Nevada family-law case summaries

Robert and Bernice Fick married in 1984 after signing a prenuptial agreement (drafted by Robert) that waived alimony; the agreement referenced attached asset schedules, but Robert did not attach his schedule until a year after signing. On divorce, the district court characterized a Cold Creek lot as community property and ordered it sold, valued the couple's Las Vegas house at $60,000, declared the prenuptial alimony waiver unenforceable, and awarded Bernice unpaid support, $3,000 in rehabilitative alimony, and attorney's fees. Robert appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part. On the lot, Robert had repeatedly treated it as community property below, waiving his joint-tenancy argument; regardless, NRS 125.150 allows equitable division of both community property and post-1979 joint tenancies, so any mischaracterization was harmless, and Robert lacked standing to assert his grandson's interest. The $60,000 house valuation was supported by substantial evidence given the home's disrepair. The court affirmed invalidation of the prenuptial alimony waiver: even though Bernice signed voluntarily, had a chance to consult counsel, and understood the deal, the agreement was unenforceable because Robert failed to fully disclose his assets and obligations BEFORE execution. Finally, while rehabilitative alimony was justified by the disparity in the parties' education and earning potential, the district court failed to set a time frame for Bernice to begin re-training as NRS 125.150(9) requires, so that issue was remanded.

In this Nevada divorce appeal, Maria Aldona Toigo challenged the trial court's decree dissolving her marriage to Michael Toigo. She disputed how the judge characterized and divided the couple's community property and debts, and she challenged the denial of her requests for alimony and attorney's fees. The problem on appeal was procedural. Aldona's arguments rested on what witnesses said at trial, but her lawyer never included the trial transcript in the record given to the Supreme Court. The court explained that on appeal it can consider only what is in the record and the reasonable inferences from it; it cannot rely on a lawyer's descriptions of what testimony "might have" shown. Without the transcript (or an approved substitute statement of the evidence under the appellate rules), the court had no basis to second-guess the trial judge's findings, so it affirmed the decree. The court also pointedly criticized Aldona's attorney. It observed that he apparently performed minimal discovery and called only his client as a witness, yet charged fees exceeding $13,000 and filed an attorney's lien for over $26,000 against Aldona's award, even though her net share of the community estate was less than $12,000. The court said the fee seemed excessive, that appealing without a transcript did the client a disservice, and it strongly recommended that counsel reassess his fees and report back the results of his reconsideration.

Vincent Siragusa, a prominent Las Vegas cardiologist, and Joanne Siragusa divorced in 1983. Their settlement required Vincent to pay alimony and to buy out Joanne's community interest in his medical practice for $1,250,000 over fifteen years. Vincent defaulted, then filed for bankruptcy: the bankruptcy court discharged (wiped out) his property-settlement obligation but not his alimony. Joanne obtained a $126,000 judgment for alimony arrearages, payable in monthly installments. After Vincent made his final arrearage payment, Joanne moved to modify (increase) the alimony. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant that modification. First, even though Vincent had failed to object to the referee's recommendation in the district court, he could still appeal to the Supreme Court. Second, the court still had jurisdiction to modify the alimony: under Nevada law, only 'accrued' alimony is unmodifiable, and whether payments have accrued depends on the period of the award, not just whether they were paid. A payor cannot escape the court's jurisdiction by paying early - or, as here, by falling into arrears. The arrearage judgment extended the alimony obligation through its payment period, and Joanne's motion came before that period ended. Most significantly, the Court held that a district court may treat a spouse's discharge of a property-settlement debt in bankruptcy as a 'changed circumstance' justifying an increase in alimony. Doing so does not re-create the discharged debt or violate federal bankruptcy law's 'fresh start' policy.

A Nevada decree of divorce awarded certain real property to the wife. The husband, now an inmate at the Nevada State Prison representing himself, refused to sign a quitclaim deed to that property, so the court entered an order divesting him of any interest in it. He tried to appeal. At first the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely, but on rehearing the husband showed he had actually mailed a timely notice of appeal. The district court clerk had stamped it "received" and returned it to him because it lacked a filing fee and a signed affidavit for the request to proceed without paying fees, rather than keeping it in the record. The court held that a notice of appeal is effective when the clerk receives it, that the clerk had no authority to return it, and that returning the document was improper. The clerk must keep an accurate record of the date every document is received, regardless of its form, and should have notified the party of any deficiency. The court granted rehearing and reached the merits. On the merits, the husband had never appealed the divorce decree itself, so the decree, including the award of the property to the wife, was final and could not be challenged now. Because he had no interest in the property as a matter of law, he could not show that any claimed irregularity in the divesting proceeding prejudiced him. Concluding that briefing and argument were unwarranted, the court dismissed the appeal.

When Lee Blanchard and Rene Blanchard divorced, they divided their property under a written settlement agreement based on a financial statement that Rene prepared. Lee later filed a separate lawsuit to undo (rescind) that agreement, claiming Rene had intentionally misrepresented several community assets. She alleged: a one-acre Florida lot the agreement gave her "free and clear" had actually been forfeited to the state for unpaid taxes years earlier, so it did not exist; her share of a pension was represented as about $44,100 but was really only about $29,000; stocks she received were worthless; and an investment Rene kept, which he supposedly called worthless, was actually worth a great deal and he sold it at a profit. The trial court dismissed Lee's lawsuit without a trial, ruling she could not show justifiable reliance. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. On a motion to dismiss, the court must assume the complaint's allegations are true and may dismiss only if there is no possible set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Lee's complaint set out the elements of intentional misrepresentation. The court rejected Rene's defense that the agreement's fine print said Lee did not rely on his valuations. Such "integration" and "waiver" clauses cannot bar a misrepresentation claim. The court also explained that whether Lee justifiably relied, and whether she conducted an independent investigation, are questions of fact for trial, not something to resolve on a motion to dismiss. An independent investigation does not defeat reliance where the falsity is not obvious, the plaintiff cannot judge the facts without expert help, or the defendant has superior knowledge. Because the misrepresentation about the Florida property's existence alone supported a claim, the court reversed and sent the case back so Rene could assert his defenses by a responsive pleading.

In their divorce, James Martin agreed to pay child support and to take sole responsibility for two credit-card debts, in exchange for paying a lower amount of monthly child support. Shortly after the decree, James filed for bankruptcy and discharged those credit-card debts - leaving his ex-wife Judy personally on the hook for them. Judy asked the court for support. The district court found that James's promise to hold Judy harmless on the debts was really 'in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support,' because without it Judy would have been inadequately supported. It ordered James to reimburse Judy. James appealed, arguing the debts had been wiped out in bankruptcy. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Federal bankruptcy law decides whether a debt can be discharged, and obligations for alimony, maintenance, and support cannot be discharged. A 'hold harmless' promise counts as non-dischargeable support if, without the debt assumption, the spouse would be inadequately supported. Here, because James assumed the debts in exchange for lower child support, his obligation was directly tied to child support; when he broke that promise, he effectively reduced the child support Judy received. While his personal obligations to the credit-card companies were properly discharged, his separate obligation to Judy arose from the divorce decree and was not discharged.

Theodore Dobson moved from Germany to Las Vegas and filed for divorce from his wife, Cecile, who remained in Germany. He served her by newspaper publication, stating in his affidavit that he did not know her current address. The court entered a default decree dissolving the marriage. Cecile, through a Nevada lawyer, made a "special appearance" (appearing only to contest jurisdiction, without submitting to the court's power over her) and moved to quash the service, claiming Theodore committed fraud by listing an incorrect address and mailing the papers there. The district court granted her motion "in all respects" and declared the divorce decree null and void. Theodore appealed, and Cecile moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that an order quashing service of process is ordinarily not appealable. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. By granting the motion to quash, the district court necessarily determined that it had never obtained jurisdiction over Cecile and, therefore, that the divorce decree was void. The court explained that the proper way to attack a void judgment is a motion under NRCP 60(b)(3), and that a motion resting solely on lack of proper service is not a "general appearance," so it did not subject Cecile to the court's personal jurisdiction. Because the district court effectively treated Cecile's motion as a Rule 60(b)(3) motion and its order declared the decree void, that order was appealable. The court denied Cecile's motion to dismiss the appeal and set a briefing schedule.

