Nevada family-law case summaries

Christie and George Anastassatos divorced in 1987 and share joint legal custody of their three children, with Christie having primary physical custody. George paid $900 a month in child support. In 1995, Christie asked the court to review and increase George's child support. The parties tried to settle through counsel and George acknowledged he should be paying the statutory cap ($1,500 a month total), but he also asked for a credit for half the health insurance premium and a set visitation schedule. After the matter was resubmitted on the pleadings, both sides submitted proposed orders. The district court adopted George's proposed order, which not only increased support and gave the insurance credit, but also abated (suspended) George's support during his one-month summer visitation, changed the payment due date, set a visitation schedule, and split transportation costs. Christie appealed, arguing the court granted relief on issues she never had a chance to respond to. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the only issues properly before the district court were the amount of support and the health-insurance credit (and the visitation schedule). Nevada is a notice-pleading state, but a party must still receive reasonable advance notice of an issue and a chance to respond. By raising support abatement, transportation-cost sharing, and the change to the payment due date for the first time in his proposed order, George effectively denied Christie an opportunity to respond, so the court exceeded its jurisdiction on those three matters. The court also reiterated - even though it did not need to decide the point - that a district court has only limited discretion to deviate from Nevada's child support guidelines, and any deviation must be supported by specific written findings of fact justifying it. The court found the summer-visitation abatement improper because the district court made no such findings, and because a primary custodian's fixed child-rearing expenses do not necessarily decrease when the children visit the other parent. Finally, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the effective date of the increase (August 1, 1995 rather than the earlier motion date), since NRS 125B.140 leaves that to the court's discretion and the delay was attributable to the parties' out-of-court settlement efforts.

William ('Randy') and Kristine Jackson divorced in 1994; Kristine had physical custody of their infant daughter, and the parties agreed Randy would pay $450 per month in child support. Later, learning of Nevada's formula (18 percent of income for one child), Kristine moved to modify the support, pointing out that Randy earned about $6,000 per month. The district court increased support from $450 to $1,000 per month. Randy appealed on three points. First, he said the court lacked jurisdiction because Kristine's motion, filed under a rule (NRCP 60(b)) meant for relief from judgments, came more than six months after the decree. The Supreme Court rejected this: regardless of Kristine's mistaken citation, her motion was properly a request to review and modify child support under NRS 125B.145(1)(b), which allows a parent to request review at any time, with no time bar. Second, Randy argued the $1,000 award exceeded the $500-per-child statutory cap without the required findings. The Court agreed. The statutory cap for one child is $500 even if 18 percent of income is higher, and a court may deviate only if it makes specific written findings of fact under NRS 125B.080(6) - including stating what the formula amount would have been. The district court failed to make those findings, so the award had to be vacated. Third, and as a question of first impression, Randy argued the income of Kristine's live-in boyfriend should count in weighing the parties' 'relative income.' The Court agreed that it could be considered - not because they were married (they were not, so community-property rules did not apply), but because a nonmarital cohabitant's contributions to a parent's rent and household expenses can effectively increase that parent's available income, which is relevant under NRS 125B.080(9). The Court vacated the order and remanded for the district court either to make proper findings justifying a deviation or to redetermine the amount.

This case is about how Nevada's child-support cap works. The custodial mother, Lee Ann Garrett, has two children. Under the support formula, a noncustodial parent pays 25 percent of gross monthly income for two children, 'but not more than $500 per month per child' - a $500-per-child cap - unless the court makes findings to justify a different amount. Here the family court first set support at the $500 cap ($1,000 total for two children), then decided to deviate downward, and, after making the required findings (based on the noncustodial parent's travel expenses, the parties' relative incomes, and time spent with each parent), awarded $700 per month. Lee Ann argued that the amount 'established' by the formula was really 25 percent of income - $1,354.16 - and that any deviation should start from that higher number, not from the $1,000 cap. The Supreme Court rejected this. It held the $500-per-child cap is the amount 'established' by the formula; that capped figure is the starting point from which a court calculates any deviation upward or downward. Reading the statute otherwise would make the 'established' amount different in every case where 25 percent exceeds the cap, contrary to the statute's plain language that support 'shall not' exceed $500 per child unless the facts support a deviation. The Court also noted that even under Lee Ann's reading she showed no prejudice - she did not show the result would have differed had the court started from $1,354.16 - so the judgment would be affirmed regardless. Finding the family court followed the statute exactly and did not abuse its discretion, the Court affirmed.

When Yvonne and Sharif Khaldy divorced, Yvonne got custody of their son Karim and Sharif paid $200 per month in child support, which he paid regularly. Later Yvonne voluntarily gave up custody, and Sharif went to court to formalize that he now had custody. The district court awarded Sharif custody and ordered Yvonne to pay child support - but only $200 per month, even though the statutory formula (18 percent of her income) called for $395. Worse, the court suspended Yvonne's support obligation entirely for one year, reasoning that Sharif should have voluntarily raised his own payments over the years as his income grew, and was being penalized for not doing so. Sharif appealed and the Supreme Court reversed. First, child support must be set according to the statutory guidelines. A court may deviate from the formula, but only if it makes specific findings tied to the factors listed in NRS 125B.080(9). Here the district court did not base its reduction on any of those statutory factors - it relied purely on 'equity' (giving Yvonne 'a break' because Sharif had arguably underpaid). The Court held that equitable principles alone are insufficient; equity may inform a deviation only when the deviation is actually based on one of the enumerated statutory factors. Second, suspending Yvonne's obligation for a year as a penalty against Sharif was an improper retroactive modification of the earlier support order. Nevada law is clear that once support payments accrue they become vested and cannot later be modified or wiped out. Sharif had faithfully paid the $200 the court ordered; if Yvonne thought he should pay more as his income rose, her remedy was to move to modify support based on changed circumstances or the periodic statutory review, not to have him penalized after the fact. The Court reversed the ruling on Yvonne's obligation and remanded for a support award that conforms to the statutory guidelines.

The question in this case was narrow: may a district attorney represent a custodial parent in a lawsuit to increase existing child support when the paying parent is fully current on his payments? The Supreme Court said no. Sandra and Vincent Hedlund divorced in California; Sandra had custody of their three children and Vincent was ordered to pay support. Vincent later moved to Nevada and fell behind, and Sandra used the interstate support-enforcement process (URESA) to collect the arrears - eventually obtaining a $6,050 judgment. Over the next two years Vincent caught up, became current, and stipulated to keep paying $375 per month. After that, the Washoe County District Attorney registered Sandra's support order in Nevada and moved to modify (increase) the support to match Nevada's formula. The district court dismissed the motion, holding the district attorney had no authority to represent a custodial parent to modify support when the noncustodial parent is current. The Supreme Court affirmed. Reading NRS 125B.150 by its plain language, the Court explained that the statute directs district attorneys to take action against a 'deserting or nonsupporting parent' - to establish parentage, establish the support obligation, and enforce payment. Nothing in it authorizes a district attorney to represent custodial parents in actions to modify the amount of support once the obligation is established. The statute also expressly says the district attorney represents the State, not the parent or child. The purpose of that public service is to keep nonsupported children from becoming an economic burden on the State - and here Vincent was current and the children were not receiving state aid, so using the district attorney would burden state resources rather than relieve them. If Sandra wanted to increase support, she could file the action herself or hire private counsel.

