Nevada family-law case summaries

Christopher Seaton filed an appeal on his own, without a lawyer, challenging a decision from a family court judge in Clark County about child custody. When someone appeals, the appellate court requires them to complete several procedural steps, such as requesting transcripts of the earlier proceedings and filing written arguments (called briefs) by set deadlines. On June 29, 2026, the court sent Seaton a notice telling him what he needed to file and when: a transcript request form (or a document stating no transcript was needed) within 14 days, a docketing statement within 21 days, and an opening brief within 60 days. When Seaton did not file the transcript form and docketing statement, the court gave him a second chance on August 3, 2026, ordering him to file those documents within 14 days and warning him that if he did not, his appeal could be dismissed. According to the court, Seaton never filed those documents. He also did not file his opening brief, which was due August 28, 2026, and he did not otherwise communicate with the court. Because it appeared to the court that Seaton had abandoned his appeal, the court dismissed it. This means the appeal ended without the court ever deciding whether the underlying custody decision was right or wrong.

This case involves a custody dispute between two divorced parents, Burke Hall and Vanessa Loftis, who had three children together. Their youngest child died in a tragic accident, and the parents divorced shortly after. In the divorce decree, the district court gave Loftis sole legal custody (the authority to make major decisions about the children) and primary physical custody (the children live mostly with her) of the two remaining children, S.H. (born 2009) and I.H. (born 2010). An earlier appeal affirmed that decree. Over time, with Loftis's consent, Hall began having weekend parenting time. In January 2024, Hall asked the court for joint legal and physical custody. He alleged that Loftis medically neglected the children and that her husband, Nathan Pressley, is a convicted felon. The court ordered the children interviewed at the Family Mediation Center, adopted the parents' informal parenting arrangement as a temporary order, increased Hall's child support based on his new full-time job, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Before that hearing, two incidents occurred involving Hall's household and S.H., who is on the autism spectrum. In one, Hall's wife Laura threw S.H.'s backpack (containing his laptop) off a second-floor landing after a dispute; she said S.H. pushed her. In the second, Hall said S.H. kicked him when Hall tried to take away a laptop; S.H. said Hall took the laptop and hit him on the head with it. S.H. was arrested after the second incident and placed in a specialized court program for autistic youth. Loftis asked the court to reduce Hall's visitation with S.H. and to be reimbursed for the laptop. The court reduced Hall's parenting time with S.H. to a short Friday window and ordered the laptop returned. Rather than proceed to a formal evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed to use the Informal Family Trial Court (IFTC) program. Before agreeing, both parties were told that the judge would question witnesses and that neither party could object during testimony. Both signed a form agreeing to those procedures and waiving the rules of evidence. At the informal trial, Hall testified about his concerns with Loftis's parenting and spent much of his time discussing Pressley's decades-old criminal convictions. He said he did not believe helping the children with homework was his responsibility because that was "a mother's job," and claimed Loftis suffered from "Munchausen syndrome." Loftis's employer, who ran an autism therapy facility both boys attended, testified that S.H. was not aggressive. Laura testified about the backpack incident and admitted she had refused to return the replacement laptop, claiming the court had no jurisdiction over her. Loftis testified about her efforts to obtain the children's autism diagnoses and therapy, and said she opposed joint legal custody because she feared Hall would undo that work since he disagreed with the diagnoses. The district court found that circumstances had changed (because the parties had informally modified their prior schedule) but denied joint custody based on its findings about the children's best interests. It kept Loftis's sole legal and primary physical custody, gave Hall weekend time with I.H. and a short Friday window with S.H. (with S.H. allowed to extend it at his own discretion), and imputed income to Hall for child support after finding his claim that he could not work was not credible. The court denied Hall's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded Hall had voluntarily agreed to the informal trial procedures and therefore could not complain about them. It found the court's custody and child support findings were supported by substantial evidence, and emphasized that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility.

Myisha and Ester Gray were married and share one child, born in 2017. After Myisha filed for divorce, the parties eventually agreed to share joint physical and legal custody, and the district court entered a divorce decree in 2022 adopting that agreement. The decree contained an "event" provision that let Myisha take the child to weekend events with seven days' notice, unless Ester already had plans with the child. The decree did not define "event." Ester later filed two motions to change the arrangement to give her primary physical custody. Her first motion, filed in November 2023, described a phone call from Myisha's girlfriend Rochelle reporting a domestic dispute in the child's presence (the "phone call incident"). The court declined to modify custody at that time, finding the parents had worked together in a stressful moment to keep the child's interests first. Ester's second motion, filed in November 2024, described a September 28, 2024 incident (the "soccer game incident") in which, according to Ester, Myisha pushed and hit her to separate her from the child, then grabbed the child by the arm and forced him into a vehicle as he screamed and cried. Myisha had been arrested for domestic violence in connection with that incident. Ester also said Myisha repeatedly used the "event" provision to take the child without her consent. The district court found a substantial change in circumstances based on the soccer game incident and gave Ester temporary primary physical custody. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the district court granted Ester primary physical custody. It found that Myisha had committed domestic violence during the soccer game incident and had used the "event" provision to interfere with Ester's parenting time. The court reviewed the statutory best-interest factors, found by clear and convincing evidence that Myisha's conduct amounted to domestic violence (triggering a legal presumption against her having joint or sole custody), and found Myisha's testimony not credible - especially her denial of the soccer game events. The court gave Myisha parenting time each week and on the first weekend of each month, ended the "event" provision, and later awarded Ester $20,000 in attorney fees (reduced from the $46,989.25 requested, in light of the income difference between the parties). On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Myisha's arguments. On the domestic violence history, the court found the record showed the district court did not use the older incidents (the gun incident and the phone call incident) to establish a "substantial change in circumstances"; instead it used them only in weighing the child's best interest, which is permitted. On the recorded phone call, the court held Myisha had objected below only on the ground that the call was recorded without consent, so her new hearsay and foundation arguments were forfeited and did not amount to plain error. On the claim that the court acted arbitrarily by revisiting the call, the court explained that credibility and weighing of evidence are left to the trial court, which used the call as one part of its overall credibility and best-interest analysis. On whether pulling the child's arm was domestic violence, the court said it did not need to decide that question because Myisha did not dispute that she committed domestic violence against Ester during the same incident, making any error harmless. On the rebuttal-evidence argument, the court held the findings were supported by substantial evidence and it would not reweigh credibility. Finally, the court upheld the fee award as within the district court's discretion.

This case involves a dispute over custody of a minor child between Vanessa R. Lovett and William Christensen. Lovett had appealed a district court order that modified child custody. While the appeal was pending, she asked the Court of Appeals to send the matter back to the district court temporarily - a step called a "remand" - so that the lower court could enter a new, permanent custody order. According to a district court order dated July 31, 2026, which Lovett attached to her motion, the two parties had reached an agreement on the record: Lovett would have sole legal and physical custody of the child, and Christensen would have no parenting time. The order stated the parties intended this arrangement to be permanent. Based on that agreement, the district court temporarily granted Lovett sole legal and physical custody and encouraged her to seek a remand from the appellate court so a permanent order could be entered. Christensen did not oppose Lovett's request. The Court of Appeals reviewed her unopposed motion and the district court's order and decided that sending the case back to the district court was warranted, so the lower court could enter a new permanent custody order. Lovett had asked that the remand be limited, saying she was not giving up her other arguments on appeal. The court instead concluded that dismissing the appeal was appropriate. The court added a note explaining that its order does not prevent Lovett from appealing the order the district court enters after remand, as long as she is harmed by that order and it is otherwise something that can be appealed.

Madison Buchanan and Corey Brewer were never married but had a child together, A.B., born in June 2020 in Las Vegas. After their romantic relationship ended in July 2022, they informally shared joint legal and physical custody of A.B. without a court order. Circumstances changed when Madison's now-husband accepted a job in Reno in June 2024 to be closer to his mother, who had been diagnosed with cancer. Madison then accepted her own job in Reno with an earlier start date, moving up her planned relocation to the end of October 2024. In response, Corey filed an amended complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. Madison asked the court to set a temporary custody schedule and to allow her to relocate with A.B. to Reno. The parties went through mediation and agreed on some matters — they agreed to share joint legal custody and worked out schedules for holidays, vacations, and school breaks. But they could not agree on physical custody and relocation, so the district court held a trial where both parents testified. The testimony covered how they had shared custody, Corey's past drug use and his recovery efforts, the family support networks in both Las Vegas and Reno, Madison's better-paying Reno job and belief that Reno had better schools, and Madison's pregnancy and the chance for A.B. to spend more time with siblings. The district court decided that both parents were essentially equal when it came to what was best for A.B. Because the parent who wants to move must prove that moving is in the child's best interest, and because the court found the best-interest factors were evenly balanced (a "tie"), Madison did not carry that burden. The court denied her request to move and gave Corey primary physical custody. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision under an "abuse of discretion" standard — meaning it would not overturn the district court simply because it might have decided differently, but only if the decision lacked support in the evidence or was clearly wrong. The appeals court explained that because there was no prior permanent custody order in this case, the relocation statute the district court cited did not technically govern, but the district court was permitted to use that framework as a guide. The court found that the district court had properly considered whether Madison had a good reason to move (it found she did), and then weighed the child's best interest using the statutory best-interest factors. Because the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence, and because the appeals court is not allowed to re-weigh the evidence itself, it affirmed the district court's decision.

Anderson-Alexander and Moten were never married but have one child together, born in July 2020. In February 2022, Moten filed for custody, and the district court noted from the start that there was extremely high conflict between the two parents. In July 2023, the court entered its first custody decree, giving Anderson-Alexander sole legal and physical custody while Moten received supervised parenting time. The decree said that if Moten completed six months of supervised parenting time with positive reports, finished a parenting course, and met other requirements, he could ask the court for unsupervised time. Later, Moten went back to court, saying Anderson-Alexander was not following the decree and was not letting him see the child. The court expressed concern that she was not complying with its orders. After a series of hearings and an evidentiary hearing in March 2025, the district court reversed the earlier arrangement: it gave Moten sole legal and primary physical custody, and limited Anderson-Alexander to two supervised hours every Thursday. Anderson-Alexander appealed, arguing the court did not adequately explain its decision. The Court of Appeals split its decision into parts. First, the court agreed with the district court that there had been a "substantial change in circumstances" — a legal requirement for changing custody. The district court found that Moten had improved his situation since the first decree, while Anderson-Alexander had interfered with his relationship with the child. The Court of Appeals also noted the district court had gone through the statutory list of "best interest" factors and found that seven of them favored Moten, with none favoring Anderson-Alexander. On these points, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion and upheld the award of primary physical custody in principle. Because Anderson-Alexander did not specifically challenge the sole legal custody decision on appeal, the court also affirmed that portion. But the court found a problem with how the custody was labeled. Under a prior Nevada case called Roe v. Roe, when a parent's time with a child is cut down to almost nothing — such as a very limited block of hours on a single day each week with supervision — the arrangement is really "sole physical custody," even if a court calls it "primary physical custody." Sole physical custody is a more severe restriction and requires the court to make extra, specific written findings before imposing it. Because Anderson-Alexander was limited to two supervised hours per week, the Court of Appeals concluded this was functionally sole physical custody for Moten, not primary physical custody. The district court had not made the additional findings that sole physical custody requires. It did not expressly find Anderson-Alexander unfit for the child to live with, did not explain specifically why a less restrictive arrangement would not serve the child's best interest, and did not explain why other, less restrictive options were rejected. Because those findings were missing, the Court of Appeals could not tell whether the district court had properly considered less restrictive alternatives. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the physical custody and parenting time portions of the order and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must either give Anderson-Alexander enough parenting time so that the arrangement is genuinely primary (not functionally sole) physical custody, or make the specific findings Nevada law requires to justify a sole physical custody award.

Kevin De Vincenzi and Jennifer Reeves entered into a domestic partnership in Nevada in November 2018 and have two children together. In August 2021, Reeves took the children to visit her sister in Midland, Texas. While she was there, De Vincenzi told her he had begun a relationship with the children's nanny and was ending his relationship with Reeves. In September 2021, De Vincenzi filed a petition to terminate the domestic partnership and obtained a temporary protective order barring Reeves from their shared Las Vegas home. According to the opinion, Reeves had not initially planned to stay in Texas, but she decided to remain because she and the children had no return airline tickets, she was unemployed and financially dependent on De Vincenzi, and De Vincenzi did not respond to her messages about returning to Las Vegas with the children. She eventually decided to relocate permanently to Midland, where she got a job and a house. After extended litigation and a trial at which both parties testified and presented evidence, the district court entered a written order giving Reeves primary physical custody in Texas. De Vincenzi appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that it does not overturn a district court's custody decision unless there was a clear abuse of discretion, and that it does not re-weigh the evidence or reassess which witnesses were believable — that job belongs to the trial judge who heard the testimony. De Vincenzi first argued that Reeves broke the law by relocating without the consent required under a Nevada statute. The court held that statute did not apply because it only governs situations where a court has already issued a custody order, and here no court order about custody existed when Reeves went to Texas or when she decided to stay. The court also examined a separate criminal-type statute about wrongfully removing or concealing a child. It held that statute did apply (because there was no custody order, both parents shared legal and physical custody by default), but that Reeves did not violate it: the trial court found she had traveled for a short visit, kept communicating with De Vincenzi about returning, and got no response from him after he ended the relationship and obtained a protective order keeping her out of their home. De Vincenzi next argued the district court should not have considered relocation because Reeves never filed a formal relocation petition. The court rejected this, again noting the consent statute did not apply, and pointing out that De Vincenzi had agreed early in the case to a custody evaluation that included relocation and to admitting the relocation assessment at trial, so he had notice that relocation would be decided. Finally, De Vincenzi challenged the trial court's conclusion that primary physical custody with Reeves served the children's best interests. The court held the district court had conducted a thorough analysis of the statutory best-interest factors, and that De Vincenzi was essentially asking the appellate court to re-weigh the evidence — something it does not do. The court affirmed.

