Nevada family-law case summaries

Sandra and Curtis Stewart married in 2010 and have three minor children. During the marriage, Curtis worked in mining and Sandra was a stay-at-home mother. In 2018, Curtis filed for divorce and asked for sole custody of the children, saying Sandra was unfit because of mental health issues, addiction, and erratic behavior. Sandra responded by asking for joint custody, child support, and alimony (financial support paid by one former spouse to the other). After years of contested custody litigation, the case went to trial in January 2021. The trial judge awarded Curtis sole legal and primary physical custody and gave Sandra supervised parenting time. The judge also decided Sandra had been deliberately earning less than she could ("willfully underemployed"), assigned her an assumed income for calculating child support, ordered her to pay a small amount in child support arrears (past-due support), awarded her a limited amount of alimony, and awarded Curtis a large sum in attorney fees. When dividing the couple's property, the judge gave Curtis the marital home and most of the vehicles, tools, and guns, while making Curtis responsible for the community debt, and gave Sandra a retirement account and one handgun. Sandra appealed, challenging almost everything. The Court of Appeals split its decision. On custody, the court sided with the trial judge. Sandra argued the judge did not make enough findings and that the judge was really punishing her rather than protecting the children. The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that the trial judge had gone through the statutory "best interest of the child" factors in detail, found that eight of twelve favored Curtis, and grounded the decision in concerns such as alleged domestic violence in Sandra's home and Sandra's arrest for driving under the influence with a crash during her parenting time. Because the decision was supported by the evidence and was not made to punish Sandra, the court affirmed it. The court also noted Sandra did not challenge the child support ruling on appeal, so that ruling was treated as waived and affirmed too. On the other three issues, the court found problems and sent them back to the trial court. First, on alimony, the trial judge did not explain how it applied the eleven factors the law requires, so the appeals court reversed the alimony award and ordered the trial court to do the required analysis. Second, on the division of property, the judge gave Curtis a much larger share without adequately explaining why an unequal split was justified, and never calculated what Sandra's share of the marital home would be. The court also said the judge improperly tried to balance things out by treating attorney fees and child support arrears as if they were part of the couple's shared property, which they were not. So the court reversed the property division and sent it back. Third, on attorney fees, the judge awarded Curtis fees without going through the required legal factors, including the difference in the parties' incomes, so the court reversed that too.

Justin and Lynsey Freelove were married for a little over a year and share one child. After the divorce, Lynsey was given primary physical custody of the child and lives in Nevada, while Justin lives in Idaho and shares joint legal custody. Before moving, Justin filed a motion apparently seeking primary physical custody and permission to relocate with the child. After hearings, his child support obligation was set at $750 per month in November 2019, and he was ordered to pay support starting in October 2019, when Lynsey was apparently awarded primary physical custody. Justin says he did not receive notice of the 2019 order, which is why he did not initially pay. The record does not show whether the order was actually served on him. Later, the district court entered an amended order clarifying that his obligation began in October 2019. Justin acknowledged he knew about this amended order and began making payments after receiving it, but he contested the past-due amount, arguing he had not been notified of the original 2019 order. By June 2020, he owed $6,031.59 in arrears, interest, and penalties. In February 2021, Justin got a new job in Idaho that cut his gross monthly income by about 33 percent. He asked the court to lower his child support to match his new, lower income. At the hearing before the court master, neither Justin nor Lynsey had a lawyer. The master decided there were no significant changed circumstances that would justify changing the support amount. Neither party filed a formal objection, so the master's decision became the court's judgment, and Justin appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in Justin's favor on one point and against him on another. First, it rejected Lynsey's argument that Justin gave up (waived) his right to appeal by not objecting to the master's decision below. The court explained that failing to object only prevents you from challenging the master's report in the district court; it does not stop you from appealing to a higher court. Second, on the merits, the court agreed with Justin that the master made a mistake. Because Justin's income dropped by more than 20 percent, Nevada law required the master to conduct a review of the child support order. The master's one-sentence conclusion that there was "not a significant change of circumstances" did not include the specific factual findings the law requires. Importantly, the court noted that the master was required to review the order but was not required to actually change it. Because the master left the support at $750 when the guideline calculation would have produced $555, that had the effect of an "upward deviation" from the required amount without the necessary findings. So the court reversed and sent the case back for a new hearing. Third, the court rejected Justin's due process arguments about the interest and penalties on his arrears. It found he waived these arguments because he did not raise them before the court master and did not file a motion to set aside the earlier order. The court also noted he was present at the 2019 hearing with his lawyer, and that he failed to appeal the amended order clarifying the October 2019 start date.

Johnnie C. Campbell asked a family court judge in Clark County for permission to send items and gifts to his son. The judge denied that request. Mr. Campbell then tried to appeal that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing himself without a lawyer. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether Mr. Campbell should or should not be allowed to send items and gifts to his son. Instead, the court explained that it can only hear appeals when a statute or court rule specifically allows that type of order to be appealed. Because no statute or court rule lets a person appeal this kind of order, the Supreme Court concluded it had no power - no "jurisdiction" - to consider the case. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the underlying request about sending items and gifts.

This is a one-page clerk's order ending an appeal before it ever began on the merits. When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, the rules require two basic things at the outset: paying a filing fee (or showing eligibility to proceed without paying it) and filing a short document called a "case appeal statement" that identifies the case and the parties. According to the order, the appellant, Crystal London, did neither. On the same day the appeal was docketed, the court sent her notices telling her she had 7 days to pay the fee (or demonstrate she qualified to skip it under NRAP 24) and to file the case appeal statement. The notices warned that not paying the fee would lead to dismissal and that not filing the case appeal statement could also lead to sanctions including dismissal. The order states that the appellant did not pay the fee, did not file the case appeal statement, and did not otherwise respond to the court's notices. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying child custody dispute or any substantive issue.

This is a one-paragraph order from the Nevada Supreme Court closing out an appeal in a child custody case. The person who filed the appeal, Chastity Destinee Diez, asked the court to dismiss her own appeal voluntarily. The court granted that request and dismissed the appeal. The order does not discuss the underlying custody dispute or decide any legal issue about custody.

This case is a dispute between two parents, James Ramseier and Nohelia Moldestad, who were never married but have one child together, named N.R. in the opinion. The child is about eleven years old. The parents had been sharing custody under a 2016 court order that set a parenting-time schedule and required them to agree in writing about the child's extracurricular activities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the parents made a separate written agreement in 2020 for the 2020-2021 school year. That agreement covered how the child would be schooled (homeschooling for fifth grade) and a parenting-time schedule the parents described as each having the child "50% of the time." This 2020 agreement was never filed with the court. When disagreements arose, both parents went back to court. Moldestad asked to change the custody and holiday schedules, to use an app called Our Family Wizard to communicate, and for attorney fees. Ramseier asked the court to decide which middle school the child would attend, to change the schedule and holiday plan, and for attorney fees. They disagreed about which school was best, about the child's participation in synchronized swimming and how it affected Ramseier's time with the child, and about how child support should be calculated. The district court held a hearing and eventually ruled that the child would attend Sig Rogich Middle School (the school in Moldestad's zone), applying a set of ten factors the Nevada Supreme Court laid out in an earlier case, Arcella, for deciding a child's schooling. The court also ordered Ramseier to take the child to synchronized swimming during his parenting time and to share equally in the recurring costs of that activity, on top of his $2,000-per-month child support. On child support, the record showed that Ramseier had agreed (stipulated) to the $2,000 monthly amount. On appeal, Ramseier raised eight arguments, including that the judge was biased, that the court wrongly considered the child's progress at her current school, that the court did not fully analyze his alternative school choices, that tying school to Moldestad's residence was improper, that he should not be forced to take the child to an activity he did not agree to, that the court ignored the 2020 agreement's 50/50 schedule, that child support calculations should have accounted for both parents' household incomes, and that the upward deviation in child support for synchronized swimming was improper. The appeals court rejected each argument. On judicial bias, it found Ramseier had not overcome the presumption that judges are unbiased. On several points, it found he either failed to support his argument with legal authority, failed to object below, or took positions on appeal that contradicted what he had argued or conceded in the trial court (for example, he had stipulated to the child support amount and had testified he supported the swimming activity). On the school-choice order, the court noted that the order was not permanently fixed - it allowed for future modification if Moldestad moved or if the parents could not agree - so Ramseier had not shown he was harmed. On the 2020 agreement, the court found the parenting schedules were substantially the same as the 2016 order, that the 2020 agreement was only for a school year that had already ended, and that no substantial change in circumstances justified modification. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in full.

This is a child custody appeal that ended before the court ever considered the merits. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, ask the court for permission to proceed "in forma pauperis" - meaning without paying the fee because of financial hardship. The appellant, Dama Cox, filed her appeal on November 15, 2022, but did not pay the fee. The Nevada Supreme Court told her she had 14 days to either pay or show she qualified to proceed without paying. The district court then denied her request to proceed without paying. On December 14, 2022, the Supreme Court gave her another 30 days to either pay the fee or file a motion in the Supreme Court itself asking to proceed without paying. The court warned that if she did neither, her appeal would be dismissed. She did not respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying child custody dispute.

Kelly Byrd asked a family court in Clark County to change a custody arrangement involving her minor children. The judge denied her request. She then tried to appeal that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. In Nevada, a person who wants to appeal a district court ruling has to file a piece of paper called a "notice of appeal" within a strict deadline - generally 30 days after being served with notice that the order has been entered. Here, notice that the order had been entered was served electronically on Byrd's lawyer on November 9, 2022. That meant the notice of appeal had to be filed in the district court by December 9, 2022. Byrd missed that deadline. She also filed her notice of appeal in the wrong court - she sent it to the Supreme Court instead of the district court. Under the appellate rules, when that happens the Supreme Court clerk notes the date it was received and forwards it to the district court, and the notice is treated as filed on the date the Supreme Court received it. That date was December 12, 2022 - three days late. Because the notice of appeal was untimely, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that it had no power (no "jurisdiction") to hear the appeal at all. The court did not consider whether the custody ruling was right or wrong. It simply dismissed the appeal.

