Nevada family-law case summaries

This case is about who gets to care for a baby, J.B., whose parents were both incarcerated when he was born. (His parents had been arrested for the homicide of his older sibling.) Because neither parent could care for J.B., Nevada's child-welfare agency had to find someone else to take him in. Shortly after J.B.'s birth, DFS placed him with Becky and Jay Whipple, family friends of J.B.'s grandmother. The Whipples were not licensed foster parents at the time, and the district court signed an order describing them as "Unlicensed Fictive Kin." "Fictive kin," under Nevada law, means a person not related to a child by blood but who has a significant emotional and positive bond with the child. No one objected to that designation when it was made. Months later, after a paternity test confirmed Miles Stano Jr. was J.B.'s father, the father asked that J.B. be sent to live with the paternal grandfather in Illinois. After interstate paperwork was completed (about nine months after J.B. was placed with the Whipples, by which point the Whipples had become licensed foster parents), the district court held a placement hearing. The district court did not take evidence about what was best for J.B. Instead, the judge ruled that, as a matter of law, a blood relative always wins out over an unrelated person in placement decisions, and the judge also reversed course and decided the Whipples were not really fictive kin after all. The court ordered J.B. moved to Illinois. Compounding the issue, J.B.'s court-appointed attorney did not appear at the placement hearing or at the later reconsideration hearing. The Supreme Court noted J.B. was largely without representation throughout the case, even though state law requires that children in these proceedings be represented by counsel. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ and made several rulings. First, it explained that "fictive kin" status is judged from the perspective of both the prospective caregiver and the child. For an infant who cannot yet form relationships, the bond and commitment shown by the adult is what counts; an infant is not excluded from being placed with fictive kin just because the baby has not had time to bond. Second, the Supreme Court held that Nevada law does not put blood relatives ahead of fictive kin. The statute groups them together and prefers either over a foster home, but it does not rank them against each other. The decisive question is the child's best interest, and that requires actual factual findings. Third, the district court should not have proceeded with the placement hearing when J.B.'s attorney was absent and a continuance was being sought. Fourth, the Supreme Court ordered the case reassigned to a different district court judge, citing statements by the original judge that suggested he could not put aside his view that placement with "safe family" is always best. The Supreme Court vacated the placement order, lifted its prior stay, and sent the matter back for new proceedings before a different judge, who must hear evidence and make findings about what is actually in J.B.'s best interest.

Khalifa and Monique Hollings were never married but have one child together. Early in the case, they reached a parenting agreement, and the court entered a custody arrangement based on it that gave both parents joint legal and physical custody. After problems arose with Khalifa's housing, Hollings asked the court to give her primary physical custody, and the court granted that on a temporary basis. Khalifa later asked the court to restore joint physical custody and to switch to a "week-on-week-off" schedule (one week with each parent), arguing that his housing problem was resolved and that this schedule would let the child spend more time with a half-sibling from Khalifa's earlier relationship. He also said he was legally changing his own last name and wanted the child's last name changed to match. In August 2021, the court restored joint physical custody but refused the week-on-week-off schedule, finding no substantial change in circumstances and that such a schedule was not appropriate for a three-year-old. It also denied the name-change request. About three weeks later, Khalifa filed another motion repeating his requests for the week-on-week-off schedule and the name change, and then amended it to add a new request: permission to get a passport for the child so he could travel internationally with her in the future. Hollings opposed the original motion but did not respond to the passport request. In December 2021, the court denied the repeated timeshare and name-change requests because it had already ruled on them in August, and it denied the passport request without explanation. Khalifa appealed. The appeals court reached three conclusions. First, on the week-on-week-off schedule, the court explained that once a custody issue has been decided, a parent generally cannot simply refile the same request hoping for a different answer. Khalifa's second request pointed to no new circumstances since August, so the court found no error in the district court refusing to revisit it. Second, on the name change, the court noted that requests to change a child's surname are judged by the child's best interest, not by whether circumstances have substantially changed. Even so, repeatedly refiling the same request without new facts is disfavored, and Khalifa's second name-change request offered nothing new, so the court upheld the denial. The court added, however, that because Khalifa had since actually obtained his own legal name change during the appeal, nothing prevents him from filing a new name-change motion for the child on remand with those new facts — while expressing no view on whether such a motion should succeed. Third, on the passport, the court disagreed with the reasoning that the request was premature. Because getting a passport for a young child generally requires both parents' signatures — or a court order when only one parent will sign — and because the process is lengthy and Hollings had not been cooperating, Khalifa faced a real, present obstacle. That made the issue ready for the court to decide. The district court was therefore required to consider whether allowing the passport was in the child's best interest, but it denied the request without making any findings. The appeals court reversed that part and sent the passport issue back for further proceedings.

