Nevada family-law case summaries

Norman and Stamper married in 2014 and have three minor children. Stamper filed for divorce in 2023 and asked for primary physical custody of the children. Norman filed a counterclaim also seeking primary physical custody. Both parties initially had lawyers, but Norman's counsel withdrew, and Norman began representing himself (pro se, meaning without a lawyer). The couple negotiated a settlement outside of court. Stamper sent Norman a "global settlement offer" under which the parties would share joint physical and legal custody, Norman would pay $550 per month in child support, they would split the children's medical costs, the children would stay on Norman's health insurance, and Stamper would receive 35 percent of Norman's CalPERS retirement funds instead of alimony. The parties added a term about Stamper returning a set of diamond earrings, then signed the agreement and told the court they had settled. Before the settlement conference, Stamper mailed Norman an updated financial disclosure form (a document, called an FDF, that lists a person's income and finances) on August 23, 2023, but did not file a copy with the court. That form showed Stamper had been hired at a law firm and expected to make about $75,000 a year. Norman testified he received it on August 26. On August 28, Stamper emailed Norman a draft of the divorce decree that included both parties' income figures updated to reflect her new job. On August 29, the court held a settlement conference. Both parties confirmed they had settled and testified that they had enough time to consider the terms, understood they were giving up their right to a trial, believed the terms were fair, and believed the agreement was in the children's best interest. The court signed the decree, which listed gross monthly incomes of $7,374 for Stamper and $10,509.36 for Norman. Norman did not appeal the divorce decree. About six months later, on March 4, 2024, Norman filed a motion under NRCP 60(b)(3) — a rule that lets a court relieve a party from a judgment that resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. He argued Stamper had not timely filed her updated financial disclosure, that this information was material to his decision to settle, and that there was therefore no genuine "meeting of the minds" on child support, alimony, or the children's health insurance. He also argued the decree did not comply with an administrative rule requiring child support stipulations to list the guideline amount, and that opposing counsel's conduct violated his due process rights. The district court denied the motion. It found the motion was untimely because Norman knew about the alleged fraud before the settlement and the entry of the decree and did not seek relief quickly or file an appeal. The court also found that, even if timely, the motion would fail because Norman knew about Stamper's new job and income before he settled and relied on that information when he agreed. The court found his other arguments did not show fraud and would have been better raised in an appeal from the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court. The court noted that Norman's own sworn testimony showed he knew by August 26 that Stamper was making or expected to make at least $75,000 a year, and had her exact income figure on August 28 — the day before the settlement conference. Despite this, he agreed to pay $550 a month in child support and agreed to keep the children on his own health insurance without raising any concern with the court or filing an appeal. The court found nothing in the record showing he ever asked about Stamper's health insurance. As a result, these points did not justify setting aside the decree. The court declined to consider Norman's argument that he was forced into the settlement because his counsel abandoned him, because he had not raised that argument below in the way he framed it on appeal. The court also treated his remaining arguments (about the administrative child-support rule, whether Stamper's income was supported by the record, alleged child abuse, and temporary orders) as waived because he did not address on appeal the specific reasons the district court gave for rejecting them.

Rochelle Mezzano and John Townley signed a prenuptial agreement before marrying. Among other things, the agreement said that property titled in one spouse's name would be that spouse's separate property, and that the couple intended to "acquire no community property (unless title to property acquired after marriage is specifically taken as community property or joint tenancy property with right of survivorship) during their marriage and that all property acquired during marriage shall be owned by the acquiring party or the person contributing the acquisition funds." The agreement also spelled out specific ways the couple could create community property - property owned jointly by both spouses - such as taking title jointly or designating property as community in a signed writing. Townley filed for divorce in 2019 and initially obtained a default divorce decree, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that decree void because of improper service and sent the case back. On remand, Mezzano filed an answer, a counterclaim (with causes of action including divorce, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, abuse of process, breach of contract, and breach of good faith and fair dealing), and a crossclaim for conversion. Mezzano then failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to appear for her deposition, and failed to make required disclosures. As a sanction, the district court barred her from "introducing any document she failed to produce in discovery; or as required by NRCP 16.1 or 16.2; and she is precluded from offering any testimony or evidence in support of her affirmative claims and defenses, particularly any claim of damages against Mr. Townley." The court also granted Townley summary judgment - a ruling without trial because no facts were genuinely in dispute - on Mezzano's second through sixth causes of action, and, on its own initiative, on paragraphs 11-13 of her divorce cause of action. At trial over the division of assets and debts, one key dispute involved the Yellowstone properties, two Reno real properties in which Mezzano acquired an interest during the marriage. Mezzano said they were her separate property because the deeds were in her name (along with a third party); Townley testified he did not know the source of the purchase money and that there was no proof community funds were not used. The district court found that "Mezzano did not provide the court clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption her interest acquired during the marriage is community property. Therefore, the presumption controls." After dividing the assets, the court ordered Mezzano to pay Townley $740,647 as an equalization payment. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the Yellowstone properties. Even though both sides pointed to competing provisions of the prenuptial agreement - and the district court itself found "the prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable" - the district court made no findings and offered no discussion of the agreement when deciding whether the community had an interest in those properties; instead it appeared to rely on Nevada's default community property presumption. Because the district court did not analyze the prenuptial agreement on this issue, the Court of Appeals concluded it abused its discretion and sent that portion of the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals rejected Mezzano's other arguments. It held that the discovery sanctions were not "case concluding" because no dismissal occurred and excluding evidence does not amount to a case-concluding discovery sanction; given her failures to appear for deposition and respond to discovery, the sanction was within the district court's discretion. And because the sanction already barred her from introducing evidence supporting any affirmative claim, she could not show she was prejudiced by the court's sua sponte summary judgment on paragraphs 11-13 of her divorce counterclaim, so that ruling was affirmed.

