Nevada family-law case summaries

This case is about when a Nevada family court must hold a full hearing before deciding whether to change which parent has primary physical custody of a child. Caleb Haskins and Lisa Myers divorced in 2012 and have one child, S.H. (now 12). Caleb has primary physical custody and lives in Oregon; Lisa lives in Nevada and has the child during school breaks. In 2020, Lisa did not return S.H. to Caleb after summer break, saying the child had a panic attack at the airport and refused to fly. Caleb asked the court to enforce the custody order; Lisa filed a countermotion asking the court to give her primary physical custody, alleging that Caleb and his current wife were neglecting and verbally abusing the child, denying her parenting time, making the child sleep on a foam mattress in a non-bedroom in an overcrowded house, failing to address dental problems, and assigning the child excessive caregiving duties for other children in the home. The district court ordered Caleb to return the child and allowed both sides 90 days to gather information. After receiving documents and statements from both parents, the district court denied Lisa's motion to change custody without holding an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and the judge weighs evidence). The judge said it was a "close call" but concluded Lisa had not shown enough to justify a hearing, in part because Caleb had submitted an Oregon Child Protective Services report that did not substantiate similar claims. The Court of Appeals reversed. Drawing on a 1993 Nevada Supreme Court decision, Rooney v. Rooney, the court explained that a parent seeking to modify custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if she presents a "prima facie case" - meaning, on the face of her allegations, enough specific facts that, if true, would justify changing custody. The big question the court answered for the first time is: what materials may a judge look at when deciding whether the moving parent has cleared that initial bar? The court's answer has two parts. As a general rule, the judge should look only at the moving parent's properly sworn statements - verified pleadings, affidavits, or declarations - and accept those specific factual allegations as true. The judge should not weigh the other parent's competing evidence or judge anyone's credibility at this stage; that is what the evidentiary hearing itself is for. The narrow exception: if the non-moving parent's evidence "conclusively establishes" that the moving parent's allegations are false, the judge may consider it. Applying that framework, the court held that the district judge made a mistake by weighing Caleb's CPS report and other documents against Lisa's sworn allegations. A CPS report that did not substantiate similar claims does not "conclusively" prove Lisa's allegations are false - evaluating such a report requires credibility findings that belong at a hearing. And even setting the CPS report aside, Lisa's specific allegations (about domestic violence in the home, neglected dental care, deprived parenting time, falling math grades, and the child's living conditions and wishes) tied to Nevada's best-interest factors were enough to require a hearing. The court also held that when a judge denies a custody-modification motion without a hearing, the order must include specific findings and an adequate explanation, not just a conclusory recitation of the legal standard - both to allow appellate review and to help the parents (often self-represented) understand why their motion failed. The case goes back to the district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing, though the court emphasized that the form and scope of that hearing remain within the trial judge's broad discretion.

This is a procedural dismissal, not a ruling on the merits of any custody dispute. When a party files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they ordinarily must pay a filing fee. If they cannot afford it, they may ask to proceed "in forma pauperis," meaning the court waives the fee for indigent litigants. Here, Mr. Silver filed his appeal without paying the fee. The Supreme Court first asked the district court to rule on his fee-waiver request; the district court denied it on February 28, 2022. The Supreme Court then gave Silver the option to either pay the fee or file a fee-waiver motion directly with the Supreme Court. Silver filed an affidavit, which the court treated as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. On May 16, 2022, the Supreme Court denied that motion and gave Silver 14 days to pay the fee, warning that failure to pay would result in dismissal. Silver did not pay and did not respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. Because the dismissal is for non-payment of the filing fee, the opinion does not address the underlying child custody issues.

David and Christie Stucke entered a domestic partnership in May 2015, married in May 2016, and have two children together. After about two and a half years of marriage, David filed for divorce. The case was, in the district court's words, "hotly contested and litigated," with a five-day trial that included testimony from both spouses and a jointly retained custody expert, psychologist Dr. John Paglini. Both sides asked the appeals court to review parts of the final divorce decree. The disputes fell into two groups: how property was split, and how the children's custody and support were handled. On property, David argued that a house on West Maule Avenue should not have been divided equally. He said he had used his own money — poker winnings earned before the domestic partnership — for the down payment and for repairs, and that the house was meant to stay his. Because the parties acquired the house after entering their domestic partnership, the law presumed it was community property (property both partners own together). David wanted the court to use a formula from an older Nevada case, called Malmquist, to give him credit for his separate contributions. The appeals court explained that this formula only applies when separate property increased in value through community effort, or community property increased in value because of separate contributions. David never argued that his contributions increased the home's value, and he did not provide the supporting evidence needed to run that calculation. So the court upheld the equal division. Christie, in turn, challenged the district court's decision to give David all the sale proceeds from two other houses — one on Birkland Court and one on Grandview Place — as his separate property. For the Birkland property, David had bought it with separate funds and set up a rental business through an LLC; Christie had signed paperwork acknowledging the house was David's separate property. The law says that once property is separate, turning it into community property ("transmutation") must be proven by clear and convincing evidence — a high standard. Christie did not point to anything in the record meeting that standard, so the appeals court upheld that award. For the Grandview property, Christie had signed a quitclaim deed giving up any interest, David had used pre-marriage retirement funds, and there was no evidence community funds paid the mortgage. Nevada law treats a spouse-to-spouse transfer of real estate as a presumed gift that also requires clear and convincing evidence to undo. The appeals court upheld that award too. David also asked that Christie repay the community for "marital waste" — money he claimed she wasted, mostly through gambling and by allegedly devaluing her businesses. The district court found Christie's credibility about her finances "questionable" but also found it "impossible" to figure out how much money, if any, was actually wasted, partly because David's financial summaries were incomplete and he had no accounting background. Because the court could not determine an actual amount of waste, it declined to order reimbursement (though it did make Christie responsible for the businesses' expenses and taxes). The appeals court found this supported by the evidence and upheld it. On custody, David argued that he should not have to share joint physical custody, pointing out that several of the district court's findings were unfavorable to Christie. The expert, Dr. Paglini, had spent extensive time with the family, produced an 88-page report, found both parents fit, and recommended joint physical custody with roughly a 60/40 split in David's favor. Dr. Paglini noted Christie's unsubstantiated allegations that David had raped her and molested their daughter, and said that if the court found she fabricated those claims for advantage in the divorce, David should get primary custody — but Dr. Paglini himself did not reach a conclusion that she had fabricated them. The district court found the allegations unsubstantiated but also could not conclude Christie had fabricated them. It went through each statutory "best interest" factor and adopted Dr. Paglini's recommendation. The appeals court noted that "a different court may have reached a different conclusion," but concluded this was not an abuse of discretion, and it upheld the joint-custody award. It also upheld the label "joint physical custody" for the roughly 60/40 schedule, because Christie had the children at least 40 percent of the time and more than 146 days per year. Finally, David argued the district court should have imputed more income to Christie and ordered her to pay child support. The court found Christie had not accurately reported her income and that her actual income was "almost impossible to discern." It concluded she could earn at least as much as David, set both incomes at David's monthly figure of $8,333, and ordered equal child support, netting to zero. The appeals court pointed out that the district court had actually imputed income to Christie — the opposite of what David claimed — and that David never provided figures showing what the correct amount should have been. Finding the decision supported by the evidence, the court affirmed the entire judgment.

William and Ammie Wallace married in 2009, had three children, separated in 2017, and divorced in September 2020. In their divorce decree, they agreed that Ammie would have primary physical custody and that William would have the children on weekday afternoons from 3:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., with the parents alternating weekends. According to the opinion, the parents did not actually follow that schedule for a period. During the COVID-19 pandemic, when the children were learning from home and both parents were working from home, they used a different, more equal arrangement that William described as joint physical custody with a "2/3/2 timeshare." They kept this up until the children went back to in-person school in spring 2021, at which point they returned to the schedule written in the divorce decree. In June 2021, William asked the court to change the custody order, arguing that the parents had really been sharing custody roughly equally ("de facto joint physical custody") and that keeping that arrangement was in the children's best interest. Ammie asked the court to deny the motion without a hearing, saying William had not shown any substantial change in circumstances affecting the children, who she said were doing well in her care. After a 20-minute hearing without testimony or evidence, the district court denied William's motion. The court found that Ammie had primary physical custody (having the children about 70% of the time) and that William had not shown "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing because he had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that to change a physical custody order in Nevada, a parent must show both (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and (2) that the change serves the child's best interest. The court held that William never argued that returning to the decree's original terms was a substantial change in circumstances, so he waived that point. It also explained that a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision, Romano v. Romano, overruled the part of the older Rivero decision that William relied on - meaning a court no longer has to first decide what kind of custody arrangement exists before deciding whether to modify it. Because William did not adequately show a substantial change in circumstances, his appeal failed.

This is a divorce appeal. After a long-running case, the family court issued a divorce decree that, among other things, changed child custody from the father (Yoav Egosi) having sole custody to both parents sharing joint physical and legal custody. The court also punished the father with a financial sanction for ignoring earlier orders to pay $3,500 for an expert to put a value on a business called Joi Biz, which the court treated as marital property. The father appealed and raised several arguments. He said the judge gave the mother more time to present her case at the custody hearing, but the Supreme Court found he had attended with a lawyer, presented his case, never objected at the time, and never identified evidence he was prevented from offering. The Court rejected the argument. He next argued the court was wrong to find that circumstances had changed enough to revisit custody. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting the lower court found the mother had stabilized, completed parenting and anger-management classes, and obtained substance abuse treatment, and that joint custody now served the child's best interest. The father also challenged the way the family court applied the parties' prenuptial agreement under Georgia law, which both sides agreed governed. The Supreme Court explained that under Georgia law a court has equitable discretion to enforce, reject, or partially enforce such agreements, and the family court chose to enforce it only as to specifically listed property to avoid finding it unconscionable. The Supreme Court found that approach permissible. He argued the written order strayed from what the judge had said orally at the hearing. The Supreme Court explained that an oral ruling is not final and a judge may modify it in the written order. He argued the court improperly made him prove that Joi Biz was his separate property; the Supreme Court explained that under Nevada law property acquired during marriage is presumed community property, and the burden was properly on him to overcome that presumption. He argued the judge should have stepped aside on his own once it came out that the judge personally knew the family of one of his expert witnesses. The Supreme Court explained that the Nevada statute he relied on does not require a judge to recuse based on a relationship with a witness, and noted that judges should not recuse without cause. The one place the father prevailed was on the contempt sanction. The family court had set a $100-per-day penalty for the 1,050 days of delay, offset by attorney fees, leaving a $90,000 sanction (with $80,000 stayed if he paid $10,000 to a new forensic expert). The Supreme Court explained that this was a civil contempt sanction (because it could be wiped out by compliance), and civil contempt sanctions in Nevada are limited to the actual loss the other party suffered, not an arbitrary daily figure. The Court therefore vacated the sanction and sent it back to the family court to recalculate the amount based on the mother's actual losses caused by the delay - though the Court noted this becomes moot if the father simply complies and purges the sanction.

