Nevada family-law case summaries

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.

This case arises from a family-court dispute over a property settlement agreement—the kind of contract that divides property between spouses. One party, Dipesh S. Banker, asked the Court of Appeals to step in before the family court finished its work. He did this by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. A writ of mandamus is a court order forcing a lower court to perform a duty the law requires; a writ of prohibition is a court order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its authority. Dipesh's argument was that the family court did not have jurisdiction—that is, legal authority—to enforce the property settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals explained that these writs are "extraordinary remedies," meaning they are granted only in unusual situations and only when a person has no other adequate way to fix the problem. The person asking for the writ carries the burden of showing that this kind of extraordinary intervention is justified. The court declined to intervene for two reasons. First, Dipesh did not include a copy of the property settlement agreement—the very document at the center of his petition—in the materials he submitted. Second, the court found that the family court had not yet made a final decision about whether it had jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Instead, the family court had only scheduled an evidentiary hearing, saying it wanted to hear evidence about several things, including what the parties intended when they made the agreement, why they chose not to have the agreement merge into the divorce decree, and what they intended about enforcing the agreement's provisions. Because there was no final ruling to review and because the key document was missing, the court concluded that Dipesh had not shown that writ relief was warranted, and it denied the petition.