Nevada family-law case summaries

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

Brittany Sheehan and Justin Manty have one child together, T.S. Before this case began, there was no court order in place about who had custody. Brittany filed a case in Nevada asking a court to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. Justin responded by filing his own custody case in California and asking the Nevada court to dismiss Brittany's case for lack of jurisdiction (the court's authority to decide the matter). According to the opinion, Brittany then went to California, took T.S. out of her school, and brought her to Nevada. California criminal charges were filed against Brittany over that incident. After a hearing, the Nevada district court ordered Brittany to return T.S. to Justin and dismissed the Nevada case, finding that California was the more convenient place to handle the dispute because most of the evidence and witnesses were there. On appeal, Brittany made several arguments. First, she said the judge, Dedree Butler, showed bias by saying at the hearing that she "d[id]n't know if [T.S. is] safe right now" and that "for all [she] kn[e]w [T.S. is] . . . somewhere in a basement tied up." The Court of Appeals explained that judges are presumed to be unbiased, and it read the judge's comments—though it described them as "arguably hyperbolic"—as simply stating that the judge did not know where the child was because Brittany would not say. The court found no proof that the judge's rulings were driven by bias. Second, Brittany argued the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. The court rejected this because she did not cite supporting legal authority, did not explain why such a hearing was needed, and did not identify any disputed facts the court would have had to resolve. Third, Brittany argued the court improperly relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements) from Justin. The court said that even if she were right, it would not change the outcome, because she never disputed the core reason for dismissal—that California was the more convenient forum. She also never addressed the specific statute the court used to dismiss the case. Finally, Brittany argued the court was wrong to order the child returned to Justin without weighing the "best interest of the child" factors. The court explained that it acted under its temporary emergency jurisdiction, pointing to how T.S. had been removed from California (with Brittany criminally charged and subject to an active arrest warrant) and to Brittany's refusal to reveal where the child was, which left the court unsure the child was safe. The court found those oral findings sufficient. Because none of Brittany's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed.