Nevada family-law case summaries

Ken Nguyen and Robert Boynes were a same-sex couple who dated from November 2009 to May 2013. During the relationship, they decided to adopt a child together and went to Catholic Charities of Southern Nevada. At the time, Catholic Charities did not allow same-sex couples to adopt jointly, so according to Rob, the plan was for Ken to adopt first and Rob to adopt afterward as a second parent. Both men took part in the entire adoption process - background checks, classes, post-placement visits - and Rob even drafted the "birth mother letter" that helped them be selected. A child was placed with Ken in February 2013, and both men were there to receive the newborn. After the placement, the child spent most nights at Rob's house, Rob took the child to most doctor's visits, supplied most of the baby gear, and was listed as a father on the child's baptism certificate. The child's middle name is Rob's surname. But the men's relationship ended in May 2013. When Rob asked Ken to put him on the birth certificate, Ken refused. Ken finalized his own adoption alone in October 2013 and refused to let Rob complete a second-parent adoption. Rob then sued, asking the court to recognize him as a parent and to give him custody. The district court ruled for Rob, and Ken appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court applied a doctrine called "equitable adoption," which allows a court to enforce an adoption agreement when one person promised to adopt, the other relied on that promise, and a child would be harmed if the promise were broken. The Court had recognized this doctrine in a 1987 case (Frye v. Frye) and had declined to extend it in two later cases where the dispute was really about whether someone was the biological parent. Here, the Court said this case was different: neither Ken nor Rob is biologically related to the child, and the question was whether the two men had agreed to adopt together. The Court found substantial evidence that they had agreed, that Rob relied on Ken's promise, and that the child would be harmed by Rob's removal from his life. The Court also rejected Ken's claim that the district court treated him differently because he and Rob were a same-sex couple. The Court said child custody decisions are made case by case, and nothing in the record showed the result turned on the parties' sexual orientation. Finally, the Court affirmed the joint custody order. Ken had argued Rob was a "stalker" who sent harassing emails, which would trigger a presumption against giving custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. The district court found only a single forwarded email tied to Rob, which it concluded was not enough to show "obsessed stalking behavior." Ken also accused Rob of destroying his computer to hide evidence; the district court found the proof inconclusive. The Supreme Court held substantial evidence supported those findings. Three justices - Justice Stiglich, Chief Justice Cherry, and Justice Hardesty - concurred. They would have reached the same outcome under Nevada's Parentage Act rather than under equitable adoption, relying on the Court's earlier decision in St. Mary v. Damon, which recognized that paternity statutes can apply in same-sex parentage cases.

When Eli and Diane Mizrachi divorced, they agreed - without writing it down in detail - that Eli would have their child for "the Jewish holidays" each year and Diane would have the child for "the Christian holidays." That phrase was placed into the divorce decree as the court's order. Less than ten months later, the parents started fighting about what "the Jewish holidays" actually meant. Eli said it meant 12 different Jewish holidays for their full duration; Diane said it meant only the first day of four major holidays - Hanukkah, Passover, Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur - matching a default schedule that judges in the Family Division use as a starting point. Diane asked the district court to "clarify" the decree. Without taking testimony or evidence, the judge - relying on the parties' written filings, lawyers' arguments, and the judge's own Internet research - decided that "the Jewish holidays" meant just the first day of the four holidays Diane identified. Eli appealed. The Court of Appeals first had to decide whether what the district court did was "clarification" (defining what an existing right means) or "modification" (changing the parties' rights). The court concluded it was clarification, because the decree gave Eli the right to parenting time on the Jewish holidays and the district court was only deciding which days that phrase covered, not changing the underlying right. Next, the court asked whether the phrase "the Jewish holidays" was ambiguous - that is, whether it had more than one reasonable meaning. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was ambiguous: Eli's reading (all 12 holidays) was reasonable, Diane's reading (four holidays, first day only) was reasonable, and other reasonable readings exist as well, because not every Jewish family observes the same holidays. Because the phrase was ambiguous, the district court was allowed to clarify it. But the Court of Appeals held that the district court used the wrong procedure. When a court clarifies an ambiguous term in a divorce decree that grew out of the parties' agreement, the court must try to figure out what the parties themselves meant when they agreed - not simply impose a default schedule. The parties had each made factual claims about what they intended, and those claims conflicted. The district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to sort out those facts and determine the parties' actual intent. Because that did not happen, the Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings. The court did not decide which side's interpretation of "the Jewish holidays" is correct. It also did not reach Eli's argument that the ambiguity should be held against Diane because her attorney drafted the decree, leaving that question open for the district court to consider after taking evidence.

Mehmet and Kathleen Kar divorced in Nevada. Their decree gave them joint legal custody, with Kathleen having primary physical custody and Mehmet getting visitation. Mehmet later moved to Turkey, and Kathleen, an Air Force servicemember stationed at Creech Air Force Base, obtained an order giving her sole legal and physical custody. The Air Force then reassigned Kathleen to England, and she took the child with her. Two months after Kathleen and the child arrived in England, Mehmet filed a motion in Nevada to modify custody and child support. Kathleen asked the Nevada court to dismiss the case, arguing that Nevada no longer had jurisdiction because nobody involved still lived there. The district judge agreed, saying that the "second" the mother and child moved to England, the court "lost jurisdiction." The judge dismissed the case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that the UCCJEA, the law that governs which state (or country) can decide custody disputes, has multiple layers. Yes, Nevada lost what is called "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" once everyone moved away. But losing exclusive jurisdiction does not mean losing all jurisdiction. The Nevada court still had to ask whether it could exercise jurisdiction under a separate set of rules - the rules that govern when a state can make an "initial" custody determination - because the UCCJEA allows a court that previously decided a custody case to modify its order if those initial-jurisdiction rules are satisfied. Under those rules, Nevada could potentially still hear the case if (a) no other place qualified as the child's "home state" (a place where the child lived for at least six consecutive months), (b) the child and at least one parent still had a "significant connection" with Nevada beyond mere presence, and (c) substantial evidence about the child's well-being remained available in Nevada. At the time Mehmet filed his motion, the child had only been in England for two months, so England was not yet the child's home state. The court below never analyzed whether Nevada or England had a "significant connection" with the child or where the substantial evidence about the child was located. Those are factual questions, and the Supreme Court ruled that the district court must answer them. The Supreme Court also addressed Kathleen's argument that Nevada was an "inconvenient forum" and that England was a better place to litigate. Even if that were true, the UCCJEA does not allow the court to simply dismiss the case. It must stay (pause) the case and direct the parties to file in the more appropriate forum, so that the family is not left "in limbo" with no court anywhere to decide their dispute. The Supreme Court sent the case back so the district court can perform the full jurisdictional analysis the UCCJEA requires. The opinion did not decide whether Nevada actually has jurisdiction; it decided only that the district court must do the analysis instead of stopping at "everyone left."

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Wesley and Maria Lewis divorced in 2011 and shared joint physical custody of their child. Wesley was ordered to pay child support. In 2013, after Maria asked the court to enforce the support obligation, the district court found Wesley in contempt for not paying, entered a judgment for arrears, and required him to take the child to tutoring classes and pay half of the cost. In 2014, Maria asked the court to modify custody and again to enforce the prior orders. After a hearing where Wesley represented himself, the district court awarded Maria primary physical custody, kept the tutoring requirement in place, and held Wesley in contempt again - this time sentencing him to a total of 80 days in jail for missed support payments and missed tutoring trips. The court stayed (paused) the jail sentence on the condition that Wesley "follow the Orders of the Court." Wesley appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed three main questions. First, was the contempt order "civil" or "criminal"? This matters because the Sixth Amendment right to a court-appointed lawyer applies only to criminal proceedings. Civil contempt is meant to coerce someone into complying (for example, "you sit in jail until you pay"). Criminal contempt is meant to punish someone for past disobedience. The court explained that for a contempt order with a fixed jail term to count as civil, it must contain a "purge clause" - language that lets the contemnor get out of the punishment by complying with the order (for example, paying what is owed). Wesley's order had no purge clause: if his stay were lifted, he had no described path to avoid or shorten jail by paying. The court therefore held the order was criminal in nature and that Wesley's Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he had no lawyer at the contempt proceedings. The contempt order was vacated, and counsel must be appointed on remand if Wesley is found indigent. Second, did the district court properly modify custody? The Supreme Court said no. Nevada law forbids using a custody change to punish a parent for disobeying court orders. The district court's written and oral explanations leaned heavily on Wesley's failure to pay support, pay medical insurance, and pay tutoring costs - in other words, his disobedience. The district court also failed to make specific findings on each of the best-interest-of-the-child factors required by NRS 125.480(4) (2009). For both reasons, the custody modification was reversed, and because the child support modification was based on the custody modification, it was also reversed. Third, did the district court err in continuing the tutoring obligation? The Supreme Court said no. The 2013 order required tutoring until the child tested at or above grade level "as tested by [the tutoring school]." She had not yet met that benchmark in math at the tutoring school, even though she did well on Clark County School District tests. The tutoring obligation was therefore affirmed. The court also rejected Wesley's claim of judicial bias, finding nothing in the record that would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality.

