Nevada family-law case summaries

Myisha and Ester Gray were married and share one child, born in 2017. After Myisha filed for divorce, the parties eventually agreed to share joint physical and legal custody, and the district court entered a divorce decree in 2022 adopting that agreement. The decree contained an "event" provision that let Myisha take the child to weekend events with seven days' notice, unless Ester already had plans with the child. The decree did not define "event." Ester later filed two motions to change the arrangement to give her primary physical custody. Her first motion, filed in November 2023, described a phone call from Myisha's girlfriend Rochelle reporting a domestic dispute in the child's presence (the "phone call incident"). The court declined to modify custody at that time, finding the parents had worked together in a stressful moment to keep the child's interests first. Ester's second motion, filed in November 2024, described a September 28, 2024 incident (the "soccer game incident") in which, according to Ester, Myisha pushed and hit her to separate her from the child, then grabbed the child by the arm and forced him into a vehicle as he screamed and cried. Myisha had been arrested for domestic violence in connection with that incident. Ester also said Myisha repeatedly used the "event" provision to take the child without her consent. The district court found a substantial change in circumstances based on the soccer game incident and gave Ester temporary primary physical custody. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the district court granted Ester primary physical custody. It found that Myisha had committed domestic violence during the soccer game incident and had used the "event" provision to interfere with Ester's parenting time. The court reviewed the statutory best-interest factors, found by clear and convincing evidence that Myisha's conduct amounted to domestic violence (triggering a legal presumption against her having joint or sole custody), and found Myisha's testimony not credible - especially her denial of the soccer game events. The court gave Myisha parenting time each week and on the first weekend of each month, ended the "event" provision, and later awarded Ester $20,000 in attorney fees (reduced from the $46,989.25 requested, in light of the income difference between the parties). On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Myisha's arguments. On the domestic violence history, the court found the record showed the district court did not use the older incidents (the gun incident and the phone call incident) to establish a "substantial change in circumstances"; instead it used them only in weighing the child's best interest, which is permitted. On the recorded phone call, the court held Myisha had objected below only on the ground that the call was recorded without consent, so her new hearsay and foundation arguments were forfeited and did not amount to plain error. On the claim that the court acted arbitrarily by revisiting the call, the court explained that credibility and weighing of evidence are left to the trial court, which used the call as one part of its overall credibility and best-interest analysis. On whether pulling the child's arm was domestic violence, the court said it did not need to decide that question because Myisha did not dispute that she committed domestic violence against Ester during the same incident, making any error harmless. On the rebuttal-evidence argument, the court held the findings were supported by substantial evidence and it would not reweigh credibility. Finally, the court upheld the fee award as within the district court's discretion.

Ricky DeNoto and Alisha Babbe Hilton, who were never married, share one child, T.D., born in 2017. After both moved to Nevada, they split parenting time evenly, one week on and one week off. Although both parents stayed involved, Hilton generally handled T.D.'s medical care, insurance, appointments, and school matters, and DeNoto usually deferred to her on those issues. In early 2024, Hilton took a temporary surgical-technologist job in Hawaii. The parents, representing themselves, signed a written "Permission to Travel" agreement letting T.D. stay in Hawaii from June 6, 2024, until sometime between July 8 and July 13, 2024. According to the opinion, Hilton did not present the trip as a permanent move, though she shipped her car to Hawaii before leaving. As the return date approached, DeNoto asked for travel details; Hilton first responded, then became evasive, and then stopped communicating. T.D. never came back and has remained in Hawaii. That August, DeNoto learned from T.D. that Hilton had enrolled him in a Hawaii school without DeNoto's knowledge or consent. The next month, T.D. was struck by a vehicle in the front yard of Hilton's Hawaii home. He suffered serious injuries, was placed in a medically induced coma for three days, hospitalized until late October, treated in the ICU, and underwent major surgery. By the time of trial, T.D. had undergone multiple surgeries, resumed some activity, and been cleared to travel, but still needed ongoing care, including one more surgery. DeNoto filed a paternity case in October 2024, and Hilton answered and counterclaimed. There were no prior custody or support orders. At trial, the district court decided Nevada had jurisdiction because T.D. had lived in Nevada for years before the June 2024 departure and because DeNoto filed within months of that departure. The parents agreed to share legal custody (the right to make major decisions), and the court entered detailed rules requiring them to consult on decisions, share medical and school information, and support T.D.'s relationship with the other parent. The contested question was physical custody — where T.D. would primarily live. The court worked through the statutory "best interest of the child" factors. It found most factors neutral. It found two factors favored Hilton: the parents' ability to cooperate to meet the child's needs (because Hilton historically handled medical, insurance, and school matters and had supported T.D. financially in Hawaii), and the child's physical, developmental, and emotional needs (because of his serious injuries, ongoing medical and therapy needs, school accommodations, and Hilton's ability to keep him on medical, dental, and vision insurance). The court awarded Hilton primary physical custody in Hawaii, gave DeNoto parenting time over school breaks and long weekends plus phone contact, and set child support and related financial terms. On appeal, DeNoto argued the court mishandled several best-interest factors, downplayed Hilton's failure to return T.D. and her unilateral school enrollment, failed to resolve conflicting testimony with credibility findings, and reached conclusions unsupported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody decisions only for "abuse of discretion" — a deferential standard that does not allow the appeals court to re-weigh evidence or re-judge witness credibility. The court agreed with DeNoto on one point: the district court's finding that one factor (whether a parent would allow the child a continuing relationship with the other parent) was "neutral" seemed inconsistent with the trial court's own findings that Hilton had "reneged on the agreement," become evasive, gone "radio silence," and enrolled T.D. in school without consent. But the appeals court concluded the trial court did not ignore that conduct — it acknowledged the conduct and weighed it against other evidence, such as the parents' long history of co-parenting, DeNoto's phone access, and his extended visits. The appeals court held that even if that factor was weighed improperly, it would not change the result, because DeNoto did not meaningfully dispute the finding about T.D.'s serious medical and educational needs, which strongly supported placing him with Hilton. Because the district court considered the required factors, made findings adequate for review, and reached a decision supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

This is a very short order from the Nevada Supreme Court in a family-law case between Brandi A. Samaan and Ramy F. Samaan. One party had appealed, and the other had filed a cross-appeal (a counter-appeal by the opposing party in the same case). Before the court decided the merits, the two parties reached an agreement to end the appeal. This kind of agreement is called a stipulation - a joint request by both sides asking the court to take a particular action. Based on that stipulation, the court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, meaning the case ends without a ruling on the issues that were raised. The court also directed that each side pay its own court costs and attorney fees, rather than requiring one party to reimburse the other. The order does not explain what the underlying dispute was about or how the family court below had ruled.

