off ties with Bryan's family, and restricted the children's activities out of fear Bryan might find them. In 2021, Bryan received an inheritance, hired a lawyer, paid off his child support arrears, and completed the psychological evaluation and counseling the TPO had required. Soon after he provided proof of treatment, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. (One child, K.W.T., emancipated and later died by suicide during the proceedings, so the case proceeded only as to S.A.T.) After an evidentiary hearing - including testimony from the doctor who evaluated Bryan that his mental health issues were under control - the district court denied Molly's petition. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court emphasized that a private termination case (one parent trying to terminate the other parent's rights) is different from a state-filed termination case. When the state files, the focus is the child's safety. When one parent files against the other, the child is usually already safe, so courts must look carefully at the petitioning parent's motivations. On abandonment, the Court held Bryan rebutted the presumption: he believed the TPO barred contact until he completed treatment, he could not afford that treatment or a lawyer until 2021, and he repeatedly tried to get help and eventually paid arrears and completed treatment. On neglect, the Court held there was no evidence S.A.T. was inadequately cared for - she was in Molly's care and Bryan paid child support. On "token efforts" - the idea that a parent who barely communicates with a child has shown parental fault - the Court announced a new rule: in private termination actions, courts should disfavor terminating parental rights when the only ground proved is that the parent made only token efforts to communicate with or support the child. The Court reasoned this category is uniquely vulnerable to abuse by a custodial parent who controls access to the child, and that "settled purpose" (the standard for abandonment) is the opposite of "only token efforts." The Court also rejected Molly's argument that Bryan admitted the token-efforts allegation by failing to deny it in his response. Because a responsive pleading is not required in termination cases, an undenied allegation is treated as denied, not admitted, and the underlying facts must still be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the Court declined to address whether Bryan complied with the TPO's mental-health conditions, finding that issue moot because the TPO had long since expired by its own terms.

This case concerns a father, identified as Jason V., whose parental rights to his child R.B.J. were terminated by a Clark County family court. R.B.J. was taken into protective custody at birth because the child's mother had a prior history with the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). Jason began working on a reunification plan, but his probation was revoked after a DUI arrest, and he was incarcerated. DFS then asked the court to terminate his parental rights, and after a trial, the court did so. Jason raised two main arguments on appeal. First, he argued that a Nevada statute - NRS 128.109 - is unconstitutional because it creates "rebuttable presumptions" against parents whose children have been in protective custody for 14 or more of the last 20 months. A rebuttable presumption means the law starts by assuming something is true (here, that termination is in the child's best interest, and that the parent has only made "token efforts"), and the parent then bears the burden of disproving it. Jason argued this shifts the burden onto parents in a way that violates due process - the constitutional guarantee of fair procedures before the government takes away something important. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. It explained that while parental rights are extremely important, the court has previously held that these presumptions do not create an unacceptable risk of mistaken termination, as long as the State first proves the presumption applies by clear and convincing evidence and the parent can rebut it by a preponderance (the lower "more likely than not" standard). The court also pointed out that Nevada has a strong interest in giving abused and neglected children stable, permanent homes, and that many other states have upheld similar presumptions. The court declined to consider Jason's equal-protection argument because he did not raise it in his opening brief. Second, Jason claimed the trial judge was biased and not paying attention. The court held he waived the bias claim by not asking the trial judge to step aside during the case. As for inattentiveness, the court found none: the trial judge had simply reconsidered two evidentiary rulings - admitting some dependency court records and rejecting a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause objection (which the court explained does not apply in civil cases like termination proceedings). The court did note, without changing the outcome, that the trial judge sometimes appeared by video while the parties and witnesses appeared in person. The court reminded lower courts that, under rules adopted after Jason's trial (ADKT 581), termination trials are presumptively to be held in person, including the judge. Finally, the court reviewed the record and found "substantial evidence" supporting termination. R.B.J. was bonded with a foster family that included his biological half-sister and wished to adopt both children, and R.B.J. was thriving in a stable home where he received occupational therapy. The trial court's findings of parental unfitness, neglect, and token efforts were supported by Jason's long history of drug use, criminal activity including domestic violence, repeated incarceration, and relapse. The court acknowledged Jason had completed some programs in prison but gave that limited weight because he had no concrete plan to address his substance abuse after release and had relapsed after similar programs before.

This case is about a mother, identified as Mary W., whose parental rights to her two children were ended by a Nevada family court. After that ruling, Mary asked the court to undo it; the court refused. She then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing herself. The Supreme Court affirmed, meaning the termination stands. Mary raised three main complaints. First, she said she was not properly told when the trial would happen, which she argued violated her right to due process (a constitutional guarantee of fair notice and a chance to be heard). The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that because Mary's address was uncertain, notice was delivered to her adult son and was also published, both methods Nevada law allows when a party's address is unknown. The court also noted that the trial judge told Mary the trial date out loud four times at a November 28, 2023 status hearing, and gave her the date in writing. An earlier report had listed a wrong date, but the court said that mistake did not erase the correct notice she later received. Second, Mary argued that her children were improperly taken from her in the first place, suggesting the removal was tied to her asking for a new caseworker. The court found the record told a different story: Mary had admitted using illicit drugs, the children were living in unsafe conditions (including broken glass and staples on the floor), and Mary was behaving erratically and aggressively when the children were taken into protective custody. Third, Mary challenged the legal conclusions that justified ending her parental rights. Under Nevada law, a court must find both (a) "parental fault" and (b) that termination is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found enough evidence on both points: Mary struggled with substance abuse, refused drug tests, did not complete a treatment program, and did not substantially complete the case plan DFS gave her. The children, meanwhile, had been living with their maternal grandmother, were attached to her, were thriving, and the grandmother wanted to adopt them. Because every one of Mary's arguments failed on the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.

This case is about a mother, identified as Amanda L.F., whose parental rights to her child T.F.F. were ended by a Nevada district court. Amanda appealed that decision, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed - meaning it agreed with the trial court and left the termination in place. In Nevada, before a court can permanently end a parent's legal rights to a child, it must find by "clear and convincing evidence" two things: (1) that there is at least one ground of "parental fault" - a legal reason the parent has failed in their parenting role - and (2) that ending those rights is in the child's best interest. The trial court found both here, and Amanda argued on appeal that those findings were not properly supported. Amanda raised several arguments. First, she said the trial court relied too heavily on hearsay (out-of-court statements) in a file from an earlier removal of T.F.F. from her care. The Supreme Court declined to reweigh the evidence and concluded that, even setting aside the challenged file, there was enough other evidence to support the parental fault findings. Second, Amanda argued the trial court improperly required her to explain how T.F.F. ingested amphetamines - which, she said, would have forced her to admit to a crime. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that her court-ordered case plan focused on her own substance abuse, not on admitting criminal conduct, and that the trial court only mentioned her shifting explanations about how the child ingested drugs, not a requirement that she confess. Third, Amanda challenged the trial court's use of certain legal presumptions. Under Nevada law, when a child has been out of a parent's care for at least 14 consecutive months, the court presumes the parent has made only "token efforts" to care for the child. Amanda conceded T.F.F. had been out of her care for 15 consecutive months at the time of trial. A second presumption - that she had failed to fix the circumstances that led to removal - applied because she did not comply with her case plan within six months. The Supreme Court held the trial court properly applied both presumptions and that Amanda did not rebut them by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also pointed to substantial evidence supporting findings of neglect and parental unfitness: this was T.F.F.'s third removal from Amanda's care based on concerns related to her substance use; T.F.F. was hospitalized after ingesting amphetamines; Amanda continued to deny she had a substance abuse problem despite positive or missed drug tests; and she had not completed anger management classes required by her case plan. On the best-interest question, the court noted that T.F.F. is placed with a maternal uncle who wishes to adopt him. T.F.F. is bonded with the uncle's family, has a sibling-like bond with a cousin, was diagnosed with autism while in the uncle's care, and has progressed from being non-verbal to sometimes forming sentences. Amanda, by contrast, had not engaged with T.F.F.'s diagnosis or treatment. Although Amanda argued the trial court ignored T.F.F.'s wishes, the trial court found T.F.F. lacked the capacity to express them. Because Nevada law requires only one ground of parental fault to support termination, the Supreme Court did not need to review every fault finding. It concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court's decision and affirmed.

This case arises from a child-welfare proceeding in Clark County. After 19-month-old K.T. died of head trauma and a leg fracture, the mother's boyfriend was arrested and charged with murder and child abuse. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, told investigators she had witnessed the boyfriend abuse K.T. but did not protect the child. Concerned about Bellamy's ability to protect her surviving 4-year-old daughter, A.T., DFS took protective custody of A.T. and the District Attorney filed a petition alleging A.T. was an abused or neglected child. When the case came before the district court, Bellamy entered a "no-contest" plea to the petition. A no-contest plea means the person does not admit the allegations are true but agrees not to fight them; the court then proceeds as if the allegations were admitted. The District Attorney objected, saying Nevada's child-welfare statute (NRS 432B.530) only allows a parent to either admit or deny the allegations, not plead no contest, unless the prosecutor agrees as part of a negotiation. The district judge accepted the plea anyway, made clear there was no deal attached to it (the District Attorney was not giving up the right to use Bellamy's statements in any future criminal case), and treated the plea as the equivalent of an admission for the dependency case. DFS, the District Attorney, and the child asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in by writ - an extraordinary order used when there is no ordinary appeal available. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because rulings under NRS Chapter 432B are not appealable, and the question of whether courts may accept no-contest pleas in these cases is an important legal issue. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners and denied the writ. The majority concluded that NRS 432B.530 says the court must give parties an "opportunity to admit or deny" the allegations, but does not strictly limit them to only those two responses. The majority found the statute ambiguous and looked to its purpose. Because Nevada's child-protection laws are designed to resolve cases quickly - delays harm children waiting for permanency - the majority held that allowing a no-contest plea serves that goal. A no-contest plea avoids a contested evidentiary hearing, lets DFS move forward with services and a reunification plan, and lets a parent avoid admitting to potentially criminal conduct (which could implicate the parent's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The majority also rejected the argument that accepting the plea over the prosecutor's objection violated separation of powers. Charging decisions and plea negotiations belong to the executive branch, but here the district court was not negotiating, not dropping charges, and not giving Bellamy any assurances about a future criminal case. Bellamy pleaded no contest to the entire petition as filed. Three justices dissented. They read the statute as plainly limiting parents to admitting or denying the allegations - nothing more - and would have granted the writ.

This case is about a father, identified in court papers as Elton L., who lost his legal rights as a parent to his daughter, N.D.L. The Clark County Department of Family Services - the county agency that handles child welfare - had taken the child into protective custody, and a family court judge ultimately decided that Elton's parental rights should be ended permanently. Elton appealed that decision to the Nevada Supreme Court. To terminate someone's parental rights in Nevada, a judge has to find two things by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high standard of proof, though not as high as the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard): first, that the parent is at fault in some recognized way, and second, that ending the parent-child legal relationship is in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court reviews the trial judge's factual findings to make sure they are backed by "substantial evidence" - meaning evidence a reasonable person could rely on - rather than reweighing the evidence itself. On the parental fault side, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court had enough evidence to find neglect, parental unfitness, and a failure to adjust the circumstances that led to the child being removed. The record showed this was the fourth time N.D.L. had been placed in protective custody. Elton had been incarcerated for most of the child's life on offenses tied to substance abuse, something he admitted in court. He had not stayed in contact with DFS, and he had not completed his case plan, which required him to do substance abuse treatment and anger management. He testified he had taken part in a prison program called "Trust," but the record did not clearly show that program counted as the required treatment. He was also still in prison and could not take custody of his daughter immediately upon release. On the best-interest side, the Supreme Court pointed to evidence that N.D.L. was thriving in foster care: her grades had improved, she was benefitting from therapy, and she enjoyed the stability of the home, where she had lived longer than anywhere else. She was bonded to the foster family, the foster family wanted to adopt her, and although she wanted to keep some contact with her father, she also wanted to be adopted and supported terminating his rights. Because the evidence supported the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court affirmed the order ending Elton's parental rights. The court did not need to address Elton's arguments about a statutory presumption that termination is in a child's best interest after a child has been out of the parent's care for a certain length of time, because the underlying evidence already supported the best-interest finding on its own.