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. They shared joint legal custody of their two children, but Kerstan had primary physical custody. Their daughter I.M. struggled in Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to dyslexia. The parents agreed I.M. should attend private school in Reno and live during the school year with her paternal grandparents there, returning to Kerstan in the summers. I.M. moved to her grandparents' home in August 2013. In 2014, Michael asked the family court to give him primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed the change. Instead of choosing between the two parents, the district court awarded primary physical custody to the grandparents - even though the grandparents had never asked to be part of the case and neither parent had been told the judge was considering that option. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that custody award. The Court explained that a court generally cannot enter a judgment for or against someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. To get custody, a non-parent (like a grandparent) must either file their own custody case or formally join (intervene in) the existing one. Beyond that, before a Nevada court can take custody away from a fit parent and give it to a non-parent, it must make specific findings that giving custody to either parent would be detrimental to the child and that placing the child with the non-parent is necessary to serve the child's best interest. None of that happened here. The Court also held that giving custody to the grandparents without warning violated the parents' due process rights - their right to fair notice and a chance to be heard - because both parents had been arguing only about which of them should have custody, not about whether the grandparents should. The Court left undisturbed the portion of the order dealing with child support arrearages, because Kerstan did not include the hearing transcript needed to review that ruling. The case was sent back to the district court. On remand, the district court was directed to consider Kerstan's argument - which she had raised only in a reconsideration motion below - that no change in custody is warranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live elsewhere for educational reasons.

Beau Davis and Andrea Ewalefo, who never married, share an eight-year-old son, E.D. Davis works in Africa, primarily on Texas A&M-supervised reconstruction projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Ewalefo lives with E.D. in Nevada. The parents agreed E.D. should live mostly with Ewalefo and that they should share legal custody, but they disagreed about how Davis's visits should work. Davis asked the district court to let E.D. visit him for several two-week stretches and most of each summer, with the visits taking place in Rwanda or Uganda - safer countries that border the DRC where Davis works. Ewalefo opposed visits in Africa, citing her concerns about regional safety and the fact that Rwanda and Uganda have not signed the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty that helps return abducted children to their home countries. The district judge ruled that Davis could have up to five two-week visits per year, but barred any visits in Africa and went further by forbidding either parent from taking E.D. anywhere outside the United States until he turns 18, unless they both agree in writing or get a court order. The judge said briefly that "the world is a dangerous place" and noted that Rwanda and Uganda were not Hague signatories, but did not write detailed findings explaining how these restrictions served E.D.'s best interest. Davis appealed. A three-judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed by a 2-1 vote, with concerns about the lack of findings. Davis then asked the full Nevada Supreme Court to reconsider. The Nevada Supreme Court, sitting en banc, agreed to reconsider and reversed the travel and visitation restrictions. The court held that under Nevada law, a judge deciding custody must make specific written findings explaining how the decision serves the child's best interest. The decree here did not explain why visiting Africa was bad for E.D., why Davis could not take E.D. anywhere outside the United States during his allotted visitation, or why a flat ban on international travel until age 18 was justified. The court noted that the district judge had actually made findings favorable to Davis - including that both parents are fit, conflict between them is minimal, there is no evidence of abuse or risk of abduction, and E.D. had previously traveled to Africa with his parents and benefited from it. The court explained that judges may, in appropriate cases, restrict international travel or visitation in countries that have not signed the Hague Convention - but only with findings showing why such restrictions serve the child's best interest. If the concern is abduction, the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act (NRS Chapter 125D) provides graduated tools, from requiring travel itineraries to posting bonds to outright travel bans. Saying merely that "the world is a dangerous place" is not enough. The case goes back to the district court to take more evidence and make proper findings about whether E.D. can safely visit his father in Rwanda or Uganda, whether such visits are in his best interest, and whether any abduction prevention measures are warranted. The portions of the decree the parties did not dispute (custody and child support) remain in place. Two justices dissented, arguing that the record contained substantial evidence supporting the district court's decision and that the majority was effectively reweighing evidence the trial judge had already evaluated.

Michael and Ellen Bluestein divorced in 2004 after 13 years of marriage and one child together. They agreed Michael would have the child from Thursday evening to Sunday morning each week, with Ellen having the child the rest of the time. A month after the divorce, they filed a parenting agreement, adopted by the court, that called the arrangement "joint legal and physical custody." Neither parent paid child support. Years later, Michael started receiving public assistance. The State went after Ellen for partial reimbursement as child support. To avoid the joint-custody child support formula (which produced an $82-per-month obligation for her), Ellen asked the family court to relabel her as the "primary physical custodian." She did not ask to change the actual schedule - just the legal label. Her argument relied on a 2009 Nevada Supreme Court case, Rivero v. Rivero, which said that a joint physical custody arrangement generally requires each parent to have the child at least 40 percent of the time (about 146 days a year). Ellen calculated that Michael had the child only 38 percent of the time, below the threshold. The district court agreed with Ellen. After an evidentiary hearing focused largely on who was responsible for the child on Thursdays, the court found Ellen had the child 260 days and Michael 105 days in 2011, and on that basis redesignated her as primary physical custodian. The court then sent the case back to a child support master to recalculate support. The court did not say whether changing the custody label was in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It made two main points. First, once either parent asks the court to revisit a custody agreement, the court does have authority to review the arrangement and apply current Nevada law - even if the moving parent only asks to change the label, not the timeshare. Second, and more importantly, the 40-percent guideline from Rivero is just a tool. It cannot be applied mechanically as the only factor. The controlling question, by statute, is what is in the child's best interest. Because the district court treated the 40-percent figure as the sole basis for changing the custody designation - and never made findings about the child's best interest - it abused its discretion. The Court was particularly concerned that this kind of mechanical application can result in stripping a parent of joint custody status (with downstream consequences for child support) even when the existing schedule gives the child frequent contact with both parents and even when the only reason for the relabeling is to shift the support calculation. The case was sent back to the family court to reconsider the request with the child's best interest as the primary focus.

Mario and Lalaine Blanco married in 1989 and had four children. During their divorce, Lalaine ended up representing herself and did not fully respond to Mario's discovery requests (the formal exchange of information). As a punishment ('sanction') for those discovery violations, the district court struck her pleadings and entered a default divorce decree against her - giving Mario essentially everything he asked for in his counterclaim: the custody/visitation schedule, child support, ten and a half years of spousal support, the tax exemptions, health insurance, and the property and debt division - without holding a hearing to take evidence. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It drew lines based on the type of issue. Child custody and child support can NEVER be decided by default as a discovery sanction; the child's best interest is paramount and these must be decided on the merits, if necessary after an evidentiary hearing. Community property and debt must be divided as the law requires - an equal division unless the court gives a written compelling reason for an unequal one - so a default cannot be used to skip the equal-division requirement; the court must make its own findings on the value of the property. For other claims like spousal support and attorney fees, a case-concluding default sanction is allowed, but only after the court expressly analyzes the required factors (from Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building and Foster v. Dingwall), including whether a less severe sanction would suffice. Because the district court entered the default without any of that analysis and without an evidentiary hearing, the decree was reversed and the case sent back.

