Nevada family-law case summaries

Guido and M. Elizabeth Lucini divorced after an 11-year marriage. The main property at issue was Guido's ownership interest in Lucini & Associates, a closely held corporation. When the couple married in 1966, Guido was president and majority (51 percent) stockholder; throughout the marriage he and the other stockholders drew salaries, and excess profits were distributed to shareholders each year. Over the marriage, Guido's ownership fell from 51 percent to about 30 percent as new members joined. After the divorce was granted, the district court divided the property, and Elizabeth appealed on two points: (1) that the court wrongly used the "Van Camp" accounting method to divide the marital property, and (2) that the court should have found the couple's assets were so commingled that Guido's separate property became community property. The Nevada Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. On the first point, the court explained that when one spouse contributes time, labor, and skill to producing income from separate property, Nevada courts apportion between community and separate estates using one of two California-derived methods: "Pereira" (generally preferred) or "Van Camp." The Van Camp method is appropriate where the community was fully compensated for the spouse's labor through salary and related benefits. Because the record supported the trial court's finding that Guido received full value in salary, profit distributions, and fringe benefits, using the Van Camp method was not an abuse of discretion. On the second point, the court acknowledged that all property acquired after marriage is presumed community, and that this presumption grows stronger when separate property is extensively mixed with community property. But here, accountants for both sides had traced the funds year by year through a separate account and a joint account. Even though some funds were unaccounted for, there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the community and separate income and expenditures were traceable - so the separate property was not transmuted into community property. The judgment was affirmed. (Guido died during the appeal, and a suggestion of death was filed.)

The Occhiutos divorced in February 1977. Their divorce decree included a property settlement agreement that divided several parcels of real estate and some personal property, and to carry it out the husband signed quitclaim deeds handing certain property to the wife. A few months after the divorce, the couple got back together, moved back in with each other, and held themselves out as husband and wife - but they never actually remarried. They lived together until May 1979. In June 1979 the husband asked the court to change the 1977 decree's division of community property. That request was denied in July 1979, and he did not appeal. Then, in September 1979, he filed a brand-new lawsuit with four claims. The wife asked the court to throw it out, arguing it was barred because the same issues had already been decided, because he had missed a six-month deadline in the court rules for reopening a judgment, and because he had not properly alleged fraud. In October 1979 the trial court dismissed his whole complaint 'with prejudice' (meaning he could not refile it) without giving any reason. The Nevada Supreme Court split the difference. It held that the trial judge was allowed to look at the earlier divorce file (take 'judicial notice' of it) because the two cases were so closely related. But it ruled that dismissing the husband's first two claims - which were built on an allegation of fraud - was a mistake. Under Nevada law, the usual six-month deadline does not apply when a party alleges the kind of fraud that kept him from fairly presenting his case, and even if he had not described the fraud in enough detail, that is not a reason to dismiss a case permanently. So the court sent those two claims back and told the trial judge to give the husband a chance to rewrite them with more specifics. The husband's other two claims did not survive. The heart of those claims was his assertion that the wife had orally promised that if they ever separated again, she would give back half of her real property. Nevada law does not allow an interest in land to be created by a spoken promise - it has to be in a signed writing - so those claims could not succeed, and their dismissal was upheld.

Steven and Geraldine Applebaum had a complicated history: they divorced in 1972, remarried in 1973, and divorced again in 1976. In a 1977 decision, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the validity of their 1972 property settlement agreement and confirmed that Geraldine had excused Steven from making the payments due under that agreement during their second marriage. The 1976 decree ordered Steven to pay Geraldine the $9,000 due under the 1972 agreement "forthwith." This appeal was from a February 1978 order that reduced the arrearages (past-due amounts) to a judgment - $9,000 plus interest and $500 in attorney's fees. Steven argued the order was error because, at that time, the full amount had not yet come due. At oral argument, Steven's lawyer admitted that the entire amount was now due and owing to Geraldine. Because of that admission, the court did not need to decide the original question - courts do not issue advisory opinions on moot or abstract questions, only actual controversies. The court therefore affirmed the judgment for arrearages and interest through February 13, 1978. However, the court reversed the part of the order that had reduced to judgment amounts that were not yet due as of February 13, 1978. On remand, the district court was to recompute and award interest, according to the payment schedule in the 1972 agreement (payments of $1,000 due every fourth month), on the balance still owed but unpaid.

Louis and Susan Levy married in 1968 and separated in 1976. Louis filed for divorce, but shortly before trial the couple tried to reconcile, so the trial was called off - though the divorce case was not dismissed. During this period their lawyers negotiated a written settlement agreement covering property, support, and custody of their four children, and both spouses signed it. Louis later left again and filed an updated complaint relying on the agreement. Susan argued the agreement had been undone because the couple had reconciled and resumed living together (a concept called 'condonation'). The trial court granted the divorce and ruled the settlement agreement was valid. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in every respect. It held there was solid evidence supporting the trial court's findings that no condonation occurred and that both spouses signed the agreement freely and voluntarily, without fraud or coercion, on the advice of their own attorneys - so those findings would not be disturbed. The court refused to consider several new arguments Susan raised for the first time on appeal, because a point not raised in the trial court is generally waived. It upheld the trial court's rulings that one property (the Owl Motel) was Louis's separate property under the agreement, and that two other properties (the Rancho Reno Motel and a duplex), held in joint tenancy and acquired with both spouses' participation, were owned by each spouse in undivided separate shares. Finally, it held that awarding attorney's fees in a divorce is discretionary, not automatic, so the denial of Susan's fee request was proper.

Jerome and Frances Kramer went through a divorce, attempted a reconciliation (exchanging quitclaim deeds on two properties), and then divorced for good. A divorce decree in July 1975 gave each spouse one property; a modified decree in January 1976 instead made both properties community, owned equally as tenants in common. More than three years later, in March 1979, Frances filed a motion to modify the 1976 decree, claiming intrinsic fraud. Jerome failed to file a timely opposition, and the trial court treated that as a waiver and awarded Jerome's interest in one property to Frances. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court had no power (jurisdiction) to modify the property division so long after the decree. A divorce decree can only be changed as allowed by rule or statute. The statute governing property rights allowed later modification only by the parties' written stipulation; it did not give courts continuing jurisdiction over property rights - unlike the separate statute that gives courts continuing jurisdiction over child custody and support. Absent that authority, the general rule (NRCP 60(b)) applied, which required any such motion to be filed within six months. Because Frances filed three years late, the court lacked jurisdiction, and Jerome's failure to timely oppose could not create jurisdiction that was substantively missing.