This is a child custody dispute in which the father, Erik Douglas Ward, tried to appeal two decisions from the family court in Clark County. One was a 2021 order refusing to undo an earlier ruling, and the other was a 2022 order changing custody of a child. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the family court was right or wrong. Instead, it found a timing problem with the appeal. After each of the two orders he wanted to challenge, Mr. Ward had filed follow-up motions asking the family court to reconsider or change its ruling. Under Nevada's appellate rules, those follow-up motions pause the clock for filing an appeal. But they also mean a person cannot appeal yet - they have to wait until the family court formally rules on those follow-up motions in a written order. Mr. Ward filed his notices of appeal before the family court had issued written rulings on his pending motions. Because of that, the Supreme Court concluded it had no authority (no jurisdiction) to hear the appeal at this stage and dismissed it. The Court noted that Mr. Ward can file a new notice of appeal once the district court enters written orders resolving his still-pending motions.

Burke Hall and Vanessa Marie Loftis were married and had three minor children. Their youngest child died in a tragic accident, drowning in a swimming pool while Loftis failed to provide adequate supervision. Loftis was convicted of a felony count of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment in connection with that accident and placed on probation. (After she was discharged from probation, her conviction was reportedly reduced to a gross misdemeanor, but the amended judgment of conviction was not in the record before the appeals court.) Loftis then started this court case, asking for "separate maintenance" (financial support while remaining married) and for joint legal and physical custody of the two remaining children. Hall responded by asking for a divorce and for sole legal and physical custody of the children. The district court granted the divorce early on but waited to decide the heavily contested custody dispute. Both sides made serious accusations against each other, including claims of abuse, domestic violence, mental health problems, and withholding the children. After a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Loftis sole legal custody and primary physical custody, with discretion to let Hall have supervised parenting time. The court explained that this arrangement was in the children's best interest. It found that although Loftis committed an act of child abuse or neglect connected to the child's death, she afterward took every step possible to redeem herself and become a proper parent. By contrast, it found that Hall bore extreme animosity toward Loftis that harmed the children, refused to cooperate, interfered with the children's relationship with their half-siblings, showed potential mental health issues while refusing to obtain a psychological examination, and committed an act of abduction without just cause. On appeal, Hall first argued the district court had no power (jurisdiction) to grant a divorce because Loftis had only asked for separate maintenance, not divorce. The appeals court rejected this because Hall himself filed a counterclaim for divorce, and Nevada law allows a court to grant a divorce to either party when grounds exist. Hall also argued that a separate divorce case he had previously filed blocked the court's jurisdiction, but he had agreed to dismiss that separate case, and the court found no legal authority creating such a barrier. Hall next challenged the custody decision on three main points. He said the court ignored Loftis's role in the child's death; the appeals court disagreed, noting the court did find Loftis committed abuse or neglect but treated the factor as "neutral" because she had worked to redeem herself, a conclusion supported by evidence including her testimony and the guardian ad litem's testimony. Hall argued the court should have applied a legal presumption against giving custody to a person who commits domestic violence; the appeals court held the drowning did not amount to "domestic violence" under the statute's definition, so the presumption never applied. Hall also argued the court had no jurisdiction to make findings about child abduction because that is a criminal matter; the appeals court held that the family court does have jurisdiction over custody proceedings and that the best-interest statute specifically requires it to consider whether a parent committed an act of abduction. Finally, Hall raised complaints about the district court striking materials he had submitted. The appeals court agreed the district court was correct that exhibits are not evidence until admitted, but said striking them on that basis was an abuse of discretion because the rules contemplate filing exhibits not yet admitted. Even so, the court held any error was harmless because there was a full evidentiary hearing where both sides could offer their materials. Because appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or credibility, and substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusions, the appeals court affirmed. It noted that Hall remains free to seek parenting time and is not barred from revisiting the parenting-time arrangement.

Kory Garver and Crystal Coleman married in Reno in 2017 and had one child together, K.G. In November 2019, police responded to a domestic disturbance at the couple's home: the opinion recounts that Kory grabbed a knife and threatened to puncture Crystal's car tires, intentionally threw a pipe that broke her glass fish tank, and was later charged with battery with the use of a deadly weapon and battery by strangulation after a physical altercation involving Crystal's adult son Tye and Tye's friends. In January 2020, a second incident led to a domestic battery charge against Kory for allegedly striking Tye. Crystal then left Nevada for Oregon with K.G. Kory filed for divorce, asking for sole legal and physical custody. Crystal counterclaimed for sole legal and primary physical custody. After a trial held over Zoom, the district court walked through the "best interest of the child" factors listed in Nevada law (NRS 125C.0035(4)) and found, among other things, that Kory had committed domestic violence against Crystal and Tye. Under Nevada law, a finding of domestic violence creates a presumption - a starting assumption the parent must overcome with evidence - against awarding that parent custody. The court found Kory did not overcome it and awarded Crystal sole legal and sole physical custody. The district court also tried to set up parenting time (visitation) for Kory at trial, but the opinion describes Kory as refusing to cooperate, disparaging the court, and calling its order "dishonorable" and "garbage." The court ordered no contact and scheduled a follow-up hearing specifically to set Kory's parenting time; Kory did not attend and did not respond to the clerk's contact attempts. The final decree denied parenting time but invited Kory to file a motion asking for a schedule. He never did, and instead appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed on every point. On legal custody, the court held that the presumption favoring joint legal custody is defeated when parents cannot "cooperate, communicate, and compromise to act in the best interest of the child," and that substantial evidence - including both parents' own trial testimony about their intense mutual conflict - supported the award to Crystal. On physical custody, the court reviewed each best-interest factor Kory disputed and found substantial evidence supporting the district court's findings, including its domestic-violence findings. Notably, the court explained that the domestic-violence statute's list of qualifying acts is not exhaustive: even though threatening to destroy property is not specifically listed, a "knowing, purposeful or reckless course of conduct intended to harass the other person" counts. On parenting time, the court refused to consider Kory's arguments at all under the "invited error" doctrine - the principle that a party cannot complain on appeal about a problem he himself caused. Because Kory's disruptive behavior at trial, his failure to attend the follow-up hearing set for his benefit, and his failure to ever file a motion for parenting time induced the very ruling he challenged, the court declined to review it.

This is a family-law appeal arising out of a divorce decree that set visitation terms for the parties' children. The father asked the district court to hold the mother in contempt - that is, to find she had disobeyed a court order - for not complying with the visitation terms. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted that request, ordered the mother to bring the children for visitation pick-up, ordered her to disclose her address, and awarded attorney fees and costs against her. The mother, representing herself, tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the contempt finding was right or wrong. Instead, it explained that it can only hear an appeal when a statute or court rule says an appeal is allowed. In Nevada, an order that deals only with contempt is generally not appealable. Because the order in this case did not change the parties' underlying custody arrangement and dealt only with contempt, attorney fees, and related directives, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed it.

This case is a custody dispute between two parents, William Christensen and Vanessa Lovett, who share one child. Over the years, the arrangement changed several times. In 2016, a court gave Christensen sole legal and physical custody, noting that the child had been in the care of a state agency (the Division of Child and Family Services, or DCFS), that the child was doing better after being placed with Christensen, and that Lovett had unaddressed mental-health concerns. In 2020, the parents agreed to share joint legal custody, with Christensen having primary physical custody and Lovett getting weekends and alternating weeks in the summer. The 2020 arrangement also required Christensen to take the child to the dentist at least twice a year and to a doctor at least once a year. In 2021, Lovett asked the court to change custody again. She said the parents were actually splitting time roughly equally, that Christensen had recently been jailed on a probation violation (leaving her caring for the child during that time), that the child was not well cared for at Christensen's home, that the child developed a dental abscess requiring an extraction because Christensen did not provide dental care, and that Christensen refused to share medical and school information with her or cooperate as a co-parent. After an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where the judge listens to testimony and reviews evidence), the district court sided with Lovett. The court found that even though the paperwork said Christensen had primary physical custody, in practice the parents were sharing custody roughly equally, because Lovett had the child for just over 146 days in the prior year. The court found many problems: Christensen's incarceration, his failure to follow the court's orders about the child's medical and dental care, his failure to follow orders about joint legal custody, his hostility toward Lovett, and his inability to co-parent. The court also noted Christensen made derogatory comments about Lovett's sexuality and worried he might put down her relationship in front of the child. Weighing the legal "best interest" factors, the court decided the child should live primarily with Lovett. Christensen appealed. The Court of Appeals explained that it does not second-guess a trial judge's custody call unless the judge abused their discretion, and it will uphold the decision if it is supported by "substantial evidence" — evidence a reasonable person would accept as adequate. The appeals court rejected each of Christensen's arguments. On the claim that the parents were not really sharing time equally, the court said the record showed the district judge considered testimony, the existing order, spring break, and the period of Christensen's incarceration, and reasonably concluded the parents were practicing a de facto (in-practice, even if not on paper) joint custody arrangement. On the claim that his jail time was only temporary and therefore not a lasting change, the court noted that Christensen cited no authority requiring the change to be permanent, and that the judge based the change on many factors, not just the incarceration. On the claim that the judge wrongly excluded a DCFS report about Lovett's past mental health and drug use, the court said the report was properly excluded because Christensen did not disclose it on time, and that the judge did consider the history of the case through testimony anyway. On the CASA argument, the court said Christensen never raised it below, so he waived it. On the bias claim, the court said Christensen never sought to disqualify the judge below and, in any event, his complaints came from what the judge learned during the case itself — which does not establish legal bias. Because none of Christensen's arguments succeeded, the appeals court affirmed the custody modification.

This is a one-paragraph order from the Nevada Supreme Court closing out an appeal in a child custody case. The person who started the appeal, Jazleen Gamboa, asked the court to dismiss her own appeal voluntarily. The court granted that request and dismissed the appeal. The order does not discuss the underlying custody dispute, the trial court's ruling, or any legal issues on the merits. It is purely an administrative closure of the appeal at the appellant's request.