This case is about whether parents can undo a court-approved visitation arrangement with a grandparent simply because they are the parents. After Roger Rennels divorced in 2001, he and his daughter Martina lived for five months with his mother, Audrey Rennels, in northern California, and Martina and Audrey developed a close relationship that continued after Roger and Martina moved away. According to Audrey, Roger stopped allowing Martina to see her in June 2004, so Audrey went to court under NRS 125C.050, a Nevada statute that lets a nonparent ask for visitation rights with a child. Before the court could hold an evidentiary hearing, Audrey and Roger settled. They signed a stipulation - a formal written agreement - stating that "all pending issues" between them were resolved, and the court entered an order adopting it. Under that order, Audrey received four supervised visits per year, a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to represent the child's interests) was appointed, and a psychologist would counsel the family. If the guardian ad litem and the psychologist concluded supervision was no longer needed, Roger agreed to abide by that determination. The parties followed this arrangement until 2008, when the psychologist, Dr. John Paglini, recommended unsupervised visits and Roger refused. Audrey asked the court to enforce the order; Roger and his wife Jennifer (who had adopted Martina in 2006) countered by asking the court to end Audrey's visitation entirely, relying on Troxel v. Granville, a U.S. Supreme Court decision recognizing that fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests. The district court sided with the parents and terminated Audrey's visitation. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held, first, that the stipulated visitation order was a final judgment - meaning it resolved the dispute and could not simply be relitigated on the same facts. Second, the court held that while the parental presumption applies when a nonparent first seeks visitation, it no longer controls once a court has approved a visitation arrangement. At that point, a parent who wants to change or end the arrangement must satisfy the same two-part test that applies when parents seek to modify custody between themselves: show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) that the change serves the child's best interest. Because neither the parents nor the district court identified any substantial change in circumstances - the court pointed only to increased "acrimony" between the parties, which the Supreme Court said is not enough by itself - the termination order was reversed. The stipulated visitation order remains in effect, and on remand the district court must appoint a new guardian ad litem before deciding whether Audrey's visitation should be modified or terminated under the new test.

Thomas and Svetlana Potter married in 1994, had a child in 1995, and divorced shortly after the child was born. Svetlana was initially awarded primary physical custody, but in 1996 the parents agreed by stipulation to share joint physical and legal custody - meaning both parents shared responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. According to the record, the arrangement worked without custody problems from 1996 to 2003, with both parents actively involved. In 2003, Svetlana received a job offer from a California hospital for a registered nurse position at a higher salary than she was earning in Las Vegas, and she wanted to pursue a nurse anesthesiologist degree from a California school - a program not available in Las Vegas. She filed a petition under NRS 125C.200, Nevada's relocation statute, asking for permission to move to Corona, California with the child. Thomas opposed it, arguing that the Legislature amended the relocation statute in 1999 so that it no longer applied to joint physical custody arrangements, and that Svetlana would first have to win primary physical custody before she could seek relocation. The district court treated the case as an ordinary relocation petition under NRS 125C.200, analyzed the relocation factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz, granted Svetlana's petition, awarded her primary physical custody, and provided for significant contact and visitation between Thomas and the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that NRS 125C.200 does not apply when parents share joint physical custody. The statute's current text speaks only of "custodial" and "noncustodial" parents; an earlier version of the statute (formerly NRS 125A.350) had expressly covered "a parent having joint custody," but the Legislature removed that language. The court found the legislative history confirmed that the statute was intended to apply only to primary physical custody situations. Instead, the court explained the correct procedure: when a parent who shares joint physical custody wants to move out of Nevada with the child, that parent must file a motion for a change of custody under NRS 125.510(2), seeking primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The district court then decides, under the "best interest of the child" standard, whether the child is better off living outside Nevada with the relocating parent as primary physical custodian, or living in Nevada with the non-moving parent as primary physical custodian. The moving parent bears the burden of proving that living out of state with him or her serves the child's best interest. Because the district court applied the wrong statute, did not use the factors from Truax v. Truax, and made no finding that the move was in the child's best interest, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live in California with Svetlana or in Nevada with Thomas.

Terri and Tim Flynn divorced in 1997 and shared joint legal custody of their son, with Terri having primary physical custody. In 2002 Terri asked the court for permission to move with the eleven-year-old boy to California for two years so she could earn an associate's degree in theology at a bible college. She testified her only reason for moving was personal and religious growth and that she intended to return to Nevada afterward. Tim opposed the move and asked for primary physical custody. After a three-day hearing, the district court denied both requests. It found Terri could earn the very same degree from the same college without leaving Nevada - through online, audio, and video classes or the college's Las Vegas-area extension campus - and that the move would harm the boy while he entered middle school and puberty. A psychologist agreed the move was not in the child's best interest. On appeal, Terri argued the court used the wrong legal test. Nevada evaluates relocation requests under a set of factors from an earlier case, Schwartz v. Schwartz. Terri claimed those factors did not apply because she was not permanently changing her 'domicile,' only temporarily relocating for two years, and because Tim could still have weekly contact. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the Schwartz factors apply to all relocations outside Nevada, regardless of whether the move is temporary or permanent. Nevada's anti-removal statute (NRS 125C.200) speaks of moving one's 'residence,' not domicile, and two years is a substantial period in a child's life. The court also rejected the idea that merely offering weekly contact ends the analysis. Because substantial evidence - including that the same degree was available in Nevada and that the move would not improve the child's quality of life - supported the finding that relocation was not in the child's best interest, the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court also rejected Terri's claim that she was treated unfairly because of her religious motivation, finding no evidence the decision rested on her religion.

April and James Martin divorced in Kentucky in 1998, sharing joint legal custody with April having primary physical custody of their child and James having visitation. April later moved to Nevada; James, who is in the military, moved to North Carolina and remarried. In 2000, James asked the Nevada court to change custody to him. The district court granted the change, finding 'changed circumstances' based on April's alleged interference with James's visitation, James's remarriage, and the fact that both parents had moved away from Kentucky. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. To change primary physical custody, a parent must show both that circumstances have materially changed and that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change. On the interference claim, the Court recognized for the first time that a custodial parent's substantial or pervasive interference with visitation can be a changed circumstance - but the record here did not show that level of interference. James had only vaguely claimed he sometimes could not reach the child by phone, while acknowledging they communicated by email. On remarriage, the Court held that a noncustodial parent's remarriage alone is not enough to establish changed circumstances, because otherwise a child's home could be destabilized on that basis alone, and stability is a primary goal of the changed-circumstances rule. Because there were no changed circumstances, the Court did not need to reach the child's best interest.

Charles and Rebecca Gepford divorced in 1991, sharing joint legal custody with Charles having primary physical custody of their two sons. In 1998, both parents were laid off. Charles quickly found a new job in Oregon and a home just across the line in Idaho. He discussed the move with Rebecca, who verbally agreed he could relocate with the children, and they began working out a new visitation and child support arrangement - but never put it in writing. Charles and the children moved to Idaho. A few months later, Rebecca asked the court for primary physical custody. She pointed to three things: that Charles had not gotten her written consent to move (as required by NRS 125C.200), that on one occasion Charles left one nearly-ten-year-old son (recovering from pneumonia) home alone for a few hours while he helped his pastor nearby, and that Charles had denied her visitation. During that incident, the boy was fine - he had a pager to reach Charles, food, blankets, and a warm house, and a police welfare check found him watching TV and content. The district court granted Rebecca primary physical custody. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. To change primary custody, a parent must show both that the parents' circumstances have materially changed and that the child's welfare would be 'substantially enhanced' by the change (the two-part Murphy v. Murphy test). The court held there was no substantial evidence that the children's welfare would be substantially enhanced by moving them to Rebecca. Leaving the boy home alone once was not a basis to lose custody, and Charles appeared to be an active, involved father who had long been the stable primary custodian. The court also held the district court gave too much weight to Charles's failure to get written consent under NRS 125C.200: non-compliance is a factor a court may consider, but it is not determinative, and custody changes may not be used to punish a parent's misconduct - especially where Charles had acted in good faith after getting Rebecca's verbal consent. The court reversed and remanded for a new custody hearing with proper findings.

