Nevada family-law case summaries

A judgment gave the husband a divorce, custody of the couple's minor son, and a division of their community property. The wife filed a motion to amend the judgment, asking instead to be granted the divorce, to receive the entire family home as her separate property, along with a car and $150 per month alimony, to be awarded attorney fees, and to have the husband pay all community debts. The trial court denied the motion, and she appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that a trial court's decisions on conflicting evidence, on dividing property, and on alimony are reviewed with deference and will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, or an abuse of discretion. Substantial evidence supported granting the husband the divorce and custody and making a 'just and equitable' (not necessarily exactly equal) division of the community property. Attorney fees, although no longer requiring a showing of financial need, are discretionary, and the denial was proper because the wife offered no evidence to support her request. Finally, she could not complain that the husband received his public-employee retirement fund, because her own motion had asked that he be awarded it - so she was not an 'aggrieved party' on that point.

In a 1963 divorce, the wife received custody of three children, the family home, child support and alimony, and the husband was ordered to pay off the mortgage ('encumbrances') on the home at $167 per month. The decree said that if the wife remarried, the husband could pay a smaller monthly amount, and that if she 'sold or disposed of' the house, his obligation to pay off the mortgage would end. His payments were later reduced. In 1966 the wife stopped making the house payments (the decree had placed the duty to keep the mortgage current on the husband), the home went into foreclosure, and it was sold at a trustee's sale in 1967, leaving the wife with nothing from it. On rehearing, a judge found the wife had lost her equity through no fault of her own but because the husband failed to meet his obligations, and that she had not 'sold or disposed of' the house in the way the decree contemplated. The court entered a judgment against the husband equal to the mortgage balance at foreclosure, less interest. The husband appealed only that money judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. His duty under the decree was to pay off the mortgage; the wife's remarriage would only have reduced his monthly payment, not eliminated the total obligation, and only her own sale or disposal of the house would have ended it - a foreclosure caused by his own default was not such a 'disposal.' Under NRS 125.180(1), when a spouse defaults on a sum required by a divorce judgment, the court may enter judgment for the arrearage; because the house was lost through his default and it had become impossible to require him to clear the mortgage, entering judgment for the net balance was proper. His argument that the phrase 'less interest' was too vague to enforce failed, because that language operated only to his benefit, so he was not an aggrieved party as to it.

In this divorce, the main dispute concerned a $5,000 debt. To help buy into a business, the couple borrowed $5,000 from the wife's father, Mr. Hess, and the husband signed a promissory note to Hess. Hess, in turn, borrowed $5,000 from his credit union (securing it with a life insurance policy) and gave that money to the couple. When Hess died, the insurance paid off Hess's loan to the credit union. The husband argued that because the same $5,000 was involved - and because he had paid $150 toward Hess's credit-union loan - his own debt to Hess was extinguished. The trial court disagreed, finding that the husband's note to Hess was a separate and distinct obligation the couple still owed to Hess's estate, and ordering that, in the property division, the wife would hold the husband harmless on it. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The husband's note obligation was distinct from Hess's separate loan from the credit union; absent fraud, mistake, or failure of consideration, a prior or contemporaneous oral understanding that a note will not be paid according to its terms is generally no defense. The Court also rejected the husband's other arguments: excluding evidence of the wife's alleged adultery from eight years earlier was proper as too remote in time (the divorce rested on well-established grounds of extreme cruelty); and the division of community property and the $250 per month child support for two children were within the trial court's discretion, with no abuse shown. The Court awarded the wife attorney fees and costs for the appeal.

Before marrying, the husband owned two A&W drive-in restaurants, which he placed into a corporation. After the marriage, the corporation acquired two more drive-ins, funded largely by the cash flow from the original restaurants, and the business grew substantially in value during the marriage. In the divorce, the key question was how to treat that increase in value - as the husband's separate property, as the community's, or split between them. The Nevada Supreme Court used this case to change Nevada law. Under the old 'all-or-nothing' rule (from Lake v. Bender), the increase went entirely to the separate owner if it came mainly from the property itself, or entirely to the community if it came mainly from a spouse's efforts. The Court rejected that rule. It held that when the increase in value of separate property during marriage results from BOTH the invested separate capital AND the labor or skill of a spouse, the increase must be apportioned - divided - between separate and community property. This prevents the unfairness of denying the separate owner a reasonable return on the investment just because a spouse's efforts also contributed. The Court described two accepted methods for doing the apportionment: the Pereira approach (give the separate estate a fair return on its capital and treat the excess as community) and the Van Camp approach (value the spouse's services as the community's share and treat the rest as separate). It said courts may use whichever method achieves substantial justice. Finding the trial court's use of the Pereira method fair on these facts, the Court affirmed.

Before marrying, John Buettner (whose separate property was worth roughly $400,000) and Stella signed a prenuptial (antenuptial) agreement. It provided that each gave up claims to the other's separate estate, that they would leave each other half of their property by will, and that if they divorced, Stella would receive the house and its furnishings and $500 per month for five years ($30,000), plus half of the community property. They married the same day. Months later John sued for divorce, claiming Stella had tricked him into signing the agreement. The trial court refused to enforce the agreement, calling it 'unfair and unjust' and 'in derogation of marriage' and contrary to public policy, and instead awarded Stella only a dining room set, a couch, and $2,000. Stella appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court decided two questions. First, are prenuptial agreements about property and support in the event of divorce automatically void as against public policy? The Court held they are not per se void; such agreements are valid if fair and properly made. (Agreements that actually invite or encourage divorce, or that let a husband cheaply escape his duty to support his wife, can be void, but this was not such a case - in fact, the husband, not the wife, committed the serious marital misconduct, including beating her.) Second, was this particular agreement unconscionable or unfairly obtained? The Court found it was not: the husband's own testimony showed he entered it freely, knowingly, and voluntarily to protect his separate property for his children, with no fraud, duress, or nondisclosure. The trial court's bare finding that the agreement was 'unfair and unjust' was merely conclusory. The Court reversed and remanded to enforce the agreement, while emphasizing that courts retain the power to refuse to enforce an antenuptial contract that is unconscionable or obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, material nondisclosure, or duress.

The Reeds divorced in Nevada in 1962. Their property settlement gave the mother custody of the four children and required the father to pay $75 per week in child support. The father fell behind, and in 1971 the mother went back to court under Nevada's arrearage statute (NRS 125.180) to collect what she said was $13,285.75 in unpaid support, plus costs and attorney fees. After a hearing, the trial judge entered judgment for the mother, but only for $11,303.75, ordered it collected at no more than $50 per month, and denied her any attorney fees or costs. The mother appealed, asking the Nevada Supreme Court to give her the full original amount plus interest, payable immediately, along with fees and costs. A key problem for the mother's appeal was that she never filed a transcript of the hearing (or an approved written substitute) with the Supreme Court. Because the appellate court could not see what evidence the trial judge heard, it had to assume the evidence supported the judge's conclusions - that only $11,303.75 was actually owed, that it should be paid off gradually, and that no attorney fees were warranted. The court explained that the arrearage statute gives the trial judge broad discretion: the judge can enter judgment for all, some, or none of the claimed arrears, and can set up any reasonable payment schedule. The court had previously approved a $25-per-month payoff of child support arrears in an earlier case, so a $50-per-month schedule here was well within the judge's power. Attorney fees and costs were likewise discretionary. With no transcript to show otherwise, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order.