Bart and Bonnie Mahoney married in 2000 and had two children. When Bart filed for divorce in 2016, the couple reached an agreement that was merged into the divorce decree. Under the decree, Bonnie received primary physical custody of the children, and Bart agreed to pay child support, cover the children on his medical insurance, pay monthly alimony for five years, pay Bonnie 25% of his annual bonuses (rising to 35% if he failed to give her his annual W-2 tax forms), and pay her attorney fees and costs from the divorce. According to the opinion, Bart did not pay the child support, alimony, or attorney fees, did not pay Bonnie a share of his bonuses, and did not provide his W-2 forms. In May 2019, Bonnie asked the district court to reduce the arrearages (the unpaid amounts) to a judgment—that is, to convert what Bart owed into an enforceable court judgment—with interest and penalties, and to review child support and award her attorney fees. The case wound its way through several hearings. Bart's attorney withdrew in 2020 because Bart had never formally retained him and had stopped communicating. After that, Bart represented himself. The evidentiary hearing was rescheduled several times and ultimately set for December 3, 2020. Notice of that hearing was mailed to Bart's last-known address on file with the court, and Bonnie's attorney also emailed Bart pretrial filings—containing the hearing's date and time—at the same email address Bart had previously used to correspond with that attorney. Bart did not show up at the December 3, 2020, hearing. The district court proceeded with only Bonnie and her attorney present, took evidence including Bart's income and bonus records obtained by subpoena, and granted Bonnie's motion. It found Bart owed child support, alimony, and attorney fees and costs from the divorce, and—because Bart never provided his W-2 forms—awarded Bonnie 35% of his bonuses. It also awarded Bonnie the attorney fees and costs of bringing the motion, setting the amount in January 2021 after Bonnie filed a detailed memorandum of her fees and costs. Bart then moved to set aside the orders under NRCP 60(b), claiming he was never notified of the hearing, but filed his notice of appeal before the district court ruled on that motion. The appeal was still properly before the Court of Appeals under NRAP 4(a)(6), which treats the premature notice as filed on the date the district court denied the set-aside motion. However, because Bart's briefs did not address the denial of that motion, any challenge to it was waived. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Bart's arguments. First, it held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Bart was properly notified of the hearing: notice was mailed to his last-known address (which under the court rules completes service upon mailing), and he also had actual notice via emails from Bonnie's attorney. Bart pointed to nothing in the record—such as a sworn affidavit—showing he did not actually receive notice, and the onus was on him to keep the court updated with his address. Second, the court held that Bart's challenges to the arrearage findings were waived because he never raised those specific arguments in the district court, despite multiple opportunities to do so. Third, the court held that the fee award was not an abuse of discretion: the award was authorized by statute, and the district court made detailed findings under the four-factor test from Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank for evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees.