This case involves a father asking a Nevada court to permanently end the mother's legal relationship with their young son. The father, Logan, and the mother, Shianna, dated from 2017 to 2019 and had a son, R.A.S., in 2018. After they broke up, Shianna - who was struggling with substance abuse - left R.A.S. in Logan's care so she could enter a 30-day rehabilitation program. When she finished the program in early 2020, she tried to find her son. According to her testimony, Logan had moved to a new home, changed his phone number, and blocked her on the social media account he shared with his now-wife. Logan's stepmother told her she did not have updated contact information. Shianna later relapsed, was placed on probation, absconded, and spent several months in jail in 2022. By the time she was released, she had not seen her son since December 2019. After her release, Shianna moved in with her sister, worked as a nanny, had another child whom she has cared for full time, and later started work as a dental assistant. In June 2023, Logan filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated her rights on four grounds and Shianna appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Court used the opinion to draw an important distinction between two kinds of termination cases. Most termination cases are filed by the state because a child is in danger; in those cases, parents are typically offered services and case plans, and termination is treated as a last resort. Nevada's statutes, however, also allow private individuals - like another parent - to file termination petitions, and the statutes do not distinguish between the two kinds of cases. The Court emphasized that private termination cases involve different motivations and circumstances and instructed district courts to handle them "carefully and with a watchful eye for these distinctions." Applied to Shianna's case, the Court found that none of the four parental fault grounds was supported by substantial evidence. On abandonment, the Court acknowledged that Shianna had not seen her son since 2019, which created a legal presumption of abandonment, but found Shianna had rebutted that presumption: she tried to find Logan and R.A.S. in multiple ways, but Logan had moved, changed his phone, and blocked her online. The Court said it was "difficult to discern what more Shianna could have done." On neglect, the Court explained that neglect is judged by how the parent treats a child while the child is in the parent's care; because R.A.S. was in Logan's care and was being properly cared for, Shianna could not be deemed to have neglected him. On unfitness, the Court held that this concept is closely tied to neglect; for the same reason, the unfitness finding could not stand. On token efforts, the Court found that Shianna's inability to locate Logan and R.A.S. - because Logan had cut off contact - undermined the conclusion that she had made only minimal effort. Because at least one ground of parental fault must be proven, and none was, the Court reversed the termination order without reaching the best-interest analysis or the evidentiary issues.

Mike V. and Alexandrea P. are the parents of a child, G.V. In 2021, Alexandrea was given sole legal and physical custody. In early 2023, Mike asked the court to set aside that custody order; later that month, Alexandrea asked the court to terminate his parental rights altogether. Mike's motion to undo the custody order was denied, he was incarcerated from September to December 2023, and after his release his request for mediation so he could see G.V. was also denied. After an evidentiary hearing in May 2024, the district court terminated Mike's parental rights in July 2024. Mike appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. On Mike's first argument - that the trial court should have appointed him a lawyer - the Court rejected the claim. There is no automatic right to a free lawyer in parental termination cases, and because Mike never asked for one, the trial court was not required to analyze whether due process demanded appointed counsel. On the substance, however, the Court found that none of the four grounds the trial court used to terminate Mike's rights was supported by the evidence. The trial court said Mike had "abandoned" G.V. because he had not seen her in over six months. But the Supreme Court explained that the legal presumption of abandonment does not apply when a court has placed the child with the other parent, as happened here. Even if it did apply, Mike rebutted it: he had repeatedly tried to see G.V., asked the court to change custody, and sought mediation as soon as he was out of jail - all of which Alexandrea opposed. The Court also noted that being incarcerated, by itself, does not show an intent to abandon a child. The trial court called Mike "unfit" because of his criminal history and substance abuse. The Supreme Court explained that the unfitness statute focuses on felony convictions and cruel or abusive conduct toward a child, and the evidence here was domestic-violence allegations that did not involve the child and did not lead to a conviction. As for substance abuse, Mike testified he had been sober nearly a year, had held jobs, had bought things for G.V., and had even cared for G.V. by himself for an extended period. That was not enough to show the kind of "severe and persistent" unfitness the law requires. The trial court also listed "failure to support" as a ground of parental fault. The Supreme Court pointed out that "failure to support" is not actually one of the grounds for terminating parental rights listed in Nevada's statute. Finally, the trial court found Mike had made only "token efforts" to support or communicate with G.V. The Supreme Court observed that Mike's ability to see G.V. was limited by the existing custody order and by Alexandrea's refusal to allow visits. As for financial support, the trial court discounted Mike's testimony because he did not produce receipts - but it was Alexandrea's burden to prove parental fault, not Mike's burden to disprove it. Because none of the parental-fault grounds held up, the Court did not need to address the "best interests of the child" question, but it reminded the trial court on remand that best interests must rest on more than just findings of parental fault.

Cheyenne Soldo-Allesio and Kevin Alan Ferguson were never married but share a young child, E.F. After their final separation in February 2022, Soldo-Allesio obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) - a short-term court order intended to protect a person from alleged abuse - against Ferguson based on allegations of domestic violence and moved with E.F. to Florida. Ferguson then filed for primary physical custody in Nevada. Soldo-Allesio responded that Ferguson had a long history of domestic violence, attaching exhibits including the TPO and its extension, police reports, and photos of injuries. At trial, the district court excluded all of Soldo-Allesio's exhibits, mainly because she disclosed her trial exhibit list only three days before trial. Soldo-Allesio still testified about several incidents of alleged abuse. The court ultimately found there was no "clear and convincing evidence" of domestic violence and largely awarded the custody outcome Ferguson requested. Soldo-Allesio asked the court to reconsider, arguing it had used the wrong burden of proof on the domestic violence question and had wrongly thrown out all her exhibits. The district court denied that motion. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that Nevada law uses two different burdens of proof when domestic violence comes up in a custody case. To trigger the legal "rebuttable presumption" - a starting assumption a parent can try to overcome - that an abuser should not get custody, the abuse must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high standard). But when the court is simply weighing domestic violence as one of the statutory "best interest" factors used to choose a custody arrangement, the standard is the lower "preponderance of the evidence" (more likely than not). The district court used the higher standard for both purposes, which the Court of Appeals held was legal error. The Court of Appeals also held that the district court was wrong to suggest Soldo-Allesio needed to show Ferguson had been criminally convicted of domestic violence. A criminal conviction is not required to prove domestic violence in a civil custody case; a victim's testimony alone can be enough. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that excluding all of Soldo-Allesio's exhibits effectively was a discovery sanction, and the district court did not follow the rules (NRCP 16.205(g) and NRCP 37(c)) governing such sanctions - rules that require the court to consider whether the failure to disclose was justified or harmless and whether exclusion is an appropriate penalty. That mattered especially because some of the excluded exhibits had already been served on Ferguson earlier in the case, and because the Nevada Supreme Court has said courts must hear "all information regarding domestic violence" when deciding what is best for a child. The case was sent back to the district court to apply the right legal standards and reconsider the evidence.

Samarn and Dorothy Reed were married for about 29 years. Before the divorce, Samarn was an executive-level employee at the United States Postal Service (USPS) earning over $200,000 per year. In 2021 he began a relationship with a coworker whom he had promoted and for whom he had advocated for management training and other benefits. When Dorothy learned of the relationship, she filed for divorce; around the same time, Samarn notified USPS's human relations department about the relationship, triggering an internal investigation. In April 2022, the parties entered a stipulated (agreed-upon) divorce decree requiring Samarn to pay alimony - $1,250 per month at first, rising to $2,500 per month for 10 years once his child support obligation for the parties' youngest child ended. The decree contained no provision making the alimony nonmodifiable. In January 2023, USPS concluded its investigation and terminated Samarn's employment, finding he had promoted an applicant with whom he was romantically or sexually involved and knew his conduct violated USPS's rules of employment and ethical guidelines. Samarn appealed to the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, then settled: instead of termination, he accepted a voluntary demotion to a non-executive position paying $110,000 per year and agreed not to seek a promotion at USPS until February 2025. About two weeks later, Samarn asked the district court to terminate his alimony, arguing his demotion cut his monthly income by 45 percent and he could not afford $2,500 per month. He later argued the court should at least reduce alimony to $557.87 per month to equalize the parties' incomes. Dorothy opposed any change, arguing the income reduction stemmed from Samarn's knowing violation of USPS's rules and that he could still afford the payments. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court declined to terminate or substantially modify alimony. Instead, it narrowly restructured the obligation: $2,000 per month from October 1, 2023, through January 31, 2025 (the period before Samarn could again seek a promotion), returning to $2,500 per month thereafter, with the alimony term extended by three months to roughly offset the temporary reduction. The court found that Samarn's income loss was not beyond his control but resulted from his deliberate, willful, and knowing violation of USPS's rules, that he could maintain a nominal budget surplus if he cut unnecessary expenses, and that there was no evidence Dorothy's finances had improved since the divorce. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It held the district court properly relied on the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, which allows courts to consider whether a spouse's reduced earnings result from the spouse's own intentional or purposeful conduct rather than circumstances beyond the spouse's control. The court rejected Samarn's argument that his demotion was involuntary because USPS imposed it, reasoning that Samarn agreed to the settlement and that the changes were precipitated by his own deliberate conduct. It also rejected his argument that considering that conduct improperly penalized him for "bad behavior" during the marriage, distinguishing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez: the district court was concerned not with marital misconduct but with the violation of USPS's employment rules that caused the demotion. Finally, the court held the district court was not required to walk through the NRS 125.150(9) factors - which govern initial alimony awards - and that the court had in substance considered the parties' financial circumstances anyway, so no abuse of discretion occurred.

This is an appeal by a mother, identified as Unique B., from a Clark County family court ruling that ended her legal status as parent to her two children. In Nevada, before a court can terminate a parent's rights, it must find by "clear and convincing evidence" - a high standard of proof - both that the parent is at fault in some way the law recognizes, and that ending the parental relationship is in the children's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the family court's record and concluded the evidence was sufficient on both fronts. The children had been out of Unique's care for 18 straight months. During that time, the court found, she had not made the changes required by her case plan - the written set of steps a parent must complete to get children back. Although addressing substance use, domestic violence, and mental health were central to her plan, the court noted she denied using drugs despite multiple positive tests, refused to give a urine sample needed for a mental health assessment, downplayed domestic violence in her relationship with the children's father, did not finish the required domestic violence classes, and was inconsistent with therapy to the point of being discharged multiple times. Nevada law lets a court presume that a parent has made only "token efforts" when a child has lived outside the parent's home for more than 14 of the past 20 months. The same time period also triggers a presumption that termination is in the child's best interest. Both presumptions applied here, and the Supreme Court agreed that Unique had not rebutted them. The record indicated she did not visit the children consistently, and when she did visit, she did not engage with them. The children, both of whom have special needs, are reportedly thriving with a foster parent who wants to adopt them. The court rejected Unique's other arguments. It found she had an opportunity to defend herself at trial but did not appear, even though she knew the trial date and the court tried to facilitate her appearance. Her claim that the judge was biased was deemed waived because she did not file a motion to disqualify the judge in the lower court. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination.