A 1968 divorce gave the mother custody of the child, ordered the father to pay $50 per month support, and gave him 'reasonable' visitation, but it did not spell out the details of when support was due or what visitation was reasonable. In 1969 the parties signed an agreement defining exactly when visitation and payments would occur. The relationship later deteriorated. In 1971 the mother asked the court to terminate the father's visitation for nonpayment of support and to enter judgment for the unpaid support; the father responded by seeking to hold her in contempt for denying visitation and to transfer custody to him, each parent claiming the other was unfit. After a hearing lasting nearly three days, the court kept custody with the mother, continued the father's visitation but defined it and imposed conditions on it, continued the $50 per month support, entered judgment for the support arrears, and ruled that the father's visitation would not resume until he paid the arrears and stayed current; it also awarded the mother attorney fees. The father appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by turning his previously unqualified visitation into conditional visitation and by tying visitation to payment of support. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Because the father did not provide a transcript of the lengthy hearing, the Court had to presume the evidence supported the trial court's findings; trial courts have broad discretion to determine a child's best interests when modifying visitation, and the attorney-fee award was authorized and not shown to be unreasonable.

Harry and Matilda Sargeant married in 1940 and, the day before, signed an agreement keeping their property separate; the court noted Matilda was not made aware of what the agreement really meant. Harry managed all the money during the marriage. He was worth $285,000 when they married and about $3,000,000 by the time he, at age 81, filed for divorce. The trial court granted Matilda the divorce as the party least at fault and awarded her a large lump-sum support award, substantial attorney fees, and ordered Harry to set up a $50,000 trust fund for a foster child, Michael, whom the couple had raised since he was four but never adopted. Harry appealed several parts of the award. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed three main points. First, on attorney fees: Nevada's older rule (from Allis v. Allis) required a wife to prove she was in 'necessitous circumstances' before the court could make the husband help pay her lawyer. The court overruled that rule, reasoning that a wife should be able to face her husband in court on an equal footing without having to drain her savings. Here, Matilda's modest assets were dwarfed by Harry's $3,000,000, so the fee award (about $52,500 for 753 hours of work over a 29-year financial history) was neither improper nor excessive. Second, on lump-sum alimony: Harry objected to paying alimony as a single lump sum rather than monthly. The court approved the lump-sum approach, noting Harry's short life expectancy, his bitterness, and the risk he might give away assets to avoid paying. Nevada law lets a court set aside a husband's separate property for a needy wife's support. The court added protections: it made the award a charge against Harry's estate and directed that it be held in a trust paying Matilda monthly until her death or remarriage. Third, on the $50,000 trust for Michael: the court reversed this. Because there was no promise to adopt, the doctrine of 'equitable adoption' did not apply, and someone who stands in the place of a parent can stop doing so at any time. Bare promises of future support did not lock Harry into supporting Michael. The rest of the decree was affirmed, and the case sent back to enter a modified decree.

Burton Todkill got a divorce from Gladys Todkill. Neither the divorce itself, the alimony, nor the attorney fees were disputed on appeal. The fight was over property. Burton had inherited $750,000 in stock from his father, and he claimed that essentially all the property acquired during the marriage - a home on Mira Vista, an interest in a real-estate corporation (C.B.C. Inc.), and other lots - was really his separate property bought with his inherited money. The trial court agreed and awarded all of it to Burton, finding no community property existed and that property he had put in Gladys's name was held 'in trust' for him to avoid his creditors. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with part of this but reversed part. It first confirmed the general rule: property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property, and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and certain proof. The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the assets were traceable to Burton's inherited stock and were his separate property, because that finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence and Gladys did not prove community funds or the couple's labor bought them. But the court reversed the finding that two specific items - the Mira Vista home and Burton's one-sixth interest in C.B.C. stock, both of which Burton had transferred into Gladys's name during the marriage - were held in trust for him. The law presumes that when a husband puts his separate property into his wife's name, he intends a gift to her, even if his motive was to shield it from creditors. That gift presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, and if the evidence conflicts, the presumption wins. Here Burton said the transfers were for safekeeping in trust, but Gladys testified the home was a birthday present and the stock was given to her for security. That conflict meant Burton's proof was not clear and convincing enough to rebut the gift presumption. The court sent the case back with instructions to confirm the home as Gladys's separate property and to give her half of the C.B.C. sale proceeds ($151,389.87 plus interest), while confirming the adjacent lot to Burton.

Richard and Patricia Howe divorced in 1968. Their settlement agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, gave Patricia custody of their two young children, with Richard entitled to visit 'at all reasonable times.' Patricia and the children lived in Carson City; Richard and his new wife lived in Las Vegas. In late 1969, Richard asked to have the children visit him in Las Vegas, but Patricia objected to them traveling there. Richard then filed a motion to modify the decree, seeking a specific right to have the children visit him in Las Vegas, plus a week each at Christmas and Easter and six weeks in the summer. The trial court instead entered an order letting Richard visit the children and remove them from Patricia's home for 48 hours at a time, on notice, and stated at the hearing that he was to visit them in the Carson City area. Richard appealed, arguing the limits were an abuse of discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained the outcome was the same regardless of how you characterized Richard's motion. If his request was really for partial custody, it failed because he showed neither that the parents' circumstances had materially changed nor that the children's welfare would be substantially enhanced by a change - the standard for altering custody. And there is a presumption on appeal that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining the children's best interests, which Richard did nothing to overcome. Alternatively, if the motion was treated as one about visitation rather than custody, the trial court has broad discretionary power over establishing and modifying visitation under Nevada law (NRS 125.140(2)), and its Carson-City-area, 48-hour arrangement was not an abuse of that discretion. Either way, the order stood.

Several years after their divorce, the ex-wife went back to court asking for more child support for the couple's minor children and for money to pay her attorney. After a hearing, the court increased child support by $6,000 a year and awarded her $2,500 for attorney fees ('suit money'). Because the ex-husband did not bring the hearing transcript up on appeal, the Supreme Court assumed the evidence supported those awards, and the ex-husband did not seriously argue otherwise. The real question was different. Before the hearing, the ex-husband had served an 'offer of judgment' under a civil procedure rule (NRCP 68) offering $7,501 a year in additional support labeled as alimony, with nothing for attorney fees. Under NRCP 68 in ordinary civil cases, if a party rejects an offer and then does no better at trial, that party can be penalized by having to pay the other side's costs and fees. The ex-husband argued that because the court's $6,000 support award was arguably less than his $7,501 offer, the court should have denied his ex-wife her attorney fees and instead made her pay his. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this and affirmed. It held, as a threshold matter, that it could not even tell whether the $6,000 in child support was really less favorable than $7,501 in alimony, because alimony is taxable to the wife while child support is not, and there was no record of the tax situation. More fundamentally, the court held that NRCP 68 simply does not apply to divorce proceedings, which involve different social considerations than ordinary civil lawsuits. Suit money in divorce is awarded based on need - to prevent a failure of justice - not based on who 'prevails.' Applying NRCP 68 would undermine the legislature's efforts to help wives obtain counsel, would spawn intricate side-litigation over whether an award was 'more favorable' than an offer, and would clash with the rule that parties cannot bind the court by agreement on child custody and support, where the child's best interest controls. The court affirmed and ordered the husband to pay an additional $1,000 for his ex-wife's attorney fees on appeal.