Daniel and Stephanie Rubidoux married in 2014 and had one daughter, born in 2016. Their relationship was turbulent; they separated and reconciled several times before their final separation in November 2019. Stephanie filed for divorce in early 2020, describing several incidents she said involved domestic violence. One incident happened in early 2019 in the garage of the family home, where a surveillance camera recorded a fight. Daniel, who was intoxicated, tried to stop Stephanie from leaving, ripped items from her hand, pushed her against the garage door, and advanced toward her. Stephanie tried to push him off and at one point held a child's picnic table between them to keep her distance. Stephanie later showed the video to law enforcement, and Daniel was charged with domestic violence. Daniel entered a deferred adjudication, completed the required conditions, and the justice court dismissed the case. The parties disputed whether Daniel had pleaded "guilty" or "no contest," but the court found this difference immaterial because, even without a formal conviction, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that domestic violence occurred - and no one challenged that specific finding on appeal. During the 14 months the couple was separated and sharing custody under temporary court arrangements, the record showed no violence or fighting. Their exchanges of the child were peaceful, even though Stephanie at times kept the child during Daniel's scheduled parenting time because of the COVID-19 pandemic. At a two-day trial, both parents testified. Stephanie raised numerous domestic violence allegations and voiced concern about the child's safety around Daniel when she was not present. Daniel testified that Stephanie actively participated in the fighting and often antagonized him, and he offered evidence suggesting she was not afraid of him. Stephanie acknowledged that Daniel never physically harmed the child and that the child loves him. The district court found that Stephanie was generally not afraid of Daniel and often participated in and antagonized the conflicts, but it also found that the garage fight rose to the level of domestic violence and that no antagonizing remark could justify how Daniel physically handled Stephanie. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption under NRS 125C.0035(5) - a starting assumption that giving Daniel joint or sole physical custody would not be in the child's best interest. The court then concluded that Daniel had overcome (rebutted) that presumption, pointing to the parties' successful shared parenting during their 14-month separation, the absence of violence after they separated, and evidence that many of the fights were two-sided. The court awarded joint physical custody and granted the divorce. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It declined Stephanie's request to require a domestic-violence perpetrator to first complete something like an anger management course or a 12-step program before being allowed to rebut the presumption, noting that Nevada - unlike California - does not require such a condition. The court acknowledged the district court's order was imperfect, including that it seemed to blend together two parts of the statute and did not clearly tie the domestic-violence factor to the child's best interest. But given the deferential standard the appellate court applies, and because the violence was not directed at the child, Stephanie was not injured, and the child had a good relationship with both parents, the court found no abuse of discretion. It also concluded the order was not internally contradictory and that it satisfied the statute's requirement to make findings protecting the parent and child, because it maintained the same exchange protocol that had produced 14 months of safe, peaceful interactions.

Amanda and Devin Reed are divorced parents of two children. Before their divorce was finalized, they agreed in 2018 to share joint legal and physical custody. Amanda later asked the court to change that arrangement. While her modification request was still pending, the parties went to a settlement conference to wrap up the financial side of the divorce. They stipulated that the settlement would not affect the pending custody fight, which would continue separately. When the divorce decree was entered, it again awarded joint custody, but it also included language acknowledging Amanda's pending motion to modify custody and stating that nothing in the decree would waive her right to pursue that request. Two days after the decree, Amanda filed a motion to modify custody and to adopt the recommendations of a custody evaluation, citing allegations (including domestic violence) that occurred before the decree. Devin opposed the motion and asked for primary custody himself, also relying on pre-decree allegations about Amanda's prescription drug use. The case was set for an evidentiary hearing, but before it occurred the case was reassigned to a different family court judge. That judge declined to take any evidence, ruling that the divorce decree was final and that res judicata - a doctrine that prevents relitigating issues already decided - blocked consideration of any evidence predating the decree. The judge denied modification of joint custody but adjusted the visitation schedule. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that the decree's language was ambiguous: one could reasonably read it as Amanda did (preserving the custody fight) or as Devin did (merely noting that custody can always be modified later). Because the language was ambiguous, the district court needed to look at evidence about what the parties actually intended - including the circumstances of their settlement and their later conduct - before deciding whether the decree settled the custody issue with finality. The Court sent the case back so that an evidentiary hearing can be held on that question.

Ali Shahrokhi and Kizzy Burrow were never married but had one child together. After their relationship ended, Kizzy obtained a temporary restraining order against Ali, and both sides filed competing requests for custody. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave Kizzy sole legal and physical custody, allowed her to move with the child to Oregon, and ordered Ali to pay her attorney fees and costs. Ali filed three separate appeals challenging those rulings and several follow-up orders. In the first appeal (Docket No. 81978), Ali raised constitutional objections, attacked the judge for alleged bias, challenged the court's findings that he committed domestic violence, and disputed the custody and relocation decision. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument. It explained that when both parents are fit, custody is decided by what is best for the child. It found that Ali had received notice and a chance to be heard on the motions in the case. It concluded that the chief judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to disqualify Judge Harter, noting that disagreements with a judge's rulings are not grounds for disqualification and that a party cannot manufacture a conflict (such as by filing a federal civil rights suit against the judge) and then demand removal. The court also held that the domestic violence findings were civil findings made under the custody statute, not criminal findings, and that they were supported by substantial evidence including Kizzy's testimony, an interview with the child, and text messages. On relocation, the court found Kizzy had good-faith reasons to move (her relationship with her fiancé and a desire to escape Ali's behavior) and that the district court properly applied Nevada's relocation framework. The court rejected Ali's argument that the case took too long under court rule SCR 251, concluding that Ali himself caused most of the delay. In the second appeal (Docket No. 82245), Ali challenged the attorney fee award. The court held that NRS 125C.250 authorizes fees to the prevailing party in a custody case and that the district court properly considered the parties' financial information. In the third appeal (Docket No. 83726), the court found that several of the orders Ali tried to appeal - including denials of a motion to transfer departments, a post-judgment motion to dismiss, an anti-SLAPP motion, an NRCP 11 sanctions motion, and a "Demand for Bill of Particulars" - are not the kind of orders Nevada law allows to be appealed, so it dismissed those parts of the appeal. As for Ali's motion seeking relief from the judgment under NRCP 60(b), the court concluded that the evidence he relied on was available before trial, that he had not shown fraud or lack of jurisdiction, and that his "newly discovered" evidence about Donald Pearson's Oregon business interest was collateral to the custody, relocation, and child support issues actually decided. Finally, the court held Ali was not entitled to costs related to an earlier writ proceeding because neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes costs in original writ proceedings.

Ali Shahrokhi and Kizzy Burrow had one child together but never married. After their relationship ended, Burrow obtained a temporary restraining order against Shahrokhi, and the parties filed competing custody complaints. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Burrow sole legal and physical custody, allowed her to move with the child to Oregon, and ordered Shahrokhi to pay her attorney fees and costs. Shahrokhi appealed those rulings and several later orders. The Nevada Supreme Court resolved all three appeals together. The court rejected Shahrokhi's constitutional arguments. It explained that when two fit parents dispute custody, both have equal constitutional rights to their child, so courts decide by asking what is in the child's best interest. The court also found that Shahrokhi received notice and a chance to be heard on the motions he complained about, which is what due process requires. The court noted that there is no right to a jury trial in family court cases. On the request to disqualify Judge Mathew Harter, the court held that most of Shahrokhi's complaints were about the judge's rulings during the case, which generally cannot be the basis for disqualification. His pending federal civil rights lawsuit against the judge did not require disqualification, because a party cannot manufacture a conflict and then use it to remove a judge. Campaign contributions from Burrow's lawyer that were within statutory limits also did not require disqualification. On the domestic violence findings, the court explained that the district court applied a family-law statute, NRS 125C.0035(5), which creates a presumption that giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence is not in the child's best interest. Because this was a family-law proceeding rather than a criminal case, the criminal-procedure protections Shahrokhi invoked did not apply. The court found substantial evidence supported the finding that Shahrokhi committed acts of domestic violence against Burrow, including threats and harassment. On custody and relocation, the court held that the trial court applied the right legal framework (the Druckman factors) because there was no prior court order awarding physical custody before Burrow's relocation request. The court found Burrow had good-faith reasons to move (a relationship with her fiancé and a desire to escape Shahrokhi's behavior) and that the record supported awarding Burrow sole physical custody. On the six-month deadline for resolving custody cases under SCR 251, the court found Shahrokhi himself caused most of the delay through writ petitions, continuance requests, and disqualification motions, so he could not now complain about it. On attorney fees, the court held that NRS 125C.250 allows the prevailing party in a custody case to recover fees and costs, and the trial court properly considered both sides' financial disclosures. For the post-judgment orders in Docket No. 83726, the court dismissed parts of the appeal because some of the challenged orders are not the kind that can be appealed under Nevada law - including denials of motions to transfer to a different judge, denials of post-judgment motions to dismiss, denials of NRCP 11 sanction motions, and denials of a "Demand for Bill of Particulars." On the NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment, the court held the new evidence Shahrokhi cited was available before trial or was unrelated to the custody, relocation, and child support issues actually decided. On his motions for costs related to a separate writ proceeding, the court held that neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes an award of costs to a prevailing party in an original writ proceeding.

Ali Shahrokhi and Kizzy Burrow were never married but share one child. After their relationship ended, Kizzy obtained a temporary restraining order, and both parents filed for custody. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and awarded Kizzy sole legal and physical custody, allowed her to move to Oregon with the child, and ordered Ali to pay her attorney fees and costs. Ali appealed those rulings and additional later orders. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each of Ali's challenges. On his constitutional arguments, the court explained that because both parents have equal fundamental rights to care for their child, the "best interest of the child" standard properly governs custody disputes. The court also found that Ali received notice and an opportunity to be heard for each motion he claimed had been decided without due process. On his motion to disqualify the trial judge, the court held that a judge's rulings during a case are not, by themselves, grounds for disqualification, and that a party cannot manufacture a conflict (such as suing the judge in federal court) and then demand disqualification. Campaign contributions within legal limits also do not require disqualification. On the domestic violence findings, the court explained these were civil findings made under the custody statute (NRS 125C.0035(5)), not criminal findings, so the additional protections that criminal defendants receive did not apply. The court found substantial evidence in the record (text messages, testimony, prior TPO proceedings, and an interview with the child) supporting the finding that Ali committed domestic violence against Kizzy, including threats and harassment. On relocation, the court applied the framework from Druckman v. Ruscitti and concluded the district court properly evaluated Kizzy's good-faith reasons for moving (her relationship with her fiancé and a desire to escape Ali's behavior) and the factors bearing on the child's best interest. On attorney fees, the court found NRS 125C.250 authorized fees to the prevailing party in a custody case, and that the trial court properly considered the parties' financial disclosures, including any income disparity. On the post-judgment orders in Docket No. 83726, the court held that several of the orders (denying transfer to another department, denying a post-judgment motion to dismiss, denying NRCP 11 sanctions, denying a "Demand for Bill of Particulars") are not appealable, so it dismissed those portions of the appeal. The court affirmed the denial of relief under NRCP 60(b), finding the "new" evidence was available before trial and was not fraudulently concealed. It also affirmed the denial of costs related to a prior writ proceeding, explaining that neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes costs to the prevailing party in an original writ proceeding.

This is a divorce case. After the district court denied Jacqueline West's request to set aside the divorce decree, she filed two things in succession: first, a motion asking the district judge to reconsider that denial, and second, a notice of appeal asking the Nevada Supreme Court to review the matter. The problem is the order in which those filings were made and what was still pending. Under Nevada's appellate rules, certain post-judgment motions - including a motion for reconsideration - pause, or "toll," the clock for filing an appeal. While that motion is pending in the district court, any notice of appeal filed in the meantime has no legal effect. The party must wait for the district court to issue a written order resolving the motion before filing (or refiling) the notice of appeal. Here, the docket showed that Jacqueline West filed a timely motion for reconsideration on March 24, 2022, and that motion had not yet been decided when she filed her notice of appeal. Because the notice was filed in that gap, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed it.

Jill Marson asked a Washoe County district court to enforce an alimony obligation against Samuel Marson and to hold him in contempt for not paying. The district court denied that request. Ms. Marson, representing herself, then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. Before deciding whether the district court got the underlying issue right or wrong, the Supreme Court had to decide a threshold question: does it even have the power (called "jurisdiction") to hear this kind of appeal? In Nevada, a party can appeal to the Supreme Court only if a statute or a court rule specifically allows an appeal from the type of order being challenged. The Supreme Court concluded that no statute or rule allows an appeal from an order about failure to pay alimony of this kind, and that orders dealing with contempt are not separately appealable on their own either. Because the order Ms. Marson tried to appeal is not one the law lets the Supreme Court review on direct appeal, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the alimony or contempt dispute.

