Nevada family-law case summaries

Thomas Cass and Miriam Sandoval Cass asked a Clark County family court to approve an adoption. The district court did not approve the adoption. Instead, on June 17, 2025, it denied the petition "without prejudice" - meaning the couple could try again - because there were questions about whether the child's biological father had properly consented to give up his parental rights. The district court told the couple they could reset the adoption hearing once a new consent from the biological father was filed, or they could bring him to court to testify about his consent. The couple then appealed that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the adoption should be granted. Instead, it concluded it had no power to hear the appeal at all. Under Nevada's appellate rules, a person can generally appeal only from a "final" decision - one that ends the case. Because the district court's order left the door open for the couple to fix the consent problem and bring the petition again, the Supreme Court treated it as the equivalent of a dismissal with leave to amend, which is not final. With no final order and no other statute or rule giving the court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court also denied as moot a motion the appellants filed on September 22, 2025.

Jefferson Tyler asked a Washoe County family court judge to step aside from his case (a process called "recusal"). The district court denied that request, and Mr. Tyler, representing himself, appealed that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the judge should have stepped aside. Instead, it explained that it can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. Because no Nevada statute or court rule permits an appeal from an order denying a motion to recuse a judge, the Supreme Court concluded it had no jurisdiction (no legal authority) to consider the appeal and dismissed it. The court also denied Mr. Tyler's related motion to transmit original JAVS (courtroom audio/video) recordings, given the dismissal.

This is a one-paragraph administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court. The party who had filed the appeal, Evgenia Kalinina, decided not to go forward with it and filed paperwork withdrawing the appeal. The court responded by formally closing the case. No legal issues were decided, no arguments were considered, and the court did not rule on the underlying family-law dispute between Kalinina and John-Paul Babyak. In short: the appeal ended because the appellant chose to drop it.

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they must pay a filing fee and show that they sent a copy of the notice of appeal to the other side. Christopher Higgins filed an appeal but did neither. The court sent him notices on the day his appeal was docketed, telling him he had 14 days to pay the fee (or show that he qualifies for a fee waiver) and 14 days to file proof that he had served the notice of appeal. The notices warned that if he did not comply, the case would be thrown out. According to the court, Higgins did not pay the fee, did not file proof of service, and did not otherwise respond. The Nevada Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of any underlying family-court issue.

This case involves a mother, identified as Theresa S., and a child welfare proceeding concerning her young child. In the district court, Theresa S. signed a stipulation - an agreement filed with the court - in which she consented to the child's adoption. As part of that agreement, the State's separate petition to terminate her parental rights was dismissed without prejudice (meaning it could potentially be refiled later, though it was not pursued at that time). After the district court entered the stipulation and order, Theresa S. tried to appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of her appeal. Instead, it dismissed the appeal for two independent reasons related to its own jurisdiction (its legal authority to hear the case). First, the appeal was filed too late. Under Nevada's appellate rules, a party generally has 30 days from the date written notice of entry of the order is served to file a notice of appeal. Notice was mailed on June 2, 2025, but Theresa S. did not file her notice of appeal until August 15, 2025 - well past the deadline. A late notice of appeal does not give the Supreme Court power to hear the case. Second, the court noted that Theresa S. did not appear to be an "aggrieved party." Nevada law allows only an aggrieved party to appeal, and a party who voluntarily agrees to an order ordinarily cannot later challenge it on appeal. Because Theresa S. had stipulated to the order she was now trying to attack, she likely lacked standing to appeal. For both reasons, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without addressing any underlying issues about the adoption or termination proceedings.

Chandra Lynn LaCost asked the trial judge handling her family-court case to step aside (a process called "disqualification"). The trial court denied that request. She then tried to appeal that denial directly to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the judge should have stepped aside. Instead, it dismissed the appeal on a threshold jurisdictional ground: under Nevada law, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows, and no statute or rule allows a direct appeal from an order refusing to disqualify a judge. Because the order she tried to appeal is not on the list of appealable orders, the court had no power to consider the appeal and dismissed it. The court also denied as moot her pending emergency motion for stay, renewed emergency motion for stay, motion to waive transcript fees, and motion to compel rulings on pending emergency motions.

This is a short jurisdictional dismissal. The appellant tried to appeal a district court order that released an appeal bond - a sum of money posted to secure a prior appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the dispute. Instead, the court explained that it can hear an appeal only when a statute or court rule specifically allows that type of appeal. Because no Nevada statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order releasing an appeal bond, the court concluded it had no power to consider the case and dismissed it. The dismissal is about the court's authority to hear the appeal, not about who was right or wrong on the underlying issue.