After the husband served his wife with a divorce complaint, he took her back into the marital home and resumed living with her. When she asked what he intended to do about the divorce action, he answered only, 'You will find out in time.' They had marital relations on the night of November 17, 1969. The next day, November 18, without her knowledge, the husband obtained a default divorce decree that awarded him all of the couple's community property and custody of their three young children (ages 9, 7, and 3). He came home early on November 19, again had marital relations with his wife, and only then told her, 'The divorce decree is now final,' and ordered her out of the home along with her three other children from a prior marriage. The wife, who was not legally sophisticated and had no money to hire a lawyer, did not consult an attorney for about three months. When she finally found counsel (who took the case without a retainer), she moved to set aside the default decree on grounds of surprise and excusable neglect. The trial court denied her motion entirely. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed in part. It found the record clearly established meritorious grounds to set aside the decree under the rule allowing relief from judgments (NRCP 60(b)) - indeed, at oral argument the husband's own counsel effectively conceded the facts amounted to fraud on the lower court. The court held that her roughly three-month delay was no bar; to treat it as 'laches,' 'estoppel,' or 'waiver' in these circumstances would 'reduce the judicial process to a mockery.' Her remarriage while the motion was pending was also no bar, because she had accepted no benefits from the parts of the decree that stripped her of her parental and property rights. The court reversed the denial of relief as to the property and custody portions of the decree and sent the case back with instructions to decide her request for preliminary attorney fees and to determine, as matters of first impression, how to divide the property and who should have custody of the children.

This was the third trip to the Nevada Supreme Court in the same divorce case. The dispute centered on how to value the 'good will' of the family restaurant business, and specifically whether $123,706.37 in 'unidentified deposits' should count as business income when calculating that value. In the two earlier appeals, the Supreme Court had already decided how the issue should be handled and, on the second remand, had specifically said no new evidence was to be taken - the lower court was just to hear objections to the special master's report and enter a corrected decree. On remand, the trial court did exactly that, awarding the wife an additional $86,300 to reflect the increased good-will value after treating the unidentified deposits as income. That result was consistent with what the Supreme Court had ordered. The husband appealed again, arguing the trial court should have let him introduce additional evidence to explain the source of those unidentified deposits. But the trial court had been bound to follow the Supreme Court's earlier mandates, which forbade new evidence. In effect, the husband was asking the Supreme Court to change its own prior rulings and give him a fresh chance to explain deposits he should have explained at the very first hearing. The court refused. While courts do have power to correct prior judgments in some situations (like fraud or mistake), equity does not require reopening a case just to let a party present evidence he should have offered the first time around. The court found his other arguments equally without merit and affirmed.

Dr. Thurston and his wife were both 57 and had been married 34 years when he filed for divorce in 1969, claiming incompatibility (and later adding one year's voluntary separation). His wife opposed the divorce throughout and, two days before trial, filed a counterclaim for separate maintenance based on his alleged extreme cruelty; she never sought a divorce herself. The trial court granted the divorce to Dr. Thurston and divided the couple's substantial property. The wife appealed, challenging the court's jurisdiction, the property division, and the decision to grant the divorce to her husband. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on every point. On jurisdiction, the wife argued Dr. Thurston did not adequately prove the required six weeks of Nevada residency because the corroboration requirement was not met. The court disagreed: a neighbor testified he saw or phoned Dr. Thurston every day during the six weeks before filing, which adequately corroborated residency, and the court would not disturb that supported finding. On the property division, the wife complained it was not equitable, but the court found the 'just and equitable' distribution under NRS 125.150 was amply supported by the record. Notably, she offered no different valuation of the assets than her husband did, and she received over $300,000 - more than half of the couple's property - capable of producing substantial income. On who got the divorce, the wife argued it was wrong to grant it to Dr. Thurston because he failed to prove incompatibility and was most at fault. The court held the record supported the finding of incompatibility, and it relied on Nevada's statute (NRS 125.120) providing that when both spouses are at fault but only one seeks a divorce, the court may grant it to the party seeking it even if that party is most at fault. Because the wife sought only separate maintenance, not a divorce, the court could grant the divorce to Dr. Thurston. The denial of her motion for a new trial was likewise proper.

In 1967, the mother and father of a young girl, Susie DeeLin, both signed a written consent appointing the child's paternal grandmother as her legal guardian. Two years later the parents' marriage broke down and the father filed for divorce. During the divorce, the mother asked the court to end the grandmother's guardianship so she could have Susie DeeLin back. The trial court granted the mother a divorce, found her a fit mother, and awarded her custody of the couple's four other children - but refused to terminate the guardianship over Susie DeeLin. The mother appealed on two fronts. First, she argued that because the court found her fit to raise the other four children, it had to give her Susie DeeLin too. Second, she argued the original guardianship was invalid because the court that appointed the grandmother never specifically found the appointment 'necessary and convenient.' The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed. On jurisdiction, it explained that district courts get their power over guardianships directly from the Nevada Constitution and statute (NRS 3.210); a specific finding of 'necessity and convenience' is a matter of proof, not a requirement for the court to have jurisdiction. Since both parents had consented and everyone was present in court, the appointment was valid, and any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence had to be brought within the proper time limits or be lost. On the refusal to terminate, the court noted the mother never provided a transcript of the guardianship-termination hearings. Without a record of the evidence, the court had to presume the trial judge properly found that the usual preference for a parent had been overcome, and that his ruling was supported by the evidence. A finding that the mother was fit for the other children did not, as a matter of law, require ending the guardianship of Susie DeeLin. Finally, the court corrected one clerical error: the divorce decree mistakenly gave the father visitation 'every other week' instead of 'every other weekend,' which the father conceded; the court modified the decree to fix that typographical mistake and otherwise affirmed.

Neng Yee Lam filed for divorce in Nevada in 1967 from her husband Kai Sing Lam, with whom she had three children. Her husband was served outside Nevada and by publication and never answered, so she got a default divorce. Because the court had no personal jurisdiction over the husband and no property was located in Nevada, the decree awarded her custody of the children but made no provision for child support or division of property. Almost two years later, the husband asked the court to change the decree to set visitation rights and he volunteered to make some child support payments. The wife then asked the court to divide the couple's property. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the husband to deposit funds from a Canadian bank account into a trust for child support and to split the rest of the Canadian account equally with the wife. The husband appealed the property-division part, arguing the court lacked power to divide property in a modification proceeding. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the child support order but reversed and dismissed the property division. It explained that matters concerning the children of a marriage can be reopened at any time under the child-welfare statute, so those issues were not barred by the six-month time limit that normally applies to reopening judgments, and the husband's own participation made the custody and support order all the more binding. But the property was different: because property division had never been litigated in the original divorce (the husband and the property were not before the court then), it could not be resolved later in a modification proceeding without an express stipulation between the parties. There was no such stipulation, so the husband's appearance was limited to matters about the children and could not support a division of property. The court also rejected the argument that this was really a separate property action rather than a modification.

Edith and Graham Jones married in Massachusetts in 1934 and had three children. In 1963, while living in New York, they signed a separation agreement under which Graham agreed to pay Edith $225 per month for her own support (until she remarried) and $87.50 per month for each of two minor children. The agreement said that even if it was later written into a divorce decree, it would not merge into that decree but would survive as a private contract binding for all time, to be interpreted under New York law. Graham then moved to Nevada, got a quick default divorce (Edith was never personally served and the agreement was never brought into that case), and remarried. Years later he stopped making the full payments. In 1968, Edith sued him in Nevada for breaking the contract, seeking the unpaid alimony and child support. After trial, the Nevada judge awarded Edith the arrears but also cut the future monthly payments called for by the agreement, gave her interest only from the date of judgment, awarded no costs, and awarded no attorney's fee. Edith appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for a new trial. It ruled that the trial court had no power to rewrite (reduce) the payments set by the surviving separation agreement, because under New York, Massachusetts, and Nevada law a court cannot modify a private support contract that is not merged into a divorce decree. It also held that interest should run on each unpaid installment from the date that installment became due, not just from the judgment; that Edith, as the winning party recovering more than $300 in a contract action for money, was entitled to costs as a matter of right; and that the judge should have explained why he denied any attorney's fee so the decision could be reviewed. The court added that whether Edith could get a fee at all depended on whether her total recovery (including interest treated as damages) exceeded $10,000 under the fee statute.