This case is about whether a Nevada district court properly ended a father's legal relationship with his child. In October 2019, Clark County's child-welfare agency removed A.J.B. from Eddie B.'s custody after a social worker reported he was acting erratically and threateningly. The agency gave Eddie a "case plan" — a list of things he needed to do to get his child back — including addressing violent behavior and drug use, finding stable housing and a job, and showing he could meet his child's basic needs. After nearly three years, the agency asked the court to permanently terminate Eddie's parental rights. The trial judge agreed, and Eddie appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing himself. The Supreme Court affirmed. To terminate parental rights in Nevada, a court must find by "clear and convincing evidence" both (1) at least one ground showing the parent is at fault, and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found enough evidence in the record to support all three of the trial court's fault findings: that Eddie was an "unfit parent" (he kept using methamphetamine and was arrested on domestic violence charges less than a month before trial); that he failed to make the changes needed to get his child back (he didn't complete outpatient drug treatment, missed drug tests, and didn't engage in domestic violence treatment); and that he made only "token efforts" — a legal presumption that applies when a child has lived outside the parent's home for more than 14 of 20 consecutive months. The Court also agreed that termination was in A.J.B.'s best interest. A statutory presumption favoring termination kicks in once a child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 months, and Eddie did not overcome it. The child is bonded to a prospective adoptive family that would also let the child maintain a relationship with the current foster family. The Court rejected Eddie's other arguments. His ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument failed because, in termination cases, the right to effective counsel exists only where there is a constitutional right to counsel — and here, the Court concluded due process did not require appointed counsel because the case was not complex and did not require expert testimony. His complaints about the termination of the child's mother's rights were irrelevant because she was not a party to this appeal and her case had already been resolved. His judicial-bias argument was waived because he never moved to disqualify the judge below.

This case is about a mother trying to regain custody of her two young children after grandparents had been appointed as their legal guardians. Several years ago, appellant Kristin S. was struggling with addiction and grief following the death of one child's father in 2017. Recognizing she could not adequately care for her children, she reached out to the children's paternal grandparents for help and signed consent forms allowing them to become guardians. Around the same time, her own grandparents, the Luceros, also sought guardianship, and Kristin signed a new consent form favoring the Luceros. After a period in which both sets of grandparents shared caretaking, the district court in 2021 appointed the paternal grandparents as permanent guardians and removed the Luceros. Kristin was not a named party in that earlier proceeding. By 2022, Kristin filed a petition to end the guardianships, saying her life had turned around. She had enrolled in mental health counseling, tested negative for drugs through voluntary hair follicle testing, obtained a driver's license and a full-time job, was raising her two youngest children without issue, and was living in a mobile home on the Luceros' property (they had moved to Colorado). A key legal question was how hard Kristin had to work to win her case. Nevada law (NRS 159A.1915) sets up two different standards. If a parent originally consented to the guardianship, that parent only has to show a "material change of circumstances" and that she is now a suitable parent. If the parent did not consent, she must show that plus an additional element - that the children's welfare would be "substantially enhanced" by ending the guardianship. The district court decided Kristin had to meet the harder, two-part standard, reasoning that when she switched her consent from the paternal grandparents to the Luceros, she effectively withdrew her consent to the guardianship altogether. The court also suggested her original consent might have been invalid because she felt pressured and did not fully understand the forms. Ultimately, the district court denied her petition, finding she had not shown either a material change or substantial enhancement. The Court of Appeals disagreed on several points. First, it held that Kristin did consent to the guardianships originally, so she should only have had to meet the easier standard. The court explained that Kristin voluntarily reached out for help, signed notarized consent forms understanding she was giving up custody while she got her life in order, and never opposed the idea of a guardianship - she simply changed her preference about which relatives should serve as guardians. The court noted that punishing a parent for having asked for help would discourage struggling parents from doing the right thing for their children. Second, the court held that even under the tougher standard, the evidence overwhelmingly showed Kristin had changed and become a suitable parent. She had fixed nearly every problem the courts had previously identified - she now had a job, a driver's license, counseling, and was drug-free. The court also found the district court had made factual errors, including mischaracterizing the testimony of Kristin's therapist, Gerri Goddard, who had actually praised Kristin as an "amazing success story" rather than doubting her. Third, the court held that because Kristin consented, the district court was required to apply the "parental preference doctrine" - a legal rule presuming that a fit parent should have custody of her own children unless she is unfit or extraordinary circumstances exist - and it failed to do so. The court concluded Kristin met her burden and ordered the guardianships terminated, with the case sent back only to handle practical matters like transitioning the children to Colorado and arranging grandparent visitation.

Ryan and Marie are the divorced parents of three young children. After their 2019 separation, Marie was awarded primary physical and sole legal custody, and a psychologist evaluated Ryan, finding him unfit at the time and recommending therapy followed by gradual reunification with the children. Marie was permitted to relocate with the children to California. Ryan briefly had supervised in-person visits and then weekly virtual visits, but the visits stopped in June 2020 after Marie switched to a paid supervision platform that Ryan said he could not afford. In the years that followed, Ryan continued to seek treatment from multiple mental-health providers, several of whom reported he had made progress and recommended reunification. He sent diapers, wipes, money toward a medical procedure for one of the twins, and a pair of custom sneakers. He also emailed Marie's lawyer asking to see his children. He did not, however, formally move the court to modify custody, and he did not pay court-ordered child support, citing financial difficulties tied in part to a prior felony conviction. In late 2022, Marie filed a petition to terminate Ryan's parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court terminated Ryan's rights, finding he had abandoned and neglected the children and made only "token efforts" to be involved in their lives. The court relied on two statutes: NRS 128.107, which lists factors courts must consider in termination cases, and NRS 128.109, which creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for a long time. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that NRS 128.107 does not apply when the children are in the physical custody of a parent (as opposed to foster care, a relative, or a guardian), and that NRS 128.109 applies only in cases brought under NRS Chapter 432B - the chapter governing child welfare cases involving the State. Because this was a private termination proceeding by one parent against the other, neither statute fit. The court also concluded that the evidence did not support any of the three parental-fault grounds. On abandonment, the court reasoned that the statutory presumption did not apply because the children were placed with Marie by court order, and even if it did, Ryan rebutted it by repeatedly requesting visits, sending gifts and support, and pursuing the treatment recommended by the custody evaluator. The court emphasized that financial inability to pay support cannot itself establish abandonment, and that an unrepresented parent's failure to navigate court procedures cannot be held against them in this context. On neglect, the court noted Marie testified the children were thriving in her care, so Ryan's conduct could not be deemed sufficiently harmful. On token efforts, Ryan's documented therapy, requests for visitation, and gifts were enough to defeat the finding. The court reversed the termination order, instructed the district court to order destruction of the amended birth certificates that had been issued (which had changed the children's last names), and sent the case back for further proceedings. Justice Lee concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's reading of NRS 128.107, arguing the statute should apply whenever the parent whose rights are being considered does not have physical custody, even if the other parent does.

This case is about whether a Nevada district court was right to permanently end a father's legal relationship with his young son. In Nevada, ending a parent's rights - sometimes called "termination" - requires the state to prove two things by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high level of proof, though not as high as the criminal standard): first, that the parent is at fault in some way the law recognizes, and second, that ending the relationship is in the child's best interest. The child, J.B.J., was placed outside Johney's home essentially from birth and had lived with a maternal relative - alongside four of his siblings who had already been adopted by that relative - for nearly three years by the time of the termination trial. DFS had earlier been involved with Johney's other children, and one of its central concerns was Johney's "protective capacity" - his ability to recognize danger and keep his children safe. DFS gave Johney a chance at trial reunification, but ended it after caseworkers found people in the home with Johney and J.B.J. whom Johney had not first cleared with DFS, as he had been required to do. According to the majority, Johney downplayed this and could not explain why having unvetted strangers around a not-quite-three-year-old could be unsafe. A licensed psychologist who evaluated Johney testified that he was already functioning at his highest level, was "not suited to be the primary child-care provider," and that more services would not improve his parenting. The psychologist also noted that when asked about daycare plans, Johney said a girlfriend could watch the child. There were also unresolved questions about how Johney, who worked nights, would supervise a toddler during the day on only four hours of sleep. The majority concluded that this evidence was enough to support the district court's finding that Johney was an "unfit" parent and that DFS could not reunify the family despite reasonable efforts. Because Nevada law requires only one ground of parental fault, the court did not need to address the other grounds the district court found. On the best-interest question, a Nevada statute creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months pursuant to chapter 432B placement; J.B.J. had been out of the home for nearly his entire life. The majority held Johney did not rebut that presumption, and that the child's bond with the maternal relative who had already adopted four of his siblings supported termination. Justice Lee dissented. She would have reversed, characterizing termination as "an exercise of awesome power that is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty" and arguing that DFS did not carry its heavy burden. She emphasized that Johney had no criminal or drug-abuse history, maintained stable housing and employment, separated from the mother whose care issues had driven prior cases, complied substantially with his case plan, made progress with his therapist, and had progressed from video visits to unsupervised at-home placement before reunification was halted. She also noted DFS produced no evidence that the unvetted individuals in the home were actually a threat, and that Johney testified he had given DFS a name and never received a response.

A Nevada district court ended Jennifer K.W.'s parental rights to two of her minor children. She appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking that the termination be undone. Her main argument was that the children themselves did not have a lawyer representing them during every part of the termination case, even though Nevada law requires children to have counsel in these proceedings. The Supreme Court did not disagree that the law requires the children to have counsel; instead, it ruled that Jennifer was not the right person to raise the complaint. In legal terms, she lacked "standing" - meaning the right to bring a particular claim - because the missing-counsel issue belonged to the children, not to her. The children were parties to the case, had counsel at the beginning of the proceedings, at the end of the proceedings, and on appeal, and could have raised the issue themselves. They did not. Jennifer also tried to challenge some of the evidence and witness testimony the district court relied on, but the Supreme Court noted she had not objected at trial. Under longstanding Nevada law, arguments not raised below are generally waived. The court also found her arguments on those points were not supported with cogent reasoning or legal authority. Finally, the court held that the district court was permitted to take judicial notice of documents from Jennifer's prior protective custody cases. Although Jennifer did not directly attack the merits of the termination, the Supreme Court added in a footnote that substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of parental fault and that termination was in the children's best interest by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination of Jennifer's parental rights.

This case involves a mother, identified as Sheena B., who lost her parental rights to her child, A.B., after Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) asked a court to permanently end her legal relationship with the child. Sheena had earlier admitted to abuse and neglect of A.B. The trial court agreed with DFS and terminated her rights. She appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking it to undo that decision. The Supreme Court rejected each of her arguments. First, Sheena argued she had ineffective assistance of counsel. The court explained that parents defending against termination petitions do not have an automatic constitutional right to a lawyer, and the appointment of counsel was not constitutionally required here because the case was not complex and did not involve expert testimony. The court also noted she did in fact have a lawyer who advocated for her. Second, Sheena argued the trial court should have considered guardianship instead of termination. The Supreme Court explained that DFS was not pursuing guardianship - it had filed a termination petition - and Nevada law prefers permanent placement and termination once a child has been out of the parent's home for a specified period. Third, Sheena complained that the trial court could not consider her first mental health evaluation because that provider did not respond to DFS's inquiries. The court found no reversible error because DFS obtained a second, more recent mental health assessment that the court did review. Finally, the Supreme Court reviewed whether enough evidence supported the trial court's findings. Under Nevada law, terminating parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one "parental fault" ground, and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. The court found that A.B. had lived outside Sheena's home for more than 14 consecutive months, which under Nevada statute creates a presumption that the parent made only "token efforts" to care for the child. Sheena did not rebut that presumption, in part because the trial court found her testimony not credible. The record also showed she repeatedly relapsed into addiction and lacked the means to care for A.B., supporting an "unfitness" finding. As for the child's best interest, A.B. had bonded with his foster placement, and his health and behavior had improved there. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination.

