Nevada family-law case summaries

This was a divorce case still in progress in the Clark County family court. While the case was ongoing, the trial judge issued an order that, among other things, fined Mr. Kader and denied his request for full custody of the children. Mr. Kader, representing himself, tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the trial judge was right or wrong. Instead, the Court explained that it can only hear appeals when a specific statute or court rule allows it. Generally, a party can only appeal after the trial court has finished with the case - issuing what is called a "final judgment." Here, the divorce case was not over: the divorce complaint and the custody issues were still pending in the lower court. The Court also concluded that the order did not "finally establish or modify" custody, which would have been another route to appeal. Because no rule or statute permitted an appeal from this kind of mid-case order, the Supreme Court said it had no power (no "jurisdiction") to hear the appeal and dismissed it. Mr. Kader can continue to litigate the underlying divorce and custody case in the family court; the dismissal simply means the Supreme Court will not review the order at this stage.

Brooke and Scott Kelley divorced and agreed to share "joint legal custody" of their two children, meaning both parents have equal say in major decisions like medical care, education, and religion. They later disagreed about whether their older child (then 11, almost 12) should receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Scott wanted the child vaccinated, partly in preparation for international travel; Brooke objected, citing concerns about the vaccine's newness, possible long-term effects, fertility, and behavior. Scott asked the district court to break the tie. After a hearing, the court accepted the children's pediatrician's recommendation that the older child be vaccinated (the younger child, age 3, was not eligible at the time) and took judicial notice of guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP). The judge ruled that vaccinating the older child was in his best interest and gave Scott "sole legal custody" for the limited purpose of obtaining the vaccine. On appeal, Brooke made two main arguments. First, she said the court used the wrong legal standard—it should have asked whether the vaccine was "medically necessary," a phrase drawn from a Nevada insurance statute, rather than asking what was in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that argument. The court explained that parents do have a fundamental constitutional right to direct their children's upbringing, but when two parents who share equal legal custody cannot agree, courts must break the tie, and they do so by asking what is in the child's best interest. Requiring proof that something is "medically necessary" would set the bar higher than tie-breaking and could itself interfere with parental rights. Second, Brooke argued the district court did not properly analyze the child's best interest. The Supreme Court agreed that the specific factors Nevada law lists for physical-custody disputes (NRS 125C.0035(4)) do not really fit a vaccination dispute. To fill that gap, the court adopted four non-exhaustive factors borrowed (with two modifications) from a California case, In re Eric B.: (1) how serious the harm to the child is, or the substantial likelihood of serious harm; (2) the evaluation or recommendation of a medical professional; (3) the risks of the medical treatment itself; and (4) the child's own preference, if the child is old enough and capable enough to form an intelligent one. Applying those factors, the Supreme Court concluded that even though the district court did not have the benefit of this new framework, it considered substantially the same things—the pediatrician's recommendation, the CDC and AAP materials on safety, and the benefits of travel—and substantial evidence supported its decision. Brooke's concerns about fertility and behavior were not backed by evidence at the hearing. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the order allowing the vaccination.

This is a one-page order from the Nevada Supreme Court closing out an appeal in a child custody case. The person who filed the appeal, Tanasha Thelma McDaniel, asked the court to dismiss her own appeal voluntarily. The court agreed and dismissed it. The order does not discuss the underlying custody dispute, the lower-court rulings, or the reasons appellant chose to abandon the appeal. It is purely an administrative closing order.

Ronald Harris and Jenniffer Figueroa share four children and divorced in 2017. According to the opinion, Harris later pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his stepdaughter, who was Figueroa's daughter from another marriage. In April 2020, Figueroa asked the court for sole legal and sole physical custody of the four children she shares with Harris. "Legal custody" means the basic responsibility to make major decisions for a child (such as those about education, health, and religion), as distinct from "physical custody," which concerns where the child lives. In May 2020, the district court granted Figueroa sole legal and sole physical custody at a case management conference that Harris did not attend, doing so on its own initiative. Harris appealed the sole-legal-custody part of that decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed it in part, finding that the district court had violated Harris's due process rights and had not followed required steps — it had not held an evidentiary hearing, had not applied the legal presumption favoring joint legal custody, and had not connected its findings about the children's best interest to its conclusion. On remand, the district court held a hearing on legal custody that both parents attended. Figueroa testified that she could not cooperate with Harris. She pointed to letters Harris wrote to the children saying they would learn "the truth" about his incarceration when they turned 18 and would hate her, to Harris's continued contact with his stepdaughter (the victim of his crimes), and to Harris threatening her. Harris testified that he and Figueroa generally agreed on raising the children, that his incarceration had no bearing on his children, and that he had not harmed his own children. He also said he was gathering evidence to "bring her to justice," claiming Figueroa was culpable in his crimes against his stepdaughter, and said "the only thing that's separating her and I right now is that she hasn't been convicted of anything yet." After the hearing, the district court entered a written order giving Figueroa sole legal custody. This time it applied the presumption favoring joint legal custody, then found the presumption was overcome because the parents could not cooperate. It found the conflict between them was high, that they could not cooperate about the children's needs, and that Harris had been convicted of child abuse of a step-sibling. The court concluded Harris was "the root of this problem," that a reasonable parent could not cooperate with someone convicted of serious sexual abuse of her daughter who was also trying to have her prosecuted, and that it would be impractical for Harris to be sole legal custodian given his incarceration. On this second appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded that substantial evidence — meaning evidence a reasonable person would accept as adequate — supported the district court's finding that the parents could not communicate, cooperate, and compromise in their children's best interest, and that the district court had followed the steps required in the prior remand. The court also rejected Harris's claim that the judge was biased, finding he had not shown the alleged bias came from outside the case or reflected the kind of deep-seated antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.

Denise and Joel Pool married in October 2007, had one son (referred to as L.P.), and divorced in 2019. At divorce they agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their son. In June 2020, Denise experienced a mental health breakdown and self-harmed in front of Joel and their son. After that episode, Joel received primary physical custody and sole legal custody, while Denise was allowed supervised parenting time plus phone and FaceTime calls. Joel also filed a motion in June 2020 asking for primary physical custody. Later that year, after losing his food-service job during the COVID-19 pandemic, Joel sought permission to move to Ohio with the child. The court denied that relocation request, but Joel and the child moved to Ohio anyway in December 2020. In March 2021, the court held a hearing on Joel's still-pending motion. A court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Holland, testified that Denise's parenting judgment was concerning and that she was an "emotional, parenting risk" to the child, but also that Denise was not a physical risk. Denise testified she intended to move to Ohio if Joel kept custody and stayed there. In a June 2021 order, the court kept joint legal custody but gave Joel sole legal authority over the child's medical and mental-health needs, let Joel keep primary physical custody, and allowed him and the child to remain in Ohio, with Denise having supervised parenting time in Ohio. Denise later decided not to move to Ohio because of family obligations in Las Vegas, and she filed a series of motions to change the custody arrangement. A February 2022 motion was denied after a May 2022 hearing. In September 2022, she filed another motion, this time seeking more parenting time and different conditions for it (not primary or joint physical custody), though the court treated it as a motion to modify custody. She supported this motion with a letter from Dr. Holland, written after the earlier order, saying that Denise—contrary to Dr. Holland's earlier suspicion—had regularly attended therapy, and recommending that the court consult Denise's treating psychologist. Denise also included a letter from her treating psychologist stating that Denise had made "great strides in treatment," was "emotionally stable," and that the psychologist had no concerns about her decision-making or emotional regulation. The district court denied the September 2022 motion without holding a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that a district court can deny a custody-modification motion without a hearing only if the person requesting the change fails to show "adequate cause" for a hearing—meaning a preliminary showing (a "prima facie case") that a change might be warranted. The court found that Denise's new evidence—the two letters and her allegations that Joel had been interfering with her communication and contact with their son since the last order—was new, not simply repeating old information, and could point to a meaningful change in circumstances affecting the child. Because of this, the appeals court held that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing and should have provided an adequate explanation for its decision. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings.

This is a brief administrative order, not a ruling on the merits of any custody dispute. When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, follow a specific procedure (under a rule called NRAP 24) to ask the court to let them proceed without paying. In this case, Wayne Andrew Seare filed an appeal but did not pay the filing fee. The court sent him a notice giving him 14 days either to pay or to follow the alternative procedure, and warned him that the appeal would be dismissed if he did neither. According to the order, he did not pay the fee and did not respond to the notice. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. The order does not address any of the underlying child custody issues.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee. If they cannot afford it, they can ask the court to waive the fee under a specific rule. In this child custody appeal, Javier Ramirez-Rivas filed his appeal but did not pay the filing fee. The court told him on the day he filed - July 17, 2023 - that he had 14 days either to pay the fee or to show that he qualified for a waiver, and warned him that not doing so would cause his appeal to be dismissed. He asked the court to waive the fee, but on August 15, 2023, the court denied that request and gave him another 14 days to pay. He still did not pay. Because the fee was never paid, the court dismissed his appeal without addressing the underlying child custody issues.

Noune Davitian-Kostanian and Varoujan Kostanian divorced in 2012 after more than 25 years of marriage. Their stipulated divorce decree required Varoujan to pay Noune alimony for ten years (ending October 1, 2021) and to pay child support for their youngest son, Alex, who has autism, until he turned 18 (or graduated high school at 19). Alex turned 18 in 2015, and child support stopped at that time. One day before Varoujan's last alimony payment was due, Noune filed a motion asking the family court to (1) extend or modify alimony, and (2) restart child support for Alex as a disabled adult. The district court denied both requests. On child support, the court said it had no power to act because Alex was already an adult and support had ended years earlier. On alimony, the court found Noune had not shown a "change in circumstances." The Nevada Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed. On child support, the Court held the district court was wrong to say it lacked jurisdiction. Nevada has a special statute, NRS 125B.110, that requires a parent to keep supporting a handicapped child past age 18 if the handicap arose before adulthood and the child cannot become self-supporting. Nothing in that statute requires the parent seeking support to ask before the child turns 18, and nothing imposes a deadline. The fact that more than five years had passed since Alex's child support ended is just one factor for the lower court to weigh, not a bar. The Court sent the case back so the district court can make findings about whether Alex qualifies for continued support. On alimony, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. NRS 125.150(8) says alimony "may" be modified on a showing of changed circumstances, and a 20-percent change in the paying spouse's gross monthly income triggers a review - but does not force the court to actually change the alimony. The district court considered Noune's arguments and reasonably concluded she had not adequately supported her claim of changed circumstances. That decision was within the trial court's discretion.

