Nevada family-law case summaries

This case is about who can be legally recognized as a parent in Nevada when a child was born through a surrogate arrangement and one of the adults raising the child has no biological connection to the child. Mary Lorenzo and Pierre Gendebien were in a relationship and lived together starting in 2016. In 2017, Gendebien signed a gestational agreement - a contract to have a child through a surrogate (a woman who carries and gives birth to a child for someone else). The child, A.G., was conceived using Gendebien's sperm and an egg from an anonymous donor. The agreement named Gendebien as the only intended parent and left the space for a mother's name blank. Before the child was born, Gendebien obtained a court order establishing himself as the sole parent, and the child's birth certificate left the mother's name blank. A.G. was born in June 2018. Lorenzo and Gendebien raised the child together in their shared home until their relationship ended in November 2021. At first they shared equal time with A.G., but Gendebien gradually reduced Lorenzo's access and eventually cut it off. Lorenzo then went to court in September 2022, asking to be recognized as A.G.'s mother and seeking joint legal and physical custody. She said she and Gendebien had held her out as A.G.'s parent, that they had lived together as a family since before the child's birth, and that Gendebien had promised to add her name to the birth certificate. Gendebien asked the court to throw out her complaint, arguing she had no right to seek parentage because she did not give birth to A.G., did not adopt A.G., was not married to Gendebien, and was not named in the gestational agreement. The district court agreed and dismissed her maternity and custody claims (though it allowed a separate request for nonparent visitation to continue, which was later denied). The Court of Appeals reversed. The court explained that when someone asks a court to dismiss a complaint at the very start of a case, the court must assume the facts the person alleges are true. The question is only whether those alleged facts, if proven, could entitle the person to relief. The court held that Nevada's parentage statutes do not limit motherhood claims only to women who have a biological link to the child. Under NRS 126.231, "any interested party may bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and child relationship," and Nevada's rules about how fatherhood can be presumed apply to motherhood cases "insofar as practicable." The court held that two of the ways a man can be presumed to be a father - living with the child's other natural parent for at least six months before conception and continuing through the period of conception, and receiving the child into his home and openly holding the child out as his own - can apply equally to a woman seeking to be recognized as a mother. Because Lorenzo alleged facts fitting these situations, her case should not have been dismissed at the outset. The court also addressed the surrogacy contract. It held that the contract locked in Gendebien's rights as the intended parent "immediately upon the birth of the child," but did not permanently block other interested people from later trying to establish that they are also a parent - unless they had agreed to be left out. The court noted that the surrogacy statutes were mainly designed to prevent a surrogate from later claiming to be the child's parent, not to forever shut out everyone else. The court sent the case back to the district court with instructions. On remand, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing. Lorenzo must first prove, by a preponderance of the evidence (meaning more likely than not), that she qualifies as a presumptive parent. If she does, Gendebien then gets the chance to rebut - to overcome - that presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence (a higher standard). To decide whether rebuttal is appropriate, the court announced a new three-part test looking at how the family was formed, whether the person voluntarily took on parental responsibilities, and whether anyone else is claiming to be the child's second parent. If Lorenzo's presumptive status is not rebutted, she is recognized as a parent and the court moves on to decide custody based on the child's best interest. If it is rebutted, judgment goes to Gendebien.