After the parties divorced, the mother had primary custody of their son, Ryan, and the father had visitation. The relationship between the parents was highly contentious, and the mother had a long, documented history of interfering with the father's visitation and his bond with his son. In 1997 the mother asked the district court for permission to move the child to Florida. After an extensive hearing, the district court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed. Nevada evaluates relocation requests using the framework from Schwartz v. Schwartz, which requires the moving parent to show a good-faith reason for the move and then weighs several factors, focusing on whether reasonable substitute visitation is available. The district court found the mother had not shown a good-faith basis for the move, in part because of her history of frustrating the father's relationship with Ryan, and separately found that no reasonable alternate visitation plan would work because she would continue to undermine the father's relationship from long distance. The Supreme Court used the case to clarify its relocation law. It held that a parent's propensity to frustrate the other parent's relationship with the child is not only relevant to the threshold good-faith question, but may also be considered as part of the final Schwartz factor - whether reasonable, adequate alternate visitation is available. The Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court's findings both that the move lacked a good-faith basis and that adequate substitute visitation was not available, so the denial of relocation was proper. It found no error in the refusal to modify child support.

Christine and Stephen Blaich divorced and shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, McKenzie. Christine received a job offer in Dallas, Texas, that she believed would advance her career and improve life for her and McKenzie. When Stephen refused to consent to the move, Christine asked the district court for permission to relocate. Stephen countered by asking for primary physical custody. The district court denied Christine's relocation motion and gave Stephen primary physical custody, reasoning that Christine first had to prove it was in the child's best interest for her to have primary custody before it would even consider the move. It also struck Christine's reply brief as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed. First, it held Christine's reply was timely under the local rule (EDCR 5.25(d)), because it was filed more than five days before the scheduled hearing, so the district court erred in striking it. Second, and more importantly, the Court held that Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125A.350) applies to parents who share joint custody, not just to parents with primary physical custody. The district court was wrong to require Christine to win primary custody before it would consider her request to move. The Court explained that all relocation motions must be analyzed under the Schwartz framework and its follow-on cases (like Jones and Trent), regardless of the custody arrangement. That framework asks whether the moving parent has a sensible, good-faith reason to move and then focuses on whether reasonable alternate visitation is possible; a court may not deny a move solely to preserve the existing visitation pattern. The Court found Christine appeared to have made the required showings (career advancement, a better environment, honorable motives, and a workable alternate visitation plan), and criticized the practice of using NRS 125A.350 to 'chain' custodial parents, most often women, to Nevada. Because the district court applied the wrong legal standard, the Court reversed and remanded for reevaluation under the proper standard.

Courtney and Michael Davis divorced in Las Vegas and shared joint legal and physical custody of their two young daughters, with Courtney temporarily designated primary physical custodian and Michael having the children four days a week. Shortly after signing a settlement agreement keeping that arrangement, Courtney decided she could not sustain herself financially in Las Vegas and petitioned to move the children to Fort Walton Beach, Florida, to live near her parents, pursue schooling, and take a job. The district court found Courtney's reasons were legitimate and made in good faith, but denied the move because it could not fashion a workable alternate visitation schedule for Michael. The Supreme Court affirmed. Nevada relocation law (NRS 125A.350) and the Schwartz framework require the moving parent to show a good-faith reason for the move and then weigh several factors, with particular focus on the fifth factor - whether reasonable, alternate visitation is available that would preserve and foster the child's relationship with the other parent. The district court accepted that Courtney had good-faith reasons, but found the fifth factor was dispositive against her. The Court agreed the district court could reasonably conclude the proposed visitation (about eight weeks in summer plus alternating Christmases) was not adequate. Michael was a hands-on parent who had the children four days a week, the roughly six-hour travel distance made short, frequent visits impractical, and Michael's job as a firefighter (four consecutive 24-hour shifts every eight days) meant extended visits would require round-the-clock childcare and would sharply reduce his actual time with the children. Because substantial evidence supported the conclusion that reasonable alternate visitation was not available, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and the denial was affirmed.

Valerie and Greg Halbrook divorced and shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, Erica, splitting each week roughly in half. Valerie, a Sprint sales representative whose Las Vegas income was dropping due to market changes, was offered a career-advancing position in Plano, Texas. When Greg refused to consent, Valerie asked the district court for permission to move Erica to Texas. The district court found Valerie's request was not made in good faith, denied the move, awarded Greg physical custody if Valerie relocated, and later awarded Greg his attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed. It held the district court was wrong to find Valerie lacked a good-faith reason. Career advancement has repeatedly been recognized as a good-faith reason to relocate, and the evidence (a documented income decline in Las Vegas, a less competitive Dallas market, a targeted managerial track, and a relocation package, all confirmed by her supervisor) showed a sensible, good-faith reason. The Court also held the district court improperly focused on the loss of Greg's weekly contact and failed to seriously consider alternate visitation, which is exactly what Nevada law forbids: a court may not deny a move solely to preserve the existing visitation pattern. The Court found Valerie's proposed visitation plan (eight weeks each summer, holidays, breaks, and long weekends) was more generous than plans previously approved. It repeated its concern that district courts were misusing the relocation statute to 'chain' custodial parents, most often women, to Nevada. Finally, the Court reversed the attorney's fees award as a consequence of its ruling, but clarified that fees may be appropriate on remand. In doing so, the Court overruled Duff v. Foster to the extent that case failed to recognize that attorney's fees may be awarded in post-divorce proceedings under NRS 125.150(3). The case was remanded for reevaluation of the relocation request under the correct standard.

Teresa McGuinness filed for divorce from James McGuinness and sought primary custody of their son, Colin. Pending the divorce, the district court ordered temporary joint legal and physical custody, with each parent having Colin half the week. After Teresa's mother died, Teresa asked for primary custody and permission to move Colin to Wheeling, West Virginia, where she had inherited money and part of a house, could live rent free, and could pursue a teaching career. The district court found Teresa's request was made in good faith, but denied it and ordered that if she moved, James would get sole physical custody. The district court reasoned that because the parents shared joint physical custody (which it believed the law strongly favored), Teresa could not relocate merely by showing good faith, and the only issue was the child's best interest. The Supreme Court reversed. It held Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125A.350) applies to parents who share joint custody, and also applies where only temporary custody has been established. The district court erred by treating the case as if the sole question were the child's best interest and by refusing to apply the Schwartz framework. Under Schwartz and its progeny, once a parent shows a sensible, good-faith reason to move, the court must focus on whether reasonable alternate visitation is possible, and it may not deny a move simply because it would disrupt the existing joint-custody arrangement. The Court explained that a child's best interest cannot be decided in a vacuum: the needs and well-being of the parents are inextricably tied to the child's best interest. If courts ignore the parents' needs, relocation would almost never be granted, effectively 'chaining' a parent to Nevada and rendering the statute meaningless. The Court held Teresa's request should have been considered in the initial permanent custody determination, applying the Schwartz factors, and remanded for reevaluation of both the custody decision and the relocation motion under the correct standard.

Jayme and Steve Hopper divorced in August 1995. Their divorce decree gave Jayme primary physical custody of their six-year-old daughter, Anna, and expressly allowed Jayme to move with Anna to California. About six months later, following a change-of-custody hearing, the district court switched primary physical custody to Steve, finding a material change in circumstances and that the change served Anna's best interest. The court pointed to Jayme's yelling and excessive discipline of Anna, her failure to foster Anna's relationship with Steve, her lack of transportation, the distance between the parents, and an alleged oral promise by Jayme (to get help for her yelling and allow more visitation) that supposedly induced Steve to agree to the decree. Jayme appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that to change custody a parent must show both (1) a material change in the parents' circumstances and (2) that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change - and, critically, the change in circumstances must have occurred since the most recent custody order. Events predating that order cannot be used to show changed circumstances. The court held that every ground the district court relied on - Jayme's yelling, her failure to facilitate Steve's relationship with Anna, and her lack of transportation - already existed at the time of the August 1995 divorce decree. Steve knew about Jayme's yelling (he had raised it before the decree) yet agreed she should have primary custody. The court also found no evidence supporting the claim that the custody award was conditioned on an oral side agreement, noting that such significant terms should have appeared in one of the three written documents (two parenting plans and the decree) that all gave Jayme primary custody. Because there was no material change in circumstances since the decree, the first requirement was not met, and the court reversed and ordered Jayme reinstated as primary physical custodian.