Cvetka and Marjan Rutar married in 1971 and divorced after eighteen years. Both trained as dental technicians in Yugoslavia, but Marjan received advanced training in Switzerland and built a dental laboratory grossing over $300,000 a year, with personal income around $150,000. Cvetka worked full time in the lab for about five years, then spent roughly fifteen years primarily as a homemaker, raising the couple's two children and Marjan's two children from a prior marriage. At divorce, the court divided the property roughly equally, awarded Cvetka $1,000 per month in "rehabilitative" alimony for three and one-half years plus child support, and required her to eventually pay half the upkeep on the house and condominium. Cvetka appealed, arguing the alimony was too low and too short. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed. Alimony must be "just and equitable," considering the parties' respective merits and the condition each will be left in after divorce (NRS 125.150). Comparing prior cases (Johnson v. Steel and Heim v. Heim), the court found a large disparity: Cvetka, then forty-five, with limited skills, difficulty with English, and no income-producing property, would be living on under $24,000 a year, while Marjan would keep roughly $130,000 a year after payments. The court increased her alimony to $1,700 per month, extended it to eight years, and directed the district court to retain jurisdiction over the alimony award and property division. It held that an attorney-fee award was unnecessary given the increase. Reversed and modified.

Virginia and James Schryver divorced in 1983. The decree, which incorporated the parties' written settlement agreement, required James to pay $1,200 per month in alimony for eight years, with September 1990 being the final month. At the beginning of September 1990, James paid the last month's alimony early, sending a $1,000 check and then a $200 check. On September 13, 1990, Virginia filed a motion to modify the alimony, asking that it be increased and extended for the remainder of her life. The district court dismissed her motion, and both parties assumed the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the payments were complete. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under NRS 125.150(7), periodic alimony payments that have not yet "accrued" when a modification motion is filed may be modified upon a showing of changed circumstances. Although James had made the final payment early, the actual term of support ran through September 30, 1990, so Virginia's September 13 motion was filed within the period of support and was timely. Addressing an issue of first impression in Nevada, the court reasoned that holding otherwise would allow a paying spouse to deprive the court of jurisdiction simply by making advance payments. It reversed the order dismissing the motion and remanded for further proceedings.

Just before ending their thirty-two-year marriage, Rudolph and Doris Anderson agreed to divide their joint bank accounts. They signed the required withdrawal slips and, at Rudolph's direction, deposited $110,000 into Doris's account and $54,000 into Rudolph's, creating an unequal division. Rudolph later argued the trial court was wrong to treat that unequal split as a "final division" of the money and should have ordered a more equitable distribution. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. Substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the overall property division was just and equitable: Rudolph received twice Doris's Social Security, was awarded a vehicle worth twice hers, and was able to live rent-free with his girlfriend. The court added that even if Rudolph were correct that a statute (NRS 123.220(1)) requires a written agreement to convert community property into separate property, the result still held under the doctrine of estoppel. Rudolph admitted in court that he had temporarily misled Doris into believing the division was permanent, so the elements of estoppel were substantially satisfied on the record. The judgment was affirmed. A concurring justice would have decided the statutory question about whether a writing is required to transmute community property, but the majority declined to reach it because it was not formally raised as an issue, not meaningfully briefed, and not essential to the decision.

After Frederick and Deborah Amie divorced, Frederick recovered a judgment against a former employer for wrongful termination. The judgment included about $46,945 in wages he had earned during the marriage, plus general tort damages and punitive damages. Because wages earned during marriage are community property, and because this wage money had never been mentioned or divided in the divorce, Deborah sued for her half. The trial court granted summary judgment for Frederick, but the Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under a longstanding decision, First National Bank v. Wolff, community property that is left out of a divorce decree is not lost: after the divorce, the former spouses hold the omitted property as "tenants in common," and either may bring a separate, independent action in equity to divide (partition) it. The court distinguished a case Frederick relied on (McCarroll), in which the later-asserted issue (fraudulent concealment) had actually been available to litigate during the divorce; here the wages were simply omitted from the parties' written settlement agreement and never came within the field of the divorce litigation, and neither party claimed exclusive entitlement. The court also held that res judicata did not bar Deborah's separate equitable action, because the policies favoring relief outweighed the purposes of former adjudication. Deborah was therefore entitled to seek partition of half the wages. The court declined to decide whether the general tort and punitive damages awards were also unresolved community property, because that question was not litigated below or briefed. Reversed and remanded for partition of the wage claim.

James and Katie Fuller divorced. In the divorce, Katie insisted on receiving the couple's interests in a real-estate partnership (the North Shore-Tahoe Partnership) and other properties, even after James testified that the partnership was roughly $5.5 million in debt and that he would be responsible for about 12.4 percent of that debt. The court gave Katie what she asked for, in exchange for her agreeing to protect James from any claims arising out of those properties. As part of dividing everything up, the court ordered the couple's marital home sold and the money used to pay off several debts. One of those was about $93,000 owed to a man named William Cahill (the "Cahill Obligation"). That debt was secured partly by James' separate property and partly by a deed of trust on a condominium the couple owned together at Incline Village. The court also gave James that condominium as his own separate property. Before the marital home was sold, James instead sold the condominium and used the sale money to pay off the Cahill debt in full. He then asked the court to make Katie pay back half of it. A different judge, hearing that request, refused and ruled that the Cahill debt was James' separate (personal) debt. Katie appealed, claiming James had committed fraud on the court by hiding the partnership's true liabilities so the decree should be undone. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that: James had openly disclosed the $5.5 million debt and his share of it in court, and Katie offered no evidence of any hidden liabilities. So there was no fraud, and the decree stood. But James won on his cross-appeal. The court explained that once a divorce decree is final, a trial court cannot go back and change it unless a rule or statute allows it. Because the original decree had treated the condominium as community (jointly owned) property, it had effectively treated the Cahill debt as a community debt too. The later judge's ruling that the Cahill debt was James' separate debt was an unauthorized change to a final decree, and the original decree was binding (res judicata). The court reversed that ruling and the denial of James' request for repayment, and sent the case back so the trial court could figure out how much Katie owes James.

Kenneth (a physician) and Nancy Malmquist divorced after a seventeen-year marriage. The central issue was how to divide the family home, which Kenneth had bought before the marriage but which the couple paid down and improved during the marriage. This is the case that gives Nevada its formula for splitting a home when both separate and community money went into it. Kenneth bought the home in 1967 for $36,500 with a $2,500 down payment and a mortgage. During the marriage, community funds reduced the mortgage, and the couple added a $25,000 kitchen and a $37,707 greenhouse. By divorce the home was worth $215,000. The Nevada Supreme Court adopted (with one change) the California 'Moore' method for apportioning the appreciation of a home between separate and community property, giving each a share in proportion to how much it paid toward the purchase price. The Court's modification, borrowed from a law-review proposal, credits the unpaid loan balance based on the number of routine monthly payments each estate made, not on who originally took out the loan. Improvements are handled separately: normally the estate that paid for an improvement is simply reimbursed its cost, without interest. The Court affirmed that the greenhouse - paid from a commingled joint account - was community property, because Kenneth's stipulation alone did not trace the money to his separate funds. It also upheld ordering Kenneth to pay the entire equity-line debt, to pay maximum child support while the home was set aside for the children, and the valuation of his medical practice's goodwill.

