Nevada family-law case summaries

Dana and Manuela Hoodenpyle traveled to Las Vegas in May 2004 for a short vacation to get married. After the trip, they returned to Virginia to live. Nearly twenty years later, in April 2024, Dana filed for divorce in Nevada. He initially obtained a clerk's entry of default (a preliminary step a plaintiff can take when the other side does not respond in time), but Manuela asked the court to set that default aside, arguing that neither party lived in Nevada. The district court set aside the default and told Manuela to file an answer or other pleadings. Manuela then answered, filed a counterclaim, and separately moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Nevada court had no power over her personally because she had never lived in Nevada and had not conducted business or transactions there. This concept is called "personal jurisdiction" - a court's authority to make decisions that legally bind a particular person. Dana disagreed. He argued that Manuela had enough connection to Nevada because the couple married in Nevada, because she had hired an attorney and participated in the case, and because a family-run company, MMP-USA LLC (a Virginia company), sold parts in many states, including Nevada. He attached various business documents to support this claim. The district court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Manuela. It noted that although the couple married in Nevada in 2004, Manuela had never lived in Nevada, and the parties' business was formed in Virginia. Because Dana himself was present in Nevada, the court granted what it called a "status divorce" - meaning it ended the marriage itself - but ruled that the couple would have to sort out their property in a court that had jurisdiction over their property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court. It explained that a court can only exercise power over an out-of-state person if that person has enough meaningful connections to the state. A one-week wedding trip two decades earlier was not enough, and the business documents Dana submitted did not show that Manuela herself was personally involved in any Nevada activities. The court also rejected Dana's argument that a hearing was required before deciding the issue, explaining that a judge may decide a fully briefed personal-jurisdiction motion without holding a hearing. The court affirmed the district court's decision.

This is a very short procedural order, not a decision about the merits of any underlying family-law dispute. Edward Foster filed an appeal against Amy Steele, who was formerly known as Amy Foster. When someone starts an appeal, the court requires a filing fee to be paid. According to the order, Foster's appeal was placed on the court's docket on May 12, 2026, but the required filing fee was not paid. That same day, the court sent Foster a notice telling him to either pay the fee or show that he qualified to proceed without paying it, and gave him 14 days to do so. The notice warned that if he did not comply, the appeal would be dismissed. Because the fee still had not been paid, the court entered another order on July 6, 2026, again directing Foster to pay the filing fee within 14 days and again warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal. The order states that, as of the date it was issued, Foster had still not paid the filing fee. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal. The order does not discuss the facts of the family dispute or reach any conclusion about who should win it.

This case involves a divorce. James Samuel Short, who was representing himself without a lawyer (referred to in court as "pro se"), tried to appeal the divorce decree - the final court order that legally ends a marriage - that a lower court in Nye County had issued. When someone appeals, the higher court requires certain paperwork to move the case forward. Here, the Supreme Court of Nevada told Short on June 26, 2026, to file two things: a transcript request form (paperwork about obtaining the written record of what was said in the lower court) within 14 days, and a docketing statement (a form giving basic information about the appeal) within 21 days. Short did not file them. The court then gave Short a second chance. On July 24, 2026, it ordered him to file the transcript request form (or a certificate saying no transcript was requested) and the docketing statement by July 31, 2026. The court warned him that if he did not comply on time, his appeal could be dismissed. Short still did not file the documents. Because Short never filed the required paperwork, the court concluded he had abandoned - given up on - his appeal, and it dismissed the case. The court did not decide anything about whether the divorce decree itself was correct or fair; it ended the appeal on procedural grounds only. The order also addressed the other party, Love A Rydes-Short. She had asked the court to let her dismiss her attorney, Ronald Brilliant, and represent herself. The court granted that request and directed the clerk to remove Mr. Brilliant as her lawyer of record.

Hakeem Khalifah appealed on his own behalf (without a lawyer, which is what "pro se" means) after a district court judge in Clark County denied his requests to reconsider and undo two earlier rulings in a child custody matter. One of those earlier rulings found him in contempt of court and gave the other party, Monique Hollings, temporary custody. The other ruling dealt with certifying that the district court would take up custody issues on a remand. Before deciding anything about the merits of the dispute, the Supreme Court of Nevada looked at whether it even had the authority to hear the appeal at all. Courts can only review certain kinds of orders on appeal; if a particular type of order is not one the law allows to be appealed, the appellate court has no power ("jurisdiction") to consider it. The court explained that while orders denying motions to reconsider or vacate can sometimes be appealed, that is only true when the underlying order those motions attacked was itself something that could be appealed. Here, the court concluded the underlying orders were not appealable. A contempt order that is connected to (ancillary to) another proceeding cannot be appealed on its own, and an order granting temporary custody is not the kind of custody decision that can be appealed. Under the applicable rule, custody appeals are allowed only from orders that finally resolve custody issues, and a temporary custody order does not do that. Because the underlying orders could not be appealed, the denial of the motions to reconsider and vacate them could not be appealed either. Having found it lacked jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal without reaching the substance of the custody dispute.

This is a short procedural order, not a decision about who wins the underlying family-law dispute. Tina Leah Rohmiller tried to appeal a district court order that had done several things: it put off (deferred) a decision on whether to formally label her a "vexatious litigant" - a designation courts use for parties who repeatedly file baseless papers; it announced that her future filings would get "heightened scrutiny"; it canceled upcoming hearings; it required her to pay $25.00 for each motion she files; and it scolded her for what the district court called "serial nonsensical filings." The Nevada Supreme Court did not weigh in on whether any of that was fair or proper. Instead, it concluded it had no power - no jurisdiction - to hear the appeal at all. In Nevada, a party can only appeal an order if some statute or court rule specifically authorizes an appeal from that kind of order. The court found that no statute or rule allows an appeal from an order that merely defers a ruling, applies heightened scrutiny to future filings, vacates hearings, imposes a standard motion fee, or admonishes a party. Because the order was not appealable, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing its merits.