Hydee and Bradley McDermott divorced in 1992 after a two-year marriage. They shared joint legal custody of their daughter, Kaylee, with Hydee as the primary custodial parent. In August 1995, Brad moved to change custody. Shortly after, in October 1995, Brad was arrested and later convicted of misdemeanor battery/domestic violence for hitting Hydee when she came to pick up their daughter. After an evidentiary hearing in December 1995, the district court nevertheless changed custody to Brad. Hydee appealed, arguing the court failed to properly apply Nevada's domestic-violence statute. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRS 125.480, when a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has committed domestic violence (as defined in NRS 33.018) against the other parent, a rebuttable presumption arises that awarding sole or joint custody to the abuser is not in the child's best interest. Because Brad had been convicted of battery/domestic violence beyond a reasonable doubt, his conduct qualified as domestic violence, and the district court was required to consider that conviction in light of the rebuttable presumption. The court found that although the district court knew about Brad's conviction, it treated the violence lightly - noting it 'understood the provocation,' ordering domestic-violence classes, and warning against future violence - without ever giving weight to, or even acknowledging, the statutory presumption against giving custody to the perpetrator. The court held this was an abuse of discretion for failing to expressly consider all necessary components of NRS 125.480, reversed the custody order, and remanded so the district court could reconsider in light of the presumption and make the required findings, including how any custody or visitation arrangement would adequately protect the child and the victim.

Tracy (formerly Wallace, now Vollmer) and Pieter Wallace divorced when their son Drake was less than a year old. Tracy had physical custody; they shared joint legal custody. As the parents began disputing visitation, the district court held a hearing. During the hearing - after evidence had focused on whether five-year-old Drake should spend Wednesday nights at his father's - Pieter revealed for the first time that he had a job offer in Atlanta and was moving there. The court then imposed a broad visitation schedule built around the Atlanta move (including seven weeks each summer), reduced Pieter's child support by $100 in any month either he or Drake traveled for visitation, completely eliminated support during summer visitation, and ordered that Drake stay with Pieter's mother in any month Pieter could not take him. Tracy appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed on three points. First, the court abused its discretion by imposing a long-distance visitation schedule based on the Atlanta move without giving notice and holding a proper hearing on that issue; Tracy had no chance to present evidence about a schedule requiring a young child to fly across the country. (The narrower Wednesday-night dispute was moot once Pieter moved.) Second, the court wrongly reduced Pieter's child support for travel costs. Nevada's statute lets a court consider travel costs as a reason to deviate from the support formula only when the custodial parent moves away - not when, as here, the noncustodial parent chooses to move. The court also failed to make the required written findings, including for the complete summer support abatement. Third, the court erred in granting the grandmother visitation without receiving evidence on and considering all the factors the statute says a court 'shall' consider. The case was reversed and remanded.

Penny (now Green) and Robert Cook divorced in 1990 and shared joint legal custody of their daughter Cassie, with Penny having sole physical custody. Penny remarried, and she and her new husband were offered supervisory jobs at a riverboat gambling operation in Louisiana. Because Nevada law requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or the court's permission before moving a child out of state, Penny asked the court for permission to move Cassie to Louisiana. Robert opposed it and, over time, made several reports of abuse and poor living conditions against Penny's household - all of which the Department of Social Services investigated and found unsubstantiated. After a hearing (including a court-appointed psychologist who described the extreme, even 'pathological,' hostility between the parents and Cassie's resulting stress), the district court denied Penny's request, reasoning that the move would harm Cassie's close, regular relationship with her father. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the district court to grant the move. It explained the governing framework from Schwartz v. Schwartz, as refined by Jones v. Jones: a custodial parent seeking to relocate must first make a threshold showing of a 'sensible, good faith reason' for the move; if she does, the court weighs additional factors, focusing on whether reasonable alternative visitation is possible, and only then does the burden shift to the noncustodial parent to show the move is against the child's best interest. The Court held Penny met the threshold (a promotion, higher salary, and better standard of living), that the secondary factors favored her, and that Robert had not shown the move would harm Cassie - noting his abuse allegations were repeatedly found baseless. The Court warned that NRS 125A.350 should not be used to 'chain' custodial parents (most often women) to Nevada when reasonable alternative visitation is possible, and remanded to grant the move with a liberal visitation schedule and adjusted child support.

This decision resolved two consolidated cases, both about a custodial parent's request to move children out of state under Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125A.350. In Gandee, the father Kenna Gandee, who had custody, wanted to move his two daughters to Medford, Oregon, for a promotion from sales associate to general manager at Montgomery Ward. One daughter, Brianna, had physical disabilities and special needs. The mother refused consent, and the district court denied the move, reasoning that the only advantage was a few thousand dollars that would be eaten up by travel and lost support, and that the children would lose weekly visits with their mother. The Supreme Court reversed. Kenna made the required threshold showing of a sensible, good-faith reason (career advancement), and all the Schwartz factors favored the move - better family support, housing, finances, and comparable special-education programs; honorable motives on both sides; and a workable long-distance visitation plan (Medford is about six hours away). The district court had abused its discretion by not even considering an alternative visitation schedule. In the companion case (Montelione), the mother Gayle Matlock wanted to move her son Tommy to Colorado to live with her new husband, who had been transferred there. The district court denied the move solely because the boy's father exercised consistent weekly visitation. The Supreme Court reversed again, holding that disruption of weekly visitation cannot be the sole basis for denial - otherwise a custodial parent could never move whenever the other parent has weekly visits, no matter how many advantages the move offers the child. Because the move offered real advantages and reasonable alternative visitation was possible, the court had to allow it. The Court concluded by restating the rule: once a custodial parent shows a good-faith reason for a move, courts must weigh the Schwartz factors and focus particularly on whether a reasonable, alternative visitation schedule is possible.

Gina and Allen Steward were divorced but shared joint legal and physical custody of their young son, Matthew. Both parents agreed that Allen's parents (Matthew's paternal grandparents) should have no contact with Matthew, pointing to grandmother Mary Ann's erratic and abusive behavior, a serious gambling problem, threats, and instances in which the grandparents failed to properly care for Matthew. The grandparents petitioned for visitation under NRS 125A.340. A court-appointed child custody specialist recommended that no visitation occur, finding Matthew ambivalent about his grandmother and the family dynamic destructive. Despite that recommendation, a domestic relations referee recommended a graduated visitation schedule, and the district court adopted it, finding no abuse of discretion. Gina appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. In this first-of-its-kind interpretation of NRS 125A.340, the court held that the statute creates a presumption AGAINST court-ordered grandparent visitation when divorced parents who both retain full legal rights to their child agree that visitation is not in the child's best interest. That presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that visitation would serve the child's best interest. Because the grandparents offered no such evidence - and the specialist's report and testimony showed visitation was not in Matthew's best interest under the factors in NRS 125A.330 - the order granting visitation was reversed.

Christi and Kenneth Trent were divorced and shared joint legal custody of their toddler son, Corey, with Christi holding primary physical custody. Christi wished to marry Douglas, a homeowner and construction-company vice-president in Dover, Ohio, and to move there with Corey, where she could stop working and give Corey a substantially better financial life. Kenneth, who had frequent visitation and a large extended family in Las Vegas, refused consent. Under NRS 125A.350, Christi petitioned the district court for permission to relocate. The district court denied the petition, emphasizing Kenneth's close bond with Corey, Corey's young age and relationships with extended family, and the relatively short time Christi had known Douglas, concluding Corey would lose too much. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition. The court explained that NRS 125A.350 is primarily a notice statute meant to stop one parent from 'stealing' a child by moving away to sever the other parent's contact - not a tool to 'chain' custodial parents (most often women) to Nevada when reasonable alternative visitation is possible. Applying the Schwartz factors, Christi made the required threshold showing of an actual advantage (marriage and a dramatically improved standard of living), had honorable motives, and would comply with substitute visitation; given Douglas's finances, adequate alternative visitation could preserve the father-son bond.