Petor and Barbara Stojanovich married in 1960 and had two young children. Petor had bought a house before the marriage, and both before and during the marriage improvements were made to it. By the time of the divorce, the home had an equity of about $18,000. The trial court granted Barbara the divorce, gave her custody and child support of $150 per month per child, and divided the couple's property. The court treated the home as community property (Petor did not dispute that on appeal) and awarded the entire home equity to Barbara, trying to offset that by giving Petor the bank account and stock. Petor appealed the property division. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the property issue. It explained that equal distribution of community property is the rule in most cases and that, while the trial court has broad discretion, it must clearly express the reason, purpose, and beneficiary of any unequal division. Here the trial judge's own stated intent was to make a roughly equal division, but by giving Barbara the whole home equity while giving Petor a much smaller offset, he failed to achieve that intent and thereby overstepped his discretion. The court noted the judge's legitimate concern that the children keep living in the family home could have been met by imposing a 'burden' on the home for the children's benefit (letting the mother and children live there during the children's minority) without giving Barbara sole ownership. The court also held the judge improperly gave Barbara several items of Petor's separate property; because the judgment did not set that property aside for support of the wife or children and the record showed no such need, the court lacked power to divest Petor of his separate property, and that part of the judgment was void.

Georgia and Mansell Rosenbaum were married 24 years and had three children while living in Missouri, where Mansell earned about $19,206 a year as an air traffic controller. A Missouri court denied him a divorce in 1968. In January 1969, Mansell quit his job, moved to Las Vegas, and filed a new divorce action. Georgia contested it and argued that the Missouri decision denying a divorce barred (was 'res judicata' of) the Nevada case. The Nevada judge granted Mansell the divorce and gave Georgia the equity in the Missouri home, half of a savings account, a car, custody of the children, and modest support ($40 per child and $10 per month alimony). During trial, Georgia's lawyer repeatedly tried to show that Mansell had earned much more in his former job and could earn more again, and that his new bank job at $400 a month was far below his capabilities. The judge refused to consider this evidence of Mansell's prior income and earning potential, calling it speculative and irrelevant. Georgia appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected her res judicata defense: proving that defense requires that the same facts and evidence support both cases, and there was nothing in the record showing what the Missouri case was decided on or that the same evidence was involved. But the court agreed the judge made a mistake in refusing to consider Mansell's earning capacity. It held that a trial judge, in setting alimony and child support, is allowed (though not required) to consider what a spouse could in good faith earn if he wanted to. If a person deliberately takes a lower-paying job or earns less than he reasonably could, the court may take that into account; if he genuinely cannot find comparable work despite good-faith effort, the award should reflect his actual ability to pay. Because the judge might reach a different result after considering the evidence, the court reversed and sent the case back for a limited retrial only on the amount of alimony and child support.

A mother who had been awarded custody of her two children in a 1954 divorce sued her deceased ex-husband's estate for child support that would come due after his death. The divorce decree had ordered the father to pay $50 per month per child 'until the further order of the court or until the children reached their majority.' The father paid faithfully until he died in September 1968. The mother then filed a claim against his estate for $3,850 - the support she calculated would accrue from his death until each child turned 18. The estate rejected the claim, and the trial court dismissed her lawsuit, suggesting she could instead seek a family allowance in the probate proceedings. The single question for the Nevada Supreme Court was whether a decree ordering child support 'until further order of the court, or until they reached the age of their majority' allows the mother to collect installments that come due after the father's death, as a claim against his estate. The court had never squarely decided this before. The court explained that at common law a father's duty to support his children ended when he died. It held that Nevada's statute (NRS 125.140) does permit a divorce court, in its discretion, to order that child support payments bind the father's estate - but a decree must specifically say that the obligation is to survive the father's death. A generic order to pay 'until further order of the court' or 'during minority' is not enough to create an estate obligation. The court declined to follow states (like California and Utah) that had read such generic language to bind the estate, and instead adopted the Washington rule requiring the decree to expressly state the obligation survives death. The court also catalogued the many unanswered practical questions that arise when support is charged against an estate (priority among children, credits for insurance or Social Security, modification after death, keeping the estate open during minority) and urged that these be addressed by comprehensive legislation. It suggested safer alternatives - a father can contractually bind his estate, or a court can require life insurance or a trust for the children. Because this decree did not specifically state the obligation would survive death, the court affirmed the dismissal.

When Marguerite and Leighton Noble divorced in 1966, Marguerite received custody of their son Scott, alimony, and child support, and Leighton was ordered to keep certain insurance and to have reasonable visitation. Although Leighton paid on time, Marguerite repeatedly blocked or frustrated his visits with Scott. The trial court warned her, in open court, that if she kept denying visitation it might use sanctions, including relieving Leighton of support payments, and it set specific visitation times. The situation did not improve. In 1969, Leighton moved to be relieved of all child support, insurance premiums, and 'any other financial contribution.' After a hearing, the trial court suspended both child support and alimony and relieved Leighton of maintaining Marguerite under the insurance policies, until Marguerite submitted an acceptable plan for complying with the visitation orders. Marguerite appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the order but sent one piece back. It held the trial court acted within its inherent power to enforce its own decrees when it suspended alimony and the insurance obligations as a sanction for Marguerite's contumacious denial of visitation, and that she had received adequate notice (Leighton's motion sought relief from any financial contribution 'in whatever form') and an opportunity to be heard. But the suspension of child support raised a conflict between the court's power to punish contempt and the paramount principle that a child's best interest and welfare come first. Because the trial court made no findings about how a total suspension of child support would affect the child's present comfort and future well-being, and the record would not let the court imply such findings, the case was remanded for the trial court to make those findings on the child support suspension. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Marguerite a continuance and denied her attorney's fees on appeal.

In this divorce, the trial court granted the wife child support, several education-related allowances (tuition to attend a lipreading school to overcome her hearing defect and tuition for a beauty college), lump-sum alimony, and attorney fees. The husband appealed those financial awards. A major obstacle for his appeal was that there was no trial transcript in the record; he filed only an abbreviated 'statement of the evidence,' which did not claim to contain all the evidence presented at trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed almost everything. It applied long-standing rules that facts asserted in briefs cannot fill gaps in the record, and that when the appellant's statement does not affirmatively show it contains all the material evidence, the court will not disturb the judgment as unsupported - it presumes the evidence justified the trial court's findings. On child support, the court held the $125-per-month award was well within the trial court's discretion. Even though the wife had not spelled out her detailed need, the court could award support consistent with her counterclaim, because the guiding principle is the best interest and welfare of the child (citing Atkins v. Atkins, where support was properly awarded even when neither parent asked for it). The court also addressed an unusual point: the trial judge had said he based the support amount on his own knowledge of what it cost to raise his own children. The court found this unusual but not error, because a judge must draw on his knowledge, training, and experience to decide what is 'necessary or proper.' On the lump-sum alimony, the court approved the awards even though they were made contingent on the wife pursuing training to improve her hearing and her earning ability; the contingency did not detract from the award, and there was no abuse of discretion. The one thing the court reversed was the attorney fee award. The wife never requested attorney fees in her pleadings, and there was no evidence in the record to support them. Under Nevada law (NRS 125.150(2)), a court may award attorney fees in a divorce even without a prior application, but only if fees are put in issue by the pleadings, and the party must also show necessitous circumstances. Because neither requirement was met, the court reversed the fee award and remanded with instructions to remove it; the rest of the judgment was affirmed.