Allison Schmidt and Erland Alan Fay married in 2019 and have one child. In 2022, Schmidt filed for divorce and asked for things like back child support, reimbursement for the child's health insurance premiums, and costs tied to her pregnancy. The case went to trial, but partway through, the two sides began settling their disputes by stating their agreement out loud "on the record" (meaning the terms were spoken in court and captured in the transcript). Schmidt said she was satisfied with most of the agreement on custody and child support, but at first did not want to give up two claims: reimbursement for her in vitro fertilization (IVF) expenses and past child support for periods when she cared for the child while the couple lived apart. The judge noted the parties were "stuck" and asked Schmidt to decide how she wanted to proceed. Fay then proposed a solution: he said Schmidt had loaned him $6,000 and he had repaid $4,500, and he offered to pay an additional $2,000. When the judge asked if $2,000 would "resolve it," Schmidt agreed. The judge described the $2,000 as a "settlement payment to resolve any other outstanding claims," and Schmidt responded, "[t]hat sounds good." When asked whether she fully agreed with the terms placed on the record, she said "Yes." The district court then wrote up a divorce decree based on that spoken agreement. The decree said Fay would pay Schmidt $2,000, which would serve as "full and final settlement of all past claims for child support arrears, labor/delivery charges, etc." Schmidt later changed course. She asked the court for relief from the decree, requesting a new trial on the financial issues and that the decree be corrected to match what she believed was actually agreed. Separately, several months after the decree, she received a Facebook friend request from the judge. On advice from the State Bar, she disclosed the friend request to Fay and tried to hire a lawyer for the upcoming hearing but could not find one on short notice. She asked the court to delay the hearing so she could obtain counsel. The court denied that emergency request and, after a hearing, also denied her motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeals examined the trial transcript and concluded there was solid evidence that Schmidt had agreed the $2,000 payment resolved all of her remaining financial claims and that the decree accurately reflected that agreement. The court noted she never objected when the judge stated the payment would settle the outstanding claims, and she confirmed she was in full agreement. The court also rejected her argument about being denied a delay to hire a lawyer, finding she did not show she was harmed or that the result would have been different — particularly because the friend request happened months after the decree was already entered. To the extent she suggested the judge was biased, the court found she did not show the alleged bias came from outside the case or reflected the kind of deep hostility that would prevent a fair judgment. The court affirmed.

Jared and Randell Cleland were married and share three minor children; both initially lived in Nevada. After the marriage broke down, Jared moved to Hurricane, Utah, and took the two youngest children with him. Randell filed for divorce and asked for primary physical custody of the two youngest children, arguing the oldest child was not part of the case because Jared was not that child's biological father. Jared countered that he had adopted the oldest child and asked for primary physical custody of the children so they could live with him in Utah. While the case was pending, a temporary order let Jared keep primary physical custody of the two youngest children, with Randell having weekend parenting time. At an evidentiary hearing, the two parents told very different stories. Randell testified she had agreed only that the children could stay with Jared for most of the summer and always intended for them to live and attend school in Nevada. Jared testified that Randell had orally agreed the two youngest children could live with him and attend school in Utah, and he pointed to Facebook Messenger exchanges as proof. Randell said those messages concerned only the logistics of summer parenting time. She acknowledged deleting some messages but said they were messages she inadvertently sent while her phone was in her pocket or that contained typos. Jared acknowledged that after being served with the divorce complaint, he was upset by Randell's custody request and, out of frustration, did not bring the children to Las Vegas for her previously agreed parenting time. The district court sided with Randell. It found that Jared was the legal father of all three children because he had signed voluntary acknowledgments of paternity, but it denied his relocation request, found the parties' messages were ambiguous and did not show Randell had consented to the move, awarded the parties joint legal custody, and gave Randell primary physical custody. Jared then asked the court to reconsider, arguing the deleted messages should have triggered a legal presumption that they were harmful to Randell's case - in other words, that the court should have assumed the deleted messages showed she consented to the move. The court denied reconsideration, finding that both parties had testified about the messages and that any information in them had little bearing on its relocation decision. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that when no custody order exists, one parent may not move a child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order allowing the move. The appellate court held that the district court's detailed findings on the relocation factors and the children's best interests were supported by substantial evidence - among them, that Jared moved without adequate housing for the children, that he used the relocation to frustrate Randell's parenting time, and that separating the youngest children from their older sibling caused them emotional pain. On the deleted messages, the court explained that a parent seeking the adverse-evidence presumption must show the evidence was destroyed with intent to harm, and Jared failed to meet that burden. Because appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility findings, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion and affirmed.