Susan (later Grandgeorge) and Robert McMonigle divorced in March 1992, with the district court giving Susan primary custody of their daughter, Mari. About a year later Robert moved to modify custody, obtained temporary custody, and after a seven-day hearing was awarded permanent custody. Susan appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under Murphy v. Murphy, a court may change primary custody only if the parents' circumstances have been materially altered SINCE the last custody order and the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change; events predating the last order are inadmissible to establish changed circumstances. Here, the district court expressly relied in large part on evidence about matters that predated the 1992 divorce judgment - most importantly Susan's move to Kansas City (which occurred before the divorce and was even noted in the divorce judgment) and reports generated in Santa Barbara in 1990. Although a court sitting without a jury is normally presumed to disregard improper evidence, this court did the opposite and expressly based its decision on it. Indeed, the record showed the court would have allowed Susan to keep shared primary custody but for the fact that she lived out of state. Because the improper reliance affected Susan's substantial rights, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to restore primary custody to Susan.

Kimberly Porter and Michael Jones (the case is captioned Jones v. Jones) shared joint legal custody of their two sons, with Porter as primary physical custodian. Porter, a full-time nurse who felt she had 'topped out' professionally in the Reno area, wanted to move to Chico, California - for expanded career opportunities, a more rural lifestyle for the boys, and a serious relationship. She lined up a nursing job in Chico and proposed a detailed alternative visitation schedule and cost-sharing. Jones refused consent, and the district court denied her removal petition, characterizing her relationship as short and speculating that the 'timid' father would not maintain contact if the boys moved. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition. Refining its Schwartz framework, the court held that a custodial parent need not show a significant economic or tangible advantage to meet the 'actual advantage' threshold - a sensible, good-faith reason suffices. Courts must consider non-economic factors bearing on the well-being of the custodial parent and children. Once the threshold is met and reasonable alternative visitation is shown to be possible, the burden shifts to the noncustodial parent to show, with concrete material reasons, that the move is not in the children's best interest. The district court abused its discretion by failing to fashion a reasonable alternative visitation schedule and by relying on speculation about the father's future conduct.

John Thomas Truax and Rita Truax had fought over the custody of their three children for years and, as of 1991, were subject to a joint (shared) physical custody order. In December 1991, Rita asked the domestic relations referee to appoint a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) to investigate suspected abuse of the parties' son by Thomas's daughter from a prior marriage. After an evidentiary hearing featuring three experts, the referee found that joint custody was harming the children and that the son had been mistreated at Thomas's home, and vested Rita with primary physical custody. The district court adopted those findings. Thomas appealed, arguing the referee applied the wrong legal standard - specifically, that under Murphy v. Murphy the court could modify custody only on materially altered circumstances that would substantially enhance the children's welfare - and that the district court abused its discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that modification or termination of a JOINT custody order is governed by NRS 125.510(2), which requires only a showing that the best interest of the child requires the change. Murphy, a 1968 primary-custody case decided before NRS 125.510(2) was enacted in 1981, does not apply to joint custody. Thomas also failed to preserve the argument below. And crediting the CASA over competing experts was within the fact-finder's discretion, supported by the record.

In a lengthy and hostile custody dispute, the district court entered a divorce decree with a temporary custody arrangement and set a procedure - agreed to by both attorneys - under which an independent psychologist would evaluate the family and report directly to the court, with a hearing available if a party requested one and stated reasons. Both parties filed reports and then filed forms submitting the matter to the court 'for decision.' After receiving the psychologist's report, the court awarded primary physical custody to the father, Thomas Pearson. The mother, Gale Lawrence Pearson, appealed, arguing she was denied notice and a hearing, that there had been improper ex parte communication with the psychologist, and that the judge was biased. The Nevada Supreme Court found the due process argument 'disingenuous': the record showed both parties knew an independent psychologist had been appointed and would report to the court, and the mother's own counsel submitted the matter for decision and never requested the report, a hearing, or cross-examination. Any deficiency was invited error. Nevertheless, given the paramount importance of a child custody determination and the inadequate representation the mother received, the court vacated the order and remanded for a custody hearing. Because counsel's public attacks on the trial judge had tainted the atmosphere, it directed that the matter proceed in the newly created family court rather than before the original judge, with the children to remain with the father in the interim.

Donni and John Sims divorced in 1990, sharing joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, Kristine, with Donni as primary physical custodian. After John complained that Donni sometimes left the ten-year-old alone after school, the referee ordered that an adult be within vision range of the child at all times and that she never be left alone 'for even 5 minutes,' warning that custody would change if the child were again left alone. When Donni left her ill ten-year-old alone for a few one-hour periods over a two- or three-day stretch (the child had a phone and could call her mother at work), the referee found she had 'flagrantly' violated the order, called leaving a sick child alone 'reprehensible,' and recommended changing primary physical custody to John. The district court adopted the recommendation, and Kristine moved to Virginia with John (an airline pilot often away, whose roughly 70-year-old mother would raise the child). Donni appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The sole consideration in a custody determination is the child's best interest (NRS 125.480). A court may not use a change of custody to punish parental misconduct or disobedience of a court order; such disobedience is punishable by other means. Here the referee's decision rested almost entirely on the mother's disobedience of a questionable, if not absurd, order rather than the child's best interest; the roughly six-month delay in deciding itself belied any real danger and harmed the family. The change of custody was an abuse of discretion.

De and Greg Rooney, both eighteen when their daughter Jessica was born, married briefly and divorced in November 1991. A settlement gave them joint legal custody, with De as primary physical custodian. Greg soon moved to modify custody, and in March 1992 the district court awarded him physical custody, finding he could offer more stable care and an extended family. Weeks later, De moved to change custody back, alleging new circumstances since the March hearing - among them that Greg had briefly signed a paper saying he no longer wanted custody before reclaiming the child, alleged harassment and interference with her visitation, that she had ended a relationship to focus on regaining custody, and that her mother wanted to provide extended family. Without holding a hearing, the district court declined to entertain the motion, finding it filed without reasonable grounds or to harass. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Deciding an issue of first impression, it adopted an 'adequate cause' standard: a district court has discretion to deny a motion to modify custody without a hearing unless the moving party demonstrates adequate cause - a prima facie case for modification shown by the affidavits. Because De's affidavits and points and authorities did not establish adequate cause, the district court properly denied her motion without a hearing.

Amy and Tim Moser divorced when their daughter, Katie, was about eighteen months old, with Amy having primary physical custody. Amy remarried and, with Tim's written permission, moved with Katie to Michigan. When Tim had Katie in Las Vegas for a two-week December visit, he refused to return her, later alleging for the first time that Katie had been sexually abused. He submitted numerous affidavits from friends and family and from a counselor he had retained. Amy denied the allegations and offered contrary evidence. A domestic relations referee held a series of hearings, had the court appoint an independent psychologist to evaluate Katie, and ultimately found that the abuse allegations had not been shown, that nothing suggested Amy or her Michigan household caused Katie's problems, and that there had been no change of circumstances; the referee ordered Katie returned to Amy. Tim objected, mainly complaining that the referee relied on the court's expert rather than his counselor. Instead of holding an evidentiary hearing, the district judge had both counselors submit one more report, then reversed the referee and awarded primary physical custody to Tim, finding a "drastic change" in circumstances without explaining what that change was. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Parents in a custody dispute have a right to a full and fair hearing; before a parent loses custody, the preconditions to changing custody must be supported by factual evidence, and the parent must have the opportunity to disprove the evidence, including the chance to cross-examine (here, Amy was denied the chance to depose the counselor whose new report the judge relied on). The court held it was error for the district judge to wholly reject the referee's explicit findings without conducting a proper evidentiary hearing, and that the unexplained change-of-circumstances finding lacked support in the record. It reversed and ordered Katie returned to her mother in Michigan, consistent with the referee's recommendation.