This case involves a mother, Jayleen B., whose parental rights to her child, K.M.W., were ended by a Clark County district court. The case began after K.M.W. was hurt in a car accident that happened when Jayleen fell asleep at the wheel. After that, the child was removed from her care. Jayleen agreed (by pleading "no contest") that there had been abuse and neglect, and the state's Department of Family Services later asked the court to terminate her parental rights altogether. The district court agreed to do so, and Jayleen appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. To end a parent's rights in Nevada, a court must find two things by clear and convincing evidence: that there is at least one ground of "parental fault," and that ending the relationship is in the child's best interest. The district court found several grounds of parental fault here, including neglect, unfitness, failure of parental adjustment, and "token efforts" because the child had been out of Jayleen's home for 24 straight months. On appeal, Jayleen argued the state had not proven neglect or unfitness with clear and convincing evidence, contending that the only real basis was her mental health and that she had managed her mental health well enough to meet her child's basic needs. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. It pointed to evidence in the record that Jayleen acted erratically toward the people caring for K.M.W., that she once grabbed the child during a visit in a way that frightened him, that she declined to exchange letters with him after he became unwilling to see her in person, and that she did not consistently work on her case plan or prove she attended the therapy that had been recommended to her. The court also concluded that ending Jayleen's parental rights was in K.M.W.'s best interest. Testimony showed K.M.W. had bonded with the family caring for him, that his food insecurity and anxiety had improved, and that he wanted to stay there. Because the child had been out of Jayleen's care for 24 consecutive months, Nevada law presumed that termination was in his best interest, and the court found Jayleen had not overcome that presumption. The court also rejected Jayleen's argument that K.M.W.'s refusal to see her in person amounted to a "constructive termination" of her rights, noting she had been offered another way to communicate (letters) but declined. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order ending Jayleen's parental rights.

When Nevada child-welfare authorities remove a child from her parents, state law generally requires the agency to make "reasonable efforts" to reunite the family. One Nevada statute, NRS 432B.393(3)(c), creates an exception: if a parent's rights to a different child (a sibling) were already involuntarily terminated, the agency does not have to keep trying to reunify the family with the new child. In this case, WCHSA removed L.S.C. from her parents in August 2020 and asked the district court to find that, because the parents had lost their rights to L.S.C.'s sibling the year before, the agency was off the hook for reunification efforts. The parents objected, arguing the statute violates their constitutional right to raise their child without fair process. A court master agreed with the parents and found the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it effectively presumes a parent is unfit forever based on a past case, and that this presumption could later be used to terminate parental rights as to the new child under a separate statute, NRS 128.105(1). The district court adopted that recommendation. WCHSA then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an extraordinary order (a writ of mandamus) overturning the district court's constitutional ruling. By the time the Supreme Court considered the petition, the dispute over reunification efforts in this particular family had already been resolved on different grounds, making the case technically "moot." The Supreme Court nonetheless decided to address the constitutional question because it is the kind of issue likely to come up repeatedly but resolve too quickly to ever be reviewed in time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that NRS 432B.393(3)(c) does not violate due process. The court explained that, although parents have a fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of their children, that right is implicated when the state removes children or terminates parental rights — not when the state merely relieves an agency of its duty to provide reunification services. Because the statute does no more than excuse the agency from reunification efforts, it does not infringe on a fundamental right. The court applied the more lenient "rational basis" test and concluded that the statute is rationally connected to Nevada's legitimate interest in keeping children out of dangerous homes and out of long-term foster care. The court noted that the district court had focused on a different statute — NRS 128.105(1), which permits termination of parental rights based in part on a finding under NRS 432B.393(3)(c). The Supreme Court explained that any constitutional concern about presuming parental fault belongs in a challenge to NRS 128.105, not to NRS 432B.393(3)(c). Even though the Supreme Court concluded the district court was wrong on the constitutional question, it denied WCHSA's petition because the underlying dispute had become moot — the agency had already been relieved of reunification efforts on a different basis, so there was nothing left to fix.

This case arises out of two child-welfare proceedings in Washoe County. The county's human services agency had taken two children, H.B. and Z.R., into protective custody in 2019 and later filed petitions to terminate their parents' rights. The parents fought back by challenging the constitutionality of part of Nevada's termination statute, NRS 128.109, which sets up legal presumptions that favor terminating parental rights once a child has been in foster care for a certain length of time. The district court agreed with the parents that two subsections of the statute violated the parents' due process rights, but it did not actually rule on whether to terminate parental rights. The county agency then asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in through a "writ" - an extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court to do something. Specifically, the agency wanted the Supreme Court to order the district judge to undo her ruling that the statute was unconstitutional. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the family court dismissed the underlying termination petitions in both cases. That left no live dispute between the parties for the Supreme Court to resolve. Z.R.'s mother moved to dismiss the writ petition as moot, and H.B.'s mother filed a notice that her case had also been dismissed. The Supreme Court denied the writ petitions as moot. A case is moot when there is no longer an actual controversy to decide. The court recognized an exception that allows it to hear moot cases that involve issues of widespread importance that are likely to recur but might escape review, but concluded the agency had not shown that this issue would evade review. The court reasoned that, in a future termination case, whichever side lost on the constitutional issue could appeal once the district court entered a final judgment on the motion to terminate parental rights. Because the issue has a path to appellate review through ordinary appeals, the exception to mootness did not apply. Two justices dissented in part. They agreed the case was moot but believed the exception to mootness applied and would have decided the merits.

Washoe County's child-welfare agency had asked the family court to terminate the parental rights of two sets of parents whose children (H.B. and Z.R.) had been in the agency's custody since 2019. The parents pushed back by arguing that a Nevada statute, NRS 128.109, was unconstitutional. That statute creates legal presumptions that can favor terminating parental rights once a child has been in protective custody long enough. The family court agreed with the parents in part, ruling that two subsections - NRS 128.109(1)(a) and 128.109(2) - violated the parents' due-process rights. The family court did not at that point decide whether actually to terminate parental rights. The agency went to the Nevada Supreme Court and asked for an extraordinary order - a writ of mandamus or prohibition (a court order directing a lower court to take or stop taking some action) - telling the district court to vacate its constitutional ruling. While the petitions were pending, however, the underlying termination cases in the family court were dismissed. The Supreme Court declined to decide the constitutional question. The court explained that once the underlying cases were dismissed, there was no longer a live dispute to resolve - the question had become "moot." Nevada courts generally do not issue opinions on abstract questions; they decide actual controversies. The agency argued that the court should still rule because the issue is important and likely to come up again. The majority recognized the issue is important and that the challenged orders are short-lived, but concluded the issue is not one that will evade review. The court explained that even though a pretrial ruling on a statute's constitutionality cannot be appealed right away, once the family court enters a final judgment on a termination petition, either side can appeal and have the constitutional question reviewed then. Because there is a normal appellate path available, the case does not fit the narrow exception that allows courts to decide moot questions. Two justices dissented. They agreed the case was moot but would have decided it anyway, reasoning that the timelines built into Nevada's termination-of-parental-rights laws are short, the constitutional issue will keep arising, and rulings like the one here tend to cause cases to settle or be dismissed before a final, appealable judgment - so the issue can in fact evade review.

This case involves a mother, identified as Natasha F.B., whose parental rights to her minor child were terminated by a Nevada family court. She appealed, arguing that the process was unfair because she was not properly notified about the hearing and did not get a real chance to participate. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the termination. The Department of Family Services (DFS) had been unable to find Natasha's current address - she had stopped communicating with DFS, had been without stable housing for about six months, and had reportedly stayed at times in what was described as a "known drug home." Because DFS could not locate her, it sought permission to give notice through publication (publishing the notice rather than handing it to her in person). Natasha argued that the affidavit DFS filed to support service by publication did not contain all the specific statements required by Nevada's termination-of-parental-rights statute. The court agreed that the affidavit did not strictly track the statute's language, but concluded that DFS had "substantially complied" - meaning it followed the statute closely enough to achieve its purpose. The court also pointed out that Natasha actually knew about the hearing. Her court-appointed attorney was on notice, and Natasha herself texted the child's paternal grandmother during the hearing saying she was on her way. The district court even delayed the hearing to give her more time to show up. She never did. Because she had notice and a chance to be heard but did not appear, the court held there was no due-process violation. On the merits, the court held that there was substantial evidence supporting termination. The child had been placed outside the home for more than 15 consecutive months, Natasha had not provided support or maintained consistent communication with the child, had not participated in reunification services, lacked stable housing, and had refused to address substance abuse issues. Under Nevada law, when a child has lived outside the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months, the parent is presumed to have made only "token efforts" to care for the child, and termination is presumed to be in the child's best interests. Natasha did not rebut those presumptions.

This case involves a dispute over where a child should be placed. Ginger P. asked the family court to place a minor child, C.A., with her. The district court denied that request. Rather than pursue a normal appeal, Ginger P. went directly to the Nevada Supreme Court and asked it to issue what is called a writ of mandamus or prohibition - an extraordinary court order that tells a lower court either to do something it is required to do or to stop doing something it has no authority to do. These writs are not available as a matter of right; the Supreme Court decides whether to get involved. The Supreme Court declined to step in. The court explained that the person asking for a writ has to show that this kind of extraordinary intervention is warranted, and Ginger P. did not make that showing here. The court reviewed the record and concluded that the district court's factual findings about what was in the child's best interest - the central question in a placement decision - were not clearly wrong or arbitrary. Ginger P. also complained that the district court considered her motion to intervene and to be recognized as a "person of special interest" on the same day as the placement hearing. The Supreme Court was not persuaded that this timing justified extraordinary relief, observing that even if she had been recognized as a person of special interest, that status would not have entitled her to conduct discovery or issue subpoenas. A person of special interest is entitled to be notified about plans for the child and to testify at placement hearings, but not to the broader litigation tools available to full parties. The petition was denied, leaving the district court's placement decision in place.

This case concerns a father whose parental rights to his child were terminated by a Nevada district court. He appealed that decision to the Nevada Supreme Court. Under Nevada law, before a court can permanently end a parent's legal relationship with a child, two things must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" - a heightened standard of proof. First, the court must find at least one "ground of parental fault" (some specific failing by the parent recognized in the statute). Second, the court must find that ending the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court concluded that the second requirement was not met here. According to the opinion, no specific evidence was offered at trial about why termination would serve the child's best interest. The mother's case essentially rested on her contention that she could support and care for the child on her own. The district court's written order likewise stated only that termination was in the child's best interest, without offering supporting reasoning. Because the "best interest" finding lacked evidentiary support, the Supreme Court reversed the termination order and sent the case back to the district court. The court noted that even though the father had not opposed the termination petition in the district court - which normally limits the arguments a party can make on appeal - he was still allowed to argue on appeal that the mother had failed to carry her burden of proof, because termination orders receive "close scrutiny" on review. Because the best-interest finding alone was enough to require reversal, the court did not reach the father's other arguments about parental fault or about the admission of evidence at trial.

This case involves a mother, identified as Maryann B.N., whose parental rights to two of her children were ended by a Nevada family court. The Nevada Supreme Court was asked to review that decision and decided to leave it in place. The children first came to the attention of the Nevada Department of Family Services in 2016, when a younger sibling was born testing positive for methamphetamine. The Department presented evidence that the mother had been neglecting the children by routinely leaving them with other people to meet their basic needs. The children were placed with a person described as "fictive kin" - someone treated like family even though not biologically related - referred to in the opinion as A.M. After 18 months, a court ordered the children returned to their mother, but the children continued to live mostly with A.M. In February 2020, the children were removed from the mother's care a second time after she reportedly hit one of them in the face and, days later, failed to pick them up from school. The Department again placed the children with A.M. and gave the mother a "case plan" - a list of steps, like addressing mental health, domestic violence, and substance abuse problems - to complete so the children could be safely returned. About a year and a half later, the Department asked the court to terminate her parental rights, and the court agreed. On appeal, the mother argued, among other things, that the Department had not made a real effort to reunite her with her children and that she had not always had a lawyer. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments. It explained that Nevada law allows the reunification-effort requirement to be waived when children are removed, returned, and then removed again because of further abuse or neglect - which is what happened here. It also noted that Nevada law does not give parents an automatic right to a free attorney in termination cases, although the trial court in fact appointed three attorneys for her over the course of the proceedings, and she had a lawyer at trial. The Supreme Court then walked through the legal requirements for terminating parental rights in Nevada: the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, both (1) some fault on the parent's part, and (2) that ending parental rights is in the children's best interest. The court found enough evidence in the record to support both. The mother had ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse problems, made only minimal efforts to engage with services, did not financially support the children while they lived elsewhere, and did not show she could provide stable housing or income. Because the children had lived outside her home for more than 14 of the previous 20 months, Nevada law presumes both that she made only "token efforts" as a parent and that termination is in the children's best interest, and she did not overcome those presumptions. Meanwhile, the children were doing well in A.M.'s home, were bonded to her, and A.M. was prepared to adopt them. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the order ending the mother's parental rights.