Leola and William Haws married in 1939 and lived in California for many years. In 1971 Leola wrote William a letter proposing how to divide their community property, telling him he could keep all of his United Airlines pension. They separated in 1973, and William moved to Nevada. Both spouses then filed for divorce at nearly the same time in different states. Leola filed in California and had William personally served there; he chose not to participate. William filed in Nevada and had Leola served; she did not participate in Nevada. The California court entered a full divorce judgment in 1976 that ordered spousal support and split the community property evenly - the California judge did not know about the 1971 letter. Meanwhile, William obtained a default divorce in Nevada that did not divide property or set support. Leola moved to set aside the Nevada divorce, and the parties agreed to let the Nevada court hold a hearing on property and support. The Nevada judge then divided the property according to the 1971 letter (giving William his entire pension), awarded Leola some back temporary support and attorney's fees, and denied permanent alimony. Leola appealed, arguing the Nevada court should have honored the earlier California judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and reversed. It held that the California divorce judgment, entered by a court with power over both spouses, was a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada (except as to marital status), and that California's rules on finality barred relitigating the property division that California had already decided. William's argument that the California judgment was obtained by fraud (because Leola never told the California court about the 1971 letter) failed, because that kind of fraud is 'intrinsic' - William was the person who received the letter, was served, and could have shown up and presented it, but chose not to appear or appeal. The court also noted that California law governed the property division and that under California law each spouse's earnings after separation are that spouse's separate property. It sent the case back with instructions to give the California judgment full faith and credit.

Ronald and Leona Brown divorced in Idaho in 1958. Leona got custody of their child, and Ronald was ordered to pay $60 a month in child support until the child grew up. He made no payments until 1968, when he began paying under a Nevada order that grew out of an interstate support case; he then paid correctly until the child reached adulthood in 1974. In 1977, Leona went back to the Idaho court and got a judgment against Ronald for $6,840 in claimed back child support - but she did this without giving Ronald any notice, so he had no chance to show up and defend. She then sued in Nevada to collect on that Idaho judgment, and the Nevada court gave her summary judgment, treating the Idaho judgment as one Nevada had to honor under the U.S. Constitution's 'full faith and credit' rule. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that a state must honor another state's judgment only if the other state's court had proper power over the person, which requires that the person got notice and a chance to be heard. Because Ronald received no notice before Idaho turned the claimed arrears into a lump-sum judgment, he was never able to raise defenses he might have had - such as that some of the claimed arrears were too old under a statute of limitations. The court relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case with very similar facts and held that a judgment entered without notice is not entitled to full faith and credit. It sent the case back so the Nevada court could let Leona proceed under the valid 1958 decree and let Ronald raise whatever defenses were available to him.

When the Roggens moved to Nevada, they bought a condominium that was put in Mrs. Roggen's name alone. She later filed for divorce, claiming the condominium was her own separate property and asking the court to divide the couple's community property. The trial court agreed the condominium was her separate property and valued the parties' businesses at about $334,641. Mr. Roggen appealed both rulings, arguing the condominium should be treated as community property and that the business valuation relied on outdated records and ignored a declining market. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. On the condominium, it explained that property bought during a marriage is presumed to be community property, and it takes clear and certain proof to overcome that presumption. Here there was such proof: Mr. Roggen had told his housekeeper and a former business associate that he had given the condominium to his wife as a gift, and his own handwritten note to her, plus the fact that title was in her name only, backed that up. Whether the evidence was clear enough to prove a gift was for the trial court to decide, and there was substantial evidence supporting its decision. On the business valuation, the court held that Mr. Roggen's complaints came too late - he could have presented the evidence he now wanted to offer at trial. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's valuation, and it is not an appellate court's job to tell the trial judge which witnesses or which parts of their testimony to believe. The judgment was affirmed.

Diana and John Renshaw divorced in 1977. As part of the divorce, they signed a written agreement giving Diana custody of their three children and requiring John to pay a single fixed monthly sum - combining alimony and child support - for a set number of years, ending in March 1982. The combined sum was structured that way on purpose so John could get certain tax benefits. The agreement said it was 'integrated' and that its support terms could not be changed by any court, only by a later written agreement of the parties. A few months later, the couple's 16-year-old daughter moved in with John, so John cut his monthly payments to Diana by 25%, reasoning that Diana no longer had to support that daughter. Diana sued him for breach of contract to recover the money he withheld. She won: the trial court ordered John to pay the $1,762.50 he had deducted, plus $1,000 in attorney's fees. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Because the settlement agreement was never incorporated into or merged with the divorce decree, Diana's claim was a straightforward breach-of-contract case. The court rejected John's theory that Diana had a legal duty to keep supporting a child who had moved out. It emphasized that the parties clearly intended a complete, integrated agreement, and when a contract is clear on its face the court enforces it as written. The agreement - drafted by John, an experienced attorney - contained no provision allowing modification or for changed circumstances, and gave him no right to unilaterally stop paying. The court affirmed, adding 12% interest, another $1,500 in appellate attorney's fees, and costs.

The Burrs divorced in two steps: the trial court entered a decree ending the marriage in November 1977 but reserved (put off) decisions about the community property and visitation. In June 1978 it entered a 'final' decree that divided the property, valued the couple's house at $59,000 with the wife's equity at $22,000, ordered the husband to provide health insurance for their child, and told each spouse to pay their own attorney's fees. The wife, Carolyn, appealed two things: being told to pay her own attorney's fees, and the house's value. The husband, Clarence, appealed the requirement that he carry health insurance for the child. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected all of these challenges and affirmed. On the house value, Carolyn tried, in a motion for a new trial, to introduce new evidence that the house was actually worth about $70,000. The court said this was too late - she could have brought that evidence forward before the decision by asking to reopen the case. On attorney's fees, the court explained that whether to award fees in a divorce is left to the trial judge's discretion and will not be second-guessed without a showing of abuse, and that the cases Carolyn cited requiring the judge to explain a fee denial came from a different statute that did not apply. On Clarence's complaint, the court held that a trial judge is allowed to make further orders about the care and support of a minor child while the case is still pending, so adding the health-insurance requirement was proper. The court also denied Clarence's request for fees for the appeal, finding the appeal was not frivolous.

About three years after the McCarrolls' divorce became final, the former wife filed a new lawsuit. Their divorce had approved an oral agreement dividing the community property, but that agreement said nothing about the former husband's U.S. Forest Service retirement pension, and the pension was never mentioned during the divorce. The former wife now claimed the husband had fraudulently hidden the pension, and she asked the court to declare it a community asset and give her a share. The trial court granted summary judgment for the former husband, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The key point was the difference between two kinds of fraud. 'Extrinsic' fraud - the kind that prevents a person from fairly presenting their case - can justify reopening an old judgment. 'Intrinsic' fraud cannot. Here, the court found that any fraud was only intrinsic, because the former wife had a fair opportunity during the divorce to raise the very claim about the pension that she was now trying to make. Because of that, the court rule that limits reopening old judgments barred her lawsuit, and the summary judgment for the husband was upheld.

