Nevada family-law case summaries

This case concerns a guardianship — a legal arrangement in which a court gives someone other than a child's parents the authority to care for that child. In April 2017, a Clark County family court granted Joelle Reed and Carolyn Louise Reed guardianship over two minor children, E.I.C. and E.M.D. The guardians, who had already been caring for the children, said the children's parents could not care for them. Over the following years, Richard Clements — E.I.C.'s father — repeatedly tried to end the guardianship over his daughter, without success. In September 2025, Richard filed what he called an emergency motion to vacate (cancel) the guardianship. His main argument was that the original 2017 order should be treated as void — legally invalid from the start — because he had never been properly served with (formally given legal notice of) the guardianship petition. He relied on a court rule, NRCP 60(b)(4), which allows a court to set aside a judgment that is void. He claimed the district court had previously acknowledged there was no proof of proper service in the record, argued the court had used an improper standard in rejecting his earlier attempts, and asserted that the court's repeated errors showed judicial corruption in his case. He asked the court to declare all the guardianship orders void and end them immediately, or, if the court reached the merits, to terminate the guardianship or hold a hearing. The district court denied his motion for two independent reasons. First, it found that Richard had not properly served his own motion on the appropriate parties. Second, addressing the substance anyway, the court found that the service issue had already been decided against Richard in earlier proceedings — meaning it was, in the court's words, "res judicata" (an issue already finally decided and not open to relitigation) — and that Richard had not offered facts showing that ending the guardianship would be in E.I.C.'s best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals pointed out that Richard did not meaningfully argue against the first reason the district court gave — his failure to serve his own motion. Because that was an independent ground for the denial and he did not challenge it, the appellate court treated any argument about it as given up (forfeited), which by itself was enough to uphold the denial. The court then went on to address Richard's actual arguments. It reviewed the district court's decision for what is called an "abuse of discretion" — a standard under which an appellate court does not substitute its own judgment but asks whether the lower court acted within its lawful range of choices. The court found that the record supported the district court's conclusions. An August 2023 order had already found that notice for the original guardianship was sufficient and that the guardians were credible about the service issue, and the district court had already considered and rejected Richard's service arguments before. The appellate court also noted that because the guardians were appointed in April 2017, Richard bore the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that ending the guardianship was in E.I.C.'s best interest — and his motion focused only on the 2017 procedure, not on the child's best interest. For those reasons, the court concluded Richard had not shown the district court abused its discretion, and it affirmed.

The Ruckles had been serving as court-appointed guardians of their three granddaughters since January 2022, when a district court found that the children had been living with their mother, Sara Q., in squalid conditions and were thriving in the Ruckles' care. Over the next two years, Sara petitioned the court to begin reunification therapy - therapy designed to repair the relationship between a parent and her children - and the court eventually ordered the Ruckles, Sara, and the children to participate with a therapist named Dr. Stephanie Holland. Disagreements arose over the wording of the therapist's consent paperwork, and the therapy was slow to begin. Dr. Holland sent the court two confidential reports under NSRG 5, a rule that allows a guardianship judge to receive certain communications about a guardian's conduct or a protected person's welfare. After receiving the second report, the court issued a July 13, 2024 order expressing "significant concern" about the Ruckles' compliance with their duties, ordered the children to undergo psychoeducational testing, expanded Sara's visitation, and set an NSRG 5 hearing for July 25 to address the issues raised in Dr. Holland's report. One day before that hearing, Sara filed a petition asking the court to remove the Ruckles and terminate the guardianship. The court did not issue the formal "citations" (legal notices) that Nevada statutes require when such a petition is filed, and there is no indication the petition was set for any hearing. At the July 25 hearing, which lasted only seven minutes, the district court announced - without taking evidence, hearing argument, or directing briefing - that it was removing the Ruckles as guardians and terminating the guardianship. When the Ruckles' lawyer tried to speak, the judge said, "I understand you've stood up, but I've made my orders. I am terminating the guardianship today." The court told counsel he could file a motion for reconsideration. A written order followed in October 2024. The Ruckles appealed, arguing that they had a constitutional right to procedural due process - basic fairness, including notice and a chance to be heard - before a court could strip them of guardianship, and that they did not get either. The Court of Appeals agreed. Building on the Nevada Supreme Court's 2023 decision in In re Guardianship of D.M.F., the Court of Appeals expressly held that a custodial relative who serves as a guardian has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the child, and is therefore entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court may, on its own initiative, remove the guardian and terminate the guardianship. The court found the notice given here was inadequate. The July 13 order flagged concerns but did not signal that removal or termination was being considered. Sara's last-minute petition came too late and was not accompanied by the statutorily required citations. And even if notice had been adequate, there was no meaningful opportunity to be heard because the district court issued its ruling at the start of a brief hearing, without briefing, evidence, or argument. Rather than simply reversing, the Court of Appeals vacated the order and sent the case back. Because Dr. Holland's confidential reports were not in the appellate record - and because Sara's petition described serious allegations including alleged emotional, psychological, and physical abuse and educational neglect - the court directed the district court on remand to permit briefing, hold an evidentiary hearing, and make the specific findings required by Nevada statutes and the NSRG before deciding whether removal or termination is warranted. In the meantime, the children will remain in Sara's physical and legal custody pending the district court's decision, although the trial court retains authority to enter temporary or emergency orders if circumstances require. The Court of Appeals also noted that the matter is moot as to the eldest child, A.L.R.-Q., because she has turned 18.

This case is a dispute between two grandmothers over who would serve as legal guardian for a young girl, M.J.V. She was born in 2017 with a radial ray malformation in her right arm (no radial bone or thumb). Because both of her parents had substance abuse issues, her maternal grandmother, Brenda, and step-grandfather, Randy, took her home from the hospital, raised her for roughly five-and-a-half years, and received guardianship over her. During that time they handled all of her medical care, consulted orthopedic specialists, and enrolled her in early intervention programs. About five years later, M.J.V.'s father, Kameron, got sober and gradually re-entered her life. When the district court held a hearing on whether Kameron would regain custody, Brenda and Randy failed to appear, purportedly because they were unaware of the hearing date. The court terminated their guardianship and awarded Kameron custody. Four months later, Kameron died in a work-related accident. After Kameron's death, both grandmothers sought guardianship. Kelly, Kameron's mother, petitioned the day after he died and was awarded temporary guardianship. Brenda and Randy received court-ordered visitation every other weekend and then filed their own competing petition. The relationship between the two households was not positive: Brenda and Randy complained that Kelly restricted visitation to the very letter of the court order and that her communication was "[l]imited and late," while Kelly disagreed with Brenda and Randy's decision to skip M.J.V.'s therapy appointments during their visitation time and believed M.J.V. needed to stay with her for stability. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded guardianship to Brenda, with Kelly receiving visitation every other weekend and on holidays. In a later written order, the court found that both sides loved M.J.V. and were credible but had serious animosity toward each other, and it based its decision on four findings: Brenda would be more likely to facilitate a good relationship between M.J.V. and Kelly; Brenda was better equipped and organized to handle M.J.V.'s medical needs; Brenda could provide better living conditions; and Brenda was in better physical and mental condition to care for M.J.V. Notably, both the GAL (a court-appointed advocate for the child) and the ACORN representative had recommended that Kelly receive the guardianship. On appeal, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or second-guess a trial court's factual findings so long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence - "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." The court found substantial evidence supporting each of the district court's challenged findings: Kelly had rigidly restricted visitation and communicated sparingly, while Brenda had a history of allowing family contact, including cautiously allowing Kameron back into M.J.V.'s life; Brenda had managed M.J.V.'s medical care for years and kept detailed handwritten records; and Kelly had chronic conditions (fibromyalgia and lupus, with the former requiring doctor-prescribed oxycodone), while Brenda had passed a physical examination as part of a foster-parent vetting process. The court also rejected Kelly's argument that the district court had to walk through the child-custody best-interest factors in NRS 125C.0035(4): those factors may be considered in a guardianship case but are not mandatory. Nor was the district court bound to follow the GAL's and ACORN representative's recommendations - it had to consider them, and it did, but each recommendation is only one factor among many. Finally, although the district court's order used the phrase "sole legal custody" - terminology that ordinarily applies to parents - any mistake in wording was harmless because the guardianship award itself gave Brenda the legal authority to make medical, educational, and similar decisions for M.J.V.