Dr. William Ford, an orthopedic surgeon, and Tomie Sue Ford divorced after a marriage that produced a large community estate. At the 1986 trial, the couple stipulated that their shares in a company (Sierra Management) were worth $400,000, and the court awarded that stock to Tomie Sue to avoid tax problems, plus rehabilitative alimony of $2,500 a month for six years and $25,000 in attorney's fees. But before the judgment was even entered, the stock was bought out at a higher price and Tomie Sue received $600,000 - $200,000 more than the stipulated value. The trial court reopened the case and, treating that $200,000 as a 'windfall,' cancelled her alimony and attorney's fees. The Nevada Supreme Court held that reopening the case was proper, but that the trial court erred by ignoring the roughly $133,000 in capital-gains taxes Tomie Sue owed on the sale. Courts must consider tax consequences when a taxable event has occurred or is certain to occur within a predictable time. Cancelling her alimony and fees based on a 'windfall' without accounting for the taxes and the installment nature of the payout was an abuse of discretion, so the Court reinstated both. On Dr. Ford's cross-appeal, the Court adopted the modern rule that the goodwill of a professional practice (like a solo medical practice) is community property subject to division, even if it cannot easily be sold, and upheld the trial court's valuation. It also held the court should have credited Dr. Ford for the future tax liability on a large promissory note awarded to him.

Laurence and Gail McNabney had a short marriage - they parted after about two years and divorced after three. The main dispute on appeal was over one asset: a contingent legal fee Laurence earned during the marriage, paid out as an annuity of about $3,700 a month running until 2004. Everyone agreed the fee was community property. The trial court split most of the community property equally, but awarded 80 percent of the legal fee to Laurence. It based that on several facts: the marriage was short; Gail came in with a considerable separate estate and income; she was self-supporting and had not depended on Laurence; she would keep the same standard of living after the divorce; and the annuity made up a substantial part of Laurence's income. Gail appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires community property to be divided essentially equally, so the 80/20 split was improper. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. It explained that Nevada's statute requires a 'just and equitable' division of community property - not necessarily an equal, 'fifty-fifty' one. Nevada is an 'equitable distribution' state, not an 'equal distribution' state. The court took the opportunity to clear up longstanding confusion: earlier language in a 1959 case (Weeks v. Weeks) saying equal division 'appears to be the rule in most cases' was just a description of what usually happens in practice, not a binding legal rule that property must be split evenly. Courts may use equal division as a 'starting point,' but they are not required to divide equally, and there is no presumption that equal is equitable. Because the statute directs courts to consider the merits of the parties, the condition they will be left in, and who acquired the property, the trial court was entitled to give Laurence a larger share of a fee he earned, especially where both spouses would leave the marriage financially secure. The court also held that the failure to give a formal statement of reasons (as an earlier case had suggested) did not require reversal here, since Gail never asked for one, did not object, the record supplied ample reasons, and she suffered no prejudice.

After five years of marriage, Donna Petersen told her husband, Steven, that she wanted a divorce. Steven was an attorney experienced in handling divorces. He drew up the divorce papers and a property settlement agreement, and - according to Donna - urged her to sign without her own lawyer and did not accurately disclose the couple's assets. Just three days after Donna first asked for the divorce, Steven filed everything, a default was entered, and judgment was granted the same day. Donna never had a lawyer during any of this. About 90 days later, Donna came across a financial statement showing the couple was worth $758,900 - yet under the settlement she had received only $82,666. She immediately hired an attorney, who advised her the split was unfair and set about preparing a motion to set the decree aside under Rule 60(b). Her attorney took about another 90 days, so the motion ended up being filed one day short of six months after the judgment. The trial judge denied the motion. He acknowledged it was filed within Rule 60(b)'s six-month outer limit, but ruled it still was not filed within a 'reasonable time' as the rule requires. Donna appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It stressed that Rule 60(b) exists to correct injustices caused by excusable neglect or the wrongdoing of the other party, and it should be read liberally to serve that purpose. Under these facts, denying the motion as untimely was error: it was filed within the six-month limit, Donna moved to assert her rights only about 90 days after judgment, and the delay was mostly her attorney's doing. She had never had a chance to challenge the fairness of the settlement, which had been entered by default. The court did not decide whether Steven actually committed fraud; it sent the case back so the trial court could determine whether Donna's allegations of injustice were serious enough to justify setting the decree aside.

Loretta and Dr. Heim were married for 35 years. By their agreement, Loretta stayed home as a homemaker and raised the couple's six children while Dr. Heim pursued his career - earning a Ph.D. and becoming chairman of the Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department at UNLV, earning about $5,600 a month with living expenses under $2,000. The couple's modest property (a small home equity, furniture, two cars, and a retirement fund) was divided fairly, and Loretta did not appeal that. Loretta was 57, had no professional skills, was unemployed, and had never earned more than $600 a month. The trial court awarded her only $500 a month in alimony until death or remarriage. She appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding the $500 award was, as a matter of law, not 'just and equitable.' The court explained that alimony in Nevada is a creature of statute, and the statute (NRS 125.150(1)) has required since territorial days that alimony be 'just and equitable,' having regard to the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce. The court criticized a tendency in earlier cases to reduce this to a mechanical checklist of factors; while those 'matters to be considered' are useful, the judge must actually form a judgment about what is fair and just. Looking at the parties' circumstances, the disparity was stark: after paying the tax-deductible $500 alimony and his living expenses, Dr. Heim had about $3,000 left each month, while Loretta - even if she earned $600 a month - would have only about one-fifth of his income and would live near the poverty level. The court observed that the most valuable product of the marriage was Dr. Heim's degree and earning capacity, gained through the joint efforts of both spouses, and that after a 35-year marriage in which she gave up her own career, Loretta was entitled to a fair return and to live as nearly as possible at the station in life she had enjoyed. The court found an abuse of discretion, reversed, and sent the case back for a new alimony determination, noting the award need not be capped at the $1,500 a month Loretta had requested.

Russell and Alice Graham divorced, and part of the appeal concerned how their property was divided. When they married in 1979, Russell owned the couple's residence. But in 1984, he signed and recorded a quitclaim deed transferring the home into joint tenancy - that is, into the names of himself and Alice together. Despite that deed, the district court awarded the residence to Russell as his sole and separate property. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed on the house. It explained two well-established presumptions: first, when a husband transfers title to his wife, the law presumes he intended a gift; and second, a valid deed creating a joint tenancy presumes the parties intended to own the property as joint tenants. Both presumptions can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, and the personal opinion of either spouse counts for nothing. Russell's only evidence was his own testimony that he did not intend the deed to take effect until his death. The court held that was merely his opinion and was not enough to overcome the presumption. So the deed created a joint tenancy in the home, and the district court erred in finding otherwise. The court affirmed other parts of the ruling. It upheld awarding Russell's business to him as separate property, since it was financed with his separate funds (even though he drew a community-property salary from it). But it sent the case back for the trial court to make sure all of the assets of a horse-breeding partnership were actually divided, and to reconsider whether Alice should be reimbursed for the cost of appraising the residence - since the trial court had denied that reimbursement based on its now-reversed finding that the home was Russell's separate property.

William and Camille Verheyden divorced. On appeal, William challenged two parts of the trial court's ruling: (1) awarding Camille a $19,125 interest in a house on Santa Barbara Street that he owned, and (2) awarding Camille a 1982 Honda - which the parties owned jointly - on the theory that William had given it to her as a gift. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed on both points. As to the house: William had acquired it in January 1981, before the marriage, in an exchange with his sister (he traded her a less valuable house and cancelled a $30,000 debt she owed him). Because he owned it before the marriage and there was no evidence he intended to convert it into community property, the house was his separate property. Camille argued the community (the marital partnership) had acquired an interest by helping pay for it and by improving it. The court rejected both. There was no purchase-money mortgage that community funds paid down, so the rule that lets the community earn a proportional ('pro tanto') interest when it helps pay the purchase price did not apply, and the court declined to extend that rule to Camille's indirect-contribution theory. As for improvements, there was no substantial evidence they were paid with community funds or that they increased the home's value; the spending looked like routine maintenance. As to the Honda: property bought during a marriage is presumed to be community property, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and certain proof. Camille testified William told her the car was a gift and it was always called 'her car.' But the court held that a spouse's mere oral statement that something bought during the marriage is a 'gift' is not clear and certain proof, and the opinion of either spouse carries no weight. So the trial court's finding that the car was a gift was unsupported and was reversed. The court also noted that Nevada law requires a written agreement to convert community property into one spouse's separate property. The case was sent back for entry of a decree consistent with the reversals.