William and Helen Wisman divorced in 1974. Their divorce decree ordered William to pay Helen $1,000 a month in alimony until she remarried, died, 'or until further order of this Court.' In 1977 William asked the court to reduce the alimony. The district court refused even to consider the request, ruling that it had no power to change the alimony because it had not expressly said, at the time of the divorce, that it was keeping the authority to do so. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the law in effect in 1974, a court could not modify future alimony payments unless it had expressly reserved the power to do so at the final hearing. The question was whether the decree's phrase 'until further order of this Court' counted as reserving that power. The Supreme Court held that it did. Relying on an earlier decision, the court explained that when a trial court reserves the right to make further orders about alimony, it has ample authority to modify its decree upon a proper showing. Because the decree conditioned the alimony 'until further order,' the court had kept the power to modify it. The refusal to hear William's motion was reversed, and the case was sent back for further proceedings.

In this divorce case the trial court dissolved the marriage and made related orders. The wife, Manguben Patel, appealed, making three arguments: that the Nevada court had no power to grant the divorce, that the child-support amount was set improperly, and that the grounds for divorce were never proved. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected all three and affirmed. On the court's power, the wife argued the husband had not met Nevada's residency requirement (living in the state six weeks before filing). The court explained that where a person actually resides is a question of fact for the trial judge, and there was solid evidence supporting the finding that the husband was a genuine Nevada resident. On child support, the court had ordered the husband to pay $75 per month for each of the two children. Nevada law gives trial judges broad discretion over child support, and their decisions are not disturbed unless there is a clear abuse. The court found no abuse: the trial judge had reviewed detailed documentation of the husband's finances and had taken into account that the children were covered by the husband's medical and hospitalization insurance. Finally, the court easily rejected the claim that the grounds (incompatibility) were not proved, noting the record was full of evidence of incompatibility. The judgment was affirmed.

The former wife filed a lawsuit seeking to set aside her divorce decree and the property settlement agreement that went with it, claiming they were the product of 'extrinsic fraud' - fraud that keeps a person from knowing or presenting their rights and defenses. The trial court granted summary judgment against her, effectively deciding there was nothing to try. She appealed, arguing that important facts were genuinely in dispute. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with her and reversed. In reviewing a summary judgment, a court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the person who lost below. Viewed that way, the record showed that her former husband had threatened to physically harm her, to spread malicious rumors about her, and to send an adopted child back to its natural parents, and that, giving in to this pressure, she went along with the property settlement terms and even the choice of lawyer that he dictated. The court distinguished two earlier decisions the husband relied on, noting that both of those rested on the fact that the complaining spouse had free access to an attorney of her own choosing - which was exactly what was disputed here. Because her allegations, backed by a sworn complaint and affidavit, were enough to support a claim of extrinsic fraud, the case was reversed and sent back for a trial.

Janet and Richard Arnold both sought permanent custody of their two-year-old child after their divorce. The district court first gave the father temporary custody, then, after a full hearing and a detailed report from the Child Custody Division, awarded him permanent custody. The judge acknowledged it was a close call and that both parents loved the child and neither was unfit, but found the child was thriving in the father's home while the mother had admitted that emotional and financial problems from the breakup had at times harmed her relationship with the child. The mother appealed, arguing the judge abused his discretion and that the old "tender years" rule - a presumption that a young child should go to the mother unless she is unfit - required giving custody to her. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court held that the judge had carefully weighed all the facts to serve the child's best interest, which is not an abuse of discretion. Most significantly, the court used this case to abolish the "tender years" doctrine in Nevada. It expressly overruled its earlier decision in Peavey v. Peavey, explaining that a preference for one parent based only on the parent's sex is nothing more than a culturally enforced bias and has no place in custody law. The court noted the Legislature had just amended the statute to bar any custody preference given solely because a parent is the mother or father. The touchstone in every case is the best interest of the child, decided on the particular facts.

Roger and Glenda Hildahl divorced under a decree that incorporated their settlement agreement. Glenda had custody of the three children, and Roger owed a fixed monthly payment for the support of Glenda and the children, plus he was to convey the family home to her. When their son Mark moved into Roger's home for the summer, Roger unilaterally cut his monthly payments for June, July, and August, reasoning he was now supporting Mark. He also delayed transferring the home. Glenda went to court for a judgment for the amounts Roger held back and asked that he be held in contempt. The district court ruled for Glenda, entered judgment for the arrearages, and held Roger in contempt (with a suspended two-day jail sentence conditioned on paying up). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that support payments, once they come due, become vested rights that cannot be retroactively reduced or erased. A parent cannot simply decide on his own to reduce court-ordered payments. Roger claimed he had actually taken custody of Mark with Glenda's consent, but there was no real evidence of that - filing for arrearages showed Glenda had not consented. The court refused to allow an "equitable setoff" for what Roger spent on Mark, because there was neither a genuine agreement to change custody nor a compelling emergency that forced a change before court approval could be sought. Finally, the court upheld the contempt finding as a proper, coercive tool to enforce the decree.

When the Watsons divorced in 1970, they signed a property settlement agreement that the court ordered would survive as its own independent contract rather than merge into the divorce judgment. The agreement said the husband would pay the wife $600 per month "until her death or remarriage." He paid until June 1976, then stopped. When she sued for the unpaid amounts, he argued he no longer had to pay because she had "remarried" - by which he meant she was living with another man without being married. The district court found the cohabitation had gone on for years but ruled it was not a defense, and the Nevada Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. The court held that living with someone outside of marriage is not a "remarriage," especially in Nevada, which does not recognize common-law marriage. The word "remarriage" is clear and unambiguous, and a court cannot twist the plain meaning of an agreement under the guise of interpreting it. The husband therefore still owed the payments.

When Alice and Melvin Harris divorced in 1975, Melvin denied that he was the father of Alice's child. Blood tests did not exclude him, and the divorce court adjudged him the father, ordering him to pay child support and provide medical and dental care. He did not appeal. About a year later he asked to reduce the support (denied), and two years after the decree he asked the court to modify the decree on the ground that the child was not his natural child. The district court agreed, declared the child was not Melvin's, and set aside all prior support and custody orders. Alice appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the paternity question had already been litigated and decided in the 1975 divorce, so it could not be reopened - the doctrine of res judicata (and collateral estoppel) barred relitigating it. The statute that lets courts modify support and custody after a divorce exists to address changes in circumstances affecting the children of the parties; it cannot be used as a backdoor to attack the parties' status by relitigating paternity. The court noted that Melvin's earlier request to reduce support looked more like acceptance of parenthood than a denial of it.

Mary and William McInnis divorced after eight years. Mary got custody of their two young children and $150 per month in child support. The decree provided that, for a period, the support would be "deemed made" out of Mary's share of the proceeds of a promissory note (community property awarded to her), after which William would resume paying directly. A year later, Mary asked the court to increase the support; the district court denied her motion in all respects, and she appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that modifying child support is within the district court's discretion, guided by factors like the adequacy of the original award, the father's ability to pay more, and any real change in circumstances. Here there was no abuse of discretion: Mary's own income had nearly doubled, her claimed expenses were actually lower than at the time of the divorce, and the only evidence of the father's income showed a decrease. The court also rejected Mary's argument that the note-proceeds arrangement improperly relieved the father of his support duty - the decree did not eliminate his obligation, it just specified a method of payment tied to community property that had been awarded to her. Finally, the denial of her request for attorney's fees was upheld.