This case concerns who is legally recognized as the father of a child, A.A., born in 2011, and how custody of A.A. should be divided. Three adults are involved. Rosie is the child's mother. Henry was Rosie's on-and-off partner; when A.A. was born, Henry and Rosie signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity (a sworn statement declaring Henry to be the father), and Henry's name went on the birth certificate. Ignacio was also Rosie's on-and-off partner during the same period and is the biological father of Rosie's second child, J.A., based on earlier paternity testing. For years, Ignacio suspected he might also be A.A.'s biological father. Rosie and Henry told him he was not, and Henry once showed Ignacio a screenshot of a DNA test purporting to confirm Henry's paternity. Ignacio thought the test looked suspicious and obtained his own DNA tests, which showed he was A.A.'s biological father. Rosie continued to deny him regular contact with A.A. Ignacio sued for a paternity determination and custody. The district court initially ruled against him, saying his challenge came too late. Ignacio appealed, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, and on remand the district court ordered formal DNA testing. The testing confirmed Ignacio is A.A.'s biological father. The district court then declared Ignacio the legal father, ordered the birth certificate amended, and awarded Ignacio and Rosie joint physical custody. Henry was reduced to a "third party" who could request visitation similar to a grandparent. Rosie and Henry appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. They argued biology should not automatically determine legal fatherhood once a child is past age three, that the birth certificate should control, and that the trial court failed to properly analyze A.A.'s best interest before ordering joint custody. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed. It held that under Nevada's Parentage Act, a DNA test showing 99% or higher probability of paternity creates a "conclusive presumption" of fatherhood - meaning it cannot be overcome by other evidence. Because Ignacio's test met that threshold, he is A.A.'s legal father, with all the rights that come with being a parent. The court explained that an older Nevada decision, Love v. Love, which had treated DNA evidence as just one factor, no longer controls because the Legislature changed the statute in 2007 to make DNA results conclusive. The court also explained that the birth-certificate statute Rosie and Henry relied on does not make the certificate dispositive when paternity is contested and the listed father was never married to the mother. On custody, the court held that the trial judge did not have to apply the legal test for modifying an existing custody order, because there was no prior custody order for A.A. Nevada law presumes joint physical custody is in a child's best interest, and the trial court found that Rosie and Henry had intentionally kept Ignacio away from A.A. for years - a circumstance that statutorily favors joint custody. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

Lillian Hargrove and Thomas Ward had a son together but were never married and never went to court to set up a formal child support order while their son was growing up. After the son turned 18, Hargrove sued Ward, asking the court to order Ward to pay her back child support for the years she had primary care of the child. She made two arguments: (1) Ward had promised in writing (through text messages and a course of conduct) to pay $400 per month, and Nevada law makes such written promises enforceable; and (2) even without an agreement, Nevada law lets a parent who had physical custody recover up to four years of past child support from the other parent. The trial judge said he did not have the power to award child support after the child had already become an adult, and so he denied Hargrove's request. Hargrove appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court split the issues. On the written-promise theory, the Court agreed with the trial judge that Ward never made the kind of clear, specific written promise that the statute requires. Text messages saying things like "Yes" to a single deposit request, or promises to send money "as soon as i can," were either too narrow or too vague to count as an enforceable promise to pay ongoing monthly support. So that part of the trial court's ruling was affirmed. On the retroactive child support theory, however, the Court reversed. It held for the first time that a parent can sue for retroactive (back) child support even after the child has reached the age of majority, as long as the lawsuit is filed within three years of the child's 18th birthday - the same window Nevada gives for filing a paternity action. The recovery is still capped at four years of support immediately before the lawsuit was filed. Because Hargrove filed her case roughly 15 months after her son turned 18, her request was timely, and the trial judge was wrong to say he lacked authority to consider it. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings.