Barbara and Donald Jensen married in September 1981 and, on their wedding day, signed an antenuptial (prenuptial) agreement designed to keep each spouse's income and property separate. Soon after, Barbara began working part-time for Donald's company, Jensen Precast (Donald was its sole owner). About a year in, according to Donald and the company accountant, Barbara agreed she would not receive a separate salary; instead her earnings would be lumped in with Donald's income - avoiding separate payroll taxes. Throughout the marriage, that income went into the couple's joint account and paid community (shared) expenses. Barbara filed for divorce in 1986. On appeal, Barbara made several arguments. First, she claimed the company owed her $83,040 for her work. The court held that even if there had been an agreement to pay her, the evidence showed she was fully compensated as agreed, because her earnings were combined with Donald's and used for the couple's shared expenses. Second, Barbara argued that combining her income violated the antenuptial agreement, which required her income to stay separate. The court disagreed. The agreement itself allowed changes and did not require them to be in writing. Parties to a written contract can orally modify it, and their agreement to a modification can be inferred from their conduct. By orally consenting to combine income, letting it go into the joint account, using it for community expenses, and never demanding a separate salary, Barbara had effectively agreed to modify the agreement and treat her income as community property. Third, Barbara challenged the order requiring her - as the parent with primary physical custody of their daughter Megan - to sign IRS forms each year letting Donald claim the child as a tax dependent. The court agreed with Barbara on this point. Normally the custodial parent gets the exemption, and forcing her to sign the forms was an inappropriate use of the court's coercive power when the same economic result could have been reached simply by adjusting alimony. The court reversed that part of the order. It affirmed the $500-a-month child support and the division of community property, which were supported by substantial evidence.

Dora and Patrick Higgins were divorced in 1981. During the divorce, Patrick submitted a list of community property that described certain real estate as "Palomino Valley 40 acres" with a stated value. He later testified that this single entry actually represented the couple's combined equity in three separate parcels in Palomino Valley. The divorce court awarded Dora all of the parties' interest in the Palomino Valley "properties." Just five days before the final divorce decree was entered, Patrick signed a deed of trust encumbering two of the parcels in favor of Richard and Susan Ashburn, who he said had put up money to buy those parcels. Dora sued the Ashburns, and the same judge who handled the divorce ruled that the divorce decree covered the parcels the Ashburns had funded. Dora then sued Patrick for slander of title (making false, malicious statements that damage someone's ownership of property). Patrick counterclaimed, arguing the divorce had only decided ownership of one parcel and that he still co-owned two others. The trial court dismissed Dora's slander claim and ruled that Patrick and Dora co-owned two parcels. Dora appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the co-ownership ruling. It held that the divorce decree had already adjudicated the parties' rights in all three parcels, so the doctrine of res judicata barred Patrick from re-litigating ownership. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Dora's slander of title claim, because she failed to prove that Patrick acted with malice; his effort to protect the Ashburns' contribution could have been genuine, and he stood to gain nothing personally.

This unusual case grew out of a divorce between Emma and George Pelletier. George's mother, Phebe Pelletier, believed that Emma had sold coins that belonged to her (Phebe). Rather than filing her own lawsuit, Phebe tried to inject herself into Emma and George's divorce by filing a "counterclaim" against Emma for conversion (wrongfully taking and using someone else's property). Phebe was not a party to the divorce and had not properly intervened, so her counterclaim did not really belong in the case. Everyone nonetheless proceeded as if it did, and the divorce case went to trial with the coin dispute tangled into it. The trial judge found that some coins had been bought with community funds and some with Phebe's money, that the coins were "commingled," and that Emma had justifiably relied on a presumption that the coins were community property. The court dismissed Phebe's conversion claim, and Phebe appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Rather than making Phebe start over, the court decided the conversion issue on the record. It held that Phebe's coins did not become the couple's community property just by being commingled, and there was no basis to presume her coins were community property. Emma admitted she took the coins, cashed them in, and spent the money - which is conversion - and good faith or lack of knowledge is no excuse. Because the trial court found Phebe owned some of the coins and the evidence of interference was undisputed, the Supreme Court held that Emma was liable for conversion as a matter of law and sent the case back only to determine damages.

David and Wilma Hybarger married in 1972, each bringing substantial separate property into the marriage. David owned a drywall and painting business that, in 1976, became a partnership called Hybarger and Son Drywall, with David holding an 80 percent interest and his son Gordon holding 20 percent. When the couple divorced, the biggest dispute was how much of the value of that business belonged to the community (shared marital property) versus David's separate property. The trial court used a recognized accounting method (the "Pereira" formula) to separate David's separate-property share from the community share. Wilma appealed, raising three points: (1) the court miscalculated David's initial separate-property investment; (2) the court failed to reduce David's separate-property share by money he later pulled out of the business to buy a ranch in Fallon; and (3) the court wrongly refused to award her attorney's fees to offset money David spent after the couple separated. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Wilma on the first two points. On the initial investment, the court noted that only 80 percent of the $31,490 in start-up capital was David's, because 20 percent belonged to his son, so the formula had to be recalculated using the smaller figure. On the ranch, the court held that once the trial court found David withdrew over $50,000 of separate property to help buy it, it should have reduced his remaining separate-property interest in the business by that same amount. On attorney's fees, the court found no error, because whether to award fees is within the trial judge's discretion and both spouses held substantial separate property. The case was sent back only to recompute the community interest in the business.

Charles Murphy was granted a divorce in mid-1985 and was awarded essentially all of the couple's community property, leaving Alicia Murphy with only a twelve-year-old car. Nearly a year later, Alicia asked the court to set aside that lopsided property division. She claimed that Charles had threatened to kill her if she sought any more property, so she had been too afraid to fight over the issue, and that she had no lawyer at the time and moved to set aside the decree soon after first meeting with counsel. A domestic relations referee, and then the trial court, dismissed her motion, ruling that the court had lost jurisdiction because more than six months had passed since the divorce decree was entered (the general time limit for challenging a judgment for fraud). The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that the usual six-month limit does not apply to "fraud upon the court" - conduct that prevents a real trial of the issues. Threats that intimidate a spouse into not litigating her property rights can amount to fraud upon the court, especially where (unlike in older cases denying relief) the intimidated spouse was not represented by counsel. The court also held that Alicia could raise this by motion rather than being forced to file a separate lawsuit. The case was sent back for further proceedings on her claim.

Roy and Rowena Pryor married in 1963 and lived in a Henderson mobile-home park originally owned by a Mrs. King. Over the years, Mrs. King and Roy exchanged a series of deeds that gave Roy a life estate (the right to use property for his lifetime) in certain parcels, with the remainder going to the Pryors' adult children. When Roy got the life estate in two parcels, he also signed a $125,000 demand note and a trust deed. In the divorce, the district court came up with an unusual arrangement: it found that Roy held the parcels as a trustee for the children, but ruled that if Mrs. King ever demanded payment on the note, the property would then become community property (shared marital property subject to division). The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held there is no legal basis for property to switch between separate and community character at the whim of the person who granted it. The court also explained that a life estate is a valuable ownership interest that can be divided as community property, not merely a bare trust for the children. Because all property acquired during marriage is presumed community property (and rebutting that presumption requires clear and convincing evidence that the property was a gift, inheritance, or bought with separate funds), and because there was no evidence the life estates were gifts, inheritances, or purchased with Roy's separate money, the court held the interests were community property. It sent the case back and noted that adding this property to the marital estate might require the trial court to re-evaluate the entire property distribution.