Christina and Mitchell divorced in 2008 and had two children together, M.S. (17 at the time of the opinion) and E.S. (14). This appeal concerned only the physical custody of M.S.; the parents continued to share joint legal custody of both children and joint physical custody of E.S., and those arrangements were not challenged. In August 2019, Mitchell asked the court to let the children decide for themselves whether to spend custodial time at Christina's home ("teenage discretion"), saying the children did not want to go there because of fights with Christina. Christina opposed this and asked the court to hold Mitchell in contempt for keeping the children from her. After several hearings, the court ordered the parents back onto a week-on/week-off schedule and directed that custody exchanges happen at a supervised visitation center called "Donna's House." The center and child-interview reports indicated the children refused to participate in exchanges with Christina. The court then found there was enough reason ("adequate cause") to hold an evidentiary hearing - a trial-like proceeding with testimony - to decide whether custody should change. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from both children, Mitchell, and Christina. Both children said they preferred to live with Mitchell because of turmoil when with Christina. M.S. described two physical fights with Christina - one in May 2019 (Christina allegedly tackled her, pulled her hair, and hit her) and one in August 2019 (Christina allegedly scratched her, pulled her hair, and pushed her). E.S. said he saw and heard parts of these altercations. M.S. also testified about hurtful language Christina used about her, her stepmother, and her half-sibling. The district court decided it was in M.S.'s best interest for Mitchell to become her primary physical custodian, largely because of the conflict between M.S. and Christina. The court found that Christina had engaged in acts of domestic violence against M.S. under one of the "best interest" factors listed in the statute, but it noted the incidents were softened by the fact that M.S. was an active participant, that it was hard to tell who started them, and that any injuries were minor. Importantly, the court did not use the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard, did not cite the separate statute that creates a legal presumption against giving custody to a domestic-violence perpetrator, and did not apply any such presumption. On appeal, Christina argued the court should have used the clear-and-convincing standard and allowed her to rebut that presumption. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the district court never applied the domestic-violence presumption against Christina in the first place, so she was not harmed by not being given a chance to rebut it - and she had in fact testified about the incidents. The court also said the ordinary standard for civil child-custody matters is "preponderance of the evidence," not clear and convincing, unless the legislature says otherwise, and Christina cited no authority requiring the higher standard just to consider domestic-violence allegations among the best-interest factors. Finally, the court held that even if the district court had made a mistake about the domestic-violence framework, the error was harmless because the district court gave many other reasons - M.S.'s own wish (at nearly 18) to live with her father, and the fractured relationship between M.S. and Christina - that independently supported the custody change. Because those findings were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

This case asks who is allowed to run the trial when the State seeks to permanently sever a parent's legal relationship with her child. In the Eighth Judicial District (Clark County), such trials had often been conducted by a "hearing master" - a court-appointed lawyer (not a judge) who hears evidence, makes findings, and recommends a result to a district judge, who then reviews the record and makes the final decision. The Nevada Supreme Court held that this two-step approach is not allowed for termination of parental rights (TPR) trials. A district judge - not a hearing master - must preside over the trial in the first instance. The underlying facts: Tahja L. was a teenager when she brought her six-month-old daughter L.L.S. to a Department of Family Services (DFS) office, hoping to place her temporarily while Tahja finished high school. DFS instead filed a neglect petition, placed L.L.S. in foster care, and eventually moved to terminate Tahja's parental rights. The case was assigned to a hearing master. L.L.S.'s lawyer objected, arguing that a district judge should hear the trial; Tahja did not join that objection. The juvenile court overruled the objection. After the originally assigned master became a district judge, a different hearing master conducted the trial, recommended termination, and the district judge - after watching the entire video of the trial - terminated Tahja's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, TPR proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B must be conducted by a "court," and although the statutes define "court" to include a hearing master under certain circumstances, that inclusion only works if the master's role is consistent with the Nevada Constitution. The court held that having a master preside over a TPR trial violates a parent's right to procedural due process, because the right at stake - the permanent loss of one's child - is so serious that the parent must present her case directly to the judge who will decide it, not to an intermediary whose findings are then reviewed from a recording. The court applied the three-part federal test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing (1) the parent's interest, (2) the risk that the procedure used will produce a wrong result, and (3) the government's interest in efficiency. The court described a parent's interest in keeping her child as among the strongest interests the law recognizes, comparing termination to a "civil death penalty." It found that having a master, rather than the judge, see witnesses face-to-face increases the risk of error, and that the State's efficiency interests are not significantly served, because the district judge still has to review the entire record. The court also pointed to recent legislative history in which the Eighth Judicial District's Chief Judge told lawmakers the district was specifically seeking new judges to "eliminate the use of hearing masters" in dependency cases. The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back for a new TPR trial before a district judge. Three justices dissented.

