Nevada family-law case summaries

Hope Backman and Daniel Gelbman share a child, D.G., born in 2013. They originally agreed to joint legal and physical custody. In 2018, after a hearing that showed substantial conflict between the parents, the district court kept joint legal custody but changed the physical-custody schedule. In 2023, Backman (then representing herself) asked to modify custody so she could move with D.G. to San Antonio, Texas, citing financial hardship, reduced income after the COVID-19 pandemic, and family support and job opportunities there. Gelbman opposed the move and filed his own request asking for primary physical custody, arguing circumstances had changed since 2018. Gelbman also asked the court to declare Backman a "vexatious litigant" (a person the court restricts from filing new matters freely), and Backman, through her lawyer, agreed to that designation in exchange for cancelling a scheduled hearing. That agreement required her future filings to go through a screening process before being accepted. The court appointed a custody evaluator, Dr. Herbert F. Coard III, who wrote reports about the parents' mental health and the child's situation. During the evaluation, the court temporarily gave Gelbman primary physical custody and limited Backman's contact with D.G., and by the time of the main hearing, Backman had gone many months without contact with the child. After a multi-day hearing, the court in March 2024 denied Backman's request to relocate and gave Gelbman primary physical custody. It kept "joint legal custody" on paper but gave Gelbman the final say over D.G.'s education and medical and mental-health care, while Backman kept information rights, emergency-care decision-making during her time with D.G., and joint authority over religion and extracurricular activities. Backman received alternating-weekend, holiday, and extended-summer time. The court declined to appoint a "parenting coordinator" (a neutral person who helps parents resolve disputes), reasoning that Backman could not afford to share the cost. The conflict continued. In early 2025, Backman filed an emergency motion claiming Gelbman's fiancée had physically injured D.G. The court screened the motion under the vexatious-litigant procedure, found it had arguable merit, and held a hearing. It then denied the motion, finding the injury was an accidental result of roughhousing rather than abuse. Gelbman asked for his attorney fees, and the court found Backman lacked a reasonable basis to keep pursuing the motion once the evidence was in. The court found more than $9,900 in fees reasonable but reduced the award to $2,000, payable at $100 per month, because of the parties' financial circumstances. Backman appealed both orders. The Court of Appeals rejected all of her arguments and affirmed. On the custody change, the court agreed the district court should have more clearly stated a separate finding that circumstances had "substantially changed" since 2018, but concluded the detailed factual findings already showed such a change, so any error was harmless. The court found the district court was not required to appoint a parenting coordinator, that giving Gelbman final say in certain areas was still a valid form of joint legal custody rather than a hidden grant of sole custody, and that the alleged bias of the evaluator went to how much weight his testimony deserved—not to whether it had to be thrown out. The court also concluded the vexatious-litigant designation was mentioned only in passing and did not drive the custody outcome, and that the attorney fees were properly awarded and reasonably calculated.

Vick and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., who was born in Las Vegas in April 2023. About a month after K.G.'s birth, Anjena and the baby traveled to Canada for a funeral. They ended up staying longer than planned, in part because the family's Nevada home had a major water leak and Anjena found temporary work in Canada. Vick remained in regular contact, visited, and the couple even discussed having more children. At some point the marriage broke down. In November 2023, Anjena filed for custody of K.G. in a Canadian court. Vick responded by filing a Hague Convention petition in Canada seeking the child's return to Nevada; the Canadian court denied that petition, finding that K.G.'s "habitual residence" was Canada. Vick lost his appeal of that ruling. In May 2024, Vick filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court for custody and child support. The Nevada district court refused, saying it did not have "home state" jurisdiction over the child and that a lot of litigation had already happened in Canada. Vick appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJEA (Nevada's version is in NRS Chapter 125A), a state is a child's "home state" if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed, and that period includes any "temporary absence" from the state. The Court concluded that K.G.'s time in Canada from May to November 2023 was a temporary absence: Anjena originally went for a funeral intending to return, communicated frequently with Vick, discussed expanding the family, and the prolonged stay was due to a home repair and short-term work. The Hague proceeding itself found that Anjena did not form an intent to remain in Canada until November 2023. So for jurisdictional purposes, K.G. is treated as having lived in Nevada until November 6, 2023 - less than six months before Vick's May 3, 2024 filing. That makes Nevada the home state. However, the Court did not order Nevada to keep the case. It explained that the earlier Hague ruling - finding Canada to be K.G.'s habitual residence - is entitled to "considerable weight" and that international practice generally directs custody decisions to the country of habitual residence. Under NRS 125A.365(1), a Nevada court may decline jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriate. The Court said deferring to Canada "may ultimately be appropriate," but it would be premature to do so now because: (1) the Canadian court has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction; and (2) the parties have not had a chance to brief the issue in Nevada. The Court instructed the district court on remand to try to hold a UCCJEA-style conference with the Canadian court, take briefing, and apply NRS 125A.365 to decide whether Nevada or Canada is the more appropriate forum. On the child support claim, the Court noted that custody and support typically travel together, and instructed the district court to exercise jurisdiction over both pending its decision on whether to defer to Canada. The Court did not consider Vick's separate complaint about attorney fees because the record showed no fee award had actually been entered.