This was the second appeal in the Yorks' divorce. In 1983, the Nevada Supreme Court had ruled that a $15,000 award to Ms. York was an error and sent the case back so the district court could decide whether to redistribute the community assets. On remand, the district court awarded Ms. York $13,042.41, made up of three parts: compensation for her contributions to Mr. York's separate-property home, repayment of a community debt, and $2,900 "for other services." Mr. York appealed, claiming the court abused its discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the award but reversed the "other services" portion. On the home, the court held that because community funds were used to pay down a mortgage on Mr. York's separate-property residence, the community acquired an interest in the home in proportion to its contribution, so Ms. York was properly compensated. (Mr. York's contrary factual claim failed because he never supplemented the record as ordered.) On the community debt, the court found the trial court had properly split it equally, correctly accounting for the interest that accrued on the loan Ms. York repaid. But the court reversed the $2,900 awarded "for other services" - money based on Ms. York performing household duties and caring for Mr. York's children. The court explained that although marriage is a partnership in which both spouses contribute their efforts, Ms. York cited no legal authority for the idea that ordinary household services are separately compensable upon divorce, and contentions unsupported by authority need not be considered. The case was sent back to modify the judgment by removing that $2,900.

Jay Smith filed for divorce on May 10, 1984, and his wife Patsy answered the same day, representing herself. The divorce was granted the very next day, May 11, 1984. Out of what Patsy estimated to be about $1.2 million in community property, she received only the Las Vegas home, two vehicles, an acre of land in Utah, her personal effects, and $50,000 in alimony - roughly 15 percent of the marital estate. Six months later, Patsy moved to set aside the divorce decree, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. In a sworn affidavit, she stated that two days before the decree was entered, Jay had come home and physically abused her until she agreed to sign the papers needed to obtain the divorce. Their daughter, Mika, corroborated this. Jay did not deny that the abusive incident happened; he only denied that the property division itself was obtained through threats. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the denial of Patsy's motion. It explained that a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud is reviewed to see whether the record contains enough evidence to support the trial court's decision. Here, nothing in the record contradicted Patsy's and Mika's account of the beating that preceded her signing the documents. Because there was no evidence to contradict her allegations, the district court had no evidentiary basis to deny the motion. The case was sent back so the community property could be identified and divided justly and equitably.

Thelma and Max Campbell married in Las Vegas in 1977. After about six and a half years, Thelma filed for divorce. The two main assets to divide were the couple's house and a travel agency. The trial court treated the house as if it could be split unevenly and awarded it 60/40 in Thelma's favor. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed that part of the decision. Nevada law only allows a court to divide property held in joint tenancy unequally if the property was put into joint tenancy on or after July 1, 1979. The Campbells bought and titled their house as joint tenants in 1977 - before that cutoff - so it could only be split equally (50/50), unless it was needed to support a spouse or children. There were no children and neither spouse asked for alimony, so the equal-division rule applied. The court rejected Thelma's other money claims. She wanted to be repaid for half of the $69,000 down payment she made on the house from her own funds, but the law presumes that when one spouse uses separate money to buy property held jointly, half of it was a gift to the other spouse. That presumption can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence, and Thelma's own testimony (that Max was supposed to pay her back) was not enough - especially since she knew Max had reinvested the money from selling his California home into the couple's travel agency. She also claimed a $20,000 certificate of deposit was community property, but there was solid evidence it was acquired before the marriage, so it was correctly awarded to Max as his separate property. Max's cross-appeal argued the trial court should have made Thelma pay the cost of her deposition. The Supreme Court held that awarding costs in a divorce/property case is left to the trial judge's discretion, and Max showed no abuse of that discretion. Because the uneven split of the travel agency might have been influenced by the (now-reversed) uneven split of the house, the court sent the case back so the trial court could adjust its order.

Marshall Matley had just been through a difficult two-year divorce from a prior wife when he decided to marry Dorothy. He insisted they sign an antenuptial (prenuptial) agreement first. That agreement listed each person's separate property and included a key clause: if either spouse used their separate property to buy or improve property the couple held together, the contributing spouse would get that contribution back if they divorced, and it would be 'conclusively presumed' that the contribution was not a gift. After the marriage, Marshall collected on a $100,000 note that was his separate property and used the money to buy a time certificate of deposit (a CD). He put both his and Dorothy's names on it as tenants in common and wrote on the stub that it was 'under the antenuptial agreement.' He also told Dorothy he was giving her 'half of this.' Over time the couple split the CD's interest payments. When they divorced, the trial court decided Marshall's 'half of this' comment meant he had given Dorothy half of the CD's principal, and awarded her half. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Nobody claimed the prenuptial agreement was unfair or obtained by fraud or pressure; the trial court itself found it valid. When a valid antenuptial agreement is not modified by the parties, courts must enforce it exactly as written. This CD was exactly the kind of situation the agreement covered - separate funds used to buy jointly held property. The agreement's clause conclusively presumed no gift, and there was no real evidence Marshall meant to give away half the principal. His note on the stub and his testimony showed he intended the CD to be covered by the agreement (Dorothy would get half the interest, and her name was on it so she would get half the principal only if he died while they were still married). Because the trial court's finding was manifestly contrary to the evidence, Marshall was entitled to the entire principal.

Hazel and Olen Wilford married in 1963 and had two sons who were grown by the time they divorced. During the marriage Hazel worked various jobs and served as the sole clerical employee of the couple's construction company. Olen is a licensed general contractor who ran that construction company plus a cabinet and counter business. By the time of the divorce trial Hazel was unemployed and back in school. The trial court awarded Hazel about $4,640 in back preliminary support, alimony of $1,000 a month for two years then $500 a month for two more years, and found the couple's construction company to be worth nothing, giving it entirely to Olen. Hazel appealed three things. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the first two rulings but reversed the third. On the back-support amount, the evidence conflicted, and an appeals court will not disturb a trial judge's factual call based on conflicting evidence unless it is clearly wrong - it was not. On alimony, the trial court's findings showed it had properly weighed the relevant factors (each party's finances, property, contributions, the length of the marriage, and each spouse's income, age, health, and ability to earn), so the alimony award stood. But the court reversed the finding that the construction company was worthless. The trial judge said the business had zero net worth without explaining how he reached that number. Nevada rules require specific findings showing the basis for a decision. Hazel had introduced the company's financial statement showing a net stock value of about $105,449, and the true measure of the community's interest is the shareholders' equity. Olen only offered vague testimony that he did not know if the statement was still accurate. That was not enough to support a zero valuation, so the court sent the valuation issue back for the trial court to properly value the business and explain its reasoning.

The Browns married in 1954 and divorced in 1980. The divorce decree gave each spouse an equal interest in the couple's insurance policies (including any cash value), awarded the marital home to the wife subject to the husband's $15,000 equity interest payable in five years, and awarded the wife a share of the husband's military retirement as community property. After the husband appealed, the case was sent back in light of a 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision (McCarty v. McCarty), and the district court then held the military benefits were the husband's separate property and modified the spousal support. The husband refused to comply with the court's orders and, after the decree, canceled his life insurance policies. He was found in contempt and jailed. As a penalty for canceling the policies, the district court stripped him of his interest in the marital home (roughly equal to half the face value of the policies) to compensate the wife for her lost half-interest. It also imposed a $70-per-day charge, payable to Clark County, to cover the costs of his confinement. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed both of those measures. On the insurance, the court held that because the decree never required the husband to keep his life insurance in force, he was entitled to cancel the policies without penalty, so divesting him of his home interest was improper. On the per diem charge, the court held that while courts have inherent power to enforce their decrees through contempt, they are bound by statute; Nevada's contempt statutes allow fines or confinement but do not authorize a daily charge for the cost of confinement, and awarding that charge to Clark County - which was not a party to the divorce - was error. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed.