After Robert and Sandra Rodgers divorced and custody of their child was placed with Robert, Sandra was ordered to pay $125 per month in child support. Sandra then moved to California and remarried. Robert moved to increase her support, arguing that Sandra's community-property one-half interest in her new husband's earnings should be counted. A domestic relations referee agreed and recommended increasing support to $247 per month, but the district court reversed the referee without explanation. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It held that 'gross monthly income' under NRS 125B.070 - the base for the support formula - is limited to the parent's own income from employment and does not include a parent's community-property interest in a new spouse's earnings. Reading the statute otherwise would render its 'wage-earning employee' and 'self-employed person' language meaningless. However, the court held that a remarried parent's one-half community-property interest in the new spouse's earnings MAY be considered under NRS 125B.080(9)(l), the factor addressing 'the relative income of both parents,' when a court decides whether to deviate from the formula. Because the district court simply reversed the referee's recommendation without making any findings, the Supreme Court could not review its basis, so it remanded for appropriate findings on Sandra's support obligation.

Carol and Murray Westgate battled for over a decade over support and custody of their daughter. Carol had primary physical custody and, as a flight attendant, had to move to Memphis when her airline closed its Las Vegas base. Murray stopped paying support, and Carol withheld visitation after their daughter alleged Murray had molested her (Tennessee examiners found the allegations credible, though charges were later dismissed). In 1985 the district court cut Murray's child support in half primarily to penalize Carol for interfering with visitation. When Carol later sought to raise support to the new Nevada guideline amount, the referee twice recommended $400 per month from January 1988, but the district court and later the family court declined to modify, relying on older, pre-guideline case law and Carol's alleged misconduct. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It held that child support is governed by the NRS 125B.070/125B.080 guidelines, with only limited discretion to deviate on the factors enumerated in NRS 125B.080(9); punishment for denying visitation is not among them and is inconsistent with the guidelines. Support and visitation are separate issues, and support (or arrearages) cannot be reduced to punish a parent for withholding visitation. The court overruled Noble, Melahn, and similar pre-guideline decisions to the contrary, and remanded with instructions to adopt the $400 figure from January 1988 and to determine arrearages consistent with the child's best interest.

James 'Kim' McKellar was ordered in a 1974 divorce to pay $300 per month in child support for the parties' daughter, plus medical and educational expenses. He stopped paying in July 1977. Nearly 14 years later, in 1991, his ex-wife (Metzler) filed to collect the arrearages. A referee found no waiver and awarded her more than $122,000 in arrearages, interest, expenses, and fees, which the district court upheld. On appeal the Nevada Supreme Court addressed two issues. First, on waiver: the court affirmed the finding that Metzler had not waived her right to collect. Although she waited almost 14 years, delay alone is not dispositive; she had consistently demanded payment and, in 1983, even offered to forgive support if McKellar would consent to the daughter's adoption by her new husband, which McKellar refused. Second, on the statute of limitations: the court held that the 1987 amendment to NRS 125B.050, which eliminated the limitations period for collecting child support arrearages, does not apply retroactively. The general six-year statute (NRS 11.190) therefore bars any arrearages already time-barred when Metzler filed. The court affirmed the no-waiver finding, reversed the retroactive application of NRS 125B.050, and remanded to recalculate the amount owed.

Robin and Brian Scott divorced in 1975 and had two daughters; the elder, Angela, has cerebral palsy and is mildly mentally retarded. Over the years, support was modified several times, often by stipulation. In 1990 Robin again moved to increase support and to continue Angela's support past the age of majority until she is no longer handicapped or becomes self-supporting. The district court modified support but limited Angela's support to completion of her high school special-education program, provided that support would be reduced by half when the younger daughter turned eighteen, and declined to include Brian's overtime in his income. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed several points and remanded. First, a child support award can be modified to follow the statutory formula even without a "change of circumstances." Second, the court properly deviated from the NRS 125B.070 formula here because it made specific findings, including Brian's responsibility for his current wife and two additional children, his payment of certain expenses for the daughters, and the parties' relative incomes; the court distinguished an earlier case (Hoover) that barred deviating based only on the number of new children. Third, overtime should be counted as gross income if it is substantial and can be accurately determined; because Brian consistently earned overtime, the court remanded to reconsider his income. Fourth, the parents cannot, by stipulation, cut off support for a handicapped child; NRS 125B.110 requires support until the child is no longer handicapped or self-supporting, so the limitation to high-school completion was remanded. Fifth, halving support when the younger child turned eighteen was error; the handicapped child should receive eighteen percent of Brian's gross income (the one-child formula figure), not half of the two-child amount. Remanded for these determinations.

A divorced mother asked the court to extend the father's child-support obligation for their eldest daughter, Jennifer, beyond age eighteen, because Jennifer was handicapped and unable to support herself, and to increase support for both daughters. The father, a board-certified physician, disputed how severe Jennifer's condition was and claimed his income did not exceed $1,200 per month, even though he and his current wife owned numerous rental properties generating about $6,045 per month in rent (he claimed almost all of it went to expenses, leaving only about $18 per month in net income). A domestic relations referee found that Jennifer was handicapped and in need of support under NRS 125B.110(1), found the father willfully underemployed under NRS 125B.080(8), and recommended raising support to $500 per child per month. The district court adopted the referee's recommendation in its entirety. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. On the extended support, the referee was presented with conflicting evidence and exercised his discretion, and the father pointed to no particularized abuse of discretion. On the underemployment finding, the statute requires not only willful underemployment but also that it be "for the purpose of avoiding" a support obligation. The court announced a new rule: where evidence of willful underemployment preponderates, a presumption arises that the underemployment is for the purpose of avoiding support, and the burden shifts to the paying parent to prove some other purpose. Affirmed.

Hershel and Pamela Nicholson separated in July 1988 and divorced in October 1989. Their divorce decree incorporated a property settlement agreement described as a "full, complete, and final settlement" of all their marital and property rights, including all claims for support. About two months later, Pamela filed a URESA action (a support-enforcement proceeding) in Nye County, seeking "arrearages," meaning back support, for the separation period under NRS 125B.030, which lets a custodial parent recover a reasonable portion of support costs from the other parent. The district court ordered Hershel to reimburse $3,234. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The law is clear that a URESA court may not modify or nullify a preexisting duty of support. Here, the divorce decree's property settlement had fully resolved the issue of support, and uncontradicted evidence showed the divorce court had declined to impose interim support during the separation because Pamela had failed to account for $9,500 she received from selling a spa, a satellite dish, and other items. Because support had already been resolved, the URESA court's later imposition of support was an improper modification of the prior order. The court reversed the judgment, expressly declining to decide whether a URESA court has original jurisdiction to impose support under NRS 125B.030.

