Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves a custody fight over a child identified as A.L., the youngest of three children born to Kimberly Stevens and Jefferson Davis Laney. The couple married in 2006 and divorced under a Nevada decree in 2021. Because California was the children's "home state" under an interstate custody law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the Nevada divorce decree said the actual custody arrangement would be worked out in California courts. In November 2021, a California court entered a judgment - based on an agreement the parties made (a "stipulation") - that gave Stevens primary physical custody and required Laney and the children to take part in "reunification therapy," a process meant to rebuild the relationship between the children and their father. The parties agreed this therapy was in the children's best interest, agreed to jointly pick the therapist, and agreed to follow the therapist's plan and schedule. Early attempts at reunification with two therapists failed, and those therapists reported that Stevens interfered with the process. The parties then jointly selected Dr. Donna Wilburn as the reunification therapist. In May 2023, after Nevada took over jurisdiction (California gave it up), the Nevada court began enforcing the existing reunification plan. The court ordered daily 7:00 a.m. video calls between Laney and the children, and specifically ordered that the children "shall have privacy alone with [Laney]" during those calls. Private investigators hired by Laney later observed Stevens positioning herself about sixteen feet from A.L. during a scheduled call, with an older daughter hidden under a picnic table about five feet from A.L. - people apparently not visible to Laney on the call. Investigators observed similar concealment on other dates. The case eventually went to a two-day evidentiary hearing in early 2025 on custody and contempt. By the time that hearing concluded, Dr. Wilburn testified that reunification had been achieved, that it went well after initial obstacles were resolved, and that she found no signs the children had been abused by either parent. As a "mandated reporter" (someone legally required to report suspected abuse), she made no abuse report. She recommended joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. The district court found Dr. Wilburn and Laney credible and found Stevens's testimony inconsistent, evasive, and self-serving. The court held Stevens in contempt for violating the "privacy alone" order, imposing a 25-day jail sentence that she could avoid ("purge") by paying a $500 fine, complying with court orders, and paying certain attorney fees. On custody, the court found a substantial change in circumstances and, after going through the statutory best-interest factors, found most favored Laney. Even so, the court awarded joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. (not primary custody to Laney), partly to preserve A.L.'s bond with her sisters and Stevens. On appeal, the court rejected each of Stevens's arguments. It held that "Kayden's Law" - a 2025 Nevada statute limiting court-ordered reunification therapy - did not apply, because the reunification requirement came from the 2021 California judgment, not from a Nevada order, and Nevada was required under the UCCJEA to recognize and enforce that judgment. The court also held that no improper delegation to the therapist occurred, that the contempt finding was proper, and that the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence. As for the fee award, the court dismissed that part of the appeal, explaining it lacked jurisdiction because the final fee order was entered after Stevens filed her notice of appeal and she never filed a separate appeal from that order. Because the judgment was affirmed and no remand was ordered, Stevens's request to reassign the case to a different judge was moot.

Phillip Grigalanz and Elizabeth Copas were once in a romantic relationship. During that relationship, Grigalanz lived with Copas and her three minor children, identified in the opinion as K.C., E.C., and J.G. Grigalanz admits he is not the biological father of any of the three children. After the relationship ended, he filed a petition asking the court to give him custody of all three children, alleging that Copas and Jose Enrique Gonzalez-Alba (whom he identified as J.G.'s biological and legal father) had failed to adequately care for the children and that it would be in the children's best interest for the court to place them with him. According to the opinion, Grigalanz never served the petition or any other filing on any of the parents. The district court held a hearing on his request for a temporary custody order and, at that hearing, orally dismissed his petition, finding that he lacked "standing" - meaning the legal right to bring the case at all. Before the court put its decision in writing, Grigalanz filed a motion asking the judge to step aside, arguing that during the hearing she raised her voice at him and judged him unfairly. The court denied that motion and then entered a written order dismissing the petition for lack of standing. Grigalanz appealed. On appeal, Grigalanz argued that a Nevada statute, NRS 125A.135, gave him standing because it defines a "person acting as a parent," and that authority from other states allows a "psychological" or "de facto" parent to seek custody. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the statute merely defines a term; it does not, by its plain wording, give a non-parent the right to seek custody in Nevada in the first place. The court noted that the definition is used in only a few statutes, such as ones dealing with modifying or registering custody orders that were originally issued by courts in other states. The court also rejected Grigalanz's reliance on the "in loco parentis" doctrine - a legal idea about someone standing in the place of a parent. The court said Grigalanz pointed to no Nevada authority using that doctrine to give an unrelated person standing to seek custody, and that in Nevada the doctrine mainly comes up in the context of "equitable adoption." The court further said it was not persuaded by cases from other states because those cases did not analyze Nevada law. Grigalanz also argued that the district court had to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings about the children's best interests before dismissing his petition. The court rejected this too, explaining that the court did hold a motion hearing, that an evidentiary hearing is meant to resolve disputed questions of fact, and that this case turned on a purely legal question because Grigalanz conceded he was not biologically related to the children. The court also explained that best-interest findings come into play only when a court is actually deciding a custody dispute, and because Grigalanz never established standing, the court did not need to reach those factors. Because it concluded that Grigalanz failed to show standing, the Court of Appeals did not address his arguments about service or about judicial bias, and it affirmed the dismissal.

This case concerns a divorce and a fight over custody of a young child born in March 2019. Nae-Ryung Lee and Joshua Lee Perry were married and lived in San Diego, California. In October 2021, the family vacationed in South Korea, Nae-Ryung's home country. In June 2022, Joshua and the child returned to the United States and moved to Las Vegas to live with the child's paternal grandmother, while Nae-Ryung initially stayed in South Korea before joining them in Las Vegas in August 2022. After living with the family for several months, Nae-Ryung accused Joshua of "kidnapping" the child, claiming the parties had agreed to return to South Korea. She filed for divorce in Las Vegas in October 2022, asking for primary physical custody, permission to move with the child, and an order keeping Joshua from leaving the state with the child. The case had a long and tangled procedural history. The district court first decided Nevada was not the child's "home state" and threw out the custody portion of the case. Joshua appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, saying the trial court had failed to consider whether Nevada might have jurisdiction (the legal power to decide the case) on other grounds. Meanwhile, the child had been with Nae-Ryung in South Korea since November 2022, and Joshua filed a case there under the Hague Convention (an international agreement dealing with the return of children) seeking the child's return. Back in Nevada, the court went through several rounds of hearings, orders, motions to reconsider, and reversals of its own prior rulings. At one point it took "temporary emergency jurisdiction" and awarded Joshua temporary custody, then later set that aside, then later still—after Joshua asked it to reconsider—decided that Nevada did have exclusive and continuing jurisdiction and awarded Joshua sole legal and sole physical custody. Nae-Ryung repeatedly did not appear at hearings. Eventually, in June 2025, the court issued an amended decree giving Joshua sole legal custody and primary physical custody, with Nae-Ryung allowed weekly supervised parenting time. This appeal followed. On appeal, Nae-Ryung made three main arguments. First, she said the court improperly changed its own decree more than a year after entering it and did so without giving her notice that the result could be a final custody order against her—violating her right to due process (fair notice and a chance to be heard). The Court of Appeals disagreed. It pointed to the record showing that custody was clearly identified as an issue for the evidentiary hearing, that Joshua's motion asking the court to decide custody had been served on her, and that she had filed an opposition and received notice of the hearings she failed to attend. The court concluded she had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Second, she argued the court wrongly relied on a rule meant for fixing clerical mistakes (NRCP 60(a)) to justify its decision. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if relying on that rule was an error, it was harmless because the court was actually responding to the parties' motions for reconsideration. Third, she challenged the custody awards themselves. On legal custody (the authority to make major decisions about the child's health, education, and upbringing), the court found no abuse of discretion: the trial court had pointed to Nae-Ryung withholding the child for years, ignoring court orders, and obtaining a South Korean passport for the child without Joshua's knowledge or consent—facts supporting a finding that the parents could not cooperate. On physical custody, however, the Court of Appeals found a problem. Although the trial court called its award "primary physical custody," the practical effect—weekly supervised parenting time only—amounted to "sole physical custody." Under Nevada precedent (Roe v. Roe), a sole physical custody award requires specific written findings, including either that the other parent is unfit to live with or that giving that parent significant parenting time is not in the child's best interest, plus consideration of the least restrictive parenting arrangement. The trial court did not make these required findings. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the physical custody and parenting time decisions and sent the case back for the trial court either to give Nae-Ryung more parenting time so the arrangement is genuinely primary (not sole) custody, or to make the additional findings Nevada law requires to support a sole physical custody award.

Vick and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., who was born in Las Vegas in April 2023. About a month after K.G.'s birth, Anjena and the baby traveled to Canada for a funeral. They ended up staying longer than planned, in part because the family's Nevada home had a major water leak and Anjena found temporary work in Canada. Vick remained in regular contact, visited, and the couple even discussed having more children. At some point the marriage broke down. In November 2023, Anjena filed for custody of K.G. in a Canadian court. Vick responded by filing a Hague Convention petition in Canada seeking the child's return to Nevada; the Canadian court denied that petition, finding that K.G.'s "habitual residence" was Canada. Vick lost his appeal of that ruling. In May 2024, Vick filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court for custody and child support. The Nevada district court refused, saying it did not have "home state" jurisdiction over the child and that a lot of litigation had already happened in Canada. Vick appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJEA (Nevada's version is in NRS Chapter 125A), a state is a child's "home state" if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed, and that period includes any "temporary absence" from the state. The Court concluded that K.G.'s time in Canada from May to November 2023 was a temporary absence: Anjena originally went for a funeral intending to return, communicated frequently with Vick, discussed expanding the family, and the prolonged stay was due to a home repair and short-term work. The Hague proceeding itself found that Anjena did not form an intent to remain in Canada until November 2023. So for jurisdictional purposes, K.G. is treated as having lived in Nevada until November 6, 2023 - less than six months before Vick's May 3, 2024 filing. That makes Nevada the home state. However, the Court did not order Nevada to keep the case. It explained that the earlier Hague ruling - finding Canada to be K.G.'s habitual residence - is entitled to "considerable weight" and that international practice generally directs custody decisions to the country of habitual residence. Under NRS 125A.365(1), a Nevada court may decline jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriate. The Court said deferring to Canada "may ultimately be appropriate," but it would be premature to do so now because: (1) the Canadian court has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction; and (2) the parties have not had a chance to brief the issue in Nevada. The Court instructed the district court on remand to try to hold a UCCJEA-style conference with the Canadian court, take briefing, and apply NRS 125A.365 to decide whether Nevada or Canada is the more appropriate forum. On the child support claim, the Court noted that custody and support typically travel together, and instructed the district court to exercise jurisdiction over both pending its decision on whether to defer to Canada. The Court did not consider Vick's separate complaint about attorney fees because the record showed no fee award had actually been entered.

