Nevada family-law case summaries

Richard was the father of two young children, K.D.L. and S.P.K. The children came to the state's attention after a severe domestic violence incident in which Richard beat the children's mother badly enough to fracture her jaw, with one child having witnessed the attack. Both parents also had substance abuse problems. The children were made wards of the state, and a reunification case plan was set up requiring Richard to complete anger management, parenting classes, drug assessment, and other steps. The children were briefly returned to the parents, but then Richard committed a second act of domestic violence - this time against his own mother, using a deadly weapon - which violated his probation and led to a prison sentence of up to ten years. The children went back into foster care, where they bonded with a foster family that wanted to adopt them. The child welfare agency petitioned to terminate Richard's parental rights, and the district court granted the petition. Richard appealed, arguing there was no clear and convincing evidence that termination served the children's best interest or that he was at fault. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It distinguished this case from two recent decisions (Q.L.R. and J.L.N.) where terminations were reversed because they rested solely on the fact of incarceration. Here, the district court did not rely only on Richard's imprisonment. Instead, it relied on the violent nature of his crimes, his repeated failure to control his temper (including belligerence in the courtroom and blaming his child for his violence against his mother), his failure to change his behavior even after the case plan, and the risk he posed to the children. The court also upheld the best-interest finding: Richard had not overcome the statutory presumption favoring termination after the children spent well over a year in foster care, the children had formed no strong bond with him and were well integrated with a foster family wishing to adopt them. The court affirmed the termination.

Diana N. was a single mother to her daughter J.L.N. She was on probation for old check-fraud and forgery convictions. After Diana left Wisconsin for Nevada without her probation officer's permission, her boyfriend reported her, and she was arrested and later incarcerated. When she was arrested, Diana asked that her children not be placed with the boyfriend because she believed he could not care for them. Despite her request, the court released the children to him, and the younger child was seriously injured, apparently abused by the boyfriend. The children then became wards of the state and were placed in foster care. The child welfare agency (DCFS) filed to terminate Diana's parental rights. But the agency itself acknowledged this was an 'unfortunate situation': J.L.N. had a strong, loving bond with Diana and wanted to reunite with her and the grandmother, Diana had completed as much of her case plan as possible while incarcerated (the plan was designed to be finished after her release), and Diana and the grandmother had stayed in constant contact. The agency said it only pursued termination because the child had been in state care long enough to trigger statutory time limits. The district court terminated Diana's rights anyway. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. To terminate parental rights, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence both that termination serves the child's best interest and that there is parental fault. The court held that the statutory presumptions favoring termination (triggered by a child being outside the home for fourteen of twenty months) are rebuttable, and Diana rebutted them with compelling reasons: the strong bond, the grandmother relationship, that Diana's crime was unrelated to child abuse, and that her incarceration would end soon. The court also held that a parent's failure to complete a case plan solely because of incarceration is not, by itself, parental fault. Most importantly, it held that incarceration alone is insufficient to establish failure of parental adjustment; courts must consider the nature of the crime, the sentence, the victim, the parent's conduct toward the child, and the child's needs. Because termination here rested essentially on the passage of time due to incarceration, the district court abused its discretion.

Roger was the father of a young daughter, Q.L.R. After separating from the child's mother, Dina, Roger developed a cocaine addiction and went through what he called an 'idiotic two months,' calling Dina at work dozens of times a day. Dina obtained a protective order. Roger then forced his way into Dina's car and drove around Las Vegas with her and the child for several hours (he did not harm the child and stopped to buy diapers and food). This led to convictions for aggravated stalking, burglary, robbery, and second-degree kidnapping, and a prison sentence of five to fifteen years. Dina then petitioned to terminate Roger's parental rights, and the district court granted it, reasoning that by committing crimes and going to prison, Roger had abandoned the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The central question - one of first impression - was whether incarceration, by itself, proves that a parent intended to abandon his child. The court said no. Nevada law defines abandonment as conduct showing a 'settled purpose' to give up all parental claims, and intent is the decisive factor. The court held that voluntary conduct resulting in incarceration does not, by itself, establish an intent to abandon a child. The record showed the opposite of abandonment: while in prison Roger completed numerous rehabilitation programs, took college courses, sent the child cards and drawings (which the mother refused to pass along), sent a small amount of money, and filed a lawsuit to recover property to sell for the child's support. The court also held that termination cannot rest solely on the length of a parent's incarceration, and that the district court failed to properly analyze the child's best interest. Because Roger would be eligible for parole in a few years, his crime was not directed at the child, the child lived with her mother, and no one was seeking to adopt, this was not a case warranting the 'civil death penalty' of termination. The court reversed.