Alexander Posey and Margaret Bond, who were previously married, share a minor son referred to as L.P. Under an earlier custody arrangement they agreed to, the parents shared "joint legal custody" - meaning both parents together make major decisions about the child - except that Bond alone made decisions about the child's religious upbringing. In June 2024, Bond asked the court for permission to take L.P. to a child psychiatrist. According to her motion, in April 2024 the child had made troubling statements such as "I want to die and not go to heaven" and "I don't deserve to be alive," although the next day he said he "wanted to live for a thousand years." Bond said the child's former therapist recommended a child psychiatrist, that a teacher reported the child was struggling to focus in class, and that the child's pediatrician indicated a July 10 psychiatry appointment might be the best option. Posey opposed. He agreed the child should see a mental health provider, but he wanted the child to see a new therapist first and let that therapist decide whether a psychiatrist was needed. He said that if the new therapist recommended a psychiatrist, he would follow that recommendation. Because the parents could not agree, Bond asked the court to "break the tie" - a reference to a Nevada Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Kelley, that lets a court decide a health-care question when parents with joint legal custody disagree. While the motion was pending, the parents temporarily agreed to take L.P. to a therapist, and the child attended five sessions. But the dispute over the psychiatrist continued. The district court then issued an order that went further than resolving the psychiatrist question: it gave Bond sole legal custody over the child's mental health generally, including taking him to a psychiatrist, and it ordered that Posey could not make decisions about the child's mental health treatment or obstruct it. The Court of Appeals split its decision. It upheld the part of the order that let Bond take L.P. to a child psychiatrist and any recommended follow-up appointments, finding the district court acted within its discretion because the evidence - including recommendations from the prior therapist and the pediatrician - supported that this was in the child's best interest, and because Posey did not show why a therapist rather than a psychiatrist was better for the child. But the court found that the broader part of the order - giving Bond sole legal custody over all of the child's mental health decisions - went beyond what Bond had actually asked for. Bond's motion sought only the limited authority to take the child to a psychiatrist and follow-ups; she even acknowledged she never sought to strip Posey of his right to be involved in the child's care. Because the court granted this broader control without warning Posey that a wider change to legal custody was being considered, it deprived him of notice and a chance to be heard, violating his due process rights. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated (canceled) that broader part of the order while keeping the psychiatrist authorization intact.

Jesusa and Wayne Conte married in 1986 and divorced in 2012. Their divorce decree required Wayne, a military veteran whose only income comes from a retirement pension, supplemental security income, and veterans' disability income, to pay Jesusa $1,000 per month in alimony for 15 years. According to the opinion, Wayne refused to voluntarily pay, so Jesusa repeatedly had to go to court to garnish his pension (garnishment means taking money directly from a source of income under a court order). Over the years, courts entered judgments confirming what Wayne owed, including a December 2014 judgment for $16,307.50 in unpaid alimony (which the parties agree was later paid off) and a February 2021 judgment for $45,680.68. In February 2023, with the help of a pro bono attorney, Wayne asked the district court to eliminate or reduce his alimony. Among other things, he argued that a Nevada statute, NRS 125.165, barred the court from counting his veterans' disability payments as income when figuring out alimony. He also asked for sanctions under NRCP 11 - a court rule allowing penalties for improper filings - based on statements Jesusa made in her written opposition to his motion. Without holding a hearing, the district court granted both requests in January 2024. It refused to count Wayne's $4,456.22 per month in veterans' disability benefits as income, concluded that Jesusa's net income exceeded Wayne's, terminated the alimony, and made the termination retroactive to August 2022. On its own, the court also went back through a decade of the case's history, decided that the December 2014 order had "overcharged" Wayne by $6,698, credited that amount against his arrears, and imposed $5,000 in sanctions against Jesusa and/or her counsel based on its own review of past filings - not on the four arguments Wayne had actually made in his sanctions motion. The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. First, it held that NRS 125.165 only forbids courts from attaching, levying, or seizing veterans' disability benefits to satisfy alimony - it does not stop a court from considering those benefits when calculating how much alimony a veteran can afford to pay. Federal law does not forbid such consideration either. If the district court had counted the disability benefits, Wayne's net monthly income would have been over $300 higher than Jesusa's, rather than negative, so the error could have changed the outcome. Second, the appellate court held that the district court should not have gone back and recalculated arrears from the 2014 order on its own. Wayne never asked for that, Jesusa had no notice or chance to respond, and the 2014 judgment was final and could not be reopened under the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) - the rule that a valid, final judgment ends the dispute it resolved. Third, the court vacated the $5,000 sanctions award because the district court never addressed the arguments Wayne actually raised in his NRCP 11 motion and instead sanctioned Jesusa based on its own investigation of her filings over many years, without giving her the required notice and opportunity to respond. Finally, given these circumstances, the Court of Appeals directed that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand "to ensure fairness in the ongoing proceedings."

This is a family-law-related dispute in which one party, Jesus Arevalo, asked the Nevada Court of Appeals to step in and issue an extraordinary order against a lower court. He was pursuing two things at once. First, he wanted the appellate court to force the trial judge off his case; the trial court had already denied his request to disqualify (remove) that judge. Second, he wanted the appellate court to make the district court follow an earlier order the appellate court had issued on January 17, 2024, in a related case (Docket No. 86607-COA). To get relief, Arevalo used two special tools. A writ of mandamus is a court order that forces a lower court or official to do something the law requires them to do, or to correct a decision made in an arbitrary or unreasonable way. A writ of prohibition is the opposite kind of order - it stops a lower court from acting beyond the limits of its authority. Both are described by the court as "extraordinary remedies," meaning they are not routine and a court has discretion over whether to even consider such a request. The court explained that the person asking for this kind of relief carries the burden of showing it is warranted, and that it is available only when there is "no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law" - in other words, only when the ordinary court process cannot fix the problem. After reviewing the petition and the documents filed with it, the court concluded that Arevalo had not shown that its extraordinary intervention was warranted. It therefore denied the petition. The order is brief and does not analyze the underlying disqualification dispute or the earlier writ in detail; it rests on the conclusion that the demanding standard for extraordinary relief was not met.