Jose Adrian Plata and Alondra Holguin Gutierrez married in 2020, have three minor children, and divorced in 2024. In the divorce, Gutierrez received primary physical custody, and Plata was ordered to pay $1,126 per month in child support. After the divorce, Gutierrez filed motions asking the court to enforce the decree, alleging Plata was not paying child support or reimbursing her for the children's medical expenses. Meanwhile, Child Protective Services (CPS) looked into a July 2024 incident involving Gutierrez and the parties' youngest child. Gutierrez faced a criminal charge over the incident in February 2025, but the charge was dismissed after she completed a class. Based on that incident, Plata asked the district court to change custody. He also asked the court to lower his child support, saying he was in financial hardship and could not pay. After a hearing where both parents testified and submitted evidence, the district court refused to change custody, found Plata in contempt (meaning he was found to have disobeyed a court order) for not paying child support, and fined him. The Nevada Court of Appeals decided the appeal in three parts. First, it upheld the refusal to change custody. Under Nevada law, a parent seeking to change custody must show both a substantial change in circumstances and that the change would serve the children's best interest. The district court found several "best interest" factors favored Gutierrez — for example, that she allowed Plata extra parenting time while Plata took time unilaterally and testified he would violate court orders if the children asked, that Gutierrez met the children's needs, and that she provided stability. As to the July 2024 incident, the district court found the domestic violence factor neutral: CPS closed the case, found the incident isolated and the children safe with Gutierrez, and the criminal charge was dismissed. The appellate court explained that it cannot reweigh evidence or second-guess who the trial judge found believable, and that the record contained enough evidence to support the trial court's findings. Because the best-interest requirement was not met, the court did not need to decide whether Plata showed a substantial change in circumstances. Second, the appellate court reversed on child support. Plata had asked to modify his support obligation because of unemployment and the seasonal nature of his work, but the district court's order incorrectly stated that he never made that request and included no findings about it. The Court of Appeals sent that issue back for the district court to actually consider the request and make factual findings. Third, the appellate court reversed the contempt finding for nonpayment of child support. Under Nevada Supreme Court precedent, before a court can hold someone in contempt for not paying child support, it must find the person had the ability to pay but failed to make an effort to do so. The district court made no such findings here, so the Court of Appeals sent that issue back too. (Plata was also held in contempt for failing to refinance or sell his residence as ordered, but because he did not raise that issue on appeal, the court deemed any arguments about it forfeited.)

This case involves a custody fight over a child identified as A.L., the youngest of three children born to Kimberly Stevens and Jefferson Davis Laney. The couple married in 2006 and divorced under a Nevada decree in 2021. Because California was the children's "home state" under an interstate custody law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the Nevada divorce decree said the actual custody arrangement would be worked out in California courts. In November 2021, a California court entered a judgment - based on an agreement the parties made (a "stipulation") - that gave Stevens primary physical custody and required Laney and the children to take part in "reunification therapy," a process meant to rebuild the relationship between the children and their father. The parties agreed this therapy was in the children's best interest, agreed to jointly pick the therapist, and agreed to follow the therapist's plan and schedule. Early attempts at reunification with two therapists failed, and those therapists reported that Stevens interfered with the process. The parties then jointly selected Dr. Donna Wilburn as the reunification therapist. In May 2023, after Nevada took over jurisdiction (California gave it up), the Nevada court began enforcing the existing reunification plan. The court ordered daily 7:00 a.m. video calls between Laney and the children, and specifically ordered that the children "shall have privacy alone with [Laney]" during those calls. Private investigators hired by Laney later observed Stevens positioning herself about sixteen feet from A.L. during a scheduled call, with an older daughter hidden under a picnic table about five feet from A.L. - people apparently not visible to Laney on the call. Investigators observed similar concealment on other dates. The case eventually went to a two-day evidentiary hearing in early 2025 on custody and contempt. By the time that hearing concluded, Dr. Wilburn testified that reunification had been achieved, that it went well after initial obstacles were resolved, and that she found no signs the children had been abused by either parent. As a "mandated reporter" (someone legally required to report suspected abuse), she made no abuse report. She recommended joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. The district court found Dr. Wilburn and Laney credible and found Stevens's testimony inconsistent, evasive, and self-serving. The court held Stevens in contempt for violating the "privacy alone" order, imposing a 25-day jail sentence that she could avoid ("purge") by paying a $500 fine, complying with court orders, and paying certain attorney fees. On custody, the court found a substantial change in circumstances and, after going through the statutory best-interest factors, found most favored Laney. Even so, the court awarded joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. (not primary custody to Laney), partly to preserve A.L.'s bond with her sisters and Stevens. On appeal, the court rejected each of Stevens's arguments. It held that "Kayden's Law" - a 2025 Nevada statute limiting court-ordered reunification therapy - did not apply, because the reunification requirement came from the 2021 California judgment, not from a Nevada order, and Nevada was required under the UCCJEA to recognize and enforce that judgment. The court also held that no improper delegation to the therapist occurred, that the contempt finding was proper, and that the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence. As for the fee award, the court dismissed that part of the appeal, explaining it lacked jurisdiction because the final fee order was entered after Stevens filed her notice of appeal and she never filed a separate appeal from that order. Because the judgment was affirmed and no remand was ordered, Stevens's request to reassign the case to a different judge was moot.

Magdalena Ocasio and Jonathan Wirsz were never married but have one child together, M.W., born in 2014. Over several years they repeatedly went to court over custody. In 2020, a judge gave Wirsz primary physical custody and both parents shared joint legal custody, but with Wirsz holding "tie-breaking" authority to make decisions when they disagreed. Wirsz later asked to move with M.W. from Nevada to Idaho, saying he had a business opportunity there. Before the court ruled, the parents reached an agreement (called an "amended stipulation and order," or ASAO) that let him move and kept the existing custody arrangement. In that agreement, both parents gave up the right to reconsider or appeal the 2020 custody order or the ASAO, agreed that the winner of any future dispute about the agreement would get attorney fees, and promised to talk to each other about concerns over M.W. before taking those concerns to anyone else. Later, Ocasio claimed Wirsz tricked her into the move because he never actually took the Idaho business job. She also alleged he punished M.W. by making her eat hot sauce or hot peppers. She asked the court to change custody and move M.W. back to Nevada. An earlier appeal sent part of the case back to the trial court for a hearing on some of her claims — but that earlier decision also said Ocasio was not entitled to a hearing on her fraud claims because she had not shown the alleged fraud was a legally significant change, and had not filed the specific kind of motion (an NRCP 60(b) motion) needed to undo the ASAO. Back in the trial court, the fight expanded. Wirsz asked for sole legal custody, for Ocasio's parenting time to be reduced, and for her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. He also asked the court to hold her in contempt for accusing him of abuse without first raising it with him as the ASAO required. Ocasio tried to subpoena records about Wirsz's Idaho business to prove the alleged fraud. The court blocked those subpoenas, finding the business records irrelevant because Ocasio had never filed a motion to set aside the ASAO and had a history of misusing Wirsz's financial information. At a multi-day hearing, a psychiatrist Wirsz hired, Dr. Gregory Brown, testified that Ocasio met the criteria for narcissistic personality disorder and explained how that condition can make coparenting very difficult. Ocasio wanted to challenge that diagnosis using raw test data from another psychologist, Dr. Bradley, but Dr. Bradley did not appear to testify. Ocasio never formally asked the court to force Dr. Bradley to testify or to delay the hearing for that purpose. The court also excluded Ocasio's rebuttal expert, Wygant, because he was disclosed too late, and Ocasio never filed a written response opposing his exclusion. After the hearing, the court denied Ocasio's request to move M.W. and change custody, kept Wirsz's primary physical custody, gave Wirsz sole legal custody, and held Ocasio in contempt for making abuse claims in a 2021 declaration without first discussing them with Wirsz. The court also awarded Wirsz roughly $69,000 in attorney fees and about $86,000 in costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all of Ocasio's arguments. It held that because she never filed the proper motion to undo the ASAO, the trial court did not have to revisit the fraud claim or allow discovery about the Idaho business. It held she gave up (forfeited) her arguments about the witnesses because she did not properly raise them below. It held the court could rely on Dr. Brown's diagnosis, which was supported by the evidence, and that the court properly connected her diagnosis and her refusal to communicate to its decision to give Wirsz sole legal custody. Finally, it upheld the fee and cost awards, though it affirmed the fees on a different legal basis (NRS 125C.250) than the trial court used, and it held Ocasio lost her challenge to the costs because she filed the wrong type of paper (an opposition instead of a motion to retax) and filed it too late.

This case involves two parents who divorced in 2023 and originally agreed to share custody of their two young children fifty-fifty (called "joint physical custody"). They had lived together in Fallon, Nevada. After the divorce, the father, Camron, moved to Elko County. Because of the long distances involved, exchanging the children for parenting time became difficult, and the parents encountered challenges arising from the older child's behavioral and medical issues. In 2025, Camron asked the district court to give him primary physical custody — meaning the children would live mainly with him. The mother, Hannah, opposed that request, said it was not in the children's best interest, and asked the court to adjust the parenting-time schedule to account for the distance between the parents. The court held an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, along with several of the older child's care providers, both grandmothers, and a court-appointed investigator who had prepared a custody evaluation. After the hearing, the court denied Camron's request and instead awarded Hannah primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody (the parents still share major decision-making). The court gave Camron one weekend of parenting time per month, with exchanges in Winnemucca, daily phone calls, a holiday and vacation schedule, and five weeks of parenting time during summer break. On appeal, Camron raised two main arguments. First, he said his right to due process — his right to fair notice and a chance to be heard — was violated because Hannah never actually asked for primary physical custody; she wanted to keep the joint arrangement. The Court of Appeals rejected this. It explained that when a parent asks a court to change custody, Nevada law requires the court to decide the matter based on the children's best interest, and that an award of primary custody to the other parent is one of the possible outcomes. Because Camron himself put custody in front of the court and had a full chance to testify and present his position at the hearing, he had both notice and an opportunity to be heard. Second, Camron argued the court's factual findings were not backed by adequate evidence. He pointed to claims that Hannah did not consult him about the children's medical and educational issues, did not always ensure he got his parenting time, and had mental health difficulties. The Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess which witnesses the trial judge found believable. It reviewed the district court's findings — including the older child's medical treatment in Fallon, Hannah's role as the day-to-day caregiver and coordinator of that treatment, the children's close bond with their maternal grandmother, and the presence of a younger half-sibling — and concluded those findings were supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept. The court had reviewed the statutory best-interest factors, found six favored Hannah and the rest neutral or irrelevant, and connected those findings to its custody decision. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Salvatore Carrera and Lori Peterson were never married but have one child together, N.P., born in 2012 and identified in the opinion as having autism. Since 2014, the parties shared joint legal custody, with Peterson holding primary physical custody (meaning the child lived mainly with her) and Carrera having parenting time. In 2024, after Carrera sought changes, the parties agreed to keep that arrangement, with Carrera having parenting time in Texas. In March 2025, Carrera again asked the court to change custody. His request centered on an October 2024 incident in which Daniel, Peterson's ex-husband with whom she had reconciled and was living, was arrested for domestic violence against Peterson. Carrera argued that he should get primary physical custody and be allowed to move N.P. to his home in Texas, pointing to domestic violence in Peterson's home, alleged neglect, and instability, and saying his own home was stable and could provide therapy and educational resources for N.P.'s autism. The district court held an evidentiary hearing where Carrera, Peterson, Daniel, Peterson's sister, and three sheriff's deputies testified. The judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence (meaning "more likely than not"), that N.P. had lived in a home where domestic violence occurred, and even found that this factor favored Carrera. But weighing all the relevant factors together, the court concluded that N.P.'s best interest was served by staying with Peterson. The judge emphasized N.P.'s special needs, the value of stability, N.P.'s close relationship with both Peterson and Daniel, and that Daniel had been a consistent parental presence. The court denied Carrera's requests. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a judge's custody decision is reviewed only for "abuse of discretion" - the court will overturn it only if no reasonable judge could have reached the same conclusion. The appeals court rejected each of Carrera's arguments: On the excluded 9-1-1 recordings, the court said Carrera never identified who made the calls, either below or on appeal, so he did not show the trial judge was wrong to exclude them for lack of authentication. On his other evidentiary complaints, the court said he only pointed to transcript page numbers without making a developed argument, so it would not consider them. On the discovery issue, Carrera argued that because Peterson did not timely respond to his "requests for admission" (written questions a party must admit or deny), those matters should have been automatically treated as admitted. The court held that even if the trial judge erred, any error was harmless: Carrera was allowed to question Peterson about the same subjects at the hearing, and the judge decided the case on its merits. The court also noted that in custody cases involving domestic violence, all information must be considered, and sanctions that block evidence are disfavored. On domestic violence, the court held that the special rebuttable presumption in NRS 125C.0035(5) did not apply because that presumption only applies when a parent or another person seeking custody committed the violence - and Daniel was neither a parent nor seeking custody. The court found the trial judge did properly consider the domestic violence as a best interest factor. On the remaining best interest findings and the bias claim, the court held Carrera did not show the findings lacked support or that the judge acted out of improper bias. The appeals court also stressed that it could not reweigh evidence or credibility.

