Nevada family-law case summaries

Vick and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., who was born in Las Vegas in April 2023. About a month after K.G.'s birth, Anjena and the baby traveled to Canada for a funeral. They ended up staying longer than planned, in part because the family's Nevada home had a major water leak and Anjena found temporary work in Canada. Vick remained in regular contact, visited, and the couple even discussed having more children. At some point the marriage broke down. In November 2023, Anjena filed for custody of K.G. in a Canadian court. Vick responded by filing a Hague Convention petition in Canada seeking the child's return to Nevada; the Canadian court denied that petition, finding that K.G.'s "habitual residence" was Canada. Vick lost his appeal of that ruling. In May 2024, Vick filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court for custody and child support. The Nevada district court refused, saying it did not have "home state" jurisdiction over the child and that a lot of litigation had already happened in Canada. Vick appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJEA (Nevada's version is in NRS Chapter 125A), a state is a child's "home state" if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed, and that period includes any "temporary absence" from the state. The Court concluded that K.G.'s time in Canada from May to November 2023 was a temporary absence: Anjena originally went for a funeral intending to return, communicated frequently with Vick, discussed expanding the family, and the prolonged stay was due to a home repair and short-term work. The Hague proceeding itself found that Anjena did not form an intent to remain in Canada until November 2023. So for jurisdictional purposes, K.G. is treated as having lived in Nevada until November 6, 2023 - less than six months before Vick's May 3, 2024 filing. That makes Nevada the home state. However, the Court did not order Nevada to keep the case. It explained that the earlier Hague ruling - finding Canada to be K.G.'s habitual residence - is entitled to "considerable weight" and that international practice generally directs custody decisions to the country of habitual residence. Under NRS 125A.365(1), a Nevada court may decline jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriate. The Court said deferring to Canada "may ultimately be appropriate," but it would be premature to do so now because: (1) the Canadian court has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction; and (2) the parties have not had a chance to brief the issue in Nevada. The Court instructed the district court on remand to try to hold a UCCJEA-style conference with the Canadian court, take briefing, and apply NRS 125A.365 to decide whether Nevada or Canada is the more appropriate forum. On the child support claim, the Court noted that custody and support typically travel together, and instructed the district court to exercise jurisdiction over both pending its decision on whether to defer to Canada. The Court did not consider Vick's separate complaint about attorney fees because the record showed no fee award had actually been entered.