Tina Rohmiller tried to appeal an order that she said labeled her a "vexatious litigant" — a designation courts sometimes apply to a person to place limits on their ability to keep filing lawsuits or motions. She represented herself in the appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether she actually is a vexatious litigant or whether any restrictions were fair. Instead, it looked at whether it had the power (called "jurisdiction") to hear the appeal at all, and concluded that it did not. The court gave two reasons. First, it found that there did not appear to be a written order from the district court actually declaring her a vexatious litigant — and appeals generally run from written judgments or orders. Second, and more importantly, the court explained that even if such an order existed, no statute or court rule allows a person to appeal a vexatious-litigant order directly. The court noted that the proper way to ask a higher court to review that kind of order is through a different procedure called a writ — a separate type of request to the court — rather than an ordinary appeal. Because it lacked jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal.

This case involves a man, Nicholas George Malis, who was trying to appeal a divorce decree - a court order finalizing a divorce - that a family court judge in Clark County had entered. He was handling the appeal on his own, without an attorney (this is called appearing "pro se"). When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the court requires them to submit certain paperwork within specific deadlines. On April 20, 2026, the court sent Malis a notice telling him to file, within set time frames, either a form requesting a transcript of the lower-court proceedings or a certificate stating no transcript was requested, along with a "docketing statement" (a standard form that gives the court basic information about the appeal). Those deadlines were 14 days for the transcript-related form and 21 days for the docketing statement. Malis did not file these documents on time. On May 18, 2026, the court issued another order giving him a new deadline of June 1, 2026, and warned that if he did not comply, his appeal could be dismissed. He attempted to file the paperwork on June 3, 2026 - after that deadline - but the court found the documents deficient and struck them the same day. The court gave him yet another chance, directing him to fix the problems and re-file by June 17, 2026, again warning that failure could lead to dismissal. By the time the court issued this order, Malis had still not filed corrected documents or otherwise contacted the court. Concluding that it appeared he had given up on the appeal, the court dismissed it. The dismissal was based on Malis's failure to follow procedural requirements, not on any decision about whether the divorce decree itself was right or wrong.

This case involves a divorce. One of the spouses, Jametria Mays, was unhappy with the divorce decree issued by the family court in Clark County and appealed it to the Nevada Supreme Court. She did not have a lawyer and was representing herself. When someone files an appeal, the court requires certain paperwork to move the case forward. Here, on May 5, 2026, the Supreme Court sent Mays a notice telling her to file specific documents: a transcript request form (or a certificate saying no transcript was being requested) within 14 days, and a "docketing statement" - a standard form that describes the basics of the appeal - within 21 days. Mays did not file those documents. On June 1, 2026, the court issued another order giving her until June 15, 2026, to file them. That order warned that if she did not comply on time, her appeal could be dismissed. According to the court, Mays still had not filed the documents. Because of this, the court concluded she had abandoned her appeal and dismissed it. The dismissal means the appeal will not go forward; it does not reflect any decision by the Supreme Court about whether the divorce decree itself was right or wrong.

This case involves an appeal that never got off the ground because required paperwork was never properly filed. After a divorce, the family court ordered Anita A. Fors to pay attorney fees, and she appealed that order without a lawyer. To move an appeal forward, a party must file a document called a "docketing statement" - a form the appeals court uses to get basic information about the case. The court set a series of deadlines for Fors to file this document correctly. According to the opinion, the court gave her notice on April 3, 2026, to file the docketing statement by April 24, 2026. She attempted to file it on April 25, one day late, and the court rejected it on April 28 as both untimely and deficient (not meeting the rules). The opinion describes several more rounds of attempts and rejections. On April 30, she filed the docketing statement with a motion for an extension of time attached, but on May 4 the court struck both documents because the docketing statement was still deficient and because the two items had to be filed separately rather than combined. She tried again on May 7, and the court struck the motion for extension of time as deficient. When she still did not file a corrected docketing statement or a proper motion for more time, the court issued another order on May 20, 2026, giving her seven more days and warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal. The opinion states that, as of the date of the order, Fors had still not filed the docketing statement. Concluding that she appeared to have abandoned the appeal, the court dismissed it.

This is a short procedural order, not a decision about who was right on the underlying family dispute. The court never reached the merits of the case. When someone appeals a lower-court decision to the Nevada Supreme Court, they must file certain paperwork to get the appeal moving. Here, on April 17, 2026, the court sent the appellant, Julia Guadalupe Garcia, a notice telling her to file and serve a "transcript request form or certificate of no transcript request" (documents that tell the court whether she wants written records of what was said in the lower court) within 14 days, and to file a "docketing statement" (a form giving the court basic information about the appeal) within 21 days. When those documents were not filed, the court issued a second order on May 18, 2026, giving her a new deadline of June 1, 2026, and warning her that if she did not comply, the appeal could be dismissed. According to the order, the appellant still had not filed the required documents. Because of this, the court concluded that she "has abandoned this appeal" and dismissed it. In other words, the appeal ended not because of any ruling on the family-law issues, but because the required procedural steps were not completed.