Debra and Michael Parkinson divorced in 1982. Michael had adopted Debra's son Gary, and the decree ordered Michael to pay Debra $200 per month in child support until Gary reached adulthood. In January 1983, Michael stopped paying. More than five years later - about two weeks after Gary turned 18 - Debra went to court asking that Michael's 64 months of missed payments ($12,800 plus interest) be turned into a formal judgment she could collect. Michael responded that Debra had effectively given up her right to the support: through the years, she had told him to stay away from her and Gary and had never once asked him for any money. The district court agreed with Michael, finding that Debra had 'impliedly waived' her right to child support, and it refused to enter the arrearages as a judgment. Debra appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that deciding whether to reduce support arrears to judgment is within the trial court's discretion, and, aligning with most other states, that a paying parent may raise fairness defenses like waiver or estoppel in such a proceeding. A waiver means intentionally giving up a known right, and it can be shown by conduct. Importantly, the court said a waiver cannot be used to bar child support if it was obtained by fraud or coercion, or if enforcing it would harm the child. Here, the evidence supported an implied waiver: for about five and a half years Debra never demanded payment, told Michael to stay away, and made clear she wanted no contact - statements corroborated by the couple's real estate agent. Because Gary was now an adult (so no child would be harmed), and there was no fraud or coercion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Karen and Ralph Ramacciotti divorced in 1983. They had two daughters, Shannon (born 1969) and Tiffany (born 1971). The decree ordered Ralph to pay $250 per month per child until each turned 18, married, or was otherwise emancipated. Shortly afterward, in 1985, Nevada changed its law to extend child support until a child completes high school or turns 19. On October 29, 1987 - before Shannon turned 18 on November 1 - Karen asked the court to modify and extend Ralph's support obligation for both girls. The district court refused as to Shannon. It reasoned that it lacked power to change support for Shannon because the motion (in its view) came after Ralph's duty ended, and that the new law could not apply to her without being retroactive. Yet the court extended Ralph's support for Tiffany until she finished high school. It also found no reason to increase the monthly amount. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. First, Karen actually filed and served her motion before Shannon turned 18, so the case the district court relied on (which involved a motion filed after the child turned 18) did not apply, and the court did have jurisdiction to modify Shannon's support. Second, the amended statute lets support continue until 19 if the child is still in high school, and nothing requires the motion to be filed before the child turns 18. The court also pointed out the district court had applied the new law to Tiffany but inconsistently refused to for Shannon. Third, extending support as of the date Karen filed her motion is not an improper 'retroactive' application; a support modification can take effect as of the filing date. Finally, the district court had looked at the parties' 1987 incomes rather than their more recent, and more disparate, 1989 incomes. The court sent the case back for a fuller look at the parties' finances, which could support increasing Ralph's support for Tiffany based on changed circumstances.

Warren Hoover had four children: two with his former wife Linda, and two more with a later wife. Linda asked the court to set child support for their two children using Nevada's statutory formula. Under that formula, support for two children is 25 percent of the paying parent's gross monthly income. The district court awarded Linda that 25 percent. Warren objected. He argued the court should account for the fact that he also supports two other children. His proposed method was to take the four-children percentage (31 percent), then divide it by four to get a "per-child" rate, which would lower what he paid Linda. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Warren's math. It held there is no legal authority for that kind of calculation. When a parent seeks support for a specific number of children in her custody, the statute plainly states the percentage - here, 25 percent for two children - and that is what Linda was entitled to. The court acknowledged there are real policy questions about how to treat a parent who has several children across different families - whether all children should be treated equally or whether later families get less. But it said those decisions belong to the legislature, not the courts. The court did note that under the statute, a judge still has power to make equitable adjustments to the formula amount based on listed factors, including a parent's responsibility to support others. What a court cannot do is invent an entirely new formula based on the total number of children the paying parent happens to have. The support award was affirmed.

In 1987, Nevada adopted a formula-based child support law. In this case, the father, Alfred Barbagallo, shared joint physical custody of the child, having the child three of every seven days. The trial court ordered him to pay the full formula amount for one child - 18 percent of his gross monthly income, or $450 a month. The father argued that because he shared custody so heavily, he should pay less than the full formula amount. The Nevada Supreme Court used this case to explain how the child support formula works in joint or shared custody situations - something the statute did not clearly address. The court laid out a framework: First, the formula does apply in joint and shared custody cases. Second, before applying it, the court must decide which parent is the 'primary' custodian (the one who shoulders the main day-to-day and financial responsibility of running a home for the child) and which is the 'secondary' custodian. In rare cases of truly equal caretaking and equal finances, neither parent might owe the other. Third, the secondary custodian normally pays the full formula amount to the primary custodian - unless that secondary parent proves that paying the full amount would be a substantial injustice. The court emphasized that a parent simply spending a lot of time with a child does not, by itself, justify reducing support, because the primary custodian's fixed costs (rent, utilities, car, medical) do not drop just because the other parent shares time - in fact, shared custody usually increases total costs. When weighing whether a reduction is fair, courts should focus most on the parties' standard of living, earning capacity, and relative financial means, not merely on time. Any deviation from the formula - up or down - must be supported by written findings of fact. Applying these principles, the court affirmed. The referee (whose findings the trial court adopted) found the father's contacts looked more like ordinary visitation - three weekends plus an extra day per month - than a genuine sharing of full custodial responsibilities, and nothing in the record showed contributions so substantial that a reduction was required as a matter of law.

Charles Frye married Cynthia in 1982. Cynthia had a young daughter, Amanda, from a prior marriage; Amanda was less than a year and a half old when the couple married, was treated as Charles's own child throughout the marriage, and came to see Charles as her only father. The couple discussed Charles adopting Amanda. Charles hired an attorney to handle the adoption and, to make it possible, took steps that terminated the parental rights of Amanda's biological father, knowing this would leave Amanda with no legal father unless he completed the adoption. Charles then signed a petition to adopt her. Before the adoption was finalized, the marriage fell apart and Charles filed for divorce, denying he owed any duty to support Amanda. The trial court ruled that Charles owed child support on a theory of "equitable adoption" and ordered him to pay $150 per month. Charles appealed, arguing the equitable adoption doctrine should not be stretched to create a child support obligation. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that equitable adoption can apply where there is a promise to adopt and a child is harmed by reasonable reliance on that promise. Charles had shown a clear intent to adopt, backed by a promise, and had personally caused the termination of the biological father's rights, leaving Amanda without any father to look to for support. Allowing him to walk away would harm an innocent child who had justifiably relied on the promise that a new father would replace the old one. The court stressed it was not holding that every equitable adoption carries all the duties of a full legal adoption, only that on these particular facts equity required Charles to provide support.