Trisha and Joshua Rowberry divorced in 2012. Trisha received primary physical custody of their two children, and both parents shared joint legal custody. Joshua had weekly parenting time. In 2019 Trisha married Trevyn, a U.S. Air Force officer stationed near Phoenix, Arizona. Trisha asked the court for permission to move the children to Arizona; the district court granted that request in March 2020, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in a 2021 ruling. Not long after, in July 2020, Trevyn received military orders to report to a base near San Antonio, Texas. Trisha and Trevyn moved to Texas. At the time Trisha moved, the children were physically staying with Joshua in Nevada for the summer. Trisha notified Joshua of the move by email, and Joshua initially disagreed. Trisha filed an emergency motion to have the children returned to her, but Joshua relented and let the children go to Texas, so that motion became unnecessary. The children then enrolled in school in Texas. A series of motions followed. At one point the district court told Trisha she needed to file a second relocation motion (to move from Arizona to Texas). Trisha challenged that requirement in the Nevada Supreme Court, but the Court of Appeals denied her challenge because of a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision, Pelkola v. Pelkola, which held that a parent needs permission even when moving from one state outside Nevada to another state outside Nevada. Trisha then filed her second relocation motion. Joshua filed a countermotion asking for primary physical custody in Nevada. At a May 2022 evidentiary hearing, the court heard testimony from Trisha, Joshua, and Trevyn, including testimony about alleged domestic violence in the Texas home involving Trisha, Trevyn, and the older child, T.R. Those incidents had been investigated by Texas child protective services (which reached an "unable to determine" finding), the Air Force (which found the allegation did not meet its criteria), and local law enforcement (which filed no charges). T.R. told a Las Vegas interviewer he preferred to live with Joshua; the younger child, A.R., said she preferred to live with her mother in Texas. After the hearing, the district court issued a 28-page order and a formal decision. It found that Trisha had "relocated from Arizona to Texas without permission," treated that as effectively violating a criminal statute (NRS 200.359), excluded the evidence she had gathered after moving to Texas, and granted Joshua primary physical custody, finding it in the children's best interest. The Court of Appeals reversed. It found several errors. First, the court held that the criminal statute Trisha was accused of violating did not apply to her, because when she moved, the children were with Joshua in Nevada, not in her physical custody, and both Joshua and the court knew about the move before the children were relocated. Because she did not violate that criminal statute, the court also held that the evidence-exclusion rule tied to that statute should not have been used against her, meaning her post-relocation evidence about the children's schooling and activities was wrongly excluded. Second, the court found that the district court analyzed the evidence improperly. It compared the children's grades in Texas to their grades in Nevada, but the relevant comparison in a second relocation case would be between Arizona (where they had been authorized to live) and Texas. The court also found the district judge had improperly revisited and rejected findings from the earlier 2020 relocation decision, which is barred by a rule called "law of the case." Third, the court found several of the district court's factual findings were not supported by the evidence, including findings that Trisha would not comply with visitation orders, that she refused to file a relocation motion, and that she violated the criminal statute. However, the court found that the district court's finding about Joshua's motives in opposing relocation was adequately supported. Fourth, the court found the district court wrongly handled A.R.'s stated preference. A.R. was nearly 13-and-a-half when interviewed and expressed a clear wish to stay in Texas with her mother, but the district court decided she lacked the maturity to form an intelligent preference, based partly on her answers to a question about three wishes (she said she wanted to stop having migraines and to have mind-reading superpowers). The Court of Appeals found the district court applied the wrong legal standard and improperly combined A.R.'s situation with T.R.'s, even though A.R. was not involved in the alleged domestic violence and had a closer relationship with her mother. Finally, the court declined Trisha's request to limit the Pelkola decision for military families. It explained that it is bound to follow the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, and that any change for military families would have to come from the Legislature, Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, or the Nevada Supreme Court. The case was sent back to the district court for a new determination on Trisha's motion to relocate with A.R. and Joshua's countermotion for primary custody.

This case comes out of a divorce that was finalized in 2014. Years later, two competing requests were before the family court at the same time: Matthew's request to change the child custody arrangement, and Melissa's request for permission to relocate with the couple's minor child. The family court issued an order that denied Matthew's request to modify custody. But that same order did not finish the job — it stated that a further evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence is presented) should be scheduled to consider Melissa's request to move away with the child. In other words, the custody-related questions in the case were not fully wrapped up. Matthew tried to appeal the denial of his custody-modification request. Before deciding the merits, the appellate court examined whether it even had the authority — its "jurisdiction" — to hear the appeal at this stage. Generally, a party can only appeal after a court issues a decision that fully resolves the matter, not a decision that leaves parts of the dispute still pending. This is meant to avoid "piecemeal" appeals, where a single case produces multiple separate trips to the appellate court. Matthew argued the order he was challenging was the final judgment in the case and therefore appealable. Melissa argued the order was not appealable and the appeal should be dismissed. The court agreed with Melissa. It explained that the true final judgment in the case was the 2014 divorce decree, and that both parties' later requests were "post-judgment" motions. While a decision denying a request to change custody can sometimes be appealed as a "special order entered after final judgment," that was not possible here because the order did not resolve everything — Melissa's relocation request was still awaiting a hearing. The court also addressed Matthew's worry that dismissing the appeal would leave him with no way to challenge the custody ruling. It disagreed, explaining that once the family court fully resolves all the pending custody issues, including Melissa's relocation request, Matthew can challenge the denial of his motion at that later point, in an appeal that includes the relocation decision.

This case is a divorce that turned into a custody fight between a child's mother and his paternal grandparents. Rebecca and Christopher Frane married in November 2016 and had a son, P.F., born in September 2013 (before the marriage). According to the opinion, from the time P.F. was about three weeks old, he lived primarily with his grandparents, Paula and William Wall. Rebecca filed for divorce in December 2020. While the case was ongoing, the court entered a temporary order that kept things as they were, letting P.F. remain with the Walls. In May 2022, the Walls asked to join the case (a "motion to intervene") and sought permanent custody, saying they had been caring for P.F. full-time. The court allowed them to intervene and held a one-day trial. By trial, Rebecca was asking for sole legal and sole physical custody of P.F. Christopher asked for primary physical and joint legal custody, and he nominated the Walls to continue caring for the child in his place. After trial, in October 2022, the court awarded primary physical custody to the Walls, with all three adults sharing joint legal custody. Both parents were ordered to pay monthly child support to the Walls. The court also divided the couple's shared property and ordered Christopher to pay Rebecca $3,250 to even things out. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Nevada affirmed, meaning it left the district court's decision in place. Nevada law starts with a presumption - called the "parental preference doctrine" - that a child is better off with a biological parent than with a non-parent. That presumption can be overcome by showing a parent is unfit or that "extraordinary circumstances" exist. The appeals court concluded that the district court made enough findings to justify overcoming that presumption in favor of the grandparents, pointing to findings that Rebecca had neglected the child since birth, had shown little interest in him, chose to live apart from him since he was three weeks old, and that the child was stable and cared for by the Walls. The appeals court also addressed whether joint physical custody should have been ordered instead. It explained that Nevada law presumes joint physical custody is not in a child's best interest when a court finds, based on substantial evidence, that a parent cannot adequately care for the child for at least 146 days a year. The district court made that finding about Rebecca, and the appeals court held the finding was supported. The court also noted that the district court separately found it was in the child's best interest to award custody to the Walls based on statutory "best interest" factors, and that Rebecca did not challenge those particular findings. Finally, on the property division, Rebecca argued there was an unequal split. The appeals court walked through the numbers and concluded the property was in fact divided equally after the $3,250 offset, so there was no abuse of discretion.

This case concerns a custody dispute between two people who were never married but share one child, born in 2016 and diagnosed with Trisomy 21 (Down syndrome). The child receives supplemental security income (SSI), a government benefit for people with disabilities, and Kymberlie was the person designated to receive those payments. In 2021, Mario asked the court for joint legal custody and primary physical custody; Kymberlie asked for the same thing in return. At first, the parties agreed to share custody temporarily, with Mario having parenting time from Thursday evening to Sunday evening. That arrangement broke down, and Kymberlie eventually stopped letting Mario see the child during his scheduled time. After a November 2021 drug test showed Kymberlie tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and barbiturates, the court gave Mario temporary sole physical custody in January 2022, and later temporary sole legal custody. Kymberlie was allowed weekly supervised parenting time through a third-party supervisor called Family First, which she was to pay for instead of paying child support. The court also ordered Kymberlie to hand the child's SSI payments over to Mario while he had custody. An evidentiary hearing on custody was set for August 2022. Kymberlie did not attend. On the day of the hearing she filed a last-minute request to postpone it, saying she had not learned of the hearing until a few days before, even though she acknowledged receiving an email from the court's law clerk in June 2022 listing the date and time. The court went ahead with the hearing anyway and issued a written order awarding Mario sole legal and physical custody, ordering Kymberlie to pay $600 a month in child support (including $180 a month toward arrears for January through August 2022), and ordering her to turn over future and past SSI money to Mario. The Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded the district court did not do the analysis now required when a court awards sole physical custody: the court must either find the other parent unfit or make specific written findings explaining why primary (shared-time) physical custody would not be in the child's best interest, and it must then order the least restrictive parenting-time arrangement consistent with the child's best interest. The district court here did not do that. The appeals court also found the parenting-time part of the order confusing and self-contradictory. The order let Mario decide what contact Kymberlie could have with the child, yet also made Kymberlie responsible for coordinating her supervised visits - and then, in the child-support section, the order stated that "we do not have supervised visits at this time." The court further criticized the trial court's "best interest" findings as too vague to review, noting the trial court repeatedly pointed to exhibits without explaining what in those exhibits supported its conclusions. The appeals court also pointed out that the trial court speculated Kymberlie "most likely" used the child's SSI funds for drug use, and that it blurred the difference between neglect of a child and domestic violence against a child - two separate factors under the law. Finally, the court found the arrearages award inconsistent, because no support had been due during the period covered by the arrears (Kymberlie had instead been ordered to pay for supervised visits in place of support). The Court of Appeals sent the case back for the district court to redo the custody and parenting-time analysis correctly, reversed the arrearages determination, and vacated the child support determination. In the meantime, it left the October 17, 2022, custody arrangement in place, subject to modification by the district court.