A woman named Irina Spiranskaya asked the Court of Appeals of Nevada to step in and stop or correct a lower court in an ongoing family law case. She represented herself and filed what is called an "original emergency petition" for two kinds of extraordinary court orders: a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition. A writ of mandamus is a court order that forces a lower court or official to perform a duty the law requires, or that reins in a decision made in an arbitrary or capricious way. A writ of prohibition is a court order that stops a lower court from continuing proceedings when that court is acting beyond its legal authority - in other words, when it lacks jurisdiction. Spiranskaya argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction over her family law matter. The Court of Appeals explained that deciding whether to even take up this kind of petition is entirely within its own discretion, and that the person asking for relief carries the burden of showing it is warranted. After reviewing the petition and the documents filed with it, the court concluded that Spiranskaya had not shown that this extraordinary relief was justified. The court also addressed a specific law Spiranskaya relied on. She pointed to a Nevada statute about child custody jurisdiction. But the court noted that the statute she cited governs only the jurisdiction over initial child custody decisions - the very first custody determination in a case. Her petition, the court said, did not challenge an initial custody determination, so that statute did not support her request. For these reasons, the court denied the petition, along with any other relief she had requested.

Two parents, Dexter Farlough and Alana Cooper, share two children. In 2016, an Arizona court had given Farlough sole decision-making authority over the children and had identified Arizona as the children's "home state" at that time. By the time this case began, however, the situation had changed: Cooper filed a custody complaint in Nevada in January 2024, stating that she and the children lived in Nevada and asking for joint legal and physical custody. Farlough, in his own filings, also stated that he now lived in Nevada and that he and the children had moved to Nevada on June 3, 2023 - more than six months before Cooper filed her complaint. During several hearings, both parents told the court they all lived in Nevada. The court observed that no one seemed to want Arizona to keep handling the case since everyone had moved away. The parents reached agreements on most issues, including sharing joint physical custody, financial matters, and a holiday and vacation schedule. The one sticking point was legal custody - the authority to make major decisions about the children. The judge proposed that the parents share joint legal custody, but that Farlough would have the final say on medical and educational matters (one child has serious medical and educational needs, and Farlough felt he knew more about them). Cooper agreed, and Farlough said the parents had "a full agreement." The court then put all of this into a written custody decree. Farlough appealed. He raised four arguments. First, he said Arizona, not Nevada, should have decided the case. The Court of Appeals disagreed, pointing out that under the relevant rules, Nevada has authority when it is the children's "home state" (where they have lived for at least six consecutive months) and when no one still lives in the other state - and Farlough's own filings established both facts. Second, Farlough argued the court was wrong to treat the joint legal custody arrangement as something the parties had agreed to. The court rejected this, noting that the record showed Cooper agreed to the proposal and Farlough himself said they had "a full agreement." Third, Farlough claimed he was not properly notified of hearings or of Cooper's motion. The court found that he had been served through the court's electronic filing system and that Cooper's motion showed it had been mailed to him - and that he actually appeared at the key hearings where the agreements were made. Fourth, Farlough argued the judge was biased against him because of his gender. The court found no support for this, explaining that a judge's rulings made during the case generally cannot prove bias unless they show a deep-seated hostility that would make fair judgment impossible. Because none of Farlough's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed the custody decree.

Alexander Posey and Margaret Bond, who were previously married, share a minor son referred to as L.P. Under an earlier custody arrangement they agreed to, the parents shared "joint legal custody" - meaning both parents together make major decisions about the child - except that Bond alone made decisions about the child's religious upbringing. In June 2024, Bond asked the court for permission to take L.P. to a child psychiatrist. According to her motion, in April 2024 the child had made troubling statements such as "I want to die and not go to heaven" and "I don't deserve to be alive," although the next day he said he "wanted to live for a thousand years." Bond said the child's former therapist recommended a child psychiatrist, that a teacher reported the child was struggling to focus in class, and that the child's pediatrician indicated a July 10 psychiatry appointment might be the best option. Posey opposed. He agreed the child should see a mental health provider, but he wanted the child to see a new therapist first and let that therapist decide whether a psychiatrist was needed. He said that if the new therapist recommended a psychiatrist, he would follow that recommendation. Because the parents could not agree, Bond asked the court to "break the tie" - a reference to a Nevada Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Kelley, that lets a court decide a health-care question when parents with joint legal custody disagree. While the motion was pending, the parents temporarily agreed to take L.P. to a therapist, and the child attended five sessions. But the dispute over the psychiatrist continued. The district court then issued an order that went further than resolving the psychiatrist question: it gave Bond sole legal custody over the child's mental health generally, including taking him to a psychiatrist, and it ordered that Posey could not make decisions about the child's mental health treatment or obstruct it. The Court of Appeals split its decision. It upheld the part of the order that let Bond take L.P. to a child psychiatrist and any recommended follow-up appointments, finding the district court acted within its discretion because the evidence - including recommendations from the prior therapist and the pediatrician - supported that this was in the child's best interest, and because Posey did not show why a therapist rather than a psychiatrist was better for the child. But the court found that the broader part of the order - giving Bond sole legal custody over all of the child's mental health decisions - went beyond what Bond had actually asked for. Bond's motion sought only the limited authority to take the child to a psychiatrist and follow-ups; she even acknowledged she never sought to strip Posey of his right to be involved in the child's care. Because the court granted this broader control without warning Posey that a wider change to legal custody was being considered, it deprived him of notice and a chance to be heard, violating his due process rights. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated (canceled) that broader part of the order while keeping the psychiatrist authorization intact.

Cierah Johnson and William Bennett divorced in March 2022 and initially shared joint custody of their two daughters on a week-on/week-off schedule. After Johnson's father died, she moved to Colorado, and the parties signed a court-approved stipulation in May 2022 giving Bennett "primary physical custody" of the girls in Nevada, with a note that the parties would "reevaluate the details" in a year. Johnson moved back to Las Vegas in May 2023, and the parents informally resumed week-on/week-off parenting, but Johnson never filed paperwork to change the custody order on the books. Bennett, an Air Force helicopter mechanic, was then ordered to transfer to a base in Georgia. He filed a petition asking the court for permission to take the children with him. Johnson opposed the move, argued that the parties were really exercising joint custody in practice, and filed her own countermotion asking the court to give her primary physical custody. After a three-day hearing, the district court granted Bennett's relocation request. The Court of Appeals identified two main problems with how the lower court got there. First, the lower court decided Johnson's countermotion for primary custody before deciding Bennett's relocation petition. Because Johnson's countermotion was based entirely on the fact that Bennett wanted to move, deciding it first effectively put the burden on Johnson to stop the move - the opposite of what Nevada's relocation statute requires. Second, the lower court used language suggesting Johnson had to do more than show what was "more likely than not" best for the children - it said she had to "significantly tip the scales" and show the children would be "far better off" with her - while at the same time saying Bennett only had to "equal or slightly exceed" what was available for the children in Nevada. That flipped and watered down the legal standards. On the question Johnson pressed hardest - whether the trial judge should have looked past the written custody order and assessed the parents' actual day-to-day arrangement (the "true nature" of custody under the older Rivero case) - the Court of Appeals sided with Bennett. The court explained that Nevada's relocation statutes were rewritten in 2015, after Rivero. Those statutes (NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065) now key the procedure to whatever custodial arrangement "has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court." Because the 2022 stipulation clearly named Bennett as primary physical custodian and Johnson never moved to modify it, the trial court was right to treat Bennett as the primary custodian for purposes of his relocation petition. The Court of Appeals reversed the relocation order and sent the case back so the district court can reconsider Bennett's petition under the correct burden of proof - preponderance of the evidence - and decide his relocation petition before addressing any contingent countermotion by Johnson.

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents, Jennifer Crosier and Garrett Crosier, who married in Utah and had three children. After separating in 2017, Jennifer moved to Nevada with the children and Garrett moved to Colorado. Although they divorced in Utah in 2019, the parties agree that no Utah court ever issued a final custody decree. In April 2022, Jennifer filed a complaint in Nevada asking for sole legal and sole physical custody of all three children. In her complaint, Jennifer raised concerns about Garrett's alleged domestic violence, stating that he had a prior child abuse/neglect conviction from Utah and that the children were afraid of him. The two older children were interviewed by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) and described instances of alleged physical abuse by Garrett - one child said he slapped her and caused her to hit her head, and that he kicked the other child with a steel-toed boot; the other child said he picked her up and pulled her by her hair. Both older children said they preferred to stay with Jennifer in Nevada. At a single-day hearing in May 2023, both parents represented themselves without lawyers. The judge told the parties he would "take control of the questioning" to avoid wasting time, and the court itself questioned the parties and witnesses. The court admitted the FMC child interview report into evidence, but it never asked any questions about the abuse allegations in that report or the domestic violence claims from Jennifer's complaint. When Jennifer tried to raise the abuse issue in her closing argument, the court did not allow her to continue, stating she had offered "zero evidence" that Garrett abused the children. At the end of the hearing, the judge said he had to consider "certain factors in evaluating what is in a child's best interest," but he addressed only two of the twelve factors that Nevada law requires. The court decided the parents would share joint legal custody, that Jennifer would have primary physical custody of the two older children, and that Garrett would have primary physical custody of the youngest child in Colorado. The written custody decree that followed did not mention any of the twelve best interest factors and contained no factual findings about the children's best interest. A later post-decree order also failed to address those factors. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that when deciding custody, a court's only consideration is the best interest of the child, and the court must consider all twelve factors listed in the statute and put its findings in a written order that ties those findings to the custody decision. Because the decree here contained no such findings, the court found this was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. The court also held that the trial court should have addressed the domestic violence allegations - the FMC report containing those allegations was in evidence, yet the court never determined whether domestic violence occurred. Finally, the court held the trial judge should have analyzed whether moving the youngest child to Colorado was in that child's best interest, using a five-factor test from prior Nevada case law. The case was sent back for a new evidentiary hearing.