This case arises from a divorce in which the parents disputed custody of their minor child. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave the mother, Amber, sole legal custody and primary physical custody, and ordered the father, Todd, to pay some of her attorney fees. Todd appealed both decisions. Todd's main objection to the custody ruling was that the trial judge looked at materials from an earlier temporary protection order case (a short-term restraining order proceeding) to find that Todd had committed acts of domestic violence. Under Nevada law, when a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent committed domestic violence, there is a "rebuttable presumption" - a starting assumption the parent can try to disprove - that giving that parent custody is not in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was permitted to take "judicial notice" of the earlier TPO records (a process where a court accepts certain reliable facts without requiring formal evidence to re-prove them) because the cases were closely related and Nevada law actually requires courts to consider other proceedings affecting custody. The court also pointed to additional evidence supporting the domestic-violence finding, including Amber being fired from a job over safety concerns related to Todd, two California restraining orders against Todd, a letter from the child's school describing Todd's hostile behavior and alleged threats to shoot Amber and the child, and Amber's testimony that the trial judge found credible. Todd also argued the case took too long under a Nevada Supreme Court rule requiring custody disputes to be resolved within six months. The court rejected this because the rule allows extensions in extraordinary circumstances, and the trial judge documented reasons - including Todd's own four requests to continue the trial, his unsuccessful motions to disqualify the judge, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The court rejected Todd's various constitutional arguments. Because both fit parents have equal rights to their child, the only question is the child's best interest, so strict scrutiny does not apply. The divorce complaint itself did not violate due process because it was the later court orders that affected his custody rights. There is no right to a jury trial in family-court proceedings such as divorce. Double jeopardy and statute of limitations do not apply because no criminal charges were involved. Todd argued the trial judge should have recused himself for a number of reasons - including events during the proceedings, the fact that Todd had sued the judge in federal court, allegations the judge falsified TPO documents, the fact that Amber's lawyer had contributed to the judge's campaign, and a claim the judge had told Amber to "file a motion." The Supreme Court rejected each, noting that judges generally cannot be forced off a case based on things that happened during the case itself, parties cannot manufacture grounds for recusal by suing the judge, lawful campaign contributions within statutory limits do not require recusal, and Todd had not provided trial transcripts that would let the court evaluate the alleged comment to Amber. On attorney fees, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had a proper statutory basis (the divorce statute permitting fee awards), considered the income disparity between the parties, and walked through the factors Nevada courts use to assess whether requested fees are reasonable. The trial court actually reduced the fees requested by nearly half. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed both orders.

This case involves a divorce and a fight over custody of the couple's minor child. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave the mother, Amber, sole legal and primary physical custody, and ordered the father, Todd, to pay some of her attorney fees. Todd appealed both rulings. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed - meaning it left both rulings in place. A central issue was a Nevada law (NRS 125C.0035(5)) that creates a presumption against giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence. The district court had relied on findings from an earlier 2018 temporary protection order (TPO) case, plus testimony and school records, to conclude that Todd had engaged in acts of domestic violence. The school records included a letter from the school's lawyer warning security about Todd's hostile language and alleged threats to shoot Amber and the child. The Supreme Court held the district court was allowed to take "judicial notice" (officially recognize as established) of the related TPO proceedings and that there was substantial evidence supporting the domestic-violence finding. Todd also argued the case took too long under SCR 251, which generally requires custody issues to be resolved within six months. The Supreme Court explained that the rule allows extensions in extraordinary cases with appropriate findings, and pointed out that Todd himself had asked for several continuances and filed multiple unsuccessful motions to disqualify the judge, and that the COVID-19 pandemic also caused delay. Todd raised several constitutional arguments, including a claim that the custody decision should have been reviewed under "strict scrutiny" (the toughest legal test) and that he was entitled to a jury trial. The Supreme Court rejected these. It explained that when two fit parents fight over custody, both have equal constitutional rights, so courts decide based on the child's best interest. Nevada law does not provide for jury trials in family-court cases like divorce or custody. Todd also argued the trial judge should have stepped aside (recused himself) for several reasons, including that Amber's lawyer had contributed to the judge's election campaign and that Todd had sued the judge in federal court. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, noting among other things that lawful campaign contributions within statutory limits do not by themselves require recusal, and that a litigant cannot manufacture grounds for recusal by suing the judge. On attorney fees, the court found that the district court had a proper statutory basis (NRS 125.150(3), allowing fees in divorce cases), considered the income disparity between the parties, analyzed the relevant fee factors from a case called Brunzell, and actually cut the requested fees by nearly half.

Dimonaco and Ferrando share joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. After their custody decree was entered, they disagreed about who should watch the child after school on the days when the child is with Dimonaco. Dimonaco works during some of that time, so the question was what happens to the child until he gets off work. Ferrando asked the court for permission to provide after-school care herself — including help with homework — until Dimonaco finished work on his parenting days. She argued it was better for the child to be with a parent than in an after-school program run by the child's school, which is what Dimonaco had proposed and had already enrolled the child in. Dimonaco countered that the program gave the child educational services and chances to socialize, and he argued that having Ferrando provide care on his days would confuse the child, undermine the child's sense of belonging in his home, and force extra child exchanges between two parents who were in significant conflict. The district court sided with Ferrando and ordered that she provide the after-school care on Dimonaco's days. Dimonaco then asked the court to reconsider, requesting an evidentiary hearing — a proceeding where each side presents actual testimony and admitted evidence rather than just written arguments. He pointed out that the court had ruled without taking any evidence and had not made proper findings about what was in the child's best interest. The court denied the hearing request but added findings favoring Ferrando, saying Dimonaco had not shown "adequate cause" for a hearing. The Court of Appeals disagreed with how the district court handled the matter. It held that Ferrando herself had actually shown enough reason ("adequate cause") to justify an evidentiary hearing, because the parties genuinely disputed facts — such as whether the school's program provided beneficial educational services, whether the child needed those services, and how much conflict the additional exchanges would create. The court explained that resolving these questions required an evaluation that could not be done on paper alone. The appellate court also found that the district court had relied on materials that do not legally count as evidence: exhibits attached to motions that were never formally admitted, and the arguments of the attorneys. Because a decision about a child's best interest must rest on substantial evidence, and because the sworn statements in the case only vaguely addressed the key issues, the court concluded the district court did not have enough evidence to make its decision. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the amended order and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing on the after-school care issue.

This case involves a parent who asked a trial court to change an existing child custody arrangement. The trial court in Humboldt County said no, denying that request. The parent, Ashlee Jackson, then took the matter to the Nevada Court of Appeals. Before the appeal could be decided on its merits, the Court of Appeals raised a question on its own: on March 23, 2022, it issued what is called an "order to show cause" - a directive asking the appealing party to explain why the appeal should not be thrown out as "moot," meaning no longer a live dispute the court needs to resolve. The court gave the appellant a choice: either explain why the case should continue, or file paperwork voluntarily ending the appeal after obtaining the appellant's consent. In response, the appellant chose to end the appeal. She filed a motion to voluntarily withdraw it and stated that she had consented to that withdrawal. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The court did not decide who was right or wrong about the underlying custody question; it simply ended the appeal at the appellant's request.

Lisa and Joel Eorio married in New Mexico in 2006 and have two children together; Joel is also the equitable father of Lisa's third child. In 2019, Lisa moved to Las Vegas for a job, and Joel followed later with the children after they finished the school year. About a year after the move, the couple separated. Joel filed for divorce and asked the court for primary physical custody so that he could move back to New Mexico with the children. Lisa answered and asked that the children stay with her in Las Vegas. Before trial, the parties reached agreements about custody depending on how the court ruled on the move. They agreed that if they lived in the same state, they would share the children (joint physical custody). If the court allowed Joel to move to New Mexico, Joel would have primary custody and Lisa would get substantial parenting time. If the court denied the move and Joel went back to New Mexico anyway, Lisa would have primary custody and the children would stay with her in Las Vegas. Because of these agreements, the only question the trial had to decide was whether Joel could relocate with the children. At an April 2021 trial, both parents testified. Joel said moving back to New Mexico would make him more financially stable because he could live rent-free with his parents and transfer his job. Lisa testified it would be better for the children to stay with her in Las Vegas. The district judge went through the legal factors and found that most of the "best interest" factors either did not apply or applied equally to both parents. Even so, the judge concluded Joel had met the legal requirements and allowed him to move to New Mexico with the children. On appeal, the Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court explained adequately why moving was in the children's best interests. Under Nevada's relocation law, the parent who wants to move must prove, among other things, that the move is in the children's best interests, and the court must make specific findings and connect those findings to its decision. The appeals court found that the written divorce decree never actually stated that relocation was in the children's best interests; it only said most factors did not apply or were equal between the parents. The court then looked at the judge's spoken findings from the trial, but those findings only showed that neither parent was disqualified from sharing custody - they did not explain how moving to New Mexico served the children's best interests. Because the court could not tell, from either the written order or the oral findings, how the judge concluded that relocation was in the children's best interests by the required standard of proof, it reversed that part of the decision and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must make specific findings, tie them to its conclusion about which best-interest factors (if any) support giving Joel primary custody for the purpose of moving, and then weigh all the factors by comparing the children's potential home in each location. The court ordered that the existing relocation order stays in effect until a new order is entered.

This is a brief administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court dismissing an appeal before any consideration of the merits. When someone files an appeal, court rules require payment of a filing fee (or, alternatively, a showing that the filer qualifies to proceed without paying it). In this case, the appellant did not pay the fee when the appeal was docketed. The court issued a notice the same day the appeal was docketed, giving the appellant 7 days either to pay the fee or to demonstrate compliance with the rule that allows certain litigants to proceed without prepayment. The notice warned that failure to comply would lead to dismissal. The appellant did not pay and did not respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. Because the dismissal is procedural, the order does not address any of the underlying child custody issues between the parties.