This is a case about a parent's attempt to change a child custody arrangement. Tina Leah Rohmiller asked the district court to modify the custody order in her case, but on December 7, 2025, the district court said no. She then filed several follow-up motions asking the court to reconsider, rehear, or undo that decision. While her appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Nevada told the lower court (on April 27, 2026) to first resolve those pending follow-up motions and paused the briefing schedule - the written arguments that each side files. The district court then denied those follow-up motions on May 15, 2026. In this order, the court cleaned up and organized the multiple related appeals Rohmiller had filed. It found that the appeal in one docket (No. 92490) was now ready to move forward, so it restarted the briefing schedule. Because a second appeal (No. 92888) came from the same court case and involved the same people, the court combined - "consolidated" - the two appeals so they would be handled together. Rohmiller was given 40 days to file a single opening brief covering the issues in both. The court also ordered the district court clerk to send up a complete copy of the trial court record so the justices can review everything that was filed below. Finally, the court noticed that a third appeal (No. 92643) challenged the very same orders as the appeal in Docket No. 92490. Because it was a duplicate, the court dismissed the appeal in Docket No. 92643, letting the appeal in Docket No. 92490 proceed instead. No decision was made on whether custody should actually be changed; this order deals only with how the appeals will proceed.

This case is a dispute between two parents, Sandra Adams and Anthony Lee, over custody of their three young children, born in 2016, 2018, and 2020. The background: In April 2021, a California court decided that both parents would share "joint legal custody" (the authority to make major decisions about the children), but that Lee would have "primary physical custody" (the children live mainly with him). The California order also gave Adams supervised parenting time and gave Lee the authority to make decisions about the children's education. In February 2022, Lee registered that California order in the Nevada court, which the Nevada court approved in April 2022. In 2024, after both parents challenged the arrangement, the Nevada court held a hearing and kept the existing setup in place. It found there had not been a "substantial change in circumstances" — the legal threshold a parent must cross before a court will even consider changing a custody order. The court noted several concerns about Adams's parenting time, including that she had only two in-person visits with the children in the prior 16 months, that children had to be removed from the supervised-visit center during those visits, and that she had previously been dropped from the supervised video-call program for missing scheduled calls. In May 2025, Adams filed a new motion asking for full custody. She argued the children were not enrolled in school, had struggled in school before, and were being medically neglected, and that Lee was not communicating with her and was trying to turn the children against her. She said that if she had custody, the children would be in therapy, in school, have their medical needs met, and bond with their other siblings. Lee responded that the children missed school due to illness, that one child now had an educational support plan and therapy/speech services, and that an incident involving a child's eye had already been investigated by Child Protective Services and law enforcement and the case was closed. After another evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied Adams's motion. It found she had not shown a substantial change in circumstances: she had not been in contact with the children from July 2024 until March 2025, her claim that California offered better resources was speculative, and Lee had already addressed the education and medical concerns. The court kept Adams's parenting time supervised but said the parents could later agree in writing to remove supervision if visits went well, or Adams could file a new motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed — meaning it upheld the district court's decision. A key reason was practical: Adams filed a certificate stating she was not requesting transcripts of the evidentiary hearing. Without a transcript of what was said at that hearing, the appellate court explained that it is required to assume the missing record supports the lower court's decision, and it cannot meaningfully review arguments about the evidence. The court also rejected Adams's argument that her due process rights were violated when Lee, Lee's mother, and a court department manager testified, noting that a pre-hearing order had told the parties they would have an opportunity to be heard, that Adams had a chance to cross-examine the witnesses, and that she had not shown any harm.

Douglas Brofman and Gina Fiore were never married but have one child, N.B., born in 2015. In 2021, the district court entered the original custody order giving both parents joint physical and joint legal custody. Even then, the court observed the parents had a high level of conflict and poor communication that hurt their ability to raise their child together. Between 2021 and 2024, the parents repeatedly could not agree on issues like medical care, schooling, and extracurricular activities, so the court had to step in many times to break ties. In these earlier orders, the court generally found that Brofman was engaging in passive-aggressive behavior, objecting to Fiore's suggestions without a reasonable basis, or acting to frustrate or control Fiore. In 2024, Fiore asked the court to give her sole legal authority over the child's medical care, education, and extracurricular activities, and also asked for primary physical custody. She said Brofman kept refusing to cooperate, which delayed the child's medical care or kept him from playing sports, and that she was the one primarily making sure the child got to appointments and to school on time. Brofman did not file written opposition but hired a lawyer and opposed the request out loud at a hearing. The court held a three-day evidentiary hearing. Both parents blamed the other for the conflict. The child's current therapist testified that Brofman said he would not "coparent" (cooperate jointly) but preferred to "parallel parent," and that in the therapist's opinion the parents could not coparent without extraordinary intervention. Evidence showed the parents' inability to cooperate delayed the child's medical care, including therapy, and caused him to miss out on activities with friends. In July 2025, the court found circumstances had changed enough to justify modifying custody. It gave Fiore limited sole legal custody over the child's medical care and extracurricular activities, but let Brofman keep an equal say over the child's schooling and denied Fiore's request for sole authority over education. The court kept the "joint physical custody" label but changed the schedule so Fiore had more time - a schedule that gave Brofman about 36 percent of the parenting time. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first explained that most of the older orders Brofman tried to challenge had already been decided in earlier appeals (so they were settled under a rule called "law of the case") or were filed too late for the court to have power to review them. The court therefore only reviewed the July 2025 modification order. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. It found there was enough evidence that Brofman's ongoing refusal to cooperate was a substantial change in circumstances and that giving Fiore limited sole legal custody served the child's best interest, in part because repeated court intervention delayed the child's care and cost Fiore money she could have spent on the child. The court explained it does not re-weigh evidence or re-decide who was more credible on appeal, and that a trial court is allowed to rely on its own prior findings. Finally, the court concluded that labeling the arrangement "joint physical custody" was permissible even at roughly a one-third timeshare, because the percentage was not so low as to require a "primary physical custody" label and both parents agreed the child was close to and enjoyed time with each of them. The court affirmed.

Giana Curreri and Marcus Mayhall are the parents of a child, G.C.M., born in 2015. The parents were never married. Starting in 2017 they filed competing requests for custody, and the arrangements changed several times over the years, moving between shared joint custody and periods where one parent had primary physical custody. A recurring theme in the case was Curreri's allegations that Mayhall was sexually abusing the child. According to the opinion, Child Protective Services (CPS) and law enforcement investigated these allegations on more than one occasion and concluded they were unsubstantiated. The district court expressed concern that Curreri was subjecting the child to unnecessary physical examinations and forensic interviews through repeated reports. A court-ordered parenting evaluation indicated that Curreri "may suffer from paranoid personality disorder" that affected her ability to co-parent. After an evidentiary hearing in September 2023, the district court gave Mayhall sole legal custody and primary physical custody, gave Curreri weekly supervised parenting time, ordered the child to remain in counseling, and ordered Curreri to seek treatment. In November 2024, Curreri filed the motion at issue in this appeal. She argued that the earlier abuse investigations were inadequate, that the court had ignored evidence proving abuse, and that these amounted to a "material change in circumstances" that would justify changing custody. She also asked the court to take "judicial notice" (an official acknowledgment of certain facts) of items in the record but did not specify which facts. In the alternative, she asked the court to erase all its prior orders under a rule (NRCP 60(b)) that allows courts to undo prior decisions in certain situations, arguing there had been judicial and attorney misconduct dating back to 2017 and that the judge was biased against her. The district court denied everything. It found that Curreri had not pointed to any change in circumstances that happened after the 2023 custody order, so it denied the request to modify custody without holding a full hearing. It denied the judicial-notice request because it was "unsure what Mother wishes for the Court to take judicial notice [of]." And it denied the request to vacate prior orders because it had already reviewed and rejected the same misconduct arguments before. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court and affirmed. It explained that to get a hearing on a custody change, a parent must first make a preliminary showing that circumstances have substantially changed since the last custody decision. Curreri's motion instead re-argued the same abuse allegations that had already been litigated during the 2023 proceedings, so it did not clear that bar. The court also affirmed the refusal to vacate all prior orders, noting Curreri was repeatedly filing motions raising arguments the court had already rejected. It rejected her claim that the judge was biased, saying she did not adequately explain her argument. Finally, it dismissed the parts of her appeal that tried to challenge the 2023 custody order and earlier orders from 2017 to 2019, because those challenges were filed too late.

Eric Perreira and Samantha Eisenberg share a child. Eric filed a case asking for joint legal custody and primary physical custody. Samantha responded by asking for sole legal and sole physical custody (meaning she alone would make major decisions and the child would primarily live with her) and for child support. During the case, both parents raised accusations that the other used illegal drugs. Both were tested, and Eric tested positive for methamphetamine. The court ordered further drug testing and, for a time, limited Eric's time with the child to supervised visits at a facility called Donna's House. The case had already been to the Court of Appeals once. In that earlier appeal, the court found the trial judge had not made the findings the law requires before giving one parent sole custody, so it sent the case back for more proceedings. Back in the trial court, the judge set a new evidentiary hearing. Eric did not attend either the pre-hearing "calendar call" or the hearing itself. Samantha appeared with her lawyer and testified. She described her own past struggle with substance abuse, her completion of a rehabilitation program, and her sobriety since the child returned to her care in 2021. She testified about Eric's substance-abuse issues, his limited contact with the child, and an incident where she said Eric pulled her hair during an argument while she was pregnant, causing injury. She also testified about Eric's income sources. The trial judge issued a written decision that went through the factors Nevada law requires a court to weigh in deciding a child's best interest. The judge concluded most factors favored Samantha, found that Eric had committed an act of domestic violence, found his substance abuse posed a danger, and determined Eric was an unfit parent. The judge awarded Samantha sole legal and sole physical custody, but built in a path for Eric to rebuild a relationship with the child through drug testing, reunification therapy, and supervised parenting time. The judge also set child support at $711 per month plus $89 toward arrears (past-due support), using Nevada's average wage because Eric had not filed a recent financial disclosure form. On appeal, Eric raised four arguments: that he should have more time with the child and that Samantha kept the child from him; that the child support amount was wrong because of medical issues and low income; that the court should have granted him more time (a continuance) before the hearing; and that the judge was biased against him. The Court of Appeals rejected each argument and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court emphasized that it does not re-weigh evidence, that Eric did not appear at the hearing or file updated financial information, that he had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard, and that he did not show the kind of bias that would require reversal.

Phillip Grigalanz and Elizabeth Copas were once in a romantic relationship. During that relationship, Grigalanz lived with Copas and her three minor children, identified in the opinion as K.C., E.C., and J.G. Grigalanz admits he is not the biological father of any of the three children. After the relationship ended, he filed a petition asking the court to give him custody of all three children, alleging that Copas and Jose Enrique Gonzalez-Alba (whom he identified as J.G.'s biological and legal father) had failed to adequately care for the children and that it would be in the children's best interest for the court to place them with him. According to the opinion, Grigalanz never served the petition or any other filing on any of the parents. The district court held a hearing on his request for a temporary custody order and, at that hearing, orally dismissed his petition, finding that he lacked "standing" - meaning the legal right to bring the case at all. Before the court put its decision in writing, Grigalanz filed a motion asking the judge to step aside, arguing that during the hearing she raised her voice at him and judged him unfairly. The court denied that motion and then entered a written order dismissing the petition for lack of standing. Grigalanz appealed. On appeal, Grigalanz argued that a Nevada statute, NRS 125A.135, gave him standing because it defines a "person acting as a parent," and that authority from other states allows a "psychological" or "de facto" parent to seek custody. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the statute merely defines a term; it does not, by its plain wording, give a non-parent the right to seek custody in Nevada in the first place. The court noted that the definition is used in only a few statutes, such as ones dealing with modifying or registering custody orders that were originally issued by courts in other states. The court also rejected Grigalanz's reliance on the "in loco parentis" doctrine - a legal idea about someone standing in the place of a parent. The court said Grigalanz pointed to no Nevada authority using that doctrine to give an unrelated person standing to seek custody, and that in Nevada the doctrine mainly comes up in the context of "equitable adoption." The court further said it was not persuaded by cases from other states because those cases did not analyze Nevada law. Grigalanz also argued that the district court had to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings about the children's best interests before dismissing his petition. The court rejected this too, explaining that the court did hold a motion hearing, that an evidentiary hearing is meant to resolve disputed questions of fact, and that this case turned on a purely legal question because Grigalanz conceded he was not biologically related to the children. The court also explained that best-interest findings come into play only when a court is actually deciding a custody dispute, and because Grigalanz never established standing, the court did not need to reach those factors. Because it concluded that Grigalanz failed to show standing, the Court of Appeals did not address his arguments about service or about judicial bias, and it affirmed the dismissal.