This is a custody dispute between two parents, Nereida Cobian and Armando Emmanuel Ramirez, who had a child, L.R., born in Utah in October 2015. Early on, the parents submitted a letter to a Utah court in which Ramirez appeared to give up his parental rights, but the court did not treat it as a full waiver. Instead, the Utah court gave Cobian sole legal and physical custody and gave Ramirez standard parenting time, and it required Ramirez to pay child support. Cobian moved with the child, first to California and later to Las Vegas. Ramirez, who worked for and then as a civilian contractor connected to the Air Force, moved to Las Vegas as well. Over time, conflict grew. According to the district court's findings, Cobian repeatedly restricted Ramirez's time with L.R., moved to California in June 2021 without Ramirez's consent or a court order, and reported Ramirez to California child-welfare authorities for physical and sexual abuse. That investigation ended with the allegations found "unsubstantiated or inconclusive." California, which had briefly taken emergency jurisdiction, gave jurisdiction back to Nevada in July 2022. Ramirez asked the Nevada court to register the Utah order and to change custody. After an evidentiary hearing that was rescheduled four times, the district court awarded Ramirez primary physical custody, gave the parents joint legal custody, ordered L.R. returned to Las Vegas and enrolled in a Las Vegas school for the spring semester, ended Ramirez's child-support obligation, and held Cobian in contempt (with a $500 fine) for blocking Ramirez's parenting time over Thanksgiving 2023. Cobian appealed. On review, the Court of Appeals rejected each of her arguments. It concluded that Nevada was the child's "home state" and that the district court properly had jurisdiction to register the Utah order and decide custody. It found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to keep the case in Nevada rather than transfer it to California, because Ramirez still lived in Nevada and the Nevada court was familiar with the case. It upheld the custody change, noting that the trial judge made detailed findings that circumstances had substantially changed and that the child's best interests favored Ramirez. The appellate court explained that it does not re-weigh evidence or second-guess a trial court's credibility findings, including the trial court's determination that Cobian's abuse allegations were not credible. It upheld the relocation order, the contempt finding, and it declined to order the case reassigned to a different judge, finding that Cobian had not shown bias. The court did not decide certain issues. It declined to address the child-support challenge in detail because that challenge depended on reversing the custody award, which the court affirmed. It found the school-enrollment issue moot because the order concerned only the 2024 spring semester. And it concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the attorney-fees issue because the order under appeal only found that Ramirez was "entitled to" fees rather than actually awarding them.

This case involves a former married couple and their child. Alaa, a Syrian citizen, and Susan Swensen, a U.S. citizen, married in 2013 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and had a child there in 2014. In 2017 Susan and the child moved to the United States, settling in Nevada in July 2019. Alaa stayed in the UAE. According to the opinion, the parties kept in touch amicably through Facebook, email, and video calls. In May 2020, Susan started divorce and custody proceedings in Nevada, asking for joint legal custody, primary physical custody, and a change to the child's last name. Alaa was served with the papers but chose not to participate. He instead told Susan that he was not subject to U.S. law and that UAE law should apply. Because he did not respond, Susan obtained a clerk's default, and in March 2021 the court entered a default divorce decree granting joint legal custody, giving Susan primary physical custody, and approving the name change. No appeal was filed from that decree. More than two and a half years later, in October 2023, Alaa filed a motion asking the court to undo the divorce decree, return the child to the UAE for a custody decision, and restore the child's birth name. He said he had tried to begin divorce proceedings in the UAE in April 2020 but could not because he lacked the child's birth certificate and related documents. He said a UAE court issued its own default divorce decree in August 2020 but declined to decide custody, and that this UAE decree was never shown to the Nevada court before it entered its decree. He argued Susan had unlawfully removed the child from the UAE. Susan opposed the motion and asked for an abduction prevention order. She argued the motion was too late under the rule governing motions to set aside judgments, that Nevada was the child's home state, that their communications contradicted the abduction claim, and that Alaa had not shown reversing the name change was in the child's best interest. The district court denied Alaa's motion. It found no factual or legal basis to set aside the decree, noting the parties had communicated extensively after Susan left the UAE and that the child had lived in Nevada for more than six months before Susan filed for divorce. The court found Nevada was the child's "home state" and the United States the child's "home country," giving it authority (jurisdiction) over the case. It also noted Alaa could have participated in the Nevada proceedings but declined to, and had not requested parenting time. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded the district court properly had authority over the custody dispute because Nevada was the child's home state and no competing custody proceeding existed in the UAE when Susan filed in Nevada. The court also rejected the abduction argument, pointing to the parties' friendly communications in the record. Finally, the court declined to consider several of Alaa's other arguments because he had either not raised them properly in the lower court or had raised them too late.

Melinda and Paul Miller divorced in 2016 and share joint physical and joint legal custody of one child. For years, their parenting-time schedule kept changing because of Paul's work as a pilot, and the constant changes led to a lot of litigation. In August 2022, Melinda asked the court to set a permanent schedule. While the case was pending, the court temporarily put in place a week-on/week-off arrangement. In early 2023, Paul asked the court to hold Melinda in contempt - a finding that a person disobeyed a clear court order - because, he said, the divorce decree gave him parenting time on President's Day weekend in odd-numbered years, but Melinda picked the child up from school and took him to a soccer tournament in Utah that weekend without Paul's consent. Melinda responded that Paul knew about the tournament and that his own failure to reliably use his parenting time should excuse her actions. Shortly before the evidentiary hearing, Melinda for the first time asked the court - in her pretrial memorandum - to give her primary physical custody, not just a new schedule. Paul filed his own pretrial memorandum the same day and did not address that request. At the start of the hearing, the court told Melinda it would not consider the primary-custody request because it was raised too late and Paul had not received adequate notice or a chance to defend against it. Melinda's attorney asked to amend the pleadings to match the evidence, but the court declined. After the hearing, the court set a new, more predictable schedule and found Melinda in contempt, concluding she intentionally took the child during Paul's clearly defined parenting time without his written consent. It ordered her to pay a $500 sanction and later awarded Paul $1,800 in attorney fees and costs for the contempt issue. Melinda asked the court to reconsider. In a later ruling, the court found a separate contempt motion by Paul to be frivolous and awarded Melinda $500 in fees for opposing it, reducing what she owed Paul to $1,300 plus the $500 sanction. The court kept the contempt finding and fee award but removed the "floating days" from the schedule. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed on all three points. It held the district court acted within its discretion in finding Melinda in contempt because there was a clear order (the divorce decree), Melinda had notice and the ability to comply, and she intentionally violated it - something she acknowledged in her testimony. The court was not persuaded that Paul's own conduct excused her violation. On the sanction and fees, the court found Melinda's arguments unsupported by relevant authority. On the custody request, the court held the district court properly refused to consider a change to primary custody raised for the first time just before the hearing, because letting it proceed without giving Paul adequate notice and time to prepare would not satisfy due process. The appellate court also noted the district court did not permanently bar Melinda from seeking a custody modification in the future - it simply declined to address it at that hearing.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann married in 2007 and had two children. In December 2021, Kelly filed for divorce in Nevada, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody. By then Kelly had already moved back to California, while Jeremy still lived in Nevada. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree that gave Kelly sole legal and primary physical custody and stated that it was in the children's best interests to relocate to California with Kelly. Over the next year, both parents moved out of Nevada. Jeremy filed a change of address in July 2022 indicating a move from Reno to Montana. Kelly filed a change of address in July 2023 indicating a move from California to Pennsylvania. Shortly after Kelly's move, in August 2023, Jeremy filed a motion asking the court to enforce the divorce decree and/or to hold Kelly in contempt, alleging she had relocated the children to Pennsylvania without first getting permission or his consent. At a February 2024 hearing, Jeremy testified he was then in Arizona but not residing there, describing himself as a "fulltime traveler," said he was homeless, and confirmed his address on file was in Montana. Kelly testified she was in Pennsylvania with the children. After the hearing, Kelly filed a custody-modification petition in Pennsylvania, Jeremy filed one in Nevada, and Kelly asked the Nevada court to give up (relinquish) jurisdiction because everyone had left Nevada and proceedings were underway in Pennsylvania. Jeremy asked the Nevada court to hold a conference with the Pennsylvania court to resolve which state should handle the case. The Nevada district court then ruled. On the contempt issue, it found that although Kelly had relocated without seeking the court's permission, Jeremy had not filed the sworn statement (a fact-specific affidavit or declaration) required to support a contempt motion, so the court lacked jurisdiction to find contempt. On the larger jurisdictional question, the court found that once the parents and children no longer lived in Nevada, Nevada lost its "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" over the custody dispute. After an informal conference with the Pennsylvania court, the two courts agreed Pennsylvania would take jurisdiction, so the Nevada court relinquished the case and denied Jeremy's Nevada custody-modification motion as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that under the law governing which state handles interstate custody cases, Nevada's continuing authority ends when the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in Nevada. Because nobody disputed that all of them had left Nevada — and had been gone for more than a year before Jeremy filed his August 2023 motion — Nevada had lost that continuing authority. The court noted that Jeremy's complaint about the original decree letting the children move to California could not be reviewed now because he never appealed that decree in time. The court also said Jeremy failed to explain how Kelly's allegedly improper move to Pennsylvania would give Nevada authority to keep handling the case, and he did not point to the relevant statute or any supporting authority. Finally, the court found nothing in the record supporting Jeremy's claim that the district court was corrupt.

Stephanie and Garrett Hatcher were married and have one child together. When Stephanie filed for divorce, both parents asked for joint legal custody, and each wanted to be the parent the child primarily lives with (called "primary physical custody"). In January 2021, the district court granted the divorce and decided the custody arrangement. The court found that Garrett had communicated with Stephanie in an inappropriate manner, so it gave Stephanie primary physical custody and limited Garrett to supervised parenting time on Saturdays and Sundays from 10:00 a.m. to noon. That supervised time was to be run by an agency called Family First Services at Garrett's expense until he could show, through a communications app called Talking Parents, that he could communicate properly with Stephanie. The court also entered a "behavior order" telling both parents not to use abusive or foul language. In 2022, Stephanie asked the court to change the arrangement. She wanted sole legal custody, wanted Garrett's parenting time further restricted because he had attended few of his scheduled visits, and asked the court to hold Garrett in contempt (a finding that a person disobeyed a court order) for using inappropriate language, for claiming the child on his federal taxes, and for leaving the former marital home in poor condition. She also asked the court to make Garrett pay her attorney fees. Garrett opposed her request and filed his own motion asking for unsupervised parenting time. He explained that he had temporarily moved to California for financial reasons and could not visit in person during that period, that he tried to talk to the child by phone but said Stephanie would not help make that happen, and that after returning to Nevada the high cost of supervised sessions limited how often he could see the child. He said he wanted more time, and unsupervised time, to build his relationship with the child. After hearings in August and October 2023, the district court reviewed the parties' testimony and their Talking Parents messages. The court found that the most recent objectionable message from Garrett was in January 2023 and that his communications had been appropriate since then. Because the supervised-time requirement had been put in place due to his poor communication, and because Garrett had shown he could now communicate properly, the court found supervised visits were no longer necessary and posed no safety risk to the child. The court kept Stephanie as the primary physical custodian and kept joint legal custody, but gave Garrett unsupervised parenting time of two days per week, including one overnight. The court did not find Garrett's testimony that money was the only reason he missed visits to be credible, declined to hold him in contempt because he had improved his communication, and denied Stephanie's request for attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-decide the facts or re-weigh whether one witness was more believable than another; instead it checks whether the trial court had solid enough evidence to support its findings and whether it decided for the right legal reasons. Applying that limited review, the court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on any of the four issues Stephanie raised. The court therefore affirmed.