Cheryl Ann Slader and Cory Lawrence Colley went through a divorce in Clark County family court. After the district court entered a decree of divorce, Slader tried to appeal that decree to the Nevada Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court can hear an appeal, it has to have jurisdiction - that is, legal authority to review the lower court's decision. In Nevada, you generally cannot appeal from a divorce decree until the district court has finished with the case. If important issues are still pending in the trial court, the decree is not yet "final" and is not yet appealable. When the Supreme Court looked at the paperwork, it noticed two issues that appeared still unresolved: how the couple's community debts and property would be divided, and what the holiday and vacation custody schedule would be. The court told Slader to explain why the appeal should not be dismissed. In her response, Slader acknowledged that those issues were indeed still pending in the district court. She argued that the decree could at least be treated as a final custody order, which is separately appealable under a Nevada appellate rule. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the decree did not fully resolve custody because the holiday and vacation schedule was still to be decided. Because no statute or court rule authorized an appeal from this not-yet-final decree, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Slader can return to the Supreme Court later, after the district court resolves the remaining issues.

Shante Harvey asked the Nevada Supreme Court to review a family-court decision that refused to undo an earlier child-custody order. She filed her appeal without an attorney. To move an appeal forward in Nevada, the appellant has to file certain documents on a schedule, including a "docketing statement" (a form telling the court basic information about the case) and a "fast track statement" (a short brief used in child-custody appeals to speed them up). Harvey did not file these documents on time. She asked the court for more time, and the court granted at least one extension. On October 25, 2022, the Supreme Court denied her request for a second extension and told her to file the missing documents within 14 days. Instead of filing them, she asked for yet another extension. On November 28, 2022, the court denied that third request, again ordered her to file within 14 days, and warned her that if she did not comply the appeal could be thrown out. According to the order, Harvey then did nothing - she neither filed the documents nor contacted the court. Because of that, the Supreme Court dismissed her appeal. The dismissal is procedural: the court did not decide whether the family-court ruling on child custody was right or wrong.

This is a family-law appeal that the Nevada Supreme Court threw out before reaching the merits because the appeal paperwork was filed at the wrong time. The court did not decide who was right or wrong about child custody, sanctions, attorney fees, or any of the other issues from the lower court. The reason: when a party files certain post-judgment motions in the trial court (here, a motion for reconsideration), the clock to file an appeal pauses until the trial court formally rules on that motion in writing. If a notice of appeal is filed during that pause - after the motion is filed but before the trial court has issued a written order resolving it - the notice has no legal effect. That is what happened here, so the Supreme Court concluded it had no jurisdiction (no legal authority) to hear the appeal and dismissed it. The court also denied as moot Mr. Redmond's motions for a stay pending appeal and for appointment of counsel, because there was no longer an appeal pending in which those requests could matter.

Ali Shahrokhi asked the Nevada Supreme Court to issue an extraordinary court order - called a writ of mandamus or prohibition - that would throw out two child custody rulings entered against him in 2020 and would declare a Nevada child custody statute unconstitutional. The statute at issue, NRS 125C.0035(5), creates a presumption that giving custody to a parent found by clear and convincing evidence to have committed domestic violence is not in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court declined to intervene. The court explained that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when a person has no other adequate way to challenge a ruling. Here, Shahrokhi already had an ordinary path: a regular appeal from the final judgment in his custody case. In fact, he had already used that path - he appealed the same orders, and the Supreme Court affirmed them in a May 12, 2022 order in Docket Nos. 81978, 82245, and 83726. The court also pointed to the "law of the case" doctrine, which prevents a party from re-litigating issues that have already been decided. The court noted that in the prior appeal it had already rejected Shahrokhi's constitutional challenge to NRS 125C.0035, his due process claims, his arguments that the proceedings were criminal or beyond the court's jurisdiction, and his claim that he lacked adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the domestic violence allegations. The court took two additional housekeeping actions. It granted Shahrokhi's request to file his appendix under seal because it contained materials sealed below. It also struck several pages of the petition and an emergency motion for containing what the court described as inappropriate and insulting personal attacks on the district judge, noting it had previously cautioned Shahrokhi about decorum. Finally, the court denied Shahrokhi's motion to disqualify Justices Parraguirre and Herndon, which was based on his having filed (or attempting to amend) a federal lawsuit naming them.

This is a one-page administrative order, not a ruling on the merits of any custody dispute. When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally have to pay a filing fee. If they cannot afford it, they can ask the court for permission to proceed without paying by following a specific rule (NRAP 24, which governs proceeding "in forma pauperis"). Here, the appellant, Shaquawn D.R. Johnson, filed an appeal but did not pay the fee. The court sent a notice giving him 14 days to either pay or show that he qualified to proceed without paying. He did neither and did not respond at all. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying child custody issues between Johnson and Robin Isaacs.

Alfonso Estrada, an attorney living in Los Angeles, and Ida Arzola, who worked in Las Vegas, had a child together, A.E., born in May 2019. After the relationship ended, both parents went to court seeking primary physical custody - the arrangement where one parent has the child most of the time. Alfonso asked for primary custody; Ida asked for primary custody and also for child support (regular payments from one parent to help cover the child's needs). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary schedule of joint physical custody, with the parents exchanging the child in Barstow, California, each week. During that temporary period, Alfonso was ordered to pay Ida $1,583 per month in support plus $5,000 in attorney fees, reflecting that Alfonso earns roughly ten times what Ida makes. After a two-day trial, the district court changed course. It awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso, ordered that the child's "habitual residence" stay in Nevada, and directed Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support. It also ruled that Alfonso, as the "prevailing party," could recover attorney fees, and later ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $40,000 in combined fees and costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals split its decision into three parts. On custody, the court sided with Alfonso and left the custody award in place. It rejected Ida's argument that Alfonso had to meet a higher legal bar to "modify" custody, explaining that because no prior custody order existed, this was an initial determination, not a modification. It rejected her argument that the arrangement should have been called joint custody, noting that the best interest of the child is the main consideration and that percentage of time is only one factor. It rejected her argument that the court should have considered joint custody even though neither parent asked for it, in part because Ida herself never requested joint custody as an alternative. And it found the court's detailed analysis of the best-interest factors was supported by the evidence. On the relocation argument, the court declined to overturn the custody order. Ida had not raised the relocation issue in the lower court, cited no legal authority showing the relocation statute applied to her situation, and did not show that considering relocation factors would have changed the result. On child support, the court agreed with Ida. The district court had said "no adjustment evidence was provided" that would justify lowering Ida's payment - but its own findings described a large income gap (Alfonso earning about $250,000 a year while Ida attended community college), plus travel costs and Ida's limited ability to pay. Because that evidence supported considering a downward adjustment, the Court of Appeals reversed the support order and sent it back for the district court to apply the deviation factors. On attorney fees and costs, the court also agreed with Ida. The district court had awarded fees based only on Alfonso being the "prevailing party," without citing a legal basis, without making required findings, and without addressing the income disparity between the parties. The statutes Alfonso relied on did not fit the situation, and the order lumped fees and costs together without saying how much was which, making it impossible to review. The Court of Appeals reversed that award and sent it back as well.

This case is about a custody, child-support, and attorney-fee dispute between two parents of a young child. Alfonso Estrada is an attorney living in Los Angeles who met Ida Arzola in 2017 at a Las Vegas strip club where she worked as a dancer. They had a relationship, and a child, A.E., was born in May 2019. After the birth, the relationship became contentious. Alfonso asked the court for primary physical custody (meaning the child would live with him most of the time). Ida asked for primary physical custody too, and she also asked for child support. The parents agreed to share legal custody (decision-making about the child). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary arrangement where they shared physical custody, exchanging the child each week in Barstow, California, and temporarily ordered Alfonso to pay Ida $1,583 per month in child support plus $5,000 in attorney fees. By this time, Ida was working as a food server earning about one-tenth of Alfonso's salary and had started nursing school. After a two-day trial, the district court awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso on a three-week-on, two-week-off schedule, with two extra weeks for Alfonso during the year. The court kept Nevada as the child's official home ("habitual residence") and set a status check before the child starts school. It also ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support and awarded Alfonso attorney fees, saying only that he was the "prevailing party." Alfonso later asked for $48,217 in fees and $2,138.77 in costs; the court ultimately ordered Ida to pay a combined $40,000 in fees and costs, without saying how much was fees and how much was costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals reached three main conclusions. First, on custody, the court upheld the district court's decision to give Alfonso primary physical custody. The court rejected Ida's arguments: that this was really a modification of an existing custody arrangement (it was not, because there had been no prior custody determination); that a case called *Bluestein* required treating the arrangement as joint custody (the court explained percentage of time is just one consideration and the child's best interest controls); that the court had to consider joint custody even though neither parent asked for it (Ida had not requested it and could not now complain of an error she helped cause); and that the court misapplied the best-interest factors (the court found the district court's detailed findings were supported by the evidence). Second, on the claim that the court improperly "relocated" the child to California, the court found Ida had not raised this argument below, had not cited supporting authority, and had not shown that a relocation analysis would have changed the outcome. Third, on child support and attorney fees, the court sided with Ida. On child support, the court held the district court should have considered whether to reduce Ida's payment given the large income gap between the parties, and it reversed and sent that issue back. On attorney fees, the court held the award could not stand because the district court gave no legal basis for it and failed to make required findings — including about the income disparity — and because Alfonso's own filings were deficient. The court reversed and remanded the fee-and-cost order.

