Nevada family-law case summaries

Dawnette and Christopher Davidson divorced in 2006. Their divorce decree said that Dawnette would sign over her interest in the marital home to Christopher (using a "quitclaim deed," which is a document transferring whatever ownership rights one person has in property to another). In exchange, Christopher was supposed to pay Dawnette half of the equity in the home, based on a 2006 appraisal. About two weeks after the divorce, the two reconciled and lived together in the home until 2011, though they never remarried. Dawnette signed and delivered the quitclaim deed in 2006. Christopher says he later refinanced the home and paid Dawnette her share; Dawnette says he never paid her. In 2014 - eight years after she delivered the deed - Dawnette filed a motion in the family court asking the court to enforce the decree and order Christopher to pay her. Christopher argued that her claim was too old: Nevada has a six-year deadline (a "statute of limitations") for actions to enforce a court judgment, and that deadline had passed. The district court agreed with Christopher and denied her motion without deciding whether Christopher had actually paid. On appeal, Dawnette made two main arguments. First, she said that family courts have a special, unlimited power to enforce divorce decrees under NRS 125.240, so the six-year deadline should not apply. Second, she said even if the deadline did apply, the clock should not have started running until 2011, when the couple finally separated for good - because while she was still living in the house, it was not reasonable to expect her to demand payment. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the district court. The Court explained that NRS 125.240 applies to "separate maintenance" cases (a different kind of family law action), not to divorces. The Court also pointed out that when the Legislature has wanted to exempt certain family-law claims from a deadline, it has said so explicitly - for example, NRS 125B.050 says there is no time limit on collecting back child support. Because the Legislature has not done that for property-division provisions in divorce decrees, the ordinary six-year deadline in NRS 11.190(1)(a) applies. As to when the clock starts, the Court held that under NRS 11.200 and a long-standing 1892 Nevada decision, Borden v. Clow, the statute of limitations began running when Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed in 2006. That was the moment Christopher's debt to her arose. Because she did not file her motion until 2014, more than six years later, her claim was too late. The Court also noted that Dawnette could have used NRS 17.214 to renew the judgment and avoid this problem, but did not. The Court acknowledged Dawnette's concern that this rule could give an ex-spouse a "windfall" by simply waiting out the deadline, but said the Legislature has also chosen not to let people "sit" indefinitely on potential claims.

When Eli and Diane Mizrachi divorced, they agreed - without writing it down in detail - that Eli would have their child for "the Jewish holidays" each year and Diane would have the child for "the Christian holidays." That phrase was placed into the divorce decree as the court's order. Less than ten months later, the parents started fighting about what "the Jewish holidays" actually meant. Eli said it meant 12 different Jewish holidays for their full duration; Diane said it meant only the first day of four major holidays - Hanukkah, Passover, Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur - matching a default schedule that judges in the Family Division use as a starting point. Diane asked the district court to "clarify" the decree. Without taking testimony or evidence, the judge - relying on the parties' written filings, lawyers' arguments, and the judge's own Internet research - decided that "the Jewish holidays" meant just the first day of the four holidays Diane identified. Eli appealed. The Court of Appeals first had to decide whether what the district court did was "clarification" (defining what an existing right means) or "modification" (changing the parties' rights). The court concluded it was clarification, because the decree gave Eli the right to parenting time on the Jewish holidays and the district court was only deciding which days that phrase covered, not changing the underlying right. Next, the court asked whether the phrase "the Jewish holidays" was ambiguous - that is, whether it had more than one reasonable meaning. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was ambiguous: Eli's reading (all 12 holidays) was reasonable, Diane's reading (four holidays, first day only) was reasonable, and other reasonable readings exist as well, because not every Jewish family observes the same holidays. Because the phrase was ambiguous, the district court was allowed to clarify it. But the Court of Appeals held that the district court used the wrong procedure. When a court clarifies an ambiguous term in a divorce decree that grew out of the parties' agreement, the court must try to figure out what the parties themselves meant when they agreed - not simply impose a default schedule. The parties had each made factual claims about what they intended, and those claims conflicted. The district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to sort out those facts and determine the parties' actual intent. Because that did not happen, the Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings. The court did not decide which side's interpretation of "the Jewish holidays" is correct. It also did not reach Eli's argument that the ambiguity should be held against Diane because her attorney drafted the decree, leaving that question open for the district court to consider after taking evidence.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. They shared joint legal custody of their two children, but Kerstan had primary physical custody. Their daughter I.M. struggled in Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to dyslexia. The parents agreed I.M. should attend private school in Reno and live during the school year with her paternal grandparents there, returning to Kerstan in the summers. I.M. moved to her grandparents' home in August 2013. In 2014, Michael asked the family court to give him primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed the change. Instead of choosing between the two parents, the district court awarded primary physical custody to the grandparents - even though the grandparents had never asked to be part of the case and neither parent had been told the judge was considering that option. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that custody award. The Court explained that a court generally cannot enter a judgment for or against someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. To get custody, a non-parent (like a grandparent) must either file their own custody case or formally join (intervene in) the existing one. Beyond that, before a Nevada court can take custody away from a fit parent and give it to a non-parent, it must make specific findings that giving custody to either parent would be detrimental to the child and that placing the child with the non-parent is necessary to serve the child's best interest. None of that happened here. The Court also held that giving custody to the grandparents without warning violated the parents' due process rights - their right to fair notice and a chance to be heard - because both parents had been arguing only about which of them should have custody, not about whether the grandparents should. The Court left undisturbed the portion of the order dealing with child support arrearages, because Kerstan did not include the hearing transcript needed to review that ruling. The case was sent back to the district court. On remand, the district court was directed to consider Kerstan's argument - which she had raised only in a reconsideration motion below - that no change in custody is warranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live elsewhere for educational reasons.

Beau Davis and Andrea Ewalefo, who never married, share an eight-year-old son, E.D. Davis works in Africa, primarily on Texas A&M-supervised reconstruction projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Ewalefo lives with E.D. in Nevada. The parents agreed E.D. should live mostly with Ewalefo and that they should share legal custody, but they disagreed about how Davis's visits should work. Davis asked the district court to let E.D. visit him for several two-week stretches and most of each summer, with the visits taking place in Rwanda or Uganda - safer countries that border the DRC where Davis works. Ewalefo opposed visits in Africa, citing her concerns about regional safety and the fact that Rwanda and Uganda have not signed the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty that helps return abducted children to their home countries. The district judge ruled that Davis could have up to five two-week visits per year, but barred any visits in Africa and went further by forbidding either parent from taking E.D. anywhere outside the United States until he turns 18, unless they both agree in writing or get a court order. The judge said briefly that "the world is a dangerous place" and noted that Rwanda and Uganda were not Hague signatories, but did not write detailed findings explaining how these restrictions served E.D.'s best interest. Davis appealed. A three-judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed by a 2-1 vote, with concerns about the lack of findings. Davis then asked the full Nevada Supreme Court to reconsider. The Nevada Supreme Court, sitting en banc, agreed to reconsider and reversed the travel and visitation restrictions. The court held that under Nevada law, a judge deciding custody must make specific written findings explaining how the decision serves the child's best interest. The decree here did not explain why visiting Africa was bad for E.D., why Davis could not take E.D. anywhere outside the United States during his allotted visitation, or why a flat ban on international travel until age 18 was justified. The court noted that the district judge had actually made findings favorable to Davis - including that both parents are fit, conflict between them is minimal, there is no evidence of abuse or risk of abduction, and E.D. had previously traveled to Africa with his parents and benefited from it. The court explained that judges may, in appropriate cases, restrict international travel or visitation in countries that have not signed the Hague Convention - but only with findings showing why such restrictions serve the child's best interest. If the concern is abduction, the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act (NRS Chapter 125D) provides graduated tools, from requiring travel itineraries to posting bonds to outright travel bans. Saying merely that "the world is a dangerous place" is not enough. The case goes back to the district court to take more evidence and make proper findings about whether E.D. can safely visit his father in Rwanda or Uganda, whether such visits are in his best interest, and whether any abduction prevention measures are warranted. The portions of the decree the parties did not dispute (custody and child support) remain in place. Two justices dissented, arguing that the record contained substantial evidence supporting the district court's decision and that the majority was effectively reweighing evidence the trial judge had already evaluated.

Michael and Ellen Bluestein divorced in 2004 after 13 years of marriage and one child together. They agreed Michael would have the child from Thursday evening to Sunday morning each week, with Ellen having the child the rest of the time. A month after the divorce, they filed a parenting agreement, adopted by the court, that called the arrangement "joint legal and physical custody." Neither parent paid child support. Years later, Michael started receiving public assistance. The State went after Ellen for partial reimbursement as child support. To avoid the joint-custody child support formula (which produced an $82-per-month obligation for her), Ellen asked the family court to relabel her as the "primary physical custodian." She did not ask to change the actual schedule - just the legal label. Her argument relied on a 2009 Nevada Supreme Court case, Rivero v. Rivero, which said that a joint physical custody arrangement generally requires each parent to have the child at least 40 percent of the time (about 146 days a year). Ellen calculated that Michael had the child only 38 percent of the time, below the threshold. The district court agreed with Ellen. After an evidentiary hearing focused largely on who was responsible for the child on Thursdays, the court found Ellen had the child 260 days and Michael 105 days in 2011, and on that basis redesignated her as primary physical custodian. The court then sent the case back to a child support master to recalculate support. The court did not say whether changing the custody label was in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It made two main points. First, once either parent asks the court to revisit a custody agreement, the court does have authority to review the arrangement and apply current Nevada law - even if the moving parent only asks to change the label, not the timeshare. Second, and more importantly, the 40-percent guideline from Rivero is just a tool. It cannot be applied mechanically as the only factor. The controlling question, by statute, is what is in the child's best interest. Because the district court treated the 40-percent figure as the sole basis for changing the custody designation - and never made findings about the child's best interest - it abused its discretion. The Court was particularly concerned that this kind of mechanical application can result in stripping a parent of joint custody status (with downstream consequences for child support) even when the existing schedule gives the child frequent contact with both parents and even when the only reason for the relabeling is to shift the support calculation. The case was sent back to the family court to reconsider the request with the child's best interest as the primary focus.