A Nevada district court terminated a mother's parental rights to her two children. The mother wanted to appeal that decision to the Nevada Supreme Court. To do so, she had to file a "notice of appeal" - a short document that tells the courts she is challenging the decision - within 30 days after she was officially notified that the termination order had been entered. The official notice was electronically served on the mother's attorney on January 11, 2022. That meant the deadline to file the notice of appeal was February 10, 2022. The notice of appeal was dated February 12, 2022, and not filed in the district court until February 16, 2022 - several days late. The mother says she also tried to file something on February 11, 2022, but even that date would have been one day past the deadline. The mother explained that she had been confused: she understood from her district court attorney that she had 30 days to file after some other event, and she pointed out that she could not file paperwork on her own while she was represented by a lawyer. She argued her attorney should have either filed the notice of appeal or formally withdrawn from the case. The record reflects that her counsel was orally permitted to withdraw on January 12, 2022, and that the termination order itself contained a written notice telling her she had to appeal within 30 days of being served with the notice of entry. The Nevada Supreme Court said it was sympathetic to the mother's situation but explained that it has no power to hear an appeal filed after the deadline, and it has no power to extend the deadline. Because the notice of appeal was filed late, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing whether the termination of parental rights was correct.

This case involves the termination of a mother's legal rights to her 11-year-old son. S.V. was first removed from his mother Martina's care when he was two years old, after she left him with a babysitter and did not return. Once a paternity test confirmed John was S.V.'s biological father, child welfare authorities placed S.V. with John, and S.V. has lived with John and John's wife ever since. Over the following years, Martina had inconsistent contact with S.V. After the parties initially agreed to joint custody and a visitation schedule, Martina did not consistently follow it. In 2018, when S.V. was seven, Martina tried to put him alone into an Uber to send him back to John at the end of a visit, prompting another report to child welfare. When John sought sole custody, Martina did not appear at the hearing, and the court awarded John sole legal and physical custody. In July 2019, John petitioned to terminate Martina's parental rights altogether. Around the same time, Martina was in a car crash with her one-year-old daughter in the car while driving with a suspended license and under the influence of multiple illicit drugs. She then served roughly four months in jail for failing to comply with drug counseling ordered in a prior criminal case. Martina did not see S.V. between Spring 2018 and Spring 2021. After a hearing, the district court terminated Martina's parental rights, finding both that there were grounds of parental fault (including abandonment and unfitness) and that termination was in S.V.'s best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded there was substantial evidence that Martina had abandoned S.V. - she went long stretches without contact, sent no letters, cards, or gifts, and only paid child support sporadically until the termination action was filed. The court also concluded that her drug use, felony conviction for driving under the influence of illicit drugs, missed school days for S.V. while in her care, and pattern of leaving S.V. with others showed she was an unfit parent. Finally, the court agreed that termination was in S.V.'s best interest because S.V. has thrived with John and is bonded with John's wife, who intends to adopt him.

This case asks who is allowed to run the trial when the State seeks to permanently sever a parent's legal relationship with her child. In the Eighth Judicial District (Clark County), such trials had often been conducted by a "hearing master" - a court-appointed lawyer (not a judge) who hears evidence, makes findings, and recommends a result to a district judge, who then reviews the record and makes the final decision. The Nevada Supreme Court held that this two-step approach is not allowed for termination of parental rights (TPR) trials. A district judge - not a hearing master - must preside over the trial in the first instance. The underlying facts: Tahja L. was a teenager when she brought her six-month-old daughter L.L.S. to a Department of Family Services (DFS) office, hoping to place her temporarily while Tahja finished high school. DFS instead filed a neglect petition, placed L.L.S. in foster care, and eventually moved to terminate Tahja's parental rights. The case was assigned to a hearing master. L.L.S.'s lawyer objected, arguing that a district judge should hear the trial; Tahja did not join that objection. The juvenile court overruled the objection. After the originally assigned master became a district judge, a different hearing master conducted the trial, recommended termination, and the district judge - after watching the entire video of the trial - terminated Tahja's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, TPR proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B must be conducted by a "court," and although the statutes define "court" to include a hearing master under certain circumstances, that inclusion only works if the master's role is consistent with the Nevada Constitution. The court held that having a master preside over a TPR trial violates a parent's right to procedural due process, because the right at stake - the permanent loss of one's child - is so serious that the parent must present her case directly to the judge who will decide it, not to an intermediary whose findings are then reviewed from a recording. The court applied the three-part federal test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing (1) the parent's interest, (2) the risk that the procedure used will produce a wrong result, and (3) the government's interest in efficiency. The court described a parent's interest in keeping her child as among the strongest interests the law recognizes, comparing termination to a "civil death penalty." It found that having a master, rather than the judge, see witnesses face-to-face increases the risk of error, and that the State's efficiency interests are not significantly served, because the district judge still has to review the entire record. The court also pointed to recent legislative history in which the Eighth Judicial District's Chief Judge told lawmakers the district was specifically seeking new judges to "eliminate the use of hearing masters" in dependency cases. The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back for a new TPR trial before a district judge. Three justices dissented.

This case involves the State's effort to permanently end a father's legal relationship with his young son. Marcus and the child's mother, Dana, were both incarcerated when the child, T.M.R., was an infant. Marcus had pleaded guilty to felony coercion after an incident in which he hit Dana's 100-year-old great-grandmother, Gladys, and damaged her home. With both parents in custody, Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) placed T.M.R. in foster care and eventually petitioned to terminate the parents' rights so the child could be adopted. At trial, the State surprised Marcus by calling Gladys to testify even though it had never formally listed her as a trial witness in the manner Nevada's civil discovery rules normally require. Marcus asked the court to exclude her testimony because she had not been disclosed at least 45 days before trial as required by NRCP 16.2(e)(4). The trial judge ruled that NRCP 16.2's disclosure rules do not apply to termination of parental rights cases and let Gladys testify. After hearing all the evidence, the court terminated Marcus's parental rights. The Nevada Supreme Court used this appeal to clear up an ambiguity in the civil rules. The Court explained that Nevada has three related rules governing when parties must disclose their witnesses: NRCP 16.1 covers most civil cases (but exempts family-court cases), NRCP 16.2 covers divorces and similar matters, and NRCP 16.205 covers paternity and custody disputes between unmarried parents. None of the rules explicitly says it applies to a case to terminate parental rights. Reading the rules together, however, the Court concluded that NRCP 16.2's witness-disclosure rules do apply in termination cases. The Court reasoned that any other reading would allow "trial by ambush" - a surprise witness used against a parent facing what the Court described as "the equivalent of the civil death penalty." So the trial judge was wrong to admit Gladys's testimony without proper notice. But the Supreme Court went on to hold that the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because, even setting Gladys's testimony aside, there was more than enough other evidence to justify ending Marcus's parental rights. That evidence included: T.M.R. had been out of his parents' home for more than 14 months (which under Nevada law creates a legal presumption that termination is in the child's best interests); T.M.R. had bonded with his foster family, who wanted to adopt him; Marcus had failed to make timely progress on the case plan DFS designed to help him reunify with his son; Marcus minimized his drug use and blamed his relapses on Dana; he refused multiple drug tests; and he denied having anger problems despite the underlying violent incident. Because that evidence amply supported the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Marcus's parental rights.

This case is about a Nevada family court's role in helping certain immigrant children apply for a special federal immigration status. Federal law allows some children in the United States to apply for what is called Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status, which can lead to lawful permanent residency. Before a child can apply, a state court must make three specific findings about the child's situation. One of those findings is that the child cannot reasonably be reunited with one or both parents because of abandonment, abuse, neglect, or something similar. Mariela Lopez gave birth to her son K.M.L. in El Salvador in 2007 and told the father, Serbellon Portillo, both about the pregnancy and about the birth. According to the opinion, Serbellon Portillo never communicated with K.M.L., never sought contact, and never provided support, even though he lives in El Salvador and could have reached Lopez or her family. K.M.L. lived with Lopez's mother in El Salvador until 2017, when his grandmother could no longer care for him and gang violence in his neighborhood became a concern (neighbors had been killed by gang members). K.M.L. then moved to the United States to live with his mother. Lopez asked the Nevada family court for custody and for the SIJ predicate findings. The court gave her custody and agreed it was in K.M.L.'s best interest to stay with her, but declined to find that reunification with the father was "not viable," explaining it could not predict whether the father might someday try to reunite with the child. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the family court used the wrong test. The legal question is not whether future reunification is theoretically possible, but whether it is "viable" - meaning workable or practicable - given the history of the parent-child relationship and the realistic conditions in the child's home country. The Court adopted a framework drawn from out-of-state decisions: family courts should look at the entire history of the relationship between parent and child, the effects forced reunification might have on the child, and the actual conditions on the ground in the home country. The Court also emphasized that an SIJ "abandonment" finding is not the same as terminating parental rights, so the standard for abandonment in this context is broader and less demanding. The Supreme Court left the custody award in place but sent the case back to the family court to reconsider the reunification finding using the correct standard.

This case is about whether a baby in foster care should be presumed to belong with her biological sister, even though that sister has already been adopted by another family. Baby Girl W. was born in October 2017 and was quickly placed in foster care as a child in need of protection. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) decided that adoption was the right long-term plan for her. Baby Girl W. has a 3-year-old biological half-sister named Vivian, who was previously adopted by Amy Mulkern in Massachusetts. DFS itself contacted Amy in early 2018 to ask whether she would adopt Baby Girl W. so the sisters could grow up together. Amy went through the interstate placement process and was approved as a possible placement. But DFS ultimately concluded that Baby Girl W. had bonded with her current foster parents - who are also willing to adopt her - and recommended she stay with them. Amy went to the Nevada district court handling the dependency case. The court allowed Amy and the foster parents to participate as "persons with a special interest," meaning they can recommend a placement and testify at the placement hearing. But the district court also ruled that, because Vivian had been adopted, she was no longer legally Baby Girl W.'s sibling for purposes of a Nevada statute - NRS 432B.550(5)(a) - that tells courts to presume placing siblings together is in a foster child's best interest. The district court therefore decided that presumption did not apply. Amy and Vivian asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing the lower court to do something it is required by law to do. They wanted the Supreme Court to make the district court apply the sibling presumption when deciding where Baby Girl W. should live. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Amy and Vivian on that point. The court explained that Nevada law repeatedly emphasizes keeping siblings together - in initial protective placements, in placements after parental rights are terminated, in adoptions, and in custody decisions. No Nevada statute says that adoption erases sibling status for placement purposes. Because the Legislature has stressed sibling relationships so consistently, the court concluded it would not assume - without clearer instruction - that lawmakers wanted the presumption to vanish the moment one sibling is adopted. The court therefore directed the district court to apply the rebuttable sibling presumption in NRS 432B.550(5) when deciding where to place Baby Girl W. "Rebuttable" means the presumption can still be overcome - the district court can still decide, based on evidence, that placement with the sibling is not in the baby's best interest. The court did not order any other relief, noting that the district court had already considered the Mulkerns' arguments, included Amy as a possible placement, and invited her to participate at the upcoming placement hearing. The court also added a footnote making clear that its ruling does not change separate Nevada rules about confidentiality, visitation, or inheritance after adoption, and does not require DFS to do more than its statutory duty to look for relatives.