Eli Pederson and Krystina Jeter have two minor children. In 2017, Krystina began custody proceedings alleging that Eli violently attacked and assaulted her in front of the children. In September 2018, the district court awarded Krystina sole physical and legal custody, based on its analysis of the children's best interests and findings that Eli had been convicted - through a guilty plea - of attempted sexual assault against Krystina and child abuse or neglect against the children. Eli, who is incarcerated at Lovelock Correctional Center, did not appeal that 2018 order. In 2022, Eli filed a "Petition for an Order to Establish a Correspondence with Minor Children," saying he had not been allowed contact with the children since his incarceration and wanted to begin repairing the relationship through phone calls, gifts, and letters. He stated that he had completed parenting classes in prison and had grown physically, spiritually, and mentally. Krystina opposed, arguing that Eli had not shown enough of a change in circumstances to justify modifying custody, and pointing to the children's therapist and a recent psychological report indicating the children were still having problems with their father's actions. Instead of filing a reply brief, Eli submitted the matter for decision. The district court denied his motion, finding he had not set forth a sufficient basis to modify the prior custody order and had not shown that an evidentiary hearing - a court proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is presented - was necessary. Eli then sought reconsideration, arguing among other things that ruling without giving him a chance to reply violated his due process rights, and asking the court to force the children's therapist to produce treatment records. The district court denied that motion too. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that when a parent asks to change a custody arrangement, the burden is on the parent making the request - not the other parent - to show a preliminary (prima facie) case for modification. Eli's argument that Krystina had also failed to make such a showing therefore missed the mark, and because he did not otherwise address the district court's conclusion that no evidentiary hearing was warranted, the court declined to consider that issue further. The court also noted that Eli's arguments did not address the district court's central finding: that there was insufficient evidence a modification would serve the children's best interest. His contention that his convictions had nothing to do with his biological children was, in the court's words, belied by the record and conflicted with express findings in the 2018 custody decree - which he never appealed and therefore could no longer challenge. As for the reconsideration motion, the court found no due process problem: under the local rule (WDGCR 12(4)), filing a reply brief is optional, and Eli chose to submit the matter for decision without one. Because Eli did not challenge the district court's stated reasons for denying reconsideration - that he failed to establish a legal basis for it and improperly raised new claims for the first time in that motion - the court deemed those challenges waived. The Court of Appeals affirmed both denials.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Craig and Catherine Doan married in 1985 and later divorced. Craig worked as an air traffic controller for the FAA for more than 23 years and earned federal retirement benefits. During the divorce, both spouses filed sworn financial statements indicating they had retirement accounts or pensions, and Catherine's pretrial memorandum specifically identified Craig's federal retirement benefits as property earned during the marriage. After their lawyers withdrew shortly before trial, the couple settled their property division themselves at a conference with the judge. The final divorce decree, entered in August 2003, divided one retirement asset (a voluntary thrift savings plan) but said nothing about Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine asked the court to divide the FAA retirement benefit, arguing it had been left out of the decree and should now be split. The district court first denied her motion, finding the benefit had been fully disclosed during the divorce. But after Catherine asked the court to reconsider, the court changed course: it found the benefit had been left out of the decree by "mutual mistake" and divided it using a federal formula. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRCP 60(b) - a rule of court procedure allowing a party to ask for relief from a final judgment - a motion based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed within six months of the judgment. Catherine waited more than six years, so her motion was too late. The court then asked whether her request could instead be treated as an "independent action" - a separate lawsuit seeking relief in equity, which is not subject to the six-month deadline but requires a much higher showing: it is available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The court held that Catherine could not meet that standard. Nevada law recognizes that when a marital asset was never litigated or decided in the divorce - for example, because neither party mentioned it - it can be divided later through an equitable action. But here, the FAA retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed throughout the divorce proceedings: it appeared in Craig's pay statements, W-2 forms, and financial affidavit, and Catherine's own pretrial memorandum named it as property to be divided. The district court even found that the benefit was considered in setting the length of alimony. The Supreme Court explained that the key question is whether the asset was actually litigated and decided in the divorce, not simply whether it was written into the decree. Because the benefit was before the court in the original divorce, it was not an "omitted asset," and leaving it out of the written decree was not the kind of exceptional circumstance that justifies reopening a final judgment years later. Whether Nevada should have a law allowing courts to divide property merely left out of a decree - as California does - is, the court said, a question for the Legislature.