This is a short procedural order ending an appeal in a family-law matter. Robert Stevens had appealed a decision from the Clark County district court that denied his request to correct a prior order under a procedural rule (NRCP 60(a), which allows courts to fix clerical mistakes in judgments). While the appeal was pending in the Nevada Supreme Court, Mr. Stevens's attorney was permitted to withdraw on June 27, 2025. The court told Mr. Stevens he had 30 days either to hire a new attorney or to let the court know he would represent himself. He did not respond. The court gave him another chance on August 12, 2025, this time with a 14-day deadline, and warned him again that the appeal could be dismissed if he did not comply. He still did not respond or contact the court. Because Mr. Stevens did not respond to either order, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that he had abandoned the appeal and dismissed it. The order does not address the merits of the underlying district court ruling.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they have to do two basic housekeeping things: pay a filing fee (or show they qualify to have it waived) and prove they served the other side with the notice of appeal. John Severns filed an appeal but did neither. The court sent him notices the same day his appeal was docketed, telling him he had 14 days to fix both problems and warning that the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He did not pay, did not file proof that he served the other side, and did not respond to the court at all. Because the required steps were not completed, the court dismissed the appeal.

Steven A. Fisher asked the Nevada Court of Appeals to step in and overturn two decisions from a district court in Lander County: a divorce decree and an order refusing to move his case to a different court location (a "change of venue"). He did this by filing what is called a petition for a writ of mandamus - a request asking a higher court to order a lower court to do something the law requires, or to correct a decision that was made in an arbitrary or unreasonable way. The Court of Appeals explained that this kind of extraordinary court order is not something a person is automatically entitled to. The court has full discretion over whether to even consider such a petition, and the person who files it carries the burden of showing that this special relief is justified. The court concluded that Fisher had not made that showing. A central reason was that a writ petition is not a stand-in for a normal appeal. Because the divorce decree and the order denying the change of venue can ordinarily be challenged through a regular appeal, and because Fisher did not show that an appeal would fail to adequately address his complaints, the court declined to use its extraordinary writ power. As a result, the court denied the petition.

This is a one-page clerk's order ending an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court ever reached the merits. Florela Brewer had appealed a ruling in a family-law case involving Thomas Brewer. Before the court decided anything substantive, Florela asked the court to dismiss her own appeal. Thomas did not oppose that request. The court granted the unopposed request and closed the case. Because the appeal was voluntarily withdrawn, the order contains no discussion of the underlying family-law dispute, no factual findings, and no legal analysis. The order simply notes that "cause appearing," the motion is granted under the appellate rule that allows a party to voluntarily dismiss an appeal.

When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, they have to do two basic housekeeping things: pay a filing fee (or show they qualify to have it waived) and prove that they served - that is, formally delivered - the notice of appeal on the other side. Jacob Morgan did neither when his appeal was docketed on July 22, 2025. The court sent him notices the same day telling him he had 14 days to fix both problems, and warned him that if he did not, his appeal would be dismissed. He did not pay, did not file proof of service, and did not respond to the court at all. Because of that, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without ever reaching the merits of whatever dispute he had with Asia Akbar.

This case began as a child custody and support dispute. Rather than going through a normal appeal after a final decision, Tristan Alexander Davis asked the Court of Appeals to step in directly by issuing what is called a writ - an extraordinary order from a higher court. He sought either a writ of mandamus (a court order forcing a lower court or official to do something the law requires) or a writ of prohibition (a court order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its legal authority). He used these tools to challenge several orders that had been entered in his custody and support case. The Court of Appeals explained the limited situations in which these writs are available. A writ of mandamus can be used to compel an official to perform a legal duty, or to correct an exercise of discretion that is arbitrary or capricious. A writ of prohibition is used to stop a court that is acting outside of, or without, its jurisdiction (its legal power to hear and decide a matter). The court also noted that deciding whether to even take up such a petition is entirely within its own discretion, and that the person asking for the writ carries the burden of showing that this kind of relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the documents submitted with it, the court concluded that Davis had not shown that extraordinary relief was warranted. It therefore denied the petition. The order does not explain in detail which specific custody or support orders were challenged, nor does it set out particular factual findings about the underlying dispute.

