Nevada family-law case summaries

Eli Pederson and Krystina Jeter have two minor children. In 2017, Krystina began custody proceedings alleging that Eli violently attacked and assaulted her in front of the children. In September 2018, the district court awarded Krystina sole physical and legal custody, based on its analysis of the children's best interests and findings that Eli had been convicted - through a guilty plea - of attempted sexual assault against Krystina and child abuse or neglect against the children. Eli, who is incarcerated at Lovelock Correctional Center, did not appeal that 2018 order. In 2022, Eli filed a "Petition for an Order to Establish a Correspondence with Minor Children," saying he had not been allowed contact with the children since his incarceration and wanted to begin repairing the relationship through phone calls, gifts, and letters. He stated that he had completed parenting classes in prison and had grown physically, spiritually, and mentally. Krystina opposed, arguing that Eli had not shown enough of a change in circumstances to justify modifying custody, and pointing to the children's therapist and a recent psychological report indicating the children were still having problems with their father's actions. Instead of filing a reply brief, Eli submitted the matter for decision. The district court denied his motion, finding he had not set forth a sufficient basis to modify the prior custody order and had not shown that an evidentiary hearing - a court proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is presented - was necessary. Eli then sought reconsideration, arguing among other things that ruling without giving him a chance to reply violated his due process rights, and asking the court to force the children's therapist to produce treatment records. The district court denied that motion too. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that when a parent asks to change a custody arrangement, the burden is on the parent making the request - not the other parent - to show a preliminary (prima facie) case for modification. Eli's argument that Krystina had also failed to make such a showing therefore missed the mark, and because he did not otherwise address the district court's conclusion that no evidentiary hearing was warranted, the court declined to consider that issue further. The court also noted that Eli's arguments did not address the district court's central finding: that there was insufficient evidence a modification would serve the children's best interest. His contention that his convictions had nothing to do with his biological children was, in the court's words, belied by the record and conflicted with express findings in the 2018 custody decree - which he never appealed and therefore could no longer challenge. As for the reconsideration motion, the court found no due process problem: under the local rule (WDGCR 12(4)), filing a reply brief is optional, and Eli chose to submit the matter for decision without one. Because Eli did not challenge the district court's stated reasons for denying reconsideration - that he failed to establish a legal basis for it and improperly raised new claims for the first time in that motion - the court deemed those challenges waived. The Court of Appeals affirmed both denials.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.