Kenneth and Kimberly Einiger divorced in October 2014 through a stipulated divorce decree — a divorce settlement the parties agreed to and the court approved. Under that decree, Kenneth took on significant financial obligations to Kimberly, including alimony of $5,000 per month for life (with a 2.5 percent annual increase), her housing costs, various health-related expenses, a monthly credit card allowance, and continued payments on a two-million-dollar life insurance policy naming Kimberly as the sole beneficiary. Kenneth did not fully comply, including with his alimony obligations. Kimberly asked the court to convert the unpaid amounts into a formal money judgment. While that request was pending, Kimberly learned that Kenneth had listed for sale a condominium he had bought after the divorce, and that a sale was pending. She recorded a lis pendens against that condominium. A lis pendens is a public notice that a piece of real estate is tied up in a lawsuit; it warns potential buyers and lenders about the dispute. Because the notice clouded the condo's title, the pending sale collapsed. Kenneth filed an emergency motion to remove (expunge) the lis pendens. The district court denied the motion but said it would consider lifting the notice if Kenneth could show a real, viable pending sale. Kenneth then asked the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus — a court order directing a lower court to perform an act the law requires — to force the district court to remove the notice. The Court of Appeals first decided it was appropriate to hear the petition. It explained that an order refusing to expunge a lis pendens cannot ordinarily be appealed directly, and that waiting to appeal at the end of the case would not be an adequate remedy because a lis pendens hurts the property's marketability and can cause substantial hardship to the owner. The court also noted that the district court's willingness to reconsider if Kenneth found a buyer did not fix the immediate harm the notice was causing to the property's title. Turning to the merits, the court held that a lis pendens is only proper when a lawsuit affects the title to or possession of real property. It is not a tool to help collect a money judgment. Here, Kimberly's underlying request was purely about money — reducing unpaid alimony and other financial obligations to a judgment — so it did not justify a lis pendens on Kenneth's separately owned condominium. Kimberly also argued that Kenneth's attempts to sell assets amounted to a fraudulent transfer designed to dodge his obligations. The court acknowledged that a fraudulent-transfer claim can be the kind of action that affects title or possession of real property. But Kimberly had not brought such a claim in her original motion, and her later fraud allegations were too vague — she did not state the circumstances of fraud with the particularity the rules require, and did not identify a specific type of fraud. Because her claims were limited to monetary obligations and she had not adequately alleged fraud, the court concluded the district court had committed a manifest abuse of discretion in refusing to expunge the notice.

Paul and Jennifer Martinez divorced in California in 2015 and share a child, L.M. Jennifer received primary physical custody, and the parents shared joint legal custody. Jennifer later moved with the child to Nevada with court permission, and the case eventually transferred to Nevada courts. After further disputes, the Nevada district court increased Paul's visitation time and ordered Jennifer to pay all the costs of transporting L.M. to and from visits with Paul, reasoning that because Jennifer was the parent who moved away from California, she should bear those costs. Jennifer challenged two parts of that ruling: the order making her pay 100% of travel costs, and the decision to expand Paul's visitation beyond what the parties had specifically asked the court to address. On the travel-cost issue, the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Jennifer. Nevada has a detailed administrative regulation, NAC 425.150, that lists factors a court must consider before adjusting child support away from the standard formula. One of those factors is the cost of transporting the child for visitation. The Court held that a district court cannot simply impose all travel costs on one parent as a stand-alone order; instead, those costs must be evaluated as part of the overall child support analysis, looking at the child's needs and both parents' financial circumstances. The district court's reliance on the fact that Jennifer had moved years earlier, by itself, was not a proper basis for assigning her all the costs. On the visitation issue, the Court sided with the district court. Although Jennifer argued she did not have fair notice that the court might broadly change the visitation schedule, the Court found she had put visitation squarely before the court (by asking that Paul's visits be supervised), testified at length on the topic, and had the chance to present evidence. The Court also found enough evidence in the record - including doctor notes and Paul's own testimony - to support letting Paul have a standard out-of-state unsupervised visitation schedule. The Court reversed the travel-cost portion of the order and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the NAC 425.150 framework. It affirmed everything else and declined to sanction Jennifer for bringing the appeal.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann married in 2007 and had two children. In December 2021, Kelly filed for divorce in Nevada, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody. By then Kelly had already moved back to California, while Jeremy still lived in Nevada. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree that gave Kelly sole legal and primary physical custody and stated that it was in the children's best interests to relocate to California with Kelly. Over the next year, both parents moved out of Nevada. Jeremy filed a change of address in July 2022 indicating a move from Reno to Montana. Kelly filed a change of address in July 2023 indicating a move from California to Pennsylvania. Shortly after Kelly's move, in August 2023, Jeremy filed a motion asking the court to enforce the divorce decree and/or to hold Kelly in contempt, alleging she had relocated the children to Pennsylvania without first getting permission or his consent. At a February 2024 hearing, Jeremy testified he was then in Arizona but not residing there, describing himself as a "fulltime traveler," said he was homeless, and confirmed his address on file was in Montana. Kelly testified she was in Pennsylvania with the children. After the hearing, Kelly filed a custody-modification petition in Pennsylvania, Jeremy filed one in Nevada, and Kelly asked the Nevada court to give up (relinquish) jurisdiction because everyone had left Nevada and proceedings were underway in Pennsylvania. Jeremy asked the Nevada court to hold a conference with the Pennsylvania court to resolve which state should handle the case. The Nevada district court then ruled. On the contempt issue, it found that although Kelly had relocated without seeking the court's permission, Jeremy had not filed the sworn statement (a fact-specific affidavit or declaration) required to support a contempt motion, so the court lacked jurisdiction to find contempt. On the larger jurisdictional question, the court found that once the parents and children no longer lived in Nevada, Nevada lost its "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" over the custody dispute. After an informal conference with the Pennsylvania court, the two courts agreed Pennsylvania would take jurisdiction, so the Nevada court relinquished the case and denied Jeremy's Nevada custody-modification motion as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that under the law governing which state handles interstate custody cases, Nevada's continuing authority ends when the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in Nevada. Because nobody disputed that all of them had left Nevada — and had been gone for more than a year before Jeremy filed his August 2023 motion — Nevada had lost that continuing authority. The court noted that Jeremy's complaint about the original decree letting the children move to California could not be reviewed now because he never appealed that decree in time. The court also said Jeremy failed to explain how Kelly's allegedly improper move to Pennsylvania would give Nevada authority to keep handling the case, and he did not point to the relevant statute or any supporting authority. Finally, the court found nothing in the record supporting Jeremy's claim that the district court was corrupt.