Mark Madarang and Celice Germer have one child together, born in 2018. They never married and, before this case, had no court order setting out who had custody. Madarang moved to New Jersey for work in 2017, visited Las Vegas regularly to spend time with the child, and moved back to Las Vegas in 2020, where he could work remotely and see the child more. By February 2021, the parents were routinely splitting time, with Madarang having the child roughly three days a week. In mid-2021, Germer told Madarang she planned to move to Oregon with the child for better work opportunities. Madarang then filed a petition asking a court to establish custody, seeking joint legal custody and primary physical custody if Germer relocated, and asking the court to stop her from moving before it ruled. Germer filed her own petition seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody, plus a request for temporary custody to allow the move to Oregon. The two cases were combined. After a hearing in October 2021, the district court granted Germer's request to relocate temporarily, gave Madarang Thanksgiving and winter break, and scheduled a full evidentiary hearing for January 2022. At that hearing, the court heard from both parents, Madarang's girlfriend, and Germer's former work manager. In March 2022, the court issued its final decree: joint legal custody, primary physical custody with Germer (including the move to Oregon), and set parenting time for Madarang on certain holidays and school breaks. The decree said the "receiving parent" pays for the child's transportation for scheduled custodial time, and the parent using any extra parenting time pays those travel costs. Madarang appealed. He argued the court wrongly let Germer move, that the temporary move tainted the final decision, and that the court simply copied the "best interest" factors into its relocation analysis. He also said the court did not make enough findings supporting Germer, pointed to behavior he considered inappropriate, questioned whether a possible promotion actually helped the child, and said Germer sometimes blocked his relationship with the child. He also objected to paying travel costs when he was not the one moving. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody and parenting-time decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it does not second-guess the trial judge unless the judge acted unreasonably or made findings not supported by adequate evidence. The court said Madarang was essentially unhappy with how the trial judge weighed the evidence, but that weighing evidence and judging witness credibility is the trial court's job, not the appellate court's. Because the district court had addressed each issue, considered the statutory best-interest and relocation factors, and based its conclusions on substantial evidence, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. On travel costs, the court noted there is no law requiring one parent or the other to pay for travel tied to custodial time, so that decision falls within the trial judge's discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree.

Victor and Judith Gold divorced under a stipulated decree - an agreement both parties signed and the court adopted. The decree said they would share "joint physical custody" of their three children, but the actual weekly schedule gave Victor the children only from Monday at 11:00 a.m. until Wednesday at 11:00 a.m., with Judith having them the rest of each week. Disputes arose after the divorce, and Victor asked the court to change the schedule to alternating weeks. The district court refused and instead changed the custody label to give Judith "primary physical custody," reasoning that the joint-custody label in the decree was a mistake because the schedule did not actually amount to joint custody. Victor appealed that decision, and in an earlier appeal (Docket No. 83078-COA), the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court had failed to consider evidence of the parties' actual schedule, to evaluate whether the change served the children's best interest, or to make findings on those points. While that first appeal was still pending, Victor filed a new motion in the district court asking it to undo the custody change - either by setting aside the modification order under NRCP 60(b) (a court rule allowing relief from certain orders) or by setting aside both that order and the decree's schedule provision on the theory that both parents had made a mutual mistake when they agreed to it, believing they were agreeing to joint physical custody. Because the pending appeal limited the district court's power to act, Victor asked the court to certify its intent to grant relief under a procedure recognized in Nevada case law. The district court denied the motion. In this second appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case as moot. "Moot" means there is no longer a live dispute for the court to resolve. Because the court had already reversed the order modifying custody in the earlier appeal, there was nothing left to set aside under NRCP 60(b). And Victor's request to undo the decree's schedule provision was premised on that same (now-reversed) modification order, so that challenge was moot as well.

While married, Luong and Vahey set up college savings accounts (called "529 accounts" after the federal tax provision that governs them) for each of their three children. When the couple divorced, they disagreed about how to split these accounts. After a 2020 hearing where both sides presented evidence, the trial judge concluded that Vahey had put in about 25 percent of the money and Luong (with help from her family) had put in about 75 percent, and divided the accounts accordingly - 25 percent to Vahey, 75 percent to Luong, with each parent managing their share on behalf of the children. About a year after that hearing, Luong hired a financial consultant who calculated slightly different numbers: that Luong and her family contributed 77.11 percent and Vahey 22.89 percent. Based on this new report, Luong asked the court to fix or undo the account-division part of the divorce decree. She used two rules: NRCP 60(a), which lets a court fix simple clerical mistakes, and NRCP 60(b)(1), which lets a court undo a decision because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The trial court refused, finding there was no clerical error, that the request was filed too late, and that it was frivolous because it sought only a tiny adjustment to accounts the parents did not even own themselves but managed for their children. In the same set of filings, Vahey asked the court to order Luong to hand over the children's passports, saying he feared she might leave the country with the children. Luong objected. The trial court decided to split the passports - ordering Luong to surrender two of the three children's passports to Vahey's attorney and letting her keep one - to prevent either parent from taking the children abroad on their own. Luong appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that there was no clerical error to correct under NRCP 60(a), because the judge's percentage finding was a product of weighing the evidence - an exercise of judgment - not a slip of the pen. The appellate court also noted that Luong never provided a transcript of the 2020 hearing, so it presumed that the missing record supported the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals then explained that although Luong labeled her request as an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, its real substance was a request based on "newly discovered evidence," which is governed by a different rule, NRCP 60(b)(2). Courts look at what a motion actually asks for, not what it is called. On timing, the appellate court found the trial court had used the wrong starting date: the six-month deadline runs from when written notice of the decree's entry is served, not from when the decree is entered, and by that measure Luong's motion was filed in time. Even so, the appellate court upheld the denial on the merits, because Luong never explained why she waited about a year to obtain the financial analysis, and evidence that could have been found earlier with reasonable diligence does not qualify as "newly discovered evidence." Finally, on the passports, the appellate court reversed. It explained that a judge has two possible legal routes to decide a passport dispute like this: the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act (found in NRS Chapter 125D), which allows passport restrictions only when there is a credible risk of abduction, or a best-interest-of-the-child analysis. Here the trial court found no evidence that either parent was a flight risk (which ruled out the abduction route), but it split the passports based on an "adverse inference" against both parents without ever analyzing what was in the children's best interest. Because the court could not be sure the decision was made for the correct legal reasons, it sent the passport issue back for further proceedings.

Matthew Supnick asked a Clark County family court judge to change a child-custody order. The judge denied his request. Before appealing, Mr. Supnick filed what is called a "tolling motion" - a motion (here, for reconsideration and to alter or amend the judgment) that pauses the clock for filing an appeal until the trial court rules on it. He then filed his notice of appeal while that tolling motion was still pending. Under Nevada's appellate rules, a notice of appeal filed after a tolling motion but before the trial court enters a written, signed, filed order resolving that motion has "no effect." The district court issued a minute order on October 31, 2022, denying the tolling motion, and Mr. Supnick argued that minute order was enough to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that orders dealing with the merits or procedural posture of a case must be written, signed, and filed to be effective - a clerk's minute order is not enough. Because the tolling motion remained unresolved by a proper written order, the notice of appeal was premature, and the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court dismissed it. The court also noted that this premature filing did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction, meaning the district court can still formally resolve the pending tolling motion.

Richard and Melissa were divorced in 2014 by a stipulated decree - an agreement the parties reached and the court entered as its order. Under that decree, the two shared joint legal custody of their five children, but Melissa had primary physical custody, meaning the children lived mainly with her, while Richard had parenting time on Tuesday nights and alternating weekends. In November 2021, Richard asked the court to change this arrangement. He filed a motion after an argument in September 2021 between Melissa and their oldest son, C.D. According to Richard, when he arrived to pick up the children, Melissa was arguing with C.D. and told him he could not leave with Richard, and that if he did, he could not come back. Richard said Melissa would not let C.D. gather his belongings and later cut off his access to his cell phone and bank accounts. Richard said that, apart from a few exceptions, C.D. had lived with him since then. Richard also claimed Melissa had a history of keeping him from seeing the other children during his weekday parenting time. He asked the court to give him primary physical custody of C.D., to adjust his child support, and to hold an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented) and to interview the children. Melissa disagreed. She said she never prevented C.D. from coming home and that C.D. chose to go with Richard to avoid discipline for not finishing schoolwork and for sneaking out to see his girlfriend. She said the children were doing well in her care and that Richard had not shown enough of a change in circumstances to justify changing custody. She also said C.D. had actually returned to her home at various times, including a two-week period while Richard was on vacation. She asked the court to award her attorney fees, calling Richard's motion frivolous. The district court held a hearing without taking evidence. It denied Richard's request to change custody and to hold an evidentiary hearing, finding he had not made out a "prima facie case" for modification - meaning he had not, on the face of his filings, shown enough to justify a full hearing. Because C.D. was almost 17, the court said it had "no problem granting [C.D.] teenage discretion," letting C.D. choose which parent to live with. The court also denied Richard's request to interview the children and to change child support, and denied Melissa's request for attorney fees. Both parents appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. When someone asks to modify custody, the court generally must assume the moving party's specific factual claims are true unless the other side's evidence conclusively proves them false. Here, Richard's claims - that Melissa tried to prevent C.D. from leaving, that C.D. had been living mainly with Richard since the incident, and that Melissa interfered with his parenting time - were new, were relevant, and, if true, could show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare. Melissa's disagreement might eventually prove correct, but at this early stage she had not conclusively disproven Richard's claims. So the court decided a hearing was required. The Court of Appeals also found a problem with the "teenage discretion" ruling. By giving C.D. unlimited discretion to choose where to live, while not actually changing the custody order, the court created a situation where C.D. was living mainly with Richard, yet Richard was still paying child support as though Melissa had primary custody, and Melissa - though still officially the primary custodian - could not actually exercise that custody. The court concluded this was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing. Because of that, it did not decide the child support and attorney fees questions, leaving those for the district court to revisit on remand.

