Nevada family-law case summaries

Khalifa and Monique Hollings were never married but have one child together. Early in the case, they reached a parenting agreement, and the court entered a custody arrangement based on it that gave both parents joint legal and physical custody. After problems arose with Khalifa's housing, Hollings asked the court to give her primary physical custody, and the court granted that on a temporary basis. Khalifa later asked the court to restore joint physical custody and to switch to a "week-on-week-off" schedule (one week with each parent), arguing that his housing problem was resolved and that this schedule would let the child spend more time with a half-sibling from Khalifa's earlier relationship. He also said he was legally changing his own last name and wanted the child's last name changed to match. In August 2021, the court restored joint physical custody but refused the week-on-week-off schedule, finding no substantial change in circumstances and that such a schedule was not appropriate for a three-year-old. It also denied the name-change request. About three weeks later, Khalifa filed another motion repeating his requests for the week-on-week-off schedule and the name change, and then amended it to add a new request: permission to get a passport for the child so he could travel internationally with her in the future. Hollings opposed the original motion but did not respond to the passport request. In December 2021, the court denied the repeated timeshare and name-change requests because it had already ruled on them in August, and it denied the passport request without explanation. Khalifa appealed. The appeals court reached three conclusions. First, on the week-on-week-off schedule, the court explained that once a custody issue has been decided, a parent generally cannot simply refile the same request hoping for a different answer. Khalifa's second request pointed to no new circumstances since August, so the court found no error in the district court refusing to revisit it. Second, on the name change, the court noted that requests to change a child's surname are judged by the child's best interest, not by whether circumstances have substantially changed. Even so, repeatedly refiling the same request without new facts is disfavored, and Khalifa's second name-change request offered nothing new, so the court upheld the denial. The court added, however, that because Khalifa had since actually obtained his own legal name change during the appeal, nothing prevents him from filing a new name-change motion for the child on remand with those new facts — while expressing no view on whether such a motion should succeed. Third, on the passport, the court disagreed with the reasoning that the request was premature. Because getting a passport for a young child generally requires both parents' signatures — or a court order when only one parent will sign — and because the process is lengthy and Hollings had not been cooperating, Khalifa faced a real, present obstacle. That made the issue ready for the court to decide. The district court was therefore required to consider whether allowing the passport was in the child's best interest, but it denied the request without making any findings. The appeals court reversed that part and sent the passport issue back for further proceedings.

Christina and Mitchell divorced in 2008 and had two children together, M.S. (17 at the time of the opinion) and E.S. (14). This appeal concerned only the physical custody of M.S.; the parents continued to share joint legal custody of both children and joint physical custody of E.S., and those arrangements were not challenged. In August 2019, Mitchell asked the court to let the children decide for themselves whether to spend custodial time at Christina's home ("teenage discretion"), saying the children did not want to go there because of fights with Christina. Christina opposed this and asked the court to hold Mitchell in contempt for keeping the children from her. After several hearings, the court ordered the parents back onto a week-on/week-off schedule and directed that custody exchanges happen at a supervised visitation center called "Donna's House." The center and child-interview reports indicated the children refused to participate in exchanges with Christina. The court then found there was enough reason ("adequate cause") to hold an evidentiary hearing - a trial-like proceeding with testimony - to decide whether custody should change. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from both children, Mitchell, and Christina. Both children said they preferred to live with Mitchell because of turmoil when with Christina. M.S. described two physical fights with Christina - one in May 2019 (Christina allegedly tackled her, pulled her hair, and hit her) and one in August 2019 (Christina allegedly scratched her, pulled her hair, and pushed her). E.S. said he saw and heard parts of these altercations. M.S. also testified about hurtful language Christina used about her, her stepmother, and her half-sibling. The district court decided it was in M.S.'s best interest for Mitchell to become her primary physical custodian, largely because of the conflict between M.S. and Christina. The court found that Christina had engaged in acts of domestic violence against M.S. under one of the "best interest" factors listed in the statute, but it noted the incidents were softened by the fact that M.S. was an active participant, that it was hard to tell who started them, and that any injuries were minor. Importantly, the court did not use the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard, did not cite the separate statute that creates a legal presumption against giving custody to a domestic-violence perpetrator, and did not apply any such presumption. On appeal, Christina argued the court should have used the clear-and-convincing standard and allowed her to rebut that presumption. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the district court never applied the domestic-violence presumption against Christina in the first place, so she was not harmed by not being given a chance to rebut it - and she had in fact testified about the incidents. The court also said the ordinary standard for civil child-custody matters is "preponderance of the evidence," not clear and convincing, unless the legislature says otherwise, and Christina cited no authority requiring the higher standard just to consider domestic-violence allegations among the best-interest factors. Finally, the court held that even if the district court had made a mistake about the domestic-violence framework, the error was harmless because the district court gave many other reasons - M.S.'s own wish (at nearly 18) to live with her father, and the fractured relationship between M.S. and Christina - that independently supported the custody change. Because those findings were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.