This case involves a dispute over the adoption of a child, G.P., among the child's relatives. Before G.P. was born, the birth mother asked the child's step-great-grandmother and great-grandfather, Katherine and Michael, to take temporary guardianship. They agreed and obtained temporary guardianship from a Washoe County court. The child's grandparents, Angela and Randall, then filed their own competing petition for guardianship in the same court. While the guardianship dispute was pending, the birth parents signed written consents to terminate their parental rights and to allow Katherine and Michael to adopt G.P. Katherine and Michael then filed an adoption petition in Clark County, where they live. The Clark County court, unaware that a guardianship case was pending in Washoe County, granted the adoption. When the grandparents Angela and Randall learned of the adoption, they asked the Clark County court to set it aside under a procedural rule (NRCP 60(b)) that lets courts undo judgments in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. They argued the great-grandparents had hidden the existence of the Washoe County guardianship case. The Clark County judge agreed and set aside the adoption. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The central question was whether the grandparents had "standing" — that is, the legal right — to ask the court to undo the adoption at all, given that they were not parties to the adoption case. The Supreme Court explained that only parties to a case, people in close legal privity with parties, or nonparties whose own legal rights are directly affected by the judgment can file an NRCP 60(b) motion to undo it. The Court concluded that being a grandparent, by itself, does not give someone a legal interest in a grandchild's adoption sufficient to challenge it. Nevada's adoption statutes do not list grandparents among those entitled to notice or to object, and grandparents generally do not have a constitutional right to intervene in an adoption absent something extra, like a pre-existing court-ordered visitation right. The Court also held that simply having filed a guardianship petition that had not yet been decided created only a "prospective" interest — a possible future interest — which is not enough to confer standing to attack an adoption decree. Because Angela and Randall were not parties to the adoption, were not in privity with a party, and had no legal interest that was directly affected by the adoption decree, the Supreme Court held the district court should not have entertained their motion. The adoption stands.