Christopher Fisher and Elia Cobian were never married but were in an on-again-off-again relationship, and their daughter, L.F., was born in May 2019. The relationship ended after a physical altercation in April 2020 in which each parent accused the other of being the aggressor; no arrests or charges resulted, but Elia obtained a temporary protection order from the Elko Justice Court that gave her sole legal and physical custody of L.F. Both parents then went to district court seeking custody. A court-ordered custody evaluator recommended that the parents share joint legal and joint physical custody, and the case proceeded to a two-day evidentiary hearing in February 2022. At that hearing, the court heard testimony about Christopher's 2018 DUI conviction, his ongoing alcohol use, his partner's alcohol use, his refusal to give Elia his address, his estranged relationships with children from a previous relationship, health issues L.F. experienced, and his failures to tell Elia when he traveled out of town with the child. Christopher also acknowledged an incident involving a daughter from a previous relationship in which the Utah Division of Child and Family Services substantiated an abuse and neglect charge against him. Nevada law requires courts deciding custody to weigh a list of "best interest of the child" factors. The district court found that eight of the twelve factors favored Elia and that the rest were neutral or inapplicable, so it awarded her primary physical custody, with Christopher receiving parenting time from Sunday morning through Tuesday afternoon every other week. After hiring a new lawyer, Christopher asked for a new trial, arguing his trial counsel failed to present any evidence on his behalf; the district court denied that motion, and he appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. Christopher argued that the district court had to first work through the statutes expressing a preference for joint physical custody before analyzing the best-interest factors. The appellate court explained that the sole consideration in a custody decision is the best interest of the child, and that even though the district court did not explicitly cite those preference statutes, it recognized the preference for joint custody but specifically found that "joint custody was not appropriate" under the totality of the circumstances. The court of appeals also declined to reweigh the evidence or the district court's credibility determinations, concluding that substantial evidence - evidence a reasonable person could accept as adequate - supported the ruling. As for Christopher's complaints about the court considering events before L.F.'s birth and allegations he said were not properly noticed, the appellate court held those objections were waived because he did not raise them in the trial court. It added that a district court may consider a parent's past conduct when determining a child's best interest, and that any error was harmless because the district court made numerous findings about the current custodial circumstances. Finally, the court noted one clerical mistake: page 12 of the district court's order erroneously refers to awarding Christopher primary physical custody, and it sent the case back solely to fix that error.

This is a divorced-parents custody fight over an eleven-year-old boy, H.R. The mother (Maggie) and father (Jason) had shared the child equally for years under a 2017 stipulated order. In 2020, Maggie asked the court to give her primary custody, saying H.R. had become aggressive and disrespectful toward her, which she blamed in part on Jason's influence. Jason countered with his own request for primary custody. A court-appointed therapist who evaluated the family thought Jason might be engaging in "parental alienation" - turning the child against the other parent - and recommended keeping the week-on/week-off schedule. The court initially adopted that recommendation. Things then got worse. On two occasions, H.R. was taken into police custody for hitting Maggie - once after Maggie's mother called police, once after Jason called. After those incidents, the district court entered an emergency order giving Jason "sole physical custody" temporarily, restricting Maggie to six hours of parenting time per week and reunification therapy with a specific therapist, Dr. Sunshine Collins. Later, the court tightened the restrictions further: Maggie could have no contact with H.R. except through Dr. Collins's therapy sessions. Because Dr. Collins was outside Maggie's insurance and required individual sessions before any joint sessions with H.R., and because Maggie struggled to afford it, the practical effect was that Maggie had no contact with her son for six months. After a March 2022 evidentiary hearing, the district court labeled its final order "primary physical custody" to Jason but limited Maggie's parenting time to cards, texts, and phone calls - no in-person time at all - with any expansion left to Dr. Collins to decide. The court also ordered Maggie to pay Jason over $11,000 in attorney fees because he was the "prevailing party." The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to change custody (because there was enough evidence of a substantial change in circumstances - the deteriorating relationship and H.R.'s wishes), but reversed the parenting-time portion and vacated the fees. The court used this case to define "sole physical custody" for Nevada law for the first time: it is an arrangement where the child lives with only one parent and the other parent has "no significant in-person parenting time." The court explained that calling something "primary physical custody" does not change what it actually is - if a parent has only cards and phone calls, that is sole physical custody. The court held that before a judge enters a sole physical custody order, the judge must either find the noncustodial parent unfit, or make specific written findings explaining why primary physical custody is not in the child's best interest. The judge must then choose the least restrictive parenting arrangement possible, and if a less restrictive option (like supervised visits) is available but rejected, the judge must explain why on the record. The district court here did none of those things. The court also held that the trial judge improperly delegated decision-making power to Dr. Collins by letting the therapist decide when Maggie's parenting time could be expanded. Under Nevada law, only the court itself can decide substantive custody questions. The opinion further faulted the final order's specificity: it incorporated only an oral mid-hearing statement called "the March 11, 2022, Order," which was never reduced to writing in detail, making the order unenforceable. The attorney-fee award was vacated because being the "prevailing party" alone is not enough to justify fees in a custody case - the court must make additional findings under the relevant statute, and the trial judge did not. Finally, the Court of Appeals took the unusual step of directing that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand. The court pointed to multiple statements by the trial judge that, in the appellate court's view, raised reasonable doubts about her impartiality - including comments that children listen better to men because of "fisticuffs," that being a stepmother is harder than being a biological mother, and statements indicating the judge had made up her mind before Maggie put on her case.

Michelle Iranpour and Mark Winningham married in 2013 and had three minor children. In 2021, Iranpour filed for divorce. Over the course of the case, the district court held several hearings addressing contested issues including child custody, child support, spousal support, and how to divide the couple's shared property and debts. In July 2022, Iranpour's lawyer asked to postpone a scheduled trial in order to gather more information about alleged "marital waste" (wasting of shared assets) by Winningham. The court granted that request and rescheduled the trial for October 2022. Three days before the new trial date, Iranpour's lawyer again asked to postpone the trial, and the court set that request to be heard on the same day as the trial itself. According to the opinion, Iranpour's lawyer then did not show up either for the hearing on the postponement request or for the trial. Because the lawyer did not appear and did not show a good reason to delay, the district court declined to take any new evidence and said it would decide the divorce based on the briefs, arguments, and evidence already presented in the earlier hearings. On October 13, 2022, the court entered the divorce decree with its findings on custody, support, and property. On appeal, Iranpour made a single main argument: that the court held a trial without her lawyer present despite her requests. The Court of Appeals found that this description did not match the record. The transcripts Iranpour herself submitted showed the court did not hold a trial in her lawyer's absence; instead, because her counsel failed to appear and gave no good cause to postpone, the court resolved the case on the materials already in the record. The appeals court concluded that Iranpour never explained how the court's actions actually harmed her or pointed to any specific mistake in the decree, so she failed to present a developed legal argument the court could consider. The court also noted that, to the extent she was challenging the district court's earlier rulings, she had not included the necessary orders and transcripts in her appeal record. Under Nevada law, when parts of the record are missing, the appeals court assumes those missing materials support the lower court's decision. For these reasons, the court affirmed the divorce decree.

Khalifa and Monique Hollings were never married but have one child together. Early in the case, they reached a parenting agreement, and the court entered a custody arrangement based on it that gave both parents joint legal and physical custody. After problems arose with Khalifa's housing, Hollings asked the court to give her primary physical custody, and the court granted that on a temporary basis. Khalifa later asked the court to restore joint physical custody and to switch to a "week-on-week-off" schedule (one week with each parent), arguing that his housing problem was resolved and that this schedule would let the child spend more time with a half-sibling from Khalifa's earlier relationship. He also said he was legally changing his own last name and wanted the child's last name changed to match. In August 2021, the court restored joint physical custody but refused the week-on-week-off schedule, finding no substantial change in circumstances and that such a schedule was not appropriate for a three-year-old. It also denied the name-change request. About three weeks later, Khalifa filed another motion repeating his requests for the week-on-week-off schedule and the name change, and then amended it to add a new request: permission to get a passport for the child so he could travel internationally with her in the future. Hollings opposed the original motion but did not respond to the passport request. In December 2021, the court denied the repeated timeshare and name-change requests because it had already ruled on them in August, and it denied the passport request without explanation. Khalifa appealed. The appeals court reached three conclusions. First, on the week-on-week-off schedule, the court explained that once a custody issue has been decided, a parent generally cannot simply refile the same request hoping for a different answer. Khalifa's second request pointed to no new circumstances since August, so the court found no error in the district court refusing to revisit it. Second, on the name change, the court noted that requests to change a child's surname are judged by the child's best interest, not by whether circumstances have substantially changed. Even so, repeatedly refiling the same request without new facts is disfavored, and Khalifa's second name-change request offered nothing new, so the court upheld the denial. The court added, however, that because Khalifa had since actually obtained his own legal name change during the appeal, nothing prevents him from filing a new name-change motion for the child on remand with those new facts — while expressing no view on whether such a motion should succeed. Third, on the passport, the court disagreed with the reasoning that the request was premature. Because getting a passport for a young child generally requires both parents' signatures — or a court order when only one parent will sign — and because the process is lengthy and Hollings had not been cooperating, Khalifa faced a real, present obstacle. That made the issue ready for the court to decide. The district court was therefore required to consider whether allowing the passport was in the child's best interest, but it denied the request without making any findings. The appeals court reversed that part and sent the passport issue back for further proceedings.

This is a short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any custody dispute. When someone appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court, the court's clerk sends a notice listing documents the appellant must file to keep the appeal moving - here, a "docketing statement" (a form that gives the court basic information about the case) and a "fast track statement" (a streamlined brief used in certain family-law appeals). According to the order, on April 20, 2023, the clerk told Courtney Thomas to file the docketing statement by May 11, 2023, and the fast track statement by May 30, 2023. Thomas did not file them. On June 13, 2023, the court issued a follow-up order giving Thomas until June 20, 2023, to file both documents and warning that not doing so could lead to sanctions, including dismissal. Thomas still did not file the documents and did not otherwise contact the court. Because the required filings never came in, the Supreme Court treated the appeal as abandoned and dismissed it. The order does not address the underlying child-custody issues from the family court.

Mark and Margaret Summit were divorced, and their divorce decree gave Margaret primary physical custody of their minor children, with Mark receiving parenting time and a child support obligation. Over several years, the couple repeatedly returned to court, largely because Mark asked the court to change the custody arrangement to either primary custody for himself or joint physical custody, and to adjust his child support accordingly. Margaret opposed these requests. Earlier disputes produced multiple appeals; in one, the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the trial court because the trial court had denied Mark's request to change custody without first holding an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is formally admitted). After that hearing on remand, the trial court denied Mark's request to change custody. The court found that Mark had not shown a "substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child," and had not shown that changing custody was in the children's best interest. The court delayed deciding the child support issues because Mark had not filed an updated financial disclosure form, and it ordered him to file one with supporting documents such as tax returns, bank statements, proof of expenses, and a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan application his business had submitted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Mark repeatedly submitted only some of the required documents. Eventually, the trial court ruled on child support, increasing Mark's monthly obligation from $200 to $1,887.98 and finding he owed $33,966 in back child support (arrears). Because the court found Mark's 2020 tax return "wholly incomplete and inadequate" due to missing documents, it based its income calculation largely on his financial disclosure form and on his PPP loan application, in which he had reported that his business received $133,000 in net revenue over a 12-month period. On appeal, Mark argued the trial court ignored or mishandled his evidence on custody. The Court of Appeals explained that many of the materials Mark attached to his written motions were never formally admitted into evidence at the hearing, so the trial court could not treat them as proof. Because Mark did not specifically challenge the trial court's decisions about what evidence to admit or exclude, the appellate court treated that challenge as waived. The court also noted that it does not re-weigh evidence or judge witness credibility on appeal. Mark also claimed the trial judge was biased, but the court found he had not shown the kind of deep-seated bias required to disqualify a judge. On child support, Mark argued the trial court wrongly relied on his PPP loan application and that the figure was outdated because his business had shut down during the pandemic. The Court of Appeals found that Mark had not actually submitted all the documents he was ordered to provide, so the trial court's finding on that point was supported by the evidence. The appellate court acknowledged that the trial court had overlooked some documents Mark filed earlier (such as his 2018 and 2019 tax returns and 16 months of business bank statements), but concluded Mark failed to show that these overlooked documents would have changed the result. Mark also had not provided the appellate court with the hearing transcript, and Nevada appellate courts presume that missing parts of the record support the trial court's decision. Finally, on the attorney fees and costs issue, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction (legal authority to decide the issue) because the trial court's order on fees was not final — the court had granted part of Margaret's request but planned further proceedings on the rest. The appellate court therefore dismissed that part of the appeal as premature and affirmed the rest.