This case concerns a fight over custody and visitation of a child after the child's father died. On one side were the child's paternal grandmother (Colt) and aunt (Kanter). On the other side was the child's mother (Plummer). The grandmother went to court asking for custody of the child, or at least the right to visit; the aunt later joined the case. After a lengthy legal battle and a multi-day trial, the trial judge decided in the mother's favor, giving her full custody and refusing to grant custody or visitation to the grandmother and aunt. The grandmother and aunt appealed. Their main argument was that no one ever proved the mother was a fit parent, and that the trial judge ignored evidence suggesting the mother was unfit — specifically, allegations that the mother had abused and neglected the child, struggled with addiction, and had mental health problems. The Court of Appeals disagreed with that characterization of the trial record. When a judge decides child custody, the appeals court does not redo the decision from scratch; it only checks whether the trial judge "abused" his discretion and whether the decision was backed by enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept it. The guiding principle in these cases is always what is best for the child. On the custody question, the law strongly favors placing a child with a fit parent. A non-parent (like a grandmother or aunt) can only win custody over a parent by showing the parent is unfit or that other extraordinary circumstances exist. The appeals court found that the trial judge had, in fact, carefully considered the evidence about the mother. The judge reviewed the extensive Child Protective Services file, noting that out of more than 30 referrals investigated by CPS, only one incident was substantiated, and that occurred several years before this lawsuit began. The judge acknowledged the mother had struggled with addiction but found no evidence of recent addiction-related incidents, and observed that some of her behavioral problems appeared to stem from the volatile relationship with the grandmother and aunt and from the stress of the litigation. The judge also noted one 2018 incident where the mother was detained on a mental-health hold while extremely intoxicated, but found no other relevant mental-health evidence. In the end, the trial judge concluded that the evidence did not show the mother was unfit, so the grandmother and aunt failed to overcome the legal preference favoring the parent. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. On the visitation question, grandparents and certain others who have lived with a child and built a meaningful relationship can ask a court for visitation if a parent has unreasonably denied it. But when a parent has denied visitation, the law assumes visitation is not in the child's best interest, and the people seeking visitation must overcome that assumption with strong ("clear and convincing") evidence. The appeals court noted it was unclear whether the child had ever lived with the aunt (which affects whether she was even eligible to seek visitation), but because the trial judge addressed the request on its merits, the appeals court did the same. The trial judge found that although the mother had sometimes denied contact, she was generally compliant with visitation. The judge weighed the statutory factors and found most of them actually favored the grandmother and aunt, and recognized several ways a relationship with them would benefit the child. But the judge had serious concerns about one factor — the grandmother and aunt's willingness and ability to encourage a relationship between the child and his mother. The judge found a high degree of animosity and conflict between the parties, to which the child was constantly exposed, and concluded that this conflict and the appellants' inability to foster the parent-child bond outweighed the factors in their favor. The appeals court again found no abuse of discretion. Finally, to the extent the grandmother and aunt argued the trial judge gave improper weight to the evidence, the appeals court said it will not re-weigh witness credibility or the evidence on appeal.