This is a divorce case between Irina and Douglas Ansell. Before marrying in 2012, the couple signed a prenuptial agreement—a contract that spells out, in advance, how property will be treated as "separate" (belonging to one spouse) or "community" (shared) and how it will be divided if they divorce. Doug's separate property included several businesses (called the Ansell companies) and real estate. The couple married, had one child, and Irina filed for divorce in October 2015. The case took years. The district court split it into three separate trials: one on child custody, one on whether the prenuptial agreement was valid (the court ruled it was and that it would govern the financial issues), and a third on how to divide the couple's assets. That third trial happened in December 2017, but the court did not actually issue the divorce decree until February 2021—more than three years later. The decree gave Irina some alimony, child support, and an "equalization payment" (a lump sum meant to balance out the division of property) of $972,471. After the decree, both sides filed motions. Doug asked the court to give him credit for personal income tax payments he had made, arguing those taxes were a shared community obligation, and he asked for attorney fees. The court agreed with Doug: it credited half his tax payments against what he owed Irina and awarded him attorney fees, which together wiped out his entire equalization payment obligation—reducing Irina's award to essentially zero. The court denied Irina's own late-filed motion as untimely. Irina then appealed. Before reaching the substance, the court had to deal with a technical problem: Irina's notice of appeal named only the November 2021 post-trial order, not the February 2021 decree. Doug argued this meant she could not challenge the decree at all. The court disagreed. It explained that Nevada strongly prefers deciding appeals on their merits rather than on technicalities, that Irina's intent to appeal the decree could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, and that Doug was not misled or harmed. The court did, however, remind Irina's counsel to name every order they intend to appeal in the future. On the substance, the court reached mixed results. It rejected Irina's argument that the district court was required to accept a particular expert's much higher valuation of Doug's businesses (about $9.9 million in appreciation); the court found she had not properly preserved that argument, had not cited the record to support it, and had not cogently explained why the court was bound to adopt that valuation. But the court agreed with Irina on several other points. It held that the district court wrongly refused to give Irina any share of the increase in value of Doug's real estate. Under the plain language of the prenuptial agreement, Irina automatically got a community property interest in the appreciation of Doug's separate property—whether or not she had put personal time or effort into managing the properties. The court also held that the district court wrongly assigned certain of Doug's loans and debts to the community, because the prenuptial agreement said debts became joint only if both spouses signed a document agreeing to be jointly indebted, and no such document existed. The court further held that the district court failed to consider whether Irina received any benefit from Doug's income after the couple separated—income that, under Nevada law, is presumed to remain community property until the divorce is final. On the tax issue, the court found the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous about whether Irina could be liable for tax debt incurred during the marriage without a signed joint-indebtedness document, and the district court had not made the factual findings about the parties' intent needed to resolve that ambiguity. Because of that, and because it was unclear whether Irina received any of Doug's income during the relevant period, the court reversed the tax ruling and sent it back. Finally, because the court reversed parts of the decree, the attorney fee awards no longer rested on solid ground—it was no longer clear that Doug was the "prevailing party" or that he had beaten his settlement offer—so the court vacated (cancelled) the fee awards. The case returns to the district court to redo the affected portions.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann were married in 2007 and have two minor children. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree - a divorce judgment issued after Jeremy failed to participate in the proceedings. Later in 2022, Jeremy filed many motions asking the court to enforce the divorce decree or to hold Kelly in contempt, mostly over how property was divided and over property he said had been left out of the decree, including a Cummins engine and Kelly's pensions. At a November 2022 hearing, Kelly said Jeremy had a federal pension he had not disclosed before the divorce decree was entered, which Jeremy denied. In November 2022, the court resolved 31 of Jeremy's motions, ordering that several mistakenly omitted items be divided equally. The written order mentioned the Cummins engine but did not decide that issue. The court told both parties to file proof of their retirement accounts within 30 days, warning that any claims would be treated as given up if they did not. Jeremy did not file proof of his pension. In January 2023, the court entered an order awarding each party their own pension as separate property. Jeremy then filed a "motion to set aside default judgment," asking the court to undo the pension order, along with seven more motions about withheld, damaged, or omitted property, again including the Cummins engine. The court denied all but one of the motions, found Jeremy was filing piecemeal motions to harass Kelly, and ordered each party to keep any remaining community property in their possession except items specifically awarded to the other in the decree or a prior order. The court also, on its own, set a hearing to consider whether Jeremy should be declared a vexatious litigant. Jeremy appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled on three of Jeremy's challenges and declined to reach others. First, it upheld the denial of his request to undo the pension order, noting he had been given ample time to obtain his pension information but did not do so, did not ask for more time, and did not, on appeal, challenge that finding. Second, on the Cummins engine, the court explained that a party can ask a court to divide an asset mistakenly left out of a divorce decree within three years of discovering the mistake, but Jeremy did not point to evidence showing the engine was an omitted asset rather than part of a vehicle already awarded to Kelly. Third, the court rejected Jeremy's claim of judicial bias, finding he had not shown the bias came from outside the case or reflected the kind of deep-seated antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. The court also dismissed the appeal to the extent Jeremy tried to appeal from the order merely setting a future vexatious litigant hearing, because no statute or court rule allows an appeal from such an order. Claims about child custody and other matters were not addressed because they related to earlier orders not timely appealed or were not raised below.

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

Erich and Raina Martin divorced in 2015 after Erich had served in the military. As part of their divorce, they signed a settlement agreement, which the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. Critically, it also said that if Erich later chose to take military disability pay instead of retirement pay, he would have to reimburse Raina for any reduction in her share. That contingency mattered because of how federal law treats military pay. A veteran who wants tax-free disability benefits must give up an equal amount of taxable retirement pay - he cannot collect both for the same dollars. When Erich retired in 2019, Raina began receiving her share of his retirement pay directly from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The next year, Erich elected full disability pay, which wiped out all of his retirement pay - and with it, Raina's share. When Raina asked him to make up the difference as the decree required, he refused, arguing that federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The court agreed and ordered Erich to pay her the monthly amounts she would have received absent his waiver. The court also awarded Raina $5000 toward her attorney fees for the appeal, citing the large income disparity between the parties. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that under U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, a state court cannot, on its own authority, treat military disability pay as community property or order a veteran to "indemnify" a former spouse for the dollar amount of retirement pay the veteran chose to waive in favor of disability pay. But the Nevada court drew a distinction: those federal cases addressed what a state court can order on its own; they did not bar enforcement of an indemnification term that the divorcing spouses themselves negotiated and put into their property settlement. Because Erich and Raina expressly agreed to the reimbursement provision, and because the divorce decree had become a final judgment, the doctrine of res judicata (which prevents parties from relitigating matters already resolved in a final judgment) required enforcement. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $5000 in pendente lite (during-litigation) attorney fees under NRS 125.040 without analyzing the Brunzell factors. Those factors evaluate the quality of work already performed, whereas NRS 125.040 fees are designed to fund work yet to be done. A two-justice concurrence by Justice Cadish, joined by Justice Pickering, agreed the decree should be enforced - but only because res judicata bars Erich's collateral attack on the final judgment. The concurrence would have held that the reimbursement provision itself is preempted by federal law, even though the parties had agreed to it, and would overrule Shelton v. Shelton to that extent.