Richard and Angelina Korbel divorced in 1980 and had three children. Their divorce decree incorporated a property settlement agreement that set the child support Richard would pay. Over the next few years custody of the children shifted back and forth and the parties fought repeatedly in court about support. In one of those earlier fights, Richard appealed a ruling; that appeal was dismissed in April 1983. Months later, the trial court denied a motion by Richard to modify the decree, ordered him to keep paying support and related expenses under the settlement agreement, and also ordered him to pay Angelina $2,500 in attorney's fees - $2,000 of which was specifically for defending that earlier, already-dismissed appeal. Richard appealed only the part of the order that made him pay attorney's fees for the prior appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Richard and reversed the fee award. The general rule is that attorney's fees can only be awarded if a statute or an agreement allows it. Angelina pointed to three Nevada statutes, but the court found none of them applied. One statute covers fees needed to prosecute or defend the divorce case itself while it is pending - not an appeal. A second allows fees to a party in a divorce action when fees are put at issue in the pleadings, but it could not justify a fee awarded six months after the appeal had already been dismissed. The third only allows fees when a party is behind on money owed under a divorce decree. Because no law authorized fees for an appeal that had been over for six months, the court sent the case back to remove that part of the award.

When this couple divorced in 1981, the decree required the husband to pay alimony ($400 a month for ten years, then $200 a month for another ten years), but it said the alimony would stop if the wife remarried. In December 1981 the wife remarried, and the husband stopped paying. It later turned out her new husband had never divorced his first wife, so the wife obtained an annulment of that second marriage in 1983. She then asked the court to reinstate the husband's alimony. The trial court denied her request for back alimony but ordered alimony reinstated starting from the date of the annulment. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Both the divorce decree and Nevada law say alimony ends on 'remarriage,' and the case turned on what 'remarriage' means when the new marriage is later declared void. This was a question of first impression in Nevada. Following courts in other states, the Nevada court held that simply going through the remarriage ceremony ends the alimony obligation - even if that new marriage is later found void or voidable. The reasoning: the paying ex-spouse is entitled to rely on the remarriage ceremony and put those funds to other uses; otherwise his obligation could stay uncertain for years while hidden grounds for annulment lingered; and courts should not be burdened with stale alimony claims arising long after a remarriage. So the wife's alimony ended when she went through her remarriage ceremony in December 1981, the husband was entitled to stop paying, and the trial court was wrong to reinstate it.

Charles and Sylvia Robison married in Las Vegas in 1972; both had been married before and had children. Sylvia owned two pieces of real estate before the marriage: a parcel in Escondido, California, and a residence on Michael Way in Las Vegas. After they married, community funds (money earned during the marriage) were used to pay part of the purchase price on both properties - about $3,011 on the Escondido parcel and about $19,923 on the Michael Way home. The trial court still treated both properties as entirely Sylvia's separate property. It reasoned that because Sylvia earned much more than Charles and her income supported the household, the community payments did not give the community a real interest; for the Michael Way home, it also figured that Charles and his children benefited from living there, which offset any community interest. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the property rulings. When community funds pay part of the purchase price of one spouse's premarital property, the community gets a proportional ('pro tanto') interest based on how much the community paid versus how much was paid with separate funds. It does not matter that the money came mostly from the higher-earning spouse - all earnings during marriage are community funds, no matter who earns more. So both properties had a community interest the trial court ignored. The court also rejected the 'offset' for Charles living in the home: when a spouse chooses to use separate property (here, Sylvia's home) to cover community expenses even though community funds were available, that use is treated as a gift to the community, not a debt owed back. The court also reversed the trial court's confusing valuation of the couple's community business, because the judge's method was unclear, possibly double-counted debts, understated the company's actual long-term debt, and did not explain its basis - Nevada rules require specific findings. However, the court affirmed the $600-per-month, two-year spousal support award to Sylvia: awarding support is within the trial court's broad discretion, and although Sylvia had earned about $40,000 a year as a cocktail waitress, she had been injured and could no longer work, while Charles kept the businesses.

Les and Sharon Smith married in 1974; Sharon filed for divorce in 1977 and the trial began in 1980. Partway through trial, with a property settlement nearly done, Les's attorney asked the judge to go ahead and grant the divorce and deal with the property later - a 'bifurcated' (split) approach. Neither side objected. When the settlement still was not finished, the court granted Sharon an absolute divorce and referred the property issues to a master. The parties then signed a Marital Termination Agreement (MTA) requiring Les to pay Sharon $70,000, partly through monthly payments and partly through a promissory note. Les did not sign the note or fully pay, so Sharon sought to have him held in contempt. The court ordered him to sign the note and a deed of trust. Les appealed that order; while the appeal was pending he signed the documents and paid $10,000, but the Supreme Court (treating Sharon's non-response as a confession of error) had the order vacated. Back in the trial court, the judge ruled that the vacated order did not change Les's underlying duty under the MTA, denied his request to get his money back, found him in contempt for not signing a new note and deed of trust, and ordered him to pay $2,500 in attorney's fees. Les appealed again. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Les argued the trial court lost the power to enforce the property settlement once it granted the absolute divorce. While it is generally improper to grant a divorce without simultaneously dividing the community property (the Gojack rule), there is an exception when the parties agree to a bifurcated trial. Two facts placed this case within that exception: Les himself had asked the court to grant the divorce before the property was settled and never properly objected to bifurcation, and the decree referred the property matters to a master, which reserved the court's jurisdiction over them. Having reserved that issue, the court kept the power to enter orders enforcing the MTA. The court also upheld the attorney's fee award, since Nevada law allows fees to a party in a divorce action when fees are put at issue - and 'an action for divorce' includes the bifurcated property proceedings. The court cautioned, however, that bifurcated divorce proceedings are disfavored and should generally be avoided.

When this couple married in 1976, each already owned real estate. The husband owned a separate home on Model Way in Reno and an unimproved lot on Acquifer in Lemmon Valley; the wife owned a residence on Probasco Way in Sparks. During the marriage they lived in the wife's Probasco home and made mortgage payments on it, mostly from a crafts business they bought together after marrying. The husband, a carpenter, later built a house himself on his Acquifer lot, using money from various sources. At the divorce, each spouse claimed that community money had gone into the other's separate property, creating a community interest. The trial court found the husband's Acquifer property had a community interest (based on the value of his labor plus materials), but found no community interest at all in the wife's Probasco home, and found the crafts business had become the wife's separate property. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. When community funds pay part of the purchase price of one spouse's separate property, the community gets a proportional interest. The evidence showed community money (the business's profits before it became separate) had gone toward the mortgage on the wife's Probasco home, so the trial court was wrong to ignore any community interest there - and it gave no reason for doing so, even though equal distribution of community property is the general rule. On the husband's Acquifer house, the court's math was inconsistent: it identified separate-property sources for the building materials but then treated those same funds as community, with no support in the record. However, the court rejected the husband's argument that his own labor created no community interest - a spouse's labor and skills belong to the community, even work done on top of a regular job. Because the judge who tried the case was no longer on the bench, the court remanded for a completely new trial on the community property division.

Virginia and Tom Hay married in 1949 and divorced in 1957 - but almost immediately after the divorce they moved back in together and lived as a couple for about another 23 years, until they separated in 1981. They had three children (all adults by the time of this case). When they split, they owned various homes, land, and vehicles, titled in different ways: the residence was in both names as joint tenants, other real estate was in Tom's name alone, and the vehicles were titled to 'Tom or Virginia.' Virginia sued, asking the court to stop Tom from disposing of the property and to declare and divide her interest in it. She alleged that throughout their long relationship they had held themselves out as husband and wife, pooled all their money, and bought assets as if they were a marital community or a business partnership, intending the property to be treated as marital community property. The trial court threw out her case on summary judgment, ruling she had not stated a valid legal claim (Tom had already moved the vehicles into his name alone). The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Nevada is a notice-pleading state, and Virginia's complaint stated at least one valid claim - for breach of an implied agreement to acquire and hold property as if the couple were married or partners. Adopting the reasoning of the well-known California case Marvin v. Marvin, the court held that unmarried people who live together can make enforceable agreements about their property (as long as the agreement is not for sexual services). Those agreements can be express or implied from the couple's conduct, and courts can also use remedies like quantum meruit or constructive trusts. Where a couple agreed to acquire and hold property as if married, Nevada's community property laws apply by analogy. The court stressed that Nevada does not recognize common law marriage and strongly favors legal marriage, but that policy is not served by letting one partner walk off with the couple's assets. Because whether Virginia had an interest in the property was a genuine factual dispute - and title alone does not decide ownership - summary judgment was improper. The case was sent back for trial, with leave for Virginia to amend her complaint.