This case involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and father over their four children. The case began in December 2013 when the oldest child, then-fifteen-year-old S.L., showed up at school with a black eye and told a friend that her father, Donald, had hit her. Although S.L. initially told Child Protective Services that she had hit her eye on a cabinet, an investigation revealed multiple bruises and abrasions consistent with abuse. All four children were removed from the home in January 2014 and eventually placed together in a foster home. Once safely in foster care, the children disclosed years of abuse. At trial, S.L. testified that Donald had been abusing her since around third grade. The abuse she described included being hit with a belt and buckle, having her wrist cut with a knife, being shot with a BB gun, having a tooth knocked out, being jumped on while Donald wore work boots until she passed out, being made to stand on her head for thirty minutes, being denied food, and being treated differently from the other children. S.L. testified that her mother, Melissa, knew about the abuse and covered S.L.'s facial injuries with makeup. The children were also coached to repeat false stories about how the injuries occurred. Donald and Melissa entered no-contest pleas to the protective custody petition and were given case plans. They participated in assessments and therapy. However, throughout the process, both parents continued to insist that S.L.'s injuries were self-inflicted. Recorded jail calls captured Melissa calling S.L. a "killer kid" with "a brain of a fucking peanut." A psychological assessment found both parents at high risk to abuse or neglect again. On appeal, the parents argued that taking away their parental rights because they refused to admit the abuse violated their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination - the constitutional protection against being forced to confess to a crime. The Nevada Supreme Court had recently addressed a similar issue in a case called A.D.L., where it ruled that a parent cannot be forced to admit a crime under threat of losing her children. The Court rejected the parents' argument here. It distinguished A.D.L., where a single accidental-looking injury was at issue and the mother had otherwise satisfied her therapy requirements. In this case, the Court explained, the abuse was severe, repeated, and stretched over years, and the parents had not engaged in meaningful therapy that would address the abuse and ensure the children's safety if returned home. The Court drew a line: parents cannot be compelled to admit a crime, but they can be required to engage in genuine therapy aimed at protecting their children. Losing children for failing to undergo such therapy, the Court said, "is simply a consequence of the reality that it is unsafe for children to be with parents who are abusive and violent." The Court also affirmed that there was enough evidence to support the district court's findings that the parents were unfit, had failed to adjust, had made only token efforts toward reunification, and posed a risk of serious injury to the children. Because the children had been outside the home for 30 months at the time of trial, a legal presumption applied that the parents had only made token efforts, and the Court agreed they failed to rebut that presumption. Finally, the Court agreed that termination served the children's best interests, noting that the children had bonded with and integrated into a foster family willing to adopt them.

This case involves a Nevada family in which the oldest child, S.L., suffered severe physical and emotional abuse over a period of years. The abuse came to light in December 2013 when S.L., then fifteen, arrived at school with a black eye and told a friend that her stepfather Donald had hit her. Although S.L. initially told Child Protective Services that she had hit her eye on a cabinet, an investigation found multiple bruises and abrasions consistent with abuse. All four children were removed from the home in January 2014 and placed with the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). Once in foster care, the children began describing what had happened at home. S.L. later testified that Donald had abused her since third grade — hitting her with a belt and buckle, cutting her wrist with a knife, shooting her hand with a BB gun, knocking out a front tooth, jumping on her chest while wearing work boots until she passed out, making her stand on her head for 30 minutes, and denying her food. She said her mother Melissa knew about the abuse and helped cover bruises with make-up, and that Donald made the children rehearse stories to tell outsiders. Donald and Melissa entered no-contest pleas to the protective custody petition and were given case plans. They attended assessments and therapy programs, but throughout the process they continued to insist that S.L.'s injuries were self-inflicted. A psychological assessment rated both parents at high risk to abuse or neglect again. Recorded jailhouse phone calls captured Melissa calling S.L. a "killer kid" and saying she "has a brain of a fucking peanut." After a trial, the district court terminated both parents' rights. On appeal, the parents made a constitutional argument: they said they could not be punished — by losing their children — simply for refusing to admit to a crime, because the Fifth Amendment protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that argument here. The court explained that, under its earlier decision In re Parental Rights as to A.D.L., parents indeed cannot have their rights terminated solely because they refuse to confess. But the court drew a line: parents can be required to engage in meaningful therapy designed to make sure the children will be safe at home, and a failure to make real progress in therapy is a different thing from a refusal to confess. Here, the court said, the parents' rights were not terminated merely because they would not admit the abuse — they were terminated because the abuse was extensive and ongoing, the parents had not meaningfully addressed it in therapy, the assessments showed a high risk of repeat abuse, and the therapist who supported reunification had never seen the children's injuries and believed the abuse had not happened. The court also held that there was strong evidence supporting termination on the statutory grounds — parental unfitness, failure to adjust, token efforts, and risk of serious injury — and that termination was in the children's best interests, given that they had bonded with a foster family willing to adopt them, and the two younger children's wish to return home was conditioned on the violence stopping.

This case involves a young child, referred to as E.R., who was removed from her mother's custody at one month old in July 2015 because of neglect. DFS placed her in foster care and tried to find relatives to take her, but found none at first. After more than a year, the child was placed with foster parents Philip R. and Regina R., who wanted to adopt her. About 15 months after the child's initial removal, the child's mother's first cousin, Stephanie R., who lives in Georgia with her husband Joey R., contacted DFS and asked to take the child. By that time, DFS was moving toward terminating the mother's parental rights, which the court did in February 2017. The foster parents had begun adopting the child. DFS then asked the district court to decide whether the child should stay with the foster parents (with whom she was strongly bonded) or be moved to live with the maternal relatives in Georgia. After a hearing, a court master recommended sending the child to the maternal relatives, finding that the family connection was the "overriding consideration," even though the move would cause the child trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. The foster parents and DFS asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed to grant the writs and ordered the case redone. The court explained several things. First, once parental rights are terminated, the rules for placing a child change. Before termination, NRS 432B.550(5) governs placement, and that statute uses mandatory language ("preference must be given") in favor of placing a child with a relative. After termination, however, NRS 128.110(2) governs, and it uses softer, more permissive language ("may give preference") and gives the placement agency more discretion. Second, the maternal relatives' delay in coming forward did not disqualify them. Stephanie did not know the child was in protective custody until October 2016, so she had a reasonable excuse for the delay. Third, and most importantly, even when a familial preference applies, the child's best interest is the main consideration. The Supreme Court found that the hearing master and district court did not adequately weigh the child's best interest. They treated the family connection as automatically controlling and did not make written findings about what was best for this particular child, who was deeply bonded with her foster family and would suffer trauma from another move. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate its placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning a fresh hearing), this time applying NRS 128.110(2), giving appropriate weight to the child's best interest, and considering DFS's discretion in deciding placement.

This case concerns where a young child, E.R., should live. DFS removed E.R. from her mother's custody when she was one month old because of neglect. After efforts to reunify mother and child failed, the mother's parental rights were terminated in February 2017, and the foster parents who had cared for E.R. since September 2016 began the process of adopting her. About 15 months after E.R. was first removed, a maternal cousin in Georgia (Stephanie R.) contacted DFS and asked to have E.R. placed with her and her husband. After interstate-placement approval and an evidentiary hearing, a court master recommended moving E.R. to Georgia, reasoning that the "family connection is the overriding consideration" even though the child was strongly bonded to the foster parents and another removal would cause her trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. DFS and the foster parents asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court used the wrong statute. While the case was working through reunification, NRS 432B.550(5) governed placement and gave a strong preference to placing the child with relatives. But once parental rights were terminated, a different statute, NRS 128.110(2), took over. That statute uses softer language: the agency "may" prefer relatives, and "shall, if practicable" keep siblings together. So the agency's discretion and the child's best interest carry more weight at that stage. The Court agreed with the lower court on one point: the maternal cousin had a reasonable excuse for coming forward late because she did not know E.R. was in protective custody, and DFS could have located her earlier. So her delay did not eliminate any familial preference she might have. But the Court found two serious problems with the placement order. First, the master and district court did not make written findings about what was actually in E.R.'s best interest beyond acknowledging the move would traumatize her. Second, by using NRS 432B.550(5) instead of NRS 128.110(2), the courts below did not give appropriate weight to DFS's discretion in choosing placement post-termination, and did not develop the facts about whether placing E.R. with a newer sibling (born to the same mother in April 2017) was actually practicable. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate the placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning the court starts fresh rather than just reviewing the master's work) applying the correct statute and making proper findings about E.R.'s best interest.

This case decided whether a parent who agrees to give up her parental rights can still appeal the court's decision about where her child is placed. Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) sought to terminate Tonya M.'s parental rights to her child, who had already been removed from her care and was living with a foster family. WCDSS found a family that wanted to adopt the child, but Tonya wanted the child placed with a relative instead. Tonya and WCDSS reached a deal (a stipulation): Tonya would be allowed to participate in a contested hearing about the child's placement, and after that hearing she would give up her parental rights. Critically, she also agreed to waive her right to challenge the termination of her parental rights. Tonya participated in the placement hearing and argued for placing the child with her relative, but the district court instead placed the child with the adoptive family. Tonya then did not voluntarily relinquish her rights, so the court entered an order terminating them. She appealed - but only to challenge the placement decision, not the termination itself. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal. It held that only a party who is 'aggrieved' has standing to appeal, meaning the ruling must adversely affect a personal or property right. Once Tonya's parental rights were terminated - and because she agreed to that termination, waived any challenge to it, and did not contest it on appeal - she no longer had any legally protected interest in where the child is placed. A parent's interest in the child's placement flows from her overarching parental rights; when those rights end, so does her standing to challenge placement. The Court cited similar decisions from California, Utah, Iowa, Maryland, and Texas. The Court also rejected Tonya's argument that its earlier order denying her writ petition (which had said she could raise the issue on appeal) guaranteed she could appeal now. That order only recognized that an appeal existed as a remedy; it did not decide whether she would have standing. Finally, the Court expressed concern that the record did not show Tonya was warned that giving up her rights would also end her ability to challenge placement, and it encouraged parties and counsel negotiating such stipulations to make sure parents fully understand the rights they are giving up. The Court also observed in a footnote that the district court's placement order had failed to include the written findings required by prior caselaw, though it could not rule on that because Tonya lacked standing.

This case arose after the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) received an anonymous hotline call in April 2010 alleging that Keaundra D.'s infant son, C.L.B., Jr., had been burned on the face. Keaundra told investigators that the burn occurred when her two-year-old daughter, A.D.L., reported that C.L.B., Jr. had "tried to kiss" a hot iron that fell off a dresser while Keaundra was in another room. DFS removed both children from Keaundra's care. One physician who examined the child in person, Dr. Neuman, found "no evidence of abuse." A different doctor, Dr. Mehta, who reviewed only photographs, opined the burn was deliberate. The juvenile court found the injury was nonaccidental and ordered Keaundra to follow a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to get her children back. She maintained housing and a job, kept in touch with DFS, completed parenting classes, and finished a physical-abuse assessment and therapy. Her therapist testified that her risk of reoffending was low and that she showed none of the signs typical of an abusive parent. DFS itself reported that she had "successfully completed her case plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children." But DFS still wanted her parental rights terminated, and the district court still terminated them, for one reason: Keaundra would not admit that she had deliberately held the iron to her son's face. Her case plan required her to "articulate" the "sequence of events" leading to the abuse "as sustained by the Court." Because she insisted the burn was accidental, the court treated her as out of compliance. DFS confirmed at trial that, had Keaundra admitted intentional abuse, it would not have sought termination. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves, not just in criminal trials but in any proceeding where their answers might be used against them in a future criminal case. Admitting that one held a hot iron to a child's face would expose a person to prosecution for child abuse under Nevada law (NRS 200.508). The court held that a parent cannot be forced to choose between admitting a crime and losing her children - that choice is unconstitutionally coercive. The court drew a line: a juvenile court may require a parent to participate in meaningful therapy, even if therapy works better when a parent acknowledges past conduct, and a parent who refuses meaningful therapy may face consequences. But a court cannot require, as a condition of keeping parental rights, that the parent expressly admit to a crime. The court also held that the evidence did not support termination on its own merits. Nevada law presumes termination is in a child's best interest when the child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 consecutive months, and presumes a parent has made only "token efforts" in similar circumstances. The court found Keaundra rebutted both presumptions: she stayed in regular phone contact, her mother brought the children to visit, A.D.L. cried and begged to go home to her mother, Keaundra helped support the children financially, and after the first termination order the children waited 17 months in foster care before being placed with relatives. Without the presumptions, there was not substantial evidence to terminate.