Craig and Catherine Doan married in 1985 and later divorced. Craig worked as an air traffic controller for the FAA for more than 23 years and earned federal retirement benefits. During the divorce, both spouses filed sworn financial statements indicating they had retirement accounts or pensions, and Catherine's pretrial memorandum specifically identified Craig's federal retirement benefits as property earned during the marriage. After their lawyers withdrew shortly before trial, the couple settled their property division themselves at a conference with the judge. The final divorce decree, entered in August 2003, divided one retirement asset (a voluntary thrift savings plan) but said nothing about Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine asked the court to divide the FAA retirement benefit, arguing it had been left out of the decree and should now be split. The district court first denied her motion, finding the benefit had been fully disclosed during the divorce. But after Catherine asked the court to reconsider, the court changed course: it found the benefit had been left out of the decree by "mutual mistake" and divided it using a federal formula. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRCP 60(b) - a rule of court procedure allowing a party to ask for relief from a final judgment - a motion based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed within six months of the judgment. Catherine waited more than six years, so her motion was too late. The court then asked whether her request could instead be treated as an "independent action" - a separate lawsuit seeking relief in equity, which is not subject to the six-month deadline but requires a much higher showing: it is available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The court held that Catherine could not meet that standard. Nevada law recognizes that when a marital asset was never litigated or decided in the divorce - for example, because neither party mentioned it - it can be divided later through an equitable action. But here, the FAA retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed throughout the divorce proceedings: it appeared in Craig's pay statements, W-2 forms, and financial affidavit, and Catherine's own pretrial memorandum named it as property to be divided. The district court even found that the benefit was considered in setting the length of alimony. The Supreme Court explained that the key question is whether the asset was actually litigated and decided in the divorce, not simply whether it was written into the decree. Because the benefit was before the court in the original divorce, it was not an "omitted asset," and leaving it out of the written decree was not the kind of exceptional circumstance that justifies reopening a final judgment years later. Whether Nevada should have a law allowing courts to divide property merely left out of a decree - as California does - is, the court said, a question for the Legislature.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.

Edwin Griffith, a Reno resident, married Gabriela Gonzales-Alpizar, a citizen of Costa Rica, in Costa Rica in 1999. Before the wedding, the couple signed a premarital agreement that, among other things, waived any claim for alimony (spousal support) unless a divorce would leave one spouse eligible for public assistance. The couple lived in Reno with Gonzales-Alpizar's daughter Nicolle and their son Anthony, but the marriage deteriorated. In 2003, during a family trip to Costa Rica, Gonzales-Alpizar refused to return to Reno, and Griffith came home alone. In 2005, while Griffith was in Costa Rica to discuss a divorce settlement, he was allegedly served with a "Demand for Alimony," which under Costa Rican law covers both spousal and child support. The parties tell very different stories about what happened - Gonzales-Alpizar says Griffith understood he was being served and angrily threw the papers to the floor; Griffith says a stranger read something aloud in Spanish that he could not understand and he left with no paperwork. When Griffith did not respond, a Costa Rican court entered a default judgment ordering him to pay $180 per month in spousal support and $235 per month in child support for each of the two children. Gonzales-Alpizar never told the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement. In 2007, a Costa Rican court granted Gonzales-Alpizar a divorce, with service made only by publication in Costa Rica even though she knew Griffith lived in Nevada. Griffith also filed for divorce in Nevada. The Nevada district court decided the parties had already been effectively divorced in Costa Rica, refused to enforce the spousal support and child custody provisions of the 2007 Costa Rican decree because service in that proceeding was invalid, but found that Griffith had been served in the 2005 support proceeding. The district court said the 2005 support order could be enforced if it was valid under Costa Rican law, and directed the parties to litigate Griffith's defenses in Costa Rica. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two questions of first impression. First, it examined the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a law codified in NRS Chapter 130 that lets Nevada courts enforce support orders from other "states," including foreign countries in certain circumstances. The court held that Costa Rica does not qualify as a "state" under any of the three methods in the statute: it has not been declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law; Nevada's Attorney General has not declared it a "state"; and Gonzales-Alpizar failed to show that Costa Rica has procedures for enforcing foreign support orders that are "substantially similar" to UIFSA. Comparing how Nevada and Costa Rica calculate child support, the court explained, is not the relevant inquiry - what matters is whether Costa Rica has laws allowing foreign judgments to be recognized (that is, reciprocity). Second, the court considered "comity" - a principle of courtesy under which one jurisdiction's courts may give effect to another jurisdiction's judgments out of deference and respect. The court adopted Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which lists reasons a foreign judgment may or must be refused recognition, such as lack of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or fraud. Applying that framework, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Griffith was properly served with the Demand for Alimony, so due process did not bar enforcement. But because Gonzales-Alpizar purposefully failed to tell the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement - which the court concluded was enforceable and which governed spousal support - the court declined to recognize the spousal support award as a matter of comity. The child support award, however, was a different matter, because the premarital agreement said nothing about child support. Griffith claimed the child support award was procured through fraud - that Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented his parental relationship with Nicolle (who is not his biological child, with a dispute over whether he adopted her under Costa Rican law) and misrepresented his income and properties. The district court had made no findings on those claims, instead saying Costa Rica was the only forum for resolving them. The Supreme Court remanded for the district court to make findings under the Restatement approach and decide whether the child support portion of the order should be enforced as a matter of comity.

Sha'Kayla St. Mary and Veronica Lynn Damon were a couple who decided to have a child together. They used in vitro fertilization: Damon's egg was fertilized with sperm from an anonymous donor, and St. Mary carried the pregnancy and gave birth. Around the time of the procedure, the two signed a co-parenting agreement stating that they would "jointly and equally share parental responsibility" and, if their relationship ended, would continue to share the duties of raising the child. The child was given the hyphenated last name St. Mary-Damon. About a year after the birth, the relationship ended and the two disagreed over sharing time with the child. In 2009, Damon obtained a court order stating she was "the biological and legal mother of said child" and directing that her name be added to the birth certificate. When St. Mary later filed her own case seeking custody, visitation, and child support, the district court - apparently relying on that 2009 order - treated St. Mary as a mere surrogate (a woman who carries a child for someone else) rather than a parent. The court limited the hearing to "third-party visitation," a lesser right available to non-parents, and refused to consider whether St. Mary was a legal mother. It also declared the co-parenting agreement null and void, reasoning that under the then-existing surrogacy statute "a surrogate agreement is only for married couples, which only include one man and one woman." The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada's parentage law, a woman can establish that she is a child's legal mother by "proof of her having given birth to the child." It also held that Nevada law does not prevent a child from having two legal mothers - here, one woman supplied the egg and the other gave birth, and each of those facts can support legal motherhood. Because the 2009 order recognized Damon as a mother but never said St. Mary was not one, and because the district court decided St. Mary was a surrogate without ever holding a hearing on that question, the case must go back for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether St. Mary is a legal mother or instead a surrogate/gestational carrier with no legal relationship to the child. The court also held that the co-parenting agreement was not a surrogacy contract at all - nothing in it said St. Mary was giving up the child or her rights - and that such agreements between two parents are consistent with Nevada public policy. The court stated that an agreement between two parents about custody after a breakup "must not be deemed unenforceable on the basis of the parents being of the same sex." If the district court finds on remand that both women are legal parents, it must consider the co-parenting agreement in deciding custody.

Geanie and Kevin Bradford were married on December 27, 2008, in a ceremony performed by Bryce Duckworth, a newly elected district court judge. Judge Duckworth had taken his oath of office four days earlier, but under the Nevada Constitution he was not authorized to take the bench until January 5, 2009. In 2011, Geanie filed for divorce and sought custody of the couple's minor child. At the divorce hearing, the district court itself raised a question no one had briefed: did Judge Duckworth actually have authority to perform the wedding? The court concluded he did not - reasoning that being sworn in does not confer authority before the judge's term begins - and, finding no valid marriage, dismissed the divorce complaint as moot. The order stated that custody issues would be handled in a separate companion custody case. Geanie never appealed that dismissal. Instead, a year later, she asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition - an extraordinary court order directing a lower court to act or to stop acting - to undo the dismissal. The Supreme Court declined. It observed that the district court "may have been in error" about the marriage, noting that both a statute (NRS 122.090) and the "de facto officer doctrine" provide that a marriage performed by someone without actual authority is still valid if both parties believed in good faith that the person had authority. But being wrong does not make a judgment void. Because the district court had jurisdiction over the divorce complaint, its dismissal order was a valid, final judgment that Geanie could have appealed. And because an appeal would have allowed the Supreme Court to meaningfully review the validity of the marriage, an appeal was an adequate legal remedy - and a writ petition cannot substitute for an appeal that was never filed. The court acknowledged that Geanie's failure to timely appeal or move to set aside the order leaves her without legal recourse to challenge the district court's conclusion, but it declined to entertain the petition.

When a person files for bankruptcy, most of what they own goes into a "bankruptcy estate" that can be used to pay creditors. But state law lets debtors keep - or "exempt" - certain property from that process. In Nevada, the list of exempt property is set out in a statute, NRS 21.090. Two of those exemptions were at issue here: one that lets a debtor keep a single vehicle if the debtor's equity in it does not exceed $15,000, and a catch-all "wildcard exemption" that lets a debtor protect up to $1,000 of other personal property. Ana Fox filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 2010. Her husband did not join her bankruptcy case and did not file his own. Even so, because Nevada is a community property state, the couple's shared marital property became part of Fox's bankruptcy estate. Fox then claimed exemptions for two vehicles and more than $1,400 in other property - in effect, one set of exemptions for herself and a second set for her husband. The bankruptcy trustee, Yvette Weinstein, objected, arguing that a debtor gets only one vehicle exemption and one $1,000 wildcard exemption, and that a non-debtor spouse has no right to claim exemptions in someone else's bankruptcy. The federal bankruptcy court sided with Fox, which effectively doubled her exemptions. The trustee appealed, and the federal appellate panel asked the Nevada Supreme Court to answer the underlying question of Nevada law: can a debtor claim these exemptions on behalf of a spouse who isn't in bankruptcy? The Nevada Supreme Court said no. The court looked at the words of the statute itself, which refer to the "judgment debtor" - the person against whom the exemptions operate - and said nothing about a non-debtor spouse or a dependent. Following the reasoning of an Idaho bankruptcy court decision that addressed the same question under Idaho law, In re DeHaan, the court held that "based on NRS 21.090(1)(f) and (z)'s plain language, Nevada law does not allow debtors to claim motor vehicle and wildcard exemptions on behalf of their non-debtor spouses." A debtor in Nevada is therefore limited to one motor vehicle exemption not to exceed $15,000 and other personal property exemptions not to exceed $1,000.