Christina and Mitchell divorced in 2008 and had two children together, M.S. (17 at the time of the opinion) and E.S. (14). This appeal concerned only the physical custody of M.S.; the parents continued to share joint legal custody of both children and joint physical custody of E.S., and those arrangements were not challenged. In August 2019, Mitchell asked the court to let the children decide for themselves whether to spend custodial time at Christina's home ("teenage discretion"), saying the children did not want to go there because of fights with Christina. Christina opposed this and asked the court to hold Mitchell in contempt for keeping the children from her. After several hearings, the court ordered the parents back onto a week-on/week-off schedule and directed that custody exchanges happen at a supervised visitation center called "Donna's House." The center and child-interview reports indicated the children refused to participate in exchanges with Christina. The court then found there was enough reason ("adequate cause") to hold an evidentiary hearing - a trial-like proceeding with testimony - to decide whether custody should change. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from both children, Mitchell, and Christina. Both children said they preferred to live with Mitchell because of turmoil when with Christina. M.S. described two physical fights with Christina - one in May 2019 (Christina allegedly tackled her, pulled her hair, and hit her) and one in August 2019 (Christina allegedly scratched her, pulled her hair, and pushed her). E.S. said he saw and heard parts of these altercations. M.S. also testified about hurtful language Christina used about her, her stepmother, and her half-sibling. The district court decided it was in M.S.'s best interest for Mitchell to become her primary physical custodian, largely because of the conflict between M.S. and Christina. The court found that Christina had engaged in acts of domestic violence against M.S. under one of the "best interest" factors listed in the statute, but it noted the incidents were softened by the fact that M.S. was an active participant, that it was hard to tell who started them, and that any injuries were minor. Importantly, the court did not use the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard, did not cite the separate statute that creates a legal presumption against giving custody to a domestic-violence perpetrator, and did not apply any such presumption. On appeal, Christina argued the court should have used the clear-and-convincing standard and allowed her to rebut that presumption. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the district court never applied the domestic-violence presumption against Christina in the first place, so she was not harmed by not being given a chance to rebut it - and she had in fact testified about the incidents. The court also said the ordinary standard for civil child-custody matters is "preponderance of the evidence," not clear and convincing, unless the legislature says otherwise, and Christina cited no authority requiring the higher standard just to consider domestic-violence allegations among the best-interest factors. Finally, the court held that even if the district court had made a mistake about the domestic-violence framework, the error was harmless because the district court gave many other reasons - M.S.'s own wish (at nearly 18) to live with her father, and the fractured relationship between M.S. and Christina - that independently supported the custody change. Because those findings were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Lyudmyla Abid and Sean Abid divorced in 2010 and originally agreed to share custody of their child. In 2016, after a hearing, the district court gave Sean primary physical custody, and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal in 2017. In September 2019, Lyudmyla went back to court asking to change custody again. She claimed that since getting primary custody, Sean had been undermining and trying to alienate her relationship with the child, and had not properly cared for the child. The district court denied her motion at a November 2019 hearing, though it ordered the child into therapy and a child interview at the Family Medication Center (FMC). The court did not put its written order on file until November 2020. In that order, the court said that even if Lyudmyla's allegations were true, they did not amount to a "prima facie case" — a preliminary showing strong enough to justify a full evidentiary hearing — and it found the child was doing well in Sean's care and that CPS records she cited were unsubstantiated. Meanwhile, in October 2020, Lyudmyla filed additional motions asking the court to make findings from the FMC child interview and to modify custody based on the child's best interest, including the child's stated desire to spend equal time with both parents. After the written order was entered, she also asked the court to reconsider. The district court denied all of these requests, concluding among other things that the 12-year-old child was too young for his custody preference to be given weight and that Lyudmyla appeared to be relitigating issues already decided. The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, a parent asking to change custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing — a proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is formally admitted — if the parent makes a preliminary showing of facts that, if true, could justify a custody change. The court concluded that Lyudmyla's allegations (that Sean was not properly caring for the child, was not using all of his custodial time, and was interfering with her parenting time) were relevant to modification and, if proven at a hearing, could warrant a change. The appeals court also pointed out a problem with how the district court reached its findings: it appeared to decide the merits based on the parties' arguments and filings, but arguments of lawyers are not evidence — factual findings must rest on evidence actually presented. Because no evidentiary hearing was held, the findings lacked an evidentiary basis. The appeals court also reversed the later order, because the district court appeared to review only whether its earlier order was correct, without addressing Lyudmyla's separate arguments that events occurring after the November 2019 hearing justified modification or at least additional findings. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings. The appeals court declined to revisit the original custody modification itself, explaining that those issues either were or could have been raised in the earlier appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.

A parent in Elko County tried to appeal two decisions made by the district court in a child-custody dispute. One decision changed (modified) the existing custody arrangement. The other gave the other parent temporary sole custody of the child. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of either decision. Instead, it dismissed the appeal for two reasons related to its own authority to hear the case. First, the appeal of the order modifying custody was filed too late. Notice that the order had been entered was mailed to the appellant on February 3, 2022. Under the appellate rules, the deadline to file a notice of appeal was March 10, 2022. The appellant did not file the notice of appeal until March 17, 2022 - one week past the deadline. When an appeal is filed late, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction (legal authority) to hear it. Second, the order granting temporary sole custody is not the kind of order that can be appealed at all. Nevada law allows appeals from orders that finally establish custody of children, not from temporary ones. Because of these two jurisdictional problems, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing whether the district court's custody decisions were right or wrong.

This case concerns which relatives should serve as legal guardians of two young children, C.F. and P.S. A guardian is a person a court appoints to care for and make decisions for someone who cannot care for themselves - here, two minors. The children's mother, Kristin S., is the natural mother of both. Several relatives competed to be guardians: the maternal great grandparents (called the Luceros in the opinion - the appellants Pamela L. and Michael L.), and the paternal grandparents (the Fergusons and the McGrews). According to the opinion, when the children were about three months and two years old, Kristin gave written consent for the paternal grandparents to serve as guardians while she went to California, saying she was seeking treatment for methamphetamine use. She apparently did not attend any rehabilitation program. After Pamela traveled to California to bring her home, Kristin withdrew her consent to the paternal grandparents and instead consented to the Luceros being guardians of both children. The district court initially set up a temporary arrangement in which all the competing relatives shared guardianship, with the children spending alternating weeks in different homes. This week-on/week-off arrangement continued for nearly two years. The opinion describes concerns that arose during that period, including that P.S. experienced distress from moving between homes and gained a large amount of weight while living with the Luceros, and that P.S. was returned to the Luceros with a bruise after the McGrews had her. Maria admitted spanking P.S. but said the bruise came from a fall on a hearth; a state investigation (DCFS) did not substantiate abuse and attributed the injury to the fall. During the final guardianship hearing, the district court reviewed DCFS reports about all the parties privately (in camera - meaning the judge reviewed the documents in chambers rather than in open court). Those reports showed the Luceros had extensive DCFS involvement and at least one substantiated 2014 report of child neglect, while the paternal grandparents had either no reports (the Fergusons) or one unsubstantiated report (the McGrews). The district court found that Kristin was currently unsuitable to care for her children, citing a history of drug use, failure to attend treatment, unemployment, and instability. The court also found that the Luceros had a chaotic household, a bankruptcy, law enforcement issues, and the substantiated neglect report, and that they were unwilling to allow relationships with the other grandparents. It found the paternal grandparents offered more stability. So it appointed the Fergusons as guardians of C.F. and the McGrews as guardians of P.S., with visitation for Kristin and the Luceros as long as it served the children's best interests. On appeal, the Luceros raised three main complaints. First, they said the DCFS reports were improper hearsay and that reviewing them privately violated their due process rights. The appellate court explained that the Luceros never gave the court the DCFS reports as part of the appellate record, so the court presumed the missing documents supported the district court's decision. The court also concluded that plenty of other evidence - independent of the DCFS reports - supported the guardianship decision, so any error would not have changed the outcome. The court found the due process argument was not properly preserved and, in any event, that the Luceros had opportunities to learn about and respond to the reports. Second, the Luceros argued the court should not have appointed the paternal grandparents and should have applied the "best interest" factors used in custody cases. The appellate court explained that guardianship law has its own set of considerations for deciding who is a suitable guardian and does not require applying the custody-specific best interest factors. The court also found the district court did make specific findings tied to the children's best interests. Third, the Luceros argued the attorneys for the paternal grandparents and for the children should have been disqualified because of prior involvement with the Lucero family - one had represented the Luceros' grandson in a juvenile matter, and the other had represented a victim in a related child-protection case. The appellate court held the Luceros likely lacked standing to raise these conflicts (because they were neither the former nor the current clients of those attorneys) and, in any event, that the prior representations were not disqualifying. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision in full.

Scott Anthony and Katarina Kurz married in Nevada in 2008, later moved to Nebraska, and had one child, M.A., born in 2014. They separated in early 2017, and Katarina moved back to Nevada. Scott filed for divorce in Nebraska. The Nebraska divorce decree gave Katarina sole legal and physical custody and permission to relocate to Nevada with the child, while giving Scott roughly 70 to 75 days of parenting time per year without restrictions. According to the opinion, the divorce decree did not include a finding that Scott had committed domestic violence, even though Katarina had alleged it during the divorce. In 2020, Scott moved to Nevada. Katarina then agreed to give him extra time with M.A. but would not agree to split time 50/50. Scott went to a Nevada court and asked to change custody to joint physical and legal custody. Katarina opposed this. At the hearing, she again raised her claim that Scott had committed domestic violence in Nebraska, and she argued it was best for the child that she keep sole custody. To back up her domestic-violence claim, Katarina tried to introduce a letter she said was written by the Nebraska divorce judge. The letter, in a section titled "REMOVAL," stated that the evidence supported a finding that Katarina had moved from Omaha in part because "she had suffered physical abuse by [Scott]." Scott objected, arguing the letter was hearsay - an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it says, which is generally not allowed as evidence. Katarina argued the letter fit the "business records" exception, a rule that lets certain routine business records in despite the hearsay bar. The district court refused to admit the letter, finding it did not fit any hearsay exception. After the hearing, the district court found that Scott had shown a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and that switching to joint legal and physical custody was in M.A.'s best interest. The court granted Scott's request. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. First, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in treating Scott's move to Nevada as a substantial change in circumstances, because the district court connected that move to concrete, positive changes in the child's life - more parenting time with Scott and a regular, loving relationship with his father. Second, the appeals court addressed the excluded letter. In the district court, Katarina had argued only that the letter qualified under the business records exception. On appeal, she switched to a different rule, the public records exception. The Court of Appeals declined to consider the new argument because she had not raised it in the lower court, and Nevada treats the business records exception and the public records exception as two separate rules. The court also noted that the Nebraska divorce decree contained no finding of domestic violence and imposed no restrictions on Scott's parenting time, which Nebraska law would have required had such a finding been made. The court added that even if excluding the letter had been an error, it would have been harmless: the district court did in fact consider Katarina's domestic-violence allegation, found no credible evidence supporting it, and Katarina testified she had no present concerns about Scott's care of the child.