This case asks whether a Nevada court can take away a parent's legal rights to her children because she is poor. The Nevada Supreme Court answers clearly that poverty alone is not, and never has been, a permissible reason to terminate parental rights. But the Court also holds that the trial judge in this case did not, in fact, terminate the mother's rights because she was poor. He terminated them because, even with substantial help from the State and a nonprofit, she did not follow through on the steps required to be reunited with her children. Jacqueline G. is the mother of four children. Beginning in late 2012, child-welfare authorities received reports that she did not have stable housing. She moved frequently, was evicted, and had used up local housing resources. Three of her children were removed from her custody in April 2013. Her fourth child, E.H.-T., was born in January 2014 and was removed later after a caseworker found a motel room with animal feces, urine, dirty diapers, and significant clutter that posed a safety risk to the now-mobile baby. WCDSS gave Jacqueline a written "case plan" - a list of things she needed to do to get her children back. The plan required her to find and keep housing, obtain stable income (through work or welfare), and show she could meet her children's basic needs. WCDSS and a nonprofit called the Children's Cabinet then provided extensive help: referrals to the Reno Housing Authority and Section 8 housing, victim-assistance programs, low-income energy assistance, job-search help, resume help, mental-health referrals, hotel funds, diapers, donated furniture, bus passes, clothing for job interviews, and more. Despite this assistance, Jacqueline lived in roughly 15 different shelters, apartments, and motels between October 2012 and July 2015. She quit or was fired from nearly every job within a month. She did not complete therapy with any of three referred therapists. She did not use a Section 8 voucher she received, did not apply for Victims of Crime Act funds, and did not submit paperwork for low-income energy assistance. After a six-day trial with 21 witnesses, the district court terminated her parental rights, finding that she had made only "token efforts" toward reunification and that termination served the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirms. Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Parraguirre uses the case to make a clear public statement: under Nevada law, a parent cannot be found neglectful or unfit simply because she lacks money. The relevant statutes themselves require the parent to be "financially able" before failing to provide basic care counts against her. But that protection does not shield a parent who fails to use the resources she is given. The Court concludes there was substantial evidence that Jacqueline's failure to reunite with her children was not caused by poverty, but by her not following through on the help offered. The Court also rejects Jacqueline's argument that the district court was required to find "serious harm" to the children before terminating her rights. Nevada law lists several possible grounds for parental fault, and the trial court only needs to find one of them.

This case asks a question that Nevada's appellate courts had not previously answered head-on: can a court terminate a parent's rights to her child when the parent is so mentally ill that she would not be considered competent to stand trial in a criminal case? The Nevada Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances here, yes - the trial may go forward. The mother in this case had been diagnosed with schizoaffective bipolar disorder. Shortly after her son was born, hospital staff alerted the Department of Family Services because the mother insisted the baby was not hers and tried to take a different child. Two months later she brought the baby to the hospital claiming the infant had told her, in full sentences, that he had an earache. The child was placed in protective custody, adjudicated neglected, and made a ward of the court. The mother received a case plan focused on her mental health, but DFS observed that her condition did not improve. While the termination case was pending, she was arrested for allegedly boarding a bus and trying to take another child she believed was hers, and she was repeatedly found incompetent to stand trial in that criminal case. The district court did several things to protect the mother's interests. It appointed a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to look after the legal interests of someone who cannot represent themselves) under Rule 17(c) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. It granted multiple continuances - delays - hoping the mother would regain competence. When that did not happen, the court ultimately conducted the termination trial without her present in September 2015, with her guardian ad litem in attendance, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the mother argued that proceeding without her violated her constitutional right to due process. She pointed to a U.S. Supreme Court case, Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires courts to balance the private interest, the risk of an inaccurate result, and the government's interest before depriving someone of an important right. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that challenge. It explained that, unlike criminal cases, civil cases - including termination cases - do not require a court to wait indefinitely for a party to regain mental competence. Nevada law actually allows mental illness itself to be a basis for finding parental fault, so it would be inconsistent to also require the court to halt the case forever because of that same illness. The court noted that children have a powerful interest in stability and permanency, and that holding a child "in limbo" until a parent might one day be well enough to participate is not what Nevada law contemplates. The district court had given the mother many chances and had effectively considered all the factors that due process required. The mother also argued that the State had improperly served her by publication (publishing notice in a newspaper rather than handing it to her directly) when it actually knew or could have known where she was. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the State's conduct was proper, but ruled that the mother's lawyer never raised this objection in the district court, so the issue was waived and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court therefore affirmed the order terminating her parental rights.

This case asks whether a parent facing the loss of his parental rights in Nevada is entitled to have a jury -- rather than a judge -- decide the case. The Nevada Supreme Court answered no. The Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) removed Jesus F.'s six children from his home in January 2010, citing drug use, safety hazards, and inadequate supervision. The children were placed in protective custody under NRS 432B.330 and lived in various out-of-home placements over the next four years. After the three older children reached adulthood, WCDSS petitioned to terminate Jesus F.'s parental rights as to the three remaining minor children. Jesus F. demanded a jury trial. The district court denied that demand, held a bench trial, and terminated his parental rights. On appeal, Jesus F. argued that both the U.S. Constitution and the Nevada Constitution gave him a right to a jury. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. As to the federal constitution, the Seventh Amendment's civil jury-trial right does not apply to the states, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that due process requires a jury in termination cases. Applying the due-process balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concluded that a bench trial here posed only a minimal risk of an erroneous decision because Jesus F. received notice, appointed counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, and the right to appeal. As to the Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 preserves the right to jury trial as it existed when Nevada's Constitution was adopted in 1864. Termination of parental rights actions did not exist in 1864 -- they were created by the Nevada Legislature in 1975 -- and the Legislature has not granted a jury-trial right in such proceedings. The court also noted that requiring jury trials would slow family courts, undermine the children's anonymity, and require structural changes that several Nevada family courts are not equipped to make. The court observed that the majority of states deny jury trials in termination cases. The court also upheld the termination on the merits. Under NRS 128.109, when a child has been placed outside the home for 14 of any consecutive 20 months, the law presumes that the parent has made only token efforts and that termination is in the child's best interest. The district court found that Jesus F. did not rebut the presumption and that there were five separate grounds of parental fault. The Supreme Court held those findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.

This case is about who should have legal custody of a young girl, N.M., and whether a Nevada court had the power to decide that question. N.M. was born in California in 2007 to appellant, a Mexican citizen. Mother and child moved to Mexico, and in 2008 the mother left N.M. with the maternal grandparents. A Mexican family-services agency (DIF) and the grandmother signed a document indicating the grandparents had custody. By 2009 or 2010, the child's aunt and the aunt's then-partner (the respondent, a U.S. citizen) were raising N.M. In 2011, the mother signed a document appearing to give custody to the aunt and respondent. In 2012, after the aunt's relationship with respondent ended, respondent moved with N.M. to Nevada. Soon after, the mother's half-sister came to respondent's home at night and tried to take N.M. Respondent then asked a Nevada district court to appoint him temporary guardian on an emergency basis. The court did so, and several months later, after a two-day hearing, made him N.M.'s general (permanent) guardian, finding that the mother had abandoned the child. The mother appealed, arguing chiefly that the Nevada court had no authority to decide custody because N.M. had not yet lived in Nevada for six months when respondent first filed his emergency petition. She also argued that there was not enough evidence to overcome the legal preference that biological parents - not third parties - should generally be appointed guardians of their own children. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. On jurisdiction, the court explained that NRS 125A.335 lets a Nevada court step in on an emergency basis to protect a child physically present in the state who has been abandoned or who faces mistreatment. Because N.M. was in Nevada and someone had tried to take her from respondent's home at night, the emergency power applied. The court then held that an emergency order can ripen into a final custody decision once Nevada has become the child's "home state" - meaning the child has lived here for six months - so long as no other state or country has an existing custody case or order. By the time the general-guardianship proceeding began, N.M. had lived in Nevada more than six months and there was no competing custody order or case elsewhere. So the Nevada court had power to make a final ruling. On the merits, the court explained that Nevada law presumes parents are preferred as guardians, but that presumption can be overcome by showing the parent is unfit or that other "extraordinary circumstances" exist - including abandonment. Nevada law presumes a parent intended to abandon a child if the parent leaves the child with someone else for six months without supporting or communicating with the child. The district court had evidence that the mother left N.M. with relatives, signed a document apparently giving custody away, and did not provide support or communicate with the child during long stretches. The Supreme Court concluded that this was enough evidence to support the abandonment finding, and so affirmed the appointment of respondent as N.M.'s guardian.

This case involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his two surviving children. Between 2006 and 2011, the family experienced seven separate incidents in which one of the three children swallowed foreign objects such as coins, magnets, and batteries. All occurred while the father, Arli, was at work and the mother, Abigail, was home with the children. One son, J.M., died in 2006 from undetermined causes. After three-year-old E.M.M. required surgery to remove a large battery lodged in his throat, doctors became concerned that Abigail was forcing the children to swallow objects and contacted child protective services. The doctors compared the size of the battery, for a child E.M.M.'s age, to an adult swallowing a golf ball. In November 2011, DFS removed A.P.M. and E.M.M. from the home and placed them in foster care. The juvenile court gave each parent a "case plan" - a written list of things they had to do (such as parenting classes and counseling) to try to get their children back. Arli completed his case plan quickly. Even so, in December 2012, DFS asked the court to terminate both parents' rights permanently. After a five-day hearing, the district court ordered termination, finding that Arli had been neglectful by not taking action to protect his children after the repeated swallowing incidents - including continuing to leave them alone with Abigail - and that termination was in the children's best interests. Abigail died while the appeal was pending, leaving only Arli's appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two new legal questions. First, it held that finishing a court-ordered case plan does not, by itself, prevent a court from terminating parental rights. A completed case plan can be persuasive evidence in the parent's favor, but Nevada law does not make it a shield against termination if the other legal grounds are satisfied. Second, it interpreted a Nevada statute that creates two legal presumptions when a child has lived outside the home "for 14 months of any 20 consecutive months": (1) the parent is presumed to have made only token efforts, and (2) termination is presumed to be in the child's best interest. Arli argued the district court had to wait the full 20 months before applying these presumptions. The Supreme Court disagreed - once the 14-month threshold is hit, the presumptions can apply right away. Here the children had been out of the home about 17 months, which was enough. Finally, the court held that "substantial evidence" - meaning enough credible evidence that a reasonable factfinder could agree - supported termination. The court pointed to Arli's failure to take protective action after seven serious swallowing incidents, his limited relationship with the children, and the foster parent's testimony that she had a close relationship with the children and wished to adopt them. The court noted that even with Abigail's death, Arli remained "unable to protect his children from danger, swallowing or otherwise." Two justices dissented in whole or in part. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Cherry, would have remanded for a new best-interests hearing because Abigail - the apparent source of the danger - had died and Arli had completed his case plan. Justice Saitta agreed with most of the majority opinion but wrote separately to dissent on the parental-fault finding, viewing Arli's mistaken belief about Abigail and his completed case plan as not enough to amount to neglect.