Bryce Wolfe and Taylor Mannion (now Taylor Clayton) share a young daughter, E.W., born in March 2022. According to the opinion, E.W. is nearly blind, has a growth-hormone deficiency, and has several developmental delays. In 2023, the parents mediated an agreement to share joint legal and joint physical custody, and the district court adopted that agreement, setting up a schedule where E.W. rotated between her parents every two or three days. Things changed when Taylor became engaged to a military servicemember being transferred to a base near San Diego, California. In February 2024, Taylor asked the court for primary physical custody and permission to move to California with E.W. Bryce opposed that request and asked for primary physical custody himself. By the time of the hearing, Taylor had married. At a January 2025 evidentiary hearing, both parents testified. Even though Taylor had asked for primary custody, she said she would be open to continuing to share custody, suggesting a two-weeks-on, two-weeks-off arrangement. She testified that E.W. needed regular specialist visits and twice-weekly therapy, but said she was not worried about continuity of care as long as E.W. had insurance and providers in both states. Bryce disagreed that a long-distance shared arrangement was in E.W.'s best interest, emphasizing E.W.'s need for stability, the difficulty of long car trips, and the importance of consistent therapists. At one point, Bryce told the court "it would be up to what you decide" because he "do[es]n't set custody . . . for a living." In March 2025, the district court denied both parents' requests for primary physical custody and effectively denied Taylor's request to relocate. The court found that Taylor had a good-faith reason for the move but had not shown that relocation was in E.W.'s best interest or offered an actual advantage. The court found that all of the best-interest factors were either neutral or did not apply, and concluded that both parents were fully capable of caring for E.W. The court kept joint physical custody in place, but — to address Bryce's concern about frequent travel — ordered a one-month-on, one-month-off schedule instead of the two-week rotation Taylor had suggested. On child support, the court kept the baseline obligation at $0 because the parents' incomes were similar, but ordered Taylor to pay Bryce $100 per month for transportation costs tied to her decision to relocate. Bryce asked the court to reconsider its custody and parenting-time decisions (but did not separately challenge the $100 transportation award), and the court denied that request. He then appealed. The Court of Appeals rejected each of Bryce's arguments. It held that his due process rights were not violated, because Nevada's custody statutes put him on notice that joint physical custody was a possible outcome once custody was before the court, and he had a chance to be heard on the issue. It held that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding a substantial change in circumstances (relying on a prior Nevada Supreme Court case involving a relocating military spouse) or in finding that joint custody with a monthly schedule served E.W.'s best interest — noting that much of Bryce's argument amounted to asking the appellate court to reweigh the evidence, which it does not do. Finally, it held that the court properly handled the $100 transportation award as part of the overall child support determination and that Bryce had not built a record showing the amount was inadequate. The court affirmed.

Kristen Medina and Aaron Ortega were married, had one child, and divorced in August 2023. In December 2025, after a hearing, the district court entered a written order modifying Ortega's parenting time. That custody order is being challenged in a separate appeal (Docket No. 91803). While that appeal was pending, disputes arose over Medina apparently withholding the child from Ortega. Following further hearings, the district court entered orders in January and February 2026 addressing the custody arrangement and exchanges. Ortega then asked the court to give him primary physical custody, saying Medina was continuing to withhold the child. The court set a hearing, appointed a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to represent the child's interests), and ordered the parents to appear in person for an exchange of the child, warning that failing to appear could lead to a bench warrant (a court order authorizing a person's arrest). When Medina failed to appear with the child on March 19, 2026 - even after the court called her and directed her to do so - the court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. The court also entered orders for the return of the child and a warrant directing law enforcement to take physical custody of the child and deliver her to Ortega. Medina asked the appellate court for an extraordinary court order (a writ of mandamus or prohibition) to undo all of these orders. She argued the district court had no power to act because an appeal was already pending. The appellate court rejected most of Medina's arguments. It concluded she had not shown that the court's intervention was warranted regarding the January, February, and March 2026 orders, or the orders transferring temporary custody to Ortega. But the court agreed with Medina on one point: the way the district court handled the contempt finding and the bench warrant. The court explained that the bench warrant did not follow the correct legal procedure - it did not formally find Medina guilty of contempt, did not set out any specific punishment such as a fine or jail term, and did not set a bail amount. Instead, it ordered her held without bail and allowed up to 72 hours to pass after her arrest before the court would even be notified. For these reasons, the appellate court concluded the district court had abused its discretion in the procedure it used, and it ordered the bench warrant vacated. The court noted that proceedings related to ongoing contempt appeared to be set for August 2026 and that nothing in its order prevented the district court from addressing any ongoing contempt. It also noted the orders for return of the child and to take physical custody had expired by their own terms on May 6, 2026, and nothing prevented the district court from reentering them if still warranted.

Anthony Ibanez and Patamawadee Chaisawang were never married but have a child together, born in September 2021. In June 2023, Ibanez filed a court complaint asking for sole legal and primary physical custody after Chaisawang moved from Nevada to California with the child. He argued that Chaisawang had taken the child without his permission—an "abduction"—and asked that the child be returned to Nevada. Chaisawang responded, denied taking the child improperly, and formally asked the court for permission to relocate to California with the child. After a trial where both parents testified and submitted evidence—including text messages between them and a statement Ibanez gave to police the day after Chaisawang moved—the district court gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Chaisawang primary physical custody, and allowed her to relocate to California. The court also set a child support amount. Ibanez then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its custody decision, arguing the court used the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether an abduction occurred and improperly relied on things that happened after the move. The court denied that motion and later issued a separate order setting Ibanez's monthly child support obligation at $959.33, based on a gross monthly income of $9,116.67 and a $250 reduction for transportation costs. On appeal, Ibanez raised several arguments. First, he said the court used a stricter standard of proof ("clear and convincing evidence") when deciding whether an abduction happened, when it should have used the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning "more likely than not"). The appeals court disagreed. It explained that while the trial court had referenced a subsection dealing with a special legal presumption against parents who commit abduction, the court also analyzed the abduction question under the ordinary best-interest factor and later clarified in writing that it had applied the "more likely than not" standard. The appeals court found Ibanez did not show the wrong standard was used. Second, Ibanez argued that the evidence proved Chaisawang abducted the child and that recognizing this would have shifted other factors in his favor. The appeals court noted that the trial court repeatedly declined to find an abduction, and that its findings—based on testimony and text messages showing Chaisawang had tried to reach a custody agreement while Ibanez refused to compromise—were supported by adequate evidence. The court emphasized that weighing evidence and judging witnesses' credibility is the trial court's job, and an appeals court does not re-weigh that evidence. Third, Ibanez challenged the decision letting Chaisawang relocate to California, saying the court improperly relied on benefits that only existed because of the move (like a California school). The appeals court explained that when there is no prior custody order, a parent still needs court permission to move a child out of state, and the court must decide what is in the child's best interest. The trial court found a "sensible, good faith reason for the move"—a better school with services for the child's speech delay, nearby family, and Chaisawang's flexible remote work. The trial court also clarified that it relied on forward-looking, prospective benefits rather than benefits that had already accrued from the move. Fourth, Ibanez challenged the child support calculation, saying the court overstated his income. The appeals court found the income figure was supported by evidence: his own disclosure form showing $6,516.67, plus regular monthly transfers of at least $1,500 from his grandmother, plus $1,100 in rental income. The court also noted Ibanez received the $250 transportation reduction he had requested. Finally, Ibanez argued the court wrongly denied him attorney fees because Chaisawang caused the litigation by abducting the child. Because the appeals court had already upheld the finding that there was no abduction and no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, it found no abuse of discretion in denying attorney fees. The court affirmed all the district court's orders.

Amber Johnson-Parker and Clevis Parker married in 2019 and had one child that same year. In 2021, Clevis filed for divorce and asked for joint legal and physical custody. Amber wanted joint legal custody but asked to be the child's primary physical custodian. The parties settled many issues, and the divorce decree adopted their agreement. As part of that agreement, they said they would work toward joint physical custody but temporarily gave Clevis primary physical custody because Amber had a pending criminal matter. The agreement listed conditions Amber would need to meet - such as no new criminal charges, no new child-protective-services matters with substantiated allegations, and no new safety concerns for the child - before joint physical custody could be awarded. They also agreed to joint legal custody. After several incidents involving Amber and the child's school, the court temporarily gave Clevis sole legal custody. Amber later asked the court to give her joint physical custody. Clevis opposed that and asked to move to Texas with the child. Amber underwent a psychological assessment, the parties took part in a custody evaluation, and Clevis asked for attorney fees. At trial, the parties presented evidence about the child's well-being and Amber's mental health. Witnesses testified that Amber had been arrested for driving under the influence and had made abuse allegations against Clevis that were not substantiated. Clevis explained why he believed moving to Texas would benefit the child. The district court denied Amber's request, allowed Clevis to relocate, and set a final custody arrangement. It found that Amber's abuse allegations were false and had caused the child mental trauma, that the custody evaluator found Amber exhibited "paranoid and delusional thinking," and that Amber's actions posed a continuous risk of stress and emotional harm to the child. In contrast, it found Clevis provided a stable and supportive environment. The court found relocation was in the child's best interest and gave Clevis primary physical custody, while giving Amber parenting time. It also gave Clevis primary legal custody, finding Amber interfered with the child's schooling and did not support the child's therapy. Finally, the court found Amber's conduct significantly increased litigation costs and later awarded Clevis $45,000 in attorney fees (out of the more than $117,000 he requested), and directed Amber to pay portions of the assessment and evaluation costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the custody, relocation, and fee decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning the appeals court does not decide the case fresh, but only asks whether the trial court's decision was supported by adequate evidence and was reasonable. The court explained that in child custody matters, the only question is what serves the child's best interest. It concluded that although the district court did not specifically cite the statute listing the best-interest factors, the court made extensive findings covering most of those factors and tied them to its decision. The appeals court also noted it is not allowed to re-weigh evidence or second-guess the trial court's credibility findings. The court also addressed Amber's claim that the district court judge was biased. It explained that judges are presumed unbiased and that a party challenging a judge must show real factual grounds for disqualification. Because rulings a judge makes during a case generally do not show improper bias, and Amber had not shown bias from an outside source or "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism," the court found no abuse of discretion in the chief judge's refusal to disqualify the trial judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed every part of the district court's decision. It also denied Amber's emergency motion to stay the current parenting-time schedule.

This case involves a grandmother's request for court-ordered time with her two grandchildren. Eddie Lindsey and Nia Bullock had two children together. Bullock died shortly after their second child was born. Bullock's mother, Nia Hicks, is the children's grandmother. She went to court asking for "grandparent visitation" - a legal arrangement in which a court sets aside time for a grandparent to see grandchildren. Hicks said in her petition that Lindsey, the father, was unreasonably keeping her from the children. Lindsey disagreed, saying he had not blocked her visits and was willing to let her see the children. At trial, the court heard that Hicks lives mainly in Virginia but travels to Las Vegas often because she works for an airline. She testified that she visited the children about 8 times in the past 12 months. She wanted a court order requiring Lindsey to let the children stay with her - including overnight - during her Las Vegas trips, and on holidays and birthdays. Lindsey testified that although he does not get along well with Hicks, he had not tried to block her relationship with the children, pointing to the many visits she had over the past year. He raised concerns about overnight stays because the younger child has sickle cell anemia and needs care for that condition, and he worried that the amount of visitation Hicks wanted would be disruptive. The district court found that Lindsey is a fit parent with a right to the care and custody of his children, and that he had not denied or unreasonably restricted Hicks's visits. The court decided it was in the children's best interest to let Lindsey set their schedules, and it denied the petition. On appeal, Hicks asked the higher court to look again at the evidence about her involvement with the children. The Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-weigh evidence, and that under Nevada law a court can order grandparent visitation only when a parent has denied or unreasonably restricted visits. Because the district court found that Lindsey had not done so, and because Hicks did not make a developed legal argument challenging that specific finding, the appellate court affirmed - meaning it upheld the district court's decision to deny visitation.