Michael and Susie Grisham settled their divorce on the morning of trial. Their lawyers had a final draft property settlement agreement (PSA) with a few handwritten changes but no time to type a clean copy. So they put the settlement on the record: the draft was admitted as an exhibit, the handwritten changes were read aloud, and both spouses testified under oath that they had reviewed, understood, and agreed to be bound by the PSA. The judge accepted the settlement and recorded it in a minute order granting the divorce on the PSA's terms. Susie and her lawyer later signed the clean copy; Michael refused to sign, asked for changes, then stopped responding, and eventually asked for a mistrial. The Nevada Supreme Court held the PSA was enforceable even though Michael never signed it. Under District Court Rule 16 (and its Eighth District counterpart EDCR 7.50), a settlement of pending litigation can be enforced by motion if it is either put in a signed writing OR entered in the court minutes following a stipulation. Because the parties stipulated on the record and the court entered a minute order adopting the PSA, DCR 16 was satisfied. The court also held that a settlement placed on the record in open court is not barred by the statute of frauds even though it involves interests in land - the in-court testimony supplies the authentication that a signature would, and the testimony can incorporate a longer unsigned writing by reference. The parties' stated intent to prepare a clean execution copy did not prevent immediate binding agreement, and Michael showed no basis (mistake, fraud, etc.) to be relieved of the stipulation. The court affirmed the decree and the related attorney's-lien judgment.

This case is about whether parents can undo a court-approved visitation arrangement with a grandparent simply because they are the parents. After Roger Rennels divorced in 2001, he and his daughter Martina lived for five months with his mother, Audrey Rennels, in northern California, and Martina and Audrey developed a close relationship that continued after Roger and Martina moved away. According to Audrey, Roger stopped allowing Martina to see her in June 2004, so Audrey went to court under NRS 125C.050, a Nevada statute that lets a nonparent ask for visitation rights with a child. Before the court could hold an evidentiary hearing, Audrey and Roger settled. They signed a stipulation - a formal written agreement - stating that "all pending issues" between them were resolved, and the court entered an order adopting it. Under that order, Audrey received four supervised visits per year, a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to represent the child's interests) was appointed, and a psychologist would counsel the family. If the guardian ad litem and the psychologist concluded supervision was no longer needed, Roger agreed to abide by that determination. The parties followed this arrangement until 2008, when the psychologist, Dr. John Paglini, recommended unsupervised visits and Roger refused. Audrey asked the court to enforce the order; Roger and his wife Jennifer (who had adopted Martina in 2006) countered by asking the court to end Audrey's visitation entirely, relying on Troxel v. Granville, a U.S. Supreme Court decision recognizing that fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests. The district court sided with the parents and terminated Audrey's visitation. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held, first, that the stipulated visitation order was a final judgment - meaning it resolved the dispute and could not simply be relitigated on the same facts. Second, the court held that while the parental presumption applies when a nonparent first seeks visitation, it no longer controls once a court has approved a visitation arrangement. At that point, a parent who wants to change or end the arrangement must satisfy the same two-part test that applies when parents seek to modify custody between themselves: show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) that the change serves the child's best interest. Because neither the parents nor the district court identified any substantial change in circumstances - the court pointed only to increased "acrimony" between the parties, which the Supreme Court said is not enough by itself - the termination order was reversed. The stipulated visitation order remains in effect, and on remand the district court must appoint a new guardian ad litem before deciding whether Audrey's visitation should be modified or terminated under the new test.

Hony Fernandez and Jennifer Fernandez (now known as Jennifer Rothman) divorced in 1998 after a brief marriage that produced two children. Both worked in the securities industry. The original divorce decree required the father to pay $3,000 per month in child support, plus health insurance, uncovered medical expenses, a housekeeper, and a nanny or day care. In 1999, the parties agreed to raise support to $4,000 per month (effective 2001) and to add private-school tuition. In 2000, after a failed reconciliation, they entered a third stipulation giving both parents joint physical custody — and in that stipulation, both parents "voluntarily waive[d] any right they may have pursuant to Chapter 125B of the Nevada Revised Statutes" to seek modification of the father's child support obligation. By 2007, according to the father's motion, his fortunes had reversed dramatically. He had once earned between $500,000 and more than $4,000,000 a year trading securities, but heavy market losses beginning in 2002 left him earning $3,000 a month selling cars, plus a similar amount in interest — while his child support obligations totaled roughly $80,000 a year. The mother, meanwhile, had remarried; her household income equaled or exceeded his, and the two had comparable net worth. The trial court itself found that if it applied the statutory child support formula to the parties' current incomes, "neither party would be obligated to pay child support to the other." Even so, it refused to modify the order, relying on the parties' waiver and on the fact that the father could still pay from his remaining assets. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that parents cannot, by agreement, strip a court of its statutory power to review and modify child support. Once a support agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree, it becomes a court order, not just a private contract, and Nevada's statutes provide for its periodic review and modification — up or down — as circumstances change. Quoting a California decision, the court concluded that "the court always has the power to modify a child support order, upward or downward, regardless of the parents' agreement to the contrary." The court also rejected the trial court's approach of requiring the father to draw down his assets before modification could be considered, and it rejected the mother's argument that her partial performance of the agreement barred the father from challenging it. One limit remained for the father, however. Under the court's recent decision in Rivero v. Rivero, the mere fact that more than three years had passed since the last review entitled him to a review, but not automatically to a modification: on remand, he must still demonstrate changed circumstances. The court noted that his alleged income drop — more than 80 percent — appears to satisfy the statutory trigger, under which a change of 20 percent or more in the support obligor's gross monthly income is deemed a changed circumstance requiring review for modification.

Shinichi and Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997 and moved several times between Japan and the United States, buying a home in Henderson, Nevada. Their three children were all born in Japan. In June 2004, the children traveled from Nevada to Japan. The parents told very different stories about that trip: Yoko said it was only a summer vacation and that Shinichi refused to send the children back in August 2004; Shinichi said the whole family had planned to live in Japan permanently. Either way, the children stayed in Japan with Shinichi. About eight months after the children left, in February 2005, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court to order the children's immediate return, calling their retention in Japan an international abduction. The Nevada court agreed with Yoko, ordered the children returned, later held Shinichi in contempt when they were not returned, and ultimately - after a hearing at which Shinichi's lawyer appeared but Shinichi personally did not - entered a "default" divorce decree. That decree gave Yoko sole legal and physical custody with "no contact" for Shinichi, all of the community property (including a share of a house in Japan), spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court decided three questions. First, did the Nevada court have power to decide custody at all, given that the children had been out of Nevada for eight months when the case was filed? Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a law that generally gives custody-deciding authority to a child's "home state" - a child's temporary absences from a state do not break the required six-month residency period. Because the evidence supported the district court's finding that the children left Nevada in June 2004 for a temporary three-month vacation, Nevada remained their home state, and the Nevada court properly had jurisdiction. Second, was the order sending the children back to the U.S. proper? The district court had relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty designed to ensure the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their home country. But Japan has not signed that treaty, so the Convention and its U.S. implementing statute provide no remedy here. Even so, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not need the treaty: because it had custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, it had authority to order the children's return as part of the custody case. So the return order stood, even though the Hague Convention did not apply. Third, was the default divorce decree proper? A "default" is what happens when a party fails to respond to a lawsuit. Here, Shinichi had filed an answer and a countercomplaint for divorce, and his lawyer appeared at the divorce hearing - only Shinichi himself was absent. The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances a default was inappropriate, and that the district court erred by treating the hearing as a one-sided "prove-up," awarding Yoko everything she asked for, cutting off meaningful cross-examination, and never deciding the case on its merits. The court reversed the decree's awards of custody, property, support, and fees, and sent the case back for a hearing on the merits. It denied Shinichi's request that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand, because he cited no record support or legal authority showing reassignment was necessary.

On Christmas Day 2003, Steven and Susan Maini, their two children, and Susan's parents were all killed when their small airplane, piloted by Susan's father, crashed at the North Las Vegas airport. Because everyone died at once, two family members ended up on opposite sides of a probate fight: Susan's brother, Paul Waldman, administered her estate, and Steven's brother, Michael Maini, administered Steven's estate. Two sets of assets were at stake: a 95-percent ownership interest in the family company, Maini Distributing, Inc. (MDI), and about $1.1 million in proceeds from two life insurance policies on Susan's life (a Prudential policy and a Jackson National Life policy). MDI had paid all the insurance premiums, Steven was the named beneficiary on both policies, and each policy said that if no beneficiary survived Susan, the money would go to her estate. The trial court decided that both the MDI ownership interest and the insurance money were "community property" - property that belongs equally to both spouses in a marriage - and split each in half between the two estates. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed on two of the three main issues. First, the ownership of MDI. Steven's mother gave him 90 percent of the company during his marriage, and he inherited another 5 percent when she died. Although property acquired during marriage is usually presumed to be community property, the court explained that property received as a gift or inheritance is presumed to be the recipient's separate property. Waldman offered no evidence to overcome that presumption, so the court reversed and held the MDI interest was Steven's separate property, which goes to his estate. Second, MDI's claim to the insurance money. MDI argued that because it paid every premium, it should own the policies and collect the proceeds. The court held, for the first time in Nevada, that a corporation can in some situations gain an ownership interest in a life insurance policy through equitable devices called constructive trusts and resulting trusts - court-imposed arrangements that treat one person as holding property for the benefit of another. But those doctrines did not fit here: there was no fraud, no unjust enrichment, and no evidence that anyone intended the policies to benefit MDI (MDI was never named a beneficiary and never treated the policies as company assets). The court also held that even if a trust theory fit the facts, a Nevada statute, NRS 687B.040, requires a company to have an "insurable interest" in a person's life - a real economic stake in the person staying alive - before it can own insurance on that person. Susan was MDI's unpaid vice president and accountant, but the $1.1 million payout was far more than the cost of replacing her services, so MDI would have profited more from her death than her life. It therefore had no insurable interest, and the court affirmed the ruling that MDI gets none of the proceeds. Third, who gets the insurance money as between the two estates. Nevada's Uniform Simultaneous Death Act says that when an insured person and the policy's beneficiary die at the same time and there is no evidence about who died first, the law treats the insured as having survived the beneficiary. The trial court had ruled the Act did not apply and split the money as community property. The Supreme Court held the Act did apply, because neither Susan's will nor her insurance policies called for a distribution different from what the Act would produce. Under the Act, Susan is presumed to have outlived Steven, and that presumption carries all the way through to the final distribution of the money - even though the policies were bought with community funds. Because Steven died without a valid will, his community-property half of the proceeds passed to Susan under Nevada's intestacy rules, since she was presumed to have survived him. The result: all of the insurance proceeds belong to Susan's estate and should be distributed under her will, with Waldman as her ultimate residuary beneficiary.