This case asks a question that Nevada's appellate courts had not previously answered head-on: can a court terminate a parent's rights to her child when the parent is so mentally ill that she would not be considered competent to stand trial in a criminal case? The Nevada Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances here, yes - the trial may go forward. The mother in this case had been diagnosed with schizoaffective bipolar disorder. Shortly after her son was born, hospital staff alerted the Department of Family Services because the mother insisted the baby was not hers and tried to take a different child. Two months later she brought the baby to the hospital claiming the infant had told her, in full sentences, that he had an earache. The child was placed in protective custody, adjudicated neglected, and made a ward of the court. The mother received a case plan focused on her mental health, but DFS observed that her condition did not improve. While the termination case was pending, she was arrested for allegedly boarding a bus and trying to take another child she believed was hers, and she was repeatedly found incompetent to stand trial in that criminal case. The district court did several things to protect the mother's interests. It appointed a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to look after the legal interests of someone who cannot represent themselves) under Rule 17(c) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. It granted multiple continuances - delays - hoping the mother would regain competence. When that did not happen, the court ultimately conducted the termination trial without her present in September 2015, with her guardian ad litem in attendance, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the mother argued that proceeding without her violated her constitutional right to due process. She pointed to a U.S. Supreme Court case, Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires courts to balance the private interest, the risk of an inaccurate result, and the government's interest before depriving someone of an important right. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that challenge. It explained that, unlike criminal cases, civil cases - including termination cases - do not require a court to wait indefinitely for a party to regain mental competence. Nevada law actually allows mental illness itself to be a basis for finding parental fault, so it would be inconsistent to also require the court to halt the case forever because of that same illness. The court noted that children have a powerful interest in stability and permanency, and that holding a child "in limbo" until a parent might one day be well enough to participate is not what Nevada law contemplates. The district court had given the mother many chances and had effectively considered all the factors that due process required. The mother also argued that the State had improperly served her by publication (publishing notice in a newspaper rather than handing it to her directly) when it actually knew or could have known where she was. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the State's conduct was proper, but ruled that the mother's lawyer never raised this objection in the district court, so the issue was waived and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court therefore affirmed the order terminating her parental rights.

This case involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his two surviving children. Between 2006 and 2011, the family experienced seven separate incidents in which one of the three children swallowed foreign objects such as coins, magnets, and batteries. All occurred while the father, Arli, was at work and the mother, Abigail, was home with the children. One son, J.M., died in 2006 from undetermined causes. After three-year-old E.M.M. required surgery to remove a large battery lodged in his throat, doctors became concerned that Abigail was forcing the children to swallow objects and contacted child protective services. The doctors compared the size of the battery, for a child E.M.M.'s age, to an adult swallowing a golf ball. In November 2011, DFS removed A.P.M. and E.M.M. from the home and placed them in foster care. The juvenile court gave each parent a "case plan" - a written list of things they had to do (such as parenting classes and counseling) to try to get their children back. Arli completed his case plan quickly. Even so, in December 2012, DFS asked the court to terminate both parents' rights permanently. After a five-day hearing, the district court ordered termination, finding that Arli had been neglectful by not taking action to protect his children after the repeated swallowing incidents - including continuing to leave them alone with Abigail - and that termination was in the children's best interests. Abigail died while the appeal was pending, leaving only Arli's appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two new legal questions. First, it held that finishing a court-ordered case plan does not, by itself, prevent a court from terminating parental rights. A completed case plan can be persuasive evidence in the parent's favor, but Nevada law does not make it a shield against termination if the other legal grounds are satisfied. Second, it interpreted a Nevada statute that creates two legal presumptions when a child has lived outside the home "for 14 months of any 20 consecutive months": (1) the parent is presumed to have made only token efforts, and (2) termination is presumed to be in the child's best interest. Arli argued the district court had to wait the full 20 months before applying these presumptions. The Supreme Court disagreed - once the 14-month threshold is hit, the presumptions can apply right away. Here the children had been out of the home about 17 months, which was enough. Finally, the court held that "substantial evidence" - meaning enough credible evidence that a reasonable factfinder could agree - supported termination. The court pointed to Arli's failure to take protective action after seven serious swallowing incidents, his limited relationship with the children, and the foster parent's testimony that she had a close relationship with the children and wished to adopt them. The court noted that even with Abigail's death, Arli remained "unable to protect his children from danger, swallowing or otherwise." Two justices dissented in whole or in part. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Cherry, would have remanded for a new best-interests hearing because Abigail - the apparent source of the danger - had died and Arli had completed his case plan. Justice Saitta agreed with most of the majority opinion but wrote separately to dissent on the parental-fault finding, viewing Arli's mistaken belief about Abigail and his completed case plan as not enough to amount to neglect.