Ken Nguyen and Robert Boynes were a same-sex couple who dated from November 2009 to May 2013. During the relationship, they decided to adopt a child together and went to Catholic Charities of Southern Nevada. At the time, Catholic Charities did not allow same-sex couples to adopt jointly, so according to Rob, the plan was for Ken to adopt first and Rob to adopt afterward as a second parent. Both men took part in the entire adoption process - background checks, classes, post-placement visits - and Rob even drafted the "birth mother letter" that helped them be selected. A child was placed with Ken in February 2013, and both men were there to receive the newborn. After the placement, the child spent most nights at Rob's house, Rob took the child to most doctor's visits, supplied most of the baby gear, and was listed as a father on the child's baptism certificate. The child's middle name is Rob's surname. But the men's relationship ended in May 2013. When Rob asked Ken to put him on the birth certificate, Ken refused. Ken finalized his own adoption alone in October 2013 and refused to let Rob complete a second-parent adoption. Rob then sued, asking the court to recognize him as a parent and to give him custody. The district court ruled for Rob, and Ken appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court applied a doctrine called "equitable adoption," which allows a court to enforce an adoption agreement when one person promised to adopt, the other relied on that promise, and a child would be harmed if the promise were broken. The Court had recognized this doctrine in a 1987 case (Frye v. Frye) and had declined to extend it in two later cases where the dispute was really about whether someone was the biological parent. Here, the Court said this case was different: neither Ken nor Rob is biologically related to the child, and the question was whether the two men had agreed to adopt together. The Court found substantial evidence that they had agreed, that Rob relied on Ken's promise, and that the child would be harmed by Rob's removal from his life. The Court also rejected Ken's claim that the district court treated him differently because he and Rob were a same-sex couple. The Court said child custody decisions are made case by case, and nothing in the record showed the result turned on the parties' sexual orientation. Finally, the Court affirmed the joint custody order. Ken had argued Rob was a "stalker" who sent harassing emails, which would trigger a presumption against giving custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. The district court found only a single forwarded email tied to Rob, which it concluded was not enough to show "obsessed stalking behavior." Ken also accused Rob of destroying his computer to hide evidence; the district court found the proof inconclusive. The Supreme Court held substantial evidence supported those findings. Three justices - Justice Stiglich, Chief Justice Cherry, and Justice Hardesty - concurred. They would have reached the same outcome under Nevada's Parentage Act rather than under equitable adoption, relying on the Court's earlier decision in St. Mary v. Damon, which recognized that paternity statutes can apply in same-sex parentage cases.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.

Sha'Kayla St. Mary and Veronica Lynn Damon were a couple who decided to have a child together. They used in vitro fertilization: Damon's egg was fertilized with sperm from an anonymous donor, and St. Mary carried the pregnancy and gave birth. Around the time of the procedure, the two signed a co-parenting agreement stating that they would "jointly and equally share parental responsibility" and, if their relationship ended, would continue to share the duties of raising the child. The child was given the hyphenated last name St. Mary-Damon. About a year after the birth, the relationship ended and the two disagreed over sharing time with the child. In 2009, Damon obtained a court order stating she was "the biological and legal mother of said child" and directing that her name be added to the birth certificate. When St. Mary later filed her own case seeking custody, visitation, and child support, the district court - apparently relying on that 2009 order - treated St. Mary as a mere surrogate (a woman who carries a child for someone else) rather than a parent. The court limited the hearing to "third-party visitation," a lesser right available to non-parents, and refused to consider whether St. Mary was a legal mother. It also declared the co-parenting agreement null and void, reasoning that under the then-existing surrogacy statute "a surrogate agreement is only for married couples, which only include one man and one woman." The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada's parentage law, a woman can establish that she is a child's legal mother by "proof of her having given birth to the child." It also held that Nevada law does not prevent a child from having two legal mothers - here, one woman supplied the egg and the other gave birth, and each of those facts can support legal motherhood. Because the 2009 order recognized Damon as a mother but never said St. Mary was not one, and because the district court decided St. Mary was a surrogate without ever holding a hearing on that question, the case must go back for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether St. Mary is a legal mother or instead a surrogate/gestational carrier with no legal relationship to the child. The court also held that the co-parenting agreement was not a surrogacy contract at all - nothing in it said St. Mary was giving up the child or her rights - and that such agreements between two parents are consistent with Nevada public policy. The court stated that an agreement between two parents about custody after a breakup "must not be deemed unenforceable on the basis of the parents being of the same sex." If the district court finds on remand that both women are legal parents, it must consider the co-parenting agreement in deciding custody.