This case is unusual because it was the father, Brian, who asked the court to terminate his own parental rights. Brian never wanted children, and he and the child's mother, Leah, were surprised when Leah became pregnant with T.M.C. The child was raised by Leah's sister and then Leah's mother. After the state's child support program established Brian's paternity through a blood test, Brian filed a petition to terminate his own parental rights - which would also end his obligation to pay child support. Both the state and Leah opposed the petition. Leah testified the child could benefit from a relationship with Brian, and the state pointed out that terminating Brian's rights would leave the child on public assistance and lose a source of support. The district court denied Brian's petition, both on public policy grounds and because termination was not in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that a parent cannot voluntarily terminate his own parental rights and obligations unless termination is in the child's best interest. Even if a parent's conduct satisfies the 'parental fault' grounds for termination (Brian had expressed an intent to abandon the child), the child's best interest must still be served for termination to be appropriate. The court reasoned that termination of parental rights is meant to protect children, not to reward a parent by relieving him of his support obligation. Parental rights and obligations are inseparable, and it would be a rare case where cutting off support would help, rather than hurt, the parent-child relationship. Because Brian's arguments served only his own financial interest and did not show termination was in the child's best interest, the court affirmed the denial. It also held Brian waived his complaint that he was not allowed to question Leah, because his counsel never objected at the hearing.

A child was born in 1988 in Baghdad, Iraq, to Raja and Hikmet J. In 1990, Raja brought the child to Michigan and left her with Raja's sister and brother-in-law, Talia and Sam Z. Talia and Sam raised the child in Las Vegas and San Diego for years and were the only parents the child had ever known. In 1996 they obtained guardianship, the parents' effort to end the guardianship failed, and Talia and Sam then sought to adopt the child and petitioned to terminate Raja and Hikmet's parental rights. The parties gave sharply conflicting accounts of whether Raja had given the child away or merely left her for a family visit. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition to terminate. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. Most importantly, the Court changed the legal standard Nevada courts use to decide termination cases. It abandoned the older 'jurisdictional/dispositional' test from Champagne v. Welfare Division, under which a court first had to find fault-type grounds before considering the child's best interest. Because the Legislature had amended the governing statute (NRS 128.105) to make the child's best interest the primary consideration, the Court adopted a 'best interest/parental fault' standard: the court must consider both whether termination serves the child's best interest and whether parental fault exists. The Court also held the district court made two reversible errors. First, it failed to apply the statutory presumption of abandonment in NRS 128.012(2). Once Talia and Sam showed the parents had left the child for at least six months without support or communication, the presumption arose and shifted the burden to the parents to prove they did not abandon the child; applying that presumption is not optional. Second, the district court wrongly excluded certified English translations of four Arabic letters. Because of these errors and the new statutory standard, the Court sent the case back for a new trial.

Veronica Carron became pregnant while living with her boyfriend, Shawn Whitney, and his family in New Jersey. After learning she was pregnant, Veronica ended the relationship, moved to Las Vegas, and arranged for the baby to be adopted. During the pregnancy, Shawn was told he was the putative father and that his consent to the adoption was needed, but he did little to assert his rights and at one point said he would support whatever Veronica decided. After the baby, Symantha, was born in 1996, she was placed with Teresa Pinney, who petitioned to terminate Shawn's parental rights. Only after that petition was filed did Shawn seek custody or visitation. DNA testing confirmed Shawn was the biological father, but the district court terminated his parental rights. The question on appeal was whether a court can consider a father's conduct during the mother's pregnancy (before the child was born) as evidence that he intended to abandon the child. The Supreme Court held that it can. Under Nevada's abandonment statute (NRS 128.012), a court may consider 'any conduct' by a parent that shows a settled purpose to give up all parental claims, and the Court held that 'any conduct' includes a father's actions during the pregnancy. The Court was careful to say that pre-birth conduct alone does not justify termination, but it can serve, at least in part, as a basis for finding grounds to terminate. Here, the district court found several grounds: abandonment, risk of serious injury, and only token efforts, and also found Shawn unfit due to drug use and other issues. Because there was substantial evidence supporting the termination (both the fault-type grounds and that termination served Symantha's best interest), the Supreme Court affirmed.