This is a brief administrative order ending an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court could consider its merits. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, court rules require either payment of a filing fee or a showing that the filer qualifies to proceed without paying (an in forma pauperis application under NRAP 24). In this case, the appellant did neither. The court issued a notice on the same day the appeal was docketed telling her she had 14 days to either pay the fee or show she qualified to skip it, and warning that the appeal would be dismissed if she did not respond. She did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying child custody dispute.

This case involves two parents, Heather Walent and Kyle Petterson, who share a child. Kyle first started the case back in June 2012 by filing to establish that he was the father and to set up custody. Under the resulting order, the parents shared joint legal custody (the right to make major decisions about the child), and Heather had primary physical custody (the child lived mostly with her). Later, the court changed the arrangement so that both parents shared joint legal and joint physical custody. In November 2021, Heather asked the court to order the family to attend group therapy because she was struggling with the child's behavior. Kyle did not formally oppose that request, but he filed his own motion asking to change custody. The district court denied Kyle's motion on paper but said all custody and visitation issues would be dealt with at the hearing already scheduled on Heather's therapy request. After that hearing, the district court changed custody and gave Kyle primary physical custody. The court briefly stated that circumstances had changed enough to justify a change and that giving Kyle primary physical custody was in the child's best interest, but it did not spell out detailed reasons. Heather appealed, arguing the court did not explain its decision well enough. The Court of Appeals agreed that the district court's order did not contain the specific findings the law requires. When deciding custody, a court must focus on what is best for the child and must connect specific findings about the recognized "best interest" factors to the decision it reaches. Here, the order mentioned that the child was unhappy, was not getting along with Heather, and had missed several days of school, but it did not make findings on each of the required best-interest factors or tie those findings to the custody decision. Because the appeals court could not tell whether the custody change was made for the right legal reasons, it reversed the decision and sent the case back. On remand, if the district court again decides to change custody, it must make specific findings that support its order. The opinion also addressed a side issue. Kyle claimed that, after the appeal was filed, the district court had reconsidered and changed custody again to return the parties to joint physical custody. The Court of Appeals explained that this later order was not properly before it, because once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court generally loses the power to change the very issues that are on appeal unless a specific certification-and-remand procedure is followed, which did not happen here.

This is a family-law appeal about which parent gets primary custody of two children and whether one parent may move out of state with them. Brent and Caitlin St. George divorced in October 2020 and initially shared custody equally - both joint legal custody (the right to make major decisions for the children) and joint physical custody (roughly shared parenting time). In March 2021, Caitlin asked the court to change that arrangement. She wanted primary physical custody so that she could move with the children to Orlando, Florida. After a hearing where the judge heard testimony and reviewed documents from both sides, the trial judge sided with Caitlin, giving her primary custody and permission to relocate. Brent then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Nevada. The appeals court explained that it does not re-decide these cases from scratch. Instead, it checks whether the trial judge "abused" her discretion - meaning made a decision without adequate support in the evidence or law. The court will keep the trial judge's factual findings so long as they are backed by "substantial evidence," which the court described as evidence a reasonable person could accept as enough to support the decision. In custody matters, the guiding question is the best interest of the child. Brent's main argument was not that the evidence failed to support the judge's findings. Instead, he complained that the judge did not directly compare, side by side, what the children's lives would look like in Las Vegas with him versus in Orlando with Caitlin. The appeals court rejected this argument. It noted that even though the written order did not lay out a literal side-by-side comparison, the judge clearly considered Brent's evidence about the children's Las Vegas life - finding, for example, that the children were doing well in school, had a nice home with Brent, that Brent is a great father, and that the children have extended family in Las Vegas. The judge nonetheless concluded that moving to Orlando with Caitlin served the children's best interest, partly because the children could maintain a relationship with a half-sibling and because the judge found Caitlin more likely to allow the children to keep a relationship with the other parent. The appeals court emphasized that it does not reweigh witness credibility or the evidence on appeal. Brent also argued, briefly, that his constitutional right to parent was violated because the judge gave too much weight to the children's relationship with the new sibling. The appeals court declined to grant relief on this point, in part because Brent did not develop the argument or cite supporting authority, and in part because considering a sibling relationship is a permitted part of the best-interest analysis. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision.

This is a procedural dismissal, not a decision on the merits of the underlying child custody dispute. When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, ask the court for permission to proceed "in forma pauperis" - a Latin term meaning "as a poor person," which allows a litigant to pursue a case without paying certain fees. Here, Mr. Taylor filed his appeal but did not pay the filing fee. The court gave him two chances to either pay the fee or properly request a fee waiver. He filed a request that the court interpreted as a request to proceed in forma pauperis, but the court denied that request and told him he could either pay the fee or file a copy of an in forma pauperis motion that had first been filed in the district court. The court warned him that if he did not respond, his appeal would be dismissed. He did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal.

This is a very short procedural order, not a ruling on the merits of any custody dispute. When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, follow a specific court rule (NRAP 24) that allows them to ask the court to waive the fee for indigent litigants. In this case, Cesar Maciel filed an appeal in a child custody matter against Esmeralda Mendez but did not pay the filing fee when the appeal was docketed. The court sent him a notice giving him 14 days either to pay the fee or to comply with the rule for waiving it, and told him that if he did neither the appeal would be dismissed. He did neither. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without addressing any of the underlying custody issues.

This case concerns a custody dispute between two parents, Magdalena Ocasio and Jonathan Jordan Wirsz, who share a minor child referred to as M.W. In June 2020, Wirsz was granted primary physical custody, joint legal custody, and "tie breaking decision-making authority" - meaning the ability to make the final call when the parents disagree on decisions about the child. In September 2020, the parents agreed to an amended arrangement (called the ASAO) that let Wirsz and the child move to northern Idaho while keeping the same custody structure. That agreement also set a parenting-time schedule and a three-year pause on further court fights, with exceptions for emergencies and serious breaches. After the agreement took effect, Ocasio came to believe that Wirsz should not have primary custody and decision-making power. In August 2021 she asked the court to change the custody arrangement. The district court denied her request without holding an evidentiary hearing - that is, a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented. The court's order essentially stated that Ocasio had not made "a prima facie case of a substantial change in circumstance" affecting the child's welfare. A "prima facie case" means enough of an initial showing, taken as true, to justify a fuller look at the issue. Ocasio raised two main claims. First, she argued the original relocation agreement was based on fraud because Wirsz never took the job that supposedly justified the move to Idaho. The Court of Appeals declined to consider this argument, explaining that Ocasio provided no legal authority showing that discovering alleged fraud counts as a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child, and noting she did not file a motion under the rule that allows setting aside an order for fraud. Second, Ocasio alleged that Wirsz was limiting her parenting time and turning the child against her - including disrupting Skype calls, blocking her from medical information, limiting her access to information about the child's education, refusing to investigate potential medical issues, and scheduling flights to interfere with her parenting time. The Court of Appeals concluded that these allegations were new, not merely repetitive, and could show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare. Because Wirsz had not conclusively disproven these allegations at this stage, the court held that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. The court reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals also addressed Ocasio's request for attorney fees. It concluded she did not raise a new claim for attorney fees in her November 2021 motion, and that her failure to respond to Wirsz's argument on that point was treated as a concession that his argument had merit.

Jashawn Prevost and Keilah Gronvold met in 2013 and had a child together in 2014. The family moved to Las Vegas in 2015 and lived there until the parents separated in 2020. After the separation, Gronvold moved to Mississippi while Prevost stayed in Las Vegas with the child. Prevost then filed a court case (representing himself) asking for custody, and Gronvold answered and filed her own counterclaim, also representing herself. The parties could not agree through mediation, so the case went to trial in April 2021. Both appeared virtually for a trial that lasted a single afternoon. Prevost called the child's teacher as a witness, who testified that the child had struggled in school until Gronvold left and that the child improved after Prevost became more involved. Prevost testified that he was the best parent and accused Gronvold's current partner of being a "pedophile and sex trafficker." By his own testimony, however, Prevost based those accusations only on what Gronvold had told him ("per her"). Gronvold testified that she wanted joint physical custody and to be able to see her child in Mississippi. She said she never told Prevost the things he used to support his accusations against her partner. She also described a relationship marked by repeated domestic violence, including beatings that required staples in her head, a black eye, being shot with a pellet gun, and threats to kill her. Neither party formally moved to admit their evidence during the trial. Before closing arguments, the judge asked whether the parties would agree to let her review each side's evidence. Prevost first objected, saying he could not open documents Gronvold sent through an app called OurFamilyWizard and that she should have sent them in another format, such as hard copy. The judge noted his objection but asked again whether he agreed to her reviewing the evidence, and Prevost answered, "Yes, ma'am." A few days later, the district court issued its decision. It found Gronvold credible, noted photographs showing her bruised and bloodied face, and found that Prevost had committed one or more acts of domestic violence proven by clear and convincing evidence resulting in severe injuries. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption (an assumption the law makes unless proven otherwise) that Prevost should not receive joint or primary custody, and it found Prevost did not overcome that presumption. The court awarded primary physical custody to Gronvold and, applying the statutory factors, found the child's move to Mississippi to be in the child's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Prevost's arguments. It found that the record did not show the judge forced or "strongarmed" him into agreeing to the evidence review; she heard his objection, then asked again, and he agreed. The court also concluded that any problem with how Gronvold shared her documents was minor and did not change the outcome, especially because Gronvold's own credible testimony established the domestic violence. The court also held that the district court did not ignore Prevost's accusations against Gronvold's partner. Because those accusations rested entirely on what Prevost said Gronvold told him, and Gronvold denied ever making those statements, the trial judge was entitled to decide whom to believe. Finally, the court declined Prevost's request to reweigh witness credibility, explaining that trial courts, which see and hear the witnesses, are the ones who make those calls, and appellate courts do not second-guess them from a transcript. The court affirmed the custody decree.