Chandler Jensen and Natasha Peterson share one child, born in 2016. In 2023, Jensen filed for custody. While that case was pending, Peterson obtained a protection order against domestic violence based on encounters and messages she believed were threats. The extended protection order barred Jensen from threatening or harassing Peterson and required the parties to communicate only through an electronic parenting application, in messages that were reasonable in frequency and free of profanity. After a trial in August 2024, the district court awarded the parents joint legal and physical custody. At that time, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) had an open investigation into Peterson and her boyfriend, and Peterson's parenting time was being supervised by her brother. The custody decree also ordered the parties to avoid abusive communications, including name-calling and foul language. Peterson later asked the court to change the custody arrangement. She pointed out that the DCFS investigation had ended with the allegations found unsubstantiated, that Jensen had been criminally charged with violating the protection order over an incident at a Boys and Girls Club, and that Jensen had continued sending her numerous disparaging and inappropriate messages after the decree, including repeated accusations that her boyfriend was a "pedophile." At an evidentiary hearing, Jensen testified he had not made such statements before the DCFS investigation began, but the court admitted—over his objection—a March 2024 message, sent well before the investigation, in which he called Peterson's boyfriend a "pedo." The parties also acknowledged Jensen had entered a no contest plea (a plea in which a defendant accepts conviction without admitting guilt) to charges stemming from the protection-order violation. The district court found several circumstances had substantially changed since the decree: the DCFS investigation—which had factored into the original joint custody decision—had concluded with the allegations unsubstantiated, and Jensen had violated both the protection order and the custody decree. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Jensen's harassing behavior amounted to domestic violence, which under Nevada law creates a rebuttable presumption—a starting assumption the parent can try to disprove—that joint physical custody is not in the child's best interest. The court found Jensen did not overcome that presumption, found his testimony not credible, and awarded Peterson primary physical custody. On appeal, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It held the text message was properly authenticated because Peterson explained why it was offered and provided corroborating evidence that Jensen wrote it. It held the district court's findings of changed circumstances and its best-interest analysis were supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court agreed with Jensen on one point: a no contest plea should not be used as evidence against a party in a civil case, so the district court erred by considering it. But the court concluded that error was harmless—meaning it did not change the outcome—because the district court's other extensive findings independently supported the modification. The court also held that the district court was permitted to consider harassing messages sent before the decree because that information had not been presented during the original custody proceedings.

This case concerns the difference between a divorce and an annulment, and what a court must prove before it can declare that a marriage never legally existed. Maria Rosa Dos Santos, who is originally from Argentina and was living in the United States on an expired visa, met Mark Vincent Dreibelbis, a U.S. citizen and Nevada real estate agent, through a dating app in late 2021. They married in Las Vegas in February 2022, despite a language barrier (Mark spoke English, Maria spoke only Spanish), and Maria moved in with Mark in Henderson. Mark supported Maria financially and began helping her apply for permanent residency, but the application was never filed because his real estate business struggled as mortgage interest rates rose. As their finances worsened, the relationship broke down. By October 2022, Maria had moved into a friend's home and told police that Mark had strangled her during a domestic violence incident. Police observed visible injuries, went to Mark's home, and arrested him; he denied the allegations. Mark was charged with domestic battery by strangulation, but the charge was later dismissed after Maria did not appear to testify. In May 2023, Maria filed for divorce. Mark responded by asking the court to annul the marriage - an annulment treats the marriage as if it was never valid, rather than ending a valid marriage as a divorce does. Mark claimed Maria married him only to get immigration benefits and that she had made up the domestic violence accusations to support an immigration petition. He submitted translated WhatsApp messages that he said showed Maria admitting she fabricated the abuse claims and used the marriage to get legal status. Maria denied writing the messages and said Mark - who had created her WhatsApp account and had access to her devices - fabricated them. Mark acknowledged he knew about her immigration status before the marriage and had agreed to support her and help her get documentation for legal residency. After a trial, the district court granted the annulment. It found that Maria had fraudulently induced the marriage solely for immigration purposes and that her domestic violence allegations were not credible, concluding that Mark had "sufficiently proven" his allegations. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Maria that the district court used the wrong standard of proof. Under Nevada law, a person seeking an annulment based on fraud must prove that fraud by "clear and convincing evidence" - a demanding standard. The trial court instead said only that Mark had "sufficiently proven" his claims, and it never identified or applied the clear-and-convincing standard. The appellate court also noted that the trial court never worked through the specific elements that make up fraud. Because of this, the Court of Appeals reversed the annulment and sent the case back so the district court can apply the correct standard and analyze the elements of fraud properly. The court added that if, on remand, the district court concludes Mark did not prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence, it should instead enter a decree of divorce.

This case involves a baby, A.R., who was removed from her parents in 2022 because of neglect and abuse. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) initially placed her with her paternal aunt, Mary. Over time, A.R. also began spending weekends with her maternal grandmother, Ericka. Both relatives loved A.R., wanted to adopt her, and were considered fit caregivers. After the parents' rights were terminated by the court, the district court had to decide where A.R. should live permanently. Both the aunt and the grandmother were good options, and the district court found them "equally situated" in most respects. To break the tie, the court considered DFS's recommendation. DFS preferred the aunt's home because A.R. had developed a close, sibling-like bond with her cousin (the aunt's child), and DFS believed keeping that bond intact was best for A.R. The court placed A.R. with the aunt for adoption, while preserving the grandmother's role through a Post Adoptive Contact Agreement giving her alternating weekend visits and two weeks of summer vacation each year. The grandmother asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in through a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to perform a duty required by law. She argued the district court placed too much weight on DFS's recommendation, did not make sufficient findings, did not hear enough evidence, and improperly favored a "nuclear family" structure. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and denied the petition. It explained that, after parental rights are terminated, a different statute (NRS 128.110) governs placement, and that statute gives the agency holding the child's custody discretion in deciding placement. The district court is not bound by the agency's preference, but it must consider it as part of figuring out what is in the child's best interest, which always remains the paramount concern. Here, the district court did exactly that: it acknowledged it could override DFS, but found DFS's reasoning - protecting A.R.'s bond with her cousin - persuasive. The Supreme Court also concluded that the district court's findings were sufficient and that its decision was not based on a generic preference for "traditional" families but on the specific facts of A.R.'s relationships. Some of the grandmother's other arguments were treated as waived because she did not raise them in the district court.

Jon and Melissa Pearson divorced in 2019 and shared their twin sons on a "one week on/one week off" schedule. Both boys have medical needs: one has epilepsy and other conditions, and the other sees a heart specialist for a congenital heart defect. In January 2024, Jon received a job offer from Tesla that required him to move to Austin, Texas. He believed the move offered a significant pay increase, free health insurance, and, based on his research, better schools and medical care for the boys. He asked Melissa to agree to a new custody arrangement so he could relocate with the children; she refused. Jon then filed a motion in court asking to be given primary physical custody so he could move the boys to Texas. When his emergency request was denied, Jon moved to Texas with his current wife and their young son, while the twins stayed in Las Vegas with Melissa pending a full hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Jon's relocation request, awarded Melissa primary physical custody, set a parenting-time schedule for Jon, and ordered Jon to pay monthly child support. The court largely adopted the proposed order that Melissa's attorneys had drafted. Jon appealed. The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's decision for what the law calls an "abuse of discretion" - meaning a decision unsupported by the evidence, clearly wrong, or made by disregarding the controlling legal rules. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court made several connected errors. First, the Court of Appeals held that the district court was wrong to find that Jon's move to Texas was not a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting the children. Because the parents could no longer keep the every-other-week schedule once Jon lived in Texas, the children's lives would be affected no matter what the court decided. Second, the Court of Appeals found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when weighing the move. The court had faulted Jon for not proving that the children's schools and doctors in Las Vegas were "substandard" or inadequate. But under Nevada law, Jon did not have to prove that Las Vegas was bad; he only had to show that the children's needs might be *better* served, or that they would gain an *actual advantage*, by moving to Texas. The district court never made findings on that question. Third, the Court of Appeals held that several of the district court's findings improperly punished Jon for deciding to relocate and for the arguments his lawyers made during the case. Under Nevada law, a court may not use a change of custody as a "sword" to punish a parent's conduct or litigation tactics. Fourth, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court focused too heavily on keeping things exactly as they were for Melissa, rather than seriously considering whether an alternative parenting-time schedule - Jon had proposed one, plus travel contributions and iPads for communication - could preserve Melissa's relationship with the boys. The court also found the district court's suggestion that Jon might try to "replace" Melissa with his new family was speculative and contradicted by the court's own other findings that both parents had cooperated. Because it was unclear whether the district court would have reached the same result without these errors, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals noted that the district court may hold a new hearing to consider the family's current circumstances and the children's wishes, since more than a year had passed and the children would soon turn 13.