Allison Holmes and Felipe Serrano were never married but have one child together, born in 2019. In 2021, Holmes went to court asking for various things, including primary physical custody (meaning the child would live mainly with her). Serrano responded by asking for joint physical custody (meaning both parents would share custody more equally). The court sent them to mediation, where they worked out and agreed on a parenting plan setting a weekly schedule. Under that schedule, Serrano would have the child from Saturday evening to Monday morning, and again from Wednesday (pickup from daycare) to Thursday morning. Holmes would have the child the rest of the week. Even though they agreed on the schedule itself, they could not agree on what to call the arrangement legally - primary custody for Holmes, or joint custody. So the court adopted the schedule but let both sides file written arguments about the correct label. The district court decided the arrangement was joint physical custody. It reached that conclusion by counting the nights the child would spend with each parent, finding the child would be with Serrano about 156 nights a year, which is roughly 42 percent of the year - above the 40-percent line that courts use as a general guideline for joint custody. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada Supreme Court decisions, counting nights alone is the wrong way to measure how custody time is split. The correct approach looks at which parent actually supervises the child, provides a home, and makes day-to-day decisions - not simply where the child sleeps on a given night. The appeals court also pointed out that the district court did not make any findings about what was in the child's best interest, which Nevada law treats as the most important factor in deciding the custody designation. The court noted that part of the problem came from how the parties themselves framed their arguments - they asked the court to decide the label purely from the written schedule, without offering details about who actually handled the child's daily care. Even so, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court used the wrong legal standard and sent the case back for further proceedings. The court also noted that Serrano did not file a brief on appeal. While the court could have treated that as a concession that he was wrong and reversed on that basis alone, it chose not to and instead decided the case on the merits.

Paul Bertuccini and Lisa Esposito have one child together, born in 2011. They divorced in 2014 and agreed to share joint legal custody, with Esposito having primary physical custody. The parenting-time arrangement was modified in 2015 and 2016, ultimately giving Bertuccini roughly ten days a month with the child. In 2021, Bertuccini asked the court for joint physical custody. He argued that circumstances had changed enough to justify revisiting custody. Specifically, he claimed: (1) the child, now approaching puberty and middle school, had changed mental and emotional needs; (2) both parents' work schedules had changed, leaving Esposito with less time and him with more; (3) the parents continued to struggle with custody exchanges, coparenting, school decisions, and extracurricular activities; and (4) Esposito was, in his view, encouraging a negative relationship between the child, Bertuccini, and the child's step-sister. Esposito disagreed with these factual claims and argued that merely more time passing was not enough to require a change in custody. After the written filings and a hearing that did not include the presentation of evidence, the district court issued a six-page order denying the motion. The court reasoned that "the passage of time and/or the age of the child are not factors creating a substantial change of circumstances," and that Bertuccini therefore had not made the preliminary showing (called a "prima facie case") needed to trigger a full hearing where evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals disagreed with how the district court handled the motion. It found that the lower court focused only on the passage-of-time point and never addressed the several other issues Bertuccini raised - the child's schooling and emotional needs, the changed work schedules, the parents' ability to cooperate, and the child's relationship with her step-sibling. Under recent Nevada caselaw, when deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, a court is generally supposed to accept the moving parent's specific factual allegations as true and must explain its reasoning. Because the district court did not address these other allegations, the Court of Appeals concluded it had abused its discretion (used its authority improperly) and had not given an adequate explanation. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial and sent the case back ("remanded") so the district court can make more complete findings, and it directed the lower court to apply the guidance from a case called Myers v. Haskins in any further proceedings.

This case is about which state - Texas or Nevada - has the legal power to decide who should have custody of a child known by the initials B.J.M. The background, which all parties agree on, is this: In 2011, B.J.M. was removed from his mother's care in Texas. In December 2012, a Texas court placed him with his father, Stacey B.M., and gave Stacey primary custody. That 2012 Texas order also closed the underlying dependency case. Years later, B.J.M. came to Nevada and lived with his paternal aunt, Tonja Ochonma, for more than six months. In 2022, Tonja asked a Nevada court to make her B.J.M.'s legal guardian. Stacey objected, arguing that because Texas had already entered a custody order, only Texas could change it. The Nevada district court disagreed and granted the guardianship to Tonja. Stacey appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Both Texas and Nevada have adopted a uniform law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which is designed to prevent two states from issuing conflicting custody orders about the same child. Under that law, once a state issues a custody order, that state generally keeps "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" - meaning it remains the only state allowed to modify the order - until certain specific conditions are met. One key condition is that everyone involved (the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent) has moved out of the original state. Here, Stacey still lives in Texas. Because of that, the Nevada Supreme Court held, Texas remains the only state that can decide whether it still has jurisdiction over custody questions about B.J.M. A Nevada court cannot, on its own, declare that Texas has lost jurisdiction or step in to modify the Texas order (outside of an emergency, which was not at issue here). The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not have authority to grant the guardianship and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with that ruling.

This case involves a dispute between two parents, Nancy Rodriguez and Ryan Stojack, over a child custody matter. The trial court issued an order that, among other things, directed Rodriguez to pay for one of the child's medical expenses on her own. Rodriguez tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the trial court was right or wrong about the medical expense. Instead, it concluded it could not hear the appeal at all because the trial court's decision was not yet final on that issue. The trial court's order said Rodriguez had to pay "until further order of the court," and the trial court had already scheduled another hearing to look again at the parents' finances and consider whether Stojack should help share that expense. Because the trial court had not finished deciding the question, there was nothing yet for the Supreme Court to review. In Nevada, a party can only appeal certain kinds of trial court decisions. One category is a "special order entered after final judgment" - an order issued after the case is over that significantly affects the parties' rights or obligations. Rodriguez argued her order fit that category because it changed the custody decree's allocation of medical expenses. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that since the issue was still being actively considered by the trial court, the order did not finally resolve anything. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Dustin and Megan Barral divorced in 2012 and had two children together. In the divorce, the court gave Megan sole legal custody (the authority to make major decisions for the children) and primary physical custody (where the children mainly live), while Dustin was to have parenting time. Shortly after the divorce, Dustin was arrested, and he has been incarcerated since 2013. Because of that, he has not been able to exercise his parenting time. In 2022, Dustin asked the court to change the custody arrangement. He wanted joint legal custody and to resume parenting time. His main reason was that he was scheduled to be released on parole in September 2023. The trial court turned him down for two reasons: first, that his request was premature because the change he was pointing to (his parole release) had not yet happened; and second, that reunifying with the children while he was still in prison would not be in the children's best interest. Dustin appealed. He argued the trial court should have considered that the children could start the process of reconnecting with him, and that he could share legal decision-making even while incarcerated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Under Nevada law, a parent asking to change physical custody must show two things: (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) that the change would serve the child's best interest. The court found Dustin had not met the first requirement, because his hoped-for change (parole) had not yet occurred, making his motion premature. Since he failed on the first requirement, the court did not need to go further on physical custody. On the request for joint legal custody, the court found that Dustin had not seen the children since 2013 (when they were 5 and 3, and now 15 and 13), and that his incarceration made it hard for him to communicate with Megan or understand the children's current needs. The court noted that keeping legal custody with Megan for now did not block Dustin's relationship with the children and that his request could be revisited once he is paroled. Importantly, the court explained that because the denial rested largely on the motion being premature, nothing in the order prevents Dustin from refiling his motion to modify custody at a more appropriate time.

This is a child-custody appeal that never got off the ground. After Ms. Allen filed her appeal from a temporary custody order issued by a Clark County family court judge, the Nevada Supreme Court clerk sent her a notice explaining the deadlines for filing the documents and briefs that every appellant must submit to move an appeal forward. When Ms. Allen did not file those documents, the court entered an order on April 25, 2023, giving her 14 more days to file the overdue transcript request form and docketing statement. The court warned her that if she did not comply, her appeal could be dismissed. Ms. Allen still did not file the required documents, and she did not contact the court. Her fast track statement - a separate required filing in child-custody appeals - also became overdue. Concluding that she had abandoned the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed it. The dismissal ends this appeal; the order does not address the merits of the underlying custody dispute.

Erik Ward and Svetlana Villaflor were never married and have two minor children together. In December 2019, the district court entered a final custody decree giving Villaflor primary physical custody. The court allowed Ward one hour per week of supervised parenting time at a third-party facility called Donna's House, but conditioned continued parenting time on Ward submitting to a psychological evaluation showing the children would be safe in his care. The court also asked Ward to provide the documents supporting that evaluation so the court could review them privately (an "in camera review" - a review conducted by the judge in chambers rather than in open court). Ward asked the court to reconsider, and the court denied that request in March 2020. Ward then filed a motion to set aside the March 2020 order under NRCP 60(b) - a court rule that lets a party ask a court to undo a prior ruling for certain reasons. The district court denied that motion too. Ward appealed, and in an earlier, separate appeal, the Court of Appeals sent the matter back (reversed and remanded), finding the district court had not applied the required legal factors from a case called Yochum v. Davis. On remand, the district court re-examined those factors in detail and again denied Ward's NRCP 60(b) request. That second denial is what Ward challenged in Docket No. 85148-COA. Separately, Ward's supervised parenting time had been terminated after an incident that led to his removal from Donna's House. Ward filed a "Motion for Visitation" asking to restart his parenting time. After briefing and a hearing, the district court denied that request, repeating that it might reconsider if Ward provided a psychological evaluation showing he was not a danger to the children. Ward challenged that denial in Docket No. 84674-COA. On appeal, Ward mostly tried to attack the original 2019 custody decision. The Court of Appeals said it could not consider those arguments because Ward had not filed a timely appeal of the 2019 order - and filing a timely appeal is a basic requirement without which the court has no power to hear the issue. Because Ward did not otherwise challenge how the district court applied the Yochum factors, the court treated those arguments as given up (waived), and found no abuse of discretion in the denial of NRCP 60(b) relief. On the parenting-time issue, the court noted that Ward did not dispute the district court's authority to order a psychological evaluation. Instead, Ward argued it was impossible to comply because several psychiatrists refused to treat him. But the letters he submitted to show this were heavily blacked out (redacted), and he did not provide unredacted versions for the court's private in-chambers review, even though the court had told him he could submit them that way. Under these circumstances, the court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed both orders.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally have to pay a filing fee, or alternatively show that they qualify to proceed without paying it (a process governed by a court rule called NRAP 24, which addresses proceeding "in forma pauperis," meaning as a poor person who cannot afford the fee). In this child custody appeal, the appellants did not pay the filing fee when the appeal was opened. The court sent them a notice giving them 14 days either to pay the fee or to show they qualified to skip it. The notice told them that if they did neither, the appeal would be dismissed. The appellants did not pay and did not otherwise respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching any of the underlying issues in the custody case.