Mr. Grigalanz is involved in a child custody case in Las Vegas family court. He wanted to serve the other party, Elizabeth Marie Copas, with court papers by email rather than by traditional means. The district court apparently did not allow that, so he came directly to the Nevada Supreme Court asking for an emergency order - called a writ of mandamus or prohibition - that would force the district court to permit email service and would also reassign his case to a different judge. A writ of mandamus is a court order telling a lower court to do something it is legally required to do; a writ of prohibition tells a lower court to stop doing something beyond its authority. Both are considered "extraordinary" remedies, meaning the Supreme Court only grants them in unusual circumstances and the person asking has the burden to show the relief is warranted. The Supreme Court denied the petition. It pointed out several practical problems. First, his filings were missing required components (no routing statement, no page numbers, no certificate of compliance, and an appendix without a cover page or proper index), and his service on the other party did not appear to comply with the appellate rules because he had not shown she consented in writing to electronic service. The court excused these defects this one time and considered the petition anyway. On the merits, the court explained that Grigalanz had not given it the materials it needed - he did not include the district court's email or order he was challenging, nor did he include the motion he had filed below asking for alternative service. He also did not show that he had satisfied the rule (NRCP 4.4(b)(2)) that requires a party to demonstrate due diligence before a court will authorize alternative methods of service. On top of that, he had a motion for reconsideration still pending in the district court, meaning the lower court had not yet finished addressing the issue. Because Grigalanz had not shown the kind of clear legal failure by the lower court that would justify extraordinary intervention, the Supreme Court denied his petition.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally have to pay a filing fee. If they cannot afford it, there is a process to ask the court to waive the fee (under a rule called NRAP 24, which governs filing as a "pauper" - someone too poor to pay). In this case, Shawnice Annie Cabral filed an appeal against Bobby Johnson on July 1, 2025, but did not pay the filing fee. That same day, the court sent her a notice telling her she had 14 days to either pay the fee or follow the procedure to have it waived. The notice warned that if she did neither, her appeal would be thrown out. Cabral did not pay and did not respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying merits of the dispute between the parties.

Rishard'Dnae Cooper, representing himself without a lawyer, tried to appeal something to the Nevada Supreme Court. To start an appeal, a person has to file a "notice of appeal" - a document that, among other things, has to identify the lower-court decision the person is challenging. The Supreme Court looked at Cooper's notice of appeal and could not tell what decision he was trying to challenge. The court also checked the district court's docket (the official list of filings and rulings in the case) and found that no order had been entered in the underlying matter for several years. Without an identifiable order to review, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction - that is, no legal authority - to hear the appeal, and dismissed it.

This case involves an appeal from a divorce decision. The appellant, Elizabeth Ann Mitro, was representing herself (without an attorney) in challenging the trial court's ruling. When someone appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court, they are required to file certain documents on a schedule. Two of the most important are the "docketing statement" (a form that gives the court basic information about the case) and the "opening brief" (the main written argument explaining why the lower court got it wrong). An "informal brief" is a simplified version available to self-represented parties. According to the order, the Supreme Court repeatedly directed Ms. Mitro to file these documents. The court issued a notice on February 20, 2025, setting deadlines. When the docketing statement was not filed, the court issued another order on April 11, 2025, setting a new deadline of April 18, 2025, and warning that missing the deadline could result in dismissal. The court then granted an extension to May 19, 2025. Ms. Mitro tried to file the docketing statement on that date, but it was rejected as deficient, and she was given until June 2, 2025, to file a corrected version. The court also granted her an extension to July 21, 2025, to file her opening brief or informal brief, again warning of possible dismissal. By the time the order issued, Ms. Mitro had not filed a corrected docketing statement or an opening brief. Concluding that she had abandoned the appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed it. The order does not address the merits of the underlying divorce dispute.

When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally have to pay a filing fee, or else show they qualify to proceed without paying it (a process called proceeding "in forma pauperis," which essentially means asking the court to waive fees because the filer cannot afford them). In this case, Rishard'Dnae Cooper filed an appeal but did not pay the filing fee. On the same day the appeal was docketed, the court sent him a notice giving him 14 days either to pay the fee or to show he qualified for a fee waiver under the court's rules. The notice warned that if he did neither, the appeal would be thrown out. According to the court, Cooper did not pay the fee and did not respond to the notice at all. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the merits of whatever issue Cooper was trying to appeal.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee. If they cannot afford the fee, there is a separate procedure that allows them to ask the court to waive it. In this case, Rishard'Dnae Cooper filed an appeal but did not pay the filing fee and did not file the paperwork required to proceed without paying. The court sent Cooper a notice giving him 14 days either to pay the fee or to show that he qualified to proceed without paying. The notice warned that if he did neither, his appeal would be dismissed. Cooper did not pay and did not respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal. This order does not address the underlying merits of whatever Cooper was trying to appeal; it ends the case on procedural grounds only.

When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, file paperwork asking the court to let them proceed without paying (this is called proceeding "in forma pauperis"). In this case, the appellant docketed his appeal but did not pay the filing fee. The court issued a notice the same day the appeal was docketed, telling the appellant he had 14 days either to pay the fee or to show that he qualified to proceed without paying under the court's rules. The notice warned that if he did neither, his appeal would be dismissed. The appellant did not pay the fee and did not respond to the notice. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying merits of the family-division case.

This is a very short procedural order from the Nevada Supreme Court, not a ruling on the merits of any parental rights question. When someone files an appeal, court rules require them to pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, to follow a specific procedure to ask the court to waive the fee (that procedure is set out in a rule called NRAP 24). Here, the appellant filed an appeal involving a minor child but did not pay the filing fee. The court sent a notice giving the appellant 14 days to either pay or show that they qualified to proceed without paying. The appellant did neither and did not respond to the notice at all. Because of that, the court dismissed the appeal. The order does not discuss the underlying parental rights case or decide anything about the parent-child relationship; it ends the appeal solely because of the unpaid fee and lack of response.