This case involved the termination of parental rights to five of Pamela Daniels' children. The putative father, Andre Kidwell, claimed three of them. After police found the children unattended in a filthy apartment (with Kidwell asleep), Child Protective Services removed them. Daniels struggled with cocaine addiction and spent time in prison; Kidwell repeatedly failed to follow his case plans, did not pay child support, did not establish paternity, visited rarely, kept living with Daniels against instructions, and later married someone else while still trying to reconcile with Daniels. The children had significant behavioral and developmental problems that improved dramatically in foster care. The district court terminated both parents' rights. Kidwell's main argument on appeal was that his due process rights were violated because the juvenile court did not appoint him a lawyer during the earlier proceedings, when the children were only temporarily removed. The Supreme Court rejected this. It explained that at the actual termination hearing, Kidwell received the required due process protections, including counsel. During the earlier temporary-removal juvenile proceedings, appointment of counsel was discretionary under the governing statute (NRS 432B.420), and the U.S. Constitution does not require appointed counsel for indigent parents in these proceedings. The Court held temporary custody does not require the same safeguards as permanent termination, and Kidwell's confusion about whether his rights had been terminated did not establish a due process violation. The Court also rejected his claim that the agency failed to make reasonable reunification efforts, noting the agency worked with him for over two years. Finally, the Court held the district court properly found, by clear and convincing evidence, both jurisdictional grounds (abandonment and failure of parental adjustment) and dispositional grounds (the children's best interest) for terminating both parents' rights, and affirmed.

Marla Cooley was sixteen when she gave birth to her daughter, Christina, in 1993. The child's father is Terry. Over the next couple of years, evidence showed Marla struggled badly: she was repeatedly evicted, lived in filthy and unsafe conditions, had a volatile temper, often failed to feed or supervise the baby, and did not complete the parenting and homemaking programs the state offered. In 1994 Marla voluntarily gave custody to the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), and after a short foster placement Christina went to live with her father, Terry, where she remained and was doing well. Marla's visits and support were minimal, and she never completed a single goal in her case plan. DCFS petitioned to terminate Marla's parental rights, and after a trial the district court terminated them, finding that Marla had abandoned and neglected Christina, failed to make parental adjustments, and made only token efforts, and that termination was in Christina's best interest. Marla appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that terminating parental rights requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of both 'jurisdictional' grounds (a specific fault or condition of the parent) and 'dispositional' grounds (the child's best interest). The court concluded the record supported the jurisdictional grounds - especially Marla's failure of parental adjustment and abuse/neglect while Christina was in her care - because Marla accomplished none of her case-plan goals despite the help offered. On best interest, the court agreed that Christina, who was thriving with her father, needed a parent now and should not have to wait indefinitely on the mere possibility that Marla might someday mature into a capable parent. One justice dissented, arguing that the state was increasingly terminating the rights of poor, disabled, or (as here) very young parents without meeting the strict standard the law requires, and that permanently cutting off Marla's tie to a child already safely living with her father served no one's interest.

Christy Amber Deck ('Amber') was born in 1989 to Michele Deck, who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and, months before the birth, placed under a guardianship because she could not manage her own affairs. Within days of Amber's birth, the child was placed with Michele's sister and brother-in-law, the Nelsons, where she remained and thrived, calling them 'Mommy' and 'Daddy.' A reunification case plan required Michele to get counseling, take her medication, pay a small amount of child support, keep monthly contact with her social worker, and visit Amber monthly. Over roughly six years of case reports, Michele visited Amber only rarely (none between December 1992 and August 1994), paid almost no support, and at times stopped taking her medication, which caused her condition to deteriorate. William Dupree, who claimed to be Amber's father, was never listed on the birth certificate, never established paternity until after termination proceedings began, and had virtually no involvement with Amber. The district court terminated the parental rights of both Michele (for failure of parental adjustment) and William (for abandonment) and placed Amber with the Nelsons. Both appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It rejected Michele's argument that her due process rights were violated or that there was no evidence of neglect, explaining she received notice, counsel, and years of reunification services, and that her rights were terminated for failure of parental adjustment - not neglect - so proof of neglect was not required. The court held clear and convincing evidence showed Michele failed to make necessary parental adjustments: her token visits, near-total failure to pay support, and refusal to consistently manage her illness. It held the State was not obligated to provide William a reunification case plan because he never meaningfully acknowledged paternity or showed interest in Amber, and that his lack of support, gifts, and contact was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment. Finally, the court held Amber's best interest (the dispositional ground) was served by termination, given the bond with the Nelsons, the long estrangement from her biological parents, and the trauma any reunion would likely cause.