Phyllis Burton and Jimmie Burton were divorced in June 1982. Their divorce decree treated Jimmie's military retirement benefits as his own separate property, which was the correct result at the time under a 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision (McCarty v. McCarty) that barred state courts from dividing federal military retirement pay as community property. After the divorce, Congress changed the law. It passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, which again allowed state courts to divide military retirement benefits under state law. The Nevada Legislature then passed its own law, effective May 15, 1983, letting former military spouses who had divorced during a specific window (June 26, 1981 to January 31, 1983) go back to the district court and ask to have the property division re-examined to determine their rights to support or to a share of the military pension. Phyllis had filed a motion to modify her divorce decree, which the district court denied (most likely because it believed it had no power to change the decree). She appealed. While the appeal was pending, the new Nevada statute took effect, and she asked the Supreme Court to send the case back to the district court so it could reconsider under the new law. Before granting that request, the Supreme Court had to decide whether it even had the power to hear an appeal from an order refusing to modify a divorce decree. The court held that it did. It explained that when a party seeks to modify a decree based on a change in facts or law that happened after the divorce - and is not just re-attacking the original judgment - the denial is an appealable "special order made after final judgment." Because Phyllis was pointing to the new federal and state laws, her appeal was proper. The court then granted her unopposed motion and sent the case back so the district court could reconsider the property division under the new statutes.

The Forrests married in 1955 and separated in 1973, living apart for years before their case went to trial in 1981. The wife had asked for the family home in Sparks and modest maintenance; the husband claimed the home was held in joint tenancy (separate property) rather than community property, and he had bought a mobile home after the separation. The trial court decided the home was joint tenancy - even though no deed was ever put into evidence - ordered it sold or bought out, awarded no alimony, and made no ruling on the mobile home. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained that all property acquired during marriage is presumed community property, and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. A valid deed showing joint tenancy is the kind of clear proof needed; a spouse's mere opinion about whether property is separate or community carries no weight. Since no deed was in the record, the home had to be presumed community, and the case was sent back so the husband could try to prove joint tenancy if he could. The Court also held the trial court had to actually consider the required factors before denying alimony (alimony is part of a divorce and need not be specifically pleaded), and that the mobile home bought after an informal separation - with no written agreement or decree of separate maintenance - was community property. Retirement benefits earned during the marriage are also divisible, but the wife had not yet produced enough evidence about them.

Billy Dean York and Jeanne Darlene York were married twice. In their first marriage (which began in May 1976), Jeanne moved into Billy's home even though she owned her own house from a prior divorce. During that first marriage she sold her house for $15,000, and the money went into a joint account that the couple used for bills, clothes, family trips, and improvements to Billy's separate property. By the time the first divorce was granted in November 1979, the $15,000 was entirely spent. Jeanne did not make any claim to that money in the first divorce. About two weeks after the first divorce, the couple began living together again and remarried in December 1979. When the second divorce was granted in October 1982, the district court ordered Billy to pay Jeanne $15,000 for the money she had contributed during the marriage. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that Jeanne's claim to the $15,000 was barred by "res judicata" - the rule that a matter already decided (or that could have been decided) in an earlier lawsuit cannot be relitigated. Applying a three-part test, the court found: the issue (division of the couple's property) was the same as in the first divorce; the first divorce was a final judgment on the merits; and the parties were the same. The court stressed that even though Jeanne did not actually raise the $15,000 claim in the first divorce, a judgment is conclusive not only on issues actually decided but on all matters that could have been litigated. Because the claim could have been raised in the first divorce, she could not raise it in the second. The court sent the case back so the district court could decide whether the rest of the community property needed to be redistributed in light of this ruling.

Clyde and Betty Lou Schreiber married in 1955 and moved to Clark County, Nevada, in 1960. When their marriage broke down in 1977, they separated and made an oral (spoken, not written) agreement to divide their community property and go their separate ways. Acting on that agreement, they sold the family home and split the proceeds evenly; Betty Lou kept most of the other family assets, while Clyde kept the assets of a masonry contracting business the couple owned. In 1980, Betty Lou filed for divorce and asked the court to divide the community property. The district court found that the couple had in fact made an oral agreement to divide their assets, but ruled that because the agreement was not in writing, it was null and void and had no effect - so the court divided the property itself, ordering Clyde to hand over portions of the community property he held. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Clyde agreed that a property settlement agreement generally must be in writing (a Nevada statute requires a writing to convert community property into separate property). But he argued the oral agreement should still be enforced because the couple had already fully carried it out, and that letting Betty Lou hide behind the writing requirement would unjustly enrich her. The court agreed that the writing requirement (the statute of frauds) is not an absolute bar: under longstanding Nevada law, an oral agreement can still be enforced if the party seeking enforcement proves "part performance" or a basis for "estoppel," so that the statute meant to prevent fraud does not itself become a tool of fraud. The court saw no reason to treat oral property settlement agreements differently from other oral contracts. It sent the case back to the district court to decide whether the couple's oral agreement was enforceable under those principles.

This case was a property dispute between a father (Hugh Locken) and his son (Lawrence Locken) over ownership of land - not a divorce, despite the "Locken v. Locken" caption. The father had agreed to accept two land patent applications to satisfy a debt. Because federal law (the Desert Land Act) barred him from making more than one land entry in his own name, the father and son verbally agreed to put one application in the son's name; the father would improve the land, and once the patent issued, the son would deed the property to the father. The father did his part - spending considerable time, effort, and money improving the land - but the son refused to convey the property. The district court ruled that the son held the land in a "constructive trust" for his father (a court-created remedy that treats the legal owner as holding property for the person truly entitled to it), ordered the son to convey the land, and awarded the father attorney's fees. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the constructive trust but reversed the attorney's fees. On the constructive trust, the court held that the statute of frauds (which normally requires land agreements to be in writing) did not bar the trust, because the statute expressly allows trusts arising by operation of law. A constructive trust arises where (1) a confidential relationship exists, (2) the holder's retention of title would be inequitable, and (3) the trust is essential to justice - all present here, given the close father-son relationship and the son's abuse of it. The court rejected the son's "unclean hands" argument (based on the father's affidavit stating he had no interest in the parcel), because that misstatement was not directed at the son and, absent intent to deceive, did not amount to unclean hands; even an agreement that was arguably illegal would not shield the son from having to right his own subsequent wrong. On attorney's fees, the court reversed. Nevada follows the rule that attorney's fees are not awarded without a statute, rule, or contract. The statute the father could have relied on allowed fees only to a prevailing party recovering $10,000 or less, and the property here was worth over $50,000 - far exceeding the statutory limit - so the fee award was improper.