When the Bongiovis divorced in 1971, the decree required the husband to pay the wife $1,000 per month, starting July 1, 1971, until $10,000 had been paid, as a partial settlement of her alimony and community property rights. He never paid. In late 1977, the wife asked the court to convert the unpaid amount into a money judgment. The district court gave her judgment for $5,000 but ruled that the rest was barred by Nevada's six-year statute of limitations. The husband appealed, arguing the entire $10,000 was time-barred. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that argument. It held that the six-year limitations period runs separately against each installment as it comes due, not from the date of the divorce decree, so only the older installments were barred. The court also rejected the husband's claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of a pending appeal, holding the arrearage matter was entirely collateral to and independent of the issues on appeal. Finding no reversible error, the court dismissed the appeal.

Sybil Page Warren and the man she sued were entertainers who met in Hong Kong in 1963, became romantically involved, and traveled and lived together around the world for about eight and a half years without ever marrying. When the relationship ended, Sybil sued to recover half of his assets. She claimed the two of them had agreed to pool their money and that she was entitled to property rights as a kind of unmarried spouse or business partner, relying on causes of action for constructive trust, resulting trust, meretricious/common law/putative spouse rights, partnership, joint venture, and contract. Her main argument leaned on the then-recent California decision Marvin v. Marvin, which allowed unmarried partners to enforce agreements to share property. But there was a key difference: the evidence about the couple's finances was contradictory. She said they agreed to pool their resources; he said she was simply a salaried employee and there was no agreement to combine funds. The trial court believed him, finding that the parties never held themselves out as married, never agreed to pool income, kept separate bank accounts and investments, and never formed a partnership or joint venture. Sybil raised twenty issues on appeal, but the Nevada Supreme Court declined to consider most of them because she cited no relevant legal authority to support her claims of error. On the two issues it did address, the court affirmed. First, because the financial evidence was genuinely in conflict, and because the trial judge - as the person who heard the witnesses - is the sole judge of credibility, the Supreme Court would not second-guess the finding that there was no agreement to pool funds or form a partnership. Even assuming Marvin's approach applied, her theory depended on the trial court accepting her version of the facts, and it did not. Second, the court found no error in the trial judge allowing the other side extra time to answer requests for admissions after his attorney had withdrawn; trial courts have discretion to extend that deadline, she showed no abuse of that discretion, and she could not show she was prejudiced because she had more than a month before the bulk of the trial to prepare her proof and simply failed to prove her claims. The judgment was affirmed.

Evelyn and Paul Smith married in 1951. Paul went to work for the Ideal Supply Company and eventually became its sole owner - largely because the prior owner's widow left her controlling stock to Paul alone by will, and the remaining stock was retired. When they divorced, Evelyn challenged the property division, the amount of alimony, and the attorney's fees, arguing the Ideal stock should be treated as community property or at least partly hers. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court. It held that stock acquired by bequest is separate property under Nevada's community property statute, and it rejected Evelyn's theory that a bequest made to reward services should be treated differently - she had not proved the widow's motive, and property acquired by inheritance is separate regardless. The court also rejected her claim that she was entitled to a share because Paul kept working at the company after he became owner: to get an apportionment, she had to prove that Paul's own labor and skill caused the increase in the business's value, but the evidence showed he worked less than eight hours a week, had turned over daily management years earlier, and that growth was mainly due to the booming Clark County economy. So the rents, issues, and profits stayed separate property too. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the $1,000 per month alimony award (with cost-of-living increases) or in the denial of the $18,000 attorney fee request.

A wife appealed the parts of a divorce decree that divided the couple's property. While that appeal was pending, she discovered what she said was a substantial amount of community property that existed at the time of the divorce but had not been included in the court's division. She asked the Nevada Supreme Court to send the case back down (remand) so she could file motions in the district court for relief from the judgment (NRCP 60(b)) and for a new trial (NRCP 59(a)). The Supreme Court denied the motion to remand, but explained the correct procedure. Because jurisdiction over the case rests with the Supreme Court while an appeal is pending, the district court cannot grant a new trial or relief from judgment on its own. The proper approach, borrowed from federal practice and the court's own criminal decisions, is for the party to file the motions in the district court; if that court indicates it is inclined to grant relief, it certifies that to the Supreme Court, and only then is a request for remand appropriate. So the wife did not need the Supreme Court's permission to file - she should file in the district court first.

In this divorce, the district court first entered a partial decree in January 1976 that ended the marriage but expressly reserved the questions of property division and alimony for later. A supplemental decree resolving those issues followed in May 1976. The husband appealed several parts of the final result. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the rulings but reversed one. On the husband's retirement plan, the court upheld awarding the wife a half-interest in the benefits that accrued up to the May supplemental decree, explaining that the January decree was only interlocutory (not final) because it reserved the property questions, so the community continued to have an interest in the retirement benefits until the final decree. On alimony, the court affirmed the $750 per month award, noting substantial evidence that the wife could not work because of a chronic bowel disease and would lose the husband's medical coverage. It also affirmed the $3,000 attorney fee award, reiterating that a spouse need not be in necessitous circumstances to receive fees. And it upheld the order requiring the husband to pay "all outstanding debts," finding the record made the obligation sufficiently certain. The one reversal concerned two old community-property cars the court had awarded to the parties' two adult daughters. The Supreme Court held this was error: the statutory power to dispose of community property for the benefit of children does not extend to children who have reached the age of majority. That part was reversed and remanded for redistribution of the two vehicles.

After a district court granted a divorce, divided the couple's community property, and denied attorney's fees, the wife, Charlotte Woodruff, appealed. She raised four complaints, and the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with her on only one - but that one required sending part of the case back. First, Charlotte argued the court had no power to grant the divorce because her husband did not really meet Nevada's six-week residency requirement. The Supreme Court explained that residency in a divorce case is a question of fact for the trial judge, and here there was substantial evidence supporting the finding that the husband was a bona fide Nevada resident, so that finding stood. Second, she said the judge wrongly refused to postpone the trial. The court held she could not challenge that ruling because she had not filed the affidavit that the rules require to support a request for a continuance. Third, she challenged how the property was split and the refusal to award her attorney's fees. The Supreme Court found the property division fair and equitable and saw no abuse of discretion in ordering each side to pay its own costs. Fourth, and the winning point, she argued the trial court wrongly refused to let her put on evidence to support an award of alimony. The trial judge had believed that alimony must be specifically requested in the pleadings and treated her request to amend as too late. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that alimony does not have to be specially pleaded - unlike attorney's fees, which the statute says must be sought by motion or placed in issue by the pleadings, the alimony statute simply gives the court authority to award alimony 'in granting a divorce.' Alimony is considered incidental to the divorce itself. Because the court wrongly excluded the alimony evidence, that part of the case was sent back for further proceedings, though whether to actually award alimony remains within the trial court's discretion.