This case involves a family law dispute in Washoe County. One of the people in that case, Jefferson Tyler, asked the Court of Appeals to step in on an emergency basis by issuing a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do (or undo) something. Tyler was unhappy with two decisions the district court made: (1) a decision denying his request that the judge step aside from his case (a "motion to recuse"), and (2) a decision to pause, or hold "in abeyance," a hearing. The Court of Appeals declined to intervene. It explained that this kind of extraordinary intervention is discretionary - meaning the court does not have to act and only does so in limited circumstances. On the request to force the judge off the case, the court concluded that Tyler had not shown that recusal was warranted. The court noted that appellate courts give a judge's own decision not to step aside significant deference, overturning it only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. On the request to force the district court to hold a hearing on Tyler's school choice motion, the court explained that the district court had paused that hearing because Tyler had a pending motion asking the presiding judge to reconsider the earlier decision denying recusal. The Court of Appeals said it could not tell from the documents it had been given whether that reconsideration motion had been resolved, and for that reason it declined to grant the relief. The court denied the petition. Because it denied the petition, the court also denied as moot (no longer needing a decision) Tyler's related motions to expedite the case and to transmit recordings.

This case arose out of a divorce proceeding in Clark County family court. While the divorce was still pending, the family court issued an order addressing a request to sell the couple's marital home. Mr. Forrest, representing himself, tried to appeal that order to the Nevada Supreme Court before the divorce case as a whole was finished. The other side, Ms. White-Lara, asked the Supreme Court to throw the appeal out. Her argument was simple: the order Mr. Forrest was challenging was not a final decision ending the case - it was an "interlocutory" order, meaning a ruling made along the way before the case is over. Under Nevada law, parties generally cannot appeal mid-case rulings; they have to wait until the case ends and then raise their objections in an appeal from the final judgment. Mr. Forrest did not file any response opposing the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court agreed with Ms. White-Lara, explained that no statute or court rule allows an appeal from this kind of interim order about the marital residence, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Forrest may still be able to challenge the order later, after a final judgment is entered, but the Supreme Court did not address the merits of his complaints about the order itself.

This is a short procedural order, not a ruling on the merits of the underlying family-law dispute between Albert Jonathon Kagan and April Deeann Kagan. When someone files an appeal in Nevada, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, ask the court for permission to proceed without paying (called proceeding "in forma pauperis"). The Nevada Supreme Court had earlier told Mr. Kagan he had 30 days to do one of those two things, and warned him that if he did not, his appeal would be thrown out. He did neither and did not otherwise respond to the court's order. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court did not decide any of the family-law issues Mr. Kagan wished to raise.

Norman and Stamper married in 2014 and have three minor children. Stamper filed for divorce in 2023 and asked for primary physical custody of the children. Norman filed a counterclaim also seeking primary physical custody. Both parties initially had lawyers, but Norman's counsel withdrew, and Norman began representing himself (pro se, meaning without a lawyer). The couple negotiated a settlement outside of court. Stamper sent Norman a "global settlement offer" under which the parties would share joint physical and legal custody, Norman would pay $550 per month in child support, they would split the children's medical costs, the children would stay on Norman's health insurance, and Stamper would receive 35 percent of Norman's CalPERS retirement funds instead of alimony. The parties added a term about Stamper returning a set of diamond earrings, then signed the agreement and told the court they had settled. Before the settlement conference, Stamper mailed Norman an updated financial disclosure form (a document, called an FDF, that lists a person's income and finances) on August 23, 2023, but did not file a copy with the court. That form showed Stamper had been hired at a law firm and expected to make about $75,000 a year. Norman testified he received it on August 26. On August 28, Stamper emailed Norman a draft of the divorce decree that included both parties' income figures updated to reflect her new job. On August 29, the court held a settlement conference. Both parties confirmed they had settled and testified that they had enough time to consider the terms, understood they were giving up their right to a trial, believed the terms were fair, and believed the agreement was in the children's best interest. The court signed the decree, which listed gross monthly incomes of $7,374 for Stamper and $10,509.36 for Norman. Norman did not appeal the divorce decree. About six months later, on March 4, 2024, Norman filed a motion under NRCP 60(b)(3) — a rule that lets a court relieve a party from a judgment that resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. He argued Stamper had not timely filed her updated financial disclosure, that this information was material to his decision to settle, and that there was therefore no genuine "meeting of the minds" on child support, alimony, or the children's health insurance. He also argued the decree did not comply with an administrative rule requiring child support stipulations to list the guideline amount, and that opposing counsel's conduct violated his due process rights. The district court denied the motion. It found the motion was untimely because Norman knew about the alleged fraud before the settlement and the entry of the decree and did not seek relief quickly or file an appeal. The court also found that, even if timely, the motion would fail because Norman knew about Stamper's new job and income before he settled and relied on that information when he agreed. The court found his other arguments did not show fraud and would have been better raised in an appeal from the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court. The court noted that Norman's own sworn testimony showed he knew by August 26 that Stamper was making or expected to make at least $75,000 a year, and had her exact income figure on August 28 — the day before the settlement conference. Despite this, he agreed to pay $550 a month in child support and agreed to keep the children on his own health insurance without raising any concern with the court or filing an appeal. The court found nothing in the record showing he ever asked about Stamper's health insurance. As a result, these points did not justify setting aside the decree. The court declined to consider Norman's argument that he was forced into the settlement because his counsel abandoned him, because he had not raised that argument below in the way he framed it on appeal. The court also treated his remaining arguments (about the administrative child-support rule, whether Stamper's income was supported by the record, alleged child abuse, and temporary orders) as waived because he did not address on appeal the specific reasons the district court gave for rejecting them.