Charleslie Wayne Edwards and Benito Santoyo were married in Colorado and have one child together. According to the opinion, the family lived in Colorado for most of the marriage. On December 8, 2023, Edwards filed papers in a Nevada court asking for a divorce and for custody of the child. She claimed that she and the child had been living in Nevada for the previous six months, which she argued made Nevada the right place to handle the divorce and custody dispute. Santoyo asked the Nevada court to throw out the case, arguing it did not have the authority (called "jurisdiction") to hear it. He said he had already started divorce proceedings in Colorado on December 1, 2023. He also said Edwards and the child had only recently arrived in Nevada, and that Edwards had taken the child to Nevada without his knowledge or consent. Under Nevada law, a court cannot grant a divorce unless one of the spouses has lived in Nevada for at least six weeks before the case begins. And under the UCCJEA — a law that decides which state gets to handle child custody — Nevada courts generally can only rule on custody if Nevada is the child's "home state," meaning the child lived here with a parent for at least six months in a row before the case started. The court held an evidentiary hearing to figure out where Edwards and the child actually lived. Edwards testified that she and the child had lived in Nevada since April 2023, but she did not bring documents to back that up. Santoyo testified that Edwards lived with him in Colorado until November 2023. A friend of Edwards, Jesse Leszko, testified that Edwards and the child were at his Colorado home on December 1, 2023, and that Edwards had told him she lived in Colorado at that time. The district court concluded that the evidence showed Edwards had only lived in Nevada since roughly December 1, 2023 — about seven days before she filed her case. Because that did not satisfy the six-week residency requirement for divorce or the six-month "home state" requirement for custody, the court decided it lacked authority over the case and dismissed it, finding Colorado was the more appropriate place for the proceedings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada agreed with the district court. It explained that questions about how long someone lived somewhere are factual questions for the trial court to decide, and an appeals court will not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess who the trial judge found believable. Because the district court's finding was supported by adequate evidence, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.

Erika and Michael Kragen married in 2016 in San Diego and have three children. In August 2022, the family moved from California to Henderson, Nevada, where they lived with Michael's parents and enrolled the children in a private school. Erika worked at the school as a teacher's aide. In mid-January 2023, Erika told Michael she wanted a separation. According to Erika, Michael responded by grabbing a kitchen knife, threatening suicide, and stabbing it through the children's trampoline; Michael said he threw the knife and accidentally cut the trampoline. Erika did not call the police or seek a protective order at that time. On January 31, 2023, while Michael was at work, Erika took the children to San Diego to live with her family and texted Michael afterward saying they "need[ed] a divorce." Important date: that was just four days short of six months after the family's August 4, 2022, arrival in Nevada. For several weeks after January 31, the children remained enrolled in their Nevada school, Erika remained on the school's payroll, and the couple began marriage counseling. By late February, Erika withdrew the children from the school and stopped communicating with Michael. On February 26, 2023, Michael filed for divorce in Clark County, Nevada. Two days later, Erika filed for legal separation in San Diego County, California. About a month after that, Erika sought an emergency domestic violence restraining order in California. The two states' courts both issued temporary custody orders, then conferred by phone. The California court agreed to defer to Nevada on the question of which state should decide custody. The Nevada district court, after an evidentiary hearing on remand from an earlier writ proceeding, found that Nevada was the children's "home state" under the UCCJEA. The legal puzzle: under the UCCJEA, a state is a child's "home state" only if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed - but the statute counts "any temporary absence" as part of that six months. The children were physically in Nevada for only about five months and 27 days. Whether Nevada qualified as the home state therefore turned on whether the children's time in San Diego from January 31 to February 26 counted as a "temporary absence." The Court of Appeals used this case to formally adopt the "totality of the circumstances" test for deciding whether an absence is temporary - the same test most other UCCJEA states use. Under that test, courts can weigh many factors, including the parents' intent, the length of the absence, whether one parent wrongfully kept the children away, the circumstances of the children's arrival and continued presence, and when the other parent had reason to know any move was permanent. Applying that test, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court's findings. The district court had credited Michael's testimony over Erika's, found that Erika did not actually leave to escape domestic violence (noting she did not seek a Nevada protective order and waited until after Michael filed for divorce to seek one in California), and pointed to the children's continued school enrollment, Erika's continued employment at the school, and the couple's marriage counseling as evidence supporting an expectation of return. Counting the absence as temporary, the children had effectively lived in Nevada for 206 days - more than six months - so Nevada was the home state. The Court of Appeals therefore denied Erika's writ petition. The court also noted that the district court had referred to Erika's "unjustifiable conduct" in removing the children, citing NRS 125A.375(1). The Court of Appeals clarified that NRS 125A.375(1) lets a court decline jurisdiction based on unjustifiable conduct but does not itself create jurisdiction; to the extent the district court relied on it as an independent basis for jurisdiction, that was error, but harmless because the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis independently supported home state jurisdiction. The court rejected Erika's request to reassign the case to a different judge, finding she had not overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality.

This case concerns which state's courts have the authority to decide who should be appointed guardian of a young child, Y.U.G. The child was born in Las Vegas in June 2022 to Daron G. and Sway Dumes. When the child was about ten months old, the parents concluded they could not care for him because they did not have stable housing, so they entrusted him to his paternal aunt, Ladesha G., who lives in Compton, California. In April 2023, Ladesha took the child to live with her in California, while the parents stayed in Las Vegas. About three months later, in July 2023, Ladesha brought the child back to Las Vegas to obtain his birth certificate and social security card. While there, she filed a petition asking a Nevada court to appoint her as the child's guardian, and the parents consented. After filing, she returned to California with the child. At an October hearing, the district court raised a concern: because the child had been living in California after the petition was filed, the judge questioned whether a Nevada court had the power (called subject matter jurisdiction) to hear the case. The court then issued a written decision denying the petition, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because "California is the home state." The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. It explained that Nevada law lets a Nevada court hear a child custody or guardianship matter if Nevada was the child's "home state" within six months before the case was filed, so long as the child is now outside Nevada but a parent still lives in Nevada. Here, the child had lived in Nevada from birth in June 2022 until moving to California in April 2023 — more than ten months — so Nevada was his home state. The guardianship petition was filed in July 2023, only about three months after the child moved, which is within the six-month window. And even though the child was in California when the petition was filed, both parents still lived in Las Vegas. Because all of those conditions were met, the court held that the Nevada district court did have jurisdiction and should not have denied the petition for lack of it. Because that conclusion resolved the appeal, the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the district court to proceed, and did not address the other issues Y.U.G. raised.

Lauren and Taylor Wooten were married and had one child together. On December 31, 2020, Taylor filed for divorce in Nevada and asked for joint legal custody and primary physical custody (the arrangement where a child lives most of the time). Taylor's papers said Lauren had been served with the divorce documents at her Florida home. Lauren did not respond in time, and the court entered a divorce decree giving Taylor primary physical custody. Lauren then asked the court to undo the decree, arguing she had not been properly served because the documents went to a former address. In that same request, she asked for primary physical custody herself, for child support, and said the child had lived with her in Florida since 2019. The court decided to keep the parties divorced but to reopen and decide the disputed custody and support issues on their merits. Because Lauren argued the child's "home state" was Florida, the Nevada court held a conference with a Florida judge to figure out which state should decide custody, as required under a law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a set of rules that decides which state's courts handle a child custody case. The judges concluded the child had no true "home state" in 2020 because he had not lived in either state for six straight months before the case was filed. Since the Nevada case was filed first and a custody order already existed there, the Florida judge declined to take the case, and Nevada kept jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the court gave the parties joint legal custody but gave Taylor final say on important educational and urgent medical decisions when the parents could not agree. It also gave Taylor primary physical custody. The court found, among other things, that Lauren had moved to Florida with the child without Taylor's consent, had at times blocked Taylor's communications, and had withheld the child during the holidays, while Taylor was more focused on the child's needs and made sure the child wore his prescription eyeglasses. On money, the court ordered Lauren to pay Taylor $300 per month in child support - a reduced amount, adjusted downward to account for the cost of transporting the child to Florida for Lauren's parenting time and the parties' relative incomes. It also had the parties split extracurricular costs. The court rejected Lauren's later request for about $41,000 in back child support, finding Taylor had credibly testified that he supported the child financially even after the move. The court denied both sides' requests for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed everything. On service of process, it held Lauren had given up that argument because she asked the court to decide the case on the merits instead of asking it to dismiss. On the other issues, it found the district court's decisions were supported by the evidence and within its discretion, and it noted that an appeals court does not reweigh evidence or second-guess a trial judge's credibility findings.

This case is about which country's courts get to decide a custody dispute over a young girl, Z.K., born in 2018 in the Philippines to an American father (Kemp) and a Filipina mother (Centeno). After the parents' relationship ended in 2022, Kemp filed for custody in a Nevada district court. Centeno asked the court to throw the case out, arguing Nevada had no authority over a child whose life was centered in the Philippines. States and countries follow a uniform rulebook called the UCCJEA to decide which court should hear a custody case. The general rule is that custody cases belong in the child's "home state" - where the child has lived with a parent for at least the six months before the case was filed. For UCCJEA purposes, Nevada treats foreign countries the same as U.S. states. The district court looked at where Z.K. actually was during the six months before Kemp filed his complaint. Z.K. spent most of that window (March 7 to July 24, 2022) in the Philippines and a smaller portion (July 25 to September 7, 2022) in Las Vegas. The judge had to decide whether her time in Las Vegas was just a "temporary absence" from the Philippines. The judge concluded it was, because Z.K. had always returned to the same address in the Philippines after trips, and because she had spent the vast majority of her short life - about three years and five months out of four years - there. Kemp argued the judge should have given more weight to other evidence suggesting the family was relocating to Las Vegas: the mother's tourist visa, her alleged intent to live and work in Nevada, and Z.K.'s enrollment in a Las Vegas school and dance classes. The district court considered that evidence but found it unconvincing. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the district court's factual findings get deference if supported by substantial evidence, and here they were. The Supreme Court also noted that other states look at the "totality of the circumstances" when deciding whether an absence is temporary, and Nevada's approach should be harmonized with those states. Because Z.K.'s home state was the Philippines and the Philippines had not declined jurisdiction, Nevada courts had no authority to hear the case. The Supreme Court also flagged one minor mistake: the district court cited an unpublished Court of Appeals order, which Nevada appellate rules forbid. The Supreme Court called this harmless error because the result would be the same without that citation.