Dorothy and William Kelly married in 1964, each having been married before, and moved to Glenbrook, Nevada, in 1966. Dorothy filed for divorce in 1967. William was a wealthy lawyer who, before the marriage, had placed the bulk of his fortune (about $6.2 million) into a revocable Ohio trust for himself and his children. During the marriage his separate fortune grew by two to three million dollars. Because the case was complicated, a court-appointed Master tried the issues and recommended findings, which the trial court adopted. The Master found the parties owned no community property, and Dorothy appealed only that finding. Dorothy argued that the growth in William's separate property should be shared with the community because his skill and effort during the marriage helped produce it, and she asked the court to abandon Nevada's old 'all or nothing' rule from Lake v. Bender and instead apportion the increase between separate and community property. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that when there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings in a marital-property case, the appellate court will not reverse. Here the evidence, though conflicting, showed William contributed little or no valuable effort to his separate property; his admitted heavy drinking kept him from meaningful work, and professional advisers managed the investments. Because the community made no measurable contribution to the growth of William's separate estate, the court did not need to reconsider the Lake v. Bender rule; the community would not be entitled to any apportionment or reimbursement even under alternatives to that rule. The court also held that although property acquired after marriage is presumed community, that presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, and the source of the funds (here, William's separate property) controlled the character of the assets Dorothy claimed. It noted William had spent substantial separate funds supporting the couple during the marriage.

In this custody dispute over a 10-year-old boy and an 8-year-old girl, the parents had agreed at separation that the mother, Diane, would have custody, with the father, Cecil, having reasonable visitation. During the separation and after the divorce action began, Diane lived for over a month with her boyfriend (whom she later married), with the children present, and she told Cecil about the arrangement before sending the children to him for the holidays. Relying on an earlier Nevada case (Sisson v. Sisson), Cecil argued the trial court had to deny Diane custody because of her adultery, and he appealed the award of custody to her. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of custody to the mother. It distinguished Sisson, where the court had reversed a custody award to an adulterous mother who had openly and notoriously cohabited with a man for more than a year and deliberately exposed her children to that environment. Here, by contrast, the relationship was not the same kind of prolonged, open cohabitation. The court held that while a mother's adultery is a very weighty factor, it is not alone conclusive proof that she is unfit to have custody. Quoting other courts, it explained that a woman can be a bad wife but a good mother, and that a trial court weighing a child's future welfare must consider many factors - adultery being one important one, but not the only determinative one. The remaining evidence showed Diane had been a good mother - indeed, Cecil himself had agreed at separation that she should have custody. Because the trial court has broad discretion in custody cases and must act in the child's best interests under NRS 125.140, and because the court could not say as a matter of law that awarding custody to Diane was an abuse of discretion, it affirmed. The court expressly overruled any language in Sisson inconsistent with its decision.

This case concerns a default divorce decree that was set aside. The wife was served with the divorce papers in Belgium on January 3, 1969. Her copy of the summons and a power of attorney (signed January 9, 1969) were sent to a Nevada law firm hired to represent her. Following the firm's usual practice, a secretary noted the deadline to answer on the office calendar, but she mistakenly used the date the power of attorney was signed rather than the date of service to calculate the deadline, and wrote down January 29, 1969. On January 28, the wife's attorney phoned the husband's attorney to say he would be filing an answer, only to learn the case had already been heard and a divorce decree entered four days earlier. The next day, the attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, attaching an answer with a meritorious defense and a counterclaim raising property and support issues. The district court granted the motion and set aside the default. The husband appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It reiterated the strong policy favoring trial on the merits and held that the failure to appear on time was due to the excusable neglect of the wife's attorney's office. Delegating the calendaring of cases to a trusted secretary is not neglect in itself, and the secretary's calculation error in this instance was understandable and fell short of inexcusable neglect. No third-party rights had intervened, and nothing in the record justified overturning the trial court's decision to allow a trial on the merits.

Three years after a default divorce judgment was entered against him, Martin Williams asked the court to change the judgment by removing an order that required him to deed his interest in Nevada real property to his former wife, Mildred. He argued the order was void because it gave the wife more than her divorce complaint had requested. The district court refused to change the judgment, and Martin appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Martin had been personally served in Nevada, and Mildred's complaint had alleged the property was community property and asked the court to make a fair and equitable disposition of it. Martin never appeared and let the court dispose of the property without any contest. The court found the property to be community property and awarded it to Mildred. Because the trial court had full jurisdiction over both the parties and the property, its order was not open to later challenge by motion. The real substance of Martin's complaint was that the court had called the property 'community' when he claimed it was actually held in joint tenancy. But the time to raise that had long passed; he should have appeared in the original case and offered proof if he had any. The transformation of joint-tenancy property into community property can be proven, and the wife's testimony that the property was community stood undenied. The court was therefore entitled to characterize the property as community and dispose of it as it did, that ruling was res judicata, and Martin's challenge was foreclosed.

Joseph Winn, a retired Air Force colonel, and Shirley Winn married in 1965, each for the first time and later in life. Joseph had retirement pay and investments, including securities and a house he owned before the marriage, and he continued buying savings bonds and, after the couple separated, some lots in New Mexico and Florida. Shirley had worked for the state of Ohio for 17 years but quit just before the marriage, withdrawing her retirement funds; she later returned to lower-paying work, partly because Joseph was very frugal. The marriage lasted only about two and a half years, and much of the conflict was attributed to both parties' long independence before marrying. Neither party appealed the grounds for the divorce, which was granted on the wife's cross-complaint. The only issue on appeal was the award to Shirley of $4,000 in lieu of a division of property interests, plus $100 per month alimony, with the court reserving jurisdiction over the alimony. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. It cited the statute giving the trial court authority to award alimony and make a just and equitable disposition of community property, considering the parties' respective merits, the condition in which the divorce leaves them, and how the property was acquired. The court stressed that a trial judge need not achieve mathematical certainty; the goal is fairness, reached through the judge's personal observation of the parties and evaluation of the circumstances at trial, a vantage point better than an appellate court reviewing a cold record. The award was affirmed.

This custody dispute arose after a Louisiana divorce. The mother had started a separation and custody case in Louisiana, then left with the four children and moved to Clark County, Nevada. The Louisiana case continued and resulted in a divorce granting the father custody of all four children. In Nevada, the father brought a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain the children, relying on the Louisiana order. The Nevada court found the mother unfit, gave the father custody of the couple's son, but awarded custody of the three daughters to the maternal grandparents. The father appealed only the part giving the daughters to the grandparents. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that part. It emphasized that the case was really between the two parents; the grandparents were not parties, had never had legal custody, and had never formally claimed custody, though they appeared as witnesses willing to take the children if the court so decided. The court was reluctant to award custody to nonparties. Reading Nevada's divorce statute (directing custody for the 'present comfort and future well being' of children, the best-interest standard) together with the guardianship statute (a parent not otherwise unsuitable is entitled to guardianship of a minor), the court held these statutes create at least a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent is preferred over nonparents for custody. Because no one suggested the father was unfit (indeed the court had given him custody of the son), he was legally entitled to custody of his daughters as well. The court did not need to decide the father's separate argument that the Louisiana decree was entitled to full faith and credit.