This case concerns a teenager, Z.B., who was adopted by Alexis B. in 2013 after the parental rights of her biological mother, Michelle Simms, were terminated. In September 2022, Z.B. left Alexis's home and began living with biological family members, including Simms. Over the next five months, Alexis reported Z.B. as a runaway and asked law enforcement and child welfare agencies to conduct welfare checks at Simms' home, which they did. In March 2023, Simms petitioned the district court to be appointed as Z.B.'s guardian. Alexis opposed that petition and filed her own competing petition seeking guardianship. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied both petitions, finding that no guardianship was needed because Z.B. already had a parent (Alexis) willing and able to care for her. Z.B. appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that under Nevada law, a parent is preferred over others as guardian if qualified and suitable, and the person seeking guardianship must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a guardianship is necessary. The district court found Alexis could meet Z.B.'s basic needs and did not pose a safety risk. The district court also found that Z.B.'s claims of physical abuse by Alexis were not credible, and the Supreme Court explained it would not second-guess the district court's credibility determinations on appeal. The court rejected Z.B.'s argument that Alexis had abandoned her. A statutory presumption that a parent is unsuitable applies when the child has been out of the parent's care for the six months immediately before the petition is filed, but here Simms filed the petition just short of six months after Z.B. left Alexis's home, so the presumption did not apply. The record also showed Alexis made consistent efforts to bring Z.B. home. The court also addressed Z.B.'s argument that the district court ignored her preference (Z.B. wanted Simms to be her guardian). The court noted the district court had acknowledged Z.B.'s wishes in its written order, and in any event Z.B.'s preference could not override the conclusion that a guardianship was not necessary.

H.B. is a minor who lost his father and, after a period of homelessness with his mother, began living with his uncle, Marques. Marques asked the family court to make him H.B.'s legal guardian. Marques disclosed up front that he had a felony conviction (for attempted murder, in 2008) and was on parole. H.B.'s paternal grandmother appeared at the hearing supporting Marques, and Marques said H.B.'s mother also supported the arrangement by text message. The district court denied the petition with prejudice for two reasons. First, the judge concluded that Marques's felony conviction automatically disqualified him from being a guardian. Second, the judge found that Marques had not properly served notice of his petition on H.B.'s mother and other close relatives, as Nevada's guardianship statutes require. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with H.B. and Marques on the first point. Reading the statute that lists the things a court must consider in deciding whether someone is fit to serve as guardian, the court held that a felony conviction is one factor the judge must weigh - but it is not an automatic bar. The Legislature did not write an automatic disqualification into the statute, and the court will not add one. Other factors the law requires the judge to consider include the child's preference, the relationship between the proposed guardian and the child, and, ultimately, what is in the child's best interest. Because the district court treated the felony as dispositive and never reached those other factors, that part of its analysis was wrong. On the second point, however, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. Marques did not serve H.B.'s mother or other close relatives by mail, in person, or by publication, and he did not file the affidavit needed to authorize service by publication. The statute lets a judge excuse normal service in limited circumstances, but Marques did not meet those criteria either. The Supreme Court held that the district court was within its discretion to refuse to overlook the service failures. Because the service problem alone supports the denial, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Marques's guardianship petition. But it also instructed the district court to remove the words "with prejudice" from its order, because a denial for failure to serve is not a ruling on the merits. The practical effect is that Marques may file a new petition. If he does, the family court will have to evaluate his suitability using all the relevant statutory factors - not just his criminal record - and then, if it finds him suitable, decide whether the guardianship would be in H.B.'s best interest.

This case involves a grandmother, Donna Gilmore, who asked a family court to make her the legal guardian of her three-year-old granddaughter. A guardianship is a legal arrangement in which a court gives one person the authority and responsibility to care for another person who cannot fully care for themselves - here, a young child. Gilmore filed her petition in May 2023. She claimed the child's mother, Monica Fears, could not properly care for the child because Fears was often homeless, lacked steady work and a vehicle, and had a substance abuse problem. She also noted that the child's father was in jail and could not care for the child. Gilmore said the child had been living with her since May 2022, and she asked the court for temporary guardianship until the case was decided. The court granted the temporary guardianship while it looked into the situation. The court later held an evidentiary hearing - a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented so the judge can make findings of fact. Both women testified. Gilmore said she often babysat the child while Fears worked and disagreed with Fears' choices about who else babysat the child. Fears testified that the child had not moved in with Gilmore; instead, Gilmore had simply been the babysitter while Fears worked night shifts. Fears said she had a full-time job as a restaurant server, also worked part-time as a tattoo artist, had a residence, took the child to medical care when needed, and had a plan for childcare through a housemate. Fears denied having a substance abuse problem. She also explained that she had fainted at work in May 2023 (later diagnosed as a syncope, a temporary loss of consciousness) and was hospitalized, after which Gilmore filed for guardianship and kept the child from her. Under Nevada law, the person asking to become a guardian must prove that the guardianship is necessary by "clear and convincing evidence," which is a demanding standard of proof. The district court found Gilmore did not meet that standard. The court found there was no evidence that Fears could not provide the child's basic needs, no evidence Fears had a drug or alcohol problem, and no evidence of crimes or domestic violence. The court also found that Gilmore had not proven the child was out of Fears' care for the six months before the petition was filed, so a legal presumption that a parent is unsuitable (which can apply when a child has been out of a parent's care for that long) did not apply. Because Gilmore did not prove Fears was unsuitable or that a guardianship was necessary, the court denied the petition and directed that the child be returned to Fears. On appeal, Gilmore argued the court got the facts wrong and that it should have found Fears unfit and found that the child had lived with her since May 2022. The Court of Appeals explained that it generally does not re-weigh evidence or second-guess the trial judge's decisions about which witnesses to believe. It concluded that the district court's findings were supported by the evidence. Gilmore also argued the judge was biased - that the judge asked demeaning questions, used a condescending tone, and had made up her mind before hearing all the evidence. The Court of Appeals rejected this claim, explaining that a judge's rulings and conduct during a case generally do not show disqualifying bias unless they stem from something learned outside the courtroom or reveal deep-seated hostility that would make a fair decision impossible. The court found the record showed the judge listened to the testimony and considered the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.

A family-court judge in Clark County appointed a guardian ad litem - a person assigned by the court to look out for the interests of someone (here, a minor) in a legal proceeding. Irina Hansen tried to appeal that appointment to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the guardian ad litem should have been appointed. Instead, it dismissed the appeal because, after looking at the case, it concluded it had no power to hear it. In Nevada, a party can only appeal to the Supreme Court when a statute or court rule specifically allows an appeal from that kind of order. The court found that no statute or rule allows an appeal from an order appointing a guardian ad litem. Without that authorization, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, so the appeal was dismissed.

This case is about a mother trying to regain custody of her two young children after grandparents had been appointed as their legal guardians. Several years ago, appellant Kristin S. was struggling with addiction and grief following the death of one child's father in 2017. Recognizing she could not adequately care for her children, she reached out to the children's paternal grandparents for help and signed consent forms allowing them to become guardians. Around the same time, her own grandparents, the Luceros, also sought guardianship, and Kristin signed a new consent form favoring the Luceros. After a period in which both sets of grandparents shared caretaking, the district court in 2021 appointed the paternal grandparents as permanent guardians and removed the Luceros. Kristin was not a named party in that earlier proceeding. By 2022, Kristin filed a petition to end the guardianships, saying her life had turned around. She had enrolled in mental health counseling, tested negative for drugs through voluntary hair follicle testing, obtained a driver's license and a full-time job, was raising her two youngest children without issue, and was living in a mobile home on the Luceros' property (they had moved to Colorado). A key legal question was how hard Kristin had to work to win her case. Nevada law (NRS 159A.1915) sets up two different standards. If a parent originally consented to the guardianship, that parent only has to show a "material change of circumstances" and that she is now a suitable parent. If the parent did not consent, she must show that plus an additional element - that the children's welfare would be "substantially enhanced" by ending the guardianship. The district court decided Kristin had to meet the harder, two-part standard, reasoning that when she switched her consent from the paternal grandparents to the Luceros, she effectively withdrew her consent to the guardianship altogether. The court also suggested her original consent might have been invalid because she felt pressured and did not fully understand the forms. Ultimately, the district court denied her petition, finding she had not shown either a material change or substantial enhancement. The Court of Appeals disagreed on several points. First, it held that Kristin did consent to the guardianships originally, so she should only have had to meet the easier standard. The court explained that Kristin voluntarily reached out for help, signed notarized consent forms understanding she was giving up custody while she got her life in order, and never opposed the idea of a guardianship - she simply changed her preference about which relatives should serve as guardians. The court noted that punishing a parent for having asked for help would discourage struggling parents from doing the right thing for their children. Second, the court held that even under the tougher standard, the evidence overwhelmingly showed Kristin had changed and become a suitable parent. She had fixed nearly every problem the courts had previously identified - she now had a job, a driver's license, counseling, and was drug-free. The court also found the district court had made factual errors, including mischaracterizing the testimony of Kristin's therapist, Gerri Goddard, who had actually praised Kristin as an "amazing success story" rather than doubting her. Third, the court held that because Kristin consented, the district court was required to apply the "parental preference doctrine" - a legal rule presuming that a fit parent should have custody of her own children unless she is unfit or extraordinary circumstances exist - and it failed to do so. The court concluded Kristin met her burden and ordered the guardianships terminated, with the case sent back only to handle practical matters like transitioning the children to Colorado and arranging grandparent visitation.

This case is about a mother trying to end a court-ordered guardianship - an arrangement where other adults (here, Clifford C. and Nancy C.) have legal authority to care for her children - so she could regain custody of her three children. The guardianship was put in place in 2016. Amanda agreed to it for her oldest child but objected out loud to it for the two younger children. She then missed a follow-up court date, and the judge established the guardianship over all three children. In 2021, Amanda asked the court to end the guardianship. By then, Nevada had passed a new law, NRS 159A.1915, that took effect in 2017. That law treats parents differently depending on whether they originally consented to the guardianship. Parents who consented only need to show two things: (1) circumstances have materially changed, and (2) they are once again suitable parents. Parents who did not consent must show those two things plus a third, harder thing - that ending the guardianship would "substantially enhance" the child's welfare. The district court treated Amanda as a non-consenting parent for the two younger children. It found she had met the first two requirements but had not shown the children's welfare would be "substantially enhanced" if returned to her. It denied her petition. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that applying the 2017 statute to a guardianship created in 2016 was an improper retroactive application of the law. When Amanda objected to the guardianship in 2016, the heightened standard for non-consenting parents did not yet exist, so it was not fair to attach that new legal consequence to her past conduct. The Legislature, the court noted, specifically said the new statute applies only to proceedings begun on or after July 1, 2017. The court rejected the argument that earlier Nevada cases (especially Hudson v. Jones from 2006) had already imposed the same standard. Hudson dealt with a different kind of custody situation, and the case it relied on (Murphy v. Murphy) was later overruled by Ellis v. Carucci in 2007. So Amanda was not on notice in 2016 that her objection would trigger the heightened showing later codified in NRS 159A.1915. The court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to evaluate Amanda's petition under the older law - NRS 159.1905(3) (2003) - which asks whether termination is in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court's findings that Amanda had shown a material change in circumstances and was again a suitable parent, leaving only the best-interests analysis for the children to be redone on remand.

This case involves three children who had been living under the legal guardianship of their grandmother, Randy Sue K., since 2018. In 2020, the children's mother, Adison R., asked the court to end the guardianship and return the children to her care. After a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the district court agreed and terminated the guardianship. The grandmother appealed, and the children themselves also appealed through their representatives. The grandmother raised several objections. First, she argued that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard - using a "best interest of the child" analysis from Nevada's child custody statutes rather than the "substantial enhancement" of welfare standard required by Nevada's guardianship statute when a non-consenting parent seeks to end a guardianship. Second, she argued that even under the correct standard, the evidence was not strong enough to justify ending the guardianship. Third, the children's side argued that the court should have appointed a lawyer for them before appointing a guardian ad litem (a person who represents the children's interests in the case). Finally, the grandmother contended that the court did not properly weigh the evidence before deciding the mother was a fit parent entitled to the legal preference parents normally receive. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the lower court. The Court explained that the "best interest" factors and the "substantial enhancement" standard, while distinct, involve overlapping considerations - things like a child's physical, developmental, and emotional needs - so it was acceptable for the trial court to discuss best-interest factors as long as it ultimately answered whether the children's welfare would be substantially enhanced by returning them to their mother. The Court found ample evidence supporting that conclusion: the mother was in a better financial position, had a more spacious home, the children's medication needs had not been consistently met under the grandmother's care, and the grandmother had not pursued special-education plans (IEP or 504 plans) for the children's special needs until prompted by the court. Even other adult children of the grandmother testified she was unfit and that the mother could properly care for the children. On the guardian ad litem issue, the Court noted that no one asked for a separate attorney for the children before the close of the evidentiary hearing, so that argument was waived, and in any event the appellants did not show the outcome would have been different. The Court did note that the guardian ad litem's failure to speak with the children was "concerning" but not reversible error. On parental fitness, the Court held that the district court properly considered the relevant factors from the Locklin case - including the mother's absence, her commitment to raising the children, and the impact on their education - and reasonably concluded that the legal presumption favoring placement with a fit parent had not been overcome.

This case involves a young boy, identified as B.S., whose grandparents asked a Nevada district court to make them his temporary guardians - meaning they would have legal authority to care for him while a longer-term guardianship request was being decided. According to the grandparents, B.S. had lived with them his whole life. His mother, who has a history of drug abuse and mental health problems, took him to Missouri in February 2024, where she had what the grandparents described as a psychotic or drug-induced episode and was hospitalized. Child protective services in Missouri and Nevada arranged for B.S. to return to live with his grandparents under a "Present Danger Plan" that barred the mother from unsupervised contact with him. That plan was set to expire on March 10, 2024, and the mother had told the grandparents she planned to take B.S. back. The grandparents filed for guardianship and asked the district court for a temporary order to protect B.S., enroll him in school, and obtain services for his autism. The district court denied the temporary guardianship request without holding a hearing, reasoning only that there was no medical emergency under one of Nevada's two temporary-guardianship statutes (NRS 159A.052). The Nevada Supreme Court held that this was a manifest abuse of discretion because Nevada has a second temporary-guardianship statute - NRS 159A.053 - that allows a temporary guardianship for "good cause" even when no medical emergency exists. The grandparents' filings showed good cause: the mother appeared to be presumptively unsuitable under Nevada law because she could not provide for the child's basic needs and posed a significant risk to his safety; she could not be located; B.S. had pressing schooling and special-needs issues; and the grandparents had cared for him most of his life. The Supreme Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus - a court order requiring a lower court to perform a duty it is legally required to perform - directing the district court to grant the temporary guardianship and to follow the procedural requirements (such as a follow-up hearing within 10 days and notice requirements) that NRS 159A.053 imposes once a temporary guardianship is issued.

Two grandmothers in Las Vegas asked a Nevada district court to make them the legal guardians of their four grandchildren, saying the children had been living with them since March 2023 and were not safe with their mother and her new partner. The court initially denied the grandmothers' petition for procedural reasons (a service issue), and a new hearing was scheduled for April 2024 - several months away. While waiting for that hearing, the two oldest grandchildren, represented by appointed counsel, asked the court for a temporary guardianship - a short-term arrangement that would put their grandmothers in charge of them until the full hearing could happen. They said they were afraid to go back to their mother because of her new partner's history, that they might be unenrolled from school, and that they had been living with their grandmothers for nearly a year. Two days after they filed, the district court denied the request without holding a hearing, saying there was no emergency. The two children then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an emergency order forcing the district court to reconsider. The Supreme Court agreed that the district court had not properly considered the request. Under Nevada law, when a parent has not had care, custody, and control of a child for the previous six months, there is a legal presumption that temporary guardianship is in the child's best interest and that the parent is unsuitable. The children had been out of their parents' care for well over six months, so those presumptions applied. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the district court appeared to have confused who was asking for the temporary guardianship - it was the two oldest children, not the grandmothers, so the fact that no one sought temporary guardianship over the two younger children was not a reason to deny the request. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to reconsider the petition on an expedited basis. It also noted that the district court could, if it preferred, require notice and hold a quick hearing rather than rule ex parte (without the other side present), so the mother and other interested parties would have a chance to respond.

This case involves a 5-year-old boy, identified as B.S., whose grandparents asked a Nevada district court to make them his temporary legal guardians. According to the grandparents, B.S. had lived with them his entire life. His mother, who has a history of drug abuse and mental health issues, lived with them on and off. In February 2024, the mother took B.S. to Missouri, where she had what the grandparents described as a psychotic or drug-induced episode and was hospitalized. Child protective services in Missouri and Nevada arranged for B.S. to stay with his grandparents under a "Present Danger Plan" that did not allow the mother unsupervised contact with him. That plan expired on March 10, 2024. The grandparents filed a guardianship petition on March 8, 2024, asking for temporary guardianship so they could keep B.S. safe, enroll him in school, and obtain special services for his autism. They said the mother had told them she planned to remove B.S. from their home, and they could not locate her or B.S.'s father. They submitted affidavits, a copy of the Present Danger Plan, and video clips for the court to review privately. The district court initially scheduled a show-cause hearing for May 28, 2024, but four days after the petition was filed, without holding any hearing, denied temporary guardianship. The court's stated reason was that the grandparents had not shown a medical emergency under one specific Nevada statute, NRS 159A.052. The grandparents and B.S. then asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in by issuing a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do something it is legally required to do. They argued the district court ignored a different statute, NRS 159A.053, which allows temporary guardianship for nonmedical reasons when there is "good cause." The Supreme Court agreed. It held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion by considering only the medical-emergency statute and failing to consider the more general temporary-guardianship statute. The Court explained that under Nevada law, a parent is presumed unsuitable to care for a child if the parent cannot meet the child's basic needs or poses a significant risk to the child's physical or emotional safety. Based on what the grandparents had submitted, both of those presumptions likely applied to B.S.'s mother. The mother could not be located, B.S. had schooling and special needs that could not be addressed without a guardian, and child welfare agencies and the mother herself had previously entrusted B.S. to the grandparents. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to grant the grandparents temporary guardianship and to follow the additional procedural steps Nevada law requires after such an order is entered, including holding a follow-up hearing within 10 days.

Two children, ages 14 and 10, had been living with their grandmother since March 2023. In October 2023, the grandmother and another relative filed a petition asking to be made the children's general guardians, citing concerns about the mother's housing, her new partner, and her refusal to renew earlier voluntary guardianship paperwork. The hearing on that petition was set far out, eventually rescheduled to April 2024. In late January 2024, the two oldest children, through their own appointed lawyer, asked the district court for a temporary guardianship - a short-term order placing them with their grandmother until the full hearing could occur. They said they were afraid of their mother's new partner because of past domestic violence and the partner's criminal history, that they might not be enrolled in school, and that they had been out of their parents' care for far longer than six months. Two days later, the district court denied the temporary-guardianship request, finding no emergency. The children then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do something the law requires. They argued the district court ignored statutory presumptions that, after six months out of a parent's care, temporary guardianship is presumed to be in a child's best interest and the parent is presumed unsuitable. The Supreme Court agreed in part. It held that the statutory presumptions under NRS 159A.053(4) and NRS 159A.061(4)(c) apply even at the ex parte stage (before the parent has been heard), because the parent gets a chance to rebut them at a hearing held shortly after. The Court also concluded that the district judge's reasoning included a factual misunderstanding: she had partly relied on the fact that the grandmother had not sought temporary guardianship over all four children, but it was the two oldest children themselves - not the grandmother - who filed the petition at issue. The Court further observed that even if a true emergency was lacking, the district court could have required notice and held an expedited hearing rather than simply denying the petition. The Supreme Court did not order that temporary guardianship be granted. It directed the district court to reconsider the petition on an expedited basis under the proper legal framework. Disputes the mother raised about the underlying allegations can be addressed at that hearing.

This case concerns a baby boy, D.M.F., who was born exposed to opiates and amphetamines. His parents admitted to methamphetamine use during pregnancy, so they agreed that the paternal grandmother, Yalonda, would care for the twins (D.M.F. and his brother A.F.) as a temporary guardian while they sought drug treatment. CPS investigated, allowed the babies to go home with Yalonda, and approved her as caregiver. About three months later, A.F. died from positional asphyxia after the parents fell asleep with him on a bed. Police and CPS investigated and found no abuse or neglect; the death was ruled a tragic accident. CPS did, however, find that the parents had relapsed on methamphetamine. Yalonda then promised to seek a formal court guardianship over the surviving twin, D.M.F., and CPS once again approved her as caregiver. About a month after A.F.'s death, Yalonda asked the district court to be appointed D.M.F.'s legal guardian. The court granted that petition without objection. Six months later, the district court received an ex parte communication (a behind-the-scenes message) from another judge who had learned of A.F.'s death from CPS records in a separate case. The court appointed an investigator and held a hearing about whether Yalonda had misrepresented things in her petition by not telling the court about A.F.'s death. After the hearing, the court issued an order removing Yalonda as guardian and terminating the guardianship altogether, and referred the matter to CPS. D.M.F., through counsel, appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that a district court does have power, on its own initiative, to remove a guardian and end a guardianship - it does not need someone to file a formal petition first. But the court must follow constitutional and statutory rules. The Supreme Court ruled the district court violated D.M.F.'s due process rights. Due process means a person must get fair notice and a real chance to be heard before the government takes away an important interest. Here, none of the court's orders clearly told D.M.F., Yalonda, or the parents that the court was considering the major step of removing the guardian and ending the guardianship. The investigator's report contained no recommendations, the hearing took no sworn testimony, and the participants were never clearly told what was on the table. The Supreme Court also held the district court abused its discretion. To remove a guardian, the court must find one of the conditions listed in NRS 159A.185(1) and then conduct a "best interests of the child" analysis using the factors in NRS 159A.186(2). To terminate a guardianship, the court must make specific findings under NSRG 10(A) about the child's health, whether a guardianship is still needed, less restrictive alternatives, and best interests. The district court did none of these things. It also relied on factual mistakes - for example, finding A.F. died "only days" before the petition was filed when in reality it was a month before, and finding A.F. died "within a few days" of Yalonda becoming temporary guardian when she had cared for the twins for three months without incident. On the CPS issue, the Supreme Court held the district court did not exceed its authority. Although the district court expressed opinions about what CPS should do, the actual order simply referred the matter to CPS for "action as they deem fit," and that was permissible. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the lower court to reinstate Yalonda as guardian (if she is willing and able). If the district court still wants to consider removal or termination, it must give clear notice, hold a full hearing, and make the findings the statutes require.

A child identified as D.C.M.M. has a chronic medical condition that, according to his treating doctor, requires ongoing care including routine imaging and prescription renewals. His grandparents say the children's mother abandoned them in August 2023, and they have been caring for D.C.M.M. and his brother since then. The grandparents asked the district court to appoint them as temporary guardians so they could authorize the medical care - the radiology facility had refused to perform the imaging without proof of legal guardianship. The district court denied that request. It found the grandparents' paperwork - filled out without a lawyer - thin on detail and was concerned that the parents had not been notified. The grandparents had explained that they did not know where the parents were or how to reach them. D.C.M.M. then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do something the law requires it to do. The Supreme Court agreed that, on these facts, the district court should have granted at least a limited temporary guardianship for medical purposes. The doctor's letter showed an immediate medical need that could not be addressed without a legal guardian, and the grandparents' inability to locate the parents meant pre-petition notice was not feasible. The Supreme Court directed the district court to grant the temporary guardianship to the extent needed to obtain the medical care described in the doctor's letter. The court also pointed out that this is only a starting point: under the statute, notice must still be given after the temporary guardians are appointed, and the district court must hold a hearing within 10 days to decide whether to extend the guardianship. The district court remains free to require more information from the grandparents and to set conditions that protect both the child's and the parents' interests.

The case involves two minor children whose mother is deceased and whose father, Andrew M., is the appellant. In 2018, the children's maternal grandmother, Melanie Dixon, asked the district court to make her their guardian, and the court did so. Two years later, Andrew asked the court to end the guardianship, saying he had never been served with the original petition even though Melanie knew where he was. The district court refused, and later refused again when Andrew asked it to set aside its decision under a rule that allows courts to undo prior orders in exceptional circumstances. The district court also added Melanie's husband, Jimmy Dixon, as a co-guardian so the children could be covered by his veterans' health insurance. Andrew filed a series of additional requests - asking the court to order reunification therapy, to remove the Dixons as guardians (arguing they had not filed required reports and had moved the children to Florida without permission), to bring in a different therapist, and to appoint a guardian ad litem (an independent advocate for the children). The district court denied all of these and ordered Andrew to pay Melanie and Jimmy's attorney fees. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court on every issue it could reach. It held that Andrew's claim that Melanie misled the court about service was, at best, a claim of "misrepresentation by an opposing party" - which falls under a different subsection of the rule than the one Andrew used, so he could not get relief under the catchall subsection he invoked. The court found no abuse of discretion in adding Jimmy as co-guardian (because the children would benefit from his veterans' health benefits) or in keeping Melanie as guardian (the children had lived with her for four years, were doing well, and Andrew himself said he had no objection to the Florida move). The court declined to rule on the attorney fees issue because the district court had not yet set the dollar amount, making that part of the appeal premature; the court dismissed that portion for lack of jurisdiction.

This case is about when grandparents in Nevada can get a court order requiring their grandchildren's parents to let them visit. Nevada law (NRS 125C.050) lets grandparents and certain other people ask a court for visitation, but only if "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child." The grandchildren's parents, Ashley and John Franklin, divorced and were given joint legal and joint physical custody of the two children. During the divorce proceedings, the children had briefly lived with the grandparents under a six-month temporary guardianship. After the children went back to their parents, Ashley and John signed a partial parenting agreement saying that no one else, including the maternal grandparents, would have court-ordered custody or visitation. The grandparents then asked the court for visitation anyway. At the evidentiary hearing, the father (John) testified that, after a roughly five-month period when he had cut off contact based on a mistaken belief about Phillip's role in his fiance's arrest, he allowed the grandparents to see the children regularly during his custodial time - including afternoon visits, school pickups, an overnight on Christmas Eve 2021, a spring-break trip, and several overnight stays. Phillip kept a log showing 196 hours with the children in 2021. The grandmother (Carolyn), by contrast, said Ashley would not arrange visits during her custodial time. The trial judge found Ashley not credible and relied on John's and the grandparents' testimony. The trial judge ruled that, even though Ashley denied contact during her time, the overall amount of contact the grandparents had with the children - through John's parenting time - was enough that the grandparents were not being "denied or unreasonably restricted" from visiting. The petition was denied. The grandparents appealed. They argued the trial court essentially "rubber stamped" Ashley's refusal by ignoring the fact that she gave them no time at all. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The key legal question was how to read the words "a parent" in NRS 125C.050(3). Does it mean the petition can go forward if just one parent denies visits? Or does the court look at the overall picture across both parents in a joint custody situation? The Supreme Court held that, where parents share joint custody and both participate in the case, courts should look at the petitioners' overall access to the children. If one parent is providing reasonable contact, the petition fails - the court does not need to scrutinize what the other parent is doing. The court reasoned this approach better balances two interests: the child's interest in having a relationship with grandparents (which is met if the grandparents are getting regular contact through one parent) and the parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children, recognized in Troxel v. Granville. Reading the statute the other way, the court said, would let petitions proceed even when the child is already getting plenty of grandparent contact, which would intrude on parental rights without serving the child. Applying that rule, the Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The grandparents' factual reports of their visits supported the finding that contact was not unreasonably restricted. The grandparents' worry that their access could disappear in the future - what the court called the "volatility" of family relationships - was not, by itself, an unreasonable restriction. The court also declined to consider arguments the grandparents had not properly preserved below (that Ashley was unfit and that the court should adopt a "functional-parent" theory) and treated as moot their challenge to the order ending their temporary guardianship, since the six-month guardianship had already expired by its own terms.

Twin girls had been living with their aunt and uncle for roughly six months, apparently because their grandfather, who had been caring for them, was no longer able to do so due to health problems. The aunt and uncle then asked the district court to make them the girls' legal guardians. The girls' mother did not agree to that. Instead, she proposed that the grandfather be appointed guardian for only six months. The district court rejected the mother's proposal, appointed the aunt and uncle as guardians, and did not put a time limit on the guardianship. A few months later, the mother asked the court to end the guardianship and return the girls to her. The district court refused. Nevada law (NRS 159A.1915) sets out what a parent must prove to end a guardianship over her child. If the parent did not originally consent to the guardianship, she must show two things by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that circumstances have materially changed since the guardianship began, including that she is now a suitable parent again; and (2) that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by ending the guardianship and returning the child to the parent. If the parent did originally consent, she only has to prove the first thing. The mother argued she had "consented" to a guardianship - just not the specific one the court ordered - because she had agreed the grandfather could be guardian for six months. She therefore claimed she should not have to prove the second requirement. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. Because she did not consent to the guardianship that the district court actually imposed (with the aunt and uncle as guardians and no time limit), she had to satisfy both requirements. The mother also argued that even if she had to prove the second requirement, the district court was wrong to find she had not. The Supreme Court deferred to the district court's factual findings. The district court had found that the girls had lived with the aunt and uncle for a substantial time, that the aunt and uncle had enrolled them in school and were providing for their welfare, and that the mother's evidence - an apartment lease, paystubs, and photographs - did not show that ending the guardianship would substantially enhance the girls' welfare. Finally, the mother argued the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing before deciding. The Supreme Court was not persuaded, noting she never explained what evidence or which witnesses she would have presented at such a hearing. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the district court's order keeping the guardianship in place.