Michelle and Elvis Rivero divorced, and their divorce decree said they would share "joint physical custody" of their young child — but the actual schedule gave the child to Ms. Rivero five days a week and Mr. Rivero two days a week. Neither parent was ordered to pay child support. About a year later, Ms. Rivero went back to court asking for primary custody and child support, claiming Mr. Rivero rarely spent time with the child himself and lacked suitable living arrangements. The trial judge, Judge Miley, kept the joint-custody label in place, denied child support, sent the parents to mediation to work out a schedule, and eventually changed the schedule to an even 50/50 split, saying she was "just trying to find a middle ground." Along the way, Ms. Rivero asked Judge Miley to step off the case (a request called recusal), and when the judge refused, formally moved to disqualify her, claiming the judge was biased based on the parties' physical appearance. The chief judge rejected that motion as meritless, and Judge Miley then ordered Ms. Rivero to pay Mr. Rivero's attorney fees for having to fight a frivolous motion. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court used the case to answer a question Nevada law had never resolved: what exactly is "joint physical custody"? The court adopted Missouri's definition — an arrangement giving each parent "significant, but not necessarily equal" time with the child, structured so the child has "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents." In other words, joint custody does not require an exact 50/50 split, but each parent's time must be significant and meaningful. Applying that framework, the supreme court held the trial court went wrong in two ways. First, it labeled the arrangement joint physical custody without making specific factual findings to back that up. Second, it changed the custody schedule to an equal split without making specific findings that the change was in the child's best interest — the touchstone for all custody decisions. Both rulings were sent back for a do-over under the new definition. On child support, the court held that a parent may be entitled to support under Nevada's child-support statutes regardless of what the divorce decree says, and that a court departing from the statutory amounts must explain why in specific factual findings. Because the trial court did neither, that ruling was also reversed. The supreme court also announced a new math formula — a modified version of its earlier Wright v. Osburn approach — for calculating support when parents share joint custody but split time unequally, accounting for both differences in income and differences in time spent caring for the child. Finally, the court sided with the trial judges on the bias claims. A judge is presumed unbiased, and unhappiness with a judge's rulings is not a legally recognized ground for disqualification; the record contained no evidence of bias. The attorney-fee award stood as well: the court rejected Ms. Rivero's argument that a statute shielding parties from contempt punishment for seeking a change of judge also shields them from paying attorney fees for filing a frivolous disqualification motion.

This case is about when a court may permanently end a parent's legal rights to her children, and who has to prove what before that happens. In May 2002, Child Protective Services removed two children, then twelve and eleven years old, from the home of their mother, Tammila G., and her boyfriend, George L. CPS had received a report that friends of the couple were binding the children with duct tape, slapping, and kicking them while the adults were away. According to the children, this happened repeatedly, and although they told their mother, she did not take steps to stop it. During a follow-up home visit, Tammila admitted to recent methamphetamine use, and George was arrested for a probation violation after officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the house. The children were made wards of the State and placed in foster care. The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) gave Tammila a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to be reunited with her children, such as drug testing, a psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, and proof of a stable home and income. Over roughly three and a half years, DCFS filed six reports with the court, each showing that Tammila was not completing the plan. To her credit, she visited the children regularly while they were in Nevada, missing only one visit. Eventually the children were placed with their maternal aunt and uncle in Louisiana, who were interested in adopting them, and the State petitioned to end Tammila's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court granted the petition, finding both that termination was in the children's best interests and that "parental fault" existed - the two things Nevada law requires before parental rights can be terminated. On appeal, Tammila made two main arguments. First, she said the State had to prove that an actual adoptive placement existed for the children before her rights could be terminated, relying on the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), a federal law Nevada follows in order to receive federal child-welfare funding. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this. Reading the federal statute's plain language, the court explained that it requires states to begin looking for an adoptive family at the same time as they seek to terminate parental rights - not to prove one exists first - and the statute even excuses that concurrent search when "the child is being cared for by a relative," which was the situation here. The court also found nothing in Nevada's own statutes requiring proof of an adoptive placement before termination. Second, Tammila argued that the State should have presented evidence of what the children themselves wanted. Nevada law (NRS 128.107(2)) tells courts to consider a child's desires about termination if the child is capable of expressing them, but the statute does not say which side must produce that evidence. Separately, another statute (NRS 128.109(2)) creates a "presumption" - a legal starting assumption - that termination is in a child's best interest once the child has lived outside the parent's home under a protective placement for 14 of any 20 consecutive months. Here, the children had been out of the home for over forty consecutive months. The court held that once that presumption kicks in, it is the parent's burden - not the State's - to offer evidence of the children's desires if the parent wants the court to consider them, because such evidence is part of rebutting the presumption. Tammila offered no such evidence. The court noted that a CASA report from about two years before the hearing indicated the children did not wish to be adopted, but that report predated their move to their aunt and uncle's home, and the district court considered it and terminated the rights anyway. Finally, the court reviewed the record and concluded that substantial evidence supported the termination. Tammila claimed two years of sobriety and a stable home but presented no independent proof of either; she still lived with her boyfriend in the same house where the abuse occurred, and the record did not show the threat had been eliminated. Meanwhile, the children were described as flourishing with their aunt and uncle in Louisiana, with improved school performance and behavior. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the termination.

Kelly and Steve McClintock married in September 1993 - but there was a problem. The day before their wedding, Kelly filed a joint divorce petition to end her prior marriage to John Tolas, but a judge did not sign that divorce decree until about three weeks later. So when Kelly married Steve, she was technically still married to Tolas, which made the McClintock marriage void. For about ten years Kelly and Steve believed they were validly married. After they separated and Kelly filed for divorce, Steve discovered the timing problem and counterclaimed for an annulment, arguing their marriage never legally existed. The parties even stipulated the marriage was void, and Steve, relying on that, married someone else (Marla). Kelly then asked the court, in her old Tolas divorce case, to backdate her Tolas divorce decree using a 'nunc pro tunc' order - a device that lets a court correct the record to reflect what was actually done earlier. She wanted the Tolas divorce dated to the day before she married Steve, which would retroactively make the McClintock marriage valid (and undo Steve's later marriage to Marla). The district court agreed and backdated the Tolas decree, reasoning that signing the uncontested petition was just a clerical task. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that a nunc pro tunc order can only make the record reflect what a court actually did or intended to do at the time - it cannot change the actual date a case was decided. Even though the Tolas divorce was uncontested and simple, entering the divorce decree was a judicial act that determined the parties' rights and fixed when community property stopped accumulating, not a mere clerical function. Because the court did not actually decide the Tolas divorce until the judge signed the petition weeks after the McClintock wedding, backdating it was improper. The McClintock marriage remained void.

This case is about which legal standard applies when a parent asks a court to take custody of a child back from a nonparent — here, a grandmother — after a court originally gave the nonparent custody in a contested case. In 1993, the child's mother was killed in a drive-by shooting; the father, Milton Jones, was shot in the head and hospitalized, and the child suffered minor injuries. An investigation indicated a rival gang was likely retaliating against Milton. The maternal grandmother, Mable Hudson, asked the court for custody. The district court found that Milton was an unfit parent and that extraordinary circumstances overcame the "parental preference" — the legal presumption that a fit parent should get custody of a child over a nonparent. The court awarded Mable and Milton joint legal custody, with Mable having primary physical custody and Milton having visitation. About ten years later, Milton asked the court to give him sole legal and physical custody, arguing that he had changed his lifestyle and was now living a productive, law-abiding life with his new wife. The district court interviewed the child, who repeatedly said she wanted to live with her father. The court found that Milton had turned his life around, stated that it was bound to apply the parental preference presumption, and restored sole custody to him. Mable appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that the parental preference doctrine applies only to the initial custody decision between a parent and a nonparent — not to later requests to change custody. Once a court has already found a parent unfit or found extraordinary circumstances and awarded custody to a nonparent, the parent who later wants custody back must satisfy the same two-part test used in custody disputes between two parents: the parent must show that circumstances have materially changed and that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change in custody. The court distinguished earlier cases in which parents voluntarily and temporarily gave custody to relatives (for example, while dealing with imprisonment or drug addiction). In those situations, the court explained, parents keep the benefit of the parental preference when they seek to end the arrangement, because courts do "not want to discourage parents from willingly granting temporary guardianships, while working through problems in their own lives, if that is in the child's best interest." Milton's case was different: he did not voluntarily set up a guardianship, and a court had already found him unfit after a litigated dispute. The court also declined the State Bar Family Law Section's suggestion to adopt a burden-shifting approach that would blend the parental preference into the modification analysis. Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, the Nevada court reasoned that "[h]aving once protected the parent's right to custody, at the risk of sacrificing the child's best interests, we should not then sacrifice the child's need for stability in its care and living arrangements by modifying those arrangements more readily than in a parent-parent case." Because the district court applied the parental preference instead of the two-part modification test, the Supreme Court reversed its order and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Beatriz and Gilbert Irving met through a pen pal service, exchanged letters and calls for nearly ten years while Beatriz lived in the Philippines, and married shortly after Gilbert helped her immigrate to the United States in 2002. They lived together only from June to October 2002. Beatriz never became pregnant during that time despite the couple's efforts, and after she was diagnosed with tuberculosis she moved out. Gilbert then sued to annul the marriage, claiming his consent had been obtained by fraud because, he said, Beatriz misrepresented that she wanted to have his child. Nevada law (NRS 125.340) says a marriage can be declared void if consent was obtained by fraud 'and fraud has been proved.' The statute does not say how strong the proof must be. After a bench trial the district court called the case 'very close' but granted the annulment. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It decided, for the first time, that a person seeking an annulment for fraud must prove the fraud by 'clear and convincing evidence' - a demanding standard higher than the ordinary 'more likely than not' civil standard. The court reasoned that Nevada already requires that higher level of proof to annul a marriage for intoxication and to prove the tort of fraud, and that there is a strong public policy in favor of marriage, so courts should not annul a marriage on weaker proof. Applying that standard, the court found no substantial evidence that Beatriz committed fraud. Gilbert admitted he would have married her even if she could not have children, that having a child was not his main reason for marrying, and that Beatriz never told him she could not conceive. The couple had regularly tried to conceive. Because the record did not clearly and convincingly show fraud, the court held the district court abused its discretion and reversed the annulment.