In a proceeding to modify a divorce decree, the district court awarded custody of the parties' two minor children to the father. The father also asked the court to order the mother to help pay for the children's support, but the court refused to even consider that request, finding no special circumstances that would justify it. The father appealed, arguing that as a matter of law a mother must contribute to her children's support whenever the children are not in her custody. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court found no legal authority supporting the father's claim that such a contribution is mandatory. Instead, it explained that ordering child support is a matter left to the trial court's discretion under the child support statute. A trial court's decision about child support will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion. Reviewing the record, the Supreme Court saw no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that no special circumstances had been shown that would justify ordering the mother to contribute. The judgment was affirmed.

This was the second time these divorced parties, Robert and Patricia Johnson, brought their dispute to the Nevada Supreme Court. Robert had fallen far behind on his alimony and child-support payments. In a May 1976 order dealing mainly with those arrearages, the district court also set aside - undid - Robert's transfer of his Las Vegas residence to his current wife, Renee, effectively ordering the house returned so it could be reached to satisfy the debt. Robert appealed, arguing the order could not stand because Renee, the person who received the house, was an 'indispensable party' who had to be included in the lawsuit before a court could take the property back from her, and she never was. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and reversed. The court first knocked down Patricia's procedural objections. It held that the failure to join an indispensable party can be raised by the appellate court on its own, and also by a party (like Robert) who might otherwise face inconsistent or double liability; and that this objection is not waived just because it was not raised at trial. It also rejected Patricia's argument that, because the transcript of the final day of the hearing was missing, the court had to assume the trial judge acted properly. That assumption is not automatic; here the existing record - the pleadings, Patricia's own motion admitting Renee was the transferee, the first two days of testimony, and the trial court's own order - was enough to show Renee received the house and was never made a party. On the merits, the court held that a person who received a conveyance is an indispensable party in an action to set that conveyance aside; ordering the property reconveyed without her would take property from one person and give it to another without a hearing, and would let her force the whole issue to be relitigated. Because Renee was indispensable and was never joined, the order setting aside the conveyance was vacated and the matter sent back.

When this couple divorced, they entered a property settlement agreement, approved by the court, requiring the husband to pay the wife alimony in monthly installments for ten years, or until she died or remarried. The agreement also said that if the wife lived with (cohabited with) another man, the alimony payments would stop. The husband stopped paying, claiming the wife was in fact living with another man. The wife then sued to enforce the agreement and get her payments. After hearing the evidence, the district judge sided with the husband, finding that the wife had indeed cohabited with another man as the husband alleged. The only question on appeal was whether there was enough evidence to support the trial judge's finding of cohabitation. The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded the finding was amply supported by substantial evidence. Because a trial court's factual finding that rests on substantial evidence cannot be overturned on appeal, the court affirmed.

When Douglas and Janet Gorden divorced, the trial judge granted the divorce and divided their property, but wrote only that the various items 'might be classified as either community property, joint tenancy property or separate property' and should be equitably divided. Douglas complained that because the judge never spelled out exactly which items were separate, community, or joint tenancy, he was denied a fair chance to appeal. The couple owned a residence (which Janet had brought from a prior marriage and kept in her name), a lot in Fallon, a nine-acre parcel by the river, two secured promissory notes, small bank accounts, cars, and other personal property. Douglas had used money from an inheritance - his separate property - to remodel the residence and to buy the other real estate and notes, most of which were placed in joint tenancy. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that when a trial court does not make express findings, the Supreme Court will imply the findings needed to support the judgment if the evidence clearly supports it. Two long-standing presumptions controlled. First, when a spouse uses separate funds to buy property titled in both spouses' names as joint tenants, the law presumes he intended to make a gift of half its value, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. The record did not clearly rebut it. Second, when a spouse spends separate funds to improve the other spouse's separate property (here, the residence), the law presumes he intended to benefit that property; again, nothing rebutted it, so Douglas could not claim reimbursement for the improvements. The court also upheld a $2,100 payment the judge ordered Douglas to make to Janet, which the decree expressly called a further division of property rather than alimony - a court may use one spouse's separate property to make an equitable adjustment of the parties' property. Douglas also challenged the constitutionality of the alimony statute, but because the court had denied alimony, that question could not be reached. Affirmed.

After the district court dissolved the marriage of Roberta and her husband and divided their community property, Roberta appealed, raising three problems. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with her on only one part of the property division and otherwise affirmed. First, Roberta said the trial court wrongly refused to force her husband to answer written questions (interrogatories) before trial. The Supreme Court rejected this because, at a hearing, the parties had agreed that answering the interrogatories would be unnecessary if the husband testified that he had already disclosed all of his property in an earlier deposition. He did testify to that at trial, satisfying the deal, so Roberta could not complain of error. Second, she argued the court improperly admitted certain evidence. The court rejected this too, because she never showed she was harmed by that evidence, and under Nevada law an evidence ruling cannot be reversed unless it affects a substantial right of the party. Third, she challenged the property division itself, and here she partly succeeded. The court agreed that part of the distribution was wrong: the family residence had been classified as community property even though it was actually just being held for the benefit of a third party, and the court had also failed to classify or distribute two insurance policies. Apart from those items, the division was equitable and showed no abuse of discretion. So the judgment was affirmed except for the parts dealing with the residence and the insurance policies, which were reversed and sent back for further proceedings.

Geraldine and Steven Applebaum married in 1968, divorced in 1972, remarried in 1973, and sought to end the second marriage in 1975. In the first divorce, the court had approved a property settlement agreement giving Geraldine $15,000 paid in quarterly installments. When the second marriage broke down, Geraldine tried to have that earlier property settlement declared void, claiming Steven had tricked her into signing it. She argued Steven - who was 16 years older and more experienced in business - was in a position of trust, had stayed in the family home during the first divorce, and had misrepresented the size of the community estate, which she said was worth about $1.2 million, making the $15,000 settlement grossly unfair. The district court rejected the fraud claim and upheld the agreement, granted Steven a divorce, awarded Geraldine $12,000 for her share of the community property from the second marriage, and denied her alimony. Steven's request for attorney's fees was denied, and he cross-appealed that. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed everything. On fraud, it compared her situation to earlier cases where genuine extrinsic fraud existed (a spouse secretly filing before establishing residency, or repudiating a custody promise) and found nothing comparable here. Steven submitted to the court exactly the agreement Geraldine had signed, without altering its terms. That he drafted it and was older and more business-savvy did not make it fraudulent, and his continued residence in the home created no fiduciary duty once he had announced he wanted a divorce - at that point Geraldine was on notice their interests were adverse. She had also been told to hire her own lawyer at Steven's expense, and did consult one. The court rejected her argument that the judge should have separately valued and divided the increase in Steven's separate-property business during the first marriage; that apportionment rule applies only when a court must itself divide community property, not when the parties have agreed on a division. On alimony, the denial was within the court's discretion and supported by evidence that Geraldine had adequate resources to support herself; the cases she cited on temporary alimony were distinguishable. Finally, denying Steven attorney's fees was proper because he was financially secure and able to pay his own.