Jacob Sovey went directly to Nevada's Court of Appeals asking it to remove the judge assigned to his family law case. He did this by requesting a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court or official to do (or, here, effectively step aside from) something the law requires. He labeled the request an "emergency" petition. The Court of Appeals explained that this kind of extraordinary relief is not automatic. A writ of mandamus can be used to force an official to perform a legal duty, or to correct a lower court's arbitrary or capricious use of its discretion. But whether the court will even consider such a petition is entirely up to the court, and the person asking for it carries the burden of showing that this unusual remedy is justified. After reviewing Sovey's petition and the supporting documents he submitted, the court concluded that he had not shown that the extraordinary relief he sought was warranted. It therefore denied the petition. The order does not resolve the underlying family law dispute; it only declines to remove the judge through this emergency mandamus route.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee at the time the appeal is docketed. If a person cannot afford the fee, there is a procedure to ask the court to waive it (proceeding "in forma pauperis," governed by NRAP 24). In this case, appellant Maegan Christine Chen filed an appeal in a family-law matter against Adam Lee Torgison but did not pay the filing fee when the appeal was docketed on May 12, 2025. The same day, the court sent her a notice giving her 14 days either to pay the fee or to follow the procedure for asking that it be waived. The notice warned that if she did neither, the appeal would be dismissed. She did not respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of any underlying family-court ruling.

This is a family-law-related dispute in which one party, Jesus Arevalo, asked the Nevada Court of Appeals to step in and issue an extraordinary order against a lower court. He was pursuing two things at once. First, he wanted the appellate court to force the trial judge off his case; the trial court had already denied his request to disqualify (remove) that judge. Second, he wanted the appellate court to make the district court follow an earlier order the appellate court had issued on January 17, 2024, in a related case (Docket No. 86607-COA). To get relief, Arevalo used two special tools. A writ of mandamus is a court order that forces a lower court or official to do something the law requires them to do, or to correct a decision made in an arbitrary or unreasonable way. A writ of prohibition is the opposite kind of order - it stops a lower court from acting beyond the limits of its authority. Both are described by the court as "extraordinary remedies," meaning they are not routine and a court has discretion over whether to even consider such a request. The court explained that the person asking for this kind of relief carries the burden of showing it is warranted, and that it is available only when there is "no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law" - in other words, only when the ordinary court process cannot fix the problem. After reviewing the petition and the documents filed with it, the court concluded that Arevalo had not shown that its extraordinary intervention was warranted. It therefore denied the petition. The order is brief and does not analyze the underlying disqualification dispute or the earlier writ in detail; it rests on the conclusion that the demanding standard for extraordinary relief was not met.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, two basic requirements must be met at the outset: the appellant must pay a filing fee (or qualify for a fee waiver), and the appellant must show proof that the other side was served with the notice of appeal. Wayne Andrew Seare filed this appeal but did neither. The court sent him notices on the day his appeal was docketed, telling him he had 14 days to either pay the fee (or demonstrate he qualified for a waiver) and to file proof of service. The notices warned that if he did not comply, his appeal would be dismissed. He did not pay, did not file proof of service, and did not otherwise respond. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of whatever underlying family-court ruling he was challenging.

This is a one-page clerk's order ending an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court reached the merits. The appellant, Mary Stevens (now known as Mary Khan), had appealed a ruling from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division (Judge Dedree Butler). Before the court decided the appeal, the appellant filed a notice withdrawing it. The Supreme Court treated that notice as a request to voluntarily dismiss the appeal and granted it. The case is over at the appellate level. The order does not describe the underlying family-law dispute, the lower court's ruling, or any legal issues that would have been argued.