Before their 1963 divorce, the Rushes signed an agreement dividing their property and providing that the wife would pay the husband $1,000 per month in 'alimony' from 1963 to 1973. There were no children. The wife got the divorce the same day, and the decree said the agreement would survive it. She paid until August 1964, then stopped. The husband sued to enforce the agreement. The wife argued the deal was unenforceable because it was against Nevada public policy (a wife paying alimony to a husband) and because there was no consideration (nothing given in exchange). The trial court disagreed and awarded the husband $37,000 in unpaid installments plus interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It did not decide whether a court could order a wife to pay a husband alimony as part of a divorce decree; that question was not before it. But it held that when spouses freely agree by contract that a wife will pay the husband support, and no one takes unfair advantage of the trust between them, the contract violates no public policy. Nevada statutes let spouses contract about property and support, and mutual consent supplies the consideration. Here both sides were represented by lawyers and bargained at arm's length, so the agreement was valid and enforceable. The court also held the trial judge properly admitted the divorce records to show the circumstances and purpose of the contract.

Karen and Forrest Peavey married in 1962 and had two young sons, Michael (age 5) and Marc (age 3). After a stormy marriage in Maine, Karen moved to Las Vegas in 1968 and filed for divorce, asking for custody of both boys. She had always had custody of the children, either by a Maine court order or by agreement. Each parent accused the other: she made his visits difficult and he once refused to return the children, while he accused her of neglecting her duties. The record showed neither parent was actually 'unfit.' The trial court gave custody to the father. It found the father fit but made no finding either way about the mother, and it did not specifically state that giving custody to the father was in the children's best interests. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the custody part of the decree. It explained that Nevada law (NRS 125.140) directs courts to do what is best for the children's present comfort and future well-being, and that this policy reflects the 'tender years' doctrine: young children generally belong with their mother unless there are particular circumstances showing she is unfit. A trial judge has wide discretion in custody, but the judge must actually express that the award serves the children's best interests so the appellate court can see that the tender-years principle was weighed. Because the record here balanced the scales between two fit parents and the judge never found the mother unfit, the court applied the tender-years doctrine and reversed. It sent the case back for a new hearing limited to the father's visitation and support.

Ray was granted a divorce from Hazel on the ground that the couple had lived apart for one year without cohabitation. There was a timing wrinkle: when Ray filed suit in March 1967, Nevada law required a three-year separation, but effective July 1, 1967, the statute was amended to require only one year. By the time of trial in August 1968, the parties had been separated more than two years. The trial court let Ray amend his complaint to allege one year of separation and granted the divorce on that ground. Hazel argued this was error because the one-year separation ground did not exist when the suit was started. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It found the separation resulted from the voluntary act of at least one party (here Ray), which satisfies the separation ground, and that the pending litigation between them did not interrupt or destroy their separation. The court agreed that, technically, because the one-year ground arose after the suit began, it should have been introduced by a 'supplemental' pleading rather than an 'amended' one (an amended pleading relates back to the original filing date and asserts facts that existed then). But it concluded no useful purpose would be served by reversing on that technical distinction, because the case would simply be retried with the same result. The court therefore treated the amended complaint as a supplemental complaint. It also rejected Hazel's contention that Ray failed to prove Nevada residence, finding the record showed otherwise.

Shirley Wicker had a 1962 Wisconsin divorce judgment that gave her $300 a month in alimony and, as a complete division of property, required her ex-husband to keep three life insurance policies in force naming her as the irrevocable beneficiary. Years later she sued him in Nevada to enforce the Wisconsin judgment, collect unpaid alimony, force him to catch up on the insurance premiums, and increase her alimony. He asked to decrease it. The Nevada district court gave her a judgment for the past-due alimony, but then rewrote the rest of the Wisconsin order: it said he only had to keep one of the three policies, and it cut his future alimony down to $150 a month and then to nothing. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed those changes and kept only the judgment for the alimony already owed. It explained that the U.S. Constitution requires Nevada to give 'full faith and credit' to a valid Wisconsin judgment. Under Wisconsin law, a divorce property division is fixed for all time and cannot be changed, so Nevada had no power to alter the insurance/property provisions. Alimony was different: because Wisconsin allows alimony to be changed at any time, Nevada could re-examine it, but only if there was a substantial change in circumstances. Here the change ran the other way: the husband, a doctor, had roughly doubled his income, while the wife's health and finances had badly deteriorated. Cutting her alimony was therefore an abuse of discretion. But the court also held she was not automatically entitled to more, so the Wisconsin alimony amount stayed the same for the time being.

A husband appealed after his wife was granted a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, even though he had counterclaimed accusing her of adultery. The couple married in Wisconsin in 1966 and had an 18-month-old child. They lived crowded in with the husband's large family, and the wife repeatedly demanded a place of their own, warning she would leave; the husband insisted they stay to save money. In June 1967 the wife left, driving across the country with a married man and his daughter, and ended up in Lovelock, Nevada, where she and the man lived in separate nearby apartments. The trial court found the husband's refusal to move the family threatened the wife's health (enough to establish extreme cruelty), found she had not committed adultery, and awarded custody of the child to her with $50 per month support. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. On the husband's argument that the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction because the wife never testified she intended to remain a Nevada resident indefinitely when she arrived, the court held that residence and intent are factual questions for the trial court, like any other facts. The wife testified she came to Nevada to get a divorce, intended to stay indefinitely, and had been physically present for about six months before trial; that was substantial evidence supporting bona fide residence, and her failure to give the customary 'self-serving' statement of intent on arrival was not fatal given the physical facts showing that intent. The court also noted the husband had never contested jurisdiction at trial, had counterclaimed for divorce assuming the court's jurisdiction, and was therefore estopped from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. Finally, the findings that the wife had not committed adultery and that custody should go to the mother were supported by substantial evidence and would not be disturbed.

Elaine and Jack Adams married in 1954 and in 1964 took title to a residence as joint tenants. Later in 1964, Elaine filed for divorce, alleging the home was community property, and Jack admitted that in his answer. The divorce decree provided that when the community-property residence was sold, the proceeds would be divided equally between the parties. The home was never sold. Jack died in 1967. His son, Donald, then asked the court to substitute him in place of Jack (as special administrator) and to 'construe' the divorce decree. The trial court allowed the substitution and ruled that Jack's interest in the property was of a nature that survived his death. Elaine appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that although trial courts have inherent power to construe their own judgments, there was nothing to construe here because the divorce decree was not ambiguous about the property. As a matter of law, once the divorce decree was entered, the parties' ownership of the property changed from a community estate to a tenancy in common: the divorce ended the community and left the former spouses as tenants in common. The court further held that the rule allowing substitution of a deceased party (NRCP 25(a)) applies only when the deceased's claim is not extinguished; here there was no surviving claim or right of Jack's to be litigated or construed, because the right to construction of the decree had been extinguished before his death rather than by it. That made the substitution order void, and the court directed entry of an order denying the son's motion.

Mabel Cipolla sued Augustine Cipolla for divorce in July 1966 and, when she filed, obtained a restraining order that caused Augustine to move out of the family home. About a week later, however, Mabel asked him to come back, and the couple lived together continuously for the next 19 months, until March 1, 1968. On the morning of that day, without any notice to Augustine, Mabel went to the courthouse with her attorney, took a default against Augustine, and obtained an immediate divorce. She then returned home and handed Augustine a copy of the decree, which permanently barred him from the home where they had been living together the whole time. Five days later, Augustine moved to set aside the default judgment, asserting surprise (among other grounds) and supporting the motion with his affidavit showing a meritorious defense and the fact that the couple had lived together continuously since the complaint was filed. Mabel filed no opposing affidavit. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the denial of Augustine's motion. On this record, the motion to set aside the default should have been granted: it was timely filed, Augustine had every reason to be surprised (and was), and he had shown a meritorious defense. The court stated bluntly that to condone the manner in which Mabel obtained her default judgment would reduce the judicial process to a mockery.