When Irwin and Ellen Kishner divorced in 1974, the decree ordered Irwin to pay Ellen 'lump sum alimony' of $86,100.64 spread over eleven years in monthly installments (large payments for the first two years, smaller ones for the next eight, and a final $100 payment in 1985). Neither party appealed that decree. A few months later, Ellen remarried and asked the court to clarify what her remarriage did to Irwin's obligation. There is a Nevada statute (NRS 125.150(4)) saying that when the recipient spouse remarries, all alimony awarded by the decree ceases unless the court has 'otherwise ordered.' The district court decided the alimony provision was ambiguous and ruled that the payments were meant to continue regardless of remarriage. Irwin appealed, arguing that the provision was actually clear, so the court had no power to 'clarify' it, and that the remarriage statute automatically ended his obligation. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed the statute first and held that NRS 125.150(4) does not apply to lump sum alimony (also called alimony in gross). The whole purpose of a lump sum award, whether paid all at once or in installments, is to fix the parties' rights and obligations finally and completely - it creates a vested right. Applying the remarriage-termination rule to such an award would undermine that purpose, and nothing in the statute clearly required that result. So Irwin's obligation was not terminated by Ellen's remarriage. Having decided that, the court turned to the procedural point. A court has inherent power to construe its own judgments to remove ambiguity, but not to rewrite unambiguous ones. Because the remarriage statute simply did not apply to this lump sum award, the decree was in fact not ambiguous and needed no clarification. The court therefore vacated the district court's clarification order but affirmed the original divorce decree - meaning Irwin still owed the full lump sum.

Howard McKissick, Jr., divorced his first wife, Barbara, in 1964. Their property settlement agreement said Howard would keep a life insurance policy - described as a $50,000 Equitable policy - with Barbara as the irrevocable beneficiary, mainly to secure the future support and education of their four children. In fact, no such $50,000 Equitable policy existed; Howard actually had three policies totaling $40,000. Howard later remarried (to Dorothy), changed the beneficiary on his policies to Dorothy, and died in an accident in 1973 without a will. Accidental-death benefits raised the policies to $112,848.59, which Dorothy collected. Howard and Dorothy had also bought a $385,000 bank certificate of deposit titled to 'Howard F. McKissick, Jr., and/or Dorothy McKissick.' Barbara and the children sued Dorothy (who was also administratrix of Howard's estate). They won a judgment for accrued child support, which nobody appealed. The trial court also imposed a 'constructive trust' on the life insurance for the children's benefit but capped it at $50,000, and ruled the $385,000 CD passed to Dorothy automatically as a joint tenant. Both sides appealed the trust and the CD rulings. The Nevada Supreme Court made two key changes. First, on the life insurance, it held the constructive trust should NOT be capped at $50,000. The $50,000 figure was just part of the mistaken description of a nonexistent policy; what Howard clearly intended was to secure his children's support with the life insurance he actually had. By naming Dorothy instead of Barbara as beneficiary, Howard violated the agreement, so Dorothy holds all the proceeds - the full $112,848.59, including the accidental-death increase - in constructive trust for Barbara and the children. Second, on the certificate of deposit, the court held the words 'and/or' did NOT create a joint tenancy. Under Nevada law, a joint tenancy in personal property must be created by a written transfer, agreement, or instrument, and 'and/or' is not enough; oral testimony of Dorothy's intent could not cure the defect, and the fact that the money came from previously jointly held real estate did not help (that joint tenancy ended when the real estate was sold). Instead, the CD was presumptively community property, having been acquired during the marriage. Because Howard died intestate, the CD passes to Dorothy as surviving spouse, but one-half of it is subject to administration and creditors' claims. The case was sent back for entry of judgment accordingly.

When Joseph and Joan Norris divorced in 1972, the court ordered Joseph to pay $200 a month to support each of their two children 'until said children respectively reach the age of majority or are otherwise emancipated.' At that time, Nevada law set the age of majority for males at 21. In 1973, the legislature changed the age of majority to 18 for everyone. In 1975, when the parties' son turned 18, Joseph stopped paying support for him. Joan asked the court to make Joseph keep paying or provide money for the son's college education, and also sought attorney's fees. The district judge ruled that once the son reached the new age of majority (18), he was no longer entitled to support, and that the court had no jurisdiction to order the relief Joan wanted. The judge also denied attorney's fees. Joan appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Joan relied on an earlier case, Bingham v. Bingham, where the court had held that lowering the age of majority did not cut off a father's duty to support until 21. But the Supreme Court distinguished that case: in Bingham, the support obligation had been fixed by the parties' agreement (later merged into the decree), showing the parties intended support to continue to age 21. Here, there was no agreement; the support duty came only from the decree, so there was no expression of the parties' intent to extend it. The court's power to order child support is limited to the child's minority, and once the statute lowered majority to 18, the son was no longer a minor. The court also explained that a child's right to a support payment does not become a vested (locked-in) right until each payment actually comes due. Payments that had already accrued were vested and untouchable, but payments not yet due could be modified by the court or ended by a later change in the law. Applying the 1973 statute here was proper and only prospective, because the son did not turn 18 until 1975 - well after the statute took effect - so no vested rights were disturbed. The denial of attorney's fees was also upheld.

Donald Peters Sr. and Esther Peters married in 1944, separated in 1972, and Donald filed for divorce in 1973. Before the divorce was resolved, Donald died. His son (the couple's only son) became executor of the estate and asked the court to declare certain real estate and life insurance proceeds to be community property that belonged to the estate. The district court agreed with the son and, importantly, placed the burden on Esther to prove the property was NOT community property. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The court explained the general rule that property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. But it drew a key distinction for property held in "joint tenancy" (a form of co-ownership with a right of survivorship). When a deed puts property in joint tenancy, that deed is itself strong proof that the property is NOT community property. So the burden actually fell on the son (who claimed it was community) to prove the couple had converted, or "transmuted," the joint-tenancy property into community property. He offered essentially no such proof, and merely using community funds to buy or improve joint-tenancy property does not, by itself, convert it. The district court had the burden backwards. The court also addressed the life insurance: because Esther was the named beneficiary and remained so when Donald died, the entire proceeds vested in her as her separate property even though the premiums had been paid with community funds. The court reversed the parts of the judgment treating the real property and insurance as community property belonging to the estate.

Mary Ann Schulman sued Albert Schulman for divorce. Albert had owned a Las Vegas meat business (Schulman Meats) for about 40 years before the 1968 marriage, so the business itself was his separate property. During the marriage the business grew substantially and was incorporated, and it was expanded using a large Small Business Administration (SBA) loan that Mary Ann had to sign a guaranty for. The main dispute was how much of the increase in the business's value belonged to the community (and thus to Mary Ann). The parties agreed to a special master (an accountant) who used one accepted method (the Pereira approach) and calculated a large community share. The district judge rejected parts of the master's report as clearly wrong, in particular the industry data the master relied on, and instead used a different accepted method (the Van Camp approach), which credits the community with the reasonable value of the owner-spouse's services, minus what the family already spent from the business. Under that method, the remaining community interest in the business was $55,770, of which Mary Ann's share was $27,885. The judge also ordered the family home sold and the proceeds split, and awarded Mary Ann alimony of $1,000 per month for six months. Mary Ann appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held the district judge acted within his broad power under the court rules to reject a master's clearly erroneous findings; that both the Pereira and Van Camp methods are valid and a court may pick whichever achieves substantial justice; and that using Van Camp was fair here because the business could not have operated without the separate-property capital and the SBA loan secured by it. The court also upheld rejection of Mary Ann's claims that the business had been converted into community property (an alleged oral promise of stock, and her guaranty of the SBA loan), and upheld the limited alimony award as within the judge's broad discretion given the short marriage.