Erich and Raina Martin married in 2002 while Erich served in the military. When they divorced in 2015, they negotiated a marital settlement agreement that the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. It also included a key promise: if Erich later chose to receive military disability pay instead of retirement pay (which would shrink Raina's share, because federal law requires veterans to waive retirement pay dollar-for-dollar to receive disability pay), Erich would reimburse Raina for the reduction. Erich retired in 2019, and Raina began receiving her share. In 2020, Erich elected full disability pay, waiving all retirement pay. The federal pay agency stopped sending Raina checks, and Erich refused to pay her himself, arguing federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The district court agreed with Raina and ordered Erich to pay her monthly installments equal to what she would have received absent the waiver. On appeal, Erich argued that federal law - specifically the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act and two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell - bars state courts from ordering a veteran to make up the difference when disability pay reduces a former spouse's share of retirement pay. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The majority drew a distinction: federal law does prevent state courts from dividing disability pay as community property or unilaterally ordering a veteran to indemnify a former spouse. But here, the parties themselves negotiated and agreed to the reimbursement provision, the district court entered that agreement as part of the divorce decree, and that decree became final. The court held that enforcing a final, agreed-upon decree under Nevada's res judicata (claim preclusion) doctrine and ordinary contract principles is different from a state court imposing such a division on its own. Under Nevada precedent, particularly Shelton v. Shelton, courts may enforce such agreements, and Erich may satisfy the obligation from any source of money he chooses, including his disability pay. The court also affirmed the $5000 attorney-fee award. Under NRS 125.040, a court in a divorce suit may require one party to pay money to enable the other to carry on or defend the suit, after considering each party's financial situation. The district court found Erich's income was about three times Raina's and tailored the award accordingly. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the four-factor Brunzell test for the reasonableness of attorney fees does not apply to such pendente lite awards because Brunzell evaluates work already performed, while NRS 125.040 fees cover prospective work - here, defending the appeal. Two justices concurred in the result. They would have held that the decree's indemnification provision is in fact preempted by federal law under Mansell and Howell, but agreed that under Nevada law, the decree had become a final judgment that Erich could not collaterally attack, so res judicata required affirmance.

This case grows out of a contentious custody dispute between Minh Luong and her ex-husband James Vahey (called "Jim" in the opinion), who divorced in 2021. They were originally given joint legal and joint physical custody of their three children, sharing a week-on/week-off schedule. Since 2019, the parents have repeatedly fought over school placement, therapy, and other child-related matters. After a hearing in November 2021, the district court found that Minh had turned the children against Jim - a situation the court described as parental alienation. In March 2022, the court ordered Jim and the children into an intensive reunification therapy program called Turning Points for Families, based in New York. The court also temporarily gave Jim sole legal and sole physical custody for the New York therapy and for a 90-day period afterward, while planning to revisit the arrangement once therapists recommended it. Minh asked the court to reconsider and to pause these orders. The court refused. She then took her fight to the Court of Appeals by asking for a writ - an extraordinary court order directing a lower court to act (mandamus) or to stop acting beyond its authority (prohibition). Her first such petition was denied because the New York program had not gone forward as planned and a status check was coming up. She filed the current petition after that. The Court of Appeals made several decisions. On the New York therapy orders, it said the issue was moot - meaning there was no longer any effective relief the court could give, because the parties' limited participation in the program had already concluded. On Minh's request to undo the no-contact orders and restore joint custody, the court declined to step in, noting that the district court had now scheduled a full evidentiary hearing to set final custody, and that Minh could appeal after a final decision if she disagreed with it. The court did, however, express concern that custody had been temporarily changed for a long period, effectively cutting one parent off from the children without a full hearing. The one place where Minh prevailed was her request to move the case to a different judge. Reviewing comments the district judge made about the upcoming hearing - including that the judge did not need expert or therapist testimony and had described how the case was going to come out - the Court of Appeals concluded that the judge appeared to have made up her mind before hearing the evidence. To preserve the appearance of fairness, the court ordered that the case be reassigned to a different department. It denied the petition in all other respects.

