Nevada family-law case summaries

Hope Backman and Daniel Gelbman share a child, D.G., born in 2013. They originally agreed to joint legal and physical custody. In 2018, after a hearing that showed substantial conflict between the parents, the district court kept joint legal custody but changed the physical-custody schedule. In 2023, Backman (then representing herself) asked to modify custody so she could move with D.G. to San Antonio, Texas, citing financial hardship, reduced income after the COVID-19 pandemic, and family support and job opportunities there. Gelbman opposed the move and filed his own request asking for primary physical custody, arguing circumstances had changed since 2018. Gelbman also asked the court to declare Backman a "vexatious litigant" (a person the court restricts from filing new matters freely), and Backman, through her lawyer, agreed to that designation in exchange for cancelling a scheduled hearing. That agreement required her future filings to go through a screening process before being accepted. The court appointed a custody evaluator, Dr. Herbert F. Coard III, who wrote reports about the parents' mental health and the child's situation. During the evaluation, the court temporarily gave Gelbman primary physical custody and limited Backman's contact with D.G., and by the time of the main hearing, Backman had gone many months without contact with the child. After a multi-day hearing, the court in March 2024 denied Backman's request to relocate and gave Gelbman primary physical custody. It kept "joint legal custody" on paper but gave Gelbman the final say over D.G.'s education and medical and mental-health care, while Backman kept information rights, emergency-care decision-making during her time with D.G., and joint authority over religion and extracurricular activities. Backman received alternating-weekend, holiday, and extended-summer time. The court declined to appoint a "parenting coordinator" (a neutral person who helps parents resolve disputes), reasoning that Backman could not afford to share the cost. The conflict continued. In early 2025, Backman filed an emergency motion claiming Gelbman's fiancée had physically injured D.G. The court screened the motion under the vexatious-litigant procedure, found it had arguable merit, and held a hearing. It then denied the motion, finding the injury was an accidental result of roughhousing rather than abuse. Gelbman asked for his attorney fees, and the court found Backman lacked a reasonable basis to keep pursuing the motion once the evidence was in. The court found more than $9,900 in fees reasonable but reduced the award to $2,000, payable at $100 per month, because of the parties' financial circumstances. Backman appealed both orders. The Court of Appeals rejected all of her arguments and affirmed. On the custody change, the court agreed the district court should have more clearly stated a separate finding that circumstances had "substantially changed" since 2018, but concluded the detailed factual findings already showed such a change, so any error was harmless. The court found the district court was not required to appoint a parenting coordinator, that giving Gelbman final say in certain areas was still a valid form of joint legal custody rather than a hidden grant of sole custody, and that the alleged bias of the evaluator went to how much weight his testimony deserved—not to whether it had to be thrown out. The court also concluded the vexatious-litigant designation was mentioned only in passing and did not drive the custody outcome, and that the attorney fees were properly awarded and reasonably calculated.