Paul and Jennifer Martinez divorced in California in 2015 and share a child, L.M. Jennifer received primary physical custody, and the parents shared joint legal custody. Jennifer later moved with the child to Nevada with court permission, and the case eventually transferred to Nevada courts. After further disputes, the Nevada district court increased Paul's visitation time and ordered Jennifer to pay all the costs of transporting L.M. to and from visits with Paul, reasoning that because Jennifer was the parent who moved away from California, she should bear those costs. Jennifer challenged two parts of that ruling: the order making her pay 100% of travel costs, and the decision to expand Paul's visitation beyond what the parties had specifically asked the court to address. On the travel-cost issue, the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Jennifer. Nevada has a detailed administrative regulation, NAC 425.150, that lists factors a court must consider before adjusting child support away from the standard formula. One of those factors is the cost of transporting the child for visitation. The Court held that a district court cannot simply impose all travel costs on one parent as a stand-alone order; instead, those costs must be evaluated as part of the overall child support analysis, looking at the child's needs and both parents' financial circumstances. The district court's reliance on the fact that Jennifer had moved years earlier, by itself, was not a proper basis for assigning her all the costs. On the visitation issue, the Court sided with the district court. Although Jennifer argued she did not have fair notice that the court might broadly change the visitation schedule, the Court found she had put visitation squarely before the court (by asking that Paul's visits be supervised), testified at length on the topic, and had the chance to present evidence. The Court also found enough evidence in the record - including doctor notes and Paul's own testimony - to support letting Paul have a standard out-of-state unsupervised visitation schedule. The Court reversed the travel-cost portion of the order and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the NAC 425.150 framework. It affirmed everything else and declined to sanction Jennifer for bringing the appeal.

Tiffany and James Sullivan divorced in 2012 and agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, G.S. Over the following decade, James filed several motions asking the court to give him primary physical custody. The appeal in this case arises from his third such motion, filed in April 2022. James pointed to three alleged changes: an October 2021 domestic violence incident between Tiffany and her then-boyfriend, Martin (who was later convicted of felony aggravated stalking for violating protective orders Tiffany obtained against him); a February 2022 conversation James recorded with G.S., in which the child said Tiffany often left her alone to care for her younger half-sister, did not prepare her meals, and that she would prefer to live with James; and concerns that G.S. was underweight and possibly not eating properly. Before the trial (called an "evidentiary hearing"), the court ordered that G.S. be interviewed by a neutral professional. The parties settled on Dr. Stephanie Holland, who interviewed the child and sent her report to the court. But Tiffany did not formally list Dr. Holland as a witness until after the deadline the parties had agreed to. On the first day of the hearing, James raised no objection—in fact, he agreed to take witnesses out of order so Dr. Holland could testify the next morning. The next morning, however, James objected that Tiffany had disclosed Dr. Holland too late, and the district court agreed, refusing to let Dr. Holland testify or her report come into evidence. After hearing testimony from Martin, a former babysitter, G.S.'s pediatrician, James, and Tiffany, the district court awarded James primary physical custody, finding that five of the statutory "best interest of the child" factors favored James and none favored Tiffany. The Court of Appeals concluded the district court made mistakes—but not mistakes big enough to change the outcome. First, it held that James waited too long to object to Dr. Holland's testimony. Because he participated in the interview process, knew about the late disclosure a month before the hearing, and even agreed on the first day of the hearing to let Dr. Holland testify out of order, he could not spring the objection at the last minute. The court also emphasized that Nevada public policy strongly favors letting courts consider all evidence bearing on a child's best interest; by excluding the court-appointed interviewer's testimony and report, the district court "hindered its own inquiry into G.S.'s best interest" and, in effect, sanctioned the child for her mother's procedural misstep. Second, the appellate court found that two of the district court's best-interest findings were not backed by substantial evidence: the finding that the parents' "ability to cooperate" factor was neutral (the record showed James was the less cooperative co-parent, including never giving Tiffany the number to G.S.'s phone at his house), and the finding that the "relationship with each parent" factor favored James, which rested on the recorded conversation without the expert analysis Dr. Holland would have provided. Even so, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Under Nevada law, an error justifies reversal only if it likely would have changed the result. Here, the remaining best-interest findings were supported by substantial evidence—particularly that James consistently provided G.S. three meals a day, got her to school on time, and offered a stable home—and Tiffany did not include Dr. Holland's report in the appellate record, which limited the court's ability to assess what difference it might have made. Finally, the court rejected Tiffany's claim of judicial bias: judges are presumed impartial, and rulings formed from what a judge learns during the case itself are not evidence of bias.

Natalie and Doug Gennardo married in 2002 and had three children. Doug filed for divorce in May 2019. After Doug moved out in December 2019, the parents tried to share custody, but there was significant conflict. According to the opinion, Natalie struggled with extreme alcohol abuse and sometimes exhibited violent behavior. After a confrontation between the parents in April 2020, Doug asked the court for primary physical custody. Natalie agreed to attend a 30-day treatment program in Arizona. While she was away, the court put a temporary arrangement in place giving Doug primary physical custody and leaving contact between Natalie and the children at Doug's discretion. A therapist was enlisted to try to repair Natalie's relationship with the children, which had seriously deteriorated. The children reported not wanting to see her. For roughly a year, Natalie could see the children only under the therapist's supervision or when Doug allowed it, and the court did not set a parenting-time schedule or hold a hearing on the temporary arrangement during that time. Because the case had complicated financial issues that delayed the trial, the court eventually decided in February 2021 to resolve custody before the trial on money matters. It held three custody hearings in April and May 2021, heard testimony, and awarded the parents joint legal custody with primary physical custody to Doug. It made findings on each of the statutory factors that guide a child's best interest. Separately, Doug's employer, Marriott, cut his pay early in the pandemic and told him in June 2021 that his Las Vegas position would be eliminated. In July, Marriott offered him a comparable job in Texas. Doug accepted and asked the court to let the children move with him. In August 2021, the court allowed a temporary move ahead of a promised hearing meant to permanently decide the relocation issue. That hearing was never held. Instead, after the trial on the financial matters, the court entered a final decree making the relocation permanent. Natalie asked the court to reconsider because the promised hearing never happened; the court denied her request. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reached different conclusions on the different issues. On custody, the court said the trial judge did not strictly follow Nevada's process favoring joint physical custody and may have shifted the burden of proof onto Natalie, which was an error. But the court concluded the custody decision was still supported by substantial evidence and adequately explained, so it did not reverse the custody award. The court also found that the trial judge had improperly created what amounted to a de facto sole physical custody arrangement — giving Doug complete control over Natalie's time with the children and refusing to set a schedule or a hearing for about a year — and then gave too much weight to that one year while disregarding Natalie's 16 years as the children's primary caretaker. The court called this clearly erroneous but concluded it did not change the custody result because Natalie did not show a different outcome was reasonably likely without the error. On the temporary relocation, the court held the trial judge acted within its discretion in allowing the children to move temporarily before a hearing, given the exigent circumstances of Doug being the family's sole provider and needing to start a job in another state. On the permanent relocation, however, the court held that the trial judge abused its discretion by making it permanent without ever holding the evidentiary hearing it had repeatedly promised. Because no actual evidence was taken, the court's relocation "findings" rested only on lawyers' arguments and motion exhibits, which the appellate court found insufficient. The court further held that this deprived Natalie of her constitutionally protected due process rights, because she was never given the opportunity to challenge Doug's claims and present her own evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the custody decision, reversed the permanent relocation, and sent the case back for a prompt hearing on relocation. It noted the temporary relocation order may remain in effect while that hearing is pending.