This case concerns which relatives should serve as legal guardians of two young children, C.F. and P.S. A guardian is a person a court appoints to care for and make decisions for someone who cannot care for themselves - here, two minors. The children's mother, Kristin S., is the natural mother of both. Several relatives competed to be guardians: the maternal great grandparents (called the Luceros in the opinion - the appellants Pamela L. and Michael L.), and the paternal grandparents (the Fergusons and the McGrews). According to the opinion, when the children were about three months and two years old, Kristin gave written consent for the paternal grandparents to serve as guardians while she went to California, saying she was seeking treatment for methamphetamine use. She apparently did not attend any rehabilitation program. After Pamela traveled to California to bring her home, Kristin withdrew her consent to the paternal grandparents and instead consented to the Luceros being guardians of both children. The district court initially set up a temporary arrangement in which all the competing relatives shared guardianship, with the children spending alternating weeks in different homes. This week-on/week-off arrangement continued for nearly two years. The opinion describes concerns that arose during that period, including that P.S. experienced distress from moving between homes and gained a large amount of weight while living with the Luceros, and that P.S. was returned to the Luceros with a bruise after the McGrews had her. Maria admitted spanking P.S. but said the bruise came from a fall on a hearth; a state investigation (DCFS) did not substantiate abuse and attributed the injury to the fall. During the final guardianship hearing, the district court reviewed DCFS reports about all the parties privately (in camera - meaning the judge reviewed the documents in chambers rather than in open court). Those reports showed the Luceros had extensive DCFS involvement and at least one substantiated 2014 report of child neglect, while the paternal grandparents had either no reports (the Fergusons) or one unsubstantiated report (the McGrews). The district court found that Kristin was currently unsuitable to care for her children, citing a history of drug use, failure to attend treatment, unemployment, and instability. The court also found that the Luceros had a chaotic household, a bankruptcy, law enforcement issues, and the substantiated neglect report, and that they were unwilling to allow relationships with the other grandparents. It found the paternal grandparents offered more stability. So it appointed the Fergusons as guardians of C.F. and the McGrews as guardians of P.S., with visitation for Kristin and the Luceros as long as it served the children's best interests. On appeal, the Luceros raised three main complaints. First, they said the DCFS reports were improper hearsay and that reviewing them privately violated their due process rights. The appellate court explained that the Luceros never gave the court the DCFS reports as part of the appellate record, so the court presumed the missing documents supported the district court's decision. The court also concluded that plenty of other evidence - independent of the DCFS reports - supported the guardianship decision, so any error would not have changed the outcome. The court found the due process argument was not properly preserved and, in any event, that the Luceros had opportunities to learn about and respond to the reports. Second, the Luceros argued the court should not have appointed the paternal grandparents and should have applied the "best interest" factors used in custody cases. The appellate court explained that guardianship law has its own set of considerations for deciding who is a suitable guardian and does not require applying the custody-specific best interest factors. The court also found the district court did make specific findings tied to the children's best interests. Third, the Luceros argued the attorneys for the paternal grandparents and for the children should have been disqualified because of prior involvement with the Lucero family - one had represented the Luceros' grandson in a juvenile matter, and the other had represented a victim in a related child-protection case. The appellate court held the Luceros likely lacked standing to raise these conflicts (because they were neither the former nor the current clients of those attorneys) and, in any event, that the prior representations were not disqualifying. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision in full.

This case involves a child, K.M.S., who was taken into protective custody after authorities determined that her mother had abused or neglected her. The Nevada Department of Family Services (DFS) then filed and proved an abuse-and-neglect petition against the father, Kwame A.S., who was incarcerated at the time. Eventually, the child's paternal grandmother, Asha Colson, asked the court to appoint her as the child's general guardian. After a hearing, the district court granted that request. The father appealed. On appeal, the father raised several arguments. He claimed he did not get notice of the guardianship hearing, but the Nevada Supreme Court found that the record showed he and his court-appointed attorney had been served with a citation listing the hearing date, and his attorney attended the hearing. He argued he was denied a right to counsel, but the court explained that there is generally no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney in a case like this, where the litigant's physical liberty is not at stake. Because there was no right to counsel, his related claim that his attorney performed ineffectively also failed. The father also argued that the trial court forced him to incriminate himself at the abuse-and-neglect trial. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in civil cases only when the testimony could affect a future criminal proceeding, and here the criminal case had already concluded. The court added that judges may draw negative inferences in civil cases when a witness improperly invokes the Fifth Amendment. His double-jeopardy argument was rejected because the underlying matter was civil, not criminal. On the non-constitutional side, the father argued the court should not have made K.M.S. a ward of the juvenile court, that it should have stayed the civil case while his criminal appeal continued, that it improperly excluded evidence (a video and police report he wanted admitted), and that the guardianship itself was wrongly granted. The court found substantial evidence supported the protective-custody finding (the father was incarcerated and had two domestic-violence convictions); a stay was not required because a child's need for permanency and stability outweighed the parent's interest in waiting for criminal proceedings to conclude; the proffered video and police report were inadmissible hearsay because no witness was called to authenticate them; and the father identified no procedural error in the guardianship appointment itself. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order.

This case involves a teenager, B.A.A.R., who was born in El Salvador in 2001 and fled to the United States in 2018. His aunt, Lucia, took him into her home in Las Vegas and asked a Nevada court to make her his legal guardian. She also asked the court to make a special set of factual findings under a Nevada statute (NRS 3.2203) that would let B.A.A.R. apply to federal immigration authorities for "Special Immigrant Juvenile" (SIJ) status - a federal program that can lead to lawful permanent residency for certain undocumented young people who cannot safely be reunified with a parent. To qualify for SIJ status, federal law requires a state court first to make three findings: (1) the child has been placed in the custody of an individual or agency, (2) reunification with one or both parents is not viable because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar reason, and (3) it is not in the child's best interest to be returned to his country of origin. The state court does not decide whether the child actually gets SIJ status - that is up to federal immigration officials. The state court's job is just to gather the facts. Lucia argued that returning B.A.A.R. to his mother Maria in El Salvador was not viable because Maria allowed B.A.A.R. to be exposed to violence by her live-in boyfriend, Jose, who had physically abused B.A.A.R.'s sister and threatened to kill B.A.A.R. She also argued Maria's poverty meant she could not properly provide for him. The district court refused to make the requested findings. The judge wrote that he would need a "very specific and detailed history of neglect" to find that reunification was not viable based on poverty, and that a lack of financial resources is "never a sufficient basis to terminate the relationship." The judge also pointed out that Maria and Jose had separated months before B.A.A.R. fled. The Court of Appeals reversed for two main reasons. First, the district court used the wrong legal yardstick. By treating the case as if it were a proceeding to terminate a parent's rights, the judge demanded a higher level of proof than the law requires. The Court of Appeals held that someone asking for SIJ predicate findings only has to show those findings are justified by a "preponderance of the evidence" - meaning more likely than not - which is the ordinary standard in civil cases. SIJ findings are not the same as terminating parental rights; they do not cut off the parent-child relationship. Second, the Court of Appeals said the district court appears to have misunderstood what "abuse or neglect" means under the statute. A parent who fails to protect a child from someone else's harmful conduct can themselves be guilty of abuse or neglect under Nevada law. So even though Jose was the one directly threatening B.A.A.R., Maria's failure to intervene could itself qualify. And the fact that Jose had left the home before B.A.A.R. fled does not erase that history - the court must look at the entire history of the parent-child relationship. The case goes back to the district court to reconsider Lucia's request using the correct, lower standard of proof and the proper definition of abuse or neglect.