Jacob Sovey asked a Washoe County family court judge to step aside from his case (a "motion to recuse"). The judge denied that request. Sovey, representing himself, then tried to appeal that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The court explained that it can only hear appeals when a statute or court rule specifically allows them, and no Nevada statute or rule permits an appeal from an order denying a motion to recuse a judge. Because the court lacked jurisdiction (the legal authority) to hear the appeal, it dismissed the case. The court also declined to act on Sovey's transcript-related filings in light of the dismissal.

Khari Varner asked the district court for a writ of mandamus - a court order requiring a government official or lower court to perform a duty it is legally required to perform. The district court denied that petition because Varner had not properly served it on the other side. Varner then appealed that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing himself. Once the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court issued a notice on January 17, 2025, telling Varner what he had to do next. He needed to file a transcript request form (or a certificate stating no transcript was needed), a docketing statement (a form summarizing the appeal), and an opening brief (the document that explains why the lower court got it wrong). Each had its own deadline. Varner missed the first deadlines. The court issued a follow-up order on March 5, 2025, giving him a new deadline of March 12, 2025, and warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal. Varner attempted to file the documents on March 12, but the clerk struck them as deficient. The court then gave him until March 27, 2025, to file corrected versions. He did not. On April 16, 2025, the court issued yet another order, setting an April 23, 2025 deadline and again warning of possible dismissal. He still did not file the corrected documents. He also missed the May 19, 2025 deadline for the opening brief. Concluding that Varner had abandoned the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed it. The court did not reach the merits of whether the district court was correct to deny the mandamus petition.

Jacob Sovey asked a Washoe County district court judge to step aside from his case - that is what a "motion to recuse" asks for. The judge denied that request. Mr. Sovey then tried to appeal that denial directly to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing himself. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the judge should have recused. Instead, it dismissed the appeal for a threshold reason: the court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows, and no statute or court rule permits an appeal from an order denying a motion to recuse. Because the court had no authority - no "jurisdiction" - to hear the appeal, it dismissed it.

Irene Fuentes-Jaramillo, representing herself, tried to appeal a decision from the Clark County district court. The decision she wanted to challenge was the denial of her request to disqualify a judge - that is, to have a particular judge removed from her case. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether the disqualification request had merit. Instead, the court explained that it can only hear appeals that a statute or a court rule specifically allows. Because no statute or rule permits an appeal from an order denying an affidavit to disqualify a judge, the Supreme Court concluded it had no power (no "jurisdiction") to consider the appeal and dismissed it.

The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Karyl Clarke's appeal because it concluded it had no power to hear it. Clarke had been involved in a family court case in Clark County that resulted in an order touching on child custody and also extending a temporary protection order against domestic violence (a short-term court order meant to keep one person away from another). Although the underlying order covered multiple subjects, Clarke made clear - both in his notices of appeal and in a follow-up filing - that he was only challenging the part extending the temporary protection order. The Supreme Court explained that it can hear an appeal only when a statute or court rule says it can. According to the court, no Nevada statute or rule allows a party to appeal from a temporary protection order. Because Clarke was appealing only from that piece of the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. The court also denied Clarke's pending motions and directed the clerk to strike the opening brief he had filed on April 10, 2025.

Eric Perreira tried to appeal a short scheduling decision the family court made - a "minute order" (a brief docket-entry note from the judge) that moved a calendar call to a new date and combined it with a hearing on a motion for a jury trial. He filed his appeal himself, without a lawyer. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of any underlying family-law dispute. Instead, it concluded it had no power to hear the appeal at all. Two reasons drove that conclusion. First, under Nevada law, a minute order generally is not effective as a court order unless it is written, signed, and filed - and a minute order that has not crossed that threshold is not something an appellate court can review. Second, even treating the directives in the minute order as effective, no Nevada statute or court rule allows a party to appeal a decision that merely reschedules a calendar call or consolidates it with another hearing. Because Nevada appellate courts can hear only those appeals that some statute or rule expressly authorizes, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Joseph Shellmire was appealing a Clark County family court ruling that ordered him to pay attorney fees and costs in a child custody case. While the appeal was pending, his lawyer asked to withdraw from representing him, and the Nevada Supreme Court granted that request on February 12, 2025. When a lawyer withdraws, the party still has to keep the case moving. The court told Shellmire he had 30 days either to hire a new lawyer (who would then file a "notice of appearance" formally entering the case) or to tell the court he planned to handle the appeal himself. The court warned him that not responding could cause the appeal to be thrown out. Shellmire did not respond. The court gave him a second chance on March 24, 2025, with a shorter 14-day deadline and the same warning. He again did not respond or contact the court at all. Because Shellmire took no action, the Supreme Court concluded he had abandoned the appeal and dismissed it. The underlying district court order awarding attorney fees and costs therefore stands.