Sandeep Minhas and Monika Gill married in 2008 and divorced in 2020. As part of their divorce, they signed a property settlement agreement (incorporated into the divorce decree) under which Gill was awarded a property in San Jose, California, and the net proceeds from selling a condominium in Fremont, California. A complication surfaced later: those properties were not actually owned by Minhas individually. They were held by the SMG Trust, a trust Minhas had created on October 8, 2017. Neither person mentioned the trust during the divorce, and the trust was never made a party to the divorce proceedings. Matters became more tangled because two different copies of the trust existed, both supposedly signed on the same day. One copy said the trust was *revocable* (meaning it could be undone) and governed by California law. The other copy said the trust was *irrevocable* (meaning it generally could not be undone), added "spendthrift" protections, and said it was governed by Nevada law. Everyone agreed the trust was created on October 8, 2017, and that the two properties were inside it. Minhas asked the court to set aside the divorce decree, arguing that because the trust held title to the properties, he could not personally hand them over to Gill. He first attached the revocable version of the trust to his filings. The parties agreed to bring the trust into the case, and Minhas filed a third-party complaint against the trust. Gill then asked the court to strike that complaint, arguing the trust did not need to be involved because Minhas had already revoked it as to the properties when he signed the settlement agreement, and pointing to California law. Two days before the scheduled hearing, Minhas said he had just found the "original" copy, which was the irrevocable Nevada version, and now argued the decree was void under a court rule because it had given away assets owned by a third party who was never part of the case. At the hearing, Gill argued Minhas should be blocked (by "equitable estoppel," a principle stopping someone from contradicting earlier positions) from relying on the irrevocable version, and acknowledged she had obtained a copy of the trust from Chase Bank showing it as an irrevocable Nevada trust. The district court ruled the trust was revocable, treated the irrevocable version and a related document as unreliable and of "no legal impact," dismissed Minhas's complaint against the trust, found the trust revoked as to the two properties, ordered Minhas to provide an accounting, and confirmed Gill's awards. The court's written order did not directly address Minhas's request to set aside the decree. The Court of Appeals reversed. Its central point: the SMG Trust owned the properties (or the proceeds), so the trust had an interest in the outcome. Under Nevada rules, a party with such an interest in property must be brought into the case before a court divides that property. Because the district court interpreted the trust, declared it revocable, and distributed its assets without first joining the trust as a party, the appellate court held the resulting order was void. The court sent the case back, directing that the trust be joined and that the district court then reconsider whether the divorce decree should be set aside.

Uche and Frank Ngbeken married in 2017 and have two minor children. In 2023, both filed for divorce. They agreed on custody, so the only fight left at trial concerned how to divide their property, mainly the marital home. Frank testified that he bought the home in 2019, that he alone was on the mortgage and deed, and that he paid the mortgage with his own wages. He said Uche signed a quitclaim deed—a document by which one person gives up any ownership claim they might have in a piece of property—because she did not want to own a home in the United States and preferred to put her money toward building a home in Nigeria. Uche admitted signing the quitclaim deed but said she never meant to give away her share of the home. She claimed Frank asked her to sign it to protect her credit so the family could rely on it if Frank ever defaulted on the mortgage. She acknowledged she made no mortgage payments, explaining that the couple kept their finances separate and that she instead paid childcare costs. The district court ruled that signing the quitclaim deed created a legal presumption (an assumption the law makes unless someone proves otherwise) that Uche intended to gift her interest in the home to Frank. The court believed Frank's testimony and found Uche had not overcome that presumption by "clear and convincing evidence"—a demanding standard of proof. So the court gave the entire home to Frank as his separate property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals did two things. First, it agreed with the district court that Uche had not overcome the gift presumption regarding the interest she held in the home when she signed the deed. The appeals court explained that it cannot second-guess which witness the trial judge found believable. So the original gift of Uche's existing interest stands. But the court also said the analysis did not stop there. Even if Uche gave away the interest she had at the time she signed the deed, she did not give away any future interest the marriage (the "community") might later gain in the home. Because Frank paid the mortgage with his wages—and wages earned during marriage are considered shared, community money—the marital community gained a partial interest in the home as those payments were made. The trial court should have performed a special calculation (called a Malmquist analysis) to figure out how much of the home is separate property and how much belongs to the community. Because it did not, the appeals court reversed that part of the ruling and sent the case back for the trial court to do that calculation.

This is a one-page clerk's order ending an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court reached the merits. Thomas Ditter, the person who brought the appeal, asked the court to dismiss his own appeal. The other side, Beth Marie Ditter, did not oppose that request. The court granted the request and dismissed the appeal. Each side will pay its own attorney fees and costs. Because the appeal was voluntarily withdrawn, the court did not decide any legal issues, and the underlying family-court ruling stands as it was.

Thomas Sieler asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in and overturn a temporary child-custody order issued by a family court judge. He did this by filing what is called a writ petition - a request that a higher court issue an extraordinary order directing a lower court to do something or to stop doing something. Writs are not the normal way to challenge a trial court's decision; the normal way is to wait for a final judgment and then appeal. The Supreme Court declined to get involved. It explained that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where the person asking has no other adequate way to get a fix through the regular court process. Here, the court said Mr. Sieler can raise his complaints later, after a final judgment, by way of a regular appeal. That alone generally rules out a writ. The court also noted a practical problem: Mr. Sieler did not give the justices the documents they would need to evaluate his arguments, including transcripts of what happened in the lower court. Without that record, the court could not meaningfully review what he was challenging. For these reasons, the Supreme Court denied the petition. The temporary custody order entered by the district court remains in place, and the family law case continues there.

Melissa and Matthew Supnick share a child. After their 2014 divorce, they had joint legal custody and Melissa had primary physical custody. In 2016 the court approved a stipulation letting Melissa move to Wisconsin with the child, but she did not move at that time. Years later, Matthew asked the court to change custody and to cancel the old permission to relocate. Melissa opposed that and asked again for permission to move to Wisconsin. The judge refused to change custody but did cancel the old relocation permission, and ordered an evidentiary hearing because Melissa had shown enough up front that relocating could actually benefit the child. At the hearing, the judge ruled against Melissa, denying her request to move. The judge then ordered Melissa to pay Matthew's attorney fees, finding she had pursued the relocation request "without reasonable ground," and also ordered her to pay about $3,054 in costs because Matthew was the prevailing party. Melissa appealed both awards. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the attorney-fee award. The court reasoned that Melissa's relocation request was not groundless: she had testified to concrete reasons supporting the move, including free childcare and housing from family in Wisconsin, her ability to help her ailing mother, lower cost of living, shorter pediatrician wait times that would help the child's medical conditions, the child having her own bedroom, and time with cousins. Matthew himself conceded he expected to struggle relating to the child during puberty. Given those facts - and the fact that the same district court had earlier found enough evidence to warrant a full hearing - the Supreme Court concluded that calling her position frivolous was an abuse of discretion. The court left the costs award in place. Melissa never filed a motion in the district court asking to "retax" (challenge) the costs Matthew claimed, and under Nevada precedent that failure waives the right to challenge a costs award on appeal.