Thomas and Svetlana Potter married in 1994, had a child in 1995, and divorced shortly after the child was born. Svetlana was initially awarded primary physical custody, but in 1996 the parents agreed by stipulation to share joint physical and legal custody - meaning both parents shared responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. According to the record, the arrangement worked without custody problems from 1996 to 2003, with both parents actively involved. In 2003, Svetlana received a job offer from a California hospital for a registered nurse position at a higher salary than she was earning in Las Vegas, and she wanted to pursue a nurse anesthesiologist degree from a California school - a program not available in Las Vegas. She filed a petition under NRS 125C.200, Nevada's relocation statute, asking for permission to move to Corona, California with the child. Thomas opposed it, arguing that the Legislature amended the relocation statute in 1999 so that it no longer applied to joint physical custody arrangements, and that Svetlana would first have to win primary physical custody before she could seek relocation. The district court treated the case as an ordinary relocation petition under NRS 125C.200, analyzed the relocation factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz, granted Svetlana's petition, awarded her primary physical custody, and provided for significant contact and visitation between Thomas and the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that NRS 125C.200 does not apply when parents share joint physical custody. The statute's current text speaks only of "custodial" and "noncustodial" parents; an earlier version of the statute (formerly NRS 125A.350) had expressly covered "a parent having joint custody," but the Legislature removed that language. The court found the legislative history confirmed that the statute was intended to apply only to primary physical custody situations. Instead, the court explained the correct procedure: when a parent who shares joint physical custody wants to move out of Nevada with the child, that parent must file a motion for a change of custody under NRS 125.510(2), seeking primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The district court then decides, under the "best interest of the child" standard, whether the child is better off living outside Nevada with the relocating parent as primary physical custodian, or living in Nevada with the non-moving parent as primary physical custodian. The moving parent bears the burden of proving that living out of state with him or her serves the child's best interest. Because the district court applied the wrong statute, did not use the factors from Truax v. Truax, and made no finding that the move was in the child's best interest, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live in California with Svetlana or in Nevada with Thomas.

Richard and Marcie Williams went through a marriage ceremony in 1973 and lived as husband and wife for 27 years. But Marcie had never actually divorced her prior husband, so the marriage was legally void. Marcie testified she believed she was divorced because her former husband told her so. When Richard discovered the truth, he filed for an annulment. Marcie asked for half of the couple's property and for spousal support, arguing she should be treated as a 'putative spouse' - someone who married in good faith believing the marriage was valid. After a trial, the district court granted the annulment, divided the jointly held property equally, and ordered Richard to pay Marcie $500 per month for four years as compensation for giving up her career to raise their children. The Nevada Supreme Court adopted, for the first time in Nevada, the 'putative spouse doctrine.' Under it, a person who participates in a marriage ceremony with an honest and reasonable good-faith belief that the marriage is valid is treated as a spouse for certain purposes. Good faith is presumed, and the court found substantial evidence that Marcie acted in good faith in relying on her former husband's statement that they were divorced. But the doctrine has limits. The court held that community property principles apply to divide property acquired during a putative marriage, so it affirmed the equal division of property. However, the court held the doctrine does not allow spousal support (alimony) unless there is a statute permitting it or the other spouse acted in bad faith or by fraud. Nevada's annulment statutes do not authorize alimony, and neither spouse here acted in bad faith. So the court reversed the spousal support award while keeping the property division.

Glenda and Antonio Rodriguez were married for more than twenty-one years. Antonio, a hotel catering director, earned at least $75,000 a year; Glenda, a school hall monitor, earned about $14,000 a year and had health problems. Despite the long marriage and the large income gap, the trial judge refused to award Glenda any alimony. The judge did so largely because Glenda had had an extramarital affair, had left the family, and had taken money from the parties' adult son's injury settlement (the judge found both spouses had wrongly taken that money). The Supreme Court reversed. It held that a trial judge may not consider a spouse's marital fault or misconduct when deciding whether to award alimony. The Court explained that in 1993 the Legislature amended the divorce statute (NRS 125.150) and deleted the phrase 'having regard to the respective merits of the parties,' which had been the basis for older suggestions that fault could matter. The amendment reflected the Legislature's intent that, in a no-fault divorce state, a party's fault should not affect alimony. Alimony, the Court said, is financial support paid when justice and equity require it; it is 'not a sword to level the wrongdoer' or 'a prize to reward virtue.' Applying the long-standing 'Buchanan factors' (things like the length of the marriage, each spouse's income, health, age, and ability to earn), the Court concluded Glenda plainly had a meritorious claim for alimony given the twenty-one-year marriage, her low income and poor health, and Antonio's much greater earning power. The trial judge abused his discretion by punishing Glenda for her affair. The Court reversed the denial of alimony and sent the case back to set a just and equitable amount without regard to Glenda's fault.

Dr. Gary Kantor, a kidney specialist with substantial business interests, and Janet Kantor signed a premarital agreement before marrying in 1990. The agreement generally made each spouse's income separate property, but it said that salary or fees Gary received for his personal medical services (which came through his professional corporation, KNC) would be community property. Gary also owned dialysis-center businesses (RDC) that could not bill for physician services. When Gary filed for divorce in 1997, Janet's first amended answer admitted the premarital agreement was valid. Shortly before trial, after her accounting expert suggested Gary's income from the dialysis centers (over $5 million) should also count as community property, Janet asked the court for permission to amend her answer again to challenge the agreement's validity. The district court refused. After trial, it ruled the dialysis-center income was not community property under the agreement, granted the divorce, and later awarded Gary about $19,580 in attorney's fees under an indemnity clause in the agreement. Janet appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, because Janet was dilatory, filed on the eve of trial, and both parties had relied on the agreement's validity (including Gary's continued use of the attorneys who drafted it, who might have been disqualified if validity were challenged). Because Janet had admitted the agreement was valid, the court was not required to independently test its fairness. The Court also held the district court kept jurisdiction to award attorney's fees even after Janet's appeal, because fees were a collateral issue, and that Gary was entitled to fees under the agreement's indemnity provision because Janet's motion was an attempt to nullify the agreement. Although the Court expressed surprise at the size of the fee award, it found no abuse of discretion.

This is the second time the divorce war between Tracy O. Guerin (later Tracy O. Hill) and Harold D. Guerin reached the Nevada Supreme Court. After an earlier appeal sent the case back to the trial court, the parties negotiated and the district court entered a second amended divorce decree in January 1999. That decree awarded Harold two beach houses in San Carlos, Mexico, and ordered Tracy to transfer title to him by a set date. Tracy refused. She had already transferred one of the houses to a Mexican national acting as her agent, and she ignored the court's orders to hand over the properties and to appear in court. The district court found her in contempt, sentenced her to jail, voided her transfer of the house, and issued a warrant for her arrest. Tracy fled and did not comply. While a fugitive, Tracy tried to appeal. The Supreme Court refused to hear her appeal, applying the 'fugitive disentitlement doctrine.' That rule lets an appeals court dismiss the appeal of a person who is dodging arrest and defying the trial court's orders. Because Tracy was evading a contempt warrant and continuing to disobey the court, the Court dismissed her appeal. Charles Hill, Tracy's new husband, tried to appeal on behalf of the 'Hill Family Trust,' a trust he and Tracy created. But Charles is not a lawyer, and Nevada law does not let a non-lawyer represent a trust or any other entity in court. Because the trust's notice of appeal was filed by a non-attorney, it was invalid and did not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction, so the Court dismissed the trust's appeal too. The Court did allow Charles Hill to remain in the case in his individual capacity.

Dean and Kim Schmanski married in 1984 and divorced in 1997. The fight was over the proceeds of three trusts holding stock in a family company, Carsonite International. Before marriage, Dean received gifts of company stock from his father. He later placed sale proceeds into joint accounts he shared with Kim, used those accounts to buy more stock, and eventually held large amounts of stock through three trusts. The district court found two of the trusts (the Dean M. Schmanski Trust and the Charitable Remainder Trust) were community property and split them equally, and found the third (the Carsonite Trust) was mostly community property. The Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part. First, it held that Nevada's divorce statute (NRS 125.150) does not automatically and permanently convert separate property into community property just because it is placed in joint tenancy; the statute only requires that joint-tenancy property be disposed of in the same manner as community property. However, when a spouse places separate property into joint tenancy, the law presumes a gift to the community, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Because Dean had placed the stock proceeds into a joint account with Kim (with both names on checks, a credit card, and account statements), substantial evidence supported treating the first two trusts as community property, and the equal division was proper. Second, the Court reversed as to the Carsonite Trust. The stock in that trust was purchased with a $25,000 gift from Dean's father plus a promissory note. The note was 'non-recourse,' meaning the only remedy on default was to take back the stock, so Kim had no personal liability and the note was not a community debt. The father intended a gift to benefit Dean and Dean's children, not to create a community interest. The Court held the entire Carsonite Trust was Dean's separate property (subject to the children's interests) and sent that issue back for a disposition consistent with the opinion.