Alexander Posey and Margaret Bond, who were previously married, share a minor son referred to as L.P. Under an earlier custody arrangement they agreed to, the parents shared "joint legal custody" - meaning both parents together make major decisions about the child - except that Bond alone made decisions about the child's religious upbringing. In June 2024, Bond asked the court for permission to take L.P. to a child psychiatrist. According to her motion, in April 2024 the child had made troubling statements such as "I want to die and not go to heaven" and "I don't deserve to be alive," although the next day he said he "wanted to live for a thousand years." Bond said the child's former therapist recommended a child psychiatrist, that a teacher reported the child was struggling to focus in class, and that the child's pediatrician indicated a July 10 psychiatry appointment might be the best option. Posey opposed. He agreed the child should see a mental health provider, but he wanted the child to see a new therapist first and let that therapist decide whether a psychiatrist was needed. He said that if the new therapist recommended a psychiatrist, he would follow that recommendation. Because the parents could not agree, Bond asked the court to "break the tie" - a reference to a Nevada Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Kelley, that lets a court decide a health-care question when parents with joint legal custody disagree. While the motion was pending, the parents temporarily agreed to take L.P. to a therapist, and the child attended five sessions. But the dispute over the psychiatrist continued. The district court then issued an order that went further than resolving the psychiatrist question: it gave Bond sole legal custody over the child's mental health generally, including taking him to a psychiatrist, and it ordered that Posey could not make decisions about the child's mental health treatment or obstruct it. The Court of Appeals split its decision. It upheld the part of the order that let Bond take L.P. to a child psychiatrist and any recommended follow-up appointments, finding the district court acted within its discretion because the evidence - including recommendations from the prior therapist and the pediatrician - supported that this was in the child's best interest, and because Posey did not show why a therapist rather than a psychiatrist was better for the child. But the court found that the broader part of the order - giving Bond sole legal custody over all of the child's mental health decisions - went beyond what Bond had actually asked for. Bond's motion sought only the limited authority to take the child to a psychiatrist and follow-ups; she even acknowledged she never sought to strip Posey of his right to be involved in the child's care. Because the court granted this broader control without warning Posey that a wider change to legal custody was being considered, it deprived him of notice and a chance to be heard, violating his due process rights. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated (canceled) that broader part of the order while keeping the psychiatrist authorization intact.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann married in 2007 and had two children. In December 2021, Kelly filed for divorce in Nevada, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody. By then Kelly had already moved back to California, while Jeremy still lived in Nevada. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree that gave Kelly sole legal and primary physical custody and stated that it was in the children's best interests to relocate to California with Kelly. Over the next year, both parents moved out of Nevada. Jeremy filed a change of address in July 2022 indicating a move from Reno to Montana. Kelly filed a change of address in July 2023 indicating a move from California to Pennsylvania. Shortly after Kelly's move, in August 2023, Jeremy filed a motion asking the court to enforce the divorce decree and/or to hold Kelly in contempt, alleging she had relocated the children to Pennsylvania without first getting permission or his consent. At a February 2024 hearing, Jeremy testified he was then in Arizona but not residing there, describing himself as a "fulltime traveler," said he was homeless, and confirmed his address on file was in Montana. Kelly testified she was in Pennsylvania with the children. After the hearing, Kelly filed a custody-modification petition in Pennsylvania, Jeremy filed one in Nevada, and Kelly asked the Nevada court to give up (relinquish) jurisdiction because everyone had left Nevada and proceedings were underway in Pennsylvania. Jeremy asked the Nevada court to hold a conference with the Pennsylvania court to resolve which state should handle the case. The Nevada district court then ruled. On the contempt issue, it found that although Kelly had relocated without seeking the court's permission, Jeremy had not filed the sworn statement (a fact-specific affidavit or declaration) required to support a contempt motion, so the court lacked jurisdiction to find contempt. On the larger jurisdictional question, the court found that once the parents and children no longer lived in Nevada, Nevada lost its "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" over the custody dispute. After an informal conference with the Pennsylvania court, the two courts agreed Pennsylvania would take jurisdiction, so the Nevada court relinquished the case and denied Jeremy's Nevada custody-modification motion as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that under the law governing which state handles interstate custody cases, Nevada's continuing authority ends when the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in Nevada. Because nobody disputed that all of them had left Nevada — and had been gone for more than a year before Jeremy filed his August 2023 motion — Nevada had lost that continuing authority. The court noted that Jeremy's complaint about the original decree letting the children move to California could not be reviewed now because he never appealed that decree in time. The court also said Jeremy failed to explain how Kelly's allegedly improper move to Pennsylvania would give Nevada authority to keep handling the case, and he did not point to the relevant statute or any supporting authority. Finally, the court found nothing in the record supporting Jeremy's claim that the district court was corrupt.

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

This case involves a custody fight between a father (Justin Blount), his wife (Stephanie Blount), and the children's paternal grandmother (Paula Blount). The children's biological mother, who was a member of the Hualapai Tribe, had originally been awarded temporary custody by the Tribal Court in Arizona. After she passed away, the Tribal Court returned custody to Justin, and the children moved to Nevada with him and Stephanie in 2017. In 2019, a Nevada court entered a decree of adoption declaring Justin and Stephanie the children's legal parents. The grandmother, Paula, then went back to the Tribal Court in late 2019 seeking grandparent visitation. After a hearing that Justin did not attend, the Tribal Court entered an order in January 2020 granting joint custody to Paula and Justin. Paula then sought to "register" that Tribal Court order in Nevada - a procedure under Nevada law that makes an out-of-state custody order enforceable here. Justin's attorney was served with notice of the registration request on April 6, 2020. Under Nevada's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a person who wants to fight registration of an out-of-state custody order has 20 days to request a hearing. Justin filed his challenge on day 24 - four days late. Stephanie filed hers months later. The district court confirmed the Tribal Court order, and Justin and Stephanie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the 20-day deadline in NRS 125A.465 means what it says: if you don't challenge registration within 20 days of receiving notice, the foreign order is automatically registered "as a matter of law," and you lose the ability to raise challenges that you could have raised during that 20-day window. Because Justin and Stephanie missed the deadline, the court did not reach the merits of their objections to the Tribal Court order - including their arguments that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, that another order superseded it, and that proper notice was not given. The court also noted that Stephanie was not legally entitled to notice of the registration request because the Tribal Court had never awarded her custody or visitation. The court expressly noted that the 2019 Nevada adoption decree was not before it on appeal and that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings." The court acknowledged that other Nevada statutes addressing adoption and post-adoption visitation could potentially conflict with the registration statute, but because the parties did not raise those statutes, the court expressed no opinion on the issue.