After the parties divorced, the wife went back to court seeking to modify the divorce decree by increasing the alimony her former husband paid her. Her request was based on a modification provision contained in the couple's integrated separation and property support agreement, which allowed for changes to the alimony amount. The district court held a hearing and then denied her motion to increase the payments. She appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to raise her alimony. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. After reviewing the record, it found no abuse of the district court's discretion in denying the requested increase. The judgment was affirmed.

The district court granted this couple a divorce and divided various pieces of real and personal property. Some of that property had been acquired during the marriage, and some had been acquired earlier, while the couple was living together and pooling their resources before marrying. The appealing spouse challenged only the property distribution, arguing that the way the property was split was based on unequal and improper legal theories and was not supported by the evidence. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. After reviewing the evidence and the pleadings, it found the arguments to be without merit. The division of property was properly based on the guidelines set out in Nevada's divorce property statute, NRS 125.150, and the court saw no abuse of discretion in how the trial judge divided the property. The judgment was affirmed.

Jacklyn and Jerald Spilsbury divorced in April 1974, and their decree approved a property settlement agreement. A few months later, Jacklyn filed a motion under the civil rules to set aside the decree, arguing the property settlement agreement was the product of fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake about the value of the community assets. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled against her on all three grounds in January 1975. Instead of appealing that ruling, Jacklyn filed a brand-new, separate lawsuit in May 1975 to vacate the property settlement agreement, again claiming fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake. The district court dismissed the new case, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the validity of the property settlement agreement had already been decided in the earlier proceeding, so the doctrine of res judicata barred Jacklyn from relitigating it. Under that doctrine, once a court of competent jurisdiction has directly decided a right, question, or fact, the same parties cannot dispute it again in a later suit, even if the second suit is technically a different kind of action.

Mildred and Norman Lemkuil married in 1944. Norman worked as an operating engineer in the Merchant Marine. In 1966, after marital difficulties, they signed a property settlement agreement that divided their property and required Norman to pay $400 a month for the support of Mildred and their minor daughter (dropping by $100 when the child died, reached adulthood, or became self-supporting). Norman made those payments until September 1971, when he quit his job, moved to Nevada, and in November 1971 filed for divorce. During the divorce, the court entered a temporary (pendente lite) order in March 1972 reducing the support payments to $200 a month. Mildred also filed a separate lawsuit in a different department of the same court seeking the past-due amounts (arrearages) owed under the 1966 agreement. That separate suit was dismissed on the ground that the divorce court already had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject. At the divorce trial, the court found the 1966 agreement was valid (rejecting Norman's claims of fraud, duress, or undue influence) and adopted most of its terms, but replaced the agreement's support terms with its own smaller support order. Critically, the court ordered Norman to pay the arrearages that had built up under the agreement only up to the March 1972 temporary order (about $1,200), and refused to make him pay the arrearages that accrued after that temporary order. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that this was error. It agreed that a divorce court may set its own order for FUTURE support regardless of the parties' prior agreement. But it held the court has no discretion to refuse enforcement of - in effect, to wipe out - support installments that had ALREADY ACCRUED under a validly executed agreement. Because the court found the agreement valid, it had to award Mildred all arrearages that accrued under the agreement up to the date of the divorce decree. That part of the divorce case was reversed and sent back with instructions to enter judgment for those arrearages. The Supreme Court separately affirmed the dismissal of Mildred's collateral lawsuit, applying the rule that once one court of competent jurisdiction takes a subject matter, another court of equal rank may not interfere. Two justices concurred in affirming the dismissal but dissented from the arrearages holding, arguing the trial judge had acted within his discretion.

The district court granted this couple a divorce and divided their community property. One of the spouses appealed, challenging (among other things) the way the property was distributed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It noted that the trial court's division of the community property was essentially equal between the two spouses. Because of that, and applying Nevada's divorce property statute (NRS 125.150), the court saw no abuse of discretion in the distribution. The court added that the other grounds raised on appeal were without merit, and affirmed the judgment.

Harold Fagin moved from New York to Las Vegas in January 1973 and, six weeks later, filed for divorce from Ruth, his wife of 36 years. On the advice of a New York attorney that Nevada courts would lack power over her if she avoided being served, Ruth twice thwarted a deputy sheriff's attempts to personally serve her, once even denying her own identity and claiming to be her own sister. Unable to serve Ruth personally, Harold served her by publication and mailed the papers, which she refused. A default divorce decree was entered, but it was defective because it was entered one day too early. Harold then remarried. Within six months, Ruth moved under the civil rules to vacate the default and decree and to file an answer, arguing the judgment was void for defective service and that she should be relieved on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The district court granted her motion. Harold appealed, arguing Ruth should be estopped by her deceitful evasion of service. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It did not need to decide whether Ruth had effectively been served, because in either event it was within the district court's broad discretion to set aside the default under the rules. The court stressed the policy of deciding cases on their merits and that appellate courts are more likely to affirm an order setting aside a default than one refusing to do so. Given Ruth's severe arthritis, her distress, her inexperience with litigation, and her reliance on her attorney's (mistaken) advice, the district court did not abuse its discretion, even though the court expressly condemned her deceitful avoidance of service. Issues of fees and support were left to the trial court.

The Braddocks married in Ohio in 1957 after signing an antenuptial (prenuptial) agreement in which the wife gave up claims to the husband's property. The husband was a wealthy, sophisticated businessman worth about $700,000; the wife was substantially younger, had little education or business experience, and was working as a waitress. When the agreement was signed, the husband's own attorney was not present, and the wife had no independent lawyer of her own; she testified she thought the yearly payments were anniversary gifts and that the agreement only guaranteed her a share of his estate if he died, not anything about divorce. The husband later moved to Las Vegas and filed for divorce, claiming the prenuptial agreement had settled all property issues. The district court found the agreement void, awarded the wife $173,429.90 (half of a property interest), $7,500 in attorney fees, use of the couple's Florida home rent-free during the appeal, and $150 per week in support during the appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Because the agreement was made and to be performed in Ohio, Ohio law governed its validity. Under Ohio law, a prenuptial agreement is not void just because a party lacked independent counsel, but it must be entered into knowingly, understandingly, freely, and voluntarily. Whether it was is a question of fact, and the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the wife did not knowingly and understandingly enter it. The court also upheld the property award (governed by Ohio law, since the personal property was accumulated there), the attorney fees under Nevada statute, the rent-free use of the home as support pending appeal, and the $150 weekly support, which enforced the husband's own earlier stipulation covering the pendency of the action.