Christopher Fisher and Elia Cobian were never married but were in an on-again-off-again relationship, and their daughter, L.F., was born in May 2019. The relationship ended after a physical altercation in April 2020 in which each parent accused the other of being the aggressor; no arrests or charges resulted, but Elia obtained a temporary protection order from the Elko Justice Court that gave her sole legal and physical custody of L.F. Both parents then went to district court seeking custody. A court-ordered custody evaluator recommended that the parents share joint legal and joint physical custody, and the case proceeded to a two-day evidentiary hearing in February 2022. At that hearing, the court heard testimony about Christopher's 2018 DUI conviction, his ongoing alcohol use, his partner's alcohol use, his refusal to give Elia his address, his estranged relationships with children from a previous relationship, health issues L.F. experienced, and his failures to tell Elia when he traveled out of town with the child. Christopher also acknowledged an incident involving a daughter from a previous relationship in which the Utah Division of Child and Family Services substantiated an abuse and neglect charge against him. Nevada law requires courts deciding custody to weigh a list of "best interest of the child" factors. The district court found that eight of the twelve factors favored Elia and that the rest were neutral or inapplicable, so it awarded her primary physical custody, with Christopher receiving parenting time from Sunday morning through Tuesday afternoon every other week. After hiring a new lawyer, Christopher asked for a new trial, arguing his trial counsel failed to present any evidence on his behalf; the district court denied that motion, and he appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. Christopher argued that the district court had to first work through the statutes expressing a preference for joint physical custody before analyzing the best-interest factors. The appellate court explained that the sole consideration in a custody decision is the best interest of the child, and that even though the district court did not explicitly cite those preference statutes, it recognized the preference for joint custody but specifically found that "joint custody was not appropriate" under the totality of the circumstances. The court of appeals also declined to reweigh the evidence or the district court's credibility determinations, concluding that substantial evidence - evidence a reasonable person could accept as adequate - supported the ruling. As for Christopher's complaints about the court considering events before L.F.'s birth and allegations he said were not properly noticed, the appellate court held those objections were waived because he did not raise them in the trial court. It added that a district court may consider a parent's past conduct when determining a child's best interest, and that any error was harmless because the district court made numerous findings about the current custodial circumstances. Finally, the court noted one clerical mistake: page 12 of the district court's order erroneously refers to awarding Christopher primary physical custody, and it sent the case back solely to fix that error.

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

Brittany Sheehan and Justin Manty have one child together, T.S. Before this case began, there was no court order in place about who had custody. Brittany filed a case in Nevada asking a court to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. Justin responded by filing his own custody case in California and asking the Nevada court to dismiss Brittany's case for lack of jurisdiction (the court's authority to decide the matter). According to the opinion, Brittany then went to California, took T.S. out of her school, and brought her to Nevada. California criminal charges were filed against Brittany over that incident. After a hearing, the Nevada district court ordered Brittany to return T.S. to Justin and dismissed the Nevada case, finding that California was the more convenient place to handle the dispute because most of the evidence and witnesses were there. On appeal, Brittany made several arguments. First, she said the judge, Dedree Butler, showed bias by saying at the hearing that she "d[id]n't know if [T.S. is] safe right now" and that "for all [she] kn[e]w [T.S. is] . . . somewhere in a basement tied up." The Court of Appeals explained that judges are presumed to be unbiased, and it read the judge's comments—though it described them as "arguably hyperbolic"—as simply stating that the judge did not know where the child was because Brittany would not say. The court found no proof that the judge's rulings were driven by bias. Second, Brittany argued the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. The court rejected this because she did not cite supporting legal authority, did not explain why such a hearing was needed, and did not identify any disputed facts the court would have had to resolve. Third, Brittany argued the court improperly relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements) from Justin. The court said that even if she were right, it would not change the outcome, because she never disputed the core reason for dismissal—that California was the more convenient forum. She also never addressed the specific statute the court used to dismiss the case. Finally, Brittany argued the court was wrong to order the child returned to Justin without weighing the "best interest of the child" factors. The court explained that it acted under its temporary emergency jurisdiction, pointing to how T.S. had been removed from California (with Brittany criminally charged and subject to an active arrest warrant) and to Brittany's refusal to reveal where the child was, which left the court unsure the child was safe. The court found those oral findings sufficient. Because none of Brittany's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Alfonso Estrada, an attorney living in Los Angeles, and Ida Arzola, who worked in Las Vegas, had a child together, A.E., born in May 2019. After the relationship ended, both parents went to court seeking primary physical custody - the arrangement where one parent has the child most of the time. Alfonso asked for primary custody; Ida asked for primary custody and also for child support (regular payments from one parent to help cover the child's needs). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary schedule of joint physical custody, with the parents exchanging the child in Barstow, California, each week. During that temporary period, Alfonso was ordered to pay Ida $1,583 per month in support plus $5,000 in attorney fees, reflecting that Alfonso earns roughly ten times what Ida makes. After a two-day trial, the district court changed course. It awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso, ordered that the child's "habitual residence" stay in Nevada, and directed Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support. It also ruled that Alfonso, as the "prevailing party," could recover attorney fees, and later ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $40,000 in combined fees and costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals split its decision into three parts. On custody, the court sided with Alfonso and left the custody award in place. It rejected Ida's argument that Alfonso had to meet a higher legal bar to "modify" custody, explaining that because no prior custody order existed, this was an initial determination, not a modification. It rejected her argument that the arrangement should have been called joint custody, noting that the best interest of the child is the main consideration and that percentage of time is only one factor. It rejected her argument that the court should have considered joint custody even though neither parent asked for it, in part because Ida herself never requested joint custody as an alternative. And it found the court's detailed analysis of the best-interest factors was supported by the evidence. On the relocation argument, the court declined to overturn the custody order. Ida had not raised the relocation issue in the lower court, cited no legal authority showing the relocation statute applied to her situation, and did not show that considering relocation factors would have changed the result. On child support, the court agreed with Ida. The district court had said "no adjustment evidence was provided" that would justify lowering Ida's payment - but its own findings described a large income gap (Alfonso earning about $250,000 a year while Ida attended community college), plus travel costs and Ida's limited ability to pay. Because that evidence supported considering a downward adjustment, the Court of Appeals reversed the support order and sent it back for the district court to apply the deviation factors. On attorney fees and costs, the court also agreed with Ida. The district court had awarded fees based only on Alfonso being the "prevailing party," without citing a legal basis, without making required findings, and without addressing the income disparity between the parties. The statutes Alfonso relied on did not fit the situation, and the order lumped fees and costs together without saying how much was which, making it impossible to review. The Court of Appeals reversed that award and sent it back as well.