This case is about a mother, Keaundra D., who lost her parental rights to her two children after her one-year-old son, C.B., was burned in the face by an iron. Keaundra told investigators she was the only adult home at the time; according to her trial testimony, she was in an attached bathroom getting ready for work when she heard the iron fall, and her older child told her that C.B. had tried to kiss the iron. After an anonymous call to a child abuse hotline, DFS investigated. Keaundra moved her family to Louisiana, which DFS characterized as a flight in an attempt to hide the children. The children were removed from her care, and DFS filed a petition for protective custody, alleging that Keaundra had either physically abused or negligently supervised C.B. At a hearing, a medical examiner, Dr. Mehta, testified that the shape of the burn was inconsistent with an accident and that the iron was deliberately held to C.B.'s face. Keaundra tried to counter that testimony with a report from Dr. Neuman, the physician who had personally examined C.B. in Louisiana. The hearing master - a court officer who conducts hearings and makes recommendations to a judge - refused to admit the report because it was not a certified copy, found that Keaundra physically abused C.B., and the juvenile court affirmed, concluding the injury was not accidental. Keaundra was then given a "case plan" - a set of requirements a parent must satisfy to be reunited with her children. She completed nearly all of it: parenting classes, stable housing and jobs, an assessment, and therapy. Her therapist testified that her behavior and demeanor had markedly changed and that her risk to reoffend was low. But DFS continued to recommend terminating her parental rights for one reason: she would not admit that she had deliberately held the iron to her son's face. DFS stated at trial that, with such an admission, it would not have sought termination. The district court ultimately terminated her rights, relying on the earlier finding that the injury was not accidental. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether Keaundra abused her child. Instead, it focused on a procedural point: Keaundra argued that Dr. Neuman's report was improperly excluded, and DFS never responded to that argument. Under Nevada's appellate rules, failing to respond to an argument can be treated as a "confession of error" - effectively conceding the point. The court concluded that DFS confessed error. Because every finding of parental fault in the case traced back to the abuse finding - which in turn rested on the improperly excluded rebuttal evidence - the court reversed the termination order and sent the case back for a new trial on Keaundra's parental rights. The court noted, but did not decide, Keaundra's separate argument that conditioning her parental rights on an admission of intentional harm violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The order terminating the father Christopher B.'s parental rights was not before the court because he did not appeal.

This is a leading Nevada case on the rights of a 'nonoffending parent' - a parent whose child ends up in state custody because of the OTHER parent's conduct, not because of anything that parent did. In May 2009, two-year-old A.G. was placed in the protective custody of Washoe County Department of Social Services after her mother, Rachael, was found extremely intoxicated while caring for her at a campsite. A.G.'s father, Kory, was not present and had nothing to do with the events leading to the removal. In fact, Kory had been A.G.'s primary caretaker since birth and she was well cared for; at the time, the child was temporarily with Rachael because Rachael had obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) against Kory. That TPO was later modified and then dismissed for lack of evidence. Even though the only allegation against Kory in the neglect petition was the TPO - which was dismissed - and Social Services agreed to dismiss the neglect petition as to Kory, the agency still gave Kory a 'case plan' requiring drug testing, a substance abuse evaluation, and a domestic violence evaluation (because a drug test taken before he even had a lawyer came back positive). The court kept the child out of Kory's custody based on concerns about his drug use, and Kory did not fully comply with the case plan. Because the child was out of the home for more than 14 of 20 months and Kory did not complete the plan, Social Services invoked legal 'presumptions' that a parent who does these things is at fault and that termination is in the child's best interest, and petitioned to terminate Kory's parental rights. After a three-day trial, the district court denied the petition, finding Kory was a nonoffending parent whose constitutional rights had been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that keeping a child from a parent who did not cause the removal, was never found to have neglected the child, and as to whom the neglect petition was dismissed, violates that parent's fundamental constitutional right to parent. Because the out-of-home placement and the failure to complete the case plan resulted from an unconstitutional requirement, the termination presumptions under NRS 128.109 could not be used against Kory. The Court explained that if the agency had genuine concerns about Kory's drug use, the proper course was to maintain and prove a neglect petition against him - not to impose a reunification case plan on a parent who should never have been required to complete one. The Court also agreed that, without the presumptions, Social Services failed to prove parental fault or that termination was in A.G.'s best interest by clear and convincing evidence.

This case is about what a trial judge must put in writing (or say in open court) when permanently ending a parent's legal relationship with a child. A father's child was removed from his care and placed in the legal custody of the State of Nevada's child-welfare agency, DCFS. DCFS then asked the district court to terminate the father's parental rights - a step that permanently severs the legal parent-child relationship. To win, DCFS had to prove two things by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high standard of proof, more demanding than the usual civil standard): first, that ending the father's rights was in the child's best interest, and second, that some form of "parental fault" existed - such as abandonment, neglect, or unfitness. The district court held a two-day trial, asked the parties to submit closing arguments in writing, and then issued a written order - drafted by the State - terminating the father's rights. The problem, according to the Nevada Supreme Court, was that the order contained no actual factual findings. On the child's best interest, it said only that "[t]he best interests of [the child] will be served by terminating any parental rights of [appellant]." On parental fault, it listed six grounds that simply repeated the language of the termination statutes, "without explanation as to any corresponding evidence." Because the trial court had also deferred its ruling until after written closing arguments, it never made any oral findings on the record either. The Supreme Court explained that without specific findings, an appellate court cannot tell whether "substantial evidence" - the level of proof needed to sustain the ruling on appeal - actually supports the decision. Merely reciting the statutory grounds does not qualify as findings, because such statements "do not explain, based on the record evidence, why the district court found that the statutory grounds for termination existed." The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back to the district court to enter its findings. Importantly, the court did not decide whether the father's rights should or should not be terminated; as it stated, "We make no comment on the merits of the underlying proceeding."

This case is about ending a mother's legal rights to her child when the child qualifies as a Native American child under a federal law called the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). N.J. was born in September 2005, two weeks premature, and both she and her mother, Dawn, tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine at the birth. Nevada's child welfare agency, DCFS, became involved, and N.J. was placed in foster care days after leaving the hospital. She remained with the same foster family from that point on. DNA testing showed that Javy J. was N.J.'s biological father, but according to DCFS he denied paternity and never contacted the child or the agency again. Because Javy is an enrolled member of the Ely Shoshone Tribe, N.J. was eligible for tribal membership, which made the ICWA apply to the case. Dawn herself is not a member of any tribe, and the tribe did not intervene in the case beyond providing expert testimony. DCFS created a case plan for Dawn and arranged visits, but the opinion recounts that Dawn continued testing positive for drugs during the first 18 months of N.J.'s life, missed more than half of her scheduled visits in the first year, achieved only a few months of sobriety in 2007, and tested positive again in October 2007. Witnesses described N.J. as fully bonded with her foster family, which planned to adopt her and, having Native American ancestry of its own, planned to educate her about her tribal roots. The complication is that two different legal standards were in play. Nevada law lets a court terminate parental rights if the key facts are proved by "clear and convincing evidence" - a demanding standard, but less demanding than the criminal-law standard. The federal ICWA requires something more: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony from a qualified expert witness, that keeping the child with the parent would likely cause the child serious emotional or physical damage. The district court used both standards - the state standard for state-law questions and the federal standard for ICWA questions. It found the state requirements satisfied, but found the ICWA requirement unmet, because the tribal expert who testified was not qualified to say whether returning N.J. to either parent would seriously harm her. The district court nonetheless terminated Dawn's rights by applying the Existing Indian Family (EIF) doctrine - a judge-made exception to the ICWA that applies when the child is not, and never was, part of a Native American family or tribe. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed on all fronts. It formally adopted the "dual-standard" approach used in most states: state-law findings are judged by Nevada's clear-and-convincing standard, and ICWA findings by the federal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. It found substantial evidence supporting the district court's conclusions that termination was in N.J.'s best interest and that Dawn was at fault as a parent through neglect, unfitness, and merely "token efforts." It agreed that DCFS did not satisfy the ICWA's higher standard because no qualified expert testified about the likelihood of serious harm. But it held that the EIF doctrine may apply on a case-by-case basis - specifically in circumstances like these, where the only person contesting termination is a non-Native American parent, neither the tribe nor the Native American parent objects, and no breakup of a Native American family is at stake. The court observed that applying the ICWA here "would serve only one purpose: to deprive N.J. of the only home she has ever known and come to love," an outcome it said would run counter to the ICWA's goal of protecting the best interests of Native American children. The termination order was affirmed.

Phillip A.C. adopted a two-year-old girl, Z.R.K., the child of his former stepdaughter, Tarah. The adoption was supported by written consents from Tarah and the child's father giving up their parental rights. Soon after the adoption was granted, Tarah contacted the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska, saying she had signed the consent under duress and had been deceived into missing the adoption hearing. Tarah is part Native American, and so is Z.R.K. The Tribe asked the court to undo the adoption, arguing it violated the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which requires special protections - including that a judge certify that a parent's consent was fully explained and understood. The consents here had not been properly certified. The district court ultimately vacated the adoption after the Tribe's enrollment officer submitted a sworn statement that Z.R.K. was eligible for tribal membership. Phillip appealed, raising three main arguments: that a voluntary dismissal notice had stripped the court of authority, that the enrollment officer's affidavit was not proper evidence of the child's tribal status, and that the Tribe had no standing to challenge the adoption on its own. The Nevada Supreme Court reached five conclusions. First, the court kept its authority because the ambiguous dismissal notice, which referred to a single 'petitioner,' applied only to Tarah, not the Tribe. Second, the dismissal was ineffective anyway because it was filed after the court had already heard and decided the merits. Third, a tribal enrollment officer's affidavit is admissible evidence that a child is a Native American child subject to ICWA, because tribes decide their own membership. Fourth, under ICWA a tribe has independent standing - separate from the parents - to challenge a voluntary adoption that terminates parental rights. Fifth, however, the district court erred by vacating the adoption without giving Phillip a chance to rebut the enrollment officer's authority. The court reversed and sent the case back solely to let Phillip present rebuttal evidence on that narrow point.

This case is about when a court may permanently end a parent's legal rights to her children, and who has to prove what before that happens. In May 2002, Child Protective Services removed two children, then twelve and eleven years old, from the home of their mother, Tammila G., and her boyfriend, George L. CPS had received a report that friends of the couple were binding the children with duct tape, slapping, and kicking them while the adults were away. According to the children, this happened repeatedly, and although they told their mother, she did not take steps to stop it. During a follow-up home visit, Tammila admitted to recent methamphetamine use, and George was arrested for a probation violation after officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the house. The children were made wards of the State and placed in foster care. The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) gave Tammila a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to be reunited with her children, such as drug testing, a psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, and proof of a stable home and income. Over roughly three and a half years, DCFS filed six reports with the court, each showing that Tammila was not completing the plan. To her credit, she visited the children regularly while they were in Nevada, missing only one visit. Eventually the children were placed with their maternal aunt and uncle in Louisiana, who were interested in adopting them, and the State petitioned to end Tammila's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court granted the petition, finding both that termination was in the children's best interests and that "parental fault" existed - the two things Nevada law requires before parental rights can be terminated. On appeal, Tammila made two main arguments. First, she said the State had to prove that an actual adoptive placement existed for the children before her rights could be terminated, relying on the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), a federal law Nevada follows in order to receive federal child-welfare funding. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this. Reading the federal statute's plain language, the court explained that it requires states to begin looking for an adoptive family at the same time as they seek to terminate parental rights - not to prove one exists first - and the statute even excuses that concurrent search when "the child is being cared for by a relative," which was the situation here. The court also found nothing in Nevada's own statutes requiring proof of an adoptive placement before termination. Second, Tammila argued that the State should have presented evidence of what the children themselves wanted. Nevada law (NRS 128.107(2)) tells courts to consider a child's desires about termination if the child is capable of expressing them, but the statute does not say which side must produce that evidence. Separately, another statute (NRS 128.109(2)) creates a "presumption" - a legal starting assumption - that termination is in a child's best interest once the child has lived outside the parent's home under a protective placement for 14 of any 20 consecutive months. Here, the children had been out of the home for over forty consecutive months. The court held that once that presumption kicks in, it is the parent's burden - not the State's - to offer evidence of the children's desires if the parent wants the court to consider them, because such evidence is part of rebutting the presumption. Tammila offered no such evidence. The court noted that a CASA report from about two years before the hearing indicated the children did not wish to be adopted, but that report predated their move to their aunt and uncle's home, and the district court considered it and terminated the rights anyway. Finally, the court reviewed the record and concluded that substantial evidence supported the termination. Tammila claimed two years of sobriety and a stable home but presented no independent proof of either; she still lived with her boyfriend in the same house where the abuse occurred, and the record did not show the threat had been eliminated. Meanwhile, the children were described as flourishing with their aunt and uncle in Louisiana, with improved school performance and behavior. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the termination.