Pamela and Dale Payne divorced in Utah in 2018 and agreed to share both legal and physical custody of their child, A.P., who is now 12. After the family moved to Reno, the Utah divorce order was registered in Nevada in 2019. Over the following years, the parents reached several agreements—modifying the parenting schedule (while keeping shared physical custody) and arranging for A.P. to attend therapy. In 2023, Pamela filed the motion at the center of this appeal, asking the court to give her primary physical custody and to adjust child support. She listed many concerns: that A.P. was fearful of Dale and got stomachaches before spending time with him, that Dale talked to A.P. about the custody dispute and read one of Pamela's court filings to her, that Dale made hurtful comments about Pamela and about A.P.'s weight, that Dale told his male friends A.P. had gotten her period, that Dale did not follow parts of the divorce order, and that Dale blocked A.P. from contacting Pamela during his parenting time. Pamela argued these facts showed Dale was emotionally abusive and that conflict between the parents was high. Dale opposed the motion, saying Pamela was simply repeating allegations she had already raised in a 2021 filing about therapy, and he disputed whether her claims were true. Without holding a hearing, the district court denied Pamela's requests. The judge found many of the allegations were "stale," identical to the 2021 filing, and too broad or conclusory—for example, that Pamela did not provide specific dates for events like when A.P. cried or had stomach issues. The court identified only a few genuinely new allegations but concluded they did not show a substantial change in circumstances. The Court of Appeals disagreed with how the district court handled the motion. Under Nevada law, when a parent asks to change custody, the trial court must generally accept the parent's specific factual allegations as true when deciding whether to hold a hearing. Taking Pamela's allegations as true, the appeals court concluded they could show a substantial change affecting A.P.'s welfare—such as a deteriorating relationship with Dale, coparenting conflict, and concerns about A.P.'s emotional needs. The court also explained that Pamela's earlier 2021 motion was about therapy, not custody, and did not result in a custody decision, so her current allegations were not merely repetitive in the legal sense. The Court of Appeals stressed that it was not deciding whether Pamela's claims are true or whether she should win. It noted Dale's challenges to her allegations "may eventually be proven correct or found more credible." But because no evidence had yet been taken and the court had also refused to let A.P. testify, the appeals court held the district court could not properly deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing. It reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Eli Pederson and Krystina Jeter have two minor children. In 2017, Krystina began custody proceedings alleging that Eli violently attacked and assaulted her in front of the children. In September 2018, the district court awarded Krystina sole physical and legal custody, based on its analysis of the children's best interests and findings that Eli had been convicted - through a guilty plea - of attempted sexual assault against Krystina and child abuse or neglect against the children. Eli, who is incarcerated at Lovelock Correctional Center, did not appeal that 2018 order. In 2022, Eli filed a "Petition for an Order to Establish a Correspondence with Minor Children," saying he had not been allowed contact with the children since his incarceration and wanted to begin repairing the relationship through phone calls, gifts, and letters. He stated that he had completed parenting classes in prison and had grown physically, spiritually, and mentally. Krystina opposed, arguing that Eli had not shown enough of a change in circumstances to justify modifying custody, and pointing to the children's therapist and a recent psychological report indicating the children were still having problems with their father's actions. Instead of filing a reply brief, Eli submitted the matter for decision. The district court denied his motion, finding he had not set forth a sufficient basis to modify the prior custody order and had not shown that an evidentiary hearing - a court proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is presented - was necessary. Eli then sought reconsideration, arguing among other things that ruling without giving him a chance to reply violated his due process rights, and asking the court to force the children's therapist to produce treatment records. The district court denied that motion too. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that when a parent asks to change a custody arrangement, the burden is on the parent making the request - not the other parent - to show a preliminary (prima facie) case for modification. Eli's argument that Krystina had also failed to make such a showing therefore missed the mark, and because he did not otherwise address the district court's conclusion that no evidentiary hearing was warranted, the court declined to consider that issue further. The court also noted that Eli's arguments did not address the district court's central finding: that there was insufficient evidence a modification would serve the children's best interest. His contention that his convictions had nothing to do with his biological children was, in the court's words, belied by the record and conflicted with express findings in the 2018 custody decree - which he never appealed and therefore could no longer challenge. As for the reconsideration motion, the court found no due process problem: under the local rule (WDGCR 12(4)), filing a reply brief is optional, and Eli chose to submit the matter for decision without one. Because Eli did not challenge the district court's stated reasons for denying reconsideration - that he failed to establish a legal basis for it and improperly raised new claims for the first time in that motion - the court deemed those challenges waived. The Court of Appeals affirmed both denials.

Erika and Michael Kragen have three minor children. The family lived in California before moving to Nevada in early August 2022. By January 31, 2023, Erika had moved back to California with the children while Michael stayed in Nevada. Michael then filed for divorce in Nevada; two days later, Erika filed for legal separation and a domestic violence restraining order in California. Both sought custody, which raised the question of which state's courts had the power to decide custody. That question turns on a law called the UCCJEA (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which Nevada has adopted). Under that framework, the children's "home state" - generally, the state where the children lived for at least six consecutive months before the case started - has first priority to decide custody. Here, the exact date the family moved to Nevada mattered enormously: if they arrived on August 1, 2022, the children may have lived in Nevada for the required six months; if they arrived on August 3 or 4, they did not. The parties' paperwork conflicted. Michael's filings and a U-Haul receipt suggested an August 1 move; Erika's filings, a different U-Haul receipt, text messages, and a bank statement suggested the family left California on the night of August 3 and arrived in Nevada on August 4. Erika had originally filed a declaration in the California case stating the move date as August 1, but she later amended it to say August 3. The Nevada district court found that the family had lived in Nevada from August 2022 through January 2023 - six months - and concluded it had home state jurisdiction. It based that decision on the parties' declarations, treating Erika's original California declaration (with the August 1 date) as binding. Before determining jurisdiction, the court had also issued a temporary custody order giving both parents joint legal and physical custody on a week-on/week-off schedule - even though a California court had already entered a restraining order temporarily giving Erika sole legal and joint physical custody and limiting Michael to supervised visits. The Nevada court did not take testimony and said it would not consider Erika's domestic violence allegations until trial. The Court of Appeals granted Erika's petition for a writ of mandamus - a court order compelling a lower court to do something it is required to do. The appellate court held that Erika's original California declaration was not a binding "judicial admission" because it was filed in a different case and was later amended; it could be considered as evidence, but it was not conclusive on the disputed move date. Because the evidence about the move date conflicted, the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing - a proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is formally presented - before deciding whether it had jurisdiction. The appellate court also held that the district court lacked authority to issue a temporary custody order before determining it had jurisdiction, and that granting joint custody without any findings on the children's best interest, despite Erika's domestic violence allegations, "was a manifest abuse of discretion." The district court must now vacate its jurisdictional orders, hold an evidentiary hearing, and - if it finds it has jurisdiction - reconsider temporary custody in light of any supported domestic violence allegations.

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents, Joshua Lee Perry and Nae-Ryung Lee, over their young child. The couple married and lived in San Diego, California, where their child was born in March 2019. In October 2021, the family took what began as a six-month vacation to South Korea, Nae-Ryung's home country. That trip was extended by two more months. In June 2022, Joshua and the child returned to the United States while Nae-Ryung stayed in South Korea. Joshua and the child then moved to Las Vegas to live with the child's paternal grandmother, and Nae-Ryung joined them there in August 2022. After living with the family in Las Vegas for several months, Nae-Ryung alleged that Joshua had "kidnapped" the child, claiming the parties had agreed to return to South Korea. In October 2022, she filed for divorce in Las Vegas and asked for primary physical custody, permission to relocate with the child, and an order preventing Joshua from taking the child out of state. Both parents asked the Nevada court to take jurisdiction over the custody question, although Nae-Ryung also argued the child had no home state. The district court issued temporary custody orders, asked both sides to submit written arguments about jurisdiction, and held a hearing. It then decided that Nevada was not the child's "home state" - a legal term describing where a child has lived for a set period before a case begins - and dismissed the entire custody portion of the divorce case. Importantly, the court stopped there and did not consider whether Nevada might still have jurisdiction for other reasons allowed by law. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that Nevada law lists several different grounds under which a court can take jurisdiction over a custody case, not just the "home state" rule. Because the district court looked only at the home-state ground and never analyzed the other possible grounds, the appeals court concluded the dismissal was premature. The court sent the case back so the district court can properly examine whether any of the other jurisdictional grounds apply. The appeals court also instructed that, if there is a custody case pending in South Korea, the district court must take that into account when analyzing jurisdiction on remand.

This case is about which state - Texas or Nevada - has the legal power to decide who should have custody of a child known by the initials B.J.M. The background, which all parties agree on, is this: In 2011, B.J.M. was removed from his mother's care in Texas. In December 2012, a Texas court placed him with his father, Stacey B.M., and gave Stacey primary custody. That 2012 Texas order also closed the underlying dependency case. Years later, B.J.M. came to Nevada and lived with his paternal aunt, Tonja Ochonma, for more than six months. In 2022, Tonja asked a Nevada court to make her B.J.M.'s legal guardian. Stacey objected, arguing that because Texas had already entered a custody order, only Texas could change it. The Nevada district court disagreed and granted the guardianship to Tonja. Stacey appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Both Texas and Nevada have adopted a uniform law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which is designed to prevent two states from issuing conflicting custody orders about the same child. Under that law, once a state issues a custody order, that state generally keeps "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" - meaning it remains the only state allowed to modify the order - until certain specific conditions are met. One key condition is that everyone involved (the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent) has moved out of the original state. Here, Stacey still lives in Texas. Because of that, the Nevada Supreme Court held, Texas remains the only state that can decide whether it still has jurisdiction over custody questions about B.J.M. A Nevada court cannot, on its own, declare that Texas has lost jurisdiction or step in to modify the Texas order (outside of an emergency, which was not at issue here). The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not have authority to grant the guardianship and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with that ruling.

Erik Ward and Svetlana Villaflor were never married and have two minor children together. In December 2019, the district court entered a final custody decree giving Villaflor primary physical custody. The court allowed Ward one hour per week of supervised parenting time at a third-party facility called Donna's House, but conditioned continued parenting time on Ward submitting to a psychological evaluation showing the children would be safe in his care. The court also asked Ward to provide the documents supporting that evaluation so the court could review them privately (an "in camera review" - a review conducted by the judge in chambers rather than in open court). Ward asked the court to reconsider, and the court denied that request in March 2020. Ward then filed a motion to set aside the March 2020 order under NRCP 60(b) - a court rule that lets a party ask a court to undo a prior ruling for certain reasons. The district court denied that motion too. Ward appealed, and in an earlier, separate appeal, the Court of Appeals sent the matter back (reversed and remanded), finding the district court had not applied the required legal factors from a case called Yochum v. Davis. On remand, the district court re-examined those factors in detail and again denied Ward's NRCP 60(b) request. That second denial is what Ward challenged in Docket No. 85148-COA. Separately, Ward's supervised parenting time had been terminated after an incident that led to his removal from Donna's House. Ward filed a "Motion for Visitation" asking to restart his parenting time. After briefing and a hearing, the district court denied that request, repeating that it might reconsider if Ward provided a psychological evaluation showing he was not a danger to the children. Ward challenged that denial in Docket No. 84674-COA. On appeal, Ward mostly tried to attack the original 2019 custody decision. The Court of Appeals said it could not consider those arguments because Ward had not filed a timely appeal of the 2019 order - and filing a timely appeal is a basic requirement without which the court has no power to hear the issue. Because Ward did not otherwise challenge how the district court applied the Yochum factors, the court treated those arguments as given up (waived), and found no abuse of discretion in the denial of NRCP 60(b) relief. On the parenting-time issue, the court noted that Ward did not dispute the district court's authority to order a psychological evaluation. Instead, Ward argued it was impossible to comply because several psychiatrists refused to treat him. But the letters he submitted to show this were heavily blacked out (redacted), and he did not provide unredacted versions for the court's private in-chambers review, even though the court had told him he could submit them that way. Under these circumstances, the court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed both orders.