Nathan Robertson and Jessica Gardner were never married but have one child together. In 2021, Robertson asked the district court to give him joint legal custody (shared authority to make major decisions about the child) and primary physical custody (the child living mostly with him), along with child support. Gardner responded and asked for the same things for herself. Each parent argued the other was unfit, and each submitted documents claiming the other had committed acts of domestic violence in front of the child. After a trial, the district court gave Gardner sole legal custody and primary physical custody, set Robertson's support payment at $905 per month, and ordered him to pay $10,450 in past-due support (arrears). The trial judge noted that the law would have supported a joint legal custody arrangement, but appears to have given Gardner sole legal custody because Robertson had not obtained a mental health evaluation. Robertson appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the court's decision. The Court of Appeals explained that when a court decides custody, its written order must connect the child's best interest - supported by specific findings - to the custody decision it makes. The appeals court found that the district court's order did not do this. The court had recognized that the law favored joint legal custody, but made no findings about whether the parents could communicate, cooperate, or compromise for the child's benefit, and did not explain how giving Gardner sole legal custody served the child's best interest. The same problem affected the physical custody decision: the court awarded primary physical custody to Gardner without discussing the best-interest factors. And to the extent the court relied on claims that Robertson committed domestic violence, it did not make the specific findings required by law that acts of domestic violence occurred and that the custody arrangement adequately protects the child. Because the custody rulings lacked the required findings, the Court of Appeals reversed them and sent the case back for the district court to make specific written findings. Since the child support amount and arrears depend on the custody arrangement, the court also reversed those for reconsideration. The court noted that the arrears figure appeared to be miscalculated - $10,450 over that period matches a $950 monthly obligation rather than the $905 the court ordered. In the meantime, the existing custody arrangement from the November 23, 2021, order stays in place until the district court revisits the matter.

This case never reached the merits. Mario Accomando tried to appeal a divorce decree from the Clark County family court, but he filed his paperwork too late. Under Nevada's appellate rules, a person who wants to appeal generally has 30 days from the date they are served with written notice that the judgment has been entered. Missing that deadline means the Supreme Court has no power - no "jurisdiction" - to hear the appeal at all, no matter what the appeal is about. Here, the divorce decree was filed on June 29, 2022, and written notice of entry was served on Mr. Accomando on July 6, 2022. He did not file his notice of appeal until August 29, 2022, which was well past the 30-day window. Because the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, it dismissed the appeal. The court also denied a pending motion for a stay as moot, meaning there was no longer any live appeal in which to grant a stay.

Ana Maria Salas filed an appeal challenging a family court ruling that denied her request to undo or get relief from an earlier order in a child custody case. In the Nevada Supreme Court, appellants in cases like this must file a "fast track statement" - a short document that tells the court what the appeal is about and why the lower court got it wrong. Salas did not file that statement. The court's clerk first gave her a telephonic extension until July 5, 2022. When that deadline passed with no filing, the court issued an order on July 21, 2022, giving her until August 4, 2022, and warning that failing to file could lead to dismissal. When she still did not file, the court issued another order on August 22, 2022, extending the deadline to September 6, 2022, and warning again that the appeal could be dismissed as abandoned. Salas never filed the statement and never communicated with the court. Concluding that she had abandoned her appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed it. The decision does not address the merits of her underlying child custody dispute or her NRCP 60(b) motion.

This case is about a change to a child custody arrangement between two parents, Thomas Bahr and Gesenia Arteaga. In 2017, they agreed to share both "legal custody" (the right to make major decisions about the child) and "physical custody" (where the child lives and who cares for the child day to day). In 2021, Gesenia asked the court to change the arrangement. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the trial judge gave Gesenia "primary physical custody" (meaning the child would live mostly with her) while keeping joint legal custody. Thomas appealed. Thomas raised several complaints. First, he argued the trial judge got the "best interest" analysis wrong and relied on evidence that was weak or improper (including hearsay - secondhand statements). The appeals court explained that Thomas had asked for transcripts of the hearing but never actually filed them with the court. Without the transcripts, the appeals court could not review what evidence was presented or what objections were made, so it had to assume the missing record supported the trial judge's decision. The court also noted that it does not re-decide questions about which witnesses were believable or how much weight evidence should be given - those calls belong to the trial judge. Thomas won on two points, however. Both involve the same problem: the trial judge stated conclusions without explaining the reasoning behind them. The first concerned a finding that Thomas could not adequately care for the child for at least 146 days per year. Nevada law treats that finding as important because it can trigger a legal presumption against joint physical custody. But the trial judge did not spell out what evidence supported this conclusion, so the appeals court could not be confident the decision was made for the right reasons. The second point concerned "conflict" between the parents. The trial judge found there was a lot of conflict, that neither parent could work well with the other, and that the child was suffering because of it - but then concluded that Thomas was mostly to blame, without explaining why. Again, the appeals court found the lack of explanation made review impossible. Finally, Thomas argued the judge was biased against him and asked that a different judge handle the case on remand. The appeals court rejected this, explaining that judges are presumed unbiased and that a judge's rulings alone - even rulings against a party - do not show bias. Because of the two unexplained findings, the appeals court sent the case back to the trial court to make specific findings and tie them to the custody decision. The rest of the decision stands.

Desmon Brandes and Lacey Pictum (now Lacey Krynzel) were never married but have one child together, born in 2007. In 2011, they agreed to share joint legal custody, with Lacey having primary physical custody and Desmon paying $400 per month in child support. Because Lacey had struggled with opioid addiction, their agreement said Desmon would become the primary physical custodian if Lacey relapsed. According to the opinion, Lacey did relapse, and Desmon served as the child's primary physical custodian from late 2011 until 2015, while Lacey had supervised parenting time. In 2015, Lacey married and says she has been clean from opioids since that year. After that, the child spent alternating weekends and summer time with Lacey. This arrangement continued until March 2020, when schools closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the parties agreed the child would stay with Lacey on her summer schedule until school resumed. Also in March 2020, Lacey applied for welfare benefits, which prompted the district attorney's office to open a case to enforce Desmon's child support obligation and collect back payments. Desmon opposed that effort and filed his own motion, saying he had actually been the primary custodian for years and asking the court to change the custody order. He argued that circumstances had substantially changed and that, since Lacey appeared to have been sober for years, joint physical custody would be best for the child. During the case, Desmon submitted text messages and a video from the child (then 14) expressing worry that Lacey was using drugs again, describing erratic driving and "zone out" episodes. The court ordered Lacey to take a drug test, which showed trace amounts of THC but was negative for opioids and other substances. The court then set an evidentiary hearing and told the parties to keep their current schedule for the time being. The child later told Lacey she preferred to live with Desmon until Lacey "got better," and with Lacey's permission lived with Desmon for the five months before the hearing. Because of this, Desmon changed his request and asked for primary physical custody. After a hearing where both parents testified, the district court issued a 21-page order. It found that the 2011 order should be modified and awarded the parents joint physical custody with a 50/50 split. Desmon appealed, agreeing that the old order should be changed but arguing the court was wrong to order joint custody rather than give him primary custody, given the family's history, Lacey's history of substance abuse, and the child's stated preference. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that when a court decides custody, it must not only make findings about the "best interest" factors but must also explain how those findings led to the final custody decision. Here, the court noted, the district court did make detailed findings — including that Lacey has a history of opioid addiction, that the child wanted to live with Desmon, that three factors favored Desmon, and that no factors favored Lacey — but never explained how those findings led to its conclusion that joint custody was best. Because the district court did not connect its findings to its ultimate decision, the Court of Appeals concluded it abused its discretion, reversed the order, and sent the case back so the district court could provide that missing explanation.

Diamond Hall and Justin Martin were never married but share one child, referred to in the opinion as G.M. According to the opinion, in December 2019 Diamond went to Justin's house unannounced and uninvited, entered through the dog door, and refused to leave when asked. Justin testified she poked him in the eye and chest, and a video from Justin's home security system showed her making a poking motion and trying to grab his phone while he appeared to be calling the police. Diamond denied poking him and said she was acting in self-defense, though she admitted behaving badly and admitted she had shoved Justin on an earlier occasion within the prior 12 months. She was arrested and charged with trespass and battery constituting domestic violence. Days later, Diamond filed for child custody and Justin filed an answer and counterclaim. The custody case dragged on, partly because of COVID-19 delays and partly because Diamond's criminal case kept getting reset. At a pretrial hearing, the judge said the custody case needed to be resolved and could not be continued again. The judge told Diamond to talk to her criminal lawyer about whether to testify at the custody trial or instead invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege - the right not to give testimony that could be used against her in the criminal case. When the parties agreed (stipulated) to postpone the custody trial until after the criminal case, the judge rejected that agreement. Justin then asked for a continuance himself, and the judge denied it. The trial was finally set for August 16, and Diamond never filed her own motion to continue. At the one-day custody trial, Diamond chose to testify and claimed self-defense. By testifying, she gave up (waived) her Fifth Amendment right to stay silent. During the trial, Justin's attorney referenced hours of video, and short video clips were admitted into evidence without objection after Diamond testified. The judge found, by "clear and convincing evidence," that Diamond had committed multiple acts of domestic violence - two on December 1, 2019 (battery and coercion), plus another in the preceding 12 months. Under Nevada law, that finding created a "rebuttable presumption" that giving Diamond physical custody was not in the child's best interest, meaning the burden shifted to her to disprove it. The judge found she did not overcome that presumption and awarded Justin primary physical custody, with Diamond getting parenting time of 48 hours every weekend. Diamond asked the court to reconsider, arguing Justin had failed to hand over video evidence during pretrial discovery. The judge found she had actually disclosed the existence of the videos herself in her pretrial memorandum, that she never filed a motion to compel or raised the issue with the discovery commissioner, and that neither side gave the full video to the court even though the court offered to watch it. The judge denied reconsideration and ordered Diamond to pay Justin's attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Diamond's constitutional rights were not violated. The court explained she never objected below to holding the custody trial first, that it was Justin (not Diamond) who moved to continue, and that the district court never forced her to testify - it only reminded her she had a choice and even suggested she consult her criminal lawyer. Because she voluntarily chose to testify, the court found her Fifth Amendment argument unpersuasive. The court also concluded she received due process: notice and an opportunity to be heard, with the correct "best interest of the child" standard applied. On the video-evidence issues, the court held Diamond failed to show how the missing footage would have changed the outcome or affected her substantial rights - and, importantly, because the judge separately found an earlier act of domestic violence that alone triggered the presumption, any error about the December video was "harmless." The court affirmed.