Jacob Sovey asked a Washoe County family court to give him copies of court transcripts paid for by the county. The district court said no. He then tried to appeal that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court without a lawyer. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the family court was right or wrong to deny the transcripts. Instead, it concluded it had no power to hear the appeal in the first place. In Nevada, the Supreme Court can only review the kinds of decisions that a statute or court rule specifically allows it to review. The court found that no statute and no court rule lets a person appeal an order refusing to provide transcripts at county expense. Because the court lacked jurisdiction - meaning the legal authority to decide the case - it dismissed the appeal.

This is a family law matter in which one party, Travis Shetler, asked the district court to remove the assigned judge from his case. The district court denied that request. Travis then went to the Nevada Supreme Court and asked it to issue a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do something the law requires - that would force the disqualification of the judge. The Nevada Supreme Court explained that while a writ of mandamus is the proper procedural tool for seeking to disqualify a judge, the court has discretion over whether to take up such a petition at all. After reviewing the petition and supporting documents, the court declined to intervene and denied the petition. The order does not discuss the underlying reasons Travis advanced for disqualification, and it does not decide whether the judge should or should not have been disqualified on the merits.

Todd Phillips tried to appeal a family-court order that labeled him a "vexatious litigant" - a designation courts use to restrict someone who has repeatedly filed problematic lawsuits or motions. He filed the appeal himself, without a lawyer. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of whether the vexatious-litigant label was warranted. Instead, the court concluded it had no power to hear the appeal in the first place. Under Nevada appellate rules, only certain kinds of lower-court orders can be appealed, and a post-judgment order declaring someone a vexatious litigant is not on that list. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it dismissed the appeal.

When someone files an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court, they generally must pay a filing fee or, if they cannot afford it, follow a specific procedure to ask the court to waive the fee (that procedure is set out in a rule called NRAP 24). In this case, Travis Anderson filed an appeal in a family-law dispute involving Kerstin Morales but did not pay the filing fee when he docketed the appeal on March 6, 2025. The court sent him a notice the same day telling him he had 14 days either to pay the fee or to show that he had complied with the rule for proceeding without paying. The notice warned that if he did neither, his appeal would be dismissed. According to the order, Anderson did not pay the fee and did not otherwise respond. Because of that, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The order does not address the underlying merits of the family-law dispute.

This case involves a divorce-related dispute. After the divorce decree was entered, the trial court ordered Ms. Chunyk to pay attorney fees and costs to Mr. Do. Ms. Chunyk, representing herself without a lawyer, appealed that order to the Nevada Supreme Court. To prosecute an appeal, an appellant must take certain procedural steps, including telling the court whether transcripts of the lower-court proceedings will be requested and filing a written brief explaining why the lower court got things wrong. The Nevada Supreme Court repeatedly directed Ms. Chunyk to take these steps. On November 27, 2024, the court issued a notice setting deadlines for a transcript request form (or a certificate stating that no transcript would be requested) and for an opening brief. When she missed the transcript-form deadline, the court gave her another deadline of January 2, 2025, and warned that missing it could result in dismissal. She submitted a transcript request form on January 10, 2025, but the court returned it unfiled because it was late and was not accompanied by a motion to extend the deadline. The court then gave her a third chance, setting a February 19, 2025 deadline. She did not file the transcript form by that date, and she also did not file the opening brief that was due on March 27, 2025. Concluding that she had abandoned the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed it. The dismissal ends this appeal without any ruling on whether the underlying attorney-fees order was right or wrong.

Amanda Marin tried to appeal a 2009 court decision that annulled her marriage and divided retirement benefits, along with several later orders the family court entered in her case. She filed her notice of appeal - the document that starts an appeal - on February 3, 2025. The Nevada Supreme Court explained that an appeal must be filed within a short window after the lower court's order is served (generally 30 days, plus 3 more days if served by mail). Because the orders Marin wanted to challenge were served years or many months before February 3, 2025, the deadline to appeal each of them had already passed. Without a timely notice of appeal, the Supreme Court has no power (no "jurisdiction") to review the case. The court also addressed two other categories of rulings Marin wanted reviewed. As to a 2012 stipulation and order in which rights under the retirement order were waived, the court said Marin was not "aggrieved" by it and therefore lacked standing - the legal right to challenge it on appeal. As to a September 24, 2019, set of district court minutes, the court said minutes of that kind are not the sort of order that can be appealed at all. The court also resolved several housekeeping motions: it granted Marin extra time to file her docketing statement; it denied her request to fix a clerical error in the district court case number (saying that request belongs in the district court); it denied as moot her request to proceed without paying fees because the filing fee had already been waived; and it denied her request to add the Nevada Public Employee's Retirement System, the Social Security Administration, the State of Nevada, and Elizabeth Giallanza as respondents, because they had not been properly made parties below and could not be substituted under the appellate rule governing deceased parties. Because of all of these problems, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of any of Marin's underlying complaints.