This is a family-law case about whether a father could get parenting time with his teenage son. After Jose and Zully divorced, a judge gave Zully sole legal and physical custody of their children, and also gave Zully the power to decide whether Jose could spend any time with the children at all. Jose then asked the court for more parenting time with the couple's son, I.P. Zully objected. At a hearing, the court weighed evidence about what would be best for I.P. Part of that evidence involved a plea Jose had entered years earlier. Specifically, Jose had entered what is called an "Alford plea" - a type of no-contest plea, named after a U.S. Supreme Court case, where a defendant does not admit guilt but accepts a conviction - related to sexual coercion of I.P.'s older sister, who is now an adult. The trial judge wrote an 18-page order examining each factor Nevada law requires courts to consider when deciding what is in a child's best interest. The judge found that granting Jose parenting time was not in I.P.'s best interest. The judge relied on things like: I.P. (who is over 12) became frightened, depressed, and anxious when he learned his father wanted parenting time; a high level of conflict between the parents, including Jose's attempts to have Zully deported and his continuing anger toward her; and the fact that Zully had been I.P.'s sole caretaker for more than six years, including while Jose was incarcerated, and had met all of I.P.'s needs. On appeal, Jose argued the judge's findings were not adequately supported by evidence. He also correctly pointed out that under Nevada law, an Alford plea should not be used against a person in a civil case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial judge made a mistake by considering Jose's plea. But the appeals court concluded the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because the judge's other findings, which did not depend on the plea, independently supported the decision to deny parenting time. The appeals court also declined to consider Jose's challenge to the attorney-fees-and-costs award because he did not develop a real argument about it. In the end, the appeals court affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decisions.

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

Brittany Sheehan and Justin Manty have one child together, T.S. Before this case began, there was no court order in place about who had custody. Brittany filed a case in Nevada asking a court to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. Justin responded by filing his own custody case in California and asking the Nevada court to dismiss Brittany's case for lack of jurisdiction (the court's authority to decide the matter). According to the opinion, Brittany then went to California, took T.S. out of her school, and brought her to Nevada. California criminal charges were filed against Brittany over that incident. After a hearing, the Nevada district court ordered Brittany to return T.S. to Justin and dismissed the Nevada case, finding that California was the more convenient place to handle the dispute because most of the evidence and witnesses were there. On appeal, Brittany made several arguments. First, she said the judge, Dedree Butler, showed bias by saying at the hearing that she "d[id]n't know if [T.S. is] safe right now" and that "for all [she] kn[e]w [T.S. is] . . . somewhere in a basement tied up." The Court of Appeals explained that judges are presumed to be unbiased, and it read the judge's comments—though it described them as "arguably hyperbolic"—as simply stating that the judge did not know where the child was because Brittany would not say. The court found no proof that the judge's rulings were driven by bias. Second, Brittany argued the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. The court rejected this because she did not cite supporting legal authority, did not explain why such a hearing was needed, and did not identify any disputed facts the court would have had to resolve. Third, Brittany argued the court improperly relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements) from Justin. The court said that even if she were right, it would not change the outcome, because she never disputed the core reason for dismissal—that California was the more convenient forum. She also never addressed the specific statute the court used to dismiss the case. Finally, Brittany argued the court was wrong to order the child returned to Justin without weighing the "best interest of the child" factors. The court explained that it acted under its temporary emergency jurisdiction, pointing to how T.S. had been removed from California (with Brittany criminally charged and subject to an active arrest warrant) and to Brittany's refusal to reveal where the child was, which left the court unsure the child was safe. The court found those oral findings sufficient. Because none of Brittany's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

While married, Luong and Vahey set up college savings accounts (called "529 accounts" after the federal tax provision that governs them) for each of their three children. When the couple divorced, they disagreed about how to split these accounts. After a 2020 hearing where both sides presented evidence, the trial judge concluded that Vahey had put in about 25 percent of the money and Luong (with help from her family) had put in about 75 percent, and divided the accounts accordingly - 25 percent to Vahey, 75 percent to Luong, with each parent managing their share on behalf of the children. About a year after that hearing, Luong hired a financial consultant who calculated slightly different numbers: that Luong and her family contributed 77.11 percent and Vahey 22.89 percent. Based on this new report, Luong asked the court to fix or undo the account-division part of the divorce decree. She used two rules: NRCP 60(a), which lets a court fix simple clerical mistakes, and NRCP 60(b)(1), which lets a court undo a decision because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The trial court refused, finding there was no clerical error, that the request was filed too late, and that it was frivolous because it sought only a tiny adjustment to accounts the parents did not even own themselves but managed for their children. In the same set of filings, Vahey asked the court to order Luong to hand over the children's passports, saying he feared she might leave the country with the children. Luong objected. The trial court decided to split the passports - ordering Luong to surrender two of the three children's passports to Vahey's attorney and letting her keep one - to prevent either parent from taking the children abroad on their own. Luong appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that there was no clerical error to correct under NRCP 60(a), because the judge's percentage finding was a product of weighing the evidence - an exercise of judgment - not a slip of the pen. The appellate court also noted that Luong never provided a transcript of the 2020 hearing, so it presumed that the missing record supported the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals then explained that although Luong labeled her request as an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, its real substance was a request based on "newly discovered evidence," which is governed by a different rule, NRCP 60(b)(2). Courts look at what a motion actually asks for, not what it is called. On timing, the appellate court found the trial court had used the wrong starting date: the six-month deadline runs from when written notice of the decree's entry is served, not from when the decree is entered, and by that measure Luong's motion was filed in time. Even so, the appellate court upheld the denial on the merits, because Luong never explained why she waited about a year to obtain the financial analysis, and evidence that could have been found earlier with reasonable diligence does not qualify as "newly discovered evidence." Finally, on the passports, the appellate court reversed. It explained that a judge has two possible legal routes to decide a passport dispute like this: the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act (found in NRS Chapter 125D), which allows passport restrictions only when there is a credible risk of abduction, or a best-interest-of-the-child analysis. Here the trial court found no evidence that either parent was a flight risk (which ruled out the abduction route), but it split the passports based on an "adverse inference" against both parents without ever analyzing what was in the children's best interest. Because the court could not be sure the decision was made for the correct legal reasons, it sent the passport issue back for further proceedings.

This case is about whether Nevada's child support enforcement agency followed the required procedures before enforcing a California child support order against a Nevada resident. In 2013, a California court entered an order naming "Jonathan Jace Roosevelt Smith" as the father of a minor child and requiring him to pay $238 per month in child support. In 2017, the Nevada Division of Welfare and Supportive Services filed a document in Nevada that combined a "notice and finding of financial responsibility" with a notice registering the California order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) - a law governing how one state enforces another state's support orders. Documents attached to the filing indicated Smith had not made payments and owed approximately $12,376 in arrears. Smith did not respond to the 2017 notice, but in 2021, after hiring a lawyer, he moved to void enforcement of the order. He alleged he was never served with notice of the California proceedings, the California order, or the 2017 Nevada notice, and that he only learned of the Nevada action when the agency intercepted $19,811.12 out of a $30,000 civil settlement paid to him by the Bureau of Prisons through the federal Treasury Offset Program. He also contended the California order was intended for a different person, as his name is "Jonathan Lee Smith," though the Court of Appeals noted he failed to present any evidence to support these assertions in the district court. The district court denied Smith's motion, reasoning that because the agency had previously notified Smith that his arrears were referred for federal collection, no additional notice was required before offsetting federal payments. But neither the district court nor the agency addressed Smith's argument that he was never served with the 2017 notice. On appeal, the agency admitted in its answering brief that it did not complete service of the Nevada notice on Smith in the manner required by statute, due to his incarceration. The Nevada Court of Appeals concluded the district court abused its discretion by failing to address Smith's non-service arguments. Nevada law requires that a notice and finding of financial responsibility be served on the parent, and that when an out-of-state support order is registered, the nonregistering party must be notified - requirements that protect a person's ability to contest the registration within a short window. Because Smith was never served, the district court effectively confirmed the amount of support and arrears he owed without giving him those protections. The court also concluded that the district court's finding that Smith received notice of the federal offset was not supported by evidence, because the only support for it was the oral argument of the agency's lawyer, and arguments of counsel are not evidence. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order and remanded, directing the district court to strike the 2017 notice. It clarified that this does not prevent continued enforcement of the California order by lawful means or a new registration proceeding, but any future attempt to judicially enforce the order in Nevada must comply with the registration and service requirements of NRS Chapter 130.

This case involves a custody fight between a father (Justin Blount), his wife (Stephanie Blount), and the children's paternal grandmother (Paula Blount). The children's biological mother, who was a member of the Hualapai Tribe, had originally been awarded temporary custody by the Tribal Court in Arizona. After she passed away, the Tribal Court returned custody to Justin, and the children moved to Nevada with him and Stephanie in 2017. In 2019, a Nevada court entered a decree of adoption declaring Justin and Stephanie the children's legal parents. The grandmother, Paula, then went back to the Tribal Court in late 2019 seeking grandparent visitation. After a hearing that Justin did not attend, the Tribal Court entered an order in January 2020 granting joint custody to Paula and Justin. Paula then sought to "register" that Tribal Court order in Nevada - a procedure under Nevada law that makes an out-of-state custody order enforceable here. Justin's attorney was served with notice of the registration request on April 6, 2020. Under Nevada's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a person who wants to fight registration of an out-of-state custody order has 20 days to request a hearing. Justin filed his challenge on day 24 - four days late. Stephanie filed hers months later. The district court confirmed the Tribal Court order, and Justin and Stephanie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the 20-day deadline in NRS 125A.465 means what it says: if you don't challenge registration within 20 days of receiving notice, the foreign order is automatically registered "as a matter of law," and you lose the ability to raise challenges that you could have raised during that 20-day window. Because Justin and Stephanie missed the deadline, the court did not reach the merits of their objections to the Tribal Court order - including their arguments that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, that another order superseded it, and that proper notice was not given. The court also noted that Stephanie was not legally entitled to notice of the registration request because the Tribal Court had never awarded her custody or visitation. The court expressly noted that the 2019 Nevada adoption decree was not before it on appeal and that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings." The court acknowledged that other Nevada statutes addressing adoption and post-adoption visitation could potentially conflict with the registration statute, but because the parties did not raise those statutes, the court expressed no opinion on the issue.