Adrina Recodo gave birth to Michael Bow in 1992. Recodo, a young mother living in poverty on and near a rural reservation, voluntarily placed Michael in foster care in 1993 because she could not meet his needs while trying to get her GED and find work in Las Vegas. Michael was eventually adjudicated a neglected child and placed in the custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), and later with a foster family that wished to adopt him. A case plan required Recodo to maintain steady employment and housing, complete parenting training, visit Michael regularly, undergo therapy, keep DCFS informed of her whereabouts, and pay child support. Over the next year and a half, Recodo's life remained highly unstable: she went through several short-lived jobs (some ending because of her volatility), frequently changed residences, visited Michael only a handful of times, had long stretches of no contact with DCFS, and paid only $160 in support. She also became involved in a bank fraud case. In late 1994 she began making a more concerted effort, but the State petitioned to terminate her rights, and in May 1995 the district court terminated them, finding her an unfit parent who had failed to adjust within a reasonable time, and that termination served Michael's best interest. Recodo appealed, arguing there was not clear and convincing evidence and that her due process rights were violated because she was not appointed counsel at every stage. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held clear and convincing evidence supported both jurisdictional grounds - parental unfitness and failure of parental adjustment - given Recodo's chronic instability in employment, housing, and contact with Michael, and the reasonable but unsuccessful reunification efforts by the agencies. It held the dispositional (best interest) ground was also met because Michael was thriving in his prospective adoptive foster home in stark contrast to the instability with Recodo. On due process, the court held Recodo's rights were not violated because she was represented by counsel at the actual termination hearing, which adequately protected her liberty interest.

Cortney Weinper was removed from her father Cory Weinper's home in April 1992, at seven months old, because of his admitted drug use and allegations he had physically abused the grandmother. The State's child-welfare agency (DCFS) set up a reunification plan requiring Weinper to, among other things, get clean, complete counseling, keep a job and housing, pay child support, and visit Cortney. Over nearly three years Weinper repeatedly failed: he tested positive for drugs several times, was arrested more than once, paid essentially no support (only $156 through a wage garnishment), and at the time of trial was jailed on a charge of assaulting his mother with a deadly weapon. The one plan requirement he met - completing a drug program - he did only as a condition of getting out of jail, and he relapsed afterward. DCFS petitioned to terminate his parental rights, and after a February 1995 trial the district court did so. Weinper appealed, arguing (1) he was denied due process, (2) the 'jurisdictional' grounds (his own fault or condition) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the 'dispositional' grounds (the child's best interest) were not proven. The Supreme Court affirmed. It criticized DCFS for being 'slipshod' - most notably for submitting a duplicate, un-updated report before the termination hearing - but held this did not violate due process. Due process in a termination case requires a clear statement of the allegations, notice and a chance to be heard, and the right to counsel; Weinper received all three, appeared at the hearing with appointed counsel, and could tell the court about any progress himself. A current caseworker report is not a due-process requirement, especially when the parent is present. The Court also held both required kinds of grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence. On unfitness, Weinper's persistent drug use and criminal activity qualified. On failure of parental adjustment, he could point to no meaningful compliance with the plan over nearly three years, far beyond the six-month statutory benchmark. And terminating his rights served Cortney's best interest: she had thrived for two and a half years in a foster home that could now adopt her, and it would be unjust to leave her in limbo indefinitely.

Marvin and Danielle Smith divorced in 1978, when their daughter Erica was five months old. Danielle received custody, Marvin got limited visitation, and he was ordered to pay $100 a month in child support. From 1978 to 1981 Marvin exercised visitation, though not to the full extent allowed. He moved to Arkansas in 1982, visited Erica for five days in 1984, and over the years telephoned Danielle to ask what Erica needed, called Erica every two to six months, and occasionally sent cards and gifts. Marvin was behind on his child support. Shortly after Marvin told Danielle he had remarried and had a new family, Danielle petitioned to terminate his parental rights, alleging abandonment and nonsupport. The trial court terminated Marvin's rights, finding he had neglected and abandoned Erica and that continuing the parental tie was not in her best interest. Marvin appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It stressed that terminating parental rights is an extreme measure requiring both jurisdictional grounds and dispositional grounds, proven by clear and convincing evidence. On abandonment, the court held that intent to abandon is the decisive factor and that Marvin's continued contact showed he lacked that intent (Danielle's own counsel conceded this was not abandonment). On nonsupport, the court held that failure to pay child support, by itself, is not a ground for termination and that Danielle had other remedies to collect support. On neglect, the court held that neglect cannot be established while the child is in the other parent's custody and receiving proper care. Finally, the only expert testimony (a child psychologist) said termination was not in Erica's best interest. Because Danielle failed to prove the required grounds, the termination was reversed.