Vick and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., who was born in Las Vegas in April 2023. About a month after K.G.'s birth, Anjena and the baby traveled to Canada for a funeral. They ended up staying longer than planned, in part because the family's Nevada home had a major water leak and Anjena found temporary work in Canada. Vick remained in regular contact, visited, and the couple even discussed having more children. At some point the marriage broke down. In November 2023, Anjena filed for custody of K.G. in a Canadian court. Vick responded by filing a Hague Convention petition in Canada seeking the child's return to Nevada; the Canadian court denied that petition, finding that K.G.'s "habitual residence" was Canada. Vick lost his appeal of that ruling. In May 2024, Vick filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court for custody and child support. The Nevada district court refused, saying it did not have "home state" jurisdiction over the child and that a lot of litigation had already happened in Canada. Vick appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJEA (Nevada's version is in NRS Chapter 125A), a state is a child's "home state" if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed, and that period includes any "temporary absence" from the state. The Court concluded that K.G.'s time in Canada from May to November 2023 was a temporary absence: Anjena originally went for a funeral intending to return, communicated frequently with Vick, discussed expanding the family, and the prolonged stay was due to a home repair and short-term work. The Hague proceeding itself found that Anjena did not form an intent to remain in Canada until November 2023. So for jurisdictional purposes, K.G. is treated as having lived in Nevada until November 6, 2023 - less than six months before Vick's May 3, 2024 filing. That makes Nevada the home state. However, the Court did not order Nevada to keep the case. It explained that the earlier Hague ruling - finding Canada to be K.G.'s habitual residence - is entitled to "considerable weight" and that international practice generally directs custody decisions to the country of habitual residence. Under NRS 125A.365(1), a Nevada court may decline jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriate. The Court said deferring to Canada "may ultimately be appropriate," but it would be premature to do so now because: (1) the Canadian court has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction; and (2) the parties have not had a chance to brief the issue in Nevada. The Court instructed the district court on remand to try to hold a UCCJEA-style conference with the Canadian court, take briefing, and apply NRS 125A.365 to decide whether Nevada or Canada is the more appropriate forum. On the child support claim, the Court noted that custody and support typically travel together, and instructed the district court to exercise jurisdiction over both pending its decision on whether to defer to Canada. The Court did not consider Vick's separate complaint about attorney fees because the record showed no fee award had actually been entered.

Alexander Posey and Margaret Bond, who were previously married, share a minor son referred to as L.P. Under an earlier custody arrangement they agreed to, the parents shared "joint legal custody" - meaning both parents together make major decisions about the child - except that Bond alone made decisions about the child's religious upbringing. In June 2024, Bond asked the court for permission to take L.P. to a child psychiatrist. According to her motion, in April 2024 the child had made troubling statements such as "I want to die and not go to heaven" and "I don't deserve to be alive," although the next day he said he "wanted to live for a thousand years." Bond said the child's former therapist recommended a child psychiatrist, that a teacher reported the child was struggling to focus in class, and that the child's pediatrician indicated a July 10 psychiatry appointment might be the best option. Posey opposed. He agreed the child should see a mental health provider, but he wanted the child to see a new therapist first and let that therapist decide whether a psychiatrist was needed. He said that if the new therapist recommended a psychiatrist, he would follow that recommendation. Because the parents could not agree, Bond asked the court to "break the tie" - a reference to a Nevada Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Kelley, that lets a court decide a health-care question when parents with joint legal custody disagree. While the motion was pending, the parents temporarily agreed to take L.P. to a therapist, and the child attended five sessions. But the dispute over the psychiatrist continued. The district court then issued an order that went further than resolving the psychiatrist question: it gave Bond sole legal custody over the child's mental health generally, including taking him to a psychiatrist, and it ordered that Posey could not make decisions about the child's mental health treatment or obstruct it. The Court of Appeals split its decision. It upheld the part of the order that let Bond take L.P. to a child psychiatrist and any recommended follow-up appointments, finding the district court acted within its discretion because the evidence - including recommendations from the prior therapist and the pediatrician - supported that this was in the child's best interest, and because Posey did not show why a therapist rather than a psychiatrist was better for the child. But the court found that the broader part of the order - giving Bond sole legal custody over all of the child's mental health decisions - went beyond what Bond had actually asked for. Bond's motion sought only the limited authority to take the child to a psychiatrist and follow-ups; she even acknowledged she never sought to strip Posey of his right to be involved in the child's care. Because the court granted this broader control without warning Posey that a wider change to legal custody was being considered, it deprived him of notice and a chance to be heard, violating his due process rights. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated (canceled) that broader part of the order while keeping the psychiatrist authorization intact.