A father asked a Nevada family court to lower his child support obligation. The family court denied the request and ordered him to pay the other side's attorney fees and costs. He then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court without a lawyer. In appeals of this type, the appellant must file a document called a "fast track statement" - a short written explanation of the appeal - by a deadline set by the court clerk. The clerk set a deadline of May 23, 2022. When the father missed it, the Supreme Court gave him a second chance, extending the deadline to August 22, 2022, and warning him that missing it again could result in dismissal. He did not file the statement and did not contact the court at all. Because the father took no further action, the Supreme Court concluded he had abandoned the appeal and dismissed it. The court did not decide whether the family court's child support or attorney-fee rulings were right or wrong; it dismissed solely for failure to prosecute the appeal.

Bradley and Emily Bellisario were married for seven years and have three children. During their divorce proceedings, Bradley - a lawyer who had stopped practicing and whose law license was temporarily suspended - was found by the district court to be a "vexatious litigant," meaning the court restricted his ability to file new documents because of repeated meritless filings and harassing lawsuits. The court also limited the evidence he could present at trial because he did not follow discovery rules. Bradley was incarcerated and not present when the divorce trial took place. The district court heard Emily's evidence and entered a divorce decree, which Bradley appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected most of Bradley's challenges. It held that his due process rights were not violated by the trial proceeding without him, because he had notice of the trial date and never asked the court to postpone it. The court also upheld the vexatious litigant designation, finding that the district court followed the required four-step analysis, that Bradley had filed many meritless motions and harassing lawsuits against Emily, her attorneys, and two therapists treating one of the children, and that the restrictions imposed were narrow. The Supreme Court agreed with Bradley on two issues, however. First, when the district court calculated his child support, it "imputed" income to him - that is, treated him as if he were earning a certain amount even though his law license was suspended - without first finding that he was unemployed or underemployed without good cause and without making the findings required by Nevada Administrative Code 425.125. Second, the district court awarded spousal support to Emily without addressing the factors that NRS 125.150(9) requires it to weigh. The Supreme Court reversed those two portions of the decree and sent the case back to the district court to make the required findings. The rest of the decree, including the custody schedule and the extension of the temporary protective order, was affirmed.

This case arose from a divorce. Marlene Salvatierra filed for divorce in January 2020. Walter filed his answer and a counterclaim, and the couple attended a case management conference. Because of allegations that Walter committed domestic violence, the district court initially gave Marlene temporary sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the couple's two children and allowed Walter supervised parenting time at a facility called Donna's House on Saturdays. At a hearing in November 2020, the court expanded Walter's parenting time to Saturdays and Sundays from noon until 6:00 p.m., ordered him to take a random drug test, and scheduled a trial for May 2021. In March 2021, Marlene asked the court to suspend Walter's parenting time, saying he had failed his drug test and had been convicted of battery constituting domestic violence and attempt child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The trial went ahead in May 2021, but Walter did not attend and had no lawyer there. In the resulting divorce decree, the court gave Marlene sole legal and sole physical custody of both children. The court noted that after Walter was released from prison, he could ask to change the parenting schedule and begin reunification with his children if he showed six months of sobriety. The decree also divided the couple's shared property and debts. Walter then appealed. Walter's main argument on appeal was that the decree was unfair and violated his rights because he never got notice of the trial, having been taken into custody in April 2021. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The court explained that the record showed Walter was present at the November 2020 hearing when the trial date was set, and that the written order from that hearing was mailed to his address in January 2021 - well before he was taken into custody in April 2021. The court also said Walter did not clearly explain why this was not enough notice or how his rights were violated. The court added that, to the extent Walter was arguing he could not participate because he was in jail, an appeals court is not the right place to sort out that kind of factual question for the first time. The proper way to challenge a judgment on that basis is to file a motion in the district court under a specific rule (NRCP 60(b)), which is designed for asking a trial court to set aside a judgment. Walter did not do that; he appealed instead, so the district court never had a chance to consider that argument. Because Walter did not show that reversal was warranted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the divorce decree.

Cinnamon Haynes and Malcolm Childs share one child. After a trial in family court, the judge issued a custody decree - a court order deciding who cares for and makes decisions about the child. The judge gave Malcolm sole legal custody (the authority to make major decisions about the child) and primary physical custody (the child lives mainly with him). Cinnamon was allowed supervised parenting time at a facility called Donna's House, but only after completing a parenting class, and she was ordered to pay child support. Cinnamon appealed. She told the Court of Appeals that she did not get a fair trial, that she should have primary physical custody, and that Malcolm's parental rights should be ended because, she said, he physically abused the child. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it does not re-decide the case itself, but checks whether the trial judge acted within reasonable bounds and whether the decision is backed by enough evidence. The court also noted that in custody cases the guiding standard is the best interest of the child, and that courts assume the trial judge exercised that discretion properly. The court concluded that Cinnamon's appeal did not give it enough to work with. She stated that she wanted a new trial, wanted full custody, and wanted Malcolm's rights terminated, but she did not explain how the trial judge did anything wrong. On her abuse claim, the court found nothing in the record showing she raised that issue at trial or offered the photos she referenced as evidence. On her claim that the judge prevented her mother from testifying, the court found nothing in the record showing she tried to call her mother as a witness. Because a point not raised in the trial court is treated as waived, and because the appellate courts need not consider arguments that are not clearly and fully made, the court affirmed the custody decree.

This case grows out of a contentious custody dispute between Minh Luong and her ex-husband James Vahey (called "Jim" in the opinion), who divorced in 2021. They were originally given joint legal and joint physical custody of their three children, sharing a week-on/week-off schedule. Since 2019, the parents have repeatedly fought over school placement, therapy, and other child-related matters. After a hearing in November 2021, the district court found that Minh had turned the children against Jim - a situation the court described as parental alienation. In March 2022, the court ordered Jim and the children into an intensive reunification therapy program called Turning Points for Families, based in New York. The court also temporarily gave Jim sole legal and sole physical custody for the New York therapy and for a 90-day period afterward, while planning to revisit the arrangement once therapists recommended it. Minh asked the court to reconsider and to pause these orders. The court refused. She then took her fight to the Court of Appeals by asking for a writ - an extraordinary court order directing a lower court to act (mandamus) or to stop acting beyond its authority (prohibition). Her first such petition was denied because the New York program had not gone forward as planned and a status check was coming up. She filed the current petition after that. The Court of Appeals made several decisions. On the New York therapy orders, it said the issue was moot - meaning there was no longer any effective relief the court could give, because the parties' limited participation in the program had already concluded. On Minh's request to undo the no-contact orders and restore joint custody, the court declined to step in, noting that the district court had now scheduled a full evidentiary hearing to set final custody, and that Minh could appeal after a final decision if she disagreed with it. The court did, however, express concern that custody had been temporarily changed for a long period, effectively cutting one parent off from the children without a full hearing. The one place where Minh prevailed was her request to move the case to a different judge. Reviewing comments the district judge made about the upcoming hearing - including that the judge did not need expert or therapist testimony and had described how the case was going to come out - the Court of Appeals concluded that the judge appeared to have made up her mind before hearing the evidence. To preserve the appearance of fairness, the court ordered that the case be reassigned to a different department. It denied the petition in all other respects.

This was an appeal from a divorce decree. Early in the appeal, the wife (Kayce Hatch) asked the Supreme Court to send the case back to the trial court so the trial court could undo the decree and reopen the evidence-gathering process. The husband (Luke Hatch) did not oppose that request, and the Supreme Court agreed to send the case back on May 4, 2022. Under the rule used to send the case back, the parties were supposed to tell the Supreme Court when the trial court finished its work. After the remand, neither side updated the Supreme Court. On June 8, 2022, the court ordered the husband to provide a written status update by July 8, 2022. He did not. On August 8, 2022, the court issued a second order requiring a status update by August 15, 2022, and warned that failing to respond could lead to sanctions, including dismissal. The husband still did not respond. Concluding that he had abandoned the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed it.