Maggie Cox and Jason Roe divorced and shared joint custody of their son, H.R. About seven years later, when H.R. was eleven, Maggie asked the court to give her primary physical custody, saying the boy's behavior toward her had become disrespectful and aggressive, which she blamed partly on Jason. Jason opposed and asked for primary custody himself. The court ordered therapy and a "brief focused assessment" by a therapist, Maureen Zelensky. Zelensky's report suggested Jason was likely engaging in "parental alienation" (a dynamic in which a child becomes excessively hostile toward one parent) and that Maggie likely had anxiety and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder. She recommended keeping the shared week-on-week-off schedule and issuing behavior orders for both parents, which the court adopted. The situation then worsened. On two occasions, police took H.R. into custody for battery against Maggie during her parenting time; H.R. was found to be the primary aggressor both times. The opinion notes that Maggie never called the police—her mother called once and Jason called once—and that once police were called, Nevada law generally requires an arrest and a 12-hour detention. Based on those incidents, Jason filed an emergency motion for sole custody. In March 2021, the court granted it, making findings including that "something wrong with the parent who cannot manage an 11-year-old," that Maggie had called the police (which the record contradicts), and that her behavior was "histrionic." The court sharply restricted Maggie's contact with H.R., limited her to reunification therapy with Dr. Sunshine Collins and six hours of parenting time weekly, and appointed a parenting coordinator and a guardian ad litem, with costs split between the parents. Over the following months, contact between Maggie and H.R. was further restricted. Dr. Collins was outside Maggie's insurance network and Maggie fell behind on payments; Dr. Collins required Maggie to complete individual sessions before joint sessions with H.R. In September 2021, the court granted Jason's objection and ordered Maggie to have no contact with H.R. outside of therapy with Dr. Collins—effectively barring all contact between mother and son. This prevented Maggie from contacting H.R. on his birthday and from sending gifts or cards over the holidays. Learning this midway through a later hearing, the court orally modified the order to let Maggie send cards, texts, or calls. At the end of the March 2022 hearing, the court kept joint legal custody but gave Jason "primary physical custody," finding a substantial change in circumstances (the deteriorating relationship between Maggie and H.R.) and that H.R.'s best interests favored living with Jason. In practice, Maggie received no in-person parenting time—only cards, texts, and calls—and any expansion of her time was left to Dr. Collins's discretion. The court also ordered Maggie to pay $11,365 in attorney fees and costs to Jason as the prevailing party. The Court of Appeals reached a split result. It agreed there was substantial evidence supporting the decision that circumstances had substantially changed and that primary physical custody should go to Jason, so it affirmed that part. But it held the district court went too far in limiting Maggie's parenting time—so far that it effectively awarded Jason sole physical custody without adequate justification, cutting off a mother with no criminal history, no substance-abuse history, and no history of domestic violence from any in-person time with her son for over a year. The court also held the district court improperly handed off its own decision-making authority to Dr. Collins by letting her decide when Maggie could see H.R. in person, and that the final parenting-time order was too vague to enforce because it merely referenced an unwritten oral ruling. The Court of Appeals further concluded the case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand, pointing to statements and findings in the record that could cause a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality. Finally, it vacated the attorney-fee award because the required findings were missing and because part of the underlying order was being reversed.

Douglas Brofman and Gina Fiore were never married but share a child born in 2015. In 2019, Fiore asked the family court to award joint legal and physical custody with no child support owed by either parent. Brofman countered by seeking joint legal custody, primary physical custody, child support, permission to move with the child to Cleveland, Ohio, and repayment of loans he said he had made to Fiore. After a one-and-a-half-day trial, the district court denied Brofman's request to relocate, awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody, decided the child would attend the school Fiore was zoned for, and ordered Fiore to pay child support to Brofman. The parties then litigated a series of additional disputes, which the court resolved in orders entered in September, October, and November 2021. Brofman appealed the decree and all of these orders. A large part of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on a technical but important concept: appellate jurisdiction, meaning the court's legal authority to hear an appeal at all. In Nevada, an appeal is allowed only when a statute or court rule authorizes it. One of the most common bases is an appeal from a "final judgment" - a decision that resolves everything in the case. Here, the district court had never entered a written order resolving Brofman's counterclaim seeking repayment of loans, so there was no final judgment. Because of that, the Court of Appeals held it had no jurisdiction to review the child support portion of the decree, the make-up parenting time portion of the September 20 order, the denial of Brofman's request for attorney fees and a pre-judgment writ of attachment (an order securing property before judgment) in the October 20 order, or any of the November 1 orders. Those parts of the appeals were dismissed. The court noted in a footnote that once a final judgment is entered, Brofman may appeal from it and challenge these interim decisions at that time. The custody portion of the decree, however, was appealable under a specific rule allowing appeals from orders finally establishing custody of minor children, so the court reached the merits of Brofman's custody-related arguments. First, Brofman argued the district court should not have admitted reports from the parties' independent medical examinations. But his own trial lawyer had agreed (stipulated) to their admission, and the court held that this agreement waived any challenge on appeal. The court also noted that stipulating to evidence for strategic reasons - here, because there was not enough time for the expert to testify at the short trial - is a strategic decision that does not entitle a party to relief. And because Brofman did not give the appellate court the trial transcript where the reports were apparently discussed, the court applied its usual rule of presuming that missing materials support the lower court's decision. Second, Brofman argued that the school-choice issue should not have been decided based on written memoranda without a live evidentiary hearing. The court explained the unusual posture: Fiore had not given Brofman notice before trial that she would seek to change the parties' prior home-schooling arrangement, so the district court could not fairly have decided school choice at trial itself. Instead, the district court let Brofman file a memorandum on the issue and Fiore a response, which gave him notice and a chance to be heard. The Court of Appeals held that Brofman waived his complaint about the lack of an evidentiary hearing because he never asked for one below. It also noted that the parties' memoranda were supported by unsworn declarations, which Nevada law allows in place of sworn affidavits, and that the district court also relied on trial evidence - which, again, Brofman had not provided in transcript form. The custody and support decree was affirmed in its entirety. Third, the court affirmed the denial of Brofman's motion for a new trial. Brofman claimed Fiore introduced misleading or fraudulent text messages at trial, but the court held that even assuming his arguments were correct, he had not shown prejudice materially affecting his substantial rights: the district court denied relocation because Brofman failed all three parts of the threshold relocation test, and only one finding involved a text message. The court also rejected Brofman's claim that he was denied oral argument on the motion (the transcript showed he was allowed to argue) and his argument that the school-choice decision required a full relocation analysis, since the relocation statute applies to moves out of state or far enough away to impair the other parent's relationship with the child - not to choosing a school within Las Vegas.

In 2018, Yusuf Nuri filed for divorce from Fasika Jarso. He knew Jarso was on an extended vacation in another state, but he told the district court he did not know where to find her. Based on that representation, the court allowed Nuri to serve Jarso by publication - that is, by publishing notice of the lawsuit in a newspaper rather than handing her the papers directly. When Jarso did not respond (because she did not know about the case), the court entered a divorce by default. After the divorce, the parties continued to live together. Years later, Jarso learned about the divorce and asked the district court to set it aside, arguing she had never been served. The district court agreed and vacated the divorce decree. Nuri appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It found that Nuri had committed a "fraud upon the court" by telling the judge he could not locate Jarso when, in fact, he knew where she was and when she would return. Because Nuri obtained the divorce by deceiving the court about service, the district court was within its discretion to undo it. The Supreme Court also found that Jarso acted promptly, filing her motion within a week of learning about the default divorce.

Latisha Jones and Kevin Conway divorced through a settlement. Their divorce decree gave them joint legal custody of their two children, but Latisha had primary physical custody, meaning the children lived mainly with her. Soon after the divorce, Kevin asked the court to intervene, claiming Latisha was not following the decree - including that she had left the state multiple times, once with the children, without telling him, which cost him some of his parenting time. After a hearing, both parties agreed to an order stating that neither of them could relocate without first getting written or email permission from the other parent or first asking the court, and that neither could "move first and ask for forgiveness later." Kevin later told the court that Latisha had moved with the children to Louisiana. He asked the court to order the children returned and to give him primary physical custody. Latisha responded by admitting she had already moved to Louisiana with the children and asking the court to allow the move after the fact. The court held an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented), then denied Latisha's request to relocate and gave Kevin primary physical custody. The district court found that Latisha did not get Kevin's written consent or ask the court's permission before moving, which the court concluded violated a Nevada relocation statute. The court also found she gave no compelling excuse for not following the law and did not meet the initial requirements to justify relocation under a related statute. Finally, the court decided that the children's best interests were served by placing them with Kevin. Latisha appealed. The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada affirmed - meaning it upheld the lower court's decision. On her first argument, the appeals court said Latisha did not clearly explain how the district court supposedly misapplied the relocation law, and it was undisputed that she had in fact moved with the children out of Nevada without permission. On her second argument, the court said Latisha never raised the domestic violence issue at the evidentiary hearing and no evidence about it was presented there, so the issue was "waived" - given up by not raising it at the proper time - and could not be considered on appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed.

Douglas and Natalie Gennardo are divorced parents with two appeals pending before the Nevada Supreme Court - one focused on financial issues from the divorce, and one focused on child custody. While the appeals were pending, Natalie asked the Supreme Court to either tell the trial court it could go ahead and enforce parts of the divorce decree (including an alleged hidden or improperly transferred asset), or send the case back down so the trial court could handle those matters. Douglas opposed that request. The parties then reached a settlement on all the financial issues and jointly asked the court to: (1) dismiss the financial appeal (Docket No. 85089), (2) put the custody appeal (Docket No. 85370) back on the court's expedited "fast track" schedule, and (3) send the case back to the trial court so the settlement could be adopted and carried out. The Supreme Court dismissed the financial appeal as the parties requested. Because the financial appeal was now gone and Natalie was not challenging financial issues in the remaining custody appeal, the court explained that the trial court already had jurisdiction to enter orders on financial matters - so a formal remand was unnecessary. The court denied Natalie's earlier motion and the joint remand request as no longer needed. It granted the request to put the custody appeal back on the fast track, gave Natalie 21 days to file her fast track statement and appendix, and granted the court reporter additional time to prepare transcripts.