Rabih and Avir Hamdan divorced in April 2022. As part of the divorce, the court ordered Rabih to pay Avir $2,648 per month in alimony (court-ordered financial support to a former spouse). In April 2023, Avir asked the court to hold Rabih in contempt - that is, to find that he had disobeyed the court's order - for not paying the alimony. Rabih responded and also asked the court to lower his monthly payment. In December 2023, the district court held an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented). After the hearing, the court found Rabih in civil contempt, ordered him to pay $45,016 in unpaid alimony, and refused to lower his monthly obligation. On appeal, Rabih made two main arguments. First, he said the court was wrong to hold him in contempt because it never made a finding that his failure to pay was willful or in bad faith, and because its conclusion that he could afford to pay rested on guesswork about his business accounts and home equity rather than on solid evidence. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that disobeying a clear court order is contempt, and that the district court had found a clear order requiring Rabih to pay monthly alimony, found he had not made most of the payments, and found he had the ability to pay. The district court pointed to specific findings: Rabih's businesses were valued at $400,000 after the divorce; his financial documents showed monthly income of $10,823 from his businesses; he had more than $300,000 in equity in his home; and he had access to a bank account holding $248,000. The appeals court noted that while Rabih argued the evidence about his finances was disputed, he did not specifically attack these particular findings or show they were clearly wrong. The court also noted that Rabih's appendix on appeal contained only the hearing transcript and the district court's order - not the divorce decree, the motions, or the financial materials - so the court presumed those missing parts of the record supported the district court's findings. Because the district court found Rabih not credible, and because appellate courts do not re-weigh evidence or second-guess credibility calls, the court held the contempt finding was a proper exercise of discretion. Second, Rabih argued the contempt decision was tainted by judicial bias, claiming the judge's comments at the hearing showed she had already decided he was not credible and would hold him in contempt no matter what the evidence showed. The appeals court rejected this too. It explained that bias generally must come from a source outside the courtroom, and that comments or rulings made during the proceedings themselves usually do not show disqualifying bias unless they reflect deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. The court found the record showed the judge listened to the testimony and considered the evidence before deciding, so Rabih had not shown the judge had closed her mind to the evidence. Having rejected both arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

This is a short procedural order, not a ruling on the merits of the divorce. After the appeal was filed, both sides submitted a joint paper asking the Nevada Supreme Court to end the appeal. However, the document was not signed by the attorney officially listed as representing the husband (the respondent). Because of that signature problem, the court did not treat the filing as a true stipulation by both parties' lawyers. Instead, the court treated it as a request by the filing party to voluntarily withdraw the appeal and granted that request. The appeal is over, and the case will not be decided by the Supreme Court. The order does not address any of the underlying issues in the divorce, and it does not discuss the merits of any ruling by the family court below.

This case involves a dispute over where certain minor children should be placed in a protective custody action - a court proceeding in which the state oversees the care and placement of children. A man named Jacoby Robinson asked the Court of Appeals to step in by issuing a writ of mandamus, which is a court order directing a lower court or official to do something the law requires, or to correct a decision that was made in an arbitrary or capricious way. The court explained that this kind of extraordinary relief is not automatic. A writ of mandamus can be used to force someone to perform a duty the law requires, or to control a lower court's "arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." The court also emphasized that whether to even consider such a petition is left entirely to its own discretion, and that the person bringing the petition carries the burden of showing the relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the supporting documents, the court concluded that Robinson had not shown that this extraordinary relief was warranted. As a result, the court denied the petition. The order does not explain the underlying facts of the placement dispute or give detailed reasoning beyond this conclusion.

A mother, identified as Tiffany L., is appealing a Clark County family court decision that terminated her parental rights to her child. She filed her appeal paperwork in a way that caused the Nevada Supreme Court's clerk's office to open two separate appeal files - Docket No. 91868 and Docket No. 92248 - even though both appeals are about the same termination of parental rights involving the same child. The Supreme Court reviewed the situation and concluded that the second file (Docket No. 92248) should not have been opened as a separate case. To clean up the record, the court ordered the clerk to move all of the documents from the second file into the first file and to administratively close the second file. The mother's appeal will continue, but only under the first docket number, 91868. This order does not decide whether the termination of parental rights was proper. It is a housekeeping order that consolidates the paperwork so the appeal can move forward in a single case.

When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the rules require that the notice of appeal be served on the other parties in the case and that the filed notice include paperwork showing this service was completed. In this case, Mallory Kate Mishler filed an appeal but did not include that proof-of-service paperwork. On the day the appeal was docketed - March 3, 2026 - the Nevada Supreme Court sent her a notice giving her 14 days to fix the problem and submit the missing proof of service. The notice warned her that if she did not do so, her appeal could be thrown out. She did not submit the required document within the deadline. The order also notes that the appellant filed a motion on March 6, 2026, asking to voluntarily dismiss the appeal herself, but the court struck that motion on March 10, 2026, because it did not comply with the court's rules. She never filed a corrected version of that motion. With no proof of service filed and no proper voluntary-dismissal motion on file, the court dismissed the appeal.