When the appellant's parents divorced in 1977, they signed a settlement agreement (later incorporated into the divorce decree) in which the father agreed to pay child support. The agreement said support would continue for each child until age 22 if the child attended college and kept at least a "C" average, and that the father would pay college tuition for a school the parents reasonably agreed upon. The appellant was 14 when the agreement was signed. About two years later, her mother died. After living with her father for a time, the appellant moved in with another family; the father paid that family $5,400 for her support until she turned 18, then paid nothing more. She went to college and always kept better than a "C" average. She later sued to enforce the support and tuition terms. The trial court ruled the father owed the tuition but not back child support, partly because it thought the daughter had no legal standing to enforce the agreement. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed on the child support. It held that the daughter was an intended third-party beneficiary of her parents' agreement and, given special circumstances (her mother's death and the father's refusal to have contact), had standing to enforce it. The father could not escape his obligation by pointing to the daughter's lack of communication when he himself wanted no contact. The court calculated that the father owed $475 per month for 65 months ($30,875), minus a $5,400 credit, plus statutory interest on each overdue payment. On tuition, the court agreed with the trial court that the father remained liable, but explained the reasoning differently. The case was sent back to calculate interest and enter judgment.

A couple divorced in Indiana in 1968 after having five children together. The mother got custody of all five, and the father was ordered to pay $175 a week in child support. He stopped paying. By 1980 the mother had obtained an Indiana judgment for roughly $90,000 in unpaid support plus attorney's fees. She recorded that judgment in Clark County, Nevada, where the father - a Las Vegas medical doctor - lived, and tried for years to collect. The father fought hard to avoid paying. First he put his Las Vegas home into a family trust; a court set that trust aside as a fraud designed to defeat the mother's collection efforts. Then he filed a homestead exemption on the home under Nevada law, which normally protects a family home from being seized by creditors. The mother asked the court to rule that the homestead exemption did not block her support judgment. The trial court refused, holding the father could use the homestead exemption to shield his home. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Read strictly, the homestead statute did not list the mother's situation as an exception. But the court held that reading the statute so technically would produce an absurd result and defeat the legislature's purpose. Homestead laws exist to protect families from creditors they cannot pay. When an ex-spouse or child is trying to collect court-ordered support, that protective purpose no longer applies - a family member enforcing a support judgment is not the kind of creditor the law was meant to guard against. The court rejected the father's argument that his second family (his new wife and her children, who lived in the home) deserved protection: he owed his first family support long before he remarried and cannot use a new marriage as a shield. The court noted his argument was especially weak given he was financially solvent and had bought the $160,000 home after he had already defaulted on support. The homestead exemption could not be used to defeat the child support judgment.

After Sandra Salins and Lewis Gulick divorced in Maryland, disputes over their son's custody and support continued in Nevada. Lewis asked a Nevada court (the First Judicial District) to change custody of their son to Sandra and to eliminate his child support obligations under the Maryland decree. Sandra opposed him, pointing out that a Maryland court had already transferred custody to her and that under the Maryland decree Lewis owed support until the son turned 21. She had also started a separate support-collection case (a URESA case) in a different Nevada court (the Ninth Judicial District), where, in her absence, the district attorney agreed that Lewis would only owe support until the son turned 18. Lewis then filed a new motion adopting that 18-years-old support cutoff, and the First Judicial District Court granted it the very next day, without giving Sandra a chance to respond. The court transferred custody to Sandra, adopted the URESA support terms, and ruled Lewis owed no support past age 18. It denied Sandra's request to reconsider, relying on Nevada's age of majority of 18. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, finding three errors. First, deciding the motion in one day, without letting Sandra respond within the time the local rule allowed and with no emergency, was improper. Second, the court wrongly used the URESA support order to modify the divorce decree - Nevada law says a URESA support order does not nullify or replace an earlier support order unless it specifically says so, and this one did not. Third, before applying Nevada's age of 18, the court should have determined whether the Maryland decree's support terms came from a settlement agreement between the parents; if support arises from a settlement agreement built into the decree, the obligation is not automatically cut off at the statutory age of majority. There was also no evidence of changed circumstances justifying a modification. The court sent the case back and told the trial court to also confirm its jurisdiction and whether Nevada was the appropriate forum, since the son now lived in Maryland.

Yvonne Kennedy went to a Nevada district court to enforce a California divorce decree. She asked the court to recognize the California decree as a Nevada judgment and to let her collect the child support that her former husband, Jerry Kennedy, had fallen behind on. After several hearings, the district court gave full faith and credit to the California decree, awarded Yvonne a judgment of $7,837 for the past-due support (arrearages), and - going forward - reduced Jerry's future child support obligation. Yvonne appealed on several points. The Nevada Supreme Court gave her a partial win. First, and most importantly, the court held that the district court was wrong not to add interest to the arrearages judgment. Whether a divorced spouse is entitled to interest on unpaid support is governed by the law of the state that issued the decree - here, California - and California allows interest at the legal rate on support arrearages from the date each payment was due. So the court reversed that part of the judgment and sent it back to calculate and include interest on each missed payment from its due date. Second, the court agreed that a court may allow a past-due support judgment to be paid off in installments (here, $50 per month), but because that monthly amount did not account for the interest that should have been included, the court vacated the $50 figure and sent it back for a new payment schedule that liquidates the arrearages (with interest) on a reasonable basis. Third, the court rejected Yvonne's argument that the district court could not reduce future support without a formal motion to modify. She cited no authority that a court cannot, on its own motion and with adequate notice, raise modification, and she did not claim she lacked notice; the court had taken evidence of Jerry's finances and reduced support prospectively upon a showing of changed circumstances.

Ronald and Leona Brown divorced in Idaho in 1958. Leona got custody of their child, and Ronald was ordered to pay $60 a month in child support until the child grew up. He made no payments until 1968, when he began paying under a Nevada order that grew out of an interstate support case; he then paid correctly until the child reached adulthood in 1974. In 1977, Leona went back to the Idaho court and got a judgment against Ronald for $6,840 in claimed back child support - but she did this without giving Ronald any notice, so he had no chance to show up and defend. She then sued in Nevada to collect on that Idaho judgment, and the Nevada court gave her summary judgment, treating the Idaho judgment as one Nevada had to honor under the U.S. Constitution's 'full faith and credit' rule. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that a state must honor another state's judgment only if the other state's court had proper power over the person, which requires that the person got notice and a chance to be heard. Because Ronald received no notice before Idaho turned the claimed arrears into a lump-sum judgment, he was never able to raise defenses he might have had - such as that some of the claimed arrears were too old under a statute of limitations. The court relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case with very similar facts and held that a judgment entered without notice is not entitled to full faith and credit. It sent the case back so the Nevada court could let Leona proceed under the valid 1958 decree and let Ronald raise whatever defenses were available to him.

After Judith and her former husband divorced, he was ordered to pay child support of $150 per month for each of their two children, who lived with Judith. Later the father asked the court to lower the payments, and the district judge reduced them to $100 per month per child based on the parties' changed circumstances. Judith appealed, arguing the reduction was wrong. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that changing a child support obligation because of changed circumstances is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and an appeals court will not overturn it unless that discretion was clearly abused. Reviewing the record, the court found the judge acted within his discretion, so the reduction stood.

This case involved unpaid child support that had built up under a divorce decree entered in January 1964. A parent sued to collect the accrued support payments. The district court threw out the lawsuit, believing that because the court had earlier refused a request to convert the child support arrearages into a formal money judgment, that earlier refusal blocked the new collection action. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that the dismissal was error and that the earlier refusal did not bar the collection action, citing its prior decisions in Brown v. Vonsild and Folks v. Folks. The case was sent back to the district court for a trial on the issues raised in the pleadings.