This case is about a custody, child-support, and attorney-fee dispute between two parents of a young child. Alfonso Estrada is an attorney living in Los Angeles who met Ida Arzola in 2017 at a Las Vegas strip club where she worked as a dancer. They had a relationship, and a child, A.E., was born in May 2019. After the birth, the relationship became contentious. Alfonso asked the court for primary physical custody (meaning the child would live with him most of the time). Ida asked for primary physical custody too, and she also asked for child support. The parents agreed to share legal custody (decision-making about the child). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary arrangement where they shared physical custody, exchanging the child each week in Barstow, California, and temporarily ordered Alfonso to pay Ida $1,583 per month in child support plus $5,000 in attorney fees. By this time, Ida was working as a food server earning about one-tenth of Alfonso's salary and had started nursing school. After a two-day trial, the district court awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso on a three-week-on, two-week-off schedule, with two extra weeks for Alfonso during the year. The court kept Nevada as the child's official home ("habitual residence") and set a status check before the child starts school. It also ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support and awarded Alfonso attorney fees, saying only that he was the "prevailing party." Alfonso later asked for $48,217 in fees and $2,138.77 in costs; the court ultimately ordered Ida to pay a combined $40,000 in fees and costs, without saying how much was fees and how much was costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals reached three main conclusions. First, on custody, the court upheld the district court's decision to give Alfonso primary physical custody. The court rejected Ida's arguments: that this was really a modification of an existing custody arrangement (it was not, because there had been no prior custody determination); that a case called *Bluestein* required treating the arrangement as joint custody (the court explained percentage of time is just one consideration and the child's best interest controls); that the court had to consider joint custody even though neither parent asked for it (Ida had not requested it and could not now complain of an error she helped cause); and that the court misapplied the best-interest factors (the court found the district court's detailed findings were supported by the evidence). Second, on the claim that the court improperly "relocated" the child to California, the court found Ida had not raised this argument below, had not cited supporting authority, and had not shown that a relocation analysis would have changed the outcome. Third, on child support and attorney fees, the court sided with Ida. On child support, the court held the district court should have considered whether to reduce Ida's payment given the large income gap between the parties, and it reversed and sent that issue back. On attorney fees, the court held the award could not stand because the district court gave no legal basis for it and failed to make required findings — including about the income disparity — and because Alfonso's own filings were deficient. The court reversed and remanded the fee-and-cost order.

Erich and Raina Martin married in 2002 while Erich served in the military. When they divorced in 2015, they negotiated a marital settlement agreement that the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. It also included a key promise: if Erich later chose to receive military disability pay instead of retirement pay (which would shrink Raina's share, because federal law requires veterans to waive retirement pay dollar-for-dollar to receive disability pay), Erich would reimburse Raina for the reduction. Erich retired in 2019, and Raina began receiving her share. In 2020, Erich elected full disability pay, waiving all retirement pay. The federal pay agency stopped sending Raina checks, and Erich refused to pay her himself, arguing federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The district court agreed with Raina and ordered Erich to pay her monthly installments equal to what she would have received absent the waiver. On appeal, Erich argued that federal law - specifically the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act and two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell - bars state courts from ordering a veteran to make up the difference when disability pay reduces a former spouse's share of retirement pay. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The majority drew a distinction: federal law does prevent state courts from dividing disability pay as community property or unilaterally ordering a veteran to indemnify a former spouse. But here, the parties themselves negotiated and agreed to the reimbursement provision, the district court entered that agreement as part of the divorce decree, and that decree became final. The court held that enforcing a final, agreed-upon decree under Nevada's res judicata (claim preclusion) doctrine and ordinary contract principles is different from a state court imposing such a division on its own. Under Nevada precedent, particularly Shelton v. Shelton, courts may enforce such agreements, and Erich may satisfy the obligation from any source of money he chooses, including his disability pay. The court also affirmed the $5000 attorney-fee award. Under NRS 125.040, a court in a divorce suit may require one party to pay money to enable the other to carry on or defend the suit, after considering each party's financial situation. The district court found Erich's income was about three times Raina's and tailored the award accordingly. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the four-factor Brunzell test for the reasonableness of attorney fees does not apply to such pendente lite awards because Brunzell evaluates work already performed, while NRS 125.040 fees cover prospective work - here, defending the appeal. Two justices concurred in the result. They would have held that the decree's indemnification provision is in fact preempted by federal law under Mansell and Howell, but agreed that under Nevada law, the decree had become a final judgment that Erich could not collaterally attack, so res judicata required affirmance.

Erich and Raina Martin divorced in 2015 after Erich had served in the military. As part of their divorce, they signed a settlement agreement, which the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. Critically, it also said that if Erich later chose to take military disability pay instead of retirement pay, he would have to reimburse Raina for any reduction in her share. That contingency mattered because of how federal law treats military pay. A veteran who wants tax-free disability benefits must give up an equal amount of taxable retirement pay - he cannot collect both for the same dollars. When Erich retired in 2019, Raina began receiving her share of his retirement pay directly from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The next year, Erich elected full disability pay, which wiped out all of his retirement pay - and with it, Raina's share. When Raina asked him to make up the difference as the decree required, he refused, arguing that federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The court agreed and ordered Erich to pay her the monthly amounts she would have received absent his waiver. The court also awarded Raina $5000 toward her attorney fees for the appeal, citing the large income disparity between the parties. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that under U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, a state court cannot, on its own authority, treat military disability pay as community property or order a veteran to "indemnify" a former spouse for the dollar amount of retirement pay the veteran chose to waive in favor of disability pay. But the Nevada court drew a distinction: those federal cases addressed what a state court can order on its own; they did not bar enforcement of an indemnification term that the divorcing spouses themselves negotiated and put into their property settlement. Because Erich and Raina expressly agreed to the reimbursement provision, and because the divorce decree had become a final judgment, the doctrine of res judicata (which prevents parties from relitigating matters already resolved in a final judgment) required enforcement. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $5000 in pendente lite (during-litigation) attorney fees under NRS 125.040 without analyzing the Brunzell factors. Those factors evaluate the quality of work already performed, whereas NRS 125.040 fees are designed to fund work yet to be done. A two-justice concurrence by Justice Cadish, joined by Justice Pickering, agreed the decree should be enforced - but only because res judicata bars Erich's collateral attack on the final judgment. The concurrence would have held that the reimbursement provision itself is preempted by federal law, even though the parties had agreed to it, and would overrule Shelton v. Shelton to that extent.

Desmon Brandes and Lacey Pictum (now Lacey Krynzel) were never married but have one child together, born in 2007. In 2011, they agreed to share joint legal custody, with Lacey having primary physical custody and Desmon paying $400 per month in child support. Because Lacey had struggled with opioid addiction, their agreement said Desmon would become the primary physical custodian if Lacey relapsed. According to the opinion, Lacey did relapse, and Desmon served as the child's primary physical custodian from late 2011 until 2015, while Lacey had supervised parenting time. In 2015, Lacey married and says she has been clean from opioids since that year. After that, the child spent alternating weekends and summer time with Lacey. This arrangement continued until March 2020, when schools closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the parties agreed the child would stay with Lacey on her summer schedule until school resumed. Also in March 2020, Lacey applied for welfare benefits, which prompted the district attorney's office to open a case to enforce Desmon's child support obligation and collect back payments. Desmon opposed that effort and filed his own motion, saying he had actually been the primary custodian for years and asking the court to change the custody order. He argued that circumstances had substantially changed and that, since Lacey appeared to have been sober for years, joint physical custody would be best for the child. During the case, Desmon submitted text messages and a video from the child (then 14) expressing worry that Lacey was using drugs again, describing erratic driving and "zone out" episodes. The court ordered Lacey to take a drug test, which showed trace amounts of THC but was negative for opioids and other substances. The court then set an evidentiary hearing and told the parties to keep their current schedule for the time being. The child later told Lacey she preferred to live with Desmon until Lacey "got better," and with Lacey's permission lived with Desmon for the five months before the hearing. Because of this, Desmon changed his request and asked for primary physical custody. After a hearing where both parents testified, the district court issued a 21-page order. It found that the 2011 order should be modified and awarded the parents joint physical custody with a 50/50 split. Desmon appealed, agreeing that the old order should be changed but arguing the court was wrong to order joint custody rather than give him primary custody, given the family's history, Lacey's history of substance abuse, and the child's stated preference. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that when a court decides custody, it must not only make findings about the "best interest" factors but must also explain how those findings led to the final custody decision. Here, the court noted, the district court did make detailed findings — including that Lacey has a history of opioid addiction, that the child wanted to live with Desmon, that three factors favored Desmon, and that no factors favored Lacey — but never explained how those findings led to its conclusion that joint custody was best. Because the district court did not connect its findings to its ultimate decision, the Court of Appeals concluded it abused its discretion, reversed the order, and sent the case back so the district court could provide that missing explanation.