This is a very short order from the Nevada Supreme Court in a family-law case between Brandi A. Samaan and Ramy F. Samaan. One party had appealed, and the other had filed a cross-appeal (a counter-appeal by the opposing party in the same case). Before the court decided the merits, the two parties reached an agreement to end the appeal. This kind of agreement is called a stipulation - a joint request by both sides asking the court to take a particular action. Based on that stipulation, the court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, meaning the case ends without a ruling on the issues that were raised. The court also directed that each side pay its own court costs and attorney fees, rather than requiring one party to reimburse the other. The order does not explain what the underlying dispute was about or how the family court below had ruled.

A party identified as Mandi B. filed an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in a case involving parental rights to a minor child, E.L.A. When someone files an appeal, the court typically requires a filing fee, or, alternatively, paperwork showing the person cannot afford the fee and qualifies to proceed without paying it (the procedure governed by NRAP 24, the rule for proceeding "in forma pauperis"). According to the order, Mandi B. did not pay the filing fee when the appeal was docketed on February 24, 2026. That same day, the Supreme Court sent a notice giving her 14 days either to pay the fee or to show she qualified to proceed without paying. The notice told her that if she did neither, her appeal would be dismissed. The order states that, as of the date of dismissal, Mandi B. had not paid the fee and had not responded to the court's notice. Because of that, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The opinion does not address the underlying merits of the parental-rights matter.

This is a short procedural order, not a full opinion deciding the merits of a family-law dispute. In an ongoing case about parental rights concerning a child identified as G.F., someone asked the district court to disqualify — that is, to remove — a participant in the case (the order does not specify whom the motion sought to disqualify). The district court said no. The losing party then went directly to the Nevada Court of Appeals and asked for extraordinary relief: either a writ of mandamus — a court order compelling a lower court to perform a legally required duty or correcting an arbitrary abuse of discretion — or a writ of prohibition — an order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals explained that it has complete discretion over whether to even consider such a petition, and that the person asking for this kind of extraordinary relief bears the burden of showing it is warranted. After reviewing the petition and supporting documents, the court concluded the petitioner had not made that showing and denied the petition. The court did not explain its reasoning further, and the underlying parental-rights case presumably continues in the district court (the order does not address the status of the underlying proceedings).

This is a one-paragraph clerk's order ending an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court could decide it on the merits. The appellant, Sylvia Michelle Bolanos, asked the court to dismiss her own appeal, and the respondent, Dan Charles Rogers, did not oppose her request. The court granted the unopposed motion and closed the case. Because this is a voluntary dismissal, the court did not address the underlying family-law dispute, did not issue any ruling on the merits, and did not announce any rule of law. The opinion does not describe what the appeal was about beyond identifying it as a matter from the district court presided over by the Honorable Jason Woodbury.

This case never reached a decision on the merits. Ryan Michael Jensen filed an appeal, without an attorney, from a Clark County family court order that partially granted a request to modify child support in a case involving Devyn Nicol Pledger. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the Supreme Court requires certain paperwork early in the process - including a "transcript request form" (telling the court whether a transcript of the lower-court proceedings is needed) or a "certificate of no transcript request," and a "docketing statement" (a form summarizing the case). On January 2, 2026, the court told Jensen to file these documents within set deadlines. He did not. On January 30, 2026, the court gave him another chance, with a new deadline of February 13, 2026, and warned that missing the deadline could result in dismissal. He still did not file the documents. Concluding that Jensen had abandoned his appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed it. The underlying child-support order remains in place; the court did not review whether that order was right or wrong.

Robert Benton and Jacqueline Cloutier were never married but were in a relationship and had two children together. In July 2016, Cloutier bought a house at 475 S. Chesapeake Way from Benton's parents, taking the deed and mortgage in her name alone. The couple lived in the home together. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Cloutier — a cosmetologist who was struggling financially — refinanced the house. As part of that 2021 refinance, the property was transferred from Cloutier's name alone into both parties' names as unmarried joint tenants (a form of co-ownership). Cloutier pulled out about $98,831.65 from the refinance, and Benton received roughly half of that money (about $49,415). The parties later transferred the home into a jointly held trust, the "JnB Trust," with both of them named as trustees. When the relationship ended, Cloutier went to court in September 2023 asking, among other things, to have the property divided. The two disagreed about how much each one owned. Benton said that because they held the home as joint tenants, Cloutier had to prove that she did not intend to give him an equal share. He pointed to mortgage payments he said he made and money he transferred to Cloutier, and argued he was entitled to an equal half. Cloutier said she made the down payment and most of the mortgage payments, that she only added Benton to qualify for the refinance, and that she therefore deserved the property. After a hearing, the district court found that Cloutier's mortgage contributions far exceeded Benton's and that Benton had not shown Cloutier intended to give him half the equity. Using a "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning more likely than not), the court awarded Cloutier almost 96 percent and Benton the rest. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, when people own property as joint tenants, a court must start with the presumption that they share equally, and then work through a specific step-by-step (burden-shifting) framework to decide if that presumption is overcome. The appeals court could not tell from the district court's order whether it had followed that framework correctly. The appeals court also held that the district court used the wrong standard of proof: the law requires "clear and convincing evidence" — a higher bar than preponderance — to overcome the presumptions on jointly held property. Even though Cloutier argued the mistake didn't matter because she had presented strong enough evidence anyway, the court concluded it could not say the outcome would have been the same under the correct standard. The case was sent back to the district court to redo the analysis properly.

This is a short administrative order, not a ruling on the merits of any underlying dispute. When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee. If they cannot afford it, they can ask to proceed "in forma pauperis" - that is, without paying the fee because of financial hardship. Here, the appellant filed her appeal without paying the fee. The Supreme Court directed the district court to rule on her in forma pauperis application, and the district court denied it. The Supreme Court then gave her 30 days, from a January 12, 2026 order, either to pay the fee or to file a new in forma pauperis motion directly with the Supreme Court. She was warned that not complying would end the appeal. She did neither. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal under the rule that allows dismissal when a party fails to pay the required fee.