This case arises from a divorce in which the parents disputed custody of their minor child. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave the mother, Amber, sole legal custody and primary physical custody, and ordered the father, Todd, to pay some of her attorney fees. Todd appealed both decisions. Todd's main objection to the custody ruling was that the trial judge looked at materials from an earlier temporary protection order case (a short-term restraining order proceeding) to find that Todd had committed acts of domestic violence. Under Nevada law, when a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent committed domestic violence, there is a "rebuttable presumption" - a starting assumption the parent can try to disprove - that giving that parent custody is not in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was permitted to take "judicial notice" of the earlier TPO records (a process where a court accepts certain reliable facts without requiring formal evidence to re-prove them) because the cases were closely related and Nevada law actually requires courts to consider other proceedings affecting custody. The court also pointed to additional evidence supporting the domestic-violence finding, including Amber being fired from a job over safety concerns related to Todd, two California restraining orders against Todd, a letter from the child's school describing Todd's hostile behavior and alleged threats to shoot Amber and the child, and Amber's testimony that the trial judge found credible. Todd also argued the case took too long under a Nevada Supreme Court rule requiring custody disputes to be resolved within six months. The court rejected this because the rule allows extensions in extraordinary circumstances, and the trial judge documented reasons - including Todd's own four requests to continue the trial, his unsuccessful motions to disqualify the judge, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The court rejected Todd's various constitutional arguments. Because both fit parents have equal rights to their child, the only question is the child's best interest, so strict scrutiny does not apply. The divorce complaint itself did not violate due process because it was the later court orders that affected his custody rights. There is no right to a jury trial in family-court proceedings such as divorce. Double jeopardy and statute of limitations do not apply because no criminal charges were involved. Todd argued the trial judge should have recused himself for a number of reasons - including events during the proceedings, the fact that Todd had sued the judge in federal court, allegations the judge falsified TPO documents, the fact that Amber's lawyer had contributed to the judge's campaign, and a claim the judge had told Amber to "file a motion." The Supreme Court rejected each, noting that judges generally cannot be forced off a case based on things that happened during the case itself, parties cannot manufacture grounds for recusal by suing the judge, lawful campaign contributions within statutory limits do not require recusal, and Todd had not provided trial transcripts that would let the court evaluate the alleged comment to Amber. On attorney fees, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had a proper statutory basis (the divorce statute permitting fee awards), considered the income disparity between the parties, and walked through the factors Nevada courts use to assess whether requested fees are reasonable. The trial court actually reduced the fees requested by nearly half. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed both orders.

This case involves a divorce and a fight over custody of the couple's minor child. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave the mother, Amber, sole legal and primary physical custody, and ordered the father, Todd, to pay some of her attorney fees. Todd appealed both rulings. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed - meaning it left both rulings in place. A central issue was a Nevada law (NRS 125C.0035(5)) that creates a presumption against giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence. The district court had relied on findings from an earlier 2018 temporary protection order (TPO) case, plus testimony and school records, to conclude that Todd had engaged in acts of domestic violence. The school records included a letter from the school's lawyer warning security about Todd's hostile language and alleged threats to shoot Amber and the child. The Supreme Court held the district court was allowed to take "judicial notice" (officially recognize as established) of the related TPO proceedings and that there was substantial evidence supporting the domestic-violence finding. Todd also argued the case took too long under SCR 251, which generally requires custody issues to be resolved within six months. The Supreme Court explained that the rule allows extensions in extraordinary cases with appropriate findings, and pointed out that Todd himself had asked for several continuances and filed multiple unsuccessful motions to disqualify the judge, and that the COVID-19 pandemic also caused delay. Todd raised several constitutional arguments, including a claim that the custody decision should have been reviewed under "strict scrutiny" (the toughest legal test) and that he was entitled to a jury trial. The Supreme Court rejected these. It explained that when two fit parents fight over custody, both have equal constitutional rights, so courts decide based on the child's best interest. Nevada law does not provide for jury trials in family-court cases like divorce or custody. Todd also argued the trial judge should have stepped aside (recused himself) for several reasons, including that Amber's lawyer had contributed to the judge's election campaign and that Todd had sued the judge in federal court. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, noting among other things that lawful campaign contributions within statutory limits do not by themselves require recusal, and that a litigant cannot manufacture grounds for recusal by suing the judge. On attorney fees, the court found that the district court had a proper statutory basis (NRS 125.150(3), allowing fees in divorce cases), considered the income disparity between the parties, analyzed the relevant fee factors from a case called Brunzell, and actually cut the requested fees by nearly half.

Eric and Vanessa Mesi married in Nevada in 2005 and over the years lived in both Nevada and California. In late 2018 they moved together to Las Vegas, but Vanessa returned to California about a month later. In January 2019, Vanessa filed for divorce in California. Two months later, Eric filed for divorce in Nevada. Each spouse wanted the case decided in their preferred state. Eric asked the California court to dismiss Vanessa's case, arguing that her one month in Nevada interrupted her California residency and meant she did not meet California's six-month residency requirement to file for divorce there. The California court had not ruled on that argument. Meanwhile, Vanessa asked the Nevada court to dismiss Eric's Nevada case under the "first-to-file rule" - a doctrine that says when the same lawsuit is filed in two courts, the second court usually defers to the first. Instead of holding a hearing or ruling based on the written filings, the Nevada judge personally telephoned the California judge. Neither Eric nor Vanessa, nor their lawyers, were on the call. The Nevada judge confirmed through that call that Vanessa had filed first, then immediately dismissed the Nevada case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held two things. First, the Nevada judge violated Eric's right to due process by gathering information through an ex parte phone call with another judge and basing the decision on that call without giving the parties a chance to respond. Courts are generally not allowed to investigate facts on their own outside the record. The Court noted, however, that this particular due process error was harmless, because the first-to-file rule clearly applied based on the undisputed evidence already in the record. Second, even though the first-to-file rule applied, the Nevada court should not have dismissed the case outright. Because Eric had a pending challenge to California's jurisdiction, the proper course was to stay (pause) the Nevada case rather than dismiss it. That way, if the California court ultimately decides it does not have jurisdiction, the Nevada case can simply be revived without forcing Eric to file again. If California decides it does have jurisdiction, the Nevada case can then be dismissed. The Court therefore sent the case back with instructions to enter a stay. Either party can later ask the Nevada court to lift the stay depending on what the California court decides.

This is the third time the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the long-running divorce and child support dispute between Robert Scotlund Vaile, a U.S. citizen, and Cisilie Porsboll, a citizen of Norway. The couple married in Utah in 1990, divorced in Nevada in 1998, and their children have lived in Norway. After years of litigation, Vaile fell behind on child support, and the Nevada district court ordered him to pay arrearages and penalties and held him in contempt. The central question on this appeal was which country's child support order controls: a Nevada order or an administrative child support order later entered in Norway. Vaile argued the Norway order controls; Porsboll argued the Nevada order does. The Court sided with Porsboll. Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which Nevada has adopted in NRS Chapter 130, only one support order can be effective at a time. When two orders compete, NRS 130.207 sets the tiebreaker. Because the Norway order did not clearly establish Norway's "continuing and exclusive jurisdiction," and because the parties had not both agreed Norway should have such jurisdiction, the Nevada order remained the controlling one. The Court also addressed whether it could even hear Vaile's challenges to the contempt findings against him. As a general rule in Nevada, a contempt order standing alone is not appealable. Because the order in Docket No. 62797 dealt only with contempt, the Court had no jurisdiction over that appeal. But the order in Docket No. 61415 dealt with child support as well as contempt, and an order resolving child support is appealable as a special order entered after a final judgment. So the Court had authority to consider Vaile's contempt challenges packaged into that order. However, the Court declined to actually decide those challenges because Vaile did not present coherent arguments or cite relevant law to support them. The result: the district court's judgments were affirmed.

Mehmet and Kathleen Kar divorced in Nevada. Their decree gave them joint legal custody, with Kathleen having primary physical custody and Mehmet getting visitation. Mehmet later moved to Turkey, and Kathleen, an Air Force servicemember stationed at Creech Air Force Base, obtained an order giving her sole legal and physical custody. The Air Force then reassigned Kathleen to England, and she took the child with her. Two months after Kathleen and the child arrived in England, Mehmet filed a motion in Nevada to modify custody and child support. Kathleen asked the Nevada court to dismiss the case, arguing that Nevada no longer had jurisdiction because nobody involved still lived there. The district judge agreed, saying that the "second" the mother and child moved to England, the court "lost jurisdiction." The judge dismissed the case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that the UCCJEA, the law that governs which state (or country) can decide custody disputes, has multiple layers. Yes, Nevada lost what is called "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" once everyone moved away. But losing exclusive jurisdiction does not mean losing all jurisdiction. The Nevada court still had to ask whether it could exercise jurisdiction under a separate set of rules - the rules that govern when a state can make an "initial" custody determination - because the UCCJEA allows a court that previously decided a custody case to modify its order if those initial-jurisdiction rules are satisfied. Under those rules, Nevada could potentially still hear the case if (a) no other place qualified as the child's "home state" (a place where the child lived for at least six consecutive months), (b) the child and at least one parent still had a "significant connection" with Nevada beyond mere presence, and (c) substantial evidence about the child's well-being remained available in Nevada. At the time Mehmet filed his motion, the child had only been in England for two months, so England was not yet the child's home state. The court below never analyzed whether Nevada or England had a "significant connection" with the child or where the substantial evidence about the child was located. Those are factual questions, and the Supreme Court ruled that the district court must answer them. The Supreme Court also addressed Kathleen's argument that Nevada was an "inconvenient forum" and that England was a better place to litigate. Even if that were true, the UCCJEA does not allow the court to simply dismiss the case. It must stay (pause) the case and direct the parties to file in the more appropriate forum, so that the family is not left "in limbo" with no court anywhere to decide their dispute. The Supreme Court sent the case back so the district court can perform the full jurisdictional analysis the UCCJEA requires. The opinion did not decide whether Nevada actually has jurisdiction; it decided only that the district court must do the analysis instead of stopping at "everyone left."