Paul and Jennifer Martinez divorced in California in 2015 and share a child, L.M. Jennifer received primary physical custody, and the parents shared joint legal custody. Jennifer later moved with the child to Nevada with court permission, and the case eventually transferred to Nevada courts. After further disputes, the Nevada district court increased Paul's visitation time and ordered Jennifer to pay all the costs of transporting L.M. to and from visits with Paul, reasoning that because Jennifer was the parent who moved away from California, she should bear those costs. Jennifer challenged two parts of that ruling: the order making her pay 100% of travel costs, and the decision to expand Paul's visitation beyond what the parties had specifically asked the court to address. On the travel-cost issue, the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Jennifer. Nevada has a detailed administrative regulation, NAC 425.150, that lists factors a court must consider before adjusting child support away from the standard formula. One of those factors is the cost of transporting the child for visitation. The Court held that a district court cannot simply impose all travel costs on one parent as a stand-alone order; instead, those costs must be evaluated as part of the overall child support analysis, looking at the child's needs and both parents' financial circumstances. The district court's reliance on the fact that Jennifer had moved years earlier, by itself, was not a proper basis for assigning her all the costs. On the visitation issue, the Court sided with the district court. Although Jennifer argued she did not have fair notice that the court might broadly change the visitation schedule, the Court found she had put visitation squarely before the court (by asking that Paul's visits be supervised), testified at length on the topic, and had the chance to present evidence. The Court also found enough evidence in the record - including doctor notes and Paul's own testimony - to support letting Paul have a standard out-of-state unsupervised visitation schedule. The Court reversed the travel-cost portion of the order and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the NAC 425.150 framework. It affirmed everything else and declined to sanction Jennifer for bringing the appeal.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann married in 2007 and had two children. In December 2021, Kelly filed for divorce in Nevada, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody. By then Kelly had already moved back to California, while Jeremy still lived in Nevada. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree that gave Kelly sole legal and primary physical custody and stated that it was in the children's best interests to relocate to California with Kelly. Over the next year, both parents moved out of Nevada. Jeremy filed a change of address in July 2022 indicating a move from Reno to Montana. Kelly filed a change of address in July 2023 indicating a move from California to Pennsylvania. Shortly after Kelly's move, in August 2023, Jeremy filed a motion asking the court to enforce the divorce decree and/or to hold Kelly in contempt, alleging she had relocated the children to Pennsylvania without first getting permission or his consent. At a February 2024 hearing, Jeremy testified he was then in Arizona but not residing there, describing himself as a "fulltime traveler," said he was homeless, and confirmed his address on file was in Montana. Kelly testified she was in Pennsylvania with the children. After the hearing, Kelly filed a custody-modification petition in Pennsylvania, Jeremy filed one in Nevada, and Kelly asked the Nevada court to give up (relinquish) jurisdiction because everyone had left Nevada and proceedings were underway in Pennsylvania. Jeremy asked the Nevada court to hold a conference with the Pennsylvania court to resolve which state should handle the case. The Nevada district court then ruled. On the contempt issue, it found that although Kelly had relocated without seeking the court's permission, Jeremy had not filed the sworn statement (a fact-specific affidavit or declaration) required to support a contempt motion, so the court lacked jurisdiction to find contempt. On the larger jurisdictional question, the court found that once the parents and children no longer lived in Nevada, Nevada lost its "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" over the custody dispute. After an informal conference with the Pennsylvania court, the two courts agreed Pennsylvania would take jurisdiction, so the Nevada court relinquished the case and denied Jeremy's Nevada custody-modification motion as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that under the law governing which state handles interstate custody cases, Nevada's continuing authority ends when the child, the parents, and anyone acting as a parent no longer live in Nevada. Because nobody disputed that all of them had left Nevada — and had been gone for more than a year before Jeremy filed his August 2023 motion — Nevada had lost that continuing authority. The court noted that Jeremy's complaint about the original decree letting the children move to California could not be reviewed now because he never appealed that decree in time. The court also said Jeremy failed to explain how Kelly's allegedly improper move to Pennsylvania would give Nevada authority to keep handling the case, and he did not point to the relevant statute or any supporting authority. Finally, the court found nothing in the record supporting Jeremy's claim that the district court was corrupt.