This decision consolidated two divorce cases raising the same question: whether an ex-spouse's cohabitation with a new partner justifies reducing or ending alimony (spousal support). In one case, Richard Gilman sought to end alimony to Marjorie because she lived with a boyfriend, Tom; their divorce decree said the court would consider alimony if Marjorie cohabited with a man who 'significantly contributes to her support.' In the other, Ken Callahan sought to end alimony to Valerie because she lived with a boyfriend, Chuck; their decree had no cohabitation clause. Both district courts refused to reduce the alimony, and both paying ex-husbands appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed both denials and adopted an 'economic needs test.' Under that test, cohabitation by itself is not enough to change alimony; alimony may be modified or terminated only if the recipient's actual financial need for support has decreased because of the cohabitation. Merely sharing a home, without evidence that the recipient's real financial needs have gone down, is not enough. The Court explained this test fairly balances everyone's interests: it does not punish people for choosing to cohabit, it protects a recipient who might be left with nothing if the relationship ends (since unmarried partners generally owe each other no support), and it protects the paying spouse from effectively subsidizing a third party. Applying the test to Ken and Valerie's case (no cohabitation clause), the Court held Ken failed to show Chuck's contributions reduced Valerie's actual needs. In Richard and Marjorie's case, the Court held the parties' own decree contained a specific cohabitation clause, so that contractual provision - not the general 'changed circumstances' statute - governed; and the evidence showed Tom never 'significantly contributed' to Marjorie's support. The Court distinguished the Michoff line of cases (about business partnerships between cohabitants), which was not present here. Both denials were affirmed.

Martin and Roslyn Smolen married in 1970. After Martin was diagnosed with a brain tumor and his health declined, the couple divorced in 1994 - on a lawyer's advice - to protect their assets from anticipated medical costs. The 1994 divorce decree divided their property and ordered that their Las Vegas home 'shall remain in joint tenancy,' reflecting their wish that whoever survived would keep the house. Martin and Roslyn kept living together for nine months after the divorce, but Martin's health kept getting worse and he was later diagnosed with dementia and other conditions. Roslyn obtained a temporary guardianship over Martin without his knowledge and placed him in a group home against his wishes. Martin reached out to his nephew, Jason (a lawyer), got the guardianship revoked, and was found competent. Martin then set up a trust naming Jason as beneficiary and, by a deed dated May 31, 1995, transferred his interest in the home into that trust. Martin died in October 1995. After Martin's death, Roslyn asked the court to cancel Martin's deed, arguing the divorce decree's 'joint tenancy' language locked in the survivor's right to the whole house and barred Martin from transferring his share. The district court agreed and cancelled the deed. Jason appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that a joint tenancy carries with it, under long-standing common law, the power of any joint tenant to transfer his own share at any time - even without the other's knowledge or consent - which severs the joint tenancy and ends the right of survivorship. The divorce decree created an ordinary joint tenancy and said nothing prohibiting a future transfer. So when Martin deeded his share to his trust, he lawfully severed the joint tenancy, turning it into a tenancy in common. His half passed through the trust to Jason, who became a co-owner (tenant in common) with Roslyn. Because Martin's transfer violated neither the common law nor the divorce decree, the court reversed the order cancelling the deed and sent the case back for a new order.

This is the first Supreme Court decision in the long Guerin divorce dispute; the Court consolidated three related matters. Tracy Guerin (later Tracy Hill) filed for divorce from Harold Guerin. Harold did not defend, and Tracy obtained a default divorce decree dividing more than $2.7 million in assets, including assets in the couple's 'Guerin Family Trust.' Harold later sued Tracy and moved to set aside the decree, claiming the property division was unfair. The district court refused to set aside the decree, imposed an injunction and a receiver to protect the former trust assets, and later held Tracy in contempt (and ordered assets transferred from the 'Hill Family Trust,' created by Tracy and her new husband) when she disobeyed. The Supreme Court ruled on three matters. First, on Harold's appeal, the Court reversed the refusal to set aside the divorce decree. Under NRCP 55(b)(2), a party who has appeared must get at least three days' written notice before a default judgment hearing. Tracy gave Harold's attorney only 24 hours' notice, and his attorney objected at the hearing. When a party who has appeared does not get the required notice, the resulting default judgment is void. So the Court reversed and ordered the decree set aside. Second, on Tracy's writ petition, the Court held the district court lacked authority, at the time of its April 8, 1996 order, to transfer assets from the Hill Family Trust because the trust had not yet been made a party to the case (it was joined a week later). Under the Olsen rule, court orders affecting the rights of an indispensable party who has not been properly joined are void as to that non-party. The Court issued a writ preventing enforcement of that order against the Hill Family Trust. Third, the Court affirmed the injunction and the contempt finding against Tracy, because there was evidence she was hiding assets and she clearly disobeyed the court's orders.

Tom and Margaret Shydler divorced after a seventeen-year marriage. Tom built a successful construction company (Aztec) and generally earned over $100,000 a year; Margaret ran a struggling insurance company (Alamo) and had far lower earning potential. The trial court denied Margaret any spousal support, reasoning that she had already received pre-divorce support and would receive monthly installment payments to equalize the division of community property. The Nevada Supreme Court held this was an abuse of discretion. Property-equalization payments are not a substitute for alimony: they serve different purposes. A community-property award divides what a spouse already owns as a matter of law, while alimony meets a former spouse's post-divorce needs and, in longer marriages, narrows large gaps in earning capacity and helps the recipient live as nearly as possible to the pre-divorce standard of living. The trial court effectively forced Margaret to spend down her share of community property for support while Tom kept the income-producing assets - which was unfair. Interim pre-divorce payments used for community expenses also do not bar post-divorce alimony. The Court remanded for a fair alimony award, at least for a rehabilitation period. The Court also reversed a provision placing Tom's collectibles (toy soldiers, a library, lithographs) in a trust for the couple's son, holding there is no authority to place community assets in trust for a child unless it is for the child's support. It affirmed that a valid contract transmuted 'Lot 54' into Tom's separate property.

Ursula Epstein filed for divorce from Edwin Epstein in December 1994. Her lawyer initially granted Edwin an open-ended extension to answer while the two sides tried to settle. Over the next several months the lawyers exchanged letters and a proposed settlement, and Edwin retained counsel, but negotiations broke down and Edwin never filed a formal answer. Ursula served and filed a 'praecipe for default' (a request that the clerk enter a default) on September 14-15, 1995, and the clerk entered Edwin's default. Two weeks later the court signed a default divorce decree. Edwin's counsel later filed an answer and a motion to set aside the decree under NRCP 60(b), arguing the default judgment was not properly noticed and was procured by fraud or through Edwin's excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion, finding Edwin had adequate notice, no fraud occurred, and his neglect was not excusable. Edwin appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It first held that Edwin had 'appeared' in the case, because a course of settlement negotiations counts as an appearance - which meant Ursula was required to give him written notice of her application for a default judgment. The court then held that merely serving the praecipe for default did not satisfy that requirement: a praecipe only tells the other side that a default could be sought, not that a default judgment will be sought at a particular time. Because Edwin did not receive proper notice of the application for default judgment, the default judgment was invalid. The court also used the case to clean up a conflict in its own precedent, formally overruling the requirement (most recently stated in Lesley v. Lesley) that a party seeking to set aside a default judgment must show a 'meritorious defense.' Going forward, no meritorious defense is required to set aside a default judgment. The court reversed and remanded.

Madeline and Dr. Anthony Barelli divorced in 1988. Before the divorce, Madeline had worked as an office manager in Anthony's medical practice for about $30,000 a year. As part of the divorce, they signed a property settlement agreement stating that Madeline was and would remain self-supporting and that no alimony was warranted. That agreement was not merged into the divorce decree, and neither the agreement nor the decree said anything about Madeline keeping her job. Madeline later claimed that, just before the divorce, she and Anthony had a secret unwritten 'side agreement' that she would keep working for him for life (or be paid $30,000 a year plus health benefits for life) instead of receiving alimony. In 1992 she sued, asking the court to rewrite (reform) the property settlement agreement because Anthony had supposedly tricked her into waiving alimony, or, in the alternative, to award her damages for breach of the oral employment contract. The case was transferred to family court, which kept jurisdiction over Madeline's objection. After a trial without a jury, the family court found there was no oral side agreement, denied reformation, and dismissed the case. Madeline appealed, arguing the family court had no power (jurisdiction) over what she called a purely contractual dispute, that she was wrongly denied a jury trial, and that dismissal was improper. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held the family court properly had jurisdiction: actions to reform or rescind an unmerged property settlement, filed separately from the divorce, fall within family court authority, and a court may resolve related issues (like whether an oral contract existed) that are necessary to decide claims within its jurisdiction. Because the action sought to undo the marital settlement and revive alimony and property claims, it was a domestic proceeding in which there is no right to a jury trial. Finally, since the trial judge - as the fact-finder after all evidence was in - reasonably found no oral agreement existed on conflicting evidence, there could be no fraud and the reformation/rescission claim was properly dismissed.