Andrew Warren and Aimee Jung Ahyang were never married but have one child together. In early 2019, Warren asked the court to give him primary physical custody. Ahyang answered and asked for primary physical custody herself, citing Warren's emotional and mental status. Warren, in turn, argued that Ahyang had issues with drug usage. The trial court held a two-day evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, then issued detailed written findings and awarded the parents joint legal custody while giving Ahyang primary physical custody. Warren asked the trial court for a new trial and for reconsideration. When that request was denied, he appealed. The Court of Appeals is not a place where the whole case is retried; instead, the appellate judges check whether the trial court had a reasonable basis for its decision and did not misuse its discretion. Warren's main complaint on appeal was that the trial court leaned too heavily on his mental health when it decided custody. The appellate court disagreed, saying the record did not support that claim. Nevada law requires the trial court to weigh a list of specific factors when deciding what is in a child's best interest. Reviewing the trial court's written findings, the appellate court noted that none of those factors favored Warren; several favored Ahyang, and the rest were neutral or did not apply. The court added that even if Warren's mental health had been treated as a non-issue, the other factors would still have supported the award to Ahyang. Warren also argued the trial court should have ordered Ahyang to undergo drug testing. The appellate court noted that the trial court found Ahyang "used to have a drug issue, but she has fixed it," based on three negative drug tests she presented and a review of CPS records. The appellate court concluded that was enough evidence to support the trial court's conclusion. Warren further objected to two stipulations and orders about vacation and holiday time that were entered after the hearing, saying the court never asked whether he agreed and never required his signature. The appellate court observed that Warren's own attorney had signed both stipulations, and that a local court rule allows a stipulation to be entered when it is signed by a party's attorney. Because Warren had not presented evidence below that he did not consent, the appellate court declined to consider that argument for the first time on appeal. Finally, Warren argued he deserved a new trial because the trial court excluded his medical records and because he was surprised by his inability to admit them. The appellate court explained that the trial court did not exclude the records entirely; it excluded them only for the first day of the hearing so Ahyang could review them, and it told Warren he could renew his request on day two. Warren never renewed the request. Because Warren failed to disclose the records before the hearing and then failed to seek their admission on day two, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. The judgment was affirmed.

This case is about what a Nevada judge must consider when one divorced (or separated) parent who already has primary physical custody of a child wants to move with the child out of state, and the other parent objects. Anthony Monahan and Amanda Hogan share a daughter, born in 2012. They originally had joint custody while both lived in Yerington, Nevada. After Hogan's new husband (a Navy officer) was assigned to a base in Fallon, Hogan moved there with the child, and the district court awarded her primary physical custody in 2019. When Hogan's husband was later reassigned to Virginia Beach, Hogan asked the court for permission to relocate with the child to Virginia. Monahan refused to consent, so the court held an evidentiary hearing. Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.007, requires a parent who wants to relocate to clear three threshold hurdles: (1) a sensible, good-faith reason for the move; (2) that the move is in the "best interests of the child"; and (3) that the child and the relocating parent will gain an "actual advantage" from the move. If those are met, the court then weighs six additional relocation factors. The dispute in this appeal centered on hurdle two. The statute uses the phrase "best interests of the child" but does not say what that means or whether the judge must walk through the twelve "best interest" custody factors listed in a separate statute, NRS 125C.0035(4). Monahan argued that the district court had to redo the full twelve-factor custody analysis at the relocation hearing, and that simply pointing back to findings made in earlier custody orders made the analysis "stale." Hogan argued the custody factors had no place in a relocation analysis because she already held primary custody. The Nevada Court of Appeals took a middle path. It held that when a parent who already has primary physical custody seeks to relocate, the trial judge does not have to re-prove custody by mechanically running through every one of the twelve custody best interest factors. But the judge cannot ignore those factors either. The judge should consider the custody best interest factors and any other factors that fit the case, make specific findings on whichever ones are relevant, and tie those findings to the conclusion about whether the move is in the child's best interests. The court also answered a question the parties had not directly briefed: how convinced does the judge need to be? The answer is "preponderance of the evidence" - meaning more likely than not - which is the default standard in Nevada family law unless the Legislature clearly says otherwise. Applying these rules to this case, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court did enough. The judge had previously made detailed best-interest findings (knowing that Hogan's husband might be transferred), incorporated those findings, found that nothing about the proposed move changed them, and made fresh findings about the actual advantages of the Virginia move - better tutoring and educational resources, a better quality of life, and not being separated from a half-sibling. Monahan never identified any specific factor that, if reanalyzed, would have weighed against relocation. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the order allowing the move.

Ali Shahrokhi tried to appeal a family court order from Clark County. That order did two things: it clarified what a hearing master had recommended, and it held Mr. Shahrokhi in contempt for not paying child support he had been ordered to pay. He filed his appeal without an attorney. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his complaints. Instead, it concluded it had no power to hear the appeal in the first place. In Nevada, the Supreme Court can only review the kinds of orders that a statute or court rule specifically allows to be appealed. A contempt order that is tied to (or "ancillary to") another ongoing proceeding is not on that list, and no other statute or rule made this particular order appealable. The notice of appeal also referenced several other rulings: a motion to set aside earlier orders, findings related to a "vexatious litigant" determination (a label courts use for someone who repeatedly files meritless filings), and the denial of an emergency motion to change custody. The court explained that the set-aside ruling was already the subject of a separate appeal (Docket No. 83726); that vexatious-litigant findings cannot be appealed on their own; and that the emergency-custody denial existed only as a minute order, which is not effective for appeal purposes until it is written, signed, and filed. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it dismissed the appeal and took no action on two pending pro se motions filed in February 2022.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Janea Calkins and Waylon Huber married in 2010 and had twin children two years later. They divorced in Nevada in 2016. As part of their divorce, they agreed to share both legal and physical custody of the children, and Huber agreed that Calkins could temporarily move with the children to Boise, Idaho, for two years so she could finish her education. Later, after a series of events, the district court held an evidentiary hearing in July 2020 and entered an order that temporarily gave Huber sole physical custody and gave Calkins supervised parenting time. As the opinion notes, that temporary order did not set a hearing date or specify an event that would make it permanent, though the court said it would revisit the arrangement if Calkins moved back to Nevada. In March 2021, Calkins - representing herself without a lawyer (pro se) - filed a motion asking that the children be returned to her custody in Idaho. In May 2021, Huber filed an opposition to her motion and also filed a cross-motion (his own request for relief) asking for permanent custody. Just days later, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Calkins's motion and granted Huber's request, converting the temporary custody order into a permanent one. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided it did not need to address most of the issues Calkins raised. It focused on one problem: the district court did not follow the proper procedure before entering a permanent custody order. The court had ruled too quickly - it treated the matter as ready for decision only two days after Huber filed his papers and entered its order just seven days after Huber filed, even though the applicable court rule allows a party 7 days to respond to an opposition and 14 days to respond to a motion. That meant Calkins did not get her chance to reply to Huber's opposition or to oppose his cross-motion for permanent custody. The Court of Appeals also found that the district court skipped a required step before making custody permanent. The lower court applied the standard from a prior Nevada case for modifying custody and concluded Calkins had not shown a substantial change in circumstances - but it did not first apply the threshold test from another case that governs whether an evidentiary hearing is needed. Because the district court did not hold a hearing that would have let both parties present evidence about what is best for the children, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell whether such a hearing was necessary. It sent the case back so the district court, which is familiar with the parties, could decide that question first. The appellate court reversed the district court's judgment and returned the case for further proceedings consistent with its order.

Thomas Cass and Christa Classon were divorced in 2018 and share joint legal and joint physical custody of their minor child. Joint legal custody means both parents share decision-making authority over major issues in the child's life, such as where the child goes to school. In July 2020, Thomas asked the court to let the child attend a private school. Christa opposed. At a hearing set for February 2021, the parties reportedly agreed the child could attend either a magnet school (McCaw) or a charter school (Legacy at Cadence). The court entered an order stating that the parties' agreement was now the court's order: the parents were to agree on a school, and if they could not agree, the child would stay at his current public school. In June 2021, Thomas filed a second motion about the child's schooling. He explained that the child had been accepted at two Legacy charter school locations - Legacy at Cadence, near Christa's home, and Legacy at North Valley, near his home. Thomas said Christa told him she could not transport the child to Legacy at Cadence, which meant Thomas would have to pay a babysitter to drive the child to school during Christa's parenting time. Thomas asked that the child be allowed to attend Legacy at North Valley to shorten his own commute during his custodial time, noting he was paying for all the transportation. Christa opposed. She argued the child needed stability, was excelling at his current school, and that the distance to Legacy at North Valley would make it impossible for her to transport him because of her work schedule. She also argued that Thomas had moved residences multiple times, that he was only trying to change the child's school for his own convenience, and that he would keep trying to change it based on wherever he lived. The district court denied Thomas's motion. It noted that Thomas had filed multiple motions to move the child's school and stated that his "decision to make multiple moves away from the school was not in the best interest of the Minor Child to change schools." On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. It found two problems with the district court's reasoning. First, to the extent the court denied the motion because it believed Thomas had filed numerous motions, the record showed he had filed only two - his first motion (which led to the agreement) and his second motion (filed after the parties could no longer agree). So the idea that Thomas repeatedly filed motions every time he moved was not supported by the record. Second, to the extent the court denied the motion because the distance between Thomas's home and the school was not a good enough reason to change schools, the appellate court disagreed, explaining that commute length and logistical concerns are among the factors a court is supposed to weigh. Because both parents raised arguments touching on the various relevant factors and the district court did not make findings on those factors or explain the basis for its decision, the appellate court could not tell whether the decision was made for appropriate reasons. It therefore sent the case back for the district court to make proper findings.

Brian Lee Whittle and Raven Morris are not married but have one child together. In 2019, Whittle filed a complaint asking to be listed as the child's father on the birth certificate and requesting joint legal and physical custody. Legal custody generally refers to decision-making authority over a child, while physical custody refers to where the child lives and who cares for the child day-to-day. The district court held an evidentiary hearing (a court proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is presented) on February 18, 2021. Afterward, it issued a 33-page order. That order directed Whittle to change the child's last name to Morris-Whittle, gave both parents joint legal custody, and gave Morris primary physical custody. The court went through each of the factors Nevada law lists for deciding what is in a child's best interest and described the witness testimony in detail. Whittle appealed, arguing mainly that the district court made inaccurate factual statements in its custody order and that it wrongly gave Morris primary physical custody based on those inaccurate findings, which he said relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements offered as evidence). He also filed a document called "supplemental exhibits" after the hearing to try to challenge some of the court's findings. The Court of Appeals declined to consider the "supplemental exhibits" because that document had not been properly presented to the district court before the hearing, and Whittle had not asked the district court for any relief based on it. Courts generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. The bigger problem for Whittle's appeal was the record. When someone appeals, they are responsible for giving the appellate court the documents it needs to review what happened below - including transcripts of hearings. Whittle did not provide a transcript of the February 18, 2021 evidentiary hearing. He had requested transcripts of a different, earlier hearing (a temporary custody hearing held on October 3, 2019), but never actually delivered those transcripts to the court or took steps to compel their preparation. Without the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the court explained, it could not fully evaluate his claims that the hearing was unfair or that the district court made improper evidentiary rulings. When necessary parts of the record are missing, the appellate court presumes the missing material supports the district court's decision. Looking at what it did have - the 33-page order with specific findings on the best-interest factors - the Court of Appeals concluded the record supported the district court's decision to award Morris primary physical custody, and it affirmed.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally have to pay a filing fee at the time the case is opened. If a person cannot afford the fee, there is a separate procedure to ask the court to waive it. In this case, the appellant docketed her appeal on January 4, 2022, but did not pay the filing fee. The same day, the court sent her a notice giving her 14 days either to pay the fee or to show that she qualified for a fee waiver under the applicable rule. The notice warned her that if she did neither, her appeal would be thrown out. According to the order, the appellant did not pay and did not respond. The Nevada Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying child custody dispute on the merits.