Herman and Nadine Williams married in 2004 and have four children - three boys (currently 9, 12, and almost 14) and a daughter, A.W., who is the oldest and turns 18 in October 2022. During the marriage, Nadine took out student loans and earned a master's degree in nursing and now works as a nurse. Herman works as a tow truck driver for a company called Copart, earning a fee for each completed tow. Tensions began in 2018. Nadine hit A.W. with a piece of PVC pipe, leaving a scar on the child's head, which led to a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation that closed on the understanding that the children would be in Herman's care. Nadine also committed an act of domestic violence against her own mother, Phyllis Gayle. In March 2019, Herman took the children and left the marital home; Gayle then moved in with Herman, paying him $700 per month in rent. Nadine soon filed for divorce. Before trial, the district court gave Herman temporary physical custody, with Nadine getting weekend time that gradually increased. Over time, A.W. came to prefer living with Nadine, even running away from Herman to be with her, and she stayed with Nadine by her own choice; Herman last spent parenting time with A.W. in January 2020. Interviews conducted by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) showed the children's ratings of Nadine improved over time, reportedly after Nadine stopped using physical punishment when the court told her to do so. The case went to trial in February 2021. The district court decided several issues. On custody, it applied a legal presumption against Nadine because of her acts of domestic violence (a "rebuttable presumption" is a starting assumption that can be overcome by evidence), but concluded she overcame that presumption because she stopped using corporal punishment and the children reported improved relationships with her. The court ordered joint physical custody of all four children. On alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other), the court found neither party credible about their income and calculated their incomes from bank records and pay information. It found Herman's income was actually higher on a monthly basis and refused to award him alimony, describing the income gap as "negligible." On debts, the court treated Herman's roughly $75,000 in medical bills and Nadine's roughly $76,000 in student loans as community debt and offset them against each other, assigning each spouse their own debt. It did not divide Nadine's master's degree. Herman appealed. He narrowed his custody challenge to just the three boys, conceding he was not seeking custody of A.W. The appellate court reached four conclusions. First, it upheld the joint physical custody order for the boys, finding no abuse of discretion. Second, it declined to decide whether Nadine's master's degree should have been divided, because Herman never raised that issue at trial - only later in a post-judgment motion - so the point was not preserved for appeal. Third, it found the district court appears to have made an error in calculating Herman's income by counting some money twice: Herman moved money between his checking and savings accounts, and those internal transfers were mistakenly counted as additional income. Because that error may have affected the alimony decision, the court vacated (canceled) the alimony determination and sent it back for a recalculation. Fourth, it declined Herman's invitation to reexamine the district court's credibility findings, explaining that appellate courts generally defer to the trial court, which actually sees and hears the witnesses.

Christina Sobczyk and Aaron Osborne share one child, C.O., born in January 2015. In 2017, a New York court entered a stipulated (agreed-upon) custody order that gave Christina "sole custody" and allowed her to move with the child to Nevada, while Aaron received parenting time on a gradually increasing schedule. That order also required both parents to have independent access to the child's healthcare and education records, and required Christina to give Aaron written updates about the child's providers. Christina moved to Nevada in September 2017. In 2018, Aaron had some contact with the child, including two authorized visits in New York. During the August visit, Child Protective Services came to Aaron's home based on allegations from Christina; CPS found the allegations unfounded and left the child in Aaron's care. The district court later reviewed video and found the child did not appear "stressed, traumatized, or frightened" during that visit. Agencies in both New York and Nevada investigated allegations against Aaron and closed their cases as unsubstantiated. In September 2018, Christina brought the New York order into the Nevada court system and asked the court to stop all contact between Aaron and the child. Aaron responded by asking the court to confirm joint legal custody and to grant joint physical custody. The case went to trial, and the court heard 13 days of testimony between June 2019 and February 2020. The trial was delayed by an attorney's withdrawal and the COVID-19 pandemic. The presiding judge then retired, and a senior judge granted Aaron's request for a new trial, explaining she was uncomfortable deciding the case by only watching videos of the earlier proceedings. Before the new trial, Aaron asked the court to exclude evidence of his criminal history and certain out-of-court statements the child had made to a therapist. The court excluded that evidence. After the new trial, the court found that Christina had severely interfered with Aaron's relationship with the child. It ordered joint legal custody, gave Christina primary physical custody, and provided that Aaron's parenting time would increase gradually and be determined by a "reunification specialist." On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld most of the district court's decisions. It concluded the senior judge acted within her discretion in granting a new trial under NRCP 63, which allows a successor judge to order a new trial if she did not preside over the original trial. It upheld the evidence rulings, in part because Christina did not provide transcripts of the relevant hearing, so the court presumed the missing records supported the lower court's decision. It upheld the joint legal custody and the primary physical custody determinations, finding they were supported by the evidence. However, the Court of Appeals reversed one part of the order. It held that by leaving Aaron's parenting time to be determined entirely by the reunification specialist, the district court improperly handed off decision-making authority that only a court can exercise. The court sent the case back so the district court can decide the parenting-time schedule itself and spell it out with specific times and terms.

Nechole Garcia and Evgeny Shapiro were once a couple and had one child together, A.G.-S., who was later diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. When their relationship ended, they could not agree on how to share custody or how much child support should be paid, so the case went to court. After a two-day trial, the district court decided the parenting schedule, set Garcia's child support obligation, and dealt with requests about past-owed support. Garcia appealed, raising several complaints about how the trial judge handled the case. The Court of Appeals rejected most of Garcia's arguments but agreed with one. First, Garcia argued the judge improperly let in evidence about settlement talks between the parties. The court disagreed. It explained that the materials she pointed to were never actually admitted as evidence. Arguments in motions are not evidence, and each time Shapiro tried to ask her about negotiation-related matters at trial, her objections were sustained (upheld) or the information was struck (removed) from the record. Because nothing was admitted, there was no error - and even if there had been, she never showed it harmed her case. Second, Garcia argued the judge failed to properly weigh the high level of conflict between the parents when choosing a parenting schedule. The court found that the judge had, in fact, considered the conflict, expressly noting it was high, and had weighed Garcia's point (that her schedule would mean fewer exchanges and possibly less conflict) against other factors. The judge picked Shapiro's proposed schedule as being in the child's best interest, and the court found enough evidence to support that decision - including that the parents had identical work schedules and that Shapiro's schedule would let A.G.-S. spend more time with her half-siblings, with whom she had a close bond. Third, Garcia argued the judge miscalculated Shapiro's income for child support by relying on his most recent tax return instead of bank deposits she said totaled more than $90,000 in 2020. The court found the judge did consider those bank deposits but concluded that deposits do not automatically equal income, especially since Garcia asked Shapiro about only one deposit (which he said came from pandemic-related unemployment assistance). Faced with conflicting evidence, the judge was entitled to rely on the tax returns, disclosure forms, and testimony, and the appeals court would not second-guess that. Finally, Garcia argued the judge wrongly refused to decide her request for child support arrears (past-due support) by mistakenly stating she had not asked for any. Here the court agreed with Garcia. The record showed she repeatedly requested "constructive" arrears - in her countermotion, her pretrial memorandum, an admitted exhibit, and her closing brief - claiming Shapiro owed $16,638.72. Because the judge declined to rule based on a mistaken belief that she never asked, the court reversed that portion and sent the matter back for the district court to actually decide the arrears request. Everything else was affirmed.

This case involves the termination of a mother's legal rights to her 11-year-old son. S.V. was first removed from his mother Martina's care when he was two years old, after she left him with a babysitter and did not return. Once a paternity test confirmed John was S.V.'s biological father, child welfare authorities placed S.V. with John, and S.V. has lived with John and John's wife ever since. Over the following years, Martina had inconsistent contact with S.V. After the parties initially agreed to joint custody and a visitation schedule, Martina did not consistently follow it. In 2018, when S.V. was seven, Martina tried to put him alone into an Uber to send him back to John at the end of a visit, prompting another report to child welfare. When John sought sole custody, Martina did not appear at the hearing, and the court awarded John sole legal and physical custody. In July 2019, John petitioned to terminate Martina's parental rights altogether. Around the same time, Martina was in a car crash with her one-year-old daughter in the car while driving with a suspended license and under the influence of multiple illicit drugs. She then served roughly four months in jail for failing to comply with drug counseling ordered in a prior criminal case. Martina did not see S.V. between Spring 2018 and Spring 2021. After a hearing, the district court terminated Martina's parental rights, finding both that there were grounds of parental fault (including abandonment and unfitness) and that termination was in S.V.'s best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded there was substantial evidence that Martina had abandoned S.V. - she went long stretches without contact, sent no letters, cards, or gifts, and only paid child support sporadically until the termination action was filed. The court also concluded that her drug use, felony conviction for driving under the influence of illicit drugs, missed school days for S.V. while in her care, and pattern of leaving S.V. with others showed she was an unfit parent. Finally, the court agreed that termination was in S.V.'s best interest because S.V. has thrived with John and is bonded with John's wife, who intends to adopt him.

Dustin Barral asked a family court judge in Clark County to change the child custody, visitation, and support arrangements between him and Megan Barral (now Megan Hammonds). The family court issued an order that suspended his child support obligation - which is what he had asked for - and also denied Megan's request to convert past-due support into a formal judgment. Dustin then tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the substance of the dispute. The reason: under Nevada's appellate rules, only a party who has been harmed or "aggrieved" by a court order has the right to appeal it. Because the family court gave Dustin the relief he asked for, he was not harmed by the order and therefore had no right to appeal. The court accordingly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

This case involves a custody dispute between Nicole Boatner and Randy Brown over their minor children. A district court judge in Carson City entered a temporary order giving Randy Brown sole legal and physical custody of the children. Nicole Boatner, representing herself without a lawyer, tried to appeal that temporary order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not decide who should have custody of the children. Instead, it concluded that it did not have the legal authority - what courts call "jurisdiction" - to hear the appeal at all. Under Nevada law, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. No statute or rule permits an appeal from a temporary custody order; appeals are allowed only from orders that finally change custody. Because the order Boatner challenged was temporary, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the custody dispute.