Roger and Glenda Hildahl divorced under a decree that incorporated their settlement agreement. Glenda had custody of the three children, and Roger owed a fixed monthly payment for the support of Glenda and the children, plus he was to convey the family home to her. When their son Mark moved into Roger's home for the summer, Roger unilaterally cut his monthly payments for June, July, and August, reasoning he was now supporting Mark. He also delayed transferring the home. Glenda went to court for a judgment for the amounts Roger held back and asked that he be held in contempt. The district court ruled for Glenda, entered judgment for the arrearages, and held Roger in contempt (with a suspended two-day jail sentence conditioned on paying up). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that support payments, once they come due, become vested rights that cannot be retroactively reduced or erased. A parent cannot simply decide on his own to reduce court-ordered payments. Roger claimed he had actually taken custody of Mark with Glenda's consent, but there was no real evidence of that - filing for arrearages showed Glenda had not consented. The court refused to allow an "equitable setoff" for what Roger spent on Mark, because there was neither a genuine agreement to change custody nor a compelling emergency that forced a change before court approval could be sought. Finally, the court upheld the contempt finding as a proper, coercive tool to enforce the decree.

A former wife sued her ex-husband in Nevada to collect unpaid spousal and child support owed under a 1965 California divorce decree and a later 1973 stipulation. The husband's answer denied that anything was owed but raised no formal defenses. At trial, during cross-examination, the wife mentioned that she had obtained 'two judgments' against her husband in California. Seizing on this, the husband moved to dismiss the whole case on the ground of res judicata - the doctrine that a matter already decided cannot be relitigated. The trial court ruled the wife was 'bound by her own testimony' and dismissed her case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be specifically raised in the pleadings; failing to plead it normally waives it. It can sometimes be considered anyway - if both sides effectively try the issue by consent, or if the court allows an amendment where the other side is not prejudiced - but none of that happened here. The husband never asked to amend, never raised the issue before trial, and the wife's lawyer was surprised and objected. Parties are entitled to reasonable notice of the major issues and a fair chance to respond. Because the wife had neither, the defense was not properly before the court. The Court also noted that, even if it had been raised, the wife's vague testimony did not actually prove the defense.

Mary and William McInnis divorced after eight years. Mary got custody of their two young children and $150 per month in child support. The decree provided that, for a period, the support would be "deemed made" out of Mary's share of the proceeds of a promissory note (community property awarded to her), after which William would resume paying directly. A year later, Mary asked the court to increase the support; the district court denied her motion in all respects, and she appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that modifying child support is within the district court's discretion, guided by factors like the adequacy of the original award, the father's ability to pay more, and any real change in circumstances. Here there was no abuse of discretion: Mary's own income had nearly doubled, her claimed expenses were actually lower than at the time of the divorce, and the only evidence of the father's income showed a decrease. The court also rejected Mary's argument that the note-proceeds arrangement improperly relieved the father of his support duty - the decree did not eliminate his obligation, it just specified a method of payment tied to community property that had been awarded to her. Finally, the denial of her request for attorney's fees was upheld.

In a proceeding to modify a divorce decree, the district court awarded custody of the parties' two minor children to the father. The father also asked the court to order the mother to help pay for the children's support, but the court refused to even consider that request, finding no special circumstances that would justify it. The father appealed, arguing that as a matter of law a mother must contribute to her children's support whenever the children are not in her custody. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court found no legal authority supporting the father's claim that such a contribution is mandatory. Instead, it explained that ordering child support is a matter left to the trial court's discretion under the child support statute. A trial court's decision about child support will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion. Reviewing the record, the Supreme Court saw no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that no special circumstances had been shown that would justify ordering the mother to contribute. The judgment was affirmed.

When Joseph and Joan Norris divorced in 1972, the court ordered Joseph to pay $200 a month to support each of their two children 'until said children respectively reach the age of majority or are otherwise emancipated.' At that time, Nevada law set the age of majority for males at 21. In 1973, the legislature changed the age of majority to 18 for everyone. In 1975, when the parties' son turned 18, Joseph stopped paying support for him. Joan asked the court to make Joseph keep paying or provide money for the son's college education, and also sought attorney's fees. The district judge ruled that once the son reached the new age of majority (18), he was no longer entitled to support, and that the court had no jurisdiction to order the relief Joan wanted. The judge also denied attorney's fees. Joan appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Joan relied on an earlier case, Bingham v. Bingham, where the court had held that lowering the age of majority did not cut off a father's duty to support until 21. But the Supreme Court distinguished that case: in Bingham, the support obligation had been fixed by the parties' agreement (later merged into the decree), showing the parties intended support to continue to age 21. Here, there was no agreement; the support duty came only from the decree, so there was no expression of the parties' intent to extend it. The court's power to order child support is limited to the child's minority, and once the statute lowered majority to 18, the son was no longer a minor. The court also explained that a child's right to a support payment does not become a vested (locked-in) right until each payment actually comes due. Payments that had already accrued were vested and untouchable, but payments not yet due could be modified by the court or ended by a later change in the law. Applying the 1973 statute here was proper and only prospective, because the son did not turn 18 until 1975 - well after the statute took effect - so no vested rights were disturbed. The denial of attorney's fees was also upheld.

When William and Patricia Peot divorced in 1962, the decree ordered William to pay $100 per month in child support. Patricia later moved to Wisconsin and, in 1963, used an interstate support-enforcement law (URESA, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act) to obtain a Nevada order requiring William to pay $50 per month. In 1974, Patricia asked the court for a judgment for the back support owed under the original 1962 decree. The parties agreed William had paid everything due under the 1963 URESA order. The district court concluded that the 1963 URESA order had effectively replaced (modified) the original decree, so no arrears had built up. Patricia appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that URESA's remedies are meant to be in addition to, not a substitute for, existing support remedies, and that under the statute in effect in 1963 a reciprocal support order "shall not supersede" a prior support order. A reciprocal support order does not automatically lower or replace a divorce decree's support obligation; it can do so only if the order specifically says so, and the 1963 order showed no such intent. The court held the statute means what it says, rejected William's statute-of-limitations and laches defenses because he had not raised them in the trial court, and sent the case back so the district court could decide the motion for arrears (and consider its discretionary powers under NRS 125.140).

When the Binghams divorced in 1969, they signed a settlement agreement in which the husband agreed to pay $100 per month to support each child "during the minority of said children." At that time, Nevada law set the age of majority for males at 21, so the parties intended support to continue until each child turned 21. The divorce decree approved and incorporated their agreement. In 1973, the Nevada Legislature amended the statute (NRS 129.010) to make 18 the age of full legal capacity. Relying on the change, the district court ruled that the father no longer had to help support the parties' son once the son reached the new "age of majority" of 18. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. When the agreement and decree were made, the parties contemplated that support would continue until the child reached 21, the then-existing age of majority. The later amendment lowering the age of majority to 18 did not cut off the father's obligation to pay support until the child turned 21 or was emancipated.