Deborah and Eldon Lesley married in 1992 and lived near Winnemucca, Nevada, with their three young children. Deborah alleged that in January 1996 Eldon hit her in front of the children and threatened worse. On the advice of her parents and a crisis line, she left Nevada with the children for her parents' home near Fresno, California. There she consulted a paralegal, obtained a temporary protective order, and filed for legal separation - believing she could resolve everything in California. Eldon then filed for divorce in Nevada in March 1996. When Deborah did not respond, the Nevada court entered a default divorce decree in April 1996 that gave Eldon sole legal and physical custody of the children, ordered Deborah to pay child support, and awarded Eldon essentially all the property. Deborah, once she learned she was actually divorced and consulted a Nevada attorney, moved to set aside the default. The district court denied her motion, emphasizing its displeasure that she had tried to litigate in California rather than Nevada. Deborah appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Applying the factors for setting aside a default under NRCP 60(b), the court concluded Deborah had satisfied them: she filed her motion promptly (well within the six-month limit), showed no intent to delay, acted in good faith, and reasonably lacked knowledge of Nevada procedure because California attorneys and courts had led her to believe she could proceed there. On the 'meritorious defense' factor, the court explained that in a child custody matter, that factor is met by showing the district court did not consider the children's best interests - and here the default decree awarded custody without any best-interest hearing, despite evidence Eldon may have committed domestic violence. The court stressed that Nevada policy favors deciding cases on the merits, especially in domestic relations, and that a court may not use a custody award to punish a parent's conduct. It reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

In the Puttermans' divorce, the family court divided the community property unequally, giving the wife (Barbara) certain stock and a valuable country club membership on top of her one-half share of the rest of the community property. The court said it would be 'inequitable' not to do so, and reasoned in part that the wife was the principal earner while the husband (Mitchell) had contributed less to the community. Mitchell appealed, and the wife argued the old 'just and equitable' standard should apply because the complaint was filed before the 1993 statutory change. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that in 1993 the Legislature changed Nevada's rule for dividing community property from 'equitable' to 'equal': NRS 125.150 now requires an equal division unless the court finds - and sets forth in writing - a 'compelling reason' for an unequal division. The old equitable factors (like which spouse acquired the property) were deleted from the statute. The court held the amended, equal-division statute applied to the February 1994 decree, so it was error for the family court to divide property 'fairly and equitably' based on the wife being the greater contributor - undercontribution during a marriage is not a compelling reason for an unequal split. However, the court affirmed the result because the trial court had made specific, meticulous findings of genuine financial misconduct that did qualify as compelling reasons: the husband refused to account for finances under his control, lied to the court about having no income, and after separation charged several thousand dollars on credit cards that the wife had to pay. Those findings supplied compelling reasons under NRS 125.150 and its earlier decision in Lofgren v. Lofgren, so the unequal disposition was justified. The court distinguished true financial misconduct (hiding, wasting, or misappropriating community assets) from mere disproportionate contribution or consumption during the marriage, which cannot justify an unequal division.

Ronald and Noleen Boulter divorced after a 37-year marriage. Their property settlement agreement, which the divorce decree merged in, contained a paragraph (4E) saying the parties would 'equalize' their Social Security benefits: once each began receiving Social Security, each would pay the other half of what they received, with the checks direct-deposited and the other spouse's share automatically transferred. When Ronald turned 65, he refused to apply for Social Security or to pay Noleen the equivalent of half his benefits. Noleen asked the court to enforce paragraph 4E and to award her attorney's fees under the agreement. Ronald argued that federal law bars dividing Social Security benefits in a divorce. The district court sided with Noleen, enforced the paragraph, and awarded her fees. Ronald appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that a federal statute (42 U.S.C. Section 407(a)) broadly protects Social Security benefits from being transferred, assigned, or reached by legal process, and that under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause this federal law overrides conflicting state action. Because the district court had merged the benefit-splitting agreement into the divorce decree and was being asked to enforce it, that was state action preempted by federal law. The court also held that spouses cannot validly contract to transfer their unpaid, future Social Security benefits, so the agreement to split future benefits was invalid and unenforceable by any court. Even benefits already received and deposited in a bank account remain exempt from legal process, so a court could not compel Ronald to hand over half after receipt either. The fact that the parties agreed voluntarily did not matter, because the statute bars voluntary as well as involuntary transfers. The court reversed the order enforcing paragraph 4E, vacated the attorney's fee award, and sent the case back for the district court to reconsider the overall property distribution and the fee question.

Claire and Brent Gramanz married in 1975 and divorced in California in 1989. During the marriage, Brent ran souvenir shops on the Las Vegas Strip under long-term commercial leases, and the couple acquired a 25% interest in the underlying property. In their California divorce, they stipulated to divide their property equally, agreeing that Brent's corporation (Anisac) would be valued and split. Accountants valued Anisac's stock at $300,000, and the leases were not separately valued. Years later, ITT-Sheraton wanted to buy the property. It paid Brent $6,450,000 to buy his Anisac stock for the purpose of extinguishing the three leases - far more than anyone had valued the leases during the divorce. Claire claimed she was entitled to a share of those proceeds because the leases had never really been divided. Brent filed a declaratory relief action in Nevada, and the parties stipulated that Nevada courts would decide the Nevada property and corporate issues. The Nevada district court ruled Claire had no interest in the $6,450,000 and that she owed part of a 'bonus fee' Brent had promised his attorney. Claire appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reached three conclusions. First, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the Nevada declaratory relief action, since the California divorce appeared to have fully resolved the property years earlier and the parties had agreed Nevada would decide these issues. Second, on the leases, the court reversed: the evidence showed the accountants never actually valued the three commercial leases as separate assets when they valued Anisac, so the leases (which turned out to be enormously valuable) were 'omitted' community assets. Because both spouses had mistakenly believed the leases had no independent value, that mutual mistake meant the property was not divided equally as intended, and Claire retained an interest in the leases subject to division. Third, on the attorney's bonus fee, the court affirmed: substantial evidence showed Claire knew of and acquiesced in the fee agreement and benefited from the attorney's work, so she was liable for her share. The court affirmed the bonus-fee ruling, reversed on the leases, and remanded to determine Claire's interest in the leases.

When William and Marion Spector divorced, their voluntary settlement agreement (folded into the divorce decree) said William would pay Marion $1,500 per month in alimony until certain events happened - one of which was Marion 'cohabit[ing] with an adult male not a member of her family in a romantic relationship.' In 1995 William moved to modify the decree, believing Marion was living with a man romantically. At the hearing, the judge stopped William's lawyer from presenting evidence of cohabitation and instead got Marion to admit she was living with a man she was sexually involved with. But the judge said the real question was whether this 'cohabitation provision' was even enforceable, and ruled that the provision was void from the start as against public policy. The judge therefore denied William's motion. William appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. Pointing to an ample body of decisions from other states allowing spouses to agree that alimony ends upon the recipient's cohabitation, and noting Marion offered no authority to the contrary, the Court held that a voluntary provision ending alimony upon the recipient's romantic cohabitation is not against public policy. It reversed the district court's ruling that the provision was void from the beginning and sent the case back for further proceedings (where the actual question of whether Marion's living situation triggered the provision could be addressed).

This divorce case interpreted, for the first time, the 1993 change to Nevada's community-property law. Before 1993, courts divided community property in whatever way was 'just and equitable.' The 1993 amendment to NRS 125.150 instead requires an 'equal' - 50/50 - division, unless the court finds 'compelling reasons' to divide it unequally and writes down those reasons. The Legislature did not define what counts as a 'compelling reason.' Here, the husband, Benjamin Lofgren, cross-appealed after the trial court gave his wife, Linda, more than half of the community property. The trial court had found that Benjamin engaged in financial misconduct: in violation of the court's preliminary injunction (which barred either spouse from transferring or hiding community property), he moved $100,000 in community funds to his father (leaving about $39,800 unaccounted for and either wasted or hidden) and made a series of other improper transfers and expenditures totaling $56,200 - together roughly $96,000 of community money he wasted or secreted. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that when one spouse intentionally loses, spends, or destroys community property through misconduct, that misconduct can be a 'compelling reason' for an unequal division, and the court may increase the other spouse's share to make up for it. On the numbers, half of the roughly $96,000 Benjamin misused was about $48,000; the trial court had actually given Linda about $44,106 more than a straight half - slightly less than the misconduct would justify - so the award was, if anything, favorable to Benjamin. The Court found the trial court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the unequal division.

At a court settlement conference on April 29, 1992, the Allens reached an oral divorce settlement: the wife waived spousal support, and in exchange the husband agreed to pay certain community debts and pay her $16,250 to equalize the property division. The judge announced a divorce from the bench that day, and the husband's counsel agreed to prepare the formal decree - but did not. Nearly a year later, in April 1993, the court entered a written divorce decree 'nunc pro tunc' (backdated to April 1992) adopting the year-old oral agreement. In the meantime, according to the wife, the husband told her he would not pay as agreed and would file for bankruptcy - which he did, discharging most of his obligations to her. Before the written decree was entered, the wife alerted the court to the resulting gross inequity and argued the husband never intended to pay and was using bankruptcy to defraud her. The court entered the decree anyway, and later denied her motion to set it aside, ruling the relief was 'barred by federal law' (bankruptcy). The wife appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that nothing in federal bankruptcy law prevents a state court from setting aside the divorce decree or from hearing the wife's claims about spousal support and property division on their merits. Relying on its prior decision in Siragusa v. Siragusa, the court explained a state court can consider a spouse's discharged property-settlement obligation when deciding alimony without re-creating a discharged debt. The court further held the backdated decree was 'inherently unfair' and had to be set aside regardless of any fraud question, because one spouse should not be allowed to take all the benefits of the settlement while leaving the other at a severe disadvantage. Because the husband defended solely on bankruptcy and never addressed the merits, the court reversed, set aside the nunc pro tunc decree, and remanded for the district court to hear the matter de novo on the merits, including the effect of the husband's bankruptcy on the parties' rights.

Charles and Claudette Dimick signed a prenuptial agreement the day before their 1989 wedding. It said that if they divorced, Charles would pay $200 per month of spousal support for each month of the marriage, that their community property would be split seventy-five percent to Claudette and twenty-five percent to Charles, and that whoever lost a fight over the agreement would pay the other side's attorney's fees. Charles filed for divorce in 1992. Claudette at first denied the agreement was valid, but before any hearing on that question she agreed it was valid. Charles appealed four rulings. First, he said he should get his attorney's fees as the 'prevailing party' under the agreement. The Supreme Court disagreed. Charles had not sued to enforce the agreement - he filed for divorce and asked that property be split under an agreement he himself had already broken. And because Claudette gave up her challenge before any hearing, she was not a 'non-prevailing party.' The Court explained that a party cannot be a 'prevailing party' where the case never goes to judgment, and that penalizing someone for dropping a claim would discourage settlements. Second, Charles argued he should get credit toward his $10,200 contractual spousal-support obligation for the mortgage payments he made during the divorce. The Court rejected this too. The mortgage payments were ordered as temporary support during the case; the contract support was a separate, post-divorce obligation, so the two could not be mixed. Charles won on the last two points. On the 'Fort Apache' lot, the Court held Claudette had no property interest in it because no deed was ever delivered - simply signing a purchase agreement does not transfer land under Nevada law - so the district court was wrong to give her a share and to fine Charles $2,000 for signing her name on the assignment. Finally, on a bed Charles brought into the marriage, the Court held the district court should have returned each party's separate personal property unless it specifically found the property had to be awarded as support. The Court affirmed the attorney's-fee and spousal-support rulings, reversed the Fort Apache and separate-property rulings, and sent the case back.