Cecil Estein, Jr., and Mia Ward were never married but have one child together, D.W., born in 2013. According to the opinion, Ward was the primary caretaker for the child during his first nine years, until Estein concluded his service in the United States military in 2018. After that, the parents worked together to increase Estein's parenting time, and they reached a partial agreement in which they agreed to share joint legal custody (the right to make major decisions for the child) and set out holiday and vacation plans. The parents could not agree, however, on physical custody (where the child primarily lives) or on New Year's parenting time. Estein went to district court asking for joint physical custody and a 50/50 split of parenting time. After motions and a trial before a judge (rather than a jury), the district court weighed the "best interest of the child" factors listed in Nevada law and decided that Ward should have primary physical custody, with Estein having parenting time on weekends. Estein appealed that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, meaning it left the district court's decision in place. The appellate court explained that it reviews custody decisions only for an "abuse of discretion" - that is, it does not decide the case over again from scratch. It will accept the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and it will not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the trial judge's assessments of who was credible. The court noted that Estein's main argument was not that the district court failed to make adequate findings or that its findings lacked support in the evidence. Instead, he argued that the trial court reached the wrong conclusion from the evidence. Because the appellate court does not re-weigh evidence on appeal, that kind of argument was not a basis for reversal. Estein also argued that the district court should have applied a legal presumption in favor of joint physical custody. But the opinion states that the district court had a specific reason for not applying that presumption - the parents had reached a verbal arrangement before trial giving Ward primary physical custody - and Estein did not challenge that reasoning on appeal. Because he did not challenge it, the court treated that argument as waived (given up).

This case is a dispute between two parents, Javier Ramirez Rivas and Mayra E. Arreguin, over custody of their two minor children. In earlier proceedings, the district court had given the mother primary physical custody, with the father having limited parenting time. Later, the court modified that arrangement so that the father's limited parenting time was subject to the children's discretion. The father asked the court to change the arrangement to joint physical custody, arguing that the children's school attendance and academic performance had declined during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court refused, finding that keeping the existing arrangement was in the children's best interest. On an earlier appeal, the Court of Appeals sent the case back because the district court had not specifically addressed two required questions: whether circumstances had substantially changed and how the children's best interests weighed under the factors listed in the governing statute. After the case returned to the district court, the judge held a hearing in April 2022, asked the children about their wishes, and heard testimony from a Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) - a person appointed to represent the children's interests. The court then denied the motion again, this time explaining in detail that there had been no substantial change in circumstances affecting the children and that the best interest factors did not favor changing custody. On this second appeal, the father raised a constitutional argument: he claimed the court should not have used the "best interest of the child" standard at all, because doing so violated his constitutional right as a parent to make decisions about his children's care, custody, and control. He relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case, Troxel v. Granville. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument for two reasons. First, in the earlier appeal, the court had already directed the district court to apply the best-interest standard, and the father never asked for rehearing or review of that decision. Because of a rule called the "law of the case" - the principle that a legal ruling made earlier in a case must be followed later in the same case - the district court was required to apply that standard. Second, the court explained that the Troxel case is different because it involved a dispute between a parent and a third party (grandparents seeking visitation), while this case is a dispute between two parents. When two fit parents each assert their constitutional rights, those rights cancel each other out, leaving the child's best interest as the standard to apply. The court also addressed the father's other complaints. It found that the district court had in fact considered his concerns about the children's academic performance, but concluded modification was not warranted. The court noted that a finding about the father's declining mental and physical health was supported by the judge's own observations and by the father's statement about a head injury causing migraines. The court found that the father had been given a chance to cross-examine the CASA and present evidence but had mostly used that time to argue with the CASA and had not asked for more time. As for the father's claim that a teacher's testimony was ignored, the court noted no teacher testified at the April 2022 hearing, and because the father did not obtain a transcript of an earlier January 2021 hearing, the court presumed the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. Finally, the court rejected the father's claim of bias based on gender and race, finding he offered no cogent argument and no basis in the record. Having found no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order.

This is a post-divorce child custody dispute. After the divorce, the family court entered several orders adjusting custody, denying various motions filed by the mother, and requiring her to undergo a psychological evaluation. The mother, representing herself, tried to appeal four of those orders to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the lower court was right or wrong. Instead, it asked a threshold question: does Nevada law allow an appeal from these particular orders at this time? It concluded the answer was no for each order, and dismissed the appeal. For the November 29, 2022 order, the court explained that a Nevada statute and court rule allow appeals only from custody orders that "finally" decide custody. Because this order said custody was only temporary and would be revisited after a psychological evaluation, it was not a final custody decision, so it could not yet be appealed. For the December 30, 2022 order, the mother filed her notice of appeal too late. Nevada's appellate rules require a notice of appeal within 30 days of being served with the order. She was served the day the order was entered but did not file her notice until February 12, 2023 - past the deadline. The court also noted that the December 30 order simply sent the case back to a different department of the district court, and no rule allows an appeal from that kind of order anyway. For the two January 13, 2023 orders, the court worked through each piece. One order declined to award child support to the father until he submitted financial paperwork - but the mother was not harmed by that decision, so she had no standing to appeal it. The same order required her to turn over the children's birth certificates and Social Security cards to the father; the court found this was simply part of carrying out the temporary custody arrangement and was not independently appealable. The other January 13 order denied a long list of motions she had filed, struck certain correspondence, and ordered her to undergo a psychological evaluation and stop filing motions until a report was submitted. The court treated these as procedural decisions that did not affect rights "growing out of" the divorce decree, and so were not appealable. To the extent the order denied her requests to undo earlier custody rulings, the court explained that the November 29, 2022 temporary order had already replaced the March 30, 2021 order, making the issue moot - meaning there was no longer a live dispute the court could fix. Because none of the four orders was properly appealable, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The case involves two minor children whose mother is deceased and whose father, Andrew M., is the appellant. In 2018, the children's maternal grandmother, Melanie Dixon, asked the district court to make her their guardian, and the court did so. Two years later, Andrew asked the court to end the guardianship, saying he had never been served with the original petition even though Melanie knew where he was. The district court refused, and later refused again when Andrew asked it to set aside its decision under a rule that allows courts to undo prior orders in exceptional circumstances. The district court also added Melanie's husband, Jimmy Dixon, as a co-guardian so the children could be covered by his veterans' health insurance. Andrew filed a series of additional requests - asking the court to order reunification therapy, to remove the Dixons as guardians (arguing they had not filed required reports and had moved the children to Florida without permission), to bring in a different therapist, and to appoint a guardian ad litem (an independent advocate for the children). The district court denied all of these and ordered Andrew to pay Melanie and Jimmy's attorney fees. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court on every issue it could reach. It held that Andrew's claim that Melanie misled the court about service was, at best, a claim of "misrepresentation by an opposing party" - which falls under a different subsection of the rule than the one Andrew used, so he could not get relief under the catchall subsection he invoked. The court found no abuse of discretion in adding Jimmy as co-guardian (because the children would benefit from his veterans' health benefits) or in keeping Melanie as guardian (the children had lived with her for four years, were doing well, and Andrew himself said he had no objection to the Florida move). The court declined to rule on the attorney fees issue because the district court had not yet set the dollar amount, making that part of the appeal premature; the court dismissed that portion for lack of jurisdiction.

Michael and Danielle Martin divorced in 2017. Their divorce decree required Michael to provide health insurance for the parties' three minor children. After the divorce, the parties continued to fight over custody, child support, and healthcare and financial decisions about the children. By 2020, Danielle had primary physical custody and primary legal custody for healthcare decisions, and she added the children to her current husband's insurance plan. Michael then asked the district court to change the divorce decree so he could drop the children from his insurance. Danielle opposed that request and asked the court to appoint a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral person who helps divorced parents work through ongoing disputes. The district court sided with Danielle: it refused to let Michael drop the children from his insurance, ordered the parties to submit a proposed order appointing a parenting coordinator, denied Michael's request for attorney fees, and granted Danielle's request for fees (with the dollar amount to be set later). Michael appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the parts of the district court's order that denied his motion and appointed a parenting coordinator. The court explained that Michael did not cite any legal rule that would let him out of his insurance obligation, so the district court was within its discretion to deny the change. On the parenting coordinator issue, the court said Michael had not raised his objection in the lower court and so had given up the argument; in any event, the record showed the parties could not communicate well enough to make decisions on their own, which is exactly the situation a parenting coordinator is meant to address. The Supreme Court did not reach the attorney-fee award. Because the district court had only said Danielle would get fees but had not yet decided how much, that part of the order was not final, and the appellate court said it lacked jurisdiction to review it. That portion of the appeal was dismissed. Finally, the Supreme Court declined Michael's request to send the case back to a different judge, finding no showing that Judge Almase could not fairly handle the matter or held bias against either party.

Jordan Cristos and Sarah Tolagson have two young children together and separated in February 2019. After they split up, the case describes several conflicts between them, including physical altercations in 2019 and 2020, and a 2021 incident at a park. Sarah obtained temporary protection orders in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In the 2020 incident, Jordan entered a nolo contendere plea (a plea in which a defendant does not contest a charge without formally admitting guilt) to a misdemeanor battery charge and was convicted. There was also a separate child dependency case alleging abuse and neglect that was eventually closed after Jordan complied with what Child Protective Services (CPS) recommended. Both parents asked the court for primary physical custody and joint legal custody. After a six-day trial, the district court gave Sarah primary physical custody and set up a "hybrid" joint legal custody arrangement: Sarah handles day-to-day decisions, but Jordan gets access to the children's medical and school records and is to be involved in major and moderate decisions about healthcare, education, and religion. Jordan was also ordered to pay $1,985 per month in child support, and he was given parenting time every weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Jordan appealed. He argued the trial court should not have considered three things: his nolo contendere plea, the closed child dependency case, and a CPS report. The appeals court explained that Jordan did not object to this evidence during the trial, which normally means the argument is given up ("waived"). The court can still review for "plain error," but Jordan did not argue plain error, and even looking at the substance of his complaints, the court found the trial judge's decisions were supported by the evidence. The appeals court also emphasized that it does not re-weigh witness credibility or evidence on appeal. On the child dependency case, Jordan argued the doctrine of issue preclusion (a rule that stops a party from re-litigating an issue already decided) barred the court from considering it. The appeals court found he had not shown the required elements—including that he did not even provide the juvenile court records to support his claim that the case was "dismissed." On legal custody, Jordan argued the court effectively gave Sarah sole legal custody and violated his due process rights. The appeals court disagreed, noting that in a joint legal custody arrangement the parent with the child at the time typically makes day-to-day decisions, and that Jordan still participates in major decisions and has access to records. The court looked at the judge's oral statements to interpret the written order. The one point where Jordan succeeded was the child support amount. Both sides agreed the math was wrong: the correct base obligation is $1,895 per month, not $1,985. The appeals court affirmed everything else but sent the case back solely to fix that clerical error.