This case is about who should have legal custody of a young girl, N.M., and whether a Nevada court had the power to decide that question. N.M. was born in California in 2007 to appellant, a Mexican citizen. Mother and child moved to Mexico, and in 2008 the mother left N.M. with the maternal grandparents. A Mexican family-services agency (DIF) and the grandmother signed a document indicating the grandparents had custody. By 2009 or 2010, the child's aunt and the aunt's then-partner (the respondent, a U.S. citizen) were raising N.M. In 2011, the mother signed a document appearing to give custody to the aunt and respondent. In 2012, after the aunt's relationship with respondent ended, respondent moved with N.M. to Nevada. Soon after, the mother's half-sister came to respondent's home at night and tried to take N.M. Respondent then asked a Nevada district court to appoint him temporary guardian on an emergency basis. The court did so, and several months later, after a two-day hearing, made him N.M.'s general (permanent) guardian, finding that the mother had abandoned the child. The mother appealed, arguing chiefly that the Nevada court had no authority to decide custody because N.M. had not yet lived in Nevada for six months when respondent first filed his emergency petition. She also argued that there was not enough evidence to overcome the legal preference that biological parents - not third parties - should generally be appointed guardians of their own children. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. On jurisdiction, the court explained that NRS 125A.335 lets a Nevada court step in on an emergency basis to protect a child physically present in the state who has been abandoned or who faces mistreatment. Because N.M. was in Nevada and someone had tried to take her from respondent's home at night, the emergency power applied. The court then held that an emergency order can ripen into a final custody decision once Nevada has become the child's "home state" - meaning the child has lived here for six months - so long as no other state or country has an existing custody case or order. By the time the general-guardianship proceeding began, N.M. had lived in Nevada more than six months and there was no competing custody order or case elsewhere. So the Nevada court had power to make a final ruling. On the merits, the court explained that Nevada law presumes parents are preferred as guardians, but that presumption can be overcome by showing the parent is unfit or that other "extraordinary circumstances" exist - including abandonment. Nevada law presumes a parent intended to abandon a child if the parent leaves the child with someone else for six months without supporting or communicating with the child. The district court had evidence that the mother left N.M. with relatives, signed a document apparently giving custody away, and did not provide support or communicate with the child during long stretches. The Supreme Court concluded that this was enough evidence to support the abandonment finding, and so affirmed the appointment of respondent as N.M.'s guardian.

Edwin Griffith, a Reno resident, married Gabriela Gonzales-Alpizar, a citizen of Costa Rica, in Costa Rica in 1999. Before the wedding, the couple signed a premarital agreement that, among other things, waived any claim for alimony (spousal support) unless a divorce would leave one spouse eligible for public assistance. The couple lived in Reno with Gonzales-Alpizar's daughter Nicolle and their son Anthony, but the marriage deteriorated. In 2003, during a family trip to Costa Rica, Gonzales-Alpizar refused to return to Reno, and Griffith came home alone. In 2005, while Griffith was in Costa Rica to discuss a divorce settlement, he was allegedly served with a "Demand for Alimony," which under Costa Rican law covers both spousal and child support. The parties tell very different stories about what happened - Gonzales-Alpizar says Griffith understood he was being served and angrily threw the papers to the floor; Griffith says a stranger read something aloud in Spanish that he could not understand and he left with no paperwork. When Griffith did not respond, a Costa Rican court entered a default judgment ordering him to pay $180 per month in spousal support and $235 per month in child support for each of the two children. Gonzales-Alpizar never told the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement. In 2007, a Costa Rican court granted Gonzales-Alpizar a divorce, with service made only by publication in Costa Rica even though she knew Griffith lived in Nevada. Griffith also filed for divorce in Nevada. The Nevada district court decided the parties had already been effectively divorced in Costa Rica, refused to enforce the spousal support and child custody provisions of the 2007 Costa Rican decree because service in that proceeding was invalid, but found that Griffith had been served in the 2005 support proceeding. The district court said the 2005 support order could be enforced if it was valid under Costa Rican law, and directed the parties to litigate Griffith's defenses in Costa Rica. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two questions of first impression. First, it examined the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a law codified in NRS Chapter 130 that lets Nevada courts enforce support orders from other "states," including foreign countries in certain circumstances. The court held that Costa Rica does not qualify as a "state" under any of the three methods in the statute: it has not been declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law; Nevada's Attorney General has not declared it a "state"; and Gonzales-Alpizar failed to show that Costa Rica has procedures for enforcing foreign support orders that are "substantially similar" to UIFSA. Comparing how Nevada and Costa Rica calculate child support, the court explained, is not the relevant inquiry - what matters is whether Costa Rica has laws allowing foreign judgments to be recognized (that is, reciprocity). Second, the court considered "comity" - a principle of courtesy under which one jurisdiction's courts may give effect to another jurisdiction's judgments out of deference and respect. The court adopted Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which lists reasons a foreign judgment may or must be refused recognition, such as lack of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or fraud. Applying that framework, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Griffith was properly served with the Demand for Alimony, so due process did not bar enforcement. But because Gonzales-Alpizar purposefully failed to tell the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement - which the court concluded was enforceable and which governed spousal support - the court declined to recognize the spousal support award as a matter of comity. The child support award, however, was a different matter, because the premarital agreement said nothing about child support. Griffith claimed the child support award was procured through fraud - that Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented his parental relationship with Nicolle (who is not his biological child, with a dispute over whether he adopted her under Costa Rican law) and misrepresented his income and properties. The district court had made no findings on those claims, instead saying Costa Rica was the only forum for resolving them. The Supreme Court remanded for the district court to make findings under the Restatement approach and decide whether the child support portion of the order should be enforced as a matter of comity.

Daniel and Kevyn Friedman divorced in Nevada in November 2008. Their stipulated divorce decree — one both sides agreed to — gave them joint legal custody of their three young children and included a promise that Nevada courts would "always" be the place where any future custody fights would be decided, no matter where the family lived. The decree anticipated that Kevyn and the children would move to Idaho and eventually California, and that custody would shift to a joint physical arrangement once Daniel found work in California. That is roughly what happened: Daniel found work in California and moved there, and Kevyn and the children followed. But the parents could not agree on a joint custody schedule. In August 2010, Kevyn went back to the Nevada court and asked for primary physical custody. Daniel objected, arguing that because no one in the family lived in Nevada anymore, the Nevada court had lost its power (its "subject matter jurisdiction") to decide the dispute. He also registered the decree in California and started a competing custody proceeding there. The Nevada district court sided with Kevyn, holding that the parents' written agreement to a Nevada forum trumped the jurisdictional rules and that Daniel was barred ("estopped") from denying Nevada's jurisdiction because he had agreed to it. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and granted Daniel's petition. The court explained that the UCCJEA — a uniform law adopted by Nevada, California, and every state except Massachusetts — is "the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this State." Under that law, a state's ongoing jurisdiction over its own custody orders ends once a court finds that the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in the state. The district court itself found that the entire family had left Nevada for California, so Nevada's jurisdiction ceased. By the time Kevyn filed her 2010 motion, California had become the children's "home state" under the UCCJEA — a point Kevyn conceded. The court held that the parents' agreement to litigate in Nevada could not change this result, because parties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction by agreement. Such a forum-selection agreement is not meaningless: it is one factor a court that actually has jurisdiction (here, California) may weigh in deciding whether to hand the case off to another state as the more appropriate forum. But that decision belongs to California, not Nevada. In the Supreme Court's words, by declaring itself possessed of jurisdiction and suggesting that California could ask Nevada to defer, "the district court got things precisely backward." For the same reason, the court rejected the argument that Daniel was judicially or equitably estopped from contesting jurisdiction — a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA "does not acquire it by estoppel." The Supreme Court directed the district court to stand down from its assertion of jurisdiction except as permitted by NRS 125A.355(2) — the provision requiring it to stay its proceeding and communicate with the California court — and to dismiss the case unless the California court declines jurisdiction in favor of Nevada. Two justices dissented, taking the view that extraordinary writ relief was not warranted at this time.

Shinichi and Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997 and moved several times between Japan and the United States, buying a home in Henderson, Nevada. Their three children were all born in Japan. In June 2004, the children traveled from Nevada to Japan. The parents told very different stories about that trip: Yoko said it was only a summer vacation and that Shinichi refused to send the children back in August 2004; Shinichi said the whole family had planned to live in Japan permanently. Either way, the children stayed in Japan with Shinichi. About eight months after the children left, in February 2005, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court to order the children's immediate return, calling their retention in Japan an international abduction. The Nevada court agreed with Yoko, ordered the children returned, later held Shinichi in contempt when they were not returned, and ultimately - after a hearing at which Shinichi's lawyer appeared but Shinichi personally did not - entered a "default" divorce decree. That decree gave Yoko sole legal and physical custody with "no contact" for Shinichi, all of the community property (including a share of a house in Japan), spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court decided three questions. First, did the Nevada court have power to decide custody at all, given that the children had been out of Nevada for eight months when the case was filed? Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a law that generally gives custody-deciding authority to a child's "home state" - a child's temporary absences from a state do not break the required six-month residency period. Because the evidence supported the district court's finding that the children left Nevada in June 2004 for a temporary three-month vacation, Nevada remained their home state, and the Nevada court properly had jurisdiction. Second, was the order sending the children back to the U.S. proper? The district court had relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty designed to ensure the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their home country. But Japan has not signed that treaty, so the Convention and its U.S. implementing statute provide no remedy here. Even so, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not need the treaty: because it had custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, it had authority to order the children's return as part of the custody case. So the return order stood, even though the Hague Convention did not apply. Third, was the default divorce decree proper? A "default" is what happens when a party fails to respond to a lawsuit. Here, Shinichi had filed an answer and a countercomplaint for divorce, and his lawyer appeared at the divorce hearing - only Shinichi himself was absent. The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances a default was inappropriate, and that the district court erred by treating the hearing as a one-sided "prove-up," awarding Yoko everything she asked for, cutting off meaningful cross-examination, and never deciding the case on its merits. The court reversed the decree's awards of custody, property, support, and fees, and sent the case back for a hearing on the merits. It denied Shinichi's request that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand, because he cited no record support or legal authority showing reassignment was necessary.

When William and Patricia Peot divorced in 1962, the decree ordered William to pay $100 per month in child support. Patricia later moved to Wisconsin and, in 1963, used an interstate support-enforcement law (URESA, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act) to obtain a Nevada order requiring William to pay $50 per month. In 1974, Patricia asked the court for a judgment for the back support owed under the original 1962 decree. The parties agreed William had paid everything due under the 1963 URESA order. The district court concluded that the 1963 URESA order had effectively replaced (modified) the original decree, so no arrears had built up. Patricia appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that URESA's remedies are meant to be in addition to, not a substitute for, existing support remedies, and that under the statute in effect in 1963 a reciprocal support order "shall not supersede" a prior support order. A reciprocal support order does not automatically lower or replace a divorce decree's support obligation; it can do so only if the order specifically says so, and the 1963 order showed no such intent. The court held the statute means what it says, rejected William's statute-of-limitations and laches defenses because he had not raised them in the trial court, and sent the case back so the district court could decide the motion for arrears (and consider its discretionary powers under NRS 125.140).