In this brief appeal, a mother challenged a district court order that reduced the divorced father's child support obligation from $220 per month per child to $170 per month per child for a period running from June 1975 to June 1981. She argued that the record did not show a change of circumstances sufficient to justify the reduction. The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the record and found no abuse of the district court's discretion. It affirmed the reduction.

A divorce decree gave the mother custody of seven children, provided for their support, and ordered the father to pay each child's college expenses. The mother later asked the court to compel the father to pay the college expenses of the oldest child, supporting her request with informational letters from college deans about the child's academic standing and the child's own written statement of expenses. The father, his lawyer, and the mother's lawyer all appeared at the hearing, and no one objected to the form or content of those documents. The court entered judgment against the father for the college expenses. On appeal, the father argued for the first time that the court should not have considered the supporting papers because they were not sworn affidavits. The Nevada Supreme Court held the objection came too late - by failing to object at the hearing, the father waived the point - and affirmed the judgment.

After their 1960 divorce, the husband owed child support. In 1964 the wife obtained a judgment against him for $5,220 in unpaid support plus a $350 attorney fee. He paid part of it, and in 1967 the two signed a notarized agreement in which the wife accepted a check as 'final payment' in full satisfaction of the remaining balance; she cashed the check, but the satisfaction was never formally entered in the court file. Two and a half years later, without notifying the husband, the wife used the still-open court judgment to obtain a writ of execution and had the sheriff sell the husband's real property at an execution sale - to herself - for $1,000. When the husband learned of the sale, he moved to set it aside, presenting the 1967 agreement and the cancelled check. The trial court found the judgment had in fact been satisfied and declared the sale void. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed: a sale under a judgment that has already been satisfied is void and passes no title, even if the satisfaction was never entered of record - and this is especially true where the buyer (here, the wife) had notice that the judgment had been paid. The wife's vague, unspecified claim that the husband had fraudulently induced her to sign the 1967 agreement was unsupported by any facts and provided no basis to disturb the ruling.

The Reeds divorced in Nevada in 1962. Their property settlement gave the mother custody of the four children and required the father to pay $75 per week in child support. The father fell behind, and in 1971 the mother went back to court under Nevada's arrearage statute (NRS 125.180) to collect what she said was $13,285.75 in unpaid support, plus costs and attorney fees. After a hearing, the trial judge entered judgment for the mother, but only for $11,303.75, ordered it collected at no more than $50 per month, and denied her any attorney fees or costs. The mother appealed, asking the Nevada Supreme Court to give her the full original amount plus interest, payable immediately, along with fees and costs. A key problem for the mother's appeal was that she never filed a transcript of the hearing (or an approved written substitute) with the Supreme Court. Because the appellate court could not see what evidence the trial judge heard, it had to assume the evidence supported the judge's conclusions - that only $11,303.75 was actually owed, that it should be paid off gradually, and that no attorney fees were warranted. The court explained that the arrearage statute gives the trial judge broad discretion: the judge can enter judgment for all, some, or none of the claimed arrears, and can set up any reasonable payment schedule. The court had previously approved a $25-per-month payoff of child support arrears in an earlier case, so a $50-per-month schedule here was well within the judge's power. Attorney fees and costs were likewise discretionary. With no transcript to show otherwise, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order.

A 1970 divorce ordered the husband to pay $750 per month in child support. He later asked the court to reduce that amount, saying his health had deteriorated so he could no longer practice dentistry, that he had filed for bankruptcy, and that he was now working as a hospital orderly earning only $400 per month. The trial court denied the reduction without stating its reasons, and he appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It noted that his claims appeared only in his own affidavit and that, under prior Nevada law, such a bare affidavit stating conclusions is legally insufficient. More importantly, he did not provide the Court with a transcript of the hearing (or an approved substitute), so the Court had to presume that the evidence supported the trial court's decision. Because the record did not show any abuse of discretion, the denial stood.

Several years after their divorce, the ex-wife went back to court asking for more child support for the couple's minor children and for money to pay her attorney. After a hearing, the court increased child support by $6,000 a year and awarded her $2,500 for attorney fees ('suit money'). Because the ex-husband did not bring the hearing transcript up on appeal, the Supreme Court assumed the evidence supported those awards, and the ex-husband did not seriously argue otherwise. The real question was different. Before the hearing, the ex-husband had served an 'offer of judgment' under a civil procedure rule (NRCP 68) offering $7,501 a year in additional support labeled as alimony, with nothing for attorney fees. Under NRCP 68 in ordinary civil cases, if a party rejects an offer and then does no better at trial, that party can be penalized by having to pay the other side's costs and fees. The ex-husband argued that because the court's $6,000 support award was arguably less than his $7,501 offer, the court should have denied his ex-wife her attorney fees and instead made her pay his. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this and affirmed. It held, as a threshold matter, that it could not even tell whether the $6,000 in child support was really less favorable than $7,501 in alimony, because alimony is taxable to the wife while child support is not, and there was no record of the tax situation. More fundamentally, the court held that NRCP 68 simply does not apply to divorce proceedings, which involve different social considerations than ordinary civil lawsuits. Suit money in divorce is awarded based on need - to prevent a failure of justice - not based on who 'prevails.' Applying NRCP 68 would undermine the legislature's efforts to help wives obtain counsel, would spawn intricate side-litigation over whether an award was 'more favorable' than an offer, and would clash with the rule that parties cannot bind the court by agreement on child custody and support, where the child's best interest controls. The court affirmed and ordered the husband to pay an additional $1,000 for his ex-wife's attorney fees on appeal.

After a divorce, the father asked to change the decree, and the trial court entered an order that (1) sharply reduced his child support (from $25 per week per child to $17.50 per month), (2) required him to pay $25 a month toward his past-due child support, and (3) expanded his visitation to include weekends in Las Vegas and holidays in Minnesota, with the father paying travel costs. The mother appealed, challenging all of it. The Nevada Supreme Court focused on whether circumstances had really changed enough to justify cutting support. The only change for the father was that he moved from California (where he earned $1,200 a month plus a car allowance and full expense account) to Minnesota (where he earned the same $1,200 but with no expense account). The only changes for the mother were that she remarried a casino dealer and that, because of the remarriage, her father stopped letting her draw income from a trust he had set up for the children. Given those facts, the court held that cutting the father's child support was an abuse of discretion, and it reversed that part of the order. On visitation, the court found the trial court's order was supported by the evidence, so it generally affirmed it - but with an important condition: the father may not take the children away from Las Vegas while he is behind on his child support. Otherwise he would be spending on travel money that should go to supporting his children. On the order requiring payments toward past-due support, the court found the mother was not harmed by it - it did not limit her rights - so she had nothing to complain about there. The result: the support reduction was reversed, and the rest of the order was affirmed subject to the no-removal-while-in-arrears condition.