This is the third time the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the long-running divorce and child support dispute between Robert Scotlund Vaile, a U.S. citizen, and Cisilie Porsboll, a citizen of Norway. The couple married in Utah in 1990, divorced in Nevada in 1998, and their children have lived in Norway. After years of litigation, Vaile fell behind on child support, and the Nevada district court ordered him to pay arrearages and penalties and held him in contempt. The central question on this appeal was which country's child support order controls: a Nevada order or an administrative child support order later entered in Norway. Vaile argued the Norway order controls; Porsboll argued the Nevada order does. The Court sided with Porsboll. Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which Nevada has adopted in NRS Chapter 130, only one support order can be effective at a time. When two orders compete, NRS 130.207 sets the tiebreaker. Because the Norway order did not clearly establish Norway's "continuing and exclusive jurisdiction," and because the parties had not both agreed Norway should have such jurisdiction, the Nevada order remained the controlling one. The Court also addressed whether it could even hear Vaile's challenges to the contempt findings against him. As a general rule in Nevada, a contempt order standing alone is not appealable. Because the order in Docket No. 62797 dealt only with contempt, the Court had no jurisdiction over that appeal. But the order in Docket No. 61415 dealt with child support as well as contempt, and an order resolving child support is appealable as a special order entered after a final judgment. So the Court had authority to consider Vaile's contempt challenges packaged into that order. However, the Court declined to actually decide those challenges because Vaile did not present coherent arguments or cite relevant law to support them. The result: the district court's judgments were affirmed.

Daniel and Kevyn Friedman divorced in Nevada in November 2008. Their stipulated divorce decree — one both sides agreed to — gave them joint legal custody of their three young children and included a promise that Nevada courts would "always" be the place where any future custody fights would be decided, no matter where the family lived. The decree anticipated that Kevyn and the children would move to Idaho and eventually California, and that custody would shift to a joint physical arrangement once Daniel found work in California. That is roughly what happened: Daniel found work in California and moved there, and Kevyn and the children followed. But the parents could not agree on a joint custody schedule. In August 2010, Kevyn went back to the Nevada court and asked for primary physical custody. Daniel objected, arguing that because no one in the family lived in Nevada anymore, the Nevada court had lost its power (its "subject matter jurisdiction") to decide the dispute. He also registered the decree in California and started a competing custody proceeding there. The Nevada district court sided with Kevyn, holding that the parents' written agreement to a Nevada forum trumped the jurisdictional rules and that Daniel was barred ("estopped") from denying Nevada's jurisdiction because he had agreed to it. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and granted Daniel's petition. The court explained that the UCCJEA — a uniform law adopted by Nevada, California, and every state except Massachusetts — is "the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this State." Under that law, a state's ongoing jurisdiction over its own custody orders ends once a court finds that the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in the state. The district court itself found that the entire family had left Nevada for California, so Nevada's jurisdiction ceased. By the time Kevyn filed her 2010 motion, California had become the children's "home state" under the UCCJEA — a point Kevyn conceded. The court held that the parents' agreement to litigate in Nevada could not change this result, because parties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction by agreement. Such a forum-selection agreement is not meaningless: it is one factor a court that actually has jurisdiction (here, California) may weigh in deciding whether to hand the case off to another state as the more appropriate forum. But that decision belongs to California, not Nevada. In the Supreme Court's words, by declaring itself possessed of jurisdiction and suggesting that California could ask Nevada to defer, "the district court got things precisely backward." For the same reason, the court rejected the argument that Daniel was judicially or equitably estopped from contesting jurisdiction — a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA "does not acquire it by estoppel." The Supreme Court directed the district court to stand down from its assertion of jurisdiction except as permitted by NRS 125A.355(2) — the provision requiring it to stay its proceeding and communicate with the California court — and to dismiss the case unless the California court declines jurisdiction in favor of Nevada. Two justices dissented, taking the view that extraordinary writ relief was not warranted at this time.