Robert Gavin filed an appeal on his own, without a lawyer, asking the Nevada Supreme Court to review a decision from the Clark County district court. The district court had dismissed his case and then denied his request to reconsider that dismissal. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the appellate court requires certain paperwork early on, including either a request for the trial-court transcripts (so the appellate justices can read what happened below) or a statement that no transcript is needed, plus a "docketing statement" that summarizes the case. The Supreme Court told Gavin on December 5, 2025, to file these documents within set deadlines. When he did not, the court sent a second order on January 7, 2026, giving him until January 21, 2026, and warning that missing the deadline could cause the appeal to be thrown out. Gavin still did not file the documents. Treating the silence as abandonment of the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the case. The dismissal is procedural; the court did not address the merits of his underlying dispute.

This is a clerk's order ending an appeal before it ever got off the ground. When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, court rules require two basic things at the start: paying a filing fee (or showing the appellant qualifies to proceed without paying) and filing a "case appeal statement," which is a short document identifying basic information about the case. When Dawn Marie Green's appeal was docketed, neither of those items had been submitted. The court sent notices the same day giving her seven days to pay the fee (or show she qualified for a fee waiver under NRAP 24) and to file the case appeal statement. The notices warned that not paying the fee would lead to dismissal, and that not filing the case appeal statement could also lead to sanctions including dismissal. According to the order, Green did not pay the fee, did not file the case appeal statement, and did not otherwise respond to the court's notices. Because of that, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying family-court dispute or its merits.

This is a one-page housekeeping order from the Nevada Supreme Court. Jeremy Herrmann had filed an appeal in a family-court case involving Kelly Herrmann, but he then asked the court to drop the appeal himself by filing a notice of voluntary dismissal. The court granted that request and closed the case. The order does not describe what the underlying family-court dispute was about, what the district court ruled, or why the appellant chose to withdraw. It simply ends the appeal.

This is a divorce-related appeal that the Nevada Supreme Court threw out before reaching the merits because it had no power to hear it. The husband, representing himself, tried to appeal two things from the family court: (1) an order refusing to reconsider an earlier ruling, and (2) an order that partially awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court explained that it can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. Under existing Nevada case law, an order denying a motion to reconsider is not on the list of appealable orders. As for the partial attorney fees order, it appeared no final judgment had yet been entered in the underlying case, which made the fees order "interlocutory" - meaning it came in the middle of an ongoing case rather than at the end. Mid-case orders generally cannot be appealed until the case is over. Because neither order could be appealed at this stage, the court dismissed the appeal. It also denied as moot the respondent's pending motion to dismiss and the appellant's pending motion to consolidate appeals.

This is a divorce appeal that never reached the merits. After Kristin Cogburn filed her notice of appeal from a divorce decree and a related order partially granting a motion to amend that decree, the Nevada Supreme Court noticed a problem with its own ability to hear the case. Generally, an appellate court can only review a lower court's decision once that decision has fully wrapped up the case. Here, the orders being appealed had not finished resolving every issue between the parties. The court issued what is called an order to show cause, which asks the appealing party to explain why the case should not be thrown out. The appellant agreed that the orders were not yet final and appealable, and explained she had filed the notice of appeal "out of an abundance of caution" - meaning she filed just in case, to protect her rights, rather than because she was certain the appeal was proper at this stage. Because the orders did not finally resolve everything, the Supreme Court concluded it had no power to hear the appeal and dismissed it. A pending motion to stay the appeal and pause deadlines was denied as moot, meaning there was nothing left to stay once the appeal was dismissed.

A father, identified as Khasim B., lost his parental rights to a minor child in a Carson City district court. He appealed that decision to the Nevada Supreme Court on his own, without a lawyer. When someone appeals, they have to file an "opening brief" - a written explanation of why they think the lower court got it wrong. The Supreme Court ordered Khasim B. to file his opening brief by December 8, 2025. He did not. The court then gave him another 14 days, warning him that if he still did not file, his appeal could be dismissed. He did not file the brief or contact the court at all. Because the court concluded he had abandoned the appeal, it dismissed the case. The dismissal ends the appeal; the district court's order terminating his parental rights stands.

This was an attempted appeal in a divorce/annulment case. Ms. Garcia, representing herself, tried to bring three things up to the Nevada Supreme Court: a March 28, 2025 district court order, what she described as a November 14, 2025 order awarding attorney's fees and costs to the other side, and various other in-between rulings. The Supreme Court, before reaching any of the substance, looked at whether it had the power to hear the appeal at all. It concluded it did not, for two reasons. First, the March 28, 2025 order was not a final judgment. In Nevada, a case generally must be fully resolved at the trial-court level before the Supreme Court can review it. The March 28 order left issues open for the district court to decide later, including the issue of marital waste, so it was not the kind of order that can be appealed yet. Second, there was no November 14, 2025 order awarding fees and costs. What was actually filed on that date was a memorandum of fees and costs submitted by the respondent - not a court order. You cannot appeal something that does not exist. Because no statute or rule allowed an appeal from any of the orders Ms. Garcia challenged, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Jacob Morgan, representing himself, asked a Clark County family court to lower his child support obligation. The district court said no. He appealed that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. To move an appeal forward in Nevada, the person appealing has to file certain paperwork - including a form telling the court whether transcripts of the lower-court hearings will be ordered, and a "docketing statement" that gives the Supreme Court basic information about the case. On December 10, 2025, the Supreme Court reinstated briefing in Mr. Morgan's appeal and gave him until December 17, 2025, to file those documents. He did not. The court then issued a second order on December 23, 2025, giving him a new deadline of December 30, 2025, and warning him that if he missed it the appeal could be thrown out. He missed that deadline too. Because Mr. Morgan did not file the required documents, the Supreme Court concluded he had abandoned the appeal and dismissed it. The dismissal does not address the merits of his request to modify child support.