Adam and Chalese Solinger married in May 2012 and had two young children. Adam filed for divorce in January 2019, and the case took nearly three and a half years to resolve. Trial was held over five nonconsecutive days between May 2021 and March 2022, and eight witnesses testified, including a court-appointed custody evaluator, a rebuttal expert Chalese hired, a private investigator, family members, and both parents' romantic partners. After the trial ended but before the divorce decree was entered, Chalese's boyfriend became violent at the home they shared during her parenting time - he broke a television and threatened to keep her from leaving. Chalese took the children, left, and called the police; the boyfriend was arrested for domestic violence, and Chalese obtained a temporary protection order. Chalese asked to present testimony about this incident, which Adam did not oppose, and the district court considered it in deciding custody. The final decree gave the parents joint legal and joint physical custody on a week-on/week-off schedule, ordered Adam to pay child support, required Adam to pay all of the children's health insurance and 65 percent of their other medical, educational, and extracurricular costs, divided the couple's assets and debts, and awarded attorney fees to Chalese. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Adam on several money-related points but not on custody. The court affirmed the joint physical custody arrangement. Even though it agreed that two of the district court's findings (about alleged domestic violence by Adam and his supposed lack of financial support for Chalese) were mistaken, it concluded those mistakes did not change the outcome because the district court had done a thorough analysis of the child's best-interest factors and a majority still favored Chalese - yet the court still gave Adam joint physical custody. The court also explained that the statute Adam relied on for considering a partner's violent behavior applies to parents or others seeking custody, and Chalese's boyfriend was neither; but the district court was still allowed to consider the boyfriend's behavior as part of the broader best-interest analysis, and it did. The court found several errors in the financial parts of the decree. On child support, the district court said it used Adam's financial disclosure form and his own statements to find his income, but the number it used ($9,799 per month) did not match the figures in the record (Adam reported about $7,839.86 per month, and both sides agreed he earns roughly $94,000 a year). So the court sent the child support calculation back to be redone, with credit for any overpayments. On the 65 percent share of the children's medical, educational, and extracurricular costs, the court found the district court had not adequately explained its reasoning, especially since Adam already pays 100 percent of the children's health insurance and both parents had asked to split unreimbursed medical costs equally. Without a real explanation, the appeals court could not review the decision, so it reversed and sent it back. On the pension, the district court had awarded Chalese a "survivorship interest" in Adam's future state pension (PERS) and required him to choose a payout option that keeps paying a beneficiary after his death. The Court of Appeals explained that a survivorship interest is not itself community property, and giving Chalese this benefit was an unequal division of property because Adam would keep paying into the account for years after the marriage ended while Chalese contributed nothing. The district court had not made the findings needed to justify that unequal division - including why Chalese should be preferred over a possible future spouse or child - so the court reversed that award. Because the attorney-fee award (about $200,875) rested partly on the district court calling Chalese the "prevailing party," and because parts of the decree were being reversed, the court vacated the fee award so it could be reconsidered on remand. The court did reject one of Adam's fee arguments now, holding that Chalese's fee requests complied with the rules because her firms filed memorandums of fees and costs before final judgment. The court declined to reach Adam's other fee-related arguments at this time. On expert witness fees, the court reversed the $4,750 award for Chalese's rebuttal expert because the district court did not properly address all the required factors, particularly given that a neutral expert had already been appointed by the court. Finally, the court refused to order that a different judge handle the case on remand, explaining that a judge's rulings and actions during official proceedings are not, by themselves, grounds for disqualification.

Mario Accomando and Georgann Rose Accomando were divorced, and the divorce decree was entered on June 29, 2022. After the divorce, the district court held a hearing on an "order to show cause" - a proceeding in which a party is asked to explain why they should not be held in contempt for disobeying a court order. The district court found Mario in contempt for not complying with the divorce decree, imposed sanctions, and ordered him to comply. Mario tried to appeal that contempt order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his arguments. Instead, it concluded that it had no power to hear the appeal at all, because Nevada law only lets the Supreme Court hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically authorizes. There is no statute or rule that allows an appeal from this kind of post-divorce contempt order. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a family-law case about whether a father could get parenting time with his teenage son. After Jose and Zully divorced, a judge gave Zully sole legal and physical custody of their children, and also gave Zully the power to decide whether Jose could spend any time with the children at all. Jose then asked the court for more parenting time with the couple's son, I.P. Zully objected. At a hearing, the court weighed evidence about what would be best for I.P. Part of that evidence involved a plea Jose had entered years earlier. Specifically, Jose had entered what is called an "Alford plea" - a type of no-contest plea, named after a U.S. Supreme Court case, where a defendant does not admit guilt but accepts a conviction - related to sexual coercion of I.P.'s older sister, who is now an adult. The trial judge wrote an 18-page order examining each factor Nevada law requires courts to consider when deciding what is in a child's best interest. The judge found that granting Jose parenting time was not in I.P.'s best interest. The judge relied on things like: I.P. (who is over 12) became frightened, depressed, and anxious when he learned his father wanted parenting time; a high level of conflict between the parents, including Jose's attempts to have Zully deported and his continuing anger toward her; and the fact that Zully had been I.P.'s sole caretaker for more than six years, including while Jose was incarcerated, and had met all of I.P.'s needs. On appeal, Jose argued the judge's findings were not adequately supported by evidence. He also correctly pointed out that under Nevada law, an Alford plea should not be used against a person in a civil case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial judge made a mistake by considering Jose's plea. But the appeals court concluded the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because the judge's other findings, which did not depend on the plea, independently supported the decision to deny parenting time. The appeals court also declined to consider Jose's challenge to the attorney-fees-and-costs award because he did not develop a real argument about it. In the end, the appeals court affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decisions.

Vanessa Pinto and Francis Guardado-Pinto married in February 2007 and had two minor children who were 8 and 5 years old at the time of trial. During the marriage they kept separate bank accounts and acquired three homes: a residence on Kensington Street (2010), a residence on Lodge Pole Court (2012), and a residence on Colour Magic Street (2015). When the marriage broke down, Francis filed for divorce and asked the court to divide the property and grant joint custody. Vanessa wanted sole custody and argued that certain property was hers alone. After a three-day trial, the family court divided the property and set up a custody arrangement. On appeal, Vanessa asked the Court of Appeals to overturn several of those decisions. The appeals court explained that it reviews these kinds of family-court rulings for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not overturn the trial judge unless the decision was clearly wrong or lacked adequate evidentiary support. The court also emphasized a rule that appears throughout the opinion: appellate courts do not re-weigh which witness was more believable, because that judgment belongs to the trial judge who heard the testimony. On the property questions, the court applied Nevada's rule that property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be "community property" (property belonging to both spouses) unless there is a written agreement saying otherwise. The Colour Magic home was a close call: Francis had signed a quitclaim deed (a document giving up his interest) to Vanessa, which normally creates a presumption that he gifted the property to her. But the trial judge believed Francis's testimony - including that he did not fully understand English and intended to keep his interest - and found he had overcome that presumption with strong evidence. The appeals court declined to second-guess that credibility call. Because Vanessa had transferred the Colour Magic home to her mother the day before Francis filed for divorce, and because she still lived there, the court assigned that property's value to her and awarded Francis the Kensington home to balance things out. The court also upheld the trial judge's findings that: the couple's earnings during the marriage were community property (Vanessa had no written agreement making her income separate); Vanessa did not prove Francis owned property in Honduras and that he sent $20,000 rather than $40,000 there; Vanessa's student loans were her own separate debt because she did not prove the loans existed or that her education benefited the marriage; and Vanessa did not prove Francis had possession of $20,000 in jewelry. Many of these conclusions rested on the trial judge's credibility findings and on the fact that Vanessa did not submit enough documents or legal authority to support her arguments. On custody, the court explained that Nevada law requires the family court to decide custody based on the "best interest of the child," weighing a list of statutory factors. The trial judge went through each factor and found joint physical custody with a "week on/week off" schedule was best. The judge found the children (both under nine) were too young to express an intelligent preference, that conflict between the parents was high, and that they could not communicate well about the children. The appeals court found these conclusions supported by the evidence. It also upheld the exclusion of one child's therapy records because the proper witness was not called to authenticate them, and it declined to consider several other arguments Vanessa raised without legal authority or that she had not raised in the trial court. Because none of Vanessa's arguments showed the trial court had abused its discretion, the Court of Appeals affirmed all of the rulings.

Mary Snyder and Matthew Walker were never married but had a child together (referred to as T.W., age eight at trial). While living with Matthew, Mary became pregnant with a second child (T.W.2, age five at trial), and Matthew was listed as the father on that child's birth certificate. The couple lived together until October 2019, when Mary moved in with her current husband, Hal, a member of the United States Air Force. Mary and Matthew informally shared custody without going to court. After Hal was transferred to an Air Force base in Maryland, and after Mary and Hal married in July 2021, Matthew filed a court complaint seeking joint legal and joint physical custody of both children. Mary responded by asking for primary physical custody so she could move the children to Maryland. She also claimed another man was T.W.2's biological father and asked for DNA testing. Testing showed Matthew was not T.W.2's biological father, but Mary agreed at the start of trial that the court could treat Matthew as T.W.2's legal father, because the man she believed was the actual father never took a test or appeared in the case. After a four-day trial, the district court ruled against Mary. It found she had not met the legal requirements to move the children out of state, and it gave Matthew primary physical custody of both children. The court also issued a preliminary ruling that Matthew "shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees," but it had not yet set an amount. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Nevada affirmed. On the relocation issue, the court explained that a parent who wants to move with a child must clear a "threshold test" with three parts, and only if all three are met does the court weigh six additional relocation factors. Mary argued the district court got two of the three threshold parts wrong, but she did not meaningfully challenge the finding that relocation was not in the children's best interests, and she did not challenge the district court's separate findings on the six relocation factors at all. Because those unchallenged findings independently supported the decision, the appeals court affirmed the denial of relocation. On custody, Mary argued that the district court ignored her evidence and effectively forced her to choose between her husband and her children. She disputed the court's findings on several "best interest" factors. The appeals court repeatedly explained that credibility of witnesses is decided by the trial court, not re-decided on appeal, and that the district court had not found Mary's or Hal's testimony credible. Much of Mary's argument amounted to asking the appeals court to reweigh the evidence, which it declined to do. The court found the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the custody award. On the attorney fees issue, the appeals court held that because the district court had not yet actually awarded any fees, that part of the appeal was premature.

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

This is a short, administrative dismissal - not a ruling on the merits of the underlying child custody dispute. When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, file paperwork asking the court for permission to proceed without paying (called proceeding "in forma pauperis"). Here, the appellant filed his appeal but did not pay the $250 filing fee. The Supreme Court initially thought he had filed a request to proceed without paying, and on December 27, 2022, it told the district court to rule on that request. The Supreme Court later realized that the document the appellant had filed in the district court was not actually a request to proceed without paying and did not meet the requirements of the relevant appellate rule. On February 13, 2023, the Supreme Court gave the appellant 30 days to either pay the filing fee or file a proper request to proceed without paying, and warned that failing to do so would result in dismissal. The appellant did neither and did not otherwise contact the court. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal.