Donald and Cynthia Adams divorced in Nevada, with Cynthia receiving custody of their three children. After allegations surfaced that Cynthia's boyfriend had sexually assaulted the children, a Nevada court modified custody, awarding Donald physical custody with weekend visitation to Cynthia; a later Nevada order gave Cynthia forty-eight hours of unsupervised monthly visitation and barred the boyfriend's presence during visits. About a month after that Nevada order, Donald, now living in northern California with the children, filed in a California court to establish the Nevada judgment, and California ordered Cynthia's visitation suspended pending further hearings. Donald also asked the Nevada court to relinquish jurisdiction to California as an inconvenient forum. After the Nevada and California judges conferred, Nevada decided to keep jurisdiction, and it reinstated Cynthia's monthly visitation. Donald appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the state that issued the original custody order keeps continuing jurisdiction so long as it retains jurisdiction under its own law and remains the residence of a parent or the child; another state may modify only if the first state has lost or declined jurisdiction. Because Nevada continued to exercise jurisdiction, it did not have to give full faith and credit to, or otherwise recognize, California's order suspending visitation. The court also observed that Donald engaged in the kind of "forum shopping" the PKPA and UCCJA were enacted to prevent by trying to relitigate custody in a new state just a month after the Nevada order. The December 1988 Nevada order remained in effect, making the district court's reinstatement technically redundant but proper. Affirmed.

This is the case that established Nevada's framework for when a custodial parent may move a child out of state. Laura and Christopher Schwartz divorced; Christopher had primary custody of their two young children. He asked the court for permission to move with the children to Pennsylvania, where his mother and extended family lived. The trial court allowed the move, and Laura appealed. Interpreting Nevada's anti-removal statute for the first time, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in a relocation decision, that the inquiry is fact-specific, and that there is no rigid bright-line test. The Court adopted the widely followed D'Onofrio criteria. First, the custodial parent must show a threshold 'actual advantage' to both the children and the parent from the move. If that is met, the court weighs additional factors: whether the move will likely improve the quality of life for the children and custodial parent; whether the custodial parent's motives are honorable and not designed to frustrate visitation; whether the custodial parent will comply with substitute visitation; the noncustodial parent's motives in opposing; and whether there is a realistic opportunity for substitute visitation that preserves the relationship with the noncustodial parent. Applying these, the Court affirmed. The move offered an extended family, financial benefits, and stability, and the reduced weekend visits could be replaced with extended summer visitation. The trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and it did not abuse its discretion.

Maryann and Richard Swan married and lived in Utah until they separated in September 1986. In January 1987, Richard moved to Nevada while Maryann stayed in Utah with the children. On September 28, 1987, Richard filed for divorce in Nevada, and a few days later he took the children from Utah to Nevada. Maryann filed an answer challenging whether the Nevada court had power over the custody question, but she did not otherwise participate. In November 1987, the Nevada court entered a default divorce decree giving Richard custody. About a year and a half later, Maryann asked the court to throw out the custody part of the decree, arguing the Nevada court never had authority to decide custody under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The district court refused. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJA (adopted in Nevada), a court can decide custody only in specific situations, and none applied here. Nevada was not the children's 'home state,' because they had lived in Nevada fewer than 40 days - far short of the six months the law requires. There was no 'significant connection' to Nevada or substantial evidence here about the children's care; the children were actually better off in Utah, where they went to school and had family. The emergency provision did not apply because the children had not been abandoned and there was no emergency. And the 'no other state has jurisdiction' provision did not apply either, because a Utah judge had written to the Nevada judge explaining that a Utah case on the same matter was pending and that Utah was interested in deciding it. The court also stressed that, even if Nevada had jurisdiction, the judge should have considered whether Nevada was an inconvenient forum - Maryann was indigent, and forcing her to litigate in Nevada would be a serious burden and would reward the unilateral removal of children, which the UCCJA is meant to discourage. Finally, the court held that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and cannot be waived - so Maryann did not lose the argument by failing to appear. Because the Nevada court had no jurisdiction, the custody portion of the decree was void and was reversed.

Mark and Rita Dagher divorced in 1983 and had two children, including a daughter, Monique. Their case was marked by repeated litigation. In April 1985, at Mark's request, the court set a brief five-minute hearing on a 'modification of divorce' motion and an order to show cause. But according to the record, no motion to modify the divorce was actually pending, and the order to show cause did not ask for a permanent change of physical custody. In short, Rita was never told the hearing might involve changing custody of her daughter. Rita did not appear at the hearing - she said she believed her lawyer would attend for her. At the hearing, the court ordered Monique's physical custody changed to Mark, stating that Rita intended to disobey court orders and to deny Mark a normal relationship with their daughter. Rita then moved to set aside that order; the court denied her request. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It treated Rita's request as a motion to set aside a default for excusable neglect. It noted the policy favoring deciding cases on the merits is especially strong in family cases, because a child's interests are at stake. Under Nevada law, the best interest of the child is the only proper basis for a custody decision. The court held it was error to change custody without giving Rita specific advance notice, and it was improper to change custody as a punishment for Rita's perceived misconduct - a court cannot use custody as a weapon to punish a parent (there are other ways to address disobedience of court orders). The court also found Rita had shown excusable neglect: she reasonably believed an attorney had agreed to represent her, and an attorney's abandonment of a client, unknown to the client, is excusable neglect. So the trial court should have set its order aside. The court vacated the custody-change order and sent the case back for a prompt, proper hearing on custody. Because there was evidence Rita may have tried to evade Nevada's courts, the court directed that Monique remain with her father until that hearing is decided.

Willard and Rosalie Kern divorced in Wisconsin in 1966, and Rosalie was given custody of their daughter, Linda. Rosalie and Linda later moved to North Carolina. In December 1978, at Linda's request, Willard took the then-14-year-old to live with him in Carson City, Nevada. Rosalie obtained a temporary custody order in North Carolina and then filed a habeas corpus proceeding in a Nevada court to get her daughter back. Willard asked the Nevada court to hold a full custody hearing so it could change the old Wisconsin custody order, saying circumstances had changed. The Nevada court refused to hold a hearing and ordered the child returned to Rosalie. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that even though another state had already decided custody, the U.S. Constitution's full faith and credit rule does not prevent a new custody decision when circumstances have changed since the original order, and a Nevada court can hold a full custody hearing within a habeas proceeding. The trial court had wrongly assumed that any hearing had to take place in North Carolina; the governing rule is that the best place to decide the child's welfare is the court with the most access to the relevant evidence. Here, a great deal of that evidence was in Nevada, and the 14-year-old had stated in a sworn affidavit that she wanted to stay with her father and feared returning to her mother. The court reversed and ordered the Nevada court to hold a full evidentiary hearing.

Janet and Richard Arnold both sought permanent custody of their two-year-old child after their divorce. The district court first gave the father temporary custody, then, after a full hearing and a detailed report from the Child Custody Division, awarded him permanent custody. The judge acknowledged it was a close call and that both parents loved the child and neither was unfit, but found the child was thriving in the father's home while the mother had admitted that emotional and financial problems from the breakup had at times harmed her relationship with the child. The mother appealed, arguing the judge abused his discretion and that the old "tender years" rule - a presumption that a young child should go to the mother unless she is unfit - required giving custody to her. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court held that the judge had carefully weighed all the facts to serve the child's best interest, which is not an abuse of discretion. Most significantly, the court used this case to abolish the "tender years" doctrine in Nevada. It expressly overruled its earlier decision in Peavey v. Peavey, explaining that a preference for one parent based only on the parent's sex is nothing more than a culturally enforced bias and has no place in custody law. The court noted the Legislature had just amended the statute to bar any custody preference given solely because a parent is the mother or father. The touchstone in every case is the best interest of the child, decided on the particular facts.

When the Butlers divorced in 1976, they were given joint legal custody of their two children. The father later moved to modify the decree to get sole custody. The district court granted custody to the mother, relying solely on the old "tender years" doctrine from Peavey v. Peavey - the presumption that young children belong with their mother. The father appealed, attacking the validity and constitutionality of the Peavey rule. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed without reaching those constitutional arguments. It held that the tender years doctrine of Peavey does not control a request to modify custody. Instead, under Adams v. Adams and Murphy v. Murphy, modification of child custody is governed by the standards set out in Murphy. Because the district court relied only on Peavey, the order was reversed and the case sent back for proceedings under the correct standard.

A father asked the district court to change the custody of his son. The court, exercising its discretion, denied the motion. The father appealed and asked the Nevada Supreme Court to annul that order. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed. It held that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's apparent conclusion that changing custody would not enhance the child's welfare. Because the decision was discretionary and supported by the evidence, it was left undisturbed.