This case concerns a fight over custody and visitation of a child after the child's father died. On one side were the child's paternal grandmother (Colt) and aunt (Kanter). On the other side was the child's mother (Plummer). The grandmother went to court asking for custody of the child, or at least the right to visit; the aunt later joined the case. After a lengthy legal battle and a multi-day trial, the trial judge decided in the mother's favor, giving her full custody and refusing to grant custody or visitation to the grandmother and aunt. The grandmother and aunt appealed. Their main argument was that no one ever proved the mother was a fit parent, and that the trial judge ignored evidence suggesting the mother was unfit — specifically, allegations that the mother had abused and neglected the child, struggled with addiction, and had mental health problems. The Court of Appeals disagreed with that characterization of the trial record. When a judge decides child custody, the appeals court does not redo the decision from scratch; it only checks whether the trial judge "abused" his discretion and whether the decision was backed by enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept it. The guiding principle in these cases is always what is best for the child. On the custody question, the law strongly favors placing a child with a fit parent. A non-parent (like a grandmother or aunt) can only win custody over a parent by showing the parent is unfit or that other extraordinary circumstances exist. The appeals court found that the trial judge had, in fact, carefully considered the evidence about the mother. The judge reviewed the extensive Child Protective Services file, noting that out of more than 30 referrals investigated by CPS, only one incident was substantiated, and that occurred several years before this lawsuit began. The judge acknowledged the mother had struggled with addiction but found no evidence of recent addiction-related incidents, and observed that some of her behavioral problems appeared to stem from the volatile relationship with the grandmother and aunt and from the stress of the litigation. The judge also noted one 2018 incident where the mother was detained on a mental-health hold while extremely intoxicated, but found no other relevant mental-health evidence. In the end, the trial judge concluded that the evidence did not show the mother was unfit, so the grandmother and aunt failed to overcome the legal preference favoring the parent. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. On the visitation question, grandparents and certain others who have lived with a child and built a meaningful relationship can ask a court for visitation if a parent has unreasonably denied it. But when a parent has denied visitation, the law assumes visitation is not in the child's best interest, and the people seeking visitation must overcome that assumption with strong ("clear and convincing") evidence. The appeals court noted it was unclear whether the child had ever lived with the aunt (which affects whether she was even eligible to seek visitation), but because the trial judge addressed the request on its merits, the appeals court did the same. The trial judge found that although the mother had sometimes denied contact, she was generally compliant with visitation. The judge weighed the statutory factors and found most of them actually favored the grandmother and aunt, and recognized several ways a relationship with them would benefit the child. But the judge had serious concerns about one factor — the grandmother and aunt's willingness and ability to encourage a relationship between the child and his mother. The judge found a high degree of animosity and conflict between the parties, to which the child was constantly exposed, and concluded that this conflict and the appellants' inability to foster the parent-child bond outweighed the factors in their favor. The appeals court again found no abuse of discretion. Finally, to the extent the grandmother and aunt argued the trial judge gave improper weight to the evidence, the appeals court said it will not re-weigh witness credibility or the evidence on appeal.

Justin and Sarah Maurice divorced in 2015 under an agreed ("stipulated") divorce decree. That decree gave them joint legal custody of their two children, but gave Sarah primary physical custody, with Justin having the children on alternating weekends. In 2020, Justin asked the family court to change the arrangement to joint physical custody. He gave several reasons: his job and work schedule had changed, Sarah's work schedule had changed, he was now available to care for the children himself while Sarah worked (rather than having third parties watch them), more than five years had passed since the divorce, the children had bonded with their stepsiblings, and, he said, the change was in the children's best interests. He also pointed out that during the COVID-19 pandemic he had been the parent primarily helping the children with school, that the parties had actually been following a different schedule than the decree required, and that the children had expressed a preference to spend more time with him. The family court turned down Justin's request without holding a hearing to take evidence. Its main reason was that a change in work schedule, by itself, is not a "substantial change in circumstances" — the legal threshold a parent must cross to change primary physical custody. Justin asked the court to reconsider; the court again refused and ordered Justin to pay $1,500 of Sarah's attorney fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the family court on two points. First, it explained that a change in a parent's work schedule can count as a change in circumstances if it affects the children's welfare, so the family court was wrong to reject the motion based mainly on the idea that a work-schedule change never qualifies. Second, the court said the family court gave no specific explanation for why Justin had not shown "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing — a hearing where witnesses and evidence are presented — and nothing in the record suggested his claims were just repetitive or only meant to discredit Sarah. Because Justin had presented enough to justify a hearing, the family court should have held one before deciding whether to change custody. The appeals court reversed the family court's decision and sent the case back for further proceedings. Because it undid the underlying ruling, it also canceled ("vacated") the $1,500 attorney-fee award.

This case concerns a dispute between two parents, Javier Ramirez Rivas and Mayra E. Arreguin, over custody of their two minor children. After what the court describes as "protracted custody proceedings," the district court gave Arreguin primary physical custody, with Rivas having limited parenting time. That arrangement was later changed so that Rivas's limited parenting time became subject to the children's discretion. Most recently, Rivas asked the court to change the arrangement to joint physical custody. He argued that the children's school attendance and academic performance had declined during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court refused, saying that keeping the existing arrangement was in the children's best interest. Rivas then appealed. Nevada law requires a court considering a request to change custody to work through a two-part test: first, whether there has been a significant change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and second, whether changing the arrangement would serve the child's best interest. When a court decides what is in the child's best interest, it must connect its decision to specific findings about a list of factors set out in Nevada law and any other relevant factors. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether Rivas should win his request to change custody. Instead, it found that the district court's written order was unclear and did not contain the findings the law requires. On the first part of the test, the order never clearly said whether there had been a significant change in circumstances - it could be read both ways, because the court voiced concerns about the children's academic performance but also suggested their situation was not unusual given the pandemic. On the second part, the order summarized what the parties, the children, and the children's court-appointed special advocate said, and stated that keeping the existing arrangement was best, but it did not explain specifically why that arrangement served the children's best interest or tie the facts of the case to the required factors. Because the order lacked these necessary findings, the appellate court concluded that the district court abused its discretion and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must make specific findings about whether there was a significant change in circumstances and, if so, must connect the facts of the case to each best interest factor. The appellate court expressly took no position on whether Rivas's motion should ultimately succeed. It also noted that the lower court may instead need to apply a different standard - whether Rivas showed "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing - depending on how the court frames its decision on remand.

This is a one-page administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court closing out an appeal in a child custody case. The person who filed the appeal, Tyler T. Angus, asked the court to dismiss his own appeal voluntarily - meaning he no longer wished to pursue it. The court granted that request and dismissed the appeal. The order does not discuss the underlying custody dispute, the facts between the parties, or any legal issues that might have been raised had the appeal gone forward. It is purely a procedural closing of the file.

Ahed Said Senjab and Mohamad Abulhakim Alhulaibi are Syrian citizens who married in Saudi Arabia and have one child. In 2018, Alhulaibi came to Las Vegas on an F-1 student visa to attend UNLV. In January 2020, Senjab and the child joined him on F-2 dependent visas. Two months later, Senjab filed for divorce in Clark County, also seeking spousal support, child custody, and child support. Alhulaibi moved to dismiss, arguing the Nevada court had no power to hear the case. Nevada's divorce-jurisdiction statute, NRS 125.020, requires that at least one spouse have been a "resident" of Nevada for at least six weeks before filing. Older Nevada Supreme Court decisions had said "residence" in this statute meant the same thing as "domicile" - a true, permanent home where a person intends to stay. Alhulaibi argued that because their student-related visas required them to maintain a foreign residence, they could not legally form the intent to remain in Nevada, so neither spouse could be domiciled here. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Reading the statute's words plainly, the court held that "residence" means just that - residence - not domicile. The statute itself uses the two terms separately, treating them as different. A separate Nevada statute, NRS 10.155, defines legal residence as the place where a person has been physically present during the period for which residence is claimed. Because the district court had already found that Senjab and Alhulaibi were physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before the complaint was filed, the residency requirement was met, and the district court had jurisdiction to hear the divorce. The court sent the case back to the district court to proceed with the divorce action. The court did not decide whether F-2 visa holders can or cannot establish domicile, because that question was no longer necessary to resolve the case. The court also did not address the custody and support issues, since the district court had not ruled on them.

Greg and Heidi Pelkola divorced in 2014 and share legal custody of their three children, with Heidi having primary physical custody. After the divorce, Heidi obtained court permission under Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125C.006) to move with the children from Nevada to Arizona. In October 2019, she asked the district court for permission to move again, this time from Arizona to Ohio. Greg did not consent. The district court told Heidi she did not actually need permission for this second move, reasoning that the Nevada statute only governed her original move out of Nevada. The court nevertheless granted permission and made limited findings about how the Ohio move would affect Greg's visitation. Greg appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with him on two points. First, the court read the statute's words literally: NRS 125C.006 requires permission whenever a custodial parent intends to relocate the child "to a place outside of" Nevada, and that language covers a move from one out-of-state location (Arizona) to another (Ohio), not just a move directly out of Nevada. The court noted that the opposite reading would let a parent who had moved with permission to a nearby state then move anywhere in the world - even Japan - without notice to the other parent. Second, because the relocation statute did apply, the district court was required by NRS 125C.007 to make specific findings on a list of factors, including whether there was a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, whether the move served the children's best interests, and whether the move offered an actual advantage to the relocating parent and child. If those threshold factors are met, the court must then weigh additional factors about quality of life, motives, and visitation. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not make the required findings and so abused its discretion by granting the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing and issue specific findings on each applicable factor. The court also reversed the attorney-fee award tied to the relocation petition and instructed the lower court to recalculate it as necessary.

This case is about a Nevada family court's role in helping certain immigrant children apply for a special federal immigration status. Federal law allows some children in the United States to apply for what is called Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status, which can lead to lawful permanent residency. Before a child can apply, a state court must make three specific findings about the child's situation. One of those findings is that the child cannot reasonably be reunited with one or both parents because of abandonment, abuse, neglect, or something similar. Mariela Lopez gave birth to her son K.M.L. in El Salvador in 2007 and told the father, Serbellon Portillo, both about the pregnancy and about the birth. According to the opinion, Serbellon Portillo never communicated with K.M.L., never sought contact, and never provided support, even though he lives in El Salvador and could have reached Lopez or her family. K.M.L. lived with Lopez's mother in El Salvador until 2017, when his grandmother could no longer care for him and gang violence in his neighborhood became a concern (neighbors had been killed by gang members). K.M.L. then moved to the United States to live with his mother. Lopez asked the Nevada family court for custody and for the SIJ predicate findings. The court gave her custody and agreed it was in K.M.L.'s best interest to stay with her, but declined to find that reunification with the father was "not viable," explaining it could not predict whether the father might someday try to reunite with the child. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the family court used the wrong test. The legal question is not whether future reunification is theoretically possible, but whether it is "viable" - meaning workable or practicable - given the history of the parent-child relationship and the realistic conditions in the child's home country. The Court adopted a framework drawn from out-of-state decisions: family courts should look at the entire history of the relationship between parent and child, the effects forced reunification might have on the child, and the actual conditions on the ground in the home country. The Court also emphasized that an SIJ "abandonment" finding is not the same as terminating parental rights, so the standard for abandonment in this context is broader and less demanding. The Supreme Court left the custody award in place but sent the case back to the family court to reconsider the reunification finding using the correct standard.