Christina Sobczyk and Aaron Osborne share one child, C.O., born in January 2015. In 2017, a New York court entered a stipulated (agreed-upon) custody order that gave Christina "sole custody" and allowed her to move with the child to Nevada, while Aaron received parenting time on a gradually increasing schedule. That order also required both parents to have independent access to the child's healthcare and education records, and required Christina to give Aaron written updates about the child's providers. Christina moved to Nevada in September 2017. In 2018, Aaron had some contact with the child, including two authorized visits in New York. During the August visit, Child Protective Services came to Aaron's home based on allegations from Christina; CPS found the allegations unfounded and left the child in Aaron's care. The district court later reviewed video and found the child did not appear "stressed, traumatized, or frightened" during that visit. Agencies in both New York and Nevada investigated allegations against Aaron and closed their cases as unsubstantiated. In September 2018, Christina brought the New York order into the Nevada court system and asked the court to stop all contact between Aaron and the child. Aaron responded by asking the court to confirm joint legal custody and to grant joint physical custody. The case went to trial, and the court heard 13 days of testimony between June 2019 and February 2020. The trial was delayed by an attorney's withdrawal and the COVID-19 pandemic. The presiding judge then retired, and a senior judge granted Aaron's request for a new trial, explaining she was uncomfortable deciding the case by only watching videos of the earlier proceedings. Before the new trial, Aaron asked the court to exclude evidence of his criminal history and certain out-of-court statements the child had made to a therapist. The court excluded that evidence. After the new trial, the court found that Christina had severely interfered with Aaron's relationship with the child. It ordered joint legal custody, gave Christina primary physical custody, and provided that Aaron's parenting time would increase gradually and be determined by a "reunification specialist." On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld most of the district court's decisions. It concluded the senior judge acted within her discretion in granting a new trial under NRCP 63, which allows a successor judge to order a new trial if she did not preside over the original trial. It upheld the evidence rulings, in part because Christina did not provide transcripts of the relevant hearing, so the court presumed the missing records supported the lower court's decision. It upheld the joint legal custody and the primary physical custody determinations, finding they were supported by the evidence. However, the Court of Appeals reversed one part of the order. It held that by leaving Aaron's parenting time to be determined entirely by the reunification specialist, the district court improperly handed off decision-making authority that only a court can exercise. The court sent the case back so the district court can decide the parenting-time schedule itself and spell it out with specific times and terms.

William and Ammie Wallace married in 2009, had three children, separated in 2017, and divorced in September 2020. In their divorce decree, they agreed that Ammie would have primary physical custody and that William would have the children on weekday afternoons from 3:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., with the parents alternating weekends. According to the opinion, the parents did not actually follow that schedule for a period. During the COVID-19 pandemic, when the children were learning from home and both parents were working from home, they used a different, more equal arrangement that William described as joint physical custody with a "2/3/2 timeshare." They kept this up until the children went back to in-person school in spring 2021, at which point they returned to the schedule written in the divorce decree. In June 2021, William asked the court to change the custody order, arguing that the parents had really been sharing custody roughly equally ("de facto joint physical custody") and that keeping that arrangement was in the children's best interest. Ammie asked the court to deny the motion without a hearing, saying William had not shown any substantial change in circumstances affecting the children, who she said were doing well in her care. After a 20-minute hearing without testimony or evidence, the district court denied William's motion. The court found that Ammie had primary physical custody (having the children about 70% of the time) and that William had not shown "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing because he had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that to change a physical custody order in Nevada, a parent must show both (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and (2) that the change serves the child's best interest. The court held that William never argued that returning to the decree's original terms was a substantial change in circumstances, so he waived that point. It also explained that a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision, Romano v. Romano, overruled the part of the older Rivero decision that William relied on - meaning a court no longer has to first decide what kind of custody arrangement exists before deciding whether to modify it. Because William did not adequately show a substantial change in circumstances, his appeal failed.

Lisa and Joel Eorio married in New Mexico in 2006 and have two children together; Joel is also the equitable father of Lisa's third child. In 2019, Lisa moved to Las Vegas for a job, and Joel followed later with the children after they finished the school year. About a year after the move, the couple separated. Joel filed for divorce and asked the court for primary physical custody so that he could move back to New Mexico with the children. Lisa answered and asked that the children stay with her in Las Vegas. Before trial, the parties reached agreements about custody depending on how the court ruled on the move. They agreed that if they lived in the same state, they would share the children (joint physical custody). If the court allowed Joel to move to New Mexico, Joel would have primary custody and Lisa would get substantial parenting time. If the court denied the move and Joel went back to New Mexico anyway, Lisa would have primary custody and the children would stay with her in Las Vegas. Because of these agreements, the only question the trial had to decide was whether Joel could relocate with the children. At an April 2021 trial, both parents testified. Joel said moving back to New Mexico would make him more financially stable because he could live rent-free with his parents and transfer his job. Lisa testified it would be better for the children to stay with her in Las Vegas. The district judge went through the legal factors and found that most of the "best interest" factors either did not apply or applied equally to both parents. Even so, the judge concluded Joel had met the legal requirements and allowed him to move to New Mexico with the children. On appeal, the Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court explained adequately why moving was in the children's best interests. Under Nevada's relocation law, the parent who wants to move must prove, among other things, that the move is in the children's best interests, and the court must make specific findings and connect those findings to its decision. The appeals court found that the written divorce decree never actually stated that relocation was in the children's best interests; it only said most factors did not apply or were equal between the parents. The court then looked at the judge's spoken findings from the trial, but those findings only showed that neither parent was disqualified from sharing custody - they did not explain how moving to New Mexico served the children's best interests. Because the court could not tell, from either the written order or the oral findings, how the judge concluded that relocation was in the children's best interests by the required standard of proof, it reversed that part of the decision and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must make specific findings, tie them to its conclusion about which best-interest factors (if any) support giving Joel primary custody for the purpose of moving, and then weigh all the factors by comparing the children's potential home in each location. The court ordered that the existing relocation order stays in effect until a new order is entered.