Jane and Frank Cook married in 1978, and Frank started his own Las Vegas law practice that same year. When they decided to divorce in 1992, Frank - a lawyer - drafted the property settlement agreement. It gave him the law practice as his separate property and had Jane waive any interest in his income for 1990-1992. Frank and his own attorney signed the agreement, but Jane signed it herself, in proper person (without a lawyer signing for her). Frank filed for divorce through his counsel, Jane answered in proper person, and the court granted the divorce the same day. Jane later moved to vacate the decree under NRCP 60(b), claiming the agreement was fundamentally unfair and that Frank had coerced her into signing by threatening that hiring an attorney would cost him his practice and land him in prison for tax evasion. She submitted an accountant's affidavit showing that, of roughly $700,000 in net community property, Frank received about $600,000 and she got about $100,000. The district court denied her motion, finding she had independent counsel and was not coerced. Jane appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held there was no competent evidence that Jane was represented by independent counsel: no attorney signed her answer or the settlement agreement, and there was no notice of representation in the record. Relying on Williams v. Waldman, the court explained that when an attorney divorces a non-attorney, drafts the property settlement, and represents that it is fair while the non-attorney signs without independent counsel, the agreement is treated as the product of an attorney-client (and fiduciary) relationship - subjecting it to close scrutiny and requiring the attorney to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that the deal was fundamentally fair and free of overreaching. Here, Frank awarded himself the law practice without valuing it, had Jane waive any interest in income she knew nothing about, yet made her liable for half the taxes on that same income. The court held these provisions showed, as a matter of law, that Frank breached his duty of full and fair disclosure and that the transaction was fundamentally unfair. It reversed, vacated the property-settlement portion of the decree (leaving the divorce itself intact), and remanded.

This is a rehearing of the Court's earlier decision in the same divorce, which had dealt with how to divide a house on Verde Way in Gardnerville. In the first decision, the Court relied on the trial court's conclusion that the house was community property. On rehearing, Thomas Kerley pointed out that the trial court's legal reasoning was wrong, and the Supreme Court agreed it had overlooked that error. The key facts: Thomas owned the house before the marriage. In 1982 he deeded it to himself and his wife Nancy as joint tenants; then in 1983 the couple signed a quitclaim deed putting the title back in Thomas's name alone. The trial court had said that because these deeds happened during the marriage, the house was presumed to be community property. The Supreme Court corrected this. When one spouse deeds real property to the other, Nevada law presumes a gift, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Property acquired by gift during a marriage is separate property, not community property. So the 1983 quitclaim deed putting the house in Thomas's name only is presumed to be a gift of Nancy's interest to Thomas - making it his separate property - unless clear and convincing evidence shows otherwise. Because the earlier opinion had rested partly on the mistaken community-property premise, the Court granted rehearing and sent the Verde Way issue back to the district court to reconsider under the correct rule.

Nancy and Thomas Kerley divorced after marrying in 1981. The main dispute was over a house on Verde Way in Gardnerville that Thomas had owned before the marriage. In 1982 he deeded it to himself and Nancy as joint tenants; in 1983 the couple signed a quitclaim deed putting it back in Thomas's name only. The trial court treated the house as community property and used the 'Malmquist' formula (a method for reimbursing separate-property or community-property contributions when the two are mixed in a home) to give Nancy $32,150. It also awarded Nancy $250 per month in rehabilitative alimony for two years. Both sides appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. On the property, the Supreme Court reversed. The Malmquist formula applies only in two situations: when separate property has increased in value through community efforts, or when community property's value has been enhanced by separate-property contributions. Neither happened here. The trial court found that whatever separate funds Thomas may have spent remodeling were 'inconclusive and speculative' and were 'a gift to the community' - meaning no substantial enhancement of value by separate contributions. Without that predicate, the property could not be apportioned under Malmquist, so the Court reversed the $32,150 award and remanded for a proper redistribution under NRS 125.150. On alimony, the Court affirmed. District courts have wide discretion in awarding alimony, which must be 'just and equitable' under NRS 125.150(1). The trial court found Thomas could generate income through his contractor's license and that Nancy needed support because, at Thomas's request, she had not worked during most of the marriage. Thomas failed to show the award was anything other than just and equitable, so it stood. (Note: this decision was later modified on rehearing, which corrected the separate treatment of the community-property presumption; see the companion rehearing opinion at 112 Nev. 36.)

After a seven-year marriage, Philip Alba sued Holly Alba for divorce. Following a bench trial, the judge divided the couple's personal property and awarded Holly 'rehabilitative alimony' - support meant to help a spouse get education or training. Philip appealed two rulings. First, he argued the judge improperly valued the personal property by simply averaging the values Philip and Holly each gave. At trial, Philip introduced two lists - one with his estimates and one with Holly's. Holly then introduced a third exhibit that listed both sets of values and averaged them, and the decree divided the property according to that averaged exhibit. The Supreme Court held there was no reversible error. Although Nevada had not previously addressed property valuation, other states give trial courts wide latitude, and a valuation is not an abuse of discretion so long as it falls within the range of values shown by competent evidence. An average of the parties' own figures is, by definition, within that range, so any error was harmless. Second, Philip argued Holly was not entitled to rehabilitative alimony. The Court disagreed. NRS 125.150(8) directs courts to consider two specific factors (whether the paying spouse gained greater job skills or education during the marriage, and whether the receiving spouse financially supported the other's education) but also expressly allows consideration of 'any other factors the court considers relevant.' Here the trial judge found Philip's earning potential as a general contractor was much higher than Holly's as a blackjack dealer, and ordered $1,000 per month for three years so Holly could study graphic arts. That finding justified the award. The Court affirmed both the property division and the alimony.

Louis Grey filed for divorce (and sought custody of the couple's children) in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County. His wife, Roxanne Grey, wanted the case moved to Carson City (the First Judicial District), where she said she lived, and mailed in her change-of-venue papers. The papers were not stamped 'Filed' by the district court clerk until August 1, 1994 - three days after the deadline for a venue change as of right. The district court denied the venue change as untimely. Roxanne appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. A change of venue as of right must be requested before the time to answer expires (here, by July 27, 1994). Roxanne's evidence - a notarized affidavit that she mailed the papers on July 22, a transmittal letter dated July 22, and a signed return receipt showing Louis received his copy on July 27 - supported an inference that the clerk's office received her papers before the deadline. The clerk's staff admitted they do not usually date-stamp documents when received and had no memory of when these arrived, so the date of receipt was, at best, ambiguous. Following its earlier decision in Huebner v. State, the Court resolved that ambiguity in the filer's favor, finding the late filing was caused solely by the clerk's office procedures, not by any delay on Roxanne's part. The Court admonished the Eighth Judicial District Court clerk that continued failure to date-stamp documents on receipt - contrary to the Huebner directive - would result in sanctions. It vacated the order and remanded, directing the district court to determine Roxanne's county of residence when the action began; if she lived in Carson City as alleged, she is entitled to a change of venue as of right.

Brian and Ruth Gardner ended a childless, 27-year marriage. Brian was a commercial airline pilot earning about $75,000 a year; Ruth was a reading specialist earning about $43,000. Throughout the marriage, Ruth had worked and repeatedly relocated and sacrificed her own career seniority and retirement benefits to support Brian's education and career (including his pilot training, funded by the community). The district court awarded Ruth rehabilitative alimony of $1,300 per month for one year and $1,000 per month for a second year, intended to let her earn additional university credits and approach income 'parity' with Brian. Both spouses appealed - Brian arguing alimony should not have been awarded, and Ruth arguing it was inadequate in amount and duration. The Nevada Supreme Court held the award inadequate and unfair. It explained that Nevada recognizes two types of alimony: general alimony to satisfy justice and equity, and rehabilitative alimony (NRS 125.150(8)) for job or career training. Because the record showed Ruth could not realistically approach Brian's earning capacity even with a doctorate - and pursuing one would actually hurt her current income - the rehabilitative approach would accomplish little. Evaluated instead under general fairness principles (length of marriage, comparative earning capacities, Ruth's contributions and sacrifices), the two-year award was an abuse of discretion. The court modified the award to add ten more years at $1,000 per month and remanded.

Barbara and Henry 'By' Sprenger married in 1970 and divorced in 1991 after nearly 22 years. Barbara had been a licensed practical nurse but gave up her career to raise the couple's two children, later earning 90 college credits. By owned stock (acquired before the marriage) in what became Moana Lane Nursery, a thriving business paying him about $100,000 a year. Barbara argued the nursery had become community property and that she deserved more. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed on that point: the stock was acquired before marriage and was therefore separate property, and her signature as a 'witness' or shareholder on some business documents, without more, was not the clear and convincing evidence needed to show the property had been converted (transmuted) to community property. But the Court agreed with Barbara that her alimony award - $1,500 a month for a maximum of two years - was an abuse of discretion. Applying the seven alimony factors it had drawn from Fondi, the Court emphasized the long marriage, Barbara's age (44), her giving up nursing, and that her largest property award was a minority partnership interest from which she had no right to receive income. The Court remanded with instructions to increase and extend the alimony so Barbara could live as nearly as fairly possible to the standard of living she enjoyed before the divorce, for life or until she remarried or her finances substantially improved.

Mary and John Waltz divorced. The divorce decree awarded John his entire military pension (earned over 20 years of service), but ordered him to pay Mary $200 per month by military allotment as 'permanent alimony,' to be increased pro rata with each cost-of-living adjustment to his military retirement. This was structured as alimony because Mary, having been married to John for fewer than ten years of his service, could not directly collect her community-property share of the pension from the military pay center. The $200 figure was negotiated in lieu of her roughly $217 monthly community interest. Mary remarried shortly after the divorce, and John stopped paying. When Mary sought to collect, the district court held that under NRS 125.150(5) alimony must cease upon the payee's remarriage, so John owed nothing after Mary remarried. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that the 'permanent alimony' was in substance a property settlement - Mary's community-property interest in the military pension - as shown by the decree's language (tying the payment to the pension's cost-of-living adjustments and paying it by military allotment, and using 'permanent alimony' rather than simply 'alimony') and by the testimony about the parties' intent. Under Krick v. Krick, NRS 125.150(5) cannot be used to terminate payments that are actually a property settlement, so the payments did not cease on Mary's remarriage.