This case involves a dispute over a guardianship - a legal arrangement in which a court gives one person authority to make decisions for another adult who the court believes cannot manage her own affairs. Eric Wittler filed a petition asking the district court to appoint him as both a temporary and a permanent guardian for his mother, Carmen Gomez Wittler. The district court appointed a temporary guardian almost immediately and later extended that temporary guardianship while a hearing on the permanent guardianship was still pending. Carmen tried to appeal the order that extended the temporary guardianship and refused to dismiss the case. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether the guardianship was justified. Instead, it decided whether it had the power to hear the appeal at all. In Nevada, an appellate court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. The court walked through each argument Carmen offered for why this particular order could be appealed and rejected all of them. First, Carmen argued the order was a "final judgment" - the type of order that wraps up a case and is therefore appealable. The court disagreed because the underlying petition asked for both a temporary and a permanent guardianship, and the order being appealed only addressed the temporary piece; the permanent guardianship question was still open. Second, Carmen argued the order was effectively a preliminary injunction (a court order requiring or forbidding action while a case is pending), which Nevada rules do allow to be appealed. The court rejected that analogy, explaining that temporary guardianships, like temporary child custody orders, are short-term arrangements that the district court keeps reviewing on a regular basis - and Nevada courts have consistently held that such temporary, periodically reviewed orders are not appealable. Third, Carmen pointed to a statute, NRS 159.375(1), that allows appeals from orders granting or revoking "letters of guardianship." The court explained that the order Carmen was appealing did not itself grant or revoke letters of guardianship; it merely extended a previously created temporary arrangement. Finally, Carmen asked the court to hear the appeal because the case raised important public-policy questions, or alternatively to treat her filing as a petition for a writ (an extraordinary court order). The court said it could not stretch its jurisdiction to reach important issues, but noted Carmen remained free to file a separate writ petition under the appellate rules if she wished. Because none of Carmen's theories established appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court did not need to address a separate question of whether the appeal had become moot when a later order granted a general (permanent) guardianship.

This case is about how an undocumented child living in Nevada can ask a state court to make the findings she needs to apply to the federal government for "Special Immigrant Juvenile" (SIJ) status -- a category of immigration relief for children who cannot safely return to a parent in their home country. To apply, the child first needs a state court to make three specific findings. Only after those findings are made can the child go to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and ask for SIJ status itself. The state judge does not decide whether the child gets SIJ status; the judge just makes findings that the federal agency will later review. A.A. was born in El Salvador in 2004. Her mother, Amaya, came to the United States when A.A. was two. A.A. lived with her father until, according to the opinion, he "kicked her out" when she was ten, after which she lived with her grandmother. A.A. says her father emotionally and physically abused her. At twelve, A.A. moved to Las Vegas to live with her mother, stepfather, and half-siblings. She does not want to return to El Salvador. Amaya filed a custody case in district court. The father did not respond, so the court entered a default and gave Amaya sole physical custody and both parents joint legal custody. Amaya then asked the same court to make the three SIJ findings. The district court refused. It said: (1) granting Amaya custody was not the same as "appointing" her to have custody, and (2) Amaya had not shown that A.A. could not reunify with both parents -- only with her father. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held, first, that when a Nevada district court grants a parent physical custody of a child, that order does place the child under the custody of "a person appointed by the court" for purposes of the SIJ findings. Second, the court held that the SIJ reunification requirement is satisfied when reunification with just one parent is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, or neglect -- the law does not require that reunification with both parents be impossible. The court emphasized that the federal statute uses the word "or" in "one or both" parents, and the court joined the majority of states that read it the same way. Because the district court got both points wrong and never reached the third finding (whether returning A.A. to El Salvador is in her best interest), the Supreme Court sent the case back for the district court to redo the analysis. One justice dissented, arguing that the Nevada statute authorizing district courts to make these SIJ findings, NRS 3.2203, lists the specific kinds of cases it applies to -- and Amaya's custody case (filed under NRS Chapter 125C) is not on that list. In the dissent's view, Amaya should have filed for guardianship under NRS Chapter 159A instead, and could still do so.

This case is about which legal standard applies when a parent asks a court to take custody of a child back from a nonparent — here, a grandmother — after a court originally gave the nonparent custody in a contested case. In 1993, the child's mother was killed in a drive-by shooting; the father, Milton Jones, was shot in the head and hospitalized, and the child suffered minor injuries. An investigation indicated a rival gang was likely retaliating against Milton. The maternal grandmother, Mable Hudson, asked the court for custody. The district court found that Milton was an unfit parent and that extraordinary circumstances overcame the "parental preference" — the legal presumption that a fit parent should get custody of a child over a nonparent. The court awarded Mable and Milton joint legal custody, with Mable having primary physical custody and Milton having visitation. About ten years later, Milton asked the court to give him sole legal and physical custody, arguing that he had changed his lifestyle and was now living a productive, law-abiding life with his new wife. The district court interviewed the child, who repeatedly said she wanted to live with her father. The court found that Milton had turned his life around, stated that it was bound to apply the parental preference presumption, and restored sole custody to him. Mable appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that the parental preference doctrine applies only to the initial custody decision between a parent and a nonparent — not to later requests to change custody. Once a court has already found a parent unfit or found extraordinary circumstances and awarded custody to a nonparent, the parent who later wants custody back must satisfy the same two-part test used in custody disputes between two parents: the parent must show that circumstances have materially changed and that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change in custody. The court distinguished earlier cases in which parents voluntarily and temporarily gave custody to relatives (for example, while dealing with imprisonment or drug addiction). In those situations, the court explained, parents keep the benefit of the parental preference when they seek to end the arrangement, because courts do "not want to discourage parents from willingly granting temporary guardianships, while working through problems in their own lives, if that is in the child's best interest." Milton's case was different: he did not voluntarily set up a guardianship, and a court had already found him unfit after a litigated dispute. The court also declined the State Bar Family Law Section's suggestion to adopt a burden-shifting approach that would blend the parental preference into the modification analysis. Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, the Nevada court reasoned that "[h]aving once protected the parent's right to custody, at the risk of sacrificing the child's best interests, we should not then sacrifice the child's need for stability in its care and living arrangements by modifying those arrangements more readily than in a parent-parent case." Because the district court applied the parental preference instead of the two-part modification test, the Supreme Court reversed its order and sent the case back for further proceedings.