This case arose from a divorce proceeding in which the family court found Adam Jeremy Thomas in contempt of court and ordered sanctions against him. Mr. Thomas tried to appeal that ruling immediately to the Nevada Supreme Court, before the divorce case itself had been finally resolved. The Nevada Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his arguments. Instead, it dismissed the appeal because, under Nevada law, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. There is no statute or rule that lets a party immediately appeal a contempt order, and there is no statute or rule that lets a party immediately appeal an interlocutory (mid-case) order imposing sanctions. The court noted that interlocutory orders of this kind are typically reviewable later, when an appeal is taken from a final judgment in the case. Mr. Thomas argued in opposing the motion to dismiss that his constitutional rights had been violated in the proceedings below. The court explained that, because it had no jurisdiction over the appeal in the first place, it could not consider those constitutional arguments at this stage.

This is a one-page administrative order from the Nevada Supreme Court closing out an appeal. Richard Dee had appealed something in a family-law case involving Sara Powers (formerly Sara Dee), but he then asked the court to dismiss his own appeal. The court agreed and ended the appeal. The order does not explain what the underlying family-law dispute was about, what the lower court decided, or why the appellant chose to walk away from the appeal. It simply records that the appellant asked to drop the case and that the court allowed him to do so under the appellate rule that permits voluntary dismissals.

A father, Steve Philostin, tried to appeal a Clark County family court ruling that decided custody of his child. He filed his appeal without a lawyer. When someone files an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, the court requires certain paperwork early in the process - in particular, a "docketing statement" (a form that tells the court basic information about the case) and either a request for trial transcripts or a written statement that no transcripts will be requested. On January 10, 2025, the court told Philostin to file these documents within set deadlines. He did not. On February 12, 2025, the court gave him a second chance, setting a new deadline of February 26, 2025, and warning that if he again failed to comply, his appeal could be dismissed. He again did not file the documents and did not contact the court at all. Concluding that Philostin had abandoned his appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed it. That means the family court's custody order stands and the appeal is over.

This is a short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. Two parties, Renata Popelkova and Howard Miller, had a case in the family court. One side (Popelkova) appealed and the other side (Miller) filed a cross-appeal - meaning both parties asked the Nevada Supreme Court to review something from the lower court. Before the court decided any of the underlying issues, the two sides reached an agreement to end the appeals. This kind of agreement is called a stipulation - a formal, mutual agreement between the parties that is submitted to the court. Based on that stipulation, the court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The order also states that each side will pay its own costs and attorney fees. Because this is a dismissal by agreement, the opinion does not explain the facts of the underlying family-law dispute, does not resolve any legal question, and does not address who "won." It simply closes out the appellate proceedings.

Lisa Messing and Chris Cunning divorced in 2021. Lisa previously appealed the divorce decree and several related orders. The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the lower court's rulings but reversed one piece: it took away an extra $3,500 reimbursement to Chris for two 2000 Honda XR motorcycles and restored the original $115,620 separate-property reimbursement amount from the initial decree. After that appeal ended, the district court entered a new order on October 24, 2024, implementing the Court of Appeals' decision. That order confirmed Chris's reimbursement at $115,620, said all other prior orders remained in effect, and closed the case. Lisa filed a new appeal from that October 24 order. Chris asked the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal, arguing the order was not appealable and that Lisa was really trying to relitigate issues already decided. The Supreme Court explained that whether an order can be appealed depends on whether a statute or court rule authorizes the appeal - not on what issues the appellant wants to raise. The court found that the October 24 order was, in part, a "special order after final judgment" (the divorce decree being the final judgment) because it again modified the amount of Chris's separate property reimbursement. The portions that simply kept earlier orders in effect or closed the case, however, were not appealable. Even so, the court dismissed the appeal because Lisa lacked "standing" - the legal right to appeal. To appeal, a person must be "aggrieved," meaning the order has to hurt their rights or property. The appealable portion of the October 24 order actually reduced the money Chris received, which did not harm Lisa. She might have been able to argue that the district court failed to follow the Court of Appeals' instructions, but she did not make that argument in her filings. Without an injury the court could review, she could not pursue the appeal. The court also denied Chris's request for attorney fees and costs and made no ruling on the merits of Lisa's underlying claims.

This is a very short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. Germana Rappa had appealed a matter to the Nevada Supreme Court against Aurelio Lorico. The case came out of the family division of the district court. Before the Supreme Court reached any decision about who was right, the two sides reached an agreement to end the appeal. They filed what is called a stipulation - a formal, mutual agreement between the parties submitted to the court. The court accepted that agreement and dismissed the appeal. As part of their agreement, each side agreed to pay its own attorney fees and costs, rather than one side reimbursing the other. The court entered its order to that effect. The opinion does not describe the underlying facts of the family-law dispute or address any legal questions.