This case involves a custody fight between a father (Justin Blount), his wife (Stephanie Blount), and the children's paternal grandmother (Paula Blount). The children's biological mother, who was a member of the Hualapai Tribe, had originally been awarded temporary custody by the Tribal Court in Arizona. After she passed away, the Tribal Court returned custody to Justin, and the children moved to Nevada with him and Stephanie in 2017. In 2019, a Nevada court entered a decree of adoption declaring Justin and Stephanie the children's legal parents. The grandmother, Paula, then went back to the Tribal Court in late 2019 seeking grandparent visitation. After a hearing that Justin did not attend, the Tribal Court entered an order in January 2020 granting joint custody to Paula and Justin. Paula then sought to "register" that Tribal Court order in Nevada - a procedure under Nevada law that makes an out-of-state custody order enforceable here. Justin's attorney was served with notice of the registration request on April 6, 2020. Under Nevada's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a person who wants to fight registration of an out-of-state custody order has 20 days to request a hearing. Justin filed his challenge on day 24 - four days late. Stephanie filed hers months later. The district court confirmed the Tribal Court order, and Justin and Stephanie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the 20-day deadline in NRS 125A.465 means what it says: if you don't challenge registration within 20 days of receiving notice, the foreign order is automatically registered "as a matter of law," and you lose the ability to raise challenges that you could have raised during that 20-day window. Because Justin and Stephanie missed the deadline, the court did not reach the merits of their objections to the Tribal Court order - including their arguments that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, that another order superseded it, and that proper notice was not given. The court also noted that Stephanie was not legally entitled to notice of the registration request because the Tribal Court had never awarded her custody or visitation. The court expressly noted that the 2019 Nevada adoption decree was not before it on appeal and that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings." The court acknowledged that other Nevada statutes addressing adoption and post-adoption visitation could potentially conflict with the registration statute, but because the parties did not raise those statutes, the court expressed no opinion on the issue.

Ahed Said Senjab and Mohamad Abulhakim Alhulaibi are Syrian citizens who married in Saudi Arabia and have one child. In 2018, Alhulaibi came to Las Vegas on an F-1 student visa to attend UNLV. In January 2020, Senjab and the child joined him on F-2 dependent visas. Two months later, Senjab filed for divorce in Clark County, also seeking spousal support, child custody, and child support. Alhulaibi moved to dismiss, arguing the Nevada court had no power to hear the case. Nevada's divorce-jurisdiction statute, NRS 125.020, requires that at least one spouse have been a "resident" of Nevada for at least six weeks before filing. Older Nevada Supreme Court decisions had said "residence" in this statute meant the same thing as "domicile" - a true, permanent home where a person intends to stay. Alhulaibi argued that because their student-related visas required them to maintain a foreign residence, they could not legally form the intent to remain in Nevada, so neither spouse could be domiciled here. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Reading the statute's words plainly, the court held that "residence" means just that - residence - not domicile. The statute itself uses the two terms separately, treating them as different. A separate Nevada statute, NRS 10.155, defines legal residence as the place where a person has been physically present during the period for which residence is claimed. Because the district court had already found that Senjab and Alhulaibi were physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before the complaint was filed, the residency requirement was met, and the district court had jurisdiction to hear the divorce. The court sent the case back to the district court to proceed with the divorce action. The court did not decide whether F-2 visa holders can or cannot establish domicile, because that question was no longer necessary to resolve the case. The court also did not address the custody and support issues, since the district court had not ruled on them.

This is the third time the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the long-running divorce and child support dispute between Robert Scotlund Vaile, a U.S. citizen, and Cisilie Porsboll, a citizen of Norway. The couple married in Utah in 1990, divorced in Nevada in 1998, and their children have lived in Norway. After years of litigation, Vaile fell behind on child support, and the Nevada district court ordered him to pay arrearages and penalties and held him in contempt. The central question on this appeal was which country's child support order controls: a Nevada order or an administrative child support order later entered in Norway. Vaile argued the Norway order controls; Porsboll argued the Nevada order does. The Court sided with Porsboll. Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which Nevada has adopted in NRS Chapter 130, only one support order can be effective at a time. When two orders compete, NRS 130.207 sets the tiebreaker. Because the Norway order did not clearly establish Norway's "continuing and exclusive jurisdiction," and because the parties had not both agreed Norway should have such jurisdiction, the Nevada order remained the controlling one. The Court also addressed whether it could even hear Vaile's challenges to the contempt findings against him. As a general rule in Nevada, a contempt order standing alone is not appealable. Because the order in Docket No. 62797 dealt only with contempt, the Court had no jurisdiction over that appeal. But the order in Docket No. 61415 dealt with child support as well as contempt, and an order resolving child support is appealable as a special order entered after a final judgment. So the Court had authority to consider Vaile's contempt challenges packaged into that order. However, the Court declined to actually decide those challenges because Vaile did not present coherent arguments or cite relevant law to support them. The result: the district court's judgments were affirmed.

Craig and Catherine Doan married in 1985 and later divorced. Craig worked as an air traffic controller for the FAA for more than 23 years and earned federal retirement benefits. During the divorce, both spouses filed sworn financial statements indicating they had retirement accounts or pensions, and Catherine's pretrial memorandum specifically identified Craig's federal retirement benefits as property earned during the marriage. After their lawyers withdrew shortly before trial, the couple settled their property division themselves at a conference with the judge. The final divorce decree, entered in August 2003, divided one retirement asset (a voluntary thrift savings plan) but said nothing about Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine asked the court to divide the FAA retirement benefit, arguing it had been left out of the decree and should now be split. The district court first denied her motion, finding the benefit had been fully disclosed during the divorce. But after Catherine asked the court to reconsider, the court changed course: it found the benefit had been left out of the decree by "mutual mistake" and divided it using a federal formula. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRCP 60(b) - a rule of court procedure allowing a party to ask for relief from a final judgment - a motion based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed within six months of the judgment. Catherine waited more than six years, so her motion was too late. The court then asked whether her request could instead be treated as an "independent action" - a separate lawsuit seeking relief in equity, which is not subject to the six-month deadline but requires a much higher showing: it is available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The court held that Catherine could not meet that standard. Nevada law recognizes that when a marital asset was never litigated or decided in the divorce - for example, because neither party mentioned it - it can be divided later through an equitable action. But here, the FAA retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed throughout the divorce proceedings: it appeared in Craig's pay statements, W-2 forms, and financial affidavit, and Catherine's own pretrial memorandum named it as property to be divided. The district court even found that the benefit was considered in setting the length of alimony. The Supreme Court explained that the key question is whether the asset was actually litigated and decided in the divorce, not simply whether it was written into the decree. Because the benefit was before the court in the original divorce, it was not an "omitted asset," and leaving it out of the written decree was not the kind of exceptional circumstance that justifies reopening a final judgment years later. Whether Nevada should have a law allowing courts to divide property merely left out of a decree - as California does - is, the court said, a question for the Legislature.