Andrew Warren and Aimee Jung Ahyang were never married but have one child together. In early 2019, Warren asked the court to give him primary physical custody. Ahyang answered and asked for primary physical custody herself, citing Warren's emotional and mental status. Warren, in turn, argued that Ahyang had issues with drug usage. The trial court held a two-day evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, then issued detailed written findings and awarded the parents joint legal custody while giving Ahyang primary physical custody. Warren asked the trial court for a new trial and for reconsideration. When that request was denied, he appealed. The Court of Appeals is not a place where the whole case is retried; instead, the appellate judges check whether the trial court had a reasonable basis for its decision and did not misuse its discretion. Warren's main complaint on appeal was that the trial court leaned too heavily on his mental health when it decided custody. The appellate court disagreed, saying the record did not support that claim. Nevada law requires the trial court to weigh a list of specific factors when deciding what is in a child's best interest. Reviewing the trial court's written findings, the appellate court noted that none of those factors favored Warren; several favored Ahyang, and the rest were neutral or did not apply. The court added that even if Warren's mental health had been treated as a non-issue, the other factors would still have supported the award to Ahyang. Warren also argued the trial court should have ordered Ahyang to undergo drug testing. The appellate court noted that the trial court found Ahyang "used to have a drug issue, but she has fixed it," based on three negative drug tests she presented and a review of CPS records. The appellate court concluded that was enough evidence to support the trial court's conclusion. Warren further objected to two stipulations and orders about vacation and holiday time that were entered after the hearing, saying the court never asked whether he agreed and never required his signature. The appellate court observed that Warren's own attorney had signed both stipulations, and that a local court rule allows a stipulation to be entered when it is signed by a party's attorney. Because Warren had not presented evidence below that he did not consent, the appellate court declined to consider that argument for the first time on appeal. Finally, Warren argued he deserved a new trial because the trial court excluded his medical records and because he was surprised by his inability to admit them. The appellate court explained that the trial court did not exclude the records entirely; it excluded them only for the first day of the hearing so Ahyang could review them, and it told Warren he could renew his request on day two. Warren never renewed the request. Because Warren failed to disclose the records before the hearing and then failed to seek their admission on day two, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. The judgment was affirmed.

Leslie and Brett Miller divorced in 2015. They have two minor children. Through mediation they agreed on most issues, including custody: they share joint physical custody of one child, but Leslie has primary physical custody of the other child, who lives with her and stays with Brett every other weekend. They could not agree on child support. The trial judge ordered Brett to pay Leslie $345 per month. When Leslie asked the judge to explain how he reached that number, the judge said he had "run the numbers" using statutory percentages (18% for one child and 25% for two children) along with deviation factors permitted by Nevada law, but did not show the calculations. Leslie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court took the case to answer a question it had never directly answered before: how do you calculate child support when parents share joint physical custody of one child but one parent has primary physical custody of another child? Several different formulas had been proposed by the parties and by the State Bar of Nevada's Family Law Section, producing wildly different numbers from $345 to $832.19 per month. The Court walked through Nevada's child support statutes. NRS 125B.070 sets baseline percentages of a parent's gross monthly income that the parent owes for child support, based on the number of children (18% for one child, 25% for two, etc.). The Court emphasized that this percentage depends on how many children the parents have, not on the custody arrangement. After that obligation is calculated, the custody arrangement determines who pays what to whom. The Court announced this step-by-step formula for the Millers' "split custody" situation: 1. Calculate each parent's support obligation under NRS 125B.070 based on the total number of children (here, 25% of each parent's gross monthly income because there are two children). For Leslie, that was $996.67; for Brett, $1,076.24. 2. Divide each parent's obligation by the number of children to get a per-child amount. Leslie: $498.34 per child; Brett: $538.12 per child. 3. For the child in joint physical custody, offset the per-child amounts (under the Court's prior decision in Wright v. Osburn): the higher earner pays the lower earner the difference. Brett owed Leslie $39.78 for the joint-custody child. 4. For the child in Leslie's primary physical custody, Brett owes the full per-child amount ($538.12) with no offset. 5. Add those two figures together: Brett owes $577.90 per month. 6. Make sure the result does not exceed the presumptive maximum amount per child in NRS 125B.070(2). 7. The district court may then deviate from that amount under NRS 125B.080, but if it does, it must make written findings of fact explaining the deviation and stating what the support amount would have been under the formula. Because the trial court used the wrong starting percentage (18% for one child rather than 25% for two), failed to state the pre-deviation amount, and failed to explain the deviation factors that produced $345, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back with instructions to follow the formula above. The Court also flagged an "anomaly": under its formula, Brett owes $577.90 for two children, but if there were only one child in Leslie's primary physical custody, he would owe $774.80. The Court noted that this is a matter for the legislatively created Committee to Review Child Support Guidelines to consider, since the Legislature in 2017 (through A.B. 278) directed that new guidelines be developed.

Matthew and Melissa Arcella divorced in 2009 and share joint legal and physical custody of their two children. They had agreed to send the kids to a small private secular school. When their older daughter R.A. was finishing elementary school in 2016, both parents agreed she should move to a larger middle school - but they could not agree on which one. Matthew wanted Faith Lutheran, a religious private school; Melissa wanted Bob Miller Middle School, a highly ranked public school closer to home, and she objected on religious grounds to her daughter receiving a religious education. The family court, without holding an evidentiary hearing or making detailed findings, picked Bob Miller. The only explanation it gave was that it was "taking into consideration [Melissa's] religious objection." Matthew appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that when divorced, joint-custody parents disagree about whether a child should attend a religious or non-religious school, the family court must focus on the child's best interest - not on either parent's religious preference. Treating one parent's religious objection as the deciding factor, the court explained, actually disfavors religion and runs into the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which requires the government to be neutral between religion and non-religion. The Court also faulted the family court for two procedural failures: it did not hold an evidentiary hearing even though Matthew's filings established "adequate cause" for one, and it did not make the kind of specific factual findings about R.A.'s best interest that Nevada law requires. To help guide family courts facing these school-choice disputes, the Court listed ten illustrative factors a judge should consider, including the child's wishes (if old enough), each school's ability to meet the child's educational, medical, and extracurricular needs, the quality of instruction, the commute, whether changing schools would disrupt academic progress, and whether one school choice might alienate the child from a parent. The list is a starting point, not an exhaustive checklist. The case was sent back to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings about which school is best for R.A. specifically.

Ken Nguyen and Robert Boynes were a same-sex couple who dated from November 2009 to May 2013. During the relationship, they decided to adopt a child together and went to Catholic Charities of Southern Nevada. At the time, Catholic Charities did not allow same-sex couples to adopt jointly, so according to Rob, the plan was for Ken to adopt first and Rob to adopt afterward as a second parent. Both men took part in the entire adoption process - background checks, classes, post-placement visits - and Rob even drafted the "birth mother letter" that helped them be selected. A child was placed with Ken in February 2013, and both men were there to receive the newborn. After the placement, the child spent most nights at Rob's house, Rob took the child to most doctor's visits, supplied most of the baby gear, and was listed as a father on the child's baptism certificate. The child's middle name is Rob's surname. But the men's relationship ended in May 2013. When Rob asked Ken to put him on the birth certificate, Ken refused. Ken finalized his own adoption alone in October 2013 and refused to let Rob complete a second-parent adoption. Rob then sued, asking the court to recognize him as a parent and to give him custody. The district court ruled for Rob, and Ken appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court applied a doctrine called "equitable adoption," which allows a court to enforce an adoption agreement when one person promised to adopt, the other relied on that promise, and a child would be harmed if the promise were broken. The Court had recognized this doctrine in a 1987 case (Frye v. Frye) and had declined to extend it in two later cases where the dispute was really about whether someone was the biological parent. Here, the Court said this case was different: neither Ken nor Rob is biologically related to the child, and the question was whether the two men had agreed to adopt together. The Court found substantial evidence that they had agreed, that Rob relied on Ken's promise, and that the child would be harmed by Rob's removal from his life. The Court also rejected Ken's claim that the district court treated him differently because he and Rob were a same-sex couple. The Court said child custody decisions are made case by case, and nothing in the record showed the result turned on the parties' sexual orientation. Finally, the Court affirmed the joint custody order. Ken had argued Rob was a "stalker" who sent harassing emails, which would trigger a presumption against giving custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. The district court found only a single forwarded email tied to Rob, which it concluded was not enough to show "obsessed stalking behavior." Ken also accused Rob of destroying his computer to hide evidence; the district court found the proof inconclusive. The Supreme Court held substantial evidence supported those findings. Three justices - Justice Stiglich, Chief Justice Cherry, and Justice Hardesty - concurred. They would have reached the same outcome under Nevada's Parentage Act rather than under equitable adoption, relying on the Court's earlier decision in St. Mary v. Damon, which recognized that paternity statutes can apply in same-sex parentage cases.