This case is about who can be legally recognized as a parent in Nevada when a child was born through a surrogate arrangement and one of the adults raising the child has no biological connection to the child. Mary Lorenzo and Pierre Gendebien were in a relationship and lived together starting in 2016. In 2017, Gendebien signed a gestational agreement - a contract to have a child through a surrogate (a woman who carries and gives birth to a child for someone else). The child, A.G., was conceived using Gendebien's sperm and an egg from an anonymous donor. The agreement named Gendebien as the only intended parent and left the space for a mother's name blank. Before the child was born, Gendebien obtained a court order establishing himself as the sole parent, and the child's birth certificate left the mother's name blank. A.G. was born in June 2018. Lorenzo and Gendebien raised the child together in their shared home until their relationship ended in November 2021. At first they shared equal time with A.G., but Gendebien gradually reduced Lorenzo's access and eventually cut it off. Lorenzo then went to court in September 2022, asking to be recognized as A.G.'s mother and seeking joint legal and physical custody. She said she and Gendebien had held her out as A.G.'s parent, that they had lived together as a family since before the child's birth, and that Gendebien had promised to add her name to the birth certificate. Gendebien asked the court to throw out her complaint, arguing she had no right to seek parentage because she did not give birth to A.G., did not adopt A.G., was not married to Gendebien, and was not named in the gestational agreement. The district court agreed and dismissed her maternity and custody claims (though it allowed a separate request for nonparent visitation to continue, which was later denied). The Court of Appeals reversed. The court explained that when someone asks a court to dismiss a complaint at the very start of a case, the court must assume the facts the person alleges are true. The question is only whether those alleged facts, if proven, could entitle the person to relief. The court held that Nevada's parentage statutes do not limit motherhood claims only to women who have a biological link to the child. Under NRS 126.231, "any interested party may bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and child relationship," and Nevada's rules about how fatherhood can be presumed apply to motherhood cases "insofar as practicable." The court held that two of the ways a man can be presumed to be a father - living with the child's other natural parent for at least six months before conception and continuing through the period of conception, and receiving the child into his home and openly holding the child out as his own - can apply equally to a woman seeking to be recognized as a mother. Because Lorenzo alleged facts fitting these situations, her case should not have been dismissed at the outset. The court also addressed the surrogacy contract. It held that the contract locked in Gendebien's rights as the intended parent "immediately upon the birth of the child," but did not permanently block other interested people from later trying to establish that they are also a parent - unless they had agreed to be left out. The court noted that the surrogacy statutes were mainly designed to prevent a surrogate from later claiming to be the child's parent, not to forever shut out everyone else. The court sent the case back to the district court with instructions. On remand, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing. Lorenzo must first prove, by a preponderance of the evidence (meaning more likely than not), that she qualifies as a presumptive parent. If she does, Gendebien then gets the chance to rebut - to overcome - that presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence (a higher standard). To decide whether rebuttal is appropriate, the court announced a new three-part test looking at how the family was formed, whether the person voluntarily took on parental responsibilities, and whether anyone else is claiming to be the child's second parent. If Lorenzo's presumptive status is not rebutted, she is recognized as a parent and the court moves on to decide custody based on the child's best interest. If it is rebutted, judgment goes to Gendebien.

Hope Backman and Daniel Gelbman share a child, D.G., born in 2013. They originally agreed to joint legal and physical custody. In 2018, after a hearing that showed substantial conflict between the parents, the district court kept joint legal custody but changed the physical-custody schedule. In 2023, Backman (then representing herself) asked to modify custody so she could move with D.G. to San Antonio, Texas, citing financial hardship, reduced income after the COVID-19 pandemic, and family support and job opportunities there. Gelbman opposed the move and filed his own request asking for primary physical custody, arguing circumstances had changed since 2018. Gelbman also asked the court to declare Backman a "vexatious litigant" (a person the court restricts from filing new matters freely), and Backman, through her lawyer, agreed to that designation in exchange for cancelling a scheduled hearing. That agreement required her future filings to go through a screening process before being accepted. The court appointed a custody evaluator, Dr. Herbert F. Coard III, who wrote reports about the parents' mental health and the child's situation. During the evaluation, the court temporarily gave Gelbman primary physical custody and limited Backman's contact with D.G., and by the time of the main hearing, Backman had gone many months without contact with the child. After a multi-day hearing, the court in March 2024 denied Backman's request to relocate and gave Gelbman primary physical custody. It kept "joint legal custody" on paper but gave Gelbman the final say over D.G.'s education and medical and mental-health care, while Backman kept information rights, emergency-care decision-making during her time with D.G., and joint authority over religion and extracurricular activities. Backman received alternating-weekend, holiday, and extended-summer time. The court declined to appoint a "parenting coordinator" (a neutral person who helps parents resolve disputes), reasoning that Backman could not afford to share the cost. The conflict continued. In early 2025, Backman filed an emergency motion claiming Gelbman's fiancée had physically injured D.G. The court screened the motion under the vexatious-litigant procedure, found it had arguable merit, and held a hearing. It then denied the motion, finding the injury was an accidental result of roughhousing rather than abuse. Gelbman asked for his attorney fees, and the court found Backman lacked a reasonable basis to keep pursuing the motion once the evidence was in. The court found more than $9,900 in fees reasonable but reduced the award to $2,000, payable at $100 per month, because of the parties' financial circumstances. Backman appealed both orders. The Court of Appeals rejected all of her arguments and affirmed. On the custody change, the court agreed the district court should have more clearly stated a separate finding that circumstances had "substantially changed" since 2018, but concluded the detailed factual findings already showed such a change, so any error was harmless. The court found the district court was not required to appoint a parenting coordinator, that giving Gelbman final say in certain areas was still a valid form of joint legal custody rather than a hidden grant of sole custody, and that the alleged bias of the evaluator went to how much weight his testimony deserved—not to whether it had to be thrown out. The court also concluded the vexatious-litigant designation was mentioned only in passing and did not drive the custody outcome, and that the attorney fees were properly awarded and reasonably calculated.

Ricky DeNoto and Alisha Babbe Hilton, who were never married, share one child, T.D., born in 2017. After both moved to Nevada, they split parenting time evenly, one week on and one week off. Although both parents stayed involved, Hilton generally handled T.D.'s medical care, insurance, appointments, and school matters, and DeNoto usually deferred to her on those issues. In early 2024, Hilton took a temporary surgical-technologist job in Hawaii. The parents, representing themselves, signed a written "Permission to Travel" agreement letting T.D. stay in Hawaii from June 6, 2024, until sometime between July 8 and July 13, 2024. According to the opinion, Hilton did not present the trip as a permanent move, though she shipped her car to Hawaii before leaving. As the return date approached, DeNoto asked for travel details; Hilton first responded, then became evasive, and then stopped communicating. T.D. never came back and has remained in Hawaii. That August, DeNoto learned from T.D. that Hilton had enrolled him in a Hawaii school without DeNoto's knowledge or consent. The next month, T.D. was struck by a vehicle in the front yard of Hilton's Hawaii home. He suffered serious injuries, was placed in a medically induced coma for three days, hospitalized until late October, treated in the ICU, and underwent major surgery. By the time of trial, T.D. had undergone multiple surgeries, resumed some activity, and been cleared to travel, but still needed ongoing care, including one more surgery. DeNoto filed a paternity case in October 2024, and Hilton answered and counterclaimed. There were no prior custody or support orders. At trial, the district court decided Nevada had jurisdiction because T.D. had lived in Nevada for years before the June 2024 departure and because DeNoto filed within months of that departure. The parents agreed to share legal custody (the right to make major decisions), and the court entered detailed rules requiring them to consult on decisions, share medical and school information, and support T.D.'s relationship with the other parent. The contested question was physical custody — where T.D. would primarily live. The court worked through the statutory "best interest of the child" factors. It found most factors neutral. It found two factors favored Hilton: the parents' ability to cooperate to meet the child's needs (because Hilton historically handled medical, insurance, and school matters and had supported T.D. financially in Hawaii), and the child's physical, developmental, and emotional needs (because of his serious injuries, ongoing medical and therapy needs, school accommodations, and Hilton's ability to keep him on medical, dental, and vision insurance). The court awarded Hilton primary physical custody in Hawaii, gave DeNoto parenting time over school breaks and long weekends plus phone contact, and set child support and related financial terms. On appeal, DeNoto argued the court mishandled several best-interest factors, downplayed Hilton's failure to return T.D. and her unilateral school enrollment, failed to resolve conflicting testimony with credibility findings, and reached conclusions unsupported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody decisions only for "abuse of discretion" — a deferential standard that does not allow the appeals court to re-weigh evidence or re-judge witness credibility. The court agreed with DeNoto on one point: the district court's finding that one factor (whether a parent would allow the child a continuing relationship with the other parent) was "neutral" seemed inconsistent with the trial court's own findings that Hilton had "reneged on the agreement," become evasive, gone "radio silence," and enrolled T.D. in school without consent. But the appeals court concluded the trial court did not ignore that conduct — it acknowledged the conduct and weighed it against other evidence, such as the parents' long history of co-parenting, DeNoto's phone access, and his extended visits. The appeals court held that even if that factor was weighed improperly, it would not change the result, because DeNoto did not meaningfully dispute the finding about T.D.'s serious medical and educational needs, which strongly supported placing him with Hilton. Because the district court considered the required factors, made findings adequate for review, and reached a decision supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Danial Toung and Sauri Reachi Solis were never married but had three children together: A.T. (born 2016), N.T. (born 2020), and H.R.S. (born 2024). Over the years, courts issued custody orders. A 2016 decree gave the parents joint legal and joint physical custody of A.T. In 2021, a new decree gave them joint legal custody but gave Sauri primary physical custody of A.T. and N.T., while granting Danial parenting time. That 2021 decree was the most recent final custody order before this case. After H.R.S. was born in 2024, Sauri asked the court to change custody, arguing circumstances had changed. She claimed Danial had "simply checked out on the family in favor of his new family," had stopped contacting his children, and had been arrested for domestic violence against her. She asked for sole physical custody of all three children. Danial disputed her claims, saying he had not checked out and had never been arrested for domestic violence against her. Danial also filed petitions asking the court to change H.R.S.'s name. The district court entered temporary orders adding H.R.S. to the case and giving Sauri primary physical custody of all three children. Because of an act of violence between Danial and his brother that happened in front of the children, the court ordered that Danial's parenting time be supervised. The court partially granted Danial's name-change request by adding his surname to H.R.S.'s name and adding him to the birth certificate as the father. Danial then filed an unsuccessful motion to disqualify the district court judge, and later filed a second name-change petition. A trial was held in July 2025 before a different district court judge. Both parents testified. The court considered testimony about alleged acts of child abuse and domestic violence — including a December 2023 incident in which Sauri said Danial punched her in the back — Danial's lack of contact with the children, and each parent's relationship with the children. The court decided that joint physical custody was not in the children's best interest because Danial had only "sporadic" contact with them since 2023. It denied Sauri's request for sole physical custody but ruled that Sauri should keep primary physical custody of A.T. and N.T. and receive primary physical custody of H.R.S. The court ordered Danial's parenting time supervised and gave Sauri sole legal custody. On appeal, Danial argued that the custody decision was wrong, that the court relied on hearsay and unproven claims, that there were procedural problems and he was denied a fair trial, that his motion to disqualify a judge was wrongly denied, and that the court refused to admit key evidence and excluded witnesses. The appeals court explained that it does not re-decide these cases from scratch; instead, it checks whether the trial judge abused his discretion and whether the findings are supported by "substantial evidence" — evidence a reasonable person would accept as enough to support the decision. The court found that the trial court's findings were supported by the record, that the appeals court cannot re-weigh evidence or second-guess who the trial judge believed, and that many of Danial's arguments were too vague to consider because he did not point to the specific hearsay, testimony, evidence, or witnesses he was complaining about. The court also concluded that Danial had not shown any judge was biased. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the district court's decision.

This case concerns a guardianship — a legal arrangement in which a court gives someone other than a child's parents the authority to care for that child. In April 2017, a Clark County family court granted Joelle Reed and Carolyn Louise Reed guardianship over two minor children, E.I.C. and E.M.D. The guardians, who had already been caring for the children, said the children's parents could not care for them. Over the following years, Richard Clements — E.I.C.'s father — repeatedly tried to end the guardianship over his daughter, without success. In September 2025, Richard filed what he called an emergency motion to vacate (cancel) the guardianship. His main argument was that the original 2017 order should be treated as void — legally invalid from the start — because he had never been properly served with (formally given legal notice of) the guardianship petition. He relied on a court rule, NRCP 60(b)(4), which allows a court to set aside a judgment that is void. He claimed the district court had previously acknowledged there was no proof of proper service in the record, argued the court had used an improper standard in rejecting his earlier attempts, and asserted that the court's repeated errors showed judicial corruption in his case. He asked the court to declare all the guardianship orders void and end them immediately, or, if the court reached the merits, to terminate the guardianship or hold a hearing. The district court denied his motion for two independent reasons. First, it found that Richard had not properly served his own motion on the appropriate parties. Second, addressing the substance anyway, the court found that the service issue had already been decided against Richard in earlier proceedings — meaning it was, in the court's words, "res judicata" (an issue already finally decided and not open to relitigation) — and that Richard had not offered facts showing that ending the guardianship would be in E.I.C.'s best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals pointed out that Richard did not meaningfully argue against the first reason the district court gave — his failure to serve his own motion. Because that was an independent ground for the denial and he did not challenge it, the appellate court treated any argument about it as given up (forfeited), which by itself was enough to uphold the denial. The court then went on to address Richard's actual arguments. It reviewed the district court's decision for what is called an "abuse of discretion" — a standard under which an appellate court does not substitute its own judgment but asks whether the lower court acted within its lawful range of choices. The court found that the record supported the district court's conclusions. An August 2023 order had already found that notice for the original guardianship was sufficient and that the guardians were credible about the service issue, and the district court had already considered and rejected Richard's service arguments before. The appellate court also noted that because the guardians were appointed in April 2017, Richard bore the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that ending the guardianship was in E.I.C.'s best interest — and his motion focused only on the 2017 procedure, not on the child's best interest. For those reasons, the court concluded Richard had not shown the district court abused its discretion, and it affirmed.