Jeremy and Kelly Herrmann were married in 2007 and have two minor children. In April 2022, the district court entered a default divorce decree - a divorce judgment issued after Jeremy failed to participate in the proceedings. Later in 2022, Jeremy filed many motions asking the court to enforce the divorce decree or to hold Kelly in contempt, mostly over how property was divided and over property he said had been left out of the decree, including a Cummins engine and Kelly's pensions. At a November 2022 hearing, Kelly said Jeremy had a federal pension he had not disclosed before the divorce decree was entered, which Jeremy denied. In November 2022, the court resolved 31 of Jeremy's motions, ordering that several mistakenly omitted items be divided equally. The written order mentioned the Cummins engine but did not decide that issue. The court told both parties to file proof of their retirement accounts within 30 days, warning that any claims would be treated as given up if they did not. Jeremy did not file proof of his pension. In January 2023, the court entered an order awarding each party their own pension as separate property. Jeremy then filed a "motion to set aside default judgment," asking the court to undo the pension order, along with seven more motions about withheld, damaged, or omitted property, again including the Cummins engine. The court denied all but one of the motions, found Jeremy was filing piecemeal motions to harass Kelly, and ordered each party to keep any remaining community property in their possession except items specifically awarded to the other in the decree or a prior order. The court also, on its own, set a hearing to consider whether Jeremy should be declared a vexatious litigant. Jeremy appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled on three of Jeremy's challenges and declined to reach others. First, it upheld the denial of his request to undo the pension order, noting he had been given ample time to obtain his pension information but did not do so, did not ask for more time, and did not, on appeal, challenge that finding. Second, on the Cummins engine, the court explained that a party can ask a court to divide an asset mistakenly left out of a divorce decree within three years of discovering the mistake, but Jeremy did not point to evidence showing the engine was an omitted asset rather than part of a vehicle already awarded to Kelly. Third, the court rejected Jeremy's claim of judicial bias, finding he had not shown the bias came from outside the case or reflected the kind of deep-seated antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. The court also dismissed the appeal to the extent Jeremy tried to appeal from the order merely setting a future vexatious litigant hearing, because no statute or court rule allows an appeal from such an order. Claims about child custody and other matters were not addressed because they related to earlier orders not timely appealed or were not raised below.

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

This case grows out of a contentious custody dispute between Minh Luong and her ex-husband James Vahey (called "Jim" in the opinion), who divorced in 2021. They were originally given joint legal and joint physical custody of their three children, sharing a week-on/week-off schedule. Since 2019, the parents have repeatedly fought over school placement, therapy, and other child-related matters. After a hearing in November 2021, the district court found that Minh had turned the children against Jim - a situation the court described as parental alienation. In March 2022, the court ordered Jim and the children into an intensive reunification therapy program called Turning Points for Families, based in New York. The court also temporarily gave Jim sole legal and sole physical custody for the New York therapy and for a 90-day period afterward, while planning to revisit the arrangement once therapists recommended it. Minh asked the court to reconsider and to pause these orders. The court refused. She then took her fight to the Court of Appeals by asking for a writ - an extraordinary court order directing a lower court to act (mandamus) or to stop acting beyond its authority (prohibition). Her first such petition was denied because the New York program had not gone forward as planned and a status check was coming up. She filed the current petition after that. The Court of Appeals made several decisions. On the New York therapy orders, it said the issue was moot - meaning there was no longer any effective relief the court could give, because the parties' limited participation in the program had already concluded. On Minh's request to undo the no-contact orders and restore joint custody, the court declined to step in, noting that the district court had now scheduled a full evidentiary hearing to set final custody, and that Minh could appeal after a final decision if she disagreed with it. The court did, however, express concern that custody had been temporarily changed for a long period, effectively cutting one parent off from the children without a full hearing. The one place where Minh prevailed was her request to move the case to a different judge. Reviewing comments the district judge made about the upcoming hearing - including that the judge did not need expert or therapist testimony and had described how the case was going to come out - the Court of Appeals concluded that the judge appeared to have made up her mind before hearing the evidence. To preserve the appearance of fairness, the court ordered that the case be reassigned to a different department. It denied the petition in all other respects.