Maria and Kevin Elder married in 2012 and have two children. When they divorced in 2020, both agreed that a prenuptial agreement — a contract signed before marriage — validly waived community property and alimony, and they stipulated to joint legal and physical custody of the children. That left one issue for the trial court: how much child support Kevin would pay. At a December 2021 hearing, the parties announced a settlement under which, instead of monthly child support payments, Kevin would fund a trust that would pay out money to Maria for the children's expenses. For purposes of that stipulation, they agreed Kevin's monthly gross income was $500,000. But the settlement fell apart when the parties could not agree on the trust's terms, and the district court declined to enforce it because it was premised on Kevin's child support being nonmodifiable and on the court giving up jurisdiction over future child support issues. The court entered a divorce decree in September 2022 and set an evidentiary hearing on child support for October 2023. Maria fired her lawyer and did not attend that hearing. Kevin presented evidence that his average monthly gross income was $125,000, and in October 2023 the court set his child support obligation at $8,000 per month under the child support guidelines. Maria did not appeal that decision. A year later, in October 2024, Maria asked the court to modify child support, arguing it should have used the $500,000 income figure from the failed settlement, which would have entitled her to roughly $32,000 per month. The court denied the motion, finding she had not alleged any changed circumstances, and she did not appeal. In January 2025, she filed two largely identical motions making the same argument. The district court denied them, essentially determining that Maria failed to demonstrate changed circumstances warranting review and that she failed to establish a factual or legal basis for relief. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a court can only modify child support when circumstances have changed since the last order and the change serves the children's best interest. Maria's brief did not address the March 2025 order she was actually appealing; instead it attacked the earlier 2022 decree and 2023 support order. Because challenges to those earlier rulings had to be raised in a timely appeal from the October 2023 order, the court dismissed that portion of her appeal as untimely. The court also denied Maria's motion to submit new evidence, because appellate review is limited to the record and the motion concerned events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed, and it denied Kevin's request to sanction Maria.

A party in a Clark County family court case asked the trial judge to step aside (a process called "disqualification"). The trial court denied that request, and the party then tried to appeal the denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The reason is jurisdictional: in Nevada, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals that some statute or court rule specifically authorizes. No statute or rule allows a direct appeal from an order refusing to disqualify a judge. Because the order is not on the list of appealable orders, the Supreme Court has no power to consider it. The Court also cleaned up the docket by denying as moot the appellant's pending motions to extend filing deadlines and to waive transcript-preparation costs, and the respondent's motions for a stay, to dismiss, and to enforce a custody order and pickup warrant. The Court noted that the respondent may refile the motion for stay and the motion to enforce the custody order in the district court, if appropriate.

This is a one-page clerk's order ending an appeal before it was ever decided on the merits. The case involves parental rights to a minor child, identified by initials to protect the child's privacy. Two appellants - Misha H. and Gregory M.C. - had filed an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court. When someone files an appeal, they generally have to pay a filing fee. According to this order, the court told the appellants on September 9, 2025, that they needed to pay that fee, and warned them that if they did not, the appeal would be thrown out. The fee was not paid. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal without ruling on whether the underlying decision about parental rights was right or wrong. The order does not describe the lower-court ruling, the facts of the parental rights dispute, or any legal arguments. It is purely an administrative dismissal for nonpayment.

This is a very short order in a family-law case. Two people, Pablo Llontop and Maria Llontop, were involved in an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. Pablo was the appellant (the person who brought the appeal), and Maria was the respondent (the person responding to it). Rather than have the court decide the appeal, the two sides reached an agreement - called a stipulation - to end the appeal. Based on that agreement, the court dismissed the appeal. The court also ordered that each side would pay its own attorney fees and costs. The order does not describe the underlying dispute, the lower-court ruling that was being appealed, or any legal issues. It simply records that the appeal ended by agreement of the parties.

This case began as a family-law matter that ended with a final judgment entered on February 6, 2020. Years later, the district court found Saad Jafri in contempt of court for not following its prior orders, imposed sanctions on him, and ordered him to pay Ashley Wynn's attorney fees and costs incurred in the contempt and enforcement proceedings. Jafri tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the contempt finding or the fee award was right or wrong. Instead, it decided whether it had the authority - called "jurisdiction" - to hear the appeal at all. In Nevada, a party can only appeal certain kinds of orders, and the appellant must point to a statute or rule that allows the appeal. Jafri argued the contempt order was a "final judgment" he could appeal. The court rejected that, explaining that there is generally only one final judgment in a case, and the final judgment here was already entered in 2020. The court also reiterated long-standing Nevada law that contempt orders, by themselves, are not appealable. Jafri also argued that the attorney fee award was a "special order after final judgment," which is a separate category of appealable orders. The court explained that fee awards qualify only when they affect rights arising from the final judgment itself. Here, the fees were tied to contempt and enforcement proceedings - which are not appealable - so the fee award riding on top of them was not appealable either. The court also denied Jafri's alternative request to treat his appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ relief, denied Wynn's request for sanctions against Jafri, and denied as moot Wynn's motion to dismiss under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the contempt finding.

This is a very short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. Julia Chumak had filed an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court in a family-law matter involving Jose von Buchwald. Before the court reached any questions about the substance of the case, both sides agreed to end the appeal. In legal terms, they filed a "stipulation" - a formal agreement between the parties. Based on that agreement, the court dismissed (ended) the appeal. The court also stated that each side would pay its own costs and attorney fees rather than one side reimbursing the other. The order does not explain what the original dispute was about, what the lower court decided, or why Chumak appealed. It simply records that the parties agreed to stop the appeal and that the court granted that request.

This is a very short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. The two parties in this family-court case agreed between themselves (a "stipulation") that the appeal should end. Because both sides agreed, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, citing NRAP 42, the appellate rule governing voluntary dismissals. The court also ordered that "The parties shall bear theit own costs and attorney fees" - meaning each side pays its own legal expenses rather than one side paying the other's. The order says nothing about what the underlying family-law dispute involved or who would have prevailed; those questions were never decided by the appellate court.