This case involved a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father. Nan Daly was the mother of a daughter, Mary, born in 1973; the appellant, formerly Tim Daly and later Suzanne Daly, was Mary's father and underwent sex-reassignment surgery, transitioning from male to female. The parents had divorced in 1981, with Nan awarded custody and the father given visitation. During an August 1981 visit, the father told Mary about the planned transition and asked her to keep it secret. After that visit, the mother observed dramatic changes in Mary, a previously talented child: she became withdrawn and fearful, wet the bed, could not follow instructions, and her schoolwork deteriorated. Mary eventually revealed her father's plans, and a psychologist advised that it was dangerous for Mary to be in her father's company. In 1982, the mother petitioned to terminate the father's parental rights, and in 1983 the trial court granted the petition. The father appealed, arguing there was no legal basis for termination and that the court was simply enforcing the mother's private prejudices. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It applied the required "clear and convincing evidence" standard and Nevada's framework requiring both jurisdictional grounds (a fault or condition related to the parent) and dispositional grounds (the child's best interest). The court emphasized it was not finding the father unfit merely because she was transsexual; rather, expert testimony established a serious risk of emotional or mental injury to Mary if forced visitation resumed, Mary (found old enough to express her wishes) did not want to see her father, and the father had paid no support for over a year and made only token efforts to communicate. On those grounds the court held both the jurisdictional and dispositional requirements were satisfied and that termination was in Mary's best interest.

In early September 1979, the appellant and the respondent jointly signed and filed a "Petition for Adoption" in Clark County District Court. In that petition, both of them stated under oath that they had lived in Nevada since July 1978. On September 28, 1979, the district court granted the petition and entered an adoption order. Almost two years later, in July 1981, the appellant changed course and asked the court to set the adoption order aside. She argued the order was void because the court never had "subject matter jurisdiction" - the basic power to decide the case - because the respondent had not actually met the residency requirement needed to file an adoption petition in Nevada. The district court refused to undo the adoption. It ruled that the appellant was barred (estopped) from challenging the court's jurisdiction, because she herself had signed the petition asserting the very residency facts that gave the court jurisdiction. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the adoption petition the appellant signed contained the facts needed to at least apparently give the court jurisdiction, and there was substantial evidence that she signed it freely and with understanding. Under those circumstances, she could not later attack the court's jurisdiction to have entertained the petition. The court relied on earlier decisions holding that a party who stipulates to the facts conferring jurisdiction is later estopped from disputing them.

This case concerns the termination of a mother's parental rights in her daughter, Michelle, born in 1971. After the mother (Sheree) and her now-deceased husband separated in 1976, the father took the child and, over time, placed her with his brother and sister-in-law, who cared for her. The father died in early 1978, the aunt and uncle were made the child's guardians, and they then asked the court to terminate Sheree's parental rights so they could adopt Michelle. After a hearing, the district court found Sheree unfit and found the child neglected and abandoned, and it terminated her rights. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence in the record did not support these findings. It stressed that terminating parental rights is a drastic step that must be applied with caution and reviewed closely. A key problem was that the same judge had handled the earlier guardianship case and relied on evidence from that proceeding - but no transcript or record of it was put into evidence in the termination case, and Nevada law did not allow the judge to take 'judicial notice' of that earlier evidence. So the Supreme Court reviewed only what was actually in the termination record. On abandonment, the court noted that part of the six-month no-contact period the trial court counted was a time when the mother was under a restraining order forbidding her from contacting the child - and the law cannot treat a lack of contact as abandonment when the parent is legally barred from contact. The mother was also seriously ill during part of that time and had visited often earlier. On neglect, the court held that neglect must be judged by how the parent treated the child while the parent had custody, and the thin evidence offered (taking the child to a rock concert; a single sighting years earlier of the child on a tricycle near a busy street) was legally insufficient. On unfitness, the evidence (an old drug conviction, frequent moves, a sporadic work history, socializing with someone on probation, one drink while on prescribed medication) showed a more unconventional lifestyle but did not justify permanently severing the parent-child bond. The court reversed and directed dismissal of the petition without prejudice, leaving the guardianship in place and allowing the relatives to refile later.

After a mother divorced the father in 1937 and remarried, her new husband, the child's stepfather, adopted the boy in 1939. The court granted the adoption without the natural father's consent, finding that he had abandoned the child. Almost seven years later the father moved to set aside the adoption, arguing that he never received notice and never consented, so the court lacked jurisdiction. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion. The adoption statute allowed the judge, upon finding abandonment, to proceed without the absent parent's consent, and did not require notice to a parent who had abandoned the child. Even if notice were otherwise required, the father was estopped by his own conduct: he had told the mother and her attorney he was "dropping out of the picture," then disappeared, stopped paying support although he was well able to pay, and made no effort to contact his son. His belated motion - at which he did not even appear to testify - was properly denied. The court also held that abandonment does not require that the child be left destitute; it means the neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support.