This case involves a custody fight between a father (Justin Blount), his wife (Stephanie Blount), and the children's paternal grandmother (Paula Blount). The children's biological mother, who was a member of the Hualapai Tribe, had originally been awarded temporary custody by the Tribal Court in Arizona. After she passed away, the Tribal Court returned custody to Justin, and the children moved to Nevada with him and Stephanie in 2017. In 2019, a Nevada court entered a decree of adoption declaring Justin and Stephanie the children's legal parents. The grandmother, Paula, then went back to the Tribal Court in late 2019 seeking grandparent visitation. After a hearing that Justin did not attend, the Tribal Court entered an order in January 2020 granting joint custody to Paula and Justin. Paula then sought to "register" that Tribal Court order in Nevada - a procedure under Nevada law that makes an out-of-state custody order enforceable here. Justin's attorney was served with notice of the registration request on April 6, 2020. Under Nevada's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a person who wants to fight registration of an out-of-state custody order has 20 days to request a hearing. Justin filed his challenge on day 24 - four days late. Stephanie filed hers months later. The district court confirmed the Tribal Court order, and Justin and Stephanie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the 20-day deadline in NRS 125A.465 means what it says: if you don't challenge registration within 20 days of receiving notice, the foreign order is automatically registered "as a matter of law," and you lose the ability to raise challenges that you could have raised during that 20-day window. Because Justin and Stephanie missed the deadline, the court did not reach the merits of their objections to the Tribal Court order - including their arguments that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, that another order superseded it, and that proper notice was not given. The court also noted that Stephanie was not legally entitled to notice of the registration request because the Tribal Court had never awarded her custody or visitation. The court expressly noted that the 2019 Nevada adoption decree was not before it on appeal and that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings." The court acknowledged that other Nevada statutes addressing adoption and post-adoption visitation could potentially conflict with the registration statute, but because the parties did not raise those statutes, the court expressed no opinion on the issue.

Ahed Said Senjab and Mohamad Abulhakim Alhulaibi are Syrian citizens who married in Saudi Arabia and have one child. In 2018, Alhulaibi came to Las Vegas on an F-1 student visa to attend UNLV. In January 2020, Senjab and the child joined him on F-2 dependent visas. Two months later, Senjab filed for divorce in Clark County, also seeking spousal support, child custody, and child support. Alhulaibi moved to dismiss, arguing the Nevada court had no power to hear the case. Nevada's divorce-jurisdiction statute, NRS 125.020, requires that at least one spouse have been a "resident" of Nevada for at least six weeks before filing. Older Nevada Supreme Court decisions had said "residence" in this statute meant the same thing as "domicile" - a true, permanent home where a person intends to stay. Alhulaibi argued that because their student-related visas required them to maintain a foreign residence, they could not legally form the intent to remain in Nevada, so neither spouse could be domiciled here. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Reading the statute's words plainly, the court held that "residence" means just that - residence - not domicile. The statute itself uses the two terms separately, treating them as different. A separate Nevada statute, NRS 10.155, defines legal residence as the place where a person has been physically present during the period for which residence is claimed. Because the district court had already found that Senjab and Alhulaibi were physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before the complaint was filed, the residency requirement was met, and the district court had jurisdiction to hear the divorce. The court sent the case back to the district court to proceed with the divorce action. The court did not decide whether F-2 visa holders can or cannot establish domicile, because that question was no longer necessary to resolve the case. The court also did not address the custody and support issues, since the district court had not ruled on them.