This case arose from a divorce between Kelly Jeanne Lobeck and Jason Allen Harper. During the divorce, the parties resolved the question of who would have custody of their child through a stipulated partial decree entered on August 4, 2024. Other issues raised in the divorce complaint - specifically, how to divide the couple's finances and marital property - had not yet been resolved when this appeal was filed. The district court later entered an order awarding attorney fees and costs related to the child custody issue. Lobeck tried to appeal that fee award to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, noticed a problem: in Nevada, you generally cannot appeal a ruling until the case as a whole is finished (a "final judgment"). Lobeck argued the August 4, 2024 partial decree on custody counted as a final judgment, which would make the later fee order appealable as a "special order after final judgment." The Supreme Court disagreed. Because the divorce case still had unresolved financial issues pending in the district court, no final judgment had been entered. Nevada law allows only one final judgment per case, and a partial decree resolving only one issue (custody) does not qualify. Without a final judgment, the fee order could not be appealed as a special order after final judgment, and the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court therefore dismissed it. Lobeck may pursue an appeal at a later time once a final judgment is entered, but the opinion does not address that possibility directly.

This is a child-custody appeal that never reached the merits. After a Clark County family court judge entered a custody order, Lonnie Perry Brown appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court without a lawyer. In appeals of this kind, the appellant - the person challenging the lower court's ruling - must file a "fast track opening brief," a written document explaining why the lower court got it wrong. The Supreme Court ordered Brown to file that brief by July 21, 2025, and warned him that missing the deadline could end his appeal. Brown filed a brief two days late, on July 23, 2025, but the court found it did not meet the rules and struck it. The court gave him 14 days to fix the problems and warned him again. He re-filed on August 7, 2025, but that version was also deficient and was struck on August 8, 2025. The court gave him another deadline of August 18, 2025, with another warning. When he missed that deadline, the court issued yet another order on September 4, 2025, giving him 14 more days and another warning. Brown never filed a conforming brief and stopped communicating with the court. Concluding that he had abandoned the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed it. The custody order from the family court therefore stands.

This is a procedural dismissal, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying divorce case. When someone appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court, they must complete certain initial paperwork - including a transcript request form (which tells the court what hearing transcripts to gather) and a docketing statement (a form summarizing the case for the court). According to the order, the Supreme Court issued a notice on September 2, 2025, telling the appellant to file these documents within set deadlines. The appellant tried to file a transcript request form on September 9, 2025, but the court found it deficient and gave her until September 25, 2025, to file a corrected version. When she did not, the court issued another order on October 2, 2025, extending the deadline to October 9, 2025, and warning that the appeal could be dismissed if she did not comply. She did not file the documents, so the court dismissed the appeal, treating it as abandoned.

Ronald Lee Smith appealed a decision from his divorce case in Nye County district court to the Nevada Supreme Court. He represented himself, without an attorney. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the Supreme Court requires certain paperwork early in the process. Two of those documents are a transcript request form (or a certificate stating no transcript is being requested) and a docketing statement, which gives the court basic information about the appeal. On August 26, 2025, the court told Smith to file these documents within set deadlines. He did not. On September 19, 2025, the court gave him another chance, ordering him to file the documents by September 26, 2025, and warning that missing this deadline could result in dismissal. Smith still did not file the required documents. Concluding that Smith had abandoned his appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed it. The dismissal ends this appeal without any decision on whether the divorce ruling below was right or wrong.

A man named Phillip Scott Grigalanz was involved in a custody case in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County. He asked that the judge handling his custody motion be disqualified - that is, removed from his case. The district court denied that request. Rather than waiting to appeal at the end of the case, Grigalanz, representing himself without a lawyer, went directly to the Court of Appeals and asked for an "extraordinary writ." An extraordinary writ is a special, immediate court order. He sought two kinds: a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing a lower court or official to perform a duty the law requires, or to correct an arbitrary or capricious use of discretion - and a writ of prohibition - a court order that stops a lower court from acting beyond its legal authority or jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals explained that deciding whether to take up this kind of petition at all is entirely within its own discretion, and that the person asking for the writ carries the burden of showing that this unusual relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the documents Grigalanz submitted, the court concluded he had not made that showing. The court therefore denied the petition. Because it denied the petition, the court also denied Grigalanz's emergency request to pause the proceedings (a stay) and his request to submit a video exhibit. The order does not explain the underlying facts of the custody dispute, the specific reasons the disqualification was sought, or why the district court denied disqualification. It states only that the petitioner did not demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted.

This is a one-page administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court. The person who filed the appeal, Patrome Collins, II, asked the court on his own (without a lawyer) to drop his appeal. The court agreed and closed the case. The opinion does not describe what the underlying family-court dispute was about, what the lower court decided, or why Mr. Collins chose to withdraw. It simply grants his request to end the appeal.

This is a one-page clerk's order ending an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court ever reached the merits. Jon Pearson had appealed a decision from the Eighth Judicial District Court's Family Division. He then asked the Supreme Court to dismiss his own appeal, and the other side did not object. The court granted that request and closed the case. Because the appeal was withdrawn voluntarily, the order does not discuss the underlying family-law dispute, the lower court's ruling, or any legal issues. Nothing in this order changes Nevada law or decides anything about the parties' rights beyond ending the appeal itself.

This is a one-paragraph administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court closing out an appeal. The person who filed the appeal, Terrell Avalon Lancaster, told the court he no longer wished to pursue it. When an appellant withdraws an appeal, the court's rules allow it to be dismissed without any decision on the merits - that is, without the court ruling on who was right or wrong in the underlying family-support dispute. The court did exactly that here, citing Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 42, the rule that governs voluntary dismissal of appeals. Because the appeal was withdrawn, the order does not address the underlying family-court ruling, the parties' arguments, or any legal issues. The lower court's decision stands undisturbed.