Michelle and Elvis Rivero divorced, and their divorce decree said they would share "joint physical custody" of their young child — but the actual schedule gave the child to Ms. Rivero five days a week and Mr. Rivero two days a week. Neither parent was ordered to pay child support. About a year later, Ms. Rivero went back to court asking for primary custody and child support, claiming Mr. Rivero rarely spent time with the child himself and lacked suitable living arrangements. The trial judge, Judge Miley, kept the joint-custody label in place, denied child support, sent the parents to mediation to work out a schedule, and eventually changed the schedule to an even 50/50 split, saying she was "just trying to find a middle ground." Along the way, Ms. Rivero asked Judge Miley to step off the case (a request called recusal), and when the judge refused, formally moved to disqualify her, claiming the judge was biased based on the parties' physical appearance. The chief judge rejected that motion as meritless, and Judge Miley then ordered Ms. Rivero to pay Mr. Rivero's attorney fees for having to fight a frivolous motion. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court used the case to answer a question Nevada law had never resolved: what exactly is "joint physical custody"? The court adopted Missouri's definition — an arrangement giving each parent "significant, but not necessarily equal" time with the child, structured so the child has "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents." In other words, joint custody does not require an exact 50/50 split, but each parent's time must be significant and meaningful. Applying that framework, the supreme court held the trial court went wrong in two ways. First, it labeled the arrangement joint physical custody without making specific factual findings to back that up. Second, it changed the custody schedule to an equal split without making specific findings that the change was in the child's best interest — the touchstone for all custody decisions. Both rulings were sent back for a do-over under the new definition. On child support, the court held that a parent may be entitled to support under Nevada's child-support statutes regardless of what the divorce decree says, and that a court departing from the statutory amounts must explain why in specific factual findings. Because the trial court did neither, that ruling was also reversed. The supreme court also announced a new math formula — a modified version of its earlier Wright v. Osburn approach — for calculating support when parents share joint custody but split time unequally, accounting for both differences in income and differences in time spent caring for the child. Finally, the court sided with the trial judges on the bias claims. A judge is presumed unbiased, and unhappiness with a judge's rulings is not a legally recognized ground for disqualification; the record contained no evidence of bias. The attorney-fee award stood as well: the court rejected Ms. Rivero's argument that a statute shielding parties from contempt punishment for seeking a change of judge also shields them from paying attorney fees for filing a frivolous disqualification motion.

This case is about which legal standard applies when a parent asks a court to take custody of a child back from a nonparent — here, a grandmother — after a court originally gave the nonparent custody in a contested case. In 1993, the child's mother was killed in a drive-by shooting; the father, Milton Jones, was shot in the head and hospitalized, and the child suffered minor injuries. An investigation indicated a rival gang was likely retaliating against Milton. The maternal grandmother, Mable Hudson, asked the court for custody. The district court found that Milton was an unfit parent and that extraordinary circumstances overcame the "parental preference" — the legal presumption that a fit parent should get custody of a child over a nonparent. The court awarded Mable and Milton joint legal custody, with Mable having primary physical custody and Milton having visitation. About ten years later, Milton asked the court to give him sole legal and physical custody, arguing that he had changed his lifestyle and was now living a productive, law-abiding life with his new wife. The district court interviewed the child, who repeatedly said she wanted to live with her father. The court found that Milton had turned his life around, stated that it was bound to apply the parental preference presumption, and restored sole custody to him. Mable appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that the parental preference doctrine applies only to the initial custody decision between a parent and a nonparent — not to later requests to change custody. Once a court has already found a parent unfit or found extraordinary circumstances and awarded custody to a nonparent, the parent who later wants custody back must satisfy the same two-part test used in custody disputes between two parents: the parent must show that circumstances have materially changed and that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change in custody. The court distinguished earlier cases in which parents voluntarily and temporarily gave custody to relatives (for example, while dealing with imprisonment or drug addiction). In those situations, the court explained, parents keep the benefit of the parental preference when they seek to end the arrangement, because courts do "not want to discourage parents from willingly granting temporary guardianships, while working through problems in their own lives, if that is in the child's best interest." Milton's case was different: he did not voluntarily set up a guardianship, and a court had already found him unfit after a litigated dispute. The court also declined the State Bar Family Law Section's suggestion to adopt a burden-shifting approach that would blend the parental preference into the modification analysis. Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, the Nevada court reasoned that "[h]aving once protected the parent's right to custody, at the risk of sacrificing the child's best interests, we should not then sacrifice the child's need for stability in its care and living arrangements by modifying those arrangements more readily than in a parent-parent case." Because the district court applied the parental preference instead of the two-part modification test, the Supreme Court reversed its order and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Thomas and Svetlana Potter married in 1994, had a child in 1995, and divorced shortly after the child was born. Svetlana was initially awarded primary physical custody, but in 1996 the parents agreed by stipulation to share joint physical and legal custody - meaning both parents shared responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. According to the record, the arrangement worked without custody problems from 1996 to 2003, with both parents actively involved. In 2003, Svetlana received a job offer from a California hospital for a registered nurse position at a higher salary than she was earning in Las Vegas, and she wanted to pursue a nurse anesthesiologist degree from a California school - a program not available in Las Vegas. She filed a petition under NRS 125C.200, Nevada's relocation statute, asking for permission to move to Corona, California with the child. Thomas opposed it, arguing that the Legislature amended the relocation statute in 1999 so that it no longer applied to joint physical custody arrangements, and that Svetlana would first have to win primary physical custody before she could seek relocation. The district court treated the case as an ordinary relocation petition under NRS 125C.200, analyzed the relocation factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz, granted Svetlana's petition, awarded her primary physical custody, and provided for significant contact and visitation between Thomas and the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that NRS 125C.200 does not apply when parents share joint physical custody. The statute's current text speaks only of "custodial" and "noncustodial" parents; an earlier version of the statute (formerly NRS 125A.350) had expressly covered "a parent having joint custody," but the Legislature removed that language. The court found the legislative history confirmed that the statute was intended to apply only to primary physical custody situations. Instead, the court explained the correct procedure: when a parent who shares joint physical custody wants to move out of Nevada with the child, that parent must file a motion for a change of custody under NRS 125.510(2), seeking primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The district court then decides, under the "best interest of the child" standard, whether the child is better off living outside Nevada with the relocating parent as primary physical custodian, or living in Nevada with the non-moving parent as primary physical custodian. The moving parent bears the burden of proving that living out of state with him or her serves the child's best interest. Because the district court applied the wrong statute, did not use the factors from Truax v. Truax, and made no finding that the move was in the child's best interest, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live in California with Svetlana or in Nevada with Thomas.