This case is about how an undocumented child living in Nevada can ask a state court to make the findings she needs to apply to the federal government for "Special Immigrant Juvenile" (SIJ) status -- a category of immigration relief for children who cannot safely return to a parent in their home country. To apply, the child first needs a state court to make three specific findings. Only after those findings are made can the child go to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and ask for SIJ status itself. The state judge does not decide whether the child gets SIJ status; the judge just makes findings that the federal agency will later review. A.A. was born in El Salvador in 2004. Her mother, Amaya, came to the United States when A.A. was two. A.A. lived with her father until, according to the opinion, he "kicked her out" when she was ten, after which she lived with her grandmother. A.A. says her father emotionally and physically abused her. At twelve, A.A. moved to Las Vegas to live with her mother, stepfather, and half-siblings. She does not want to return to El Salvador. Amaya filed a custody case in district court. The father did not respond, so the court entered a default and gave Amaya sole physical custody and both parents joint legal custody. Amaya then asked the same court to make the three SIJ findings. The district court refused. It said: (1) granting Amaya custody was not the same as "appointing" her to have custody, and (2) Amaya had not shown that A.A. could not reunify with both parents -- only with her father. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held, first, that when a Nevada district court grants a parent physical custody of a child, that order does place the child under the custody of "a person appointed by the court" for purposes of the SIJ findings. Second, the court held that the SIJ reunification requirement is satisfied when reunification with just one parent is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, or neglect -- the law does not require that reunification with both parents be impossible. The court emphasized that the federal statute uses the word "or" in "one or both" parents, and the court joined the majority of states that read it the same way. Because the district court got both points wrong and never reached the third finding (whether returning A.A. to El Salvador is in her best interest), the Supreme Court sent the case back for the district court to redo the analysis. One justice dissented, arguing that the Nevada statute authorizing district courts to make these SIJ findings, NRS 3.2203, lists the specific kinds of cases it applies to -- and Amaya's custody case (filed under NRS Chapter 125C) is not on that list. In the dissent's view, Amaya should have filed for guardianship under NRS Chapter 159A instead, and could still do so.

Renelyn Bautista and James Picone are the parents of a minor child and share joint physical custody under an agreement they reached and the district court approved. After that agreement, Bautista filed several motions asking the court to change the custody arrangement. The district court denied those motions and eventually appointed a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral third party who helps separated parents work out disputes about their child without having to come back to court each time. In the order Bautista challenges on appeal, the district court gave the parenting coordinator power not just to resolve small day-to-day disagreements (like scheduling) but also to make "substantive" changes to the custody plan - meaning changes big enough to shift how much time the child spends with each parent, or even to change which parent has primary custody. Bautista also filed a new motion asking the court to change custody because, she alleged, Picone was carrying on a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old girl. To support that allegation, she submitted Facebook messages and emails between Picone and the girl in which, according to the opinion, Picone acknowledged the girl's age and discussed having a sexual relationship with her. She also submitted a third-party affidavit saying Picone intentionally rammed his car into another car that the minor child was riding in. The district court denied her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing - that is, without taking live testimony or evidence. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed both orders. First, the court held that a district judge cannot hand off the power to make substantive custody decisions to a parenting coordinator. Under the Nevada Constitution, that decision-making power belongs to the judge. A parenting coordinator's authority must be limited to nonsubstantive matters such as scheduling and travel issues. Second, the court held that Bautista's allegations - especially the messages with a minor and the affidavit about the car incident - were enough to establish "adequate cause" requiring the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on her motion to modify custody. The case was sent back for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Sandra Nance and Christopher Ferraro have one child, born in 2008. Sandra lives in Las Vegas; Christopher lives in New York. Before their divorce, Sandra accused Christopher of domestic violence and child abuse, and Child Protective Services investigated. In 2011, the parties agreed that Sandra would be the primary residential parent. After ongoing co-parenting problems, the district court ordered a custody evaluation, required Christopher to exercise his parenting time in Nevada for a period, and required both parties to take parenting classes. In November 2012, the parties signed a stipulation that called their arrangement "joint legal and physical custody," and the child continued to live with Sandra in Nevada. In 2015, Christopher asked the court to give him primary physical custody and to let him move the child to New York. Sandra objected and wanted to bring up Christopher's earlier domestic violence and abuse - including the custody evaluation, CPS reports, and witness testimony - to argue that moving the child to live with him was not in the child's best interest. Christopher asked the court to block all evidence about events before the November 2012 order, citing two Nevada Supreme Court cases, McMonigle and Castle. The district court agreed and barred Sandra's older evidence. It then ruled that the parents had been sharing joint physical custody, granted Christopher primary physical custody, and let him move the child to New York. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that McMonigle and Castle limit when a parent who is trying to change custody can rely on old facts to show that "circumstances have changed" - the threshold a parent must meet before a court can modify primary physical custody. Those cases do not stop a court from looking back at the facts that supported its earlier orders when it decides what is best for the child now. And they do not stop a parent who is opposing a change in custody from pointing to old evidence - including past domestic violence - to argue that changing custody is not in the child's best interest. The court emphasized that Nevada law requires judges to consider domestic violence when deciding the best interest of a child, and that there is a rebuttable presumption against giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence. By blocking Sandra's evidence, the district court could not properly weigh those factors when it decided what kind of custody arrangement existed, whether to modify it, and whether to allow the child to move. The Court of Appeals sent the case back so the district court could consider the previously excluded evidence - though the parties cannot simply re-fight issues the court has already decided.

Matthew and Melissa Arcella divorced in 2009 and share joint legal and physical custody of their two children. They had agreed to send the kids to a small private secular school. When their older daughter R.A. was finishing elementary school in 2016, both parents agreed she should move to a larger middle school - but they could not agree on which one. Matthew wanted Faith Lutheran, a religious private school; Melissa wanted Bob Miller Middle School, a highly ranked public school closer to home, and she objected on religious grounds to her daughter receiving a religious education. The family court, without holding an evidentiary hearing or making detailed findings, picked Bob Miller. The only explanation it gave was that it was "taking into consideration [Melissa's] religious objection." Matthew appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that when divorced, joint-custody parents disagree about whether a child should attend a religious or non-religious school, the family court must focus on the child's best interest - not on either parent's religious preference. Treating one parent's religious objection as the deciding factor, the court explained, actually disfavors religion and runs into the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which requires the government to be neutral between religion and non-religion. The Court also faulted the family court for two procedural failures: it did not hold an evidentiary hearing even though Matthew's filings established "adequate cause" for one, and it did not make the kind of specific factual findings about R.A.'s best interest that Nevada law requires. To help guide family courts facing these school-choice disputes, the Court listed ten illustrative factors a judge should consider, including the child's wishes (if old enough), each school's ability to meet the child's educational, medical, and extracurricular needs, the quality of instruction, the commute, whether changing schools would disrupt academic progress, and whether one school choice might alienate the child from a parent. The list is a starting point, not an exhaustive checklist. The case was sent back to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings about which school is best for R.A. specifically.

Sean and Lyudmyla Abid divorced in 2010 and shared joint custody of their young son. In 2015, Sean asked the family court to give him primary physical custody. To support that request, Sean hid a recording device in the child's backpack on at least two occasions to capture conversations between the child and his mother when the child was at her home. Neither the mother nor the child knew about the device or consented to being recorded. Sean later edited the recordings, deleted what he considered irrelevant, and destroyed the originals. The district court found that Sean had likely violated NRS 200.650, a Nevada statute that prohibits secretly recording private conversations without the consent of at least one participant. The judge refused to admit the recordings into evidence at the custody hearing. However, the judge gave the recordings to Dr. Holland, a psychologist the court had appointed to interview and evaluate the child. Dr. Holland used the recordings, along with interviews and other materials, to form her professional opinion that the mother's behavior was "creating confusion, distress, and divided loyalty" in the child. Relying in part on Dr. Holland's testimony, the family court awarded Sean primary physical custody. The mother appealed, arguing that the psychologist should not have been allowed to consider evidence Sean obtained illegally. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court explained that under NRS 50.285(2), expert witnesses may consider evidence that would not itself be admissible at trial, as long as the type of evidence is something experts in the field would reasonably rely on. Recordings of a parent's interactions with a child are exactly the kind of information a child psychologist would consult. The court also pointed out that NRS 200.650, unlike the federal wiretap statute, does not contain its own rule barring such recordings from being used as evidence in civil cases. The court emphasized that a child custody case is different from an ordinary lawsuit between two adversaries because the child's best interests are at stake, and the child is not at fault for a parent's misconduct. Suppressing useful evidence would punish the child for the parent's act. The court stressed that it was not endorsing Sean's behavior - he could potentially be prosecuted for a category D felony under NRS 200.690(1)(a), be sued civilly by his ex-wife and child under NRS 200.690(1)(b), face other litigation sanctions, and may have his judgment as a parent questioned by the court. The court also rejected any blanket rule that illegally obtained evidence is automatically inadmissible in a child custody case, leaving admissibility to the trial court's discretion. Justice Douglas concurred in the result only, without explanation.

Jennifer Gordon and Matthew Geiger divorced in 2011. Their decree gave them joint legal custody of their two minor children, gave Gordon primary physical custody, and gave Geiger limited visitation. In early 2014, the district court increased Geiger's visitation to every other weekend. Later that year, after Geiger was arrested and jailed for 23 days on a parole-violation warrant, Gordon asked the court for sole legal and physical custody and to remove Geiger's visitation. The district court set an evidentiary hearing focused on Geiger's parole warrant and child support. Before that hearing, the judge interviewed the two children privately, off the record, with only a court clerk and marshal present. At the evidentiary hearing, the probation officer testified that Gordon was not responsible for the warrant, and the court denied Gordon's motion to change custody. The judge then described what the children had told her in the off-the-record interviews, including a statement from the older child that Gordon's boyfriend had punched him as a form of discipline. The judge also referenced an unsubstantiated Child Protective Services (CPS) report that had not been admitted into evidence and had not been provided to the parties. At the end of the hearing, Geiger's lawyer asked orally - for the first time - that Geiger's visitation be expanded. Although Geiger had never made any written request to modify custody, the district court on its own ordered a permanent change: Geiger would now have the first four weekends of every month, leaving Gordon at most eight weekends a year with the children. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that Gordon's due process rights - her constitutional right to fair notice and a chance to be heard before her parental custody is changed - were violated because she had no notice that visitation would be expanded at that hearing and no opportunity to rebut the evidence (the off-the-record child interviews and the unadmitted CPS report) the judge relied on. The court also held that the modification was not supported by substantial evidence because the materials the judge relied on were never properly part of the record. The court used the case to give broader guidance to family-court judges. When a judge wants to interview a child witness, the interview must be recorded and must follow Nevada's Uniform Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act, found at NRS 50.500 through NRS 50.620. The opinion walks through the steps the Act requires - notice, a recorded hearing, specific findings, a written order, and a full opportunity for both parents to examine or cross-examine the child. The case was sent back to the district court so the parties can properly litigate whether any modification of custody or visitation is warranted.