Michael and Catherine Love married in 1981; a child was born seven months later. Their 1984 divorce decree, based on a settlement, treated Michael as the father and required him to pay child support and the child's medical, dental, and educational expenses. Years later, DNA tests showed Michael was not the child's biological father. When Catherine asked to increase child support (Michael's finances had greatly improved), Michael sued to establish he owed no support, claiming Catherine had fraudulently made him believe he was the father. The district court ruled that the divorce decree conclusively established paternity and that the issue could not be relitigated (res judicata), increased child support to $1,800 per month, ordered Michael to pay private school tuition, and awarded Catherine attorney's fees based on sealed billing statements. The Supreme Court reversed in part. It agreed that a divorce decree establishing paternity is normally final and cannot be relitigated. But it held that 'extrinsic fraud' - here, an allegation that Catherine concealed the child's true parentage and thereby kept Michael from litigating paternity in the divorce - can be a basis to set aside the judgment. Because there was a genuine factual dispute about whether Catherine committed fraud, summary judgment was improper, and the case had to go back for the district court to decide the fraud question first. The Court also held that DNA test results do not, as a matter of law, conclusively decide paternity: under NRS 126.051, presumptions of paternity (including being married to the mother when the child is born and holding the child out as one's own) are rebuttable, and non-biological factors can matter. If, on remand, the court finds fraud, it must weigh the conflicting presumptions. The Court upheld the increased child support, holding a court may exceed the statutory support cap based on the large disparity in the parents' wealth. It held 'educational expenses' in the settlement clearly included private school tuition. But it reversed the attorney's fees award because it was based on sealed billing statements Michael could not review or dispute, noting fees may be available in post-divorce proceedings under NRS 125.150(3).

Cindy married David when she was six months pregnant with another man's child. She says she told David the child was not his; David admits she never told him he was the father. James was born in 1982, with David's name on the birth certificate. The relationship was turbulent - Cindy repeatedly sought battered women's shelters - and she eventually moved to Iowa and raised James largely alone. After a brief attempted reconciliation, Cindy filed for divorce, asserting there were no children of the marriage. The district court applied California's former conclusive presumption of legitimacy (former California Evidence Code section 621) and the doctrine of equitable estoppel to declare David the legal father, even though blood tests conclusively proved he was not James's biological father. The custody award to David followed from that paternity ruling. Cindy appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Applying Nevada's 'substantial relationship' choice-of-law test, it held Nevada law governed: California had no substantial interest (the family had left a decade earlier) and had itself repealed section 621, and applying a conclusive presumption violated Nevada public policy, which lets a child litigate paternity until three years after reaching majority (NRS 126.081). Equitable estoppel did not apply because the record did not support its elements - Cindy had told David he was not the father, and David knew he was not. Nevada's marital presumption of paternity (NRS 126.051) is rebuttable, so the case was remanded to decide paternity on the merits.

When Alice and Melvin Harris divorced in 1975, Melvin denied that he was the father of Alice's child. Blood tests did not exclude him, and the divorce court adjudged him the father, ordering him to pay child support and provide medical and dental care. He did not appeal. About a year later he asked to reduce the support (denied), and two years after the decree he asked the court to modify the decree on the ground that the child was not his natural child. The district court agreed, declared the child was not Melvin's, and set aside all prior support and custody orders. Alice appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the paternity question had already been litigated and decided in the 1975 divorce, so it could not be reopened - the doctrine of res judicata (and collateral estoppel) barred relitigating it. The statute that lets courts modify support and custody after a divorce exists to address changes in circumstances affecting the children of the parties; it cannot be used as a backdoor to attack the parties' status by relitigating paternity. The court noted that Melvin's earlier request to reduce support looked more like acceptance of parenthood than a denial of it.

These consolidated appeals concerned a six-year-old boy, Allen, born out of wedlock to Anita (who later married John Flowers) and Alfred Scott. John Flowers, Anita's husband, petitioned to adopt Allen. But before that petition was filed, Alfred - the natural father - had gone to court and obtained a formal declaration that he was Allen's father, and the court had denied Anita's petition to end Alfred's parental rights. Because Alfred's paternity had been established and he had not consented, he moved to dismiss the stepfather's adoption petition, and the trial court dismissed the adoption. On appeal (Case No. 6514), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal: under a 1971 statute that took effect before the adoption was completed, if the father of a child born out of wedlock has established his parental rights under NRS 41.530, his consent to the adoption is required - and Alfred had not consented. In the companion appeal (Case No. 6297), Anita had appealed the trial court's decision granting Alfred visitation and support rights and denying her petition to terminate his parental rights; the Court found substantial evidence supported those rulings and affirmed them as well.