N.S. was the sixth and youngest child of a mother struggling with drug addiction and incarceration. Shortly after birth, N.S. tested positive for methamphetamine and was placed in the protective custody of the State's child welfare agency (DCFS), which quickly placed the baby with a foster family. The baby's maternal grandmother, Maria, was already raising N.S.'s five older siblings under a guardianship. A caseworker, believing Maria was overwhelmed, recommended placing N.S. elsewhere, and the court placed N.S. with foster parents without first hearing Maria's own views. After the baby had bonded with the foster family, Maria petitioned to be appointed guardian and, later, for visitation. The district court denied both requests, largely because N.S. had already been living with the foster family for months and the foster parents wanted to adopt without the natural family's involvement. Because Maria could not appeal orders arising in these juvenile proceedings, she sought extraordinary writs of mandamus, and the Nevada Supreme Court granted them. The court explained that Nevada's abuse and neglect statute (NRS Chapter 432B) gives a grandparent - a relative with a 'special interest' in the child - the right to be involved in and notified of any placement plan and to receive a 'familial preference' for placement. The district court had short-circuited that right by placing N.S. with strangers based only on a caseworker's report, without hearing Maria, which set in motion the bonding that then made it nearly impossible for Maria to prevail. The court directed the district court to vacate the guardianship denial and reconsider it with the familial preference in mind. On visitation, the court held that while a district court may hear from foster parents, it cannot let the foster parents' desire to raise the child without the natural family's involvement be the determining factor. Because the foster family had been allowed to bond with N.S. to the exclusion of Maria, the district court gave their wishes undue weight. The court granted that petition too and directed reconsideration of visitation if guardianship is again denied.

D.R.G. was a child born with cystic fibrosis and cerebral palsy - serious conditions requiring daily, time-consuming medical care. From about age two, the child lived primarily with the maternal aunt, Connie, who consistently handled the child's medical appointments, hospital stays, and school transportation. The child's father, Dwight, lived in California, visited infrequently, never attended a medical appointment, and at times referred to the child by cruel nicknames related to the disability. When the child's mother was dying of cancer, she asked that Connie be given custody, saying the child's welfare would be in danger if placed with Dwight. Connie petitioned to be the child's guardian. After hearings, the district court appointed Connie as guardian, but made clear that Dwight could return to court to seek custody if he took concrete steps - creating a loving bond, taking parenting classes and reunification therapy, completing anger management, and learning to manage the child's medical needs. Dwight appealed, arguing the court ignored the 'parental preference' - the rule in NRS 159.061 that parents are preferred over others as guardians - and that there was no clear evidence guardianship with Connie served the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the parental preference is a presumption, but it only applies if the parent is 'qualified and suitable,' and it can be overcome by showing unfitness or 'extraordinary circumstances' that would seriously harm the child. Here, extraordinary circumstances existed: the child's grave medical needs required continuity of care that Dwight had shown he could not provide, Dwight had failed to give required medications and never attended appointments, the child had a strong bond with Connie and the recent loss of the mother, and the mother's will and affidavit favored Connie. The court concluded that although Dwight was not strictly 'unfit,' he was not qualified and suitable at the time of the hearing, so the parental presumption was properly rebutted and guardianship with Connie served the child's best interest.

Charlie Fisher married Jane Fisher in 1973, about thirteen months after Jane gave birth to a daughter by her former husband. Charlie and Jane were married roughly eight and a half years and had a son together. The daughter - the child at the center of this case - lived with both of them during the marriage. In late 1981, Charlie moved to Nevada, and the children joined him there in December 1981 and lived with him continuously afterward. The couple divorced in Montana in April 1982; the son's custody went to Charlie, but the daughter's custody was apparently never decided. The daughter continued living with Charlie, not Jane, for almost two years. In July 1983, Charlie filed a petition in Nevada asking to be appointed guardian of the daughter so he could legally care for her. Jane moved to dismiss. At the hearing, the district court refused to hear any evidence, summarily dismissed Charlie's petition, and on its own initiative "restored" custody of the daughter to Jane. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that an ex-stepparent has standing to seek guardianship as a "concerned person" under the guardianship statutes, and that the district court was wrong to dismiss the petition without taking evidence. Charlie had offered to prove that Jane had given up custody voluntarily, had not contacted the daughter for ten months, and that the child's best interest would be served by staying with him. The court emphasized that custody disputes between a parent and a non-parent turn on the specific facts and, above all, the best interest of the child; while the guardianship statutes include a "parental preference," a natural parent's right must yield when the child's welfare clearly requires placing custody elsewhere. The court sent the case back for an actual evidentiary hearing on the guardianship petition (including the daughter's legal and physical custody), directed that a different judge hear it, and instructed that Charlie be allowed to fix any defect in his petition.

In 1967, the mother and father of a young girl, Susie DeeLin, both signed a written consent appointing the child's paternal grandmother as her legal guardian. Two years later the parents' marriage broke down and the father filed for divorce. During the divorce, the mother asked the court to end the grandmother's guardianship so she could have Susie DeeLin back. The trial court granted the mother a divorce, found her a fit mother, and awarded her custody of the couple's four other children - but refused to terminate the guardianship over Susie DeeLin. The mother appealed on two fronts. First, she argued that because the court found her fit to raise the other four children, it had to give her Susie DeeLin too. Second, she argued the original guardianship was invalid because the court that appointed the grandmother never specifically found the appointment 'necessary and convenient.' The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed. On jurisdiction, it explained that district courts get their power over guardianships directly from the Nevada Constitution and statute (NRS 3.210); a specific finding of 'necessity and convenience' is a matter of proof, not a requirement for the court to have jurisdiction. Since both parents had consented and everyone was present in court, the appointment was valid, and any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence had to be brought within the proper time limits or be lost. On the refusal to terminate, the court noted the mother never provided a transcript of the guardianship-termination hearings. Without a record of the evidence, the court had to presume the trial judge properly found that the usual preference for a parent had been overcome, and that his ruling was supported by the evidence. A finding that the mother was fit for the other children did not, as a matter of law, require ending the guardianship of Susie DeeLin. Finally, the court corrected one clerical error: the divorce decree mistakenly gave the father visitation 'every other week' instead of 'every other weekend,' which the father conceded; the court modified the decree to fix that typographical mistake and otherwise affirmed.

M. W. Deegan's will named Thomas Deegan as guardian of the person and estates of his minor children John J., Thomas, and Michael Deegan. Thomas Deegan qualified as guardian on or about July 23, 1888 by filing a $5,000 bond. He never filed any account of his guardianship, and after being cited to account in 1893 and given extensions, he still failed to do so, so the district court revoked his letters on July 25, 1893, removed him, and appointed a new guardian (Henry Neligh, selected by the minor) the same day. One of the wards, suing through the new guardian, then brought this action on the bond, and the district court entered judgment for the ward. The guardian's final account had been settled, with $574.10 found due the ward out of $1,286.40 the guardian had received. On appeal by the defendants, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The defendants' attack on the removal and the new appointment was a collateral attack on the guardianship court's judgment, and the district court's jurisdiction is conclusively presumed in that setting; the guardian had also appeared through an attorney, which made service of the citation unnecessary. The court rejected the technical defenses to the bond: a single bond given for several wards is valid, the omission of the word 'severally' does not release the sureties or prevent one ward from suing alone, and a plea that other obligees were not joined fails unless it affirmatively shows the omitted parties were alive when suit was filed. Converting a ward's money to the guardian's own use is a breach of the bond for which the sureties answer.

H. Winkleman died intestate on February 5, 1874, leaving an infant daughter, Mary. Two days later the respondent petitioned to be appointed her guardian, and on February 10 the district court granted the petition - without any notice to the deceased's relatives or to the people who were caring for the child. The appellant, Chris Badenhoof, a distant relative living in the county and the person to whom Winkleman had written a deathbed letter asking him to become Mary's guardian, sell everything, and take the child to her grandparents in Germany, sought the guardianship himself, but the district court found him 'not a proper person' and denied his petition. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the appointment of the respondent: granting the petition without notice to the relatives or the persons who had the child's care was at least gravely irregular. But it affirmed the denial of Badenhoof's own petition, because the transcript did not purport to contain all the evidence, and the court had to presume there was undisclosed testimony supporting the district court's finding against him - although the affirmance was expressly without prejudice to his renewing his application. The court added that the peculiar attempted ratification of the respondent's appointment was in any view absolutely null.