Alvera Aldabe tried to undo a Nevada divorce her husband Charles had obtained, and separately sued him and others for damages. The trial court upheld the divorce (granting summary judgment that it was valid) and dismissed the damages case. Alvera appealed both, and the two cases were combined. Alvera had first filed for divorce in Nevada, claiming she lived in Nevada, then started the same case in California claiming she lived there. Her husband answered and counterclaimed in Nevada. Even though she said she had fired her Nevada lawyer, she later went to his office and personally verified her court papers in the Nevada case. The Nevada divorce went forward on the husband's counterclaim. The couple's ranch straddled the California-Nevada line near Reno, with the house on the California side, and a California appeals court had suggested the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction because the home was in California. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. It explained that 'residence' for divorce means domicile - actually being present plus intending to stay - and that where the house sits is only one small factor. Everything about the Aldabes' lives (voting, taxes, schools, jobs, licenses, wills) pointed to Nevada, so the Nevada court had jurisdiction. The court also rejected Alvera's claim of 'extrinsic fraud' (being tricked out of her chance to defend). She had invoked the Nevada court, personally verified pleadings, and had lawyers; notice to her lawyers counted as notice to her, and she simply chose not to participate further. Because she was given a fair chance and showed no fraud, the divorce was valid and the damages suit was properly dismissed.

The Mizners lived together in California from 1947 until they separated in 1965, when the husband moved to Nevada. He filed for divorce in Nevada; a month later the wife filed in California and won an interlocutory (not-yet-final) divorce there, which gave her California property and $300 a month in alimony. To bring him into the California case, she had him personally served with the papers at his home in Reno. Back in Nevada, the wife asked the Nevada court to honor the California alimony award. The Nevada court agreed and entered partial summary judgment for her, and the husband appealed. He accepted that California could grant the divorce and divide California property, but argued California had no power to order him to pay alimony because he was served outside California - relying on an old 1877 U.S. Supreme Court rule (Pennoyer v. Neff) that a person must be served inside the state. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the old Pennoyer rule has been greatly weakened by later cases holding that a state may exercise power over an out-of-state person who has enough connection with the state ('minimum contacts'). This idea fits support cases well, because a strict rule lets a spouse dodge financial responsibility by moving away. The court held a state may reach an absent spouse by out-of-state personal service if (1) a state statute allows it and (2) the spouse has enough contacts with the state relating to the case. California's statute allowed it, California courts had applied it to divorce and alimony, and the parties had lived in California when the wife's claim arose. So the California alimony award was valid and entitled to full faith and credit.

In this divorce, the trial court granted the wife a divorce for extreme cruelty and awarded her $16,500 'in lieu of all her community property rights, and as and for alimony.' The court found that the husband's cruelty made the wife so nervous that she lost all her hair and that her health would be irreparably harmed if the marriage continued. The husband appealed. He argued there was not enough evidence that his conduct actually injured his wife's health or made her fear for it, and that the $16,500 award was wrong. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. On the cruelty issue, it relied on the long-standing rule that the trial judge, who sees and hears the witnesses, is in the best position to judge the effect of cruelty on the injured spouse's health, and that an appellate court will reverse only when there is no substantial evidence to support the finding. On the money award, the court explained that Nevada law lets a trial court award alimony and divide community property in a way that is just and equitable, and that its decision will not be disturbed unless the record shows an abuse of discretion. Here the record showed the husband had funneled community money through his accountant to keep it from his wife, that the wife had contributed heavily to the household while the husband contributed nothing despite a good salary, so the $16,500 award was fair. The court affirmed, with interest on the award and the wife's counsel fees.

In a 1964 divorce, the father agreed to pay $200 a month in child support, and that agreement became part of the divorce decree. He repeatedly fell behind. He was found in contempt in July 1966, then paid enough and made arrangements to be cleared ('purged') of contempt in August 1966. By November 1966 he was again about $2,820 behind. He filed papers explaining his remarriage and financial troubles and asked the court to reduce his child support and set specific visitation. At a December 1966 hearing, the evidence showed he had paid only $125 over five months while earning about $540 a month. The court found he had the ability to pay, held him in contempt again, and gave him 30 days to catch up or go to jail. It also denied his request to reduce support. He appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It rejected his argument that jailing him for unpaid support would be unconstitutional 'imprisonment for debt.' The proceeding was civil contempt, and money owed as alimony or child support is not a 'debt' under the Nevada Constitution. There was enough evidence that he could pay and did not, and courts have inherent power to enforce their orders through contempt. The court also held it was proper to deny his request to reduce support, both as a matter of discretion and because a person who is in contempt of the court's orders cannot ask the court for help on his own demands.

After a long marriage and a roughly ten-year separation, the husband sued for divorce in 1965, stating there were no minor children and no community property. The wife, served in another state, hired a lawyer and filed an answer denying his claims and asking for a $500 attorney's fee. But she never alleged that she needed support or that her husband could afford to pay it, never asked the court for alimony, and filed no counterclaim. At trial, the wife's lawyer questioned the husband about money he had sent her in the past. The husband's lawyer objected, and the judge sustained the objection, noting alimony had not been requested. The wife's lawyer accepted the ruling, said he had not realized alimony was not sought, and did not try to amend the papers or offer any proof about alimony. The court granted the husband a divorce and gave the wife no relief. She appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court did not err in granting a divorce without alimony where the wife never put the issue before the court - she pleaded no facts about her need or her husband's ability to pay, never prayed for alimony, and made no effort to raise it. While Nevada's rules allow liberal amendment of pleadings and let courts grant relief a party is entitled to even without a specific demand, courts are not required to be clairvoyant about issues counsel never meaningfully raises. The court also held the judge could properly sustain the general objection at trial.

After his divorce, the husband asked the court to change the alimony he had agreed to pay ($125 a month), claiming his ex-wife had committed 'extrinsic fraud' by failing to disclose her own separate property before he agreed to the amount. He brought this request as a motion to modify under a Nevada statute (NRS 125.170(1)). The trial court denied it, and he appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained there was a mismatch between the type of relief he wanted and the tool he used. A motion to modify under NRS 125.170(1) lets a court change future alimony when there is a proper showing of changed circumstances, but it does not allow the court to enter a completely different decree. A claim of extrinsic fraud, by contrast, is the kind of attack that must be brought in a separate, independent lawsuit to annul the decree. Because his fraud theory would require a different decree, the motion to modify was the wrong vehicle, and the trial court properly denied it. The court added that even if he had used the right procedure, and even assuming that failing to disclose assets could count as extrinsic fraud, the record strongly showed he already knew enough about his ex-wife's separate property before agreeing to the alimony, which defeated the fraud claim anyway.

Ray and Gwynelle Jacobs married in 1956. They had no children together but raised two of Ray's children from a prior marriage. Over the years Gwynelle became the family's main breadwinner, paying off Ray's debts and eventually working full time, while Ray worked only sporadically. The financial strain and marital discord damaged her health, requiring an operation and treatment for a nervous condition. When they divorced in 1966, the couple's home was held in joint tenancy, and the main dispute was what to do with it. The trial court did not order monthly alimony, but instead ordered Ray to sign over all of his interest in the home to Gwynelle, stating it was set aside for her 'future support, maintenance and security.' Ray appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that a subsection of Nevada's alimony statute (NRS 125.150(3)) lets a trial court set aside a portion of the husband's separate property for the wife, but only when support is sought and the wife shows an actual need - unlike community property, this cannot be used just to even things out between the spouses. The court found Gwynelle's need was genuine given her advancing age and declining health, so setting aside Ray's interest in the home for her support was within the trial court's discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed.