Amy Hendrickson and Eric Whitney share custody of their minor child. In August 2020, Whitney asked the family court to change the physical custody and child support arrangement set by a 2013 order, essentially seeking to formalize the shared custody the parents had been informally following since about 2017. In response, Hendrickson filed a single document that both opposed Whitney's request and asked for primary physical custody so she could relocate with the child. Because a local court rule (Washoe District Court Rule 10(3)(a)) requires that a motion, opposition, and reply each be filed as a separate document unless pleaded in the alternative, Hendrickson withdrew that combined countermotion, with the court's permission, and refiled her request for primary physical custody as its own separate motion. Less than a month later, she also filed a separate motion for permission to relocate with the child. Whitney filed oppositions to both new motions and, in each, asked the court to make Hendrickson pay his attorney fees, noting that he effectively had to respond to a request for primary custody twice and had to oppose three motions over just a few months. After a hearing, the district court found that Hendrickson did not clear even the first requirement a parent must meet to relocate — a "sensible, good faith reason for the move" — and denied her relocation request. The court decided Whitney was entitled to fees. In its written order, the court listed several general fee-and-cost authorities (such as NRS 18.010, NRS 18.020, and NRCP 11) in a boilerplate way, and made detailed findings about the amount of fees under the standards from two Nevada cases (Brunzell and Miller v. Wilfong), but it never clearly tied the fee award to a specific legal basis. On appeal, Hendrickson's only argument was that because the district court did not set out a proper legal basis for the fees, the award should be reversed. She did not dispute the amount of the fees or the reasonableness of the request. The Court of Appeals agreed with some of Hendrickson's concerns about the specific authorities the district court cited, but affirmed anyway. It explained that a separate statute, NRS 125C.250, gives family courts discretion to award reasonable attorney fees and costs in cases about legal custody, physical custody, or visitation of a child. Because a court can be affirmed when it reaches the right result even for the wrong reason, and because this was a drawn-out custody dispute, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees.

This case involves a custody fight between a father (Justin Blount), his wife (Stephanie Blount), and the children's paternal grandmother (Paula Blount). The children's biological mother, who was a member of the Hualapai Tribe, had originally been awarded temporary custody by the Tribal Court in Arizona. After she passed away, the Tribal Court returned custody to Justin, and the children moved to Nevada with him and Stephanie in 2017. In 2019, a Nevada court entered a decree of adoption declaring Justin and Stephanie the children's legal parents. The grandmother, Paula, then went back to the Tribal Court in late 2019 seeking grandparent visitation. After a hearing that Justin did not attend, the Tribal Court entered an order in January 2020 granting joint custody to Paula and Justin. Paula then sought to "register" that Tribal Court order in Nevada - a procedure under Nevada law that makes an out-of-state custody order enforceable here. Justin's attorney was served with notice of the registration request on April 6, 2020. Under Nevada's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a person who wants to fight registration of an out-of-state custody order has 20 days to request a hearing. Justin filed his challenge on day 24 - four days late. Stephanie filed hers months later. The district court confirmed the Tribal Court order, and Justin and Stephanie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the 20-day deadline in NRS 125A.465 means what it says: if you don't challenge registration within 20 days of receiving notice, the foreign order is automatically registered "as a matter of law," and you lose the ability to raise challenges that you could have raised during that 20-day window. Because Justin and Stephanie missed the deadline, the court did not reach the merits of their objections to the Tribal Court order - including their arguments that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, that another order superseded it, and that proper notice was not given. The court also noted that Stephanie was not legally entitled to notice of the registration request because the Tribal Court had never awarded her custody or visitation. The court expressly noted that the 2019 Nevada adoption decree was not before it on appeal and that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings." The court acknowledged that other Nevada statutes addressing adoption and post-adoption visitation could potentially conflict with the registration statute, but because the parties did not raise those statutes, the court expressed no opinion on the issue.

This case arose from a divorce and child custody dispute. Frank Luciano started the divorce and custody proceedings in October 2019. Amy filed an answer, and the case moved forward. In December 2019, the court held a case management conference and set a "calendar call" (a scheduling check-in) for May 5, 2020, and a trial for May 19, 2020. Both parties were told these dates in open court. Amy did not appear at the calendar call. The court kept the case on the calendar for the trial date to give her another chance to present evidence. Amy also did not appear at the May 19 trial. The court then took evidence from Frank and, in June 2020, entered a final divorce decree awarding Frank sole legal and sole physical custody of the couple's child, with Amy's parenting time left to Frank's discretion. The court noted that if Amy brought the matter back, it would consider evidence to re-establish contact between her and the child. In July 2020, Amy filed a motion to set aside the decree under NRCP 60(b) (a rule allowing a court to undo a judgment in certain circumstances). She claimed she had not been served with court papers, that the decree resulted from fraud or misconduct, that Frank had committed domestic violence against her, and other allegations. The court held a hearing and, in December 2020, denied the motion, finding she had received written notice of the hearing and trial dates in open court and had not shown a basis to set aside the decree. The court again said it would consider modifying custody and support if she filed an appropriate motion. In May 2021, Amy filed a second NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside several prior orders, repeating similar arguments. The court denied it, finding she had not provided proof that she served the motion on Frank and that it had already considered the same arguments in her first motion. She then appealed. The appellate court first found it lacked jurisdiction over the part of the appeal challenging the divorce decree itself. A notice of appeal generally must be filed within 30 days after the notice of entry of the order being appealed. The notice of entry of the divorce decree was served on June 8, 2020, but Amy did not file her notice of appeal until September 17, 2021 - far too late. Her NRCP 60(b) motions were not filed in time to pause ("toll") the appeal deadline. Because the appeal was late as to the decree, the court dismissed that portion. As to the two orders denying NRCP 60(b) relief, the court affirmed. It explained that district courts have broad discretion over custody decisions and over motions to set aside judgments, and that these decisions are reviewed only for "abuse of discretion." The court found that Amy did not offer cogent argument or relevant authority supporting her claims. It noted that while a court must make specific best-interest findings, including on domestic violence, when making a custody determination, Amy's arguments really challenged the underlying custody decision in the decree - which was not timely appealed - and she cited no authority requiring such findings when deciding an NRCP 60(b) motion. The record showed she was served with the summons, complaint, and the relevant orders, undercutting her fraud and lack-of-service arguments. On the second motion, the court explained that it was denied in part because Amy failed to serve it on Frank, and because Amy did not challenge that specific finding on appeal, the court affirmed on that basis. Finally, the court rejected the claim that custody was awarded as punishment, noting the record showed the court took evidence at trial before making its custody decision rather than entering a default without a hearing.

Victor and Judith Gold divorced in 2019 through a stipulated (agreed) decree that gave both parents joint legal and joint physical custody of their three children. Even though the decree said "joint physical custody," the actual schedule gave Victor the children only from Monday at 11:00 a.m. to Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. each week, with Judith having them the rest of the time. Their oldest child also had "teenage discretion" to choose how long to stay with each parent, as long as he spent at least two days a week with each. In October 2020, Victor filed a motion asking the court to enforce the schedule (he said he had not been seeing the oldest child) and indicated he wanted a "week on/week off" arrangement, which Judith would not agree to. After a hearing, the district court decided the "joint physical custody" label in the decree had been a mistake, because the actual time split did not amount to joint physical custody. The court changed the label to give Judith primary physical custody. In December 2020, Victor filed another motion, this time asking to change the timeshare to week on/week off while keeping the joint custody designation. The court heard that motion in April 2021 and denied his request. Victor appealed. The Court of Appeals split its ruling into three parts. First, it dismissed the portions of the appeal it could not hear: it found it lacked jurisdiction over two orders (dated May 20 and May 21, 2021) allowing Judith to travel with the children, because those orders are not the kind that can be appealed. Second, it affirmed (left in place) the June 4, 2021 order that had denied Victor's request to disqualify the judge, because Victor did not make any argument about it in his appeal, and unargued issues are treated as waived. Third, and most importantly, it reversed the order changing custody to primary physical custody with Judith. The court explained that when deciding custody, the only thing that matters is the best interest of the child. Because the district court had relied only on the written schedule to switch the custody label, without looking at how the parents actually shared time or whether the change was in the children's best interest, and without making findings on those points, the appellate court concluded the district court abused its discretion. It sent the case back for further proceedings.

This case concerns who is legally recognized as the father of a child, A.A., born in 2011, and how custody of A.A. should be divided. Three adults are involved. Rosie is the child's mother. Henry was Rosie's on-and-off partner; when A.A. was born, Henry and Rosie signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity (a sworn statement declaring Henry to be the father), and Henry's name went on the birth certificate. Ignacio was also Rosie's on-and-off partner during the same period and is the biological father of Rosie's second child, J.A., based on earlier paternity testing. For years, Ignacio suspected he might also be A.A.'s biological father. Rosie and Henry told him he was not, and Henry once showed Ignacio a screenshot of a DNA test purporting to confirm Henry's paternity. Ignacio thought the test looked suspicious and obtained his own DNA tests, which showed he was A.A.'s biological father. Rosie continued to deny him regular contact with A.A. Ignacio sued for a paternity determination and custody. The district court initially ruled against him, saying his challenge came too late. Ignacio appealed, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, and on remand the district court ordered formal DNA testing. The testing confirmed Ignacio is A.A.'s biological father. The district court then declared Ignacio the legal father, ordered the birth certificate amended, and awarded Ignacio and Rosie joint physical custody. Henry was reduced to a "third party" who could request visitation similar to a grandparent. Rosie and Henry appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. They argued biology should not automatically determine legal fatherhood once a child is past age three, that the birth certificate should control, and that the trial court failed to properly analyze A.A.'s best interest before ordering joint custody. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed. It held that under Nevada's Parentage Act, a DNA test showing 99% or higher probability of paternity creates a "conclusive presumption" of fatherhood - meaning it cannot be overcome by other evidence. Because Ignacio's test met that threshold, he is A.A.'s legal father, with all the rights that come with being a parent. The court explained that an older Nevada decision, Love v. Love, which had treated DNA evidence as just one factor, no longer controls because the Legislature changed the statute in 2007 to make DNA results conclusive. The court also explained that the birth-certificate statute Rosie and Henry relied on does not make the certificate dispositive when paternity is contested and the listed father was never married to the mother. On custody, the court held that the trial judge did not have to apply the legal test for modifying an existing custody order, because there was no prior custody order for A.A. Nevada law presumes joint physical custody is in a child's best interest, and the trial court found that Rosie and Henry had intentionally kept Ignacio away from A.A. for years - a circumstance that statutorily favors joint custody. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.