A mother who had been awarded custody of her two children in a 1954 divorce sued her deceased ex-husband's estate for child support that would come due after his death. The divorce decree had ordered the father to pay $50 per month per child 'until the further order of the court or until the children reached their majority.' The father paid faithfully until he died in September 1968. The mother then filed a claim against his estate for $3,850 - the support she calculated would accrue from his death until each child turned 18. The estate rejected the claim, and the trial court dismissed her lawsuit, suggesting she could instead seek a family allowance in the probate proceedings. The single question for the Nevada Supreme Court was whether a decree ordering child support 'until further order of the court, or until they reached the age of their majority' allows the mother to collect installments that come due after the father's death, as a claim against his estate. The court had never squarely decided this before. The court explained that at common law a father's duty to support his children ended when he died. It held that Nevada's statute (NRS 125.140) does permit a divorce court, in its discretion, to order that child support payments bind the father's estate - but a decree must specifically say that the obligation is to survive the father's death. A generic order to pay 'until further order of the court' or 'during minority' is not enough to create an estate obligation. The court declined to follow states (like California and Utah) that had read such generic language to bind the estate, and instead adopted the Washington rule requiring the decree to expressly state the obligation survives death. The court also catalogued the many unanswered practical questions that arise when support is charged against an estate (priority among children, credits for insurance or Social Security, modification after death, keeping the estate open during minority) and urged that these be addressed by comprehensive legislation. It suggested safer alternatives - a father can contractually bind his estate, or a court can require life insurance or a trust for the children. Because this decree did not specifically state the obligation would survive death, the court affirmed the dismissal.

When Marguerite and Leighton Noble divorced in 1966, Marguerite received custody of their son Scott, alimony, and child support, and Leighton was ordered to keep certain insurance and to have reasonable visitation. Although Leighton paid on time, Marguerite repeatedly blocked or frustrated his visits with Scott. The trial court warned her, in open court, that if she kept denying visitation it might use sanctions, including relieving Leighton of support payments, and it set specific visitation times. The situation did not improve. In 1969, Leighton moved to be relieved of all child support, insurance premiums, and 'any other financial contribution.' After a hearing, the trial court suspended both child support and alimony and relieved Leighton of maintaining Marguerite under the insurance policies, until Marguerite submitted an acceptable plan for complying with the visitation orders. Marguerite appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the order but sent one piece back. It held the trial court acted within its inherent power to enforce its own decrees when it suspended alimony and the insurance obligations as a sanction for Marguerite's contumacious denial of visitation, and that she had received adequate notice (Leighton's motion sought relief from any financial contribution 'in whatever form') and an opportunity to be heard. But the suspension of child support raised a conflict between the court's power to punish contempt and the paramount principle that a child's best interest and welfare come first. Because the trial court made no findings about how a total suspension of child support would affect the child's present comfort and future well-being, and the record would not let the court imply such findings, the case was remanded for the trial court to make those findings on the child support suspension. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Marguerite a continuance and denied her attorney's fees on appeal.

In a 1964 divorce, the father agreed to pay $200 a month in child support, and that agreement became part of the divorce decree. He repeatedly fell behind. He was found in contempt in July 1966, then paid enough and made arrangements to be cleared ('purged') of contempt in August 1966. By November 1966 he was again about $2,820 behind. He filed papers explaining his remarriage and financial troubles and asked the court to reduce his child support and set specific visitation. At a December 1966 hearing, the evidence showed he had paid only $125 over five months while earning about $540 a month. The court found he had the ability to pay, held him in contempt again, and gave him 30 days to catch up or go to jail. It also denied his request to reduce support. He appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It rejected his argument that jailing him for unpaid support would be unconstitutional 'imprisonment for debt.' The proceeding was civil contempt, and money owed as alimony or child support is not a 'debt' under the Nevada Constitution. There was enough evidence that he could pay and did not, and courts have inherent power to enforce their orders through contempt. The court also held it was proper to deny his request to reduce support, both as a matter of discretion and because a person who is in contempt of the court's orders cannot ask the court for help on his own demands.

After a 1948 divorce, a later-modified decree incorporated the parties' agreement giving the mother custody and requiring the father to pay child support. The agreement also said that if the mother incurred medical or dental bills for the children, she had to use doctors and dentists belonging to certain professional associations, and had to submit itemized, sworn (verified) bills before the father was required to pay. The agreement also linked the father's payment duty to his visitation rights: if he failed to pay he lost visitation, but if he paid and the mother refused him visitation, his support duty stopped during that refusal. The mother later sent the father medical and dental bills that were not itemized or verified as the agreement required. He refused to pay. She then refused him visitation, and he stopped paying support. She went to court to reduce the unpaid amounts to a money judgment, and the trial court gave her judgment for the arrears. The father appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Because the verified-bill requirement was a condition that had to be met before the father owed the medical payments, and the mother admittedly never provided verified bills, that payment obligation never arose, so he was within his rights to refuse. Since he was not in default, the mother had no right to cut off his visitation; and because his ongoing support duty was tied to his visitation rights, her wrongful denial of visitation barred her from collecting the unpaid support installments. The court emphasized this was only a proceeding to collect arrears (the children's needs had already been met by the mother, who simply sought reimbursement) and did not involve any situation where the children's welfare required support despite denial of visitation. The court also held the father's earlier payment of some unverified bills was not a waiver of the verification requirement, especially given his written notice insisting on compliance.

When this couple divorced in 1955, the decree gave the wife custody of the two children, ordered the husband to pay $300 a month in child support, and divided their property. It also awarded the family home to the wife as her sole and separate property, with the condition that the husband pay off the remaining balance owed on the house. The court kept jurisdiction only over custody and child support. In 1958 the husband asked the court to modify the decree because his circumstances had changed. In 1959 the court reduced child support to $85 per month per child and relieved the husband of paying the roughly $4,800 balance still owed on the house. The evidence showed the wife had remarried and sold the house, the husband's earnings had dropped, he was helping support his aged mother, and he had fallen behind on the house payments. The wife appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court reversed in part. Except for custody and child support, a divorce decree becomes final six months after it is entered, so by the time of the modification the court no longer had power to change the property parts of the decree. The requirement that the husband pay off the $4,800 was part of the property division (the house was awarded to the wife outright, with no condition that she live in it or not sell it), so it could not be treated as modifiable child support - even though the modifying judge speculated the original judge may have intended the home to house the wife and children. That part of the order was ordered stricken. However, the court affirmed the reduction in child support. Nevada law lets courts adjust child support during a child's minority whether or not the court kept jurisdiction, and this is a matter of discretion. Because there was no trial transcript and the husband had shown his income dropped from about $16,000 to $11,000 net, the court could not say the reduction was an abuse of discretion.

A 1948 divorce decree gave the mother custody of the minor children and required the father to pay specified sums for their support. In 1953 the father asked the court to reduce his support obligation, showing that his income had dropped by about half. The court reduced the payments to $50 per month per child. The mother appealed. The mother made two arguments. First, she said the reduction was not supported by any evidence about the children's best interests and only served to lessen the father's obligation; she relied on Paine v. Paine. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this, explaining she misread Paine. Paine involved an attempt to create a support duty in a parent where none existed (shifting the mother's assumed duty to the father) without any showing it concerned the children's interests. Here, by contrast, the father's ongoing support obligation continued a relationship that concerned the children, the father, and the court, and that obligation is subject to readjustment as circumstances change; the court's power to adjust is not limited to changes in the children's favor. Second, the mother argued the father was barred by res judicata because a District of Columbia court had already refused to reduce his obligation. The court held res judicata would not be considered because it was never raised at the hearing below and was asserted for the first time on appeal. The court affirmed the reduction.