Richard and Mary Sogge divorced in 1973, and Mary was given custody of their four children. In 1976, Richard moved to change custody. Mary asked the court to order Richard to pay her attorney's fees and deposition costs so she could oppose him, saying she had received no support payments since April 1976, had no money, and could not afford a lawyer. The judge ordered Richard to pay $600 toward her costs but reserved the final ruling. Richard's response noted he had given Mary $520,000 plus child support since the divorce. After a hearing, the court awarded custody of the children to Richard and denied Mary's request for attorney's fees, ordering each side to pay its own costs. Mary appealed only the denial of attorney's fees. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that awarding attorney's fees in divorce proceedings is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and because the record showed no abuse of that discretion, the denial would not be disturbed on appeal.

In this short divorce appeal, the husband challenged a district court order that, among other things, awarded custody of the parties' minor child to the wife after a contested hearing. He argued that the court had no power to decide custody because, he said, he never received notice that custody would be considered at that hearing. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the argument. The record showed that the husband, through his attorney, received timely notice that the court had set a hearing to consider "all matters pending" in the divorce. Because custody of the child had not yet been finally decided, it was one of the pending matters covered by that notice. Both parties and their attorneys attended the hearing. The husband did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the hearing, or an approved substitute for one allowed by the appellate rules, so the court assumed each side had a full opportunity to be heard. On that record there was nothing to support the claim that the district court acted without or beyond its jurisdiction. The order was affirmed.

In this divorce case, the mother appealed the trial court's decision to give custody of the parties' two-and-a-half-year-old child to the father. Her sole argument was that, under Nevada's "tender years" doctrine (which generally favors placing very young children with a fit mother), the trial court should not have given custody to the father without first finding that the mother was unfit or that placement with the father was in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It reaffirmed that custody decisions rest in the trial court's sound discretion and are presumed to be a proper exercise of that discretion. The tender years doctrine favors the mother only if she is a fit and proper custodian and "other things" are equal. Here, the record showed things were not equal: the mother's adultery and immaturity took the case outside the tender years doctrine and supported awarding custody to the father. The court acknowledged that the trial judge's failure to make an express finding of the mother's unfitness or of the child's best interest was error, but it held that error did not require sending the case back, because the judge's own statements in the record made clear he would reach the same conclusion on remand.

Donna and William Johnson divorced in 1971, and the father initially received temporary custody of the children. After several modifications, a final modification order entered in May 1973 awarded the father permanent custody of the two remaining minor children, who were then 16 and 10 years old. The mother appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court first held that one of the orders the mother tried to challenge, an order denying her objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, was not the kind of order that can be appealed. The only issue the court could properly consider was whether awarding custody to the father was correct under the "tender years" doctrine, which generally favors placing very young children with their mother if she is fit. The court explained that whether a child is of "tender years" cannot be decided by a mechanical rule and is left to the trial court's discretion based on the facts of each case. Here, the district court could permissibly find that children aged 16 and 10 were not of tender years when the final order was entered. The court also noted the trial court's findings that the children were satisfied with their father as custodian and that his custody served their best interest. Finding no clear abuse of discretion, the court affirmed.

A divorced father appealed from a district court order that gave "full and complete custody, care and control" of his minor son to the mother and relieved the father of any further child support. The father did not challenge the custody award itself. Instead, he read the order as denying him any reasonable visitation with his son. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two points. First, the order said nothing about visitation, and the court was unwilling to read into that silence a complete denial of visitation, or to assume the trial court intended such a drastic result. Second, on the part of the order that entirely eliminated the father's child support obligation, the court noted that the trial court had failed to make the findings required before support can be totally cut off, specifically findings about the effect of eliminating support on the child's present comfort and future well-being. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

When the Culbertsons divorced in February 1972, the mother received custody of the parties' four minor children, subject to a provision in the judgment that she not engage in immoral conduct in the children's presence. The father's attorney sent the mother a check required by the decree, which she cashed, and she also enforced other parts of the decree. Later in 1972, the father asked the court to hold the mother in contempt and to take custody away from her. After a hearing, the court found the mother in contempt for violating the decree and changed custody to the father. The court found she had carried on a continuing relationship with an unmarried man who stayed in her home late into the night and slept in her bedroom while the children (some old enough to be aware of it) were nearby, that this disturbed at least one child, and that the older children's schoolwork had declined. The mother appealed both the original 1972 judgment and the amended judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court declined to review the original judgment because she had accepted its benefits (cashing the check and enforcing its terms), which barred her from challenging it. On the change of custody, the court affirmed. Custody decisions are left to the trial court's sound discretion, guided by the child's welfare, and the court presumed the trial judge properly exercised that discretion. The findings that circumstances had changed, that the mother's conduct made her unfit, and that the change served the children's best interest were supported by the record. The mother's separate challenge to the contempt finding was not considered because she cited no supporting authority.

A wife appealed a decree that granted her husband a divorce and custody of their two children, ages 10 and 8. She raised two arguments. First, she challenged whether the husband met Nevada's six-week residency requirement, which is needed to give a Nevada court jurisdiction over a divorce. The Nevada Supreme Court found enough evidence to support the trial court's residency finding - the husband's testimony about living in Nevada and intending to stay, corroborating testimony placing him here, evidence that his mother had also moved to Nevada, and evidence that he had registered his car in the state - so it would not disturb that finding. She also argued (raised only at oral argument) that residence had to continue from the start of the case through trial, but she cited no authority for that, and the Court declined to decide the question in this case. Second, she argued that children 'of tender years' belong with their mother unless she is shown to be unfit. The Court held that whether a child is of 'tender years' cannot be mechanically defined; it is left to the trial court's discretion on the facts of each case. Children aged 10 and 8 were not necessarily within the doctrine, and no clear abuse of discretion was shown. The Court affirmed.

A 1968 divorce gave the mother custody of the child, ordered the father to pay $50 per month support, and gave him 'reasonable' visitation, but it did not spell out the details of when support was due or what visitation was reasonable. In 1969 the parties signed an agreement defining exactly when visitation and payments would occur. The relationship later deteriorated. In 1971 the mother asked the court to terminate the father's visitation for nonpayment of support and to enter judgment for the unpaid support; the father responded by seeking to hold her in contempt for denying visitation and to transfer custody to him, each parent claiming the other was unfit. After a hearing lasting nearly three days, the court kept custody with the mother, continued the father's visitation but defined it and imposed conditions on it, continued the $50 per month support, entered judgment for the support arrears, and ruled that the father's visitation would not resume until he paid the arrears and stayed current; it also awarded the mother attorney fees. The father appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by turning his previously unqualified visitation into conditional visitation and by tying visitation to payment of support. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Because the father did not provide a transcript of the lengthy hearing, the Court had to presume the evidence supported the trial court's findings; trial courts have broad discretion to determine a child's best interests when modifying visitation, and the attorney-fee award was authorized and not shown to be unreasonable.

In this divorce case, the parties' marital settlement agreement gave the husband, Dale, the right to visit a child who was not his - the child was born during the wife Carole's earlier marriage, and Dale had neither fathered nor adopted the child. The district judge approved the agreement and the divorce decree that incorporated it, apparently without focusing on that visitation provision. Later, the same judge, acting on his own, deleted the visitation provision 'nunc pro tunc' - a legal term meaning a correction made now but treated as if entered back on the original date. The judge reasoned that his earlier approval of the visitation term could not really have been a considered exercise of his judgment, but was instead an oversight, and so he treated it as a clerical mistake he could fix at any time under the rule allowing correction of clerical errors (NRCP 60(a)). The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. It held that a judge's failure to be aware of the terms of a settlement agreement that he actually approved is not the kind of clerical mistake, oversight, or omission that the clerical-error rule allows to be fixed after the fact. In other words, overlooking a substantive provision the judge signed off on is not a mere clerical slip. The court set aside the nunc pro tunc order and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to rule on the merits of the mother's pending motion - a proper motion asking the court to modify the agreement and decree to remove Dale's visitation rights. The point was procedural: the visitation term had to be addressed through a real decision on the mother's motion, not erased through the clerical-error shortcut.