In this divorce appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court had twice ordered the respondent to obtain counsel and file an answering brief. First, in January 1982, she was given 30 days to get a lawyer and 60 days to file her brief; she did not comply. Then, on the court's own initiative in April 1982, she was granted an extra 30 days and warned that failure to comply might be treated as a confession of error, with the appeal decided accordingly. She still did not file a brief and apparently did not retain a lawyer. The court chose to treat her conduct as a confession of error under the appellate rules (citing its recent Rockwell decision). Accordingly, it reversed the district court's order that had denied the appellant's motion to modify the divorce decree, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

This was the second appeal in a long-running dispute over the estate of E.L. Cord, a wealthy businessman, brought by his widow, Virginia Cord, against the co-executors of his estate. In the first appeal (in 1978), the Nevada Supreme Court had struck down a post-nuptial agreement between the Cords and sent the case back so the district court could figure out how much of E.L. Cord's estate should be treated as community property (shared by the marriage) versus his separate property. On remand, the parties agreed that from 1937 to 1953, about 11.6 percent of E.L. Cord's holdings were community property. So the trial focused on his finances from 1953 until his death in 1974. After a two-week trial with dueling accounting experts (the widow's experts said about 79 percent should go to the community; the estate's experts said none of it was community property), the district court found the estate's evidence more credible and ruled that all of E.L. Cord's assets were his separate property. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. First, it rejected the widow's argument that the trial court ignored the "law of the case" from the first appeal (which had described E.L. Cord as devoting great time and energy to managing his wealth); that earlier observation was based only on financial records from 1937 to 1953, not the different 1953-1974 period now at issue. Second, the court held that E.L. Cord's separate estate was entitled to reimbursement for community expenses paid from separate funds after community assets ran out, because - like the husband in a leading California case (Beam) and unlike another (See) - he never made a conscious choice to spend separate property on the family; he assumed all his money was separate under the (later-invalidated) post-nuptial agreement. Finally, applying the rule that increases in the value of separate property must be apportioned between separate and community estates unless the increase is due only to natural enhancement or minimal owner effort, the court found substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that E.L. Cord expended only minimal effort and that his assets grew due to raw-land holdings, inflation, and natural enhancement. Because the determination rested on conflicting evidence and was supported by substantial evidence, it would not be disturbed.

When Forrest and Dicksie Duke divorced, the district court's July 1980 decree awarded Dicksie 35 percent of Forrest's military retirement pay as community property, and ordered Forrest to set up a permanent allotment with the U.S. Air Force so Dicksie's share would be sent directly to her. Forrest never set up the allotment, and never appealed the divorce decree. In June 1981, Dicksie asked the court for a judgment for the arrearages (the unpaid share of the retirement benefits Forrest owed her). Forrest fought that request and filed his own motion to modify the decree. He argued that a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, McCarty v. McCarty, meant the district court no longer had the power to enforce the part of the decree giving Dicksie a share of his military retirement pay. (McCarty had held that state courts may not divide military retirement benefits as community property.) The district court denied Forrest's motion, and he appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that McCarty does not apply retroactively to disturb a divorce decree that was already final and unappealed before McCarty was decided. Nothing in McCarty suggested the U.S. Supreme Court meant it to invalidate earlier, valid, unappealed state decrees, and most courts had held that McCarty does not change the res judicata (finality) effect of a decree that became final before McCarty. Because the Dukes' decree was final and never appealed, the district court correctly refused to modify it, and Dicksie remained entitled to enforce her 35 percent share.

In this divorce appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court had ordered the respondent (the party defending the appeal) to hire a lawyer within thirty days and to file an answering brief within sixty days, warning that failure to file the brief might be treated as a "confession of error" under the appellate rules. The respondent never responded and never filed a brief. The appellant then asked the court to treat that failure as a confession of error, and the motion was unopposed. The court granted the motion. Under the rule allowing it to treat a missing answering brief as a confession of error, the court reversed the part of the judgment that rested on findings that the appellant had a fraudulent intent when entering the marriage, and it sent the case back for a redistribution of the parties' property. The court made clear that the part of the judgment dissolving the marriage was not challenged and would not be affected - the parties remained divorced; only the property division tied to the fraud findings was undone.

The Wallakers divorced in 1969. Their divorce decree confirmed a property settlement agreement but expressly said the agreement was "not incorporated in this decree" and would "survive the decree" - meaning it stood on its own as a separate contract rather than becoming part of the court's decree. Eight years later, the appellant sued to "reform" (correct) the alimony terms of that property settlement agreement, based on contract theories of fraud and mutual mistake. Importantly, the appellant conceded the court could not modify the divorce decree itself; the lawsuit targeted only the separate agreement. At the end of trial, the district court refused to decide the merits, ruling instead that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to modify the property settlement," and entered judgment for the respondent. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Because the property settlement agreement was never merged into or incorporated into the divorce decree, it should be treated under ordinary contract law. While the court could not modify the divorce decree, the respondent offered no authority that the court was barred from reforming the separate agreement on contract grounds. The district court should have ruled on the merits of the reformation claim. Normally the Supreme Court would send the case back for findings on the merits, but because the trial judge who heard the case had since died, it reversed and remanded for a brand-new trial.

In this divorce action, the appellant asked the district court to move the case to a different county, based on a Nevada venue statute (NRS 13.040) that says an action should be tried in the county where the defendant resides when the action begins. The district court denied the request for change of venue on three grounds: that it had discretion to deny the motion; that it had already entered a temporary order in the case; and that the appellant had submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing an answer. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, rejecting all three grounds. First, the court held that a change-of-venue motion based on the defendant's residence under NRS 13.040 does not allow the district court to exercise discretion - if the statute applies, venue must change. Second, the "previously entered" order the district court relied on was just a temporary support order entered the same day the venue motion was filed, at a hearing where neither the appellant nor his counsel appeared. The court knew of no authority allowing reliance on such an order to deny a change of venue. Third, the record showed the appellant had not actually filed an answer - and, in any event, filing an answer does not waive a defendant's right to demand a change of venue. The court also noted that, although the respondent suggested the district court had found the appellant's residence to be in the current county, the district court's order made no such factual determination. The court reversed and sent the case back for a determination of the appellant's residence and further proceedings.

In this divorce case the trial court, sitting without a jury, granted the husband a divorce and divided the couple's property. The husband appealed, arguing the court made several mistakes, and the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with a number of them. First, the couple's home and a two-and-a-half-acre parcel of undeveloped land were both held in joint tenancy, which under Nevada law creates a presumption that the property is owned in a particular way based on how the deed reads. The trial court had treated these as community property. The Supreme Court held that even if the properties had been bought with community money, that fact by itself is not enough to overcome the presumption created by the form of the deeds. So the finding that these were community property was not supported by the record. Second, the trial court had found that the couple owed a community debt of about $130,000 to the wife's parents. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence properly in the record to support that finding, so it had to be set aside. Third, the trial court denied the husband any alimony without showing that it had considered the factors Nevada courts are required to weigh when deciding alimony. Because of these problems, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment - except for the part granting the divorce itself - and sent the remaining issues back for a new trial.

Raymond and Carmela Schick married in New York in 1965 and bought a duplex in 1970. They separated in 1975, and Raymond moved to Nevada and filed for divorce, asking that the duplex be sold and the money split evenly. Carmela asked instead that the duplex be given to her as her own separate property. At trial, Raymond was the only person who testified about money and property. Carmela was there but did not testify. Raymond said he was disabled, could not work, and received about $426 a month in Social Security and veterans' benefits. The couple's teenage daughter had been treated for cancer, which was in remission, and her treatment cost the parents nothing. The duplex was the only significant asset, with about $31,000 of equity. Carmela lived in it, made the $130 monthly mortgage payment, rented out the upstairs unit for enough to cover the mortgage, received $80 a month from a mortgage she held on other property, and she and the child each received about $166 a month in Social Security. The trial court gave the entire duplex to Carmela as her sole and separate property. Raymond appealed, saying that was an abuse of the court's discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and reversed. The court explained that while a trial judge has broad discretion to divide property, equal division is the rule in most cases. It pointed to an earlier decision holding that when the concern is keeping a family in the home, the judge can place a 'burden' on the property for the family's benefit rather than handing full ownership to one spouse. Here, Carmela's finances were at least as good as her disabled ex-husband's, and there was no evidence the child's medical condition created any financial burden. So there was no basis for the lopsided award of the only significant asset to Carmela, and the case was sent back for the property division to be reconsidered.