After the trial court granted the husband's motion to reduce his child-support obligation, the wife appealed. While that appeal was pending, she asked the Nevada Supreme Court for allowances to cover the costs of the appeal: a $25 clerk's filing fee, $350 to prepare the record, and $2,500 in preliminary attorney's fees. She did not claim she was in necessitous (needy) circumstances. Instead, she argued that a needy showing was unnecessary because (1) the husband had contractually agreed to pay all costs and expenses of the litigation, and (2) she was seeking the allowances not for herself but for the minor children. The Nevada Supreme Court denied the request. It held that the general rule is that preliminary allowances are granted to enable a wife to prosecute her appeal, and if she has ample funds to do so, the husband's alleged contractual promise to pay costs does not, by itself, compel a preliminary order (although it might support a later judgment if the contract obligation is proven). The court also rejected the argument that it made a difference that her appeal concerned support for the children rather than alimony for herself, finding no authority recognizing that distinction. The motion for allowances was denied.

When this wealthy couple divorced in 1952, their carefully negotiated New York settlement agreement (with lawyers and an independent arbitrator) set out who would pay the children's expenses. The husband agreed to pay for the children's schooling, camp, special education, travel, and a clothing/personal allowance; but 'as to all other expenses,' each parent would pay the expenses of whichever child was then living with him or her. The decree approved the agreement but said it survived and was not merged into the decree. The father originally had custody of one daughter and the mother the other; later the mother obtained custody of both children, then moved the court to require the father to contribute substantially more toward their support. The trial court granted that increase, and the father appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It recognized the court's continuing statutory power to modify child support to protect the welfare and interests of minor children. But here it was conceded that both parents were independently wealthy and fully able to provide suitable support, and that the mother was in fact providing it. So the increase would not give the children better support than they could otherwise expect; its real effect was simply to relieve the mother of her contractual obligation and shift it to the father. Because the children's needs and interests were not actually involved, there was nothing on which the court's discretion could properly operate, and exercising discretion without such a basis was error. The court set the order aside and directed that the motion for modification be denied.

When the parties divorced in 1948, the mother received custody of their young son, and the decree approved an agreement for the father to pay $25 a week in child support. In late 1950 the mother asked the court to raise the payment to $100 a week, arguing the $25 was not enough, the father could easily afford more, and circumstances had changed. The trial court denied the request, and she appealed. The only question was whether the denial was an abuse of the judge's discretion. The evidence (all by affidavit) showed the $25 was insufficient, the father could pay more, and some circumstances had changed. The mother argued that, given those facts, increasing support was no longer a matter of discretion but a matter of right for the child. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. It explained at length that judicial discretion is not arbitrary will, but must be guided by legal principles - yet within its proper area, reasonable judges may disagree about the best result. A key fact was that, on top of the required $25 a week, the father had voluntarily paid over $2,000 a year for the boy's support and education. The statute directs the court to make provision for children as appears most expedient 'under all the circumstances,' which the court held includes those voluntary payments. The trial judge could reasonably conclude the child was not currently suffering, that a formal increase was not necessary, and even that the child might benefit more from the continued voluntary arrangement. That was not an abuse of discretion, so the order was affirmed.

A mother, acting as court-appointed guardian of the parties' 27-year-old epileptic and incompetent son, sued the father in White Pine County for the son's past and future support and medical expenses. The father, who lived in Clark County, demanded that the case be moved to his home county. The mother objected, explaining that the son's fragile health and her lack of money made travel to Las Vegas nearly impossible, and that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice favored keeping the case in White Pine County. The trial court ordered the case moved to Clark County, and the mother appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Under the venue statute, when a defendant timely demands trial in his county of residence, the change is mandatory, and once the demand is granted the original court loses jurisdiction to weigh convenience of witnesses; that motion must instead be made in the new county. Bound by its 1870 decision in Williams v. Keller and applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the court declined to overrule that rule despite contrary California authority. It noted, sympathetically, that the mother could still ask the Clark County court to move the case back.

A 1944 divorce decree awarded the mother custody of the parties' roughly two-and-a-half-year-old daughter and expressly stated that the court "reserve[d] and retain[ed] jurisdiction over the said minor child" and could modify its orders "in connection therewith" at any time until the child reached adulthood. The decree, however, did not order the father to pay child support. In 1945 the mother moved to modify the decree to require support. The trial court refused, reasoning that it had not reserved jurisdiction over support specifically and that more than six months had passed since the decree. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It agreed that, without any reservation of jurisdiction, a court cannot modify a decree to add child support after the six-month period. But here the decree's broad reservation of jurisdiction over the child was reasonably read to include the power to order support. The court must be presumed to have been concerned for the child's welfare, which includes adequate support as well as care and custody. The case was reversed and sent back for further proceedings.

A 1924 divorce decree required the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife $1,200 per year ($100 per month) for the support of each of their two children - for the son until he became self-supporting, and for the daughter until she married - with the cost of the children's education excepted. Custody was split: the mother had the children during the school year and the father had them during summer and parts of other vacations. Nearly three years later, in 1927, the father asked the trial court to 'construe' the decree so he could deduct education expenses and the amounts he spent supporting the children while they were in his custody. The trial court obliged, ruling in effect that the mother had to pay the father out of her $100 per month for the periods the children lived with him. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Courts always have inherent power to fix clerical errors or clear up genuine ambiguity in a judgment, but this decree was not ambiguous: it plainly required $100 per month per child to the mother, with only education costs deductible. The trial court's 'construction' actually changed the decree's substance by reducing the father's payments, and under district court rule 45 no substantial change could be made more than six months after the decree was entered. The order was reversed and the trial court was directed to deny the father's motion.

A wife obtained a divorce and custody of the couple's only child. Her complaint said the husband, a physician living in Atlanta, Georgia, earned upwards of $7,000 a year, but she expressly asked for no alimony, testified she wanted nothing for the child's support (her parents were willing to help), and told the court she and her husband had agreed that no support provision would be made. The trial court nevertheless ordered the husband to pay $100 per month for the child's support, education, and maintenance until further order. The husband appealed, arguing the court had no jurisdiction to award child support that nobody requested and that the parties had agreed against. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Nevada's divorce statute commands the court, in granting a divorce, to make such provision for the children as appears most expedient for their present comfort and future well-being. Children of divorcing parents are effectively wards of the court: their best interests are paramount, and the parents' agreements cannot tie the court's hands, because it is not the parents' rights that are being determined. The court distinguished an earlier case involving a default judgment; here the husband had answered, so the court could grant any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint. There was also no abuse of discretion in the amount: the husband earned $5,000 to $7,000 a year as a physician, had contributed nothing to the child's support, and the wife had no property or income and had to keep the child in Atlanta at her own expense for three months a year if the husband requested it.