This case began with a family-law dispute over custody of a child. In December 2025, a district court judge in White Pine County granted a request to change the custody arrangement and ruled that each side would pay its own legal fees and costs. Both parties were unhappy with parts of the outcome: the father, Timothy Vidrine, filed an appeal, and the mother, Anistasia Mulliner, filed a cross-appeal (a separate appeal by the opposing party in the same case). The Supreme Court of Nevada never reached the merits of either appeal. Instead, the case was dismissed for two separate procedural reasons. First, the court found that the mother's cross-appeal was filed too late. Under the appellate rules, once one party files a notice of appeal, the other party generally has 14 days from when that first notice was served to file their own appeal. The father's notice of appeal was served on the mother's counsel on December 30, 2025, which meant the mother had until January 13, 2026, to file. She did not file until January 23, 2026 - ten days after the deadline. The mother argued that she did not realize an appeal had actually been filed until early January and that her attorney was told by the clerk's office that the 14-day clock started when the appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court. The court rejected this argument, explaining that the deadline runs from when the first notice of appeal was served, not from when it was docketed in the Supreme Court. The court also explained that even if the mother had been given incorrect information about the deadline, the filing deadline is mandatory and the court could not extend it under these circumstances. Because the cross-appeal was untimely, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction (the legal authority to hear the case) and dismissed it. Second, the father's own appeal was dismissed for a different reason. After his attorney was allowed to withdraw, the court repeatedly directed him to either hire new counsel, ask for more time, or tell the court in writing that he would represent himself. He was warned that failing to respond could result in his appeal being dismissed as abandoned. He never complied or communicated with the court, so the court dismissed his appeal as abandoned. The end result is that neither side's appeal was decided on its substance; both were dismissed for procedural reasons.

Hakeem Khalifah and Monique Hollings were never married but share one child, born in March 2018. Earlier in the case, the district court entered an agreed-upon ("stipulated") custody order giving both parents joint legal and physical custody, and later determined that Hollings owed Khalifah child support. Disagreements then arose over three main topics: which school the child should attend, which parent should have physical custody, and how to calculate child support. The child had been attending Dean Lamar Allen Elementary School (DLA) under a temporary order, and Khalifah wanted to homeschool her instead. The parents also disputed whether one of them should have primary physical custody, and whether income should be "imputed" to Khalifah - meaning treated as if he earns money even if he says he does not - when calculating support. After a four-day evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled in September 2024 that the child should keep attending DLA, that neither parent had shown a good enough reason to change the custody arrangement, and that the timeshare should switch to a week-on, week-off schedule. The court also found that Khalifah had not proven he was unable to work, so it treated him as capable of earning income for child-support purposes. Khalifah asked the court twice to reconsider, pointing to claimed new evidence about alternative schools and about a disability that he said prevents him from working. The court denied both requests. While the appeal moved forward, both parents filed new motions to modify custody. The case was sent back to the district court to hear those motions. After another hearing, the district court entered an August 2025 order denying both parents' motions, finding that neither parent had shown a "substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child" and that changing custody was not in the child's best interest. Khalifah appealed that order too. The Court of Appeals affirmed every part of the district court's decisions. On custody, the appellate court said the district court's findings were supported by adequate evidence and that an appeals court does not re-weigh evidence or re-judge witness credibility. On school choice, the court found the district court had properly considered the relevant factors and acknowledged Khalifah's concerns, even noting the judge was not entirely comfortable with the school, but concluded DLA was in the child's best interest given that the only two options presented were DLA or homeschooling. On child support, the court found Khalifah refused to explain his claimed disability or provide supporting documents at trial, and his later doctor's note about fainting episodes did not qualify as genuinely "newly discovered" evidence because he already knew about his condition. The court also rejected Khalifah's procedural complaint that the second hearing was scheduled too quickly, noting he did not identify any evidence he was prevented from presenting.

This case is about parents disputing custody of their three children after a divorce. Julie Rae Seidlinger and Roger Weibar Hsiung married in 2008 and divorced after Julie filed a complaint in 2018. During the divorce proceedings, Julie alleged that Roger physically, verbally, and emotionally abused the children, which Roger denied. The family went through a child custody evaluation, and the abuse allegations were discussed with the evaluator. Ultimately, the parents agreed to share joint legal and physical custody, and the court approved that agreement as part of the divorce. About three years later, Julie asked the court to change the custody arrangement, requesting that she temporarily be given primary physical custody to keep the children safe. She said the children reported that Roger continued the same troubling behavior she had raised before the divorce, and she attached excerpts from one child's journals, plus other writings and drawings, to support her claim. She acknowledged, however, that she did not have independent proof that Roger committed domestic violence. She also asked the court to allow the children to be interviewed at the Family Mediation Center, believing interviews would give the court insight into the children's experiences. Roger opposed her request, arguing that her allegations were just repeats of what she had said before the divorce. He filed his own request to modify custody, claiming Julie was engaging in "parental alienation" through improper abuse allegations, and asked for primary physical custody himself. In her reply, Julie added an allegation that Roger recently slapped one child's hands to force the child to finish a drawing. The district court denied both parents' requests without holding an evidentiary hearing (a court session where witnesses testify and evidence is examined). The judge found that neither side's allegations were specific enough to justify a hearing. The court also declined to order the children to be interviewed, seeing no advantage in it. After Julie asked the court to reconsider or to make its ruling final so she could appeal, the court added more explanation, again denied her request to change custody, and certified the decision as final. On appeal, Julie argued she had made out a "prima facie case" — meaning enough of a preliminary showing to require a hearing — and that the trial judge wrongly judged her credibility and demanded admissible evidence too early. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that to get a hearing, a parent must show both a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare since the last custody decision, and that changing custody serves the child's best interest. The court said this is a "heavy burden." It found that Julie's allegations were too vague and general, that they largely repeated her pre-divorce concerns, and that even the single hand-slapping incident — accepted as true — was not enough to amount to a substantial change in circumstances. The court also rejected her discovery argument, noting that postjudgment discovery generally is not allowed in custody cases unless a hearing is set or good cause is shown, and neither applied here. The court affirmed the district court's decision.

This case concerns a divorce and a fight over custody of a young child born in March 2019. Nae-Ryung Lee and Joshua Lee Perry were married and lived in San Diego, California. In October 2021, the family vacationed in South Korea, Nae-Ryung's home country. In June 2022, Joshua and the child returned to the United States and moved to Las Vegas to live with the child's paternal grandmother, while Nae-Ryung initially stayed in South Korea before joining them in Las Vegas in August 2022. After living with the family for several months, Nae-Ryung accused Joshua of "kidnapping" the child, claiming the parties had agreed to return to South Korea. She filed for divorce in Las Vegas in October 2022, asking for primary physical custody, permission to move with the child, and an order keeping Joshua from leaving the state with the child. The case had a long and tangled procedural history. The district court first decided Nevada was not the child's "home state" and threw out the custody portion of the case. Joshua appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, saying the trial court had failed to consider whether Nevada might have jurisdiction (the legal power to decide the case) on other grounds. Meanwhile, the child had been with Nae-Ryung in South Korea since November 2022, and Joshua filed a case there under the Hague Convention (an international agreement dealing with the return of children) seeking the child's return. Back in Nevada, the court went through several rounds of hearings, orders, motions to reconsider, and reversals of its own prior rulings. At one point it took "temporary emergency jurisdiction" and awarded Joshua temporary custody, then later set that aside, then later still—after Joshua asked it to reconsider—decided that Nevada did have exclusive and continuing jurisdiction and awarded Joshua sole legal and sole physical custody. Nae-Ryung repeatedly did not appear at hearings. Eventually, in June 2025, the court issued an amended decree giving Joshua sole legal custody and primary physical custody, with Nae-Ryung allowed weekly supervised parenting time. This appeal followed. On appeal, Nae-Ryung made three main arguments. First, she said the court improperly changed its own decree more than a year after entering it and did so without giving her notice that the result could be a final custody order against her—violating her right to due process (fair notice and a chance to be heard). The Court of Appeals disagreed. It pointed to the record showing that custody was clearly identified as an issue for the evidentiary hearing, that Joshua's motion asking the court to decide custody had been served on her, and that she had filed an opposition and received notice of the hearings she failed to attend. The court concluded she had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Second, she argued the court wrongly relied on a rule meant for fixing clerical mistakes (NRCP 60(a)) to justify its decision. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if relying on that rule was an error, it was harmless because the court was actually responding to the parties' motions for reconsideration. Third, she challenged the custody awards themselves. On legal custody (the authority to make major decisions about the child's health, education, and upbringing), the court found no abuse of discretion: the trial court had pointed to Nae-Ryung withholding the child for years, ignoring court orders, and obtaining a South Korean passport for the child without Joshua's knowledge or consent—facts supporting a finding that the parents could not cooperate. On physical custody, however, the Court of Appeals found a problem. Although the trial court called its award "primary physical custody," the practical effect—weekly supervised parenting time only—amounted to "sole physical custody." Under Nevada precedent (Roe v. Roe), a sole physical custody award requires specific written findings, including either that the other parent is unfit to live with or that giving that parent significant parenting time is not in the child's best interest, plus consideration of the least restrictive parenting arrangement. The trial court did not make these required findings. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the physical custody and parenting time decisions and sent the case back for the trial court either to give Nae-Ryung more parenting time so the arrangement is genuinely primary (not sole) custody, or to make the additional findings Nevada law requires to support a sole physical custody award.

Wendy Rowland and Barry Yzaguirre share one child, born in 2010. In 2023, a Nevada district court entered a custody decree. According to the opinion, the court found that Rowland had been convicted of an offense of child abuse and neglect involving the child and had permitted an ex-boyfriend to harm the child, and on that basis found she had committed acts of domestic violence against the child. The court also noted that Yzaguirre had been abusive toward Rowland when she was pregnant, but treated those acts as carrying less weight because, in the court's view, they did not compare to the domestic violence Rowland committed against the child. The court further found clear and convincing evidence that Rowland had abducted the child, and concluded a custody arrangement was needed to protect the child from another abduction. The court gave Yzaguirre primary physical custody, directed that the child relocate to Illinois with him, and gave Rowland supervised video calls. Rowland had already tried before to change the custody arrangement. An earlier appeal was decided against her by this same court in 2024. After more proceedings, in March 2025 the district court adjusted the arrangement to let Rowland have supervised parenting time with the child in Illinois and to let her other children join supervised video calls. In the motion at issue here, Rowland argued that a newly enacted law, SB 275, required the court to reconsider the domestic-violence allegations, asserting that Yzaguirre's conduct was worse than hers. She also argued that SB 275 prohibits a court from removing a child from a capable, protective parent simply to improve the child's relationship with the other parent. She asked for unsupervised parenting time and for the child to be allowed to spend time with her in Nevada. Yzaguirre opposed the motion. The district court denied it without holding an evidentiary hearing (a court session where witnesses testify and evidence is presented), and Rowland appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. To change physical custody, a parent must first show "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing, which means presenting a preliminary ("prima facie") case that (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) the change in custody would serve the child's best interest. The court explained that the "changed-circumstances" requirement exists to stop people who are unhappy with a custody ruling from filing repeated motions based on essentially the same facts until they get a different result. The court found that Rowland was relying on factual allegations the district court had already considered when it entered the original custody decree, so she did not show a substantial change in circumstances. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that SB 275 did not change the existing custody arrangement, because the court had already considered the domestic-violence allegations of both parties, and because the custody decision was not made for the sole purpose of improving the child's relationship with Yzaguirre but also rested on Rowland's physical abuse and abduction of the child. Rowland separately objected to the district court telling her that future filings "must be grounded in fact and applicable law." The Court of Appeals explained that district courts have inherent power to control proceedings and to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process, and found no abuse of discretion in the admonishment. Finally, Rowland argued the judge was biased. The court rejected this, explaining that bias generally must come from a source outside the proceedings, and that Rowland had not shown the deep-seated favoritism or antagonism needed to disqualify a judge.

Scott and Nicole Glickman married in December 2019 and have one child, A.M., born in April 2021. Scott filed for divorce in July 2022, and Nicole filed a counterclaim. Both agreed to share joint legal custody (the authority to make major decisions about the child), but each wanted primary physical custody (the arrangement governing where the child mainly lives). Early in the case, Nicole asked the court for temporary primary physical custody, saying Scott had committed acts of domestic violence against her and against her son from a prior relationship. Scott opposed and made his own domestic-violence allegations against Nicole. After a hearing at which the court said it had "grave reservations" about Scott's behavior, the court temporarily gave Nicole primary physical custody and gave Scott supervised parenting time twice a week. Over the course of the litigation, the court adjusted these temporary arrangements several times, gradually giving Scott more unsupervised time. The court then held a trial over several days to decide a permanent arrangement. It heard conflicting testimony about who had committed domestic violence. Witnesses testified that on July 4, 2022, Scott placed one of Nicole's children in a headlock. Nicole testified that, in an August 2021 garage incident, Scott pushed her into moving dollies on the floor, causing bruising she documented with photographs admitted into evidence; she also testified Scott put a knee into her C-section incision and choked her on two occasions. Scott denied these accounts and said it was Nicole who had struck him - punching and scratching him - and he offered photographs of a bloody lip. Scott's son from a prior marriage testified that he had seen marks on his father's face but was unsure whether they were related to domestic violence. While the parties awaited the final written order, Nicole filed another motion alleging that during a May 29, 2024, custody exchange, Scott assaulted her. She testified that Scott did not have a suitable car seat and restrained the three-year-old with only a lap belt, leading her to open the car door to remove the child, and that Scott grabbed her arm hard enough to leave nail marks. She offered video evidence, which the court admitted. Scott said he had an adequate travel car seat, denied grabbing her arm, said he only "blocked her," but admitted touching her arm multiple times without consent and said he would "[a]bsolutely" do so again. In February 2025, the court issued its final findings. It found Nicole and her witnesses credible, found that Scott had engaged in domestic violence in several incidents, and did not find any of Scott's allegations against Nicole credible. After analyzing the statutory best-interest factors, the court awarded joint legal custody but primary physical custody to Nicole. It also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Scott had committed domestic violence, which created a legal presumption against awarding him joint or sole physical custody - a presumption the court found Scott did not overcome. The court built a two-stage parenting plan. In stage one, Scott - who had moved to Florida during the case - would have bi-monthly weekend visits in Clark County, Nevada, from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon. Stage two would begin only after Scott completed six months of consistent visits without any further domestic-violence incidents and submitted to a psychological evaluation by a qualified provider who had reviewed the court's findings, following all treatment recommendations. In stage two, Scott could elect to have A.M. spend the first five days of each month with him in Florida. Both parents were given a daily video call when the child was with the other parent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Scott's arguments. It held that what the court ordered was primary physical custody, not sole physical custody, because Scott received two weekends of in-person parenting time per month, including unsupervised overnight visits - so the court was not required to find Scott unfit. It held that the domestic-violence finding was supported by substantial evidence, which meant the court was required to craft a parenting plan that protected both the child and Nicole. It declined to reach Scott's constitutional arguments about travel and equal protection because he did not cogently argue them, while also noting the restrictions were supported by substantial evidence. And it held the court did not improperly hand its decision-making power to an evaluator by requiring a psychological evaluation before stage two. The court affirmed.

Ariel Teamer and Quinten Summers share a daughter, A.S., born in 2015. In 2018, the parents agreed to a custody arrangement: joint legal custody, with Ariel having primary physical custody and Quinten getting parenting time on alternating weekends and certain holidays. In 2019, the court let Ariel move with the child from Las Vegas to Reno, over Quinten's objection, on the condition that she facilitate at least one weekly video call between the child and Quinten and continue his alternating weekends if he gave 21 days' notice. Things changed in late 2021 and 2022. Ariel stopped letting Quinten see the child in person (December 2021), stopped the video calls (April 2022), and then secretly moved with the child from Reno to Arizona (June 2022). Quinten asked the court to hold Ariel in contempt and to give him sole custody. At a February 2023 hearing, Ariel denied she had moved to Arizona. The court later held an evidentiary hearing that Ariel did not attend, and in June 2023 it awarded Quinten sole legal and physical custody, finding Ariel had effectively abducted the child by moving without permission and cutting off contact. In October 2023, Ariel asked the court to change the arrangement back so she would have primary physical custody and could relocate to Arizona. She made several allegations against Quinten - that he had been in car accidents with the child, was not treating her asthma, smoked marijuana around her, and had committed domestic violence. As part of preparing for a hearing, Ariel sent Quinten written "requests for admission" - formal questions a party can send asking the other side to admit certain facts. Under the court rules, if you don't respond within 30 days, the statements are automatically treated as admitted (true). Neither Quinten nor his attorney responded - the attorney was in the process of withdrawing and each thought the other was handling it. So Ariel argued the statements were automatically admitted. The two-day evidentiary hearing was split over roughly three months (February 2024 and May 2024). On the first day, the judge said it could not, "at this point," treat the admissions as conclusively established, and that it would deal with the issue at trial. Ariel then questioned Quinten extensively about the very topics in the admissions, and he denied them. Quinten's new attorney asked the court to let him formally withdraw the admissions. After the hearing ended, the judge granted that request, relying on a Nevada Supreme Court case (Blanco v. Blanco) for the principle that custody cases cannot be decided by default as a punishment for discovery violations because the child's best interest must drive the decision. The court then found a substantial change in circumstances and went through the statutory best-interest factors. It found most factors favored Quinten and that Ariel's act of abduction triggered a legal presumption against giving her sole or joint custody or unsupervised time with the child - a presumption she failed to overcome. The court ultimately gave Quinten primary physical custody, gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Ariel unsupervised out-of-state parenting time during school breaks, denied her relocation request, and ordered her to pay child support. On appeal, Ariel argued the judge should have ruled on the admissions earlier so she could have built her case around them, and that the timing was unfair. The appeals court disagreed. It found no abuse of discretion in allowing the admissions to be withdrawn, because doing so let the case be decided on its actual merits (which matters most in custody cases) and because Quinten's failure to respond came from the confusion around his attorney's withdrawal. The court also found Ariel was not unfairly harmed: she had a chance to question Quinten on those same topics over two days, and she did present testimony on the key facts. The court added that, even if there had been an error, it would not have changed the outcome - because Ariel never challenged the finding that she had abducted the child, and that finding alone created a presumption that blocked her from getting primary physical custody. The court also rejected Ariel's argument that the judge gave too little weight to the child's asthma. Quinten testified the child had no asthma attacks in his care, and the appeals court does not re-weigh evidence or decide who was more believable. Because no single factor must be given controlling weight, the appeals court found no abuse of discretion. It affirmed the district court's order.

This was an appeal in a child custody case. The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal before reaching the merits because it concluded it did not have the legal authority - jurisdiction - to hear it. Nevada appellate courts can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. The appellant pointed to (or the court considered) two possible rules: one allowing appeals from a "special order after final judgment," and another allowing appeals from orders that finally establish or change child custody. The court explained that neither fit here. The order being challenged did not change who has custody of the child or alter the parties' underlying rights. Instead, it enforced an earlier custody order (which is itself already on appeal in a separate case, Docket No. 91803-COA) and clarified logistics around picking up and dropping off the child. Because the order did neither of the things that would make it appealable, the court dismissed the appeal. The court also denied as moot the appellant's April 15, 2026, motion to waive transcript costs, since there was no longer an appeal to produce transcripts for.

Kiara Belen and Morgan Chapman were never married but have one child together, born in 2017. In 2019 they agreed to share joint legal and physical custody, and the district court entered a custody decree reflecting that agreement. In November 2024, Kiara asked the court to change the arrangement so she would have primary physical custody and could move with the child to Puerto Rico, where her fiancé lives. Morgan opposed the request. At an evidentiary hearing - a court proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is presented - several people testified, including Kiara, her fiancé, Morgan, and Morgan's mother. When Kiara tried to present testimony about domestic violence she said Morgan committed before the 2019 custody decree, Morgan objected. The district court agreed with Morgan and refused to consider that older evidence, ruling it was not relevant to the present custody dispute. After the hearing, the district court found that Kiara had shown a "substantial change in circumstances" (a legal requirement to revisit custody) based on her desire to relocate. But weighing the factors the law uses to decide what is best for a child, the court concluded it was not in the child's best interest to give Kiara primary custody or to allow the move to Puerto Rico. Kiara appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that Nevada law requires courts to hear all information about domestic violence when deciding what is in a child's best interest - even domestic violence that happened before an earlier custody order. While such older evidence cannot be used to prove the "substantial change in circumstances" needed to reopen custody, it can and must be considered as part of deciding what serves the child's best interest. Because the district court refused to hear the pre-2019 allegations and did not make written findings about certain incidents that did come out during the hearing, the appellate court could not be sure the result would have been the same had all the evidence been considered. The appellate court sent the case back to the district court for an additional hearing so both sides can present evidence about the alleged pre-2019 domestic violence, and so the district court can make proper findings about how those allegations bear on the child's best interest. The court emphasized it was taking no position on whether Kiara should ultimately win her motion - only that the additional hearing was required.

Mark and Margaret Summit divorced in 2015 and have two minor children. After their divorce, they had repeated disputes over custody and child support. Under the arrangement in place before this case, Margaret had primary physical custody (meaning the children lived mainly with her) and Mark had parenting time on certain weekends and Thursday overnights, while paying about $1,887.98 per month in child support. In June 2023, Mark took the children on vacation and then refused to return them to Margaret. Margaret asked the court to hold Mark in contempt and to order the children returned, among other relief. Mark, in turn, asked the court to change custody, claiming he had effectively become the children's main caretaker and that there was violence in Margaret's home affecting the children. The court held an evidentiary hearing (a trial-like proceeding where both sides present testimony and evidence). While the court was still deciding, Margaret reported that Mark had slashed her tire while at the children's school and obtained a temporary protection order. The court reopened the case to look at photographs of the tire damage and the school's security video, and heard more testimony. The district court ultimately found that circumstances had substantially changed (one child had become more violent and the other's mental health was suffering), that Margaret was a credible witness while Mark was not, and that Mark had slashed Margaret's tire, which the court treated as an act of domestic violence. Working through Nevada's list of "best interest" factors, the court decided the children's best interests favored Margaret keeping primary physical custody. It denied Mark's request to change custody and gave Mark only supervised parenting time of two hours each Saturday and Sunday plus brief nightly video calls. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected most of Mark's arguments. It found that the district court was entitled to believe Margaret over Mark, that the domestic-violence finding against Mark was supported by the evidence, that there was no proof of bias by the judge, and that the court did not have to treat Mark as a "de facto" primary custodian. The appeals court also upheld the refusal to lower Mark's child support, noting the district court found Mark had not been honest about his finances and was unemployed or underemployed without good cause to avoid paying support. The court declined to address Mark's complaint about attorney fees because the order he appealed did not actually award any fees. However, the Court of Appeals agreed with Mark on one significant point. Even though the district court called its order "primary physical custody," the very limited parenting time it gave Mark (a few in-person hours and short video calls each week) actually amounted to "sole physical custody" being given to Margaret. Under Nevada law, awarding sole physical custody requires additional, specific written findings — for example, that the other parent is unfit, or a clear explanation of why a less restrictive arrangement would not work. The district court did not make those findings. Because of that, the appeals court vacated (canceled) the parenting-time portion of the order and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must either give Mark enough parenting time so that Margaret is not functionally awarded sole custody, or make the proper findings to support a sole-custody arrangement.

This case involves an attempt to appeal a Nevada district court's decree of adoption concerning three minor children. Esmeralda Valdez tried to challenge that decree in the Nevada Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court dismissed her appeal without reaching the substance of her arguments because of two threshold problems with how and when the appeal was filed. The first problem was that Valdez does not appear to have been a "party" to the adoption case in the lower court. Under Nevada appellate rules, only someone who was served with process, appeared in the district court, and was named as a party of record can appeal a district court decision. The Supreme Court found no indication that Valdez was ever properly made a party in the district court proceeding. The second problem was timing. In Nevada, a person generally has 30 days from when notice of entry of a judgment is served to file a notice of appeal. Notice of entry of the adoption decree was electronically served on February 5, 2025, but Valdez did not file her notice of appeal until December 9, 2025 - more than ten months later. Valdez had filed a motion to set aside the decree on November 4, 2025. Such motions can sometimes pause ("toll") the deadline to appeal, but only if they are filed within 28 days of notice of entry. Because Valdez's motion was filed nearly nine months after notice of entry, it did not extend the appeal deadline. With no party status and no timely notice of appeal, the Supreme Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. A separate motion Valdez filed on April 14, 2026, was denied as moot.

This case involves a guardianship for a minor child. The guardian, Lamiia E. M., asked the district court to change an earlier order so that money coming from a California probate case would be deposited into a "blocked" bank account held for the protected minor. On January 14, 2026, the district court granted her request and amended the order exactly as she had asked. She then appealed that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noticed a basic problem before reaching any other issue: under Nevada's appellate rules, only a party who has been hurt or "aggrieved" by a ruling is allowed to appeal it. Because the guardian had asked the district court to do something and the district court did exactly that, she won below. A party who wins and does not want to change the outcome cannot appeal. For that reason, the Supreme Court concluded it had no jurisdiction (no legal power) to hear the appeal and dismissed it.

James Pelz and Brandee Perea share one minor child. James went to court seeking primary physical custody, joint legal custody, and permission to homeschool the child. He later asked the court for permission to move with the child to New York. Brandee opposed his requests and filed her own counterclaim asking for sole or primary physical custody, joint legal custody, and child support. She argued that James' plan to relocate to New York was impulsive and not in the child's best interest. After an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where the judge hears testimony and reviews evidence), the district court denied James' request to relocate and gave Brandee primary physical custody. The court noted that James had long absences from the child's life and an unstable living situation. The court also ordered James to pay monthly child support. Brandee then asked the court to make James pay her attorney fees and costs from the custody case. She pointed to two Nevada statutes, gave information about the parties' incomes (noting that James earned more than she did), addressed the factors Nevada courts use to evaluate the reasonableness of fees, and submitted her billing records. After a hearing, the district court awarded Brandee $21,000 in attorney fees — less than the roughly $27,441 she had requested. James appealed that fee award. He argued the income gap between him and Brandee was small, that the award was too large, and that the court did not make detailed enough findings about the parties' financial needs, the reasonableness of the fees, or whether the parties' conduct justified a fee award. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that it reviews attorney fee awards for "abuse of discretion" — meaning the appeals court will not overturn the decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or rests on a legal error. The court found that the district court had reviewed the relevant factors, made findings about the reasonableness of the fees, and specifically addressed the roughly twenty percent difference in income between James and Brandee. Because the district court considered the required factors and substantial evidence supported its conclusion that James was in a better financial position, the appeals court held there was no abuse of discretion. The appeals court also noted that one of the two statutes Brandee cited (which allows fees when a claim is brought without reasonable grounds or to harass the other party) was not supported by specific findings from the district court. But because the fee award was fully supported under the other statute that governs fees in child custody cases, the court concluded that even if the district court made a mistake on that point, James did not show that the mistake harmed him or changed the outcome. The judgment was affirmed.