This case is about whether a parent asking a court to change a child custody arrangement was entitled to a full hearing where evidence could be presented, before the court turned him down. Scott and Nancy Kelsey were divorced. Under their divorce decree, they shared joint legal custody of their child (meaning both had a say in major decisions), but Nancy had primary physical custody (the child mainly lived with her), while Scott had parenting time. Scott later asked the court to give him sole legal and physical custody. The court held a hearing but did not take live evidence — this is called a "nonevidentiary hearing." The court then denied Scott's request, deciding that none of his claims justified changing custody or holding a fuller evidentiary hearing. Scott appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with him. Under Nevada law, a parent who wants an evidentiary hearing on a request to modify custody must show there is "adequate cause" for one by presenting what the law calls a "prima facie case" — essentially, enough of a showing on paper to warrant a fuller look. To do that, the parent must show that the facts in the sworn statements supporting the motion are relevant to the legal grounds for changing custody and that the evidence is not merely repetitive or aimed only at attacking someone's credibility. The Court of Appeals explained that when a court decides whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, it is generally supposed to accept the moving parent's specific allegations as true, rather than weighing whether they seem believable. Here, Scott had alleged, among other things, that Nancy made the child attend school after he tested positive for COVID-19, failed to take the child to a doctor or emergency room when the child had a high fever, and knowingly let the child drive her vehicle without a license or learner's permit on multiple occasions. The district court had rejected these claims for reasons the Court of Appeals found improper. The lower court had said there was "no credible evidence" behind the illness-related claims and pointed to a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation that discussed the driving incident with Nancy and the child. But the Court of Appeals noted that credibility is generally not something a court should weigh at this early stage, because the allegations must be accepted as true. And relying on the CPS report to reject the request denied Scott the chance to challenge the accuracy of that report — something that should happen at an evidentiary hearing. Because Scott's allegations, taken as true, were relevant to whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and whether a custody change would be in the child's best interest — and because nothing showed those allegations were merely repetitive or aimed only at attacking credibility — the Court of Appeals held that Scott had established a prima facie case and thus satisfied the "adequate cause" standard. The court concluded the district court had abused its discretion by denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals emphasized that it was not deciding whether Scott should ultimately win. It sent the case back to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing, leaving the form of that hearing to the district court's discretion, and noted that Nancy's objections might still prevail once evidence is taken.

This case is about when grandparents in Nevada can get a court order requiring their grandchildren's parents to let them visit. Nevada law (NRS 125C.050) lets grandparents and certain other people ask a court for visitation, but only if "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child." The grandchildren's parents, Ashley and John Franklin, divorced and were given joint legal and joint physical custody of the two children. During the divorce proceedings, the children had briefly lived with the grandparents under a six-month temporary guardianship. After the children went back to their parents, Ashley and John signed a partial parenting agreement saying that no one else, including the maternal grandparents, would have court-ordered custody or visitation. The grandparents then asked the court for visitation anyway. At the evidentiary hearing, the father (John) testified that, after a roughly five-month period when he had cut off contact based on a mistaken belief about Phillip's role in his fiance's arrest, he allowed the grandparents to see the children regularly during his custodial time - including afternoon visits, school pickups, an overnight on Christmas Eve 2021, a spring-break trip, and several overnight stays. Phillip kept a log showing 196 hours with the children in 2021. The grandmother (Carolyn), by contrast, said Ashley would not arrange visits during her custodial time. The trial judge found Ashley not credible and relied on John's and the grandparents' testimony. The trial judge ruled that, even though Ashley denied contact during her time, the overall amount of contact the grandparents had with the children - through John's parenting time - was enough that the grandparents were not being "denied or unreasonably restricted" from visiting. The petition was denied. The grandparents appealed. They argued the trial court essentially "rubber stamped" Ashley's refusal by ignoring the fact that she gave them no time at all. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The key legal question was how to read the words "a parent" in NRS 125C.050(3). Does it mean the petition can go forward if just one parent denies visits? Or does the court look at the overall picture across both parents in a joint custody situation? The Supreme Court held that, where parents share joint custody and both participate in the case, courts should look at the petitioners' overall access to the children. If one parent is providing reasonable contact, the petition fails - the court does not need to scrutinize what the other parent is doing. The court reasoned this approach better balances two interests: the child's interest in having a relationship with grandparents (which is met if the grandparents are getting regular contact through one parent) and the parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children, recognized in Troxel v. Granville. Reading the statute the other way, the court said, would let petitions proceed even when the child is already getting plenty of grandparent contact, which would intrude on parental rights without serving the child. Applying that rule, the Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The grandparents' factual reports of their visits supported the finding that contact was not unreasonably restricted. The grandparents' worry that their access could disappear in the future - what the court called the "volatility" of family relationships - was not, by itself, an unreasonable restriction. The court also declined to consider arguments the grandparents had not properly preserved below (that Ashley was unfit and that the court should adopt a "functional-parent" theory) and treated as moot their challenge to the order ending their temporary guardianship, since the six-month guardianship had already expired by its own terms.

Brittany Sheehan and Justin Manty have one child together, T.S. Before this case began, there was no court order in place about who had custody. Brittany filed a case in Nevada asking a court to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. Justin responded by filing his own custody case in California and asking the Nevada court to dismiss Brittany's case for lack of jurisdiction (the court's authority to decide the matter). According to the opinion, Brittany then went to California, took T.S. out of her school, and brought her to Nevada. California criminal charges were filed against Brittany over that incident. After a hearing, the Nevada district court ordered Brittany to return T.S. to Justin and dismissed the Nevada case, finding that California was the more convenient place to handle the dispute because most of the evidence and witnesses were there. On appeal, Brittany made several arguments. First, she said the judge, Dedree Butler, showed bias by saying at the hearing that she "d[id]n't know if [T.S. is] safe right now" and that "for all [she] kn[e]w [T.S. is] . . . somewhere in a basement tied up." The Court of Appeals explained that judges are presumed to be unbiased, and it read the judge's comments—though it described them as "arguably hyperbolic"—as simply stating that the judge did not know where the child was because Brittany would not say. The court found no proof that the judge's rulings were driven by bias. Second, Brittany argued the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. The court rejected this because she did not cite supporting legal authority, did not explain why such a hearing was needed, and did not identify any disputed facts the court would have had to resolve. Third, Brittany argued the court improperly relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements) from Justin. The court said that even if she were right, it would not change the outcome, because she never disputed the core reason for dismissal—that California was the more convenient forum. She also never addressed the specific statute the court used to dismiss the case. Finally, Brittany argued the court was wrong to order the child returned to Justin without weighing the "best interest of the child" factors. The court explained that it acted under its temporary emergency jurisdiction, pointing to how T.S. had been removed from California (with Brittany criminally charged and subject to an active arrest warrant) and to Brittany's refusal to reveal where the child was, which left the court unsure the child was safe. The court found those oral findings sufficient. Because none of Brittany's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Justin Hardin filed an appeal challenging a child custody decree from a Nye County district court. He represented himself, without an attorney. When an appeal is filed in the Nevada Supreme Court, the appellant must submit several required documents on a set schedule - things like a form telling the court whether trial transcripts will be ordered, a docketing statement (a short form describing the case), and a "fast track statement" (a brief written argument used in expedited child custody appeals). The court sent Hardin a notice on the day his appeal was docketed, listing the deadlines: a transcript request form or certificate of no transcript request by January 6, 2023; a docketing statement by January 13, 2023; and a fast track statement by February 1, 2023. Hardin did not file any of those documents. On February 3, 2023, the court issued an order giving him 14 more days to file the missing paperwork and warning him that if he did not, his appeal could be dismissed as abandoned. He still did not file anything, and he did not otherwise communicate with the court. Because Hardin did not meet the filing requirements or respond to the court's follow-up order, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded he had abandoned the appeal and dismissed it. The dismissal is based on Hardin's failure to prosecute the appeal, not on the merits of the underlying custody dispute.

This was a short procedural ruling. Mr. Campbell had asked a Clark County family court judge for permission to claim a child as a dependent for tax purposes. The family court judge denied his motion, and Mr. Campbell, representing himself, tried to appeal that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his request. Before deciding whether the family court was right or wrong, the Supreme Court has to confirm it has the legal authority - called "jurisdiction" - to hear the appeal at all. In Nevada, a party can only appeal a lower-court order if a statute or a court rule specifically says that type of order can be appealed. The court reviewed the rules and statutes and concluded that no Nevada statute or court rule allows an appeal from an order denying a motion to claim a child for tax purposes. Because nothing authorized the appeal, the Supreme Court had no power to consider it and dismissed the case. The court also granted Mr. Campbell's late-filed motion to extend the time to request a transcript, noting the transcript request form was filed on February 15, 2023.

This case concerns two parents fighting over custody of their two young children after a divorce. Jasper and Carlos married in 2013 and divorced in 2017. They had two children, born in 2014 and 2016. Shortly after the divorce, both parents agreed in a court filing that Jasper would have sole legal and physical custody. In 2019, they again agreed that Jasper and Jasper's new husband could move with the children to Hampton, Virginia. In January 2021, Carlos asked the court to change the custody arrangement. His concerns focused on the children's gender fluidity and on Jasper's decision to support the use of certain strong psychiatric medications prescribed to one child. The court issued a temporary order in May 2021 giving Carlos joint legal custody, meaning both parents would share decision-making. Jasper's own attorney wrote that order, and Jasper did not object to it or ask the court to pause it. Two later disputes became important. First, the parents disagreed about whether to vaccinate the children against COVID-19; Jasper wanted to, Carlos did not. Second, an earlier 2019 order gave Carlos time with the children for Christmas 2021. Jasper asked the court either for permission to vaccinate the children or to postpone the Christmas visit. The court denied that request in early January 2022. By then, Jasper had already kept the children from Carlos over Christmas, in violation of the 2019 order. Then, right after the court's denial, Jasper had the children vaccinated and boosted anyway, against Carlos's wishes and against the court's temporary order. In May 2022, after a full-day hearing with testimony from both parents, Carlos's wife, and a clinical psychologist the parents had jointly hired, the court issued a 39-page order. It gave Carlos primary physical custody while keeping joint legal custody shared. The court did not agree that the children's gender fluidity was a "substantial change of circumstance." Instead, it found that Jasper's pattern of violating court orders and withholding Christmas visitation was the change of circumstances that justified revisiting custody. The court then went through each factor the law requires for deciding a child's best interest and concluded that primary physical custody with Carlos served the children's best interest. Because this required the children to move from Virginia back to Nevada, the court also applied the relocation rules and found relocation was warranted. On appeal, Jasper raised four arguments. The appeals court rejected all of them. It held that Jasper had waived the challenge to the temporary order by not objecting to it below, and that Jasper had treated that order as valid anyway. It held that the orders Jasper violated were not void or unenforceable. It held that the district court did not change custody merely to punish Jasper, because the court properly analyzed the required best-interest factors and found several that favored Carlos for reasons unrelated to the order violations. And it held that Jasper had not shown the court was biased against Jasper's transgender status, noting that the statements Jasper pointed to were made by Carlos, not the judge, and that a judge's rulings alone almost never prove bias. The court affirmed the custody modification. The court also declined Carlos's request to sanction Jasper, finding the appeal as a whole was not frivolous.