When Foster and Vera Edwards divorced in 1963, the decree (based on their agreement) required Foster to pay $150 a month in alimony plus $175 a month for each of two children - $500 a month total - and the court kept the power to change these amounts later. In 1965 Foster asked the court to eliminate the alimony and cut child support, a total reduction of $200 a month, saying his income had dropped. The court refused, and he appealed. Foster was an orchestra leader at the Sparks Nugget. His income had indeed fallen (from about $27,000 to under $17,000) because the casino imported acts with their own music and closed the showroom for several weeks a year, and his costs of keeping musicians and his taxes had gone up. He had also remarried and had a new child. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The only question was whether the trial court abused its discretion, and it had not. The trial judge was unimpressed that Foster had not tried to cut his own expenses: after the divorce he bought two more cars (admitting only one was needed), and the payments and insurance on those two extra cars came to more than $200 a month - exactly the reduction he was seeking. Since Foster could obtain his own relief by getting rid of the excess cars, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying his motion.

George Smith obtained a default divorce from his wife, Margaret, in 1964. Process was sent for personal service outside Nevada, and the record showed she was served both in Brookline, Massachusetts and later in Montreal, Canada. Relying on the earlier Massachusetts service, the court tried the case and granted the divorce on August 25, 1964. It later turned out that the Massachusetts service had not actually happened - the deputy had served the wrong person by mistake - and that Margaret was really served only in Montreal on August 14. That meant the August 25 hearing came too soon. About fifteen months later, Margaret filed a separate lawsuit to throw out the divorce, arguing the decree was completely void. The husband won summary judgment, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held the decree was only voidable, not void, because the court had gained jurisdiction over Margaret when she was served in Montreal; the early hearing was just a procedural irregularity. A voidable default decree has to be challenged by motion within six months, not by a new lawsuit years later, and there was no fraud - the server's mistaken affidavit was made in good faith. Because Margaret did not move within six months, she was out of time.

The Days divorced in Reno in 1949, and their divorce decree included an agreement (treated as part of the decree) under which the husband, Fairfield, paid monthly amounts to the former wife, Frances, as 'alimony' for tax reasons; out of those payments Frances agreed to support the children. Years later Frances went to court to collect money Fairfield had fallen behind on. The trial court awarded her about $12,535 in arrears, a $1,500 attorney's fee, and costs, but limited her interest on the arrears to amounts owed from January 1, 1960 onward. Fairfield appealed the award; Frances cross-appealed the interest limitation. The Nevada Supreme Court largely sided with Frances. It held that once payments for alimony or child support come due, they become vested rights that cannot be wiped out or reduced after the fact; any modification works only going forward. So Fairfield could not get credit for money he had paid directly to his son, and could not retroactively cut what he owed. The court also upheld the attorney's fee, explaining that a fee awarded in a proceeding to collect vested arrears does not require the same proof of financial need as 'suit money' during a divorce. On Frances's cross-appeal, the court reversed the interest limitation. An old undecided motion she had filed did not suspend the judgment, and because Fairfield had failed his duty to give her the yearly income statements needed to calculate the payments, there was no basis to deny her interest based on estoppel or delay. The court affirmed Fairfield's appeal and sent the case back to calculate the additional interest.

The district court granted Ileana Issarescu a divorce on the ground that she and her husband had lived apart for three years without living together. The husband, who contested the divorce and was present throughout the trial, argued the divorce should be reversed because there was no direct testimony or document proving that the separation was voluntary and that at least one spouse intended to end the marriage - neither spouse actually testified about that point. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that a divorce for three years' separation (under NRS 125.010(9)) requires a voluntary separation, without living together, for three years, with at least one spouse intending to end the marriage. The key question was whether a trial court may infer that the separation was voluntary and intended to end the marriage simply from the fact of a three-year separation. The court held that this inference is permissible. Proof of a three-year separation without cohabitation makes out a 'prima facie' case; the burden then shifts to the contesting spouse to offer credible evidence that the separation was involuntary or without intent to end the marriage. If he offers none, the court may draw reasonable inferences in the other spouse's favor. The court will also imply the findings needed to support the judgment (that the separation was voluntary and that reconciliation is impossible). The court also rejected the husband's complaint about the wife's Nevada residence, holding the trial court was entitled to believe her trial testimony over earlier letters from her New York lawyer that hinted she came to Nevada only to get a divorce.

When the Rushes divorced, their decree approved a written agreement that provided for the husband's future support, and both the agreement and the decree said the agreement would survive the divorce. The decree also purported to reserve the court's power to deal with alimony later. Years afterward, the former wife went back to court and asked the judge to modify the decree. The trial court agreed to hear the request and granted her relief. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that when both the agreement and the decree direct that the agreement survive the divorce, the parties' support rights come from the agreement itself, not from the decree. So the proper path is a lawsuit on the agreement, not a motion to modify the decree. The court also held that the decree's reservation of power over alimony did not help, because a court cannot reserve authority over something it has already given up by directing that the agreement survive. The order modifying the decree was set aside.

In this divorce case, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $18,500 toward his wife's attorney fees. The wife had between $25,000 and $40,000 in liquid assets, while the husband was worth about three-quarters of a million dollars. The judge made the award mainly because of the large gap between what each spouse was worth. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that a wife's attorney fees in a divorce turn on whether she actually needs help paying them, not on how wealthy the husband is. A court must first look only at the wife's own finances and decide whether she is in genuine need. Only after finding that she is may the court then consider the husband's wealth in setting the amount. Because the award here rested on the disparity in wealth rather than the wife's need, it was an abuse of discretion. The court also noted that an order for preliminary (temporary) fees is not appealable and cannot be reviewed until a final fee order is entered after the case ends.

This case asked whether a former wife who had already obtained a one-sided (ex parte) California divorce could later go to court in Nevada and get support from her former husband. She had not had a chance to ask for support in the California case. The Nevada trial court said she could, and awarded her support. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Under the 'divisible divorce' doctrine, a valid divorce granted at the home state of only one spouse ends the marriage but does not automatically wipe out the other spouse's right to support. Because the wife never had an opportunity to litigate support in her divorce, she could seek it later. To decide whether she was entitled to support, the court looked to the law of the state where she lived at the time of the divorce - California - which allows a former wife to obtain support after an ex parte divorce. Nevada honored that rule. The court rejected arguments that the divorce itself, or waiver, should bar her support claim.

The Foxes built a successful Las Vegas restaurant and delicatessen, Foxy's, run through a company they wholly owned. All of the company's property was community property. When they divorced after 29 years of marriage, the hardest question was how much the business was worth, especially its goodwill. The wife appealed the parts of the decree dividing the community property and setting alimony and attorney fees. The husband had run all of his personal and business money - restaurant profits, real estate deals, and loans - through one company bank account, and he could not identify the source of about $123,706 in deposits because the deposit slips had been lost. If that money came from restaurant profits, it would substantially raise the value of the business's goodwill. The trial court and its accounting master left that unidentified sum out of the goodwill calculation. The Nevada Supreme Court held that was error. Because the husband, as manager of the community, intermingled the funds and could not prove the unidentified deposits came from somewhere other than the restaurant, the burden fell on him, and the deposits had to be treated as restaurant receipts. The court sent the case back for a limited new trial to recompute the goodwill including that sum. It affirmed the rest of the decree, including the modest alimony, the attorney fees, and the costs paid out of the community, finding no abuse of discretion in those rulings.