Marc and Joanna Savard married in 1998, had four children, and divorced after Marc filed for divorce in 2020. Following a lengthy trial, the district court issued a decree of divorce addressing child custody, child support, division of the couple's property and debts, and alimony. The court later issued an amended decree to fix a child support calculation error and clarify several points. Marc appealed, raising a series of challenges. The Court of Appeals rejected all of them and left the district court's decisions in place. First, Marc argued the district court had no authority (jurisdiction) to enter the amended decree because he had already filed his notice of appeal. The appellate court explained that under the appellate rules, a notice of appeal filed before the final written order is entered is treated as premature and does not strip the district court of its power to enter that order. Because Marc filed his notice before the amended decree was entered, the district court still had jurisdiction. Second, Marc challenged the custody decision. He wanted primary physical custody and wanted to move with the children to Canada. The trial court instead awarded joint physical custody and refused the move. The trial heard testimony about incidents in which Joanna threw a water bottle that bounced near a child, forcibly took the children's phones, and kicked a hole in a wall. Joanna explained she had been under stress from the divorce and had learned to handle it better. The district court found these incidents inappropriate but not acts of domestic violence. The appellate court said custody decisions are reviewed for "abuse of discretion" - a deferential standard - and that it will not second-guess the trial judge's findings if a reasonable person could accept the supporting evidence. It also said appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or re-decide who was believable. On the request to move to Canada, the district court applied a test that asks, first, whether the parent has a "sensible, good faith reason for the move," and then weighs several additional factors about quality of life and visitation. The court found Marc's claimed benefits - climate, schools, healthcare, and family proximity - were largely speculative. It noted, for example, that Marc listed only $432 a month in health insurance costs and that higher Canadian taxes undercut his claim of major savings. The court concluded Marc actually wanted to move to interfere with Joanna's relationship with the children, and that there was no realistic way for Joanna to keep a meaningful relationship if the children moved. The appellate court found these findings supported by the evidence. Third, on child support, Marc argued the court wrongly counted his girlfriend Kate's income, wrongly imputed income to him, and should have reduced his obligation for paying the children's health insurance. The appellate court found the record showed the court considered Marc's own wages (including the $8,000 a month he earned working for Kate's business and about $4,700 a month net from cruise-ship performances), not Kate's income, and that the court did not impute income. It upheld the support amounts. Fourth, on dividing property and debts, the law generally requires an equal split unless there is a "compelling reason" for an unequal one. The district court found Marc committed financial misconduct - misrepresenting community finances, overstating business expenses, filing financial disclosure forms with inflated figures, failing to fully account for more than $400,000 in pandemic grant money received by the couple's company (MSI), and using community funds after separation on cryptocurrency and a stock-trading venture that lost substantial money. The court found Marc "intentionally manipulated community monies and strategically mislead the court" to disadvantage Joanna. Even though Joanna conceded the court misread one line on a 2022 tax filing, the appellate court found that error harmless because of the court's many other supported findings, so the unequal division stood. Fifth, on alimony, the district court awarded Joanna permanent, periodic alimony until her remarriage or the death of either party, and ordered Marc to keep a life insurance policy naming Joanna as beneficiary to secure the alimony and child support. The court found Marc's earning capacity superior given his talent and experience, that Joanna had been a full-time homemaker and primary caregiver for 18 years, that the marriage was long, and that the couple had enjoyed "a very comfortable, upper-class standard of living." The appellate court upheld the award. Sixth, on attorney fees, the district court awarded fees to Joanna, citing the income disparity between the parties and finding Marc had maintained his relocation request "without reasonable grounds and to harass Joanna." It also reviewed billing records and analyzed the required factors about counsel's skill and the work involved. The appellate court upheld the award and also upheld the court's refusal to award Marc fees for an earlier motion, partly because Marc had not timely filed a required financial disclosure form and did not make a developed argument on appeal. Finally, Marc argued the judge denied his motion to alter or amend improperly and was biased against him. The appellate court found the judge simply did not believe Marc's version of events, which is a credibility call within the judge's discretion, and that Marc did not show the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" needed to establish bias. The court affirmed the entire judgment.

This was an appeal from a Clark County family court ruling about child custody. The person who lost in the lower court, DaQuincy Jovan Davis, filed the appeal without an attorney (pro se) to challenge that custody order. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the Supreme Court requires them to submit several documents on a schedule: a form indicating whether they are ordering a transcript of the lower-court proceedings (or stating they are not), a "docketing statement" describing the case, and an opening brief explaining why the lower court got it wrong. On January 28, 2026, the court told the appellant to file these documents within specific deadlines. The appellant missed the deadlines. On February 27, 2026, the court issued a second order giving 14 more days and warning that further noncompliance could result in dismissal. The appellant still did not file the transcript request, the docketing statement, or the opening brief (which had been due March 30, 2026), and did not contact the court. Because the court concluded the appellant had abandoned the appeal, it dismissed the case. The dismissal ends this appeal; the family court's underlying custody order is not disturbed by this order.

A man named Hakeem Khalifah, handling his own case without an attorney, asked the Nevada Court of Appeals to step in and override something the trial court did in a child custody dispute. He sought what are called "extraordinary writs" - special court orders that a higher court can issue to direct or stop a lower court. Specifically, he asked for a writ of mandamus (a court order forcing a lower court to do something the law requires it to do, or to correct an arbitrary or capricious decision) or a writ of prohibition (a court order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its legal power). What Khalifah was challenging was an "order to show cause" - a court order directing a person to appear and explain why they should not be penalized for something - that had been entered in his child custody matter. The Court of Appeals explained that whether to take up this kind of writ petition at all is entirely within its own discretion, and that the person asking for the writ bears the burden of showing the relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the documents Khalifah submitted, the court concluded that he had not shown that extraordinary relief was warranted at this time. The court therefore denied the petition. The court also addressed Khalifah's emergency request to pause, or "stay," a district court order. He said that order had found him in contempt. The court denied this request as moot (no longer a live issue) given its denial of the main petition. The court additionally noted that the contempt order Khalifah said he was challenging was not actually included with his stay motion or otherwise filed in the case record.

A mother, Briana Marie Woody, tried to appeal a Clark County district court order that decided custody of her minor child. She was representing herself, without a lawyer. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, the Supreme Court requires certain paperwork early in the case so the appeal can move forward. On January 16, 2026, the court told Ms. Woody she needed to file three things on specific deadlines: a form about ordering transcripts of the lower-court proceedings (or a certificate saying no transcripts were needed), a "docketing statement" (a form describing the case), and an opening brief explaining why the lower court got it wrong. She did not file the transcript form or the docketing statement on time. On February 10, 2026, the court gave her another 7 days and warned her that if she still did not file them, the appeal could be dismissed. She did not file them. She also missed the March 17, 2026 deadline for her opening brief. Because nothing was filed, the Supreme Court concluded she had abandoned the appeal and dismissed it. The court did not address the merits of the custody dispute.

This was an appeal in a child custody case. Before the Nevada Supreme Court can hear an appeal, a statute or court rule must give it the power to do so. The court reviewed the paperwork and concluded it did not have that power here, so it dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The order the appellant tried to challenge was dated January 21, 2026. According to the Supreme Court, that order did not change the parties' underlying custody rights; it enforced a custody order that already existed. To the extent the order imposed any new requirements - specifically, arrangements for picking up and dropping off the child at school - those requirements only applied during the one-week window from January 21, 2026, through January 28, 2026. By the time the Supreme Court considered the appeal, that window had closed, and the court explained it could no longer provide any meaningful relief. The court also addressed several pending motions in a footnote: it granted the motion to extend time to file the docketing statement (which was filed April 3, 2026), and it denied as moot the motion to waive transcript costs and the motion to extend time to file the opening brief.

This was an appeal from a child custody decision made by a Clark County district court judge. The mother, Alma Salinas, filed the appeal herself, without an attorney. When someone appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court, the court requires them to file certain paperwork on a schedule. On January 14, 2026, the Supreme Court told Salinas she needed to file a "docketing statement" (a form that tells the court the basic facts about the appeal) by February 4, 2026, and a "fast track opening brief" (the written argument explaining why she thinks the lower court got it wrong) by March 16, 2026. Salinas missed the first deadline. On February 9, 2026, the court gave her an additional 7 days and warned her that if she still did not file the docketing statement, her appeal could be dismissed. She did not file the docketing statement, did not file the opening brief, and did not otherwise communicate with the court. Because she had effectively stopped pursuing her appeal, the Supreme Court concluded she had abandoned it and dismissed the case. The custody decree from the district court therefore stands.

Daniel Davis and Kortney Trotta divorced in November 2019 and initially shared joint legal and physical custody of their two children. After several changes over the years, a 2022 agreement gave Kortney primary physical custody and gave Daniel parenting time every other weekend. In October 2024, Kortney asked the court to change the arrangement. She said Daniel had stopped showing up — missing his children's medical appointments (including a medication check needed to manage their son's medication), failing to participate in educational meetings (including for the son's "504 plan" and conferences about their daughter's school struggles), reducing his parenting time, canceling visits at the last minute, and cutting off the children's contact with their half-sibling. She asked for sole legal custody and primary physical custody, plus changes to the holiday schedule, child support, and reimbursement for unpaid health insurance premiums. Daniel did not file any written response to Kortney's motion, and neither he nor his lawyer showed up to the hearing. With only Kortney present, the district court heard her testimony, found it credible and compelling, found it was in the children's best interest, and granted her requests — awarding her sole legal and primary physical custody, reducing Daniel's parenting time to every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., ending the special holiday and vacation schedule, and granting reimbursement and attorney fees. The written order was entered December 9, 2024. In January 2025, Daniel asked the court to undo that order under NRCP 60(b), a rule that lets a court set aside a final judgment for reasons like "mistake" or "excusable neglect." Daniel said he had fired his lawyer but that the lawyer never formally withdrew from the case, so the lawyer should have filed a response and appeared. Daniel also claimed he never knew about the hearing date, even though he was personally negotiating with Kortney's attorney and had emailed that attorney the day before the hearing. Kortney opposed, pointing to emails showing Daniel had reviewed a proposed stipulation that listed the hearing date, that he had specific objections to it, and that he had written that they "would be going to court." When the district court questioned Daniel under oath, it found he was not truthful about whether he knew the hearing date, because his own email showed he had reviewed the document containing it. The court said that while it would have been better practice for his lawyer to file a formal withdrawal, that did not change the fact that Daniel knew about the hearing. The court denied his motion to set aside. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that because Daniel had fired his lawyer and chosen to handle negotiations himself, he could not reasonably have expected that lawyer to attend the hearing, so the lawyer's failure to appear was not "excusable neglect." The court also agreed Daniel knew about the hearing date based on his own emails. Finally, the court noted that the modification order was not a "default judgment" entered just because Daniel didn't show up; instead, the district court had held an actual evidentiary hearing, heard Kortney's testimony, and made findings about the children's best interests. Because Daniel did not show the district court misused its discretion, the appeals court upheld the denial.

Lawana Monday and Maurice Christian share one child, born in 2020. An earlier court order gave both parents joint legal and physical custody, set their parenting schedule by agreement, and reflected their agreement that neither parent would pay the other monthly child support. Christian later asked the court to change the arrangement. He had moved to Philadelphia and wanted the child to travel there for extended parenting time. Monday opposed, saying Christian had not exercised parenting time in over a year and that she was raising the child on her own. She also asked the court to change the child support order. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the district court issued a written order. The parties agreed (stipulated) that Monday would have primary physical custody. The court gave Christian out-of-state parenting time during summer breaks and on alternating holidays. The court also set Christian's child support at $700 per month — lower than the $933 the standard formula would produce — because the court factored in the cost of transporting the child to Pennsylvania. On appeal, the Court of Appeals focused on a problem with how the district court explained its decision. Under Nevada law, when a court decides parenting time, it must make specific findings about what is in the child's best interest, using a list of factors set out in the statute. Here, the district court noted the parents' testimony — including Monday's worries about the child's possible autism and three-days-a-week speech therapy, her concern that Christian had rarely exercised parenting time, and her concern about Christian's alcohol use — but the court's order did not resolve those issues or work through the best-interest factors. Because the order lacked those findings, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell whether the parenting time decision was appropriate, and it could not meaningfully review the decision. The appellate court reversed and sent the case back, directing the district court to fully address the best-interest factors and to connect its parenting time decision to the child's best interest. In the meantime, the current custody arrangement stays in place, subject to changes the district court may make. The Court of Appeals also reversed the child support award. Because that award was tied to the transportation costs of Christian's out-of-state parenting time, and the parenting time decision was being reversed, the support figure had to be reconsidered too. On remand, the district court was directed to re-evaluate child support after addressing the parenting time requests, properly analyzing the best-interest factors, and reviewing transportation costs if it again grants out-of-state parenting time.

This is a brief administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court ending an appeal before the court considered the merits. The appellant, Dekesha Bingham, filed an appeal in a child custody case but did not pay the filing fee that the court rules require when an appeal is opened. The court sent her a notice on the same day she filed her appeal, telling her she had 7 days either to pay the fee or to show that she qualified to proceed without paying it under the rule that allows certain people to appeal without prepaying costs (NRAP 24). She did not pay and did not respond. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal. The order also notes that, because the appeal is being dismissed, the court will not act on a separate filing in which the respondent's attorney sought to withdraw from the case.