Daniel and Kevyn Friedman divorced in Nevada in November 2008. Their stipulated divorce decree — one both sides agreed to — gave them joint legal custody of their three young children and included a promise that Nevada courts would "always" be the place where any future custody fights would be decided, no matter where the family lived. The decree anticipated that Kevyn and the children would move to Idaho and eventually California, and that custody would shift to a joint physical arrangement once Daniel found work in California. That is roughly what happened: Daniel found work in California and moved there, and Kevyn and the children followed. But the parents could not agree on a joint custody schedule. In August 2010, Kevyn went back to the Nevada court and asked for primary physical custody. Daniel objected, arguing that because no one in the family lived in Nevada anymore, the Nevada court had lost its power (its "subject matter jurisdiction") to decide the dispute. He also registered the decree in California and started a competing custody proceeding there. The Nevada district court sided with Kevyn, holding that the parents' written agreement to a Nevada forum trumped the jurisdictional rules and that Daniel was barred ("estopped") from denying Nevada's jurisdiction because he had agreed to it. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and granted Daniel's petition. The court explained that the UCCJEA — a uniform law adopted by Nevada, California, and every state except Massachusetts — is "the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this State." Under that law, a state's ongoing jurisdiction over its own custody orders ends once a court finds that the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in the state. The district court itself found that the entire family had left Nevada for California, so Nevada's jurisdiction ceased. By the time Kevyn filed her 2010 motion, California had become the children's "home state" under the UCCJEA — a point Kevyn conceded. The court held that the parents' agreement to litigate in Nevada could not change this result, because parties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction by agreement. Such a forum-selection agreement is not meaningless: it is one factor a court that actually has jurisdiction (here, California) may weigh in deciding whether to hand the case off to another state as the more appropriate forum. But that decision belongs to California, not Nevada. In the Supreme Court's words, by declaring itself possessed of jurisdiction and suggesting that California could ask Nevada to defer, "the district court got things precisely backward." For the same reason, the court rejected the argument that Daniel was judicially or equitably estopped from contesting jurisdiction — a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA "does not acquire it by estoppel." The Supreme Court directed the district court to stand down from its assertion of jurisdiction except as permitted by NRS 125A.355(2) — the provision requiring it to stay its proceeding and communicate with the California court — and to dismiss the case unless the California court declines jurisdiction in favor of Nevada. Two justices dissented, taking the view that extraordinary writ relief was not warranted at this time.

Rod Mason, a U.S. Air Force servicemember, married Martine Cuisenaire while stationed in Belgium. After about eleven years, Mason obtained a divorce in North Carolina, where the couple was living. The North Carolina judgment granted Mason the divorce, gave Cuisenaire primary physical custody of their child, gave Mason summer visitation, and stated that "there are no pending claims for post-separation support, alimony, or equitable distribution." It said nothing about child support. Cuisenaire and the child moved to Belgium; Mason was later stationed at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas. After Mason failed to return the child to Belgium at the end of summer 2000, Cuisenaire won a federal court order under the Hague Convention and its implementing legislation requiring the child's return. In February 2002, she asked the Nevada state district court for post-decree child support, alimony, division of assets, and attorney fees, including back child support running from the date of the North Carolina divorce. The Nevada district court awarded her current child support, more than $10,000 in child support arrears under a Nevada statute (NRS 125B.030), and a portion of Mason's military retirement benefits, while denying alimony and setting a further hearing on other assets. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed three main questions. First, it held that the North Carolina divorce judgment was entitled to "full faith and credit" - the constitutional requirement that courts of one state respect final judgments of another state unless the judgment was obtained by fraud, without due process, or without jurisdiction. Cuisenaire raised various attacks on the North Carolina judgment on appeal, but because she had not raised those attacks in the district court, the Supreme Court declined to consider them. Second, the court held that the Nevada district court should not have used NRS 125B.030 to award back support. That statute lets a custodial parent recover up to four years of past support when the parents are "separated," but the court concluded the term does not cover parents who are already divorced and are seeking support for the period after the divorce became final. Third, the court held that back child support was nonetheless available - just under North Carolina law rather than the Nevada statute. Because no North Carolina case answered whether a divorce judgment silent on child support counts as a child support order, the court looked to a Nebraska Supreme Court decision, Willers ex rel. Powell v. Willers, and agreed that a divorce decree that says nothing about child support does not prevent a court from later ordering support retroactively to the date of the decree. The court sent the case back to the district court to recalculate the arrears using North Carolina child support guidelines. It declined to review the military retirement issue, which the parties agreed was moot after Mason's death, and directed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on survivor benefits, an issue the district court had not yet decided.