The appellant challenged a divorce judgment's awards of alimony and child support and its division of property. The problem was that the trial had not been recorded - there was no court reporter and no transcript. The appellant tried to substitute a written 'statement of the evidence' under an appellate rule (NRAP 10(c)) that lets a party reconstruct what happened at an unreported trial. That rule, however, requires the statement to be submitted to the trial judge for 'settlement and approval' so the judge can confirm it is accurate before it becomes part of the record. That step was never taken here. Without an approved record of what evidence was actually presented, the Nevada Supreme Court said it had no way to judge whether the trial court had made any of the errors the appellant claimed. It therefore affirmed the judgment.

In 1941, William and Cecile Barbash signed a property settlement agreement in which William promised to pay Cecile $100 per month "during her natural life." A 1942 California divorce decree approved the agreement and ordered William to make those lifetime payments. Many years later, William died, and Cecile filed a claim against his estate for $14,400 (the present value of $100 per month for the rest of her life expectancy). The executor rejected the claim, and the district court granted summary judgment for the estate. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Because the agreement was made and the decree entered in California, California law controlled. Under the California law in effect at that time, a court could not modify an "integrated" property settlement and support agreement (one where the property and support terms are tied together as mutual consideration), and the support obligation under such an agreement does not end when the husband dies unless the agreement says so. The court found this was clearly an integrated agreement: it settled both property rights and support, and the spouses released each other from all other claims. Since it called for payments during Cecile's natural life and did not say the obligation ended at William's death, the obligation survived his death and was a valid charge against his estate. A 1951 California amendment that would end support at death did not apply because this agreement and decree predated it. The court directed judgment for Cecile for the present value of the payments calculated as of William's death.

A 1971 divorce decree divided the couple's property. For one parcel, the divorce judge ended the joint tenancy and made the two of them tenants in common, each owning half. Importantly, during the divorce the husband had agreed that, until the parties agreed on a sale, the wife could live in the home on the parcel, manage the rental properties there, keep the income, and pay the expenses. Later the husband received a $150,000 offer for the whole parcel; the wife refused to sell, and he sued to force a sale by 'partition' (a court-ordered division or sale of co-owned property). A different judge found partition of the parcel impractical, ordered it sold, and directed that the proceeds be split equally. The wife appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that although co-owners generally have a right to partition, that right is not absolute. The husband had waived it by his own concession in the divorce - letting the wife live in and manage the property and keep the income until a sale was agreed upon - and he was estopped from undoing part of a divorce decree he had never appealed. Because the right to possess and use this property had already been litigated and decided in the divorce, the divorce decree barred the later partition suit between the same parties. The Court sent the case back with instructions to enter judgment for the wife.

When the Culbertsons divorced in February 1972, the mother received custody of the parties' four minor children, subject to a provision in the judgment that she not engage in immoral conduct in the children's presence. The father's attorney sent the mother a check required by the decree, which she cashed, and she also enforced other parts of the decree. Later in 1972, the father asked the court to hold the mother in contempt and to take custody away from her. After a hearing, the court found the mother in contempt for violating the decree and changed custody to the father. The court found she had carried on a continuing relationship with an unmarried man who stayed in her home late into the night and slept in her bedroom while the children (some old enough to be aware of it) were nearby, that this disturbed at least one child, and that the older children's schoolwork had declined. The mother appealed both the original 1972 judgment and the amended judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court declined to review the original judgment because she had accepted its benefits (cashing the check and enforcing its terms), which barred her from challenging it. On the change of custody, the court affirmed. Custody decisions are left to the trial court's sound discretion, guided by the child's welfare, and the court presumed the trial judge properly exercised that discretion. The findings that circumstances had changed, that the mother's conduct made her unfit, and that the change served the children's best interest were supported by the record. The mother's separate challenge to the contempt finding was not considered because she cited no supporting authority.

Harry Christensen, an employee of the City of Reno, had a $5,000 group life insurance policy paid for by small payroll deductions ($3.30 per month) taken from his salary after he married Jakica. He named his two sons from a prior marriage as the beneficiaries. When Harry died without a will, a dispute arose between his widow, Jakica, and the two sons over who was entitled to the $5,000. The community estate was worth about $7,177, and only $66 in premiums had been paid on the policy during the marriage. The district court ruled for the widow. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and ruled for the sons. Under the law at the time, the husband managed and controlled the community property and could make a voluntary gift of part of it, as long as the gift was reasonable compared to the whole community estate and was not made with a fraudulent intent to cheat the wife out of her share. For life insurance, the court held the key question is how much community money was actually spent (the premiums), not the face value of the policy. Here, only $66 in community funds had gone to premiums, which was not unreasonable compared to the roughly $7,177 community estate, and there was no fraud. The designation of the sons as beneficiaries was therefore a valid gift, and they were entitled to the proceeds.

Laura Cavell was divorced by default in Nevada in 1969 after being personally served with the papers in Massachusetts; she did not respond, so a default was entered. The decree gave her $125 per month in child support but no alimony. Almost two years later she asked the Nevada court to modify the decree to add alimony, and about 32 months after the decree she filed a separate lawsuit for alimony; she also asked the court to increase child support. The trial court denied the alimony requests and refused to raise child support. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the alimony rulings but sent the child support issue back. On alimony: a Nevada court cannot add or change alimony after a final divorce unless it expressly kept ('reserved') that power in the decree - and this decree did not. In addition, because Laura had been personally served, she could have appeared or moved to set aside the default within six months under a procedural rule (NRCP 60) but did not; she was therefore barred from seeking alimony now. On child support: the court always retains authority during the children's minority to adjust support (NRS 125.140(2)). The record showed the child's needs had grown and the mother could not adequately provide (she was receiving public assistance), while the father was a doctor with a lucrative practice - yet the trial court gave no reason for refusing any increase. Because that suggested a possible abuse of discretion, the Court remanded for reconsideration and directed that, if the court still declines to increase support, it must state its reasons.

The wife was granted a divorce, custody of the couple's twin daughters, $150 per month per child in support, and no alimony. She appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 'only' $150 per child and by refusing her any alimony. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. On child support, it explained that the proper amount rests on two questions - what the children reasonably need and what the father can reasonably afford - and that the trial court had reviewed the wife's own expense exhibit and the father's income and heavy monthly obligations. Even though the father (a lawyer whose income had spiked in one exceptional year) could arguably pay more, the fact that a parent could pay more does not by itself make the awarded amount an abuse of discretion; support is committed to the trial court's discretion, not to the child as an absolute right to the maximum. On alimony, the Court reaffirmed that a wife who is granted a divorce is not entitled to alimony as a matter of right; the award is discretionary and depends on the facts. Considering the short (roughly three-year) marriage, the wife's age, health, and ability to work, and the husband's finances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining alimony. The Court also noted the trial court had ordered a $3,600 payment (as part of the property settlement, not alimony) to help her adjust to her situation.