Nevada family-law case summaries

Robert and Joanna Ronchi began dating in 2004. The day before their 2008 wedding in Pennsylvania, they signed a premarital agreement - a contract made before marriage that decides how property will be divided if the couple later divorces. The agreement said it would be governed by Pennsylvania law, listed each person's separate property (including Robert's interest in his business, Element 115, and his retirement accounts), and included provisions in which each spouse gave up any claim to property held in the other spouse's sole name. Joanna, a Polish citizen, was 19 weeks pregnant when she signed. The couple married the next day and moved to Nevada in 2010. In 2015, Robert bought a house, titled only in his name, that became the family home. Joanna filed for divorce in 2022. After hearings, the district court ruled the premarital agreement was valid. It then divided the couple's property, awarding Joanna half of the portion of Robert's Fidelity IRA that came from his wages during the marriage and half of the equity in the house, while confirming Robert's business interest as his separate property. The court later ordered Robert to pay Joanna $30,304 in attorney fees. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals resolved the appeal in four main parts. First, it upheld the ruling that the premarital agreement was valid. Because the agreement chose Pennsylvania law, the court applied Pennsylvania contract principles, under which signed agreements are presumed valid and a person challenging one must prove it invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The district court had found that Joanna generally understood the agreement's purpose, could read and write English at the time, and that both parties handwrote on the agreement, "I choose to waive representation by an attorney." The district court was not persuaded that her pregnancy and immigration status amounted to duress, and the Court of Appeals concluded those findings were supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals reversed the award to Joanna of half of the marriage-era contributions to Robert's Fidelity IRA. Although the agreement never specifically said Robert's wages would be his separate property, its plain language released each spouse's rights to "[a]ny and all rights to any property of the other party titled in the other parties' sole name, whether before or after the marriage." Because the IRA was solely in Robert's name, the court held it remained his separate property even though marital wages went into it. For the same reason, the court reversed the ruling giving Robert a community interest in Joanna's own solely titled Fidelity IRA. Third, on the house, the Court of Appeals held the district court applied the wrong legal framework. The district court had used Nevada's "gift presumption" caselaw - the idea that when a spouse signs over title, she is presumed to have gifted her interest - and found Joanna rebutted that presumption with evidence that the house was titled in Robert's name only because of her credit problems, was paid for from a joint account, and that Robert admitted in an audio recording he had promised to put her name on the house and still "owed" it to her. The appellate court said that under the premarital agreement's plain language, property titled in one spouse's name stayed separate, so the gift-presumption analysis was error. But it concluded the substance of Joanna's argument and the district court's findings pointed to a different doctrine: "constructive fraud" - a breach of the special duty of trust spouses owe each other, which can allow a court to impose a "constructive trust" recognizing that an asset is actually co-owned despite how it is titled, even where a premarital agreement exists. The court vacated the ruling on the house and sent the issue back for the district court to decide whether Joanna established constructive fraud giving rise to a constructive trust. Fourth, the court rejected Joanna's argument that she was entitled to a share of the increase in value of Robert's business, Element 115. The Pennsylvania statute she relied on excludes from marital property anything the parties excluded by valid agreement, and the business was listed as Robert's separate property in the agreement's financial disclosure. Finally, because part of the property division was reversed, the court vacated the $30,304 attorney fee award. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the order.

Amber Johnson-Parker and Clevis Parker married in 2019 and had one child that same year. In 2021, Clevis filed for divorce and asked for joint legal and physical custody. Amber wanted joint legal custody but asked to be the child's primary physical custodian. The parties settled many issues, and the divorce decree adopted their agreement. As part of that agreement, they said they would work toward joint physical custody but temporarily gave Clevis primary physical custody because Amber had a pending criminal matter. The agreement listed conditions Amber would need to meet - such as no new criminal charges, no new child-protective-services matters with substantiated allegations, and no new safety concerns for the child - before joint physical custody could be awarded. They also agreed to joint legal custody. After several incidents involving Amber and the child's school, the court temporarily gave Clevis sole legal custody. Amber later asked the court to give her joint physical custody. Clevis opposed that and asked to move to Texas with the child. Amber underwent a psychological assessment, the parties took part in a custody evaluation, and Clevis asked for attorney fees. At trial, the parties presented evidence about the child's well-being and Amber's mental health. Witnesses testified that Amber had been arrested for driving under the influence and had made abuse allegations against Clevis that were not substantiated. Clevis explained why he believed moving to Texas would benefit the child. The district court denied Amber's request, allowed Clevis to relocate, and set a final custody arrangement. It found that Amber's abuse allegations were false and had caused the child mental trauma, that the custody evaluator found Amber exhibited "paranoid and delusional thinking," and that Amber's actions posed a continuous risk of stress and emotional harm to the child. In contrast, it found Clevis provided a stable and supportive environment. The court found relocation was in the child's best interest and gave Clevis primary physical custody, while giving Amber parenting time. It also gave Clevis primary legal custody, finding Amber interfered with the child's schooling and did not support the child's therapy. Finally, the court found Amber's conduct significantly increased litigation costs and later awarded Clevis $45,000 in attorney fees (out of the more than $117,000 he requested), and directed Amber to pay portions of the assessment and evaluation costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the custody, relocation, and fee decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning the appeals court does not decide the case fresh, but only asks whether the trial court's decision was supported by adequate evidence and was reasonable. The court explained that in child custody matters, the only question is what serves the child's best interest. It concluded that although the district court did not specifically cite the statute listing the best-interest factors, the court made extensive findings covering most of those factors and tied them to its decision. The appeals court also noted it is not allowed to re-weigh evidence or second-guess the trial court's credibility findings. The court also addressed Amber's claim that the district court judge was biased. It explained that judges are presumed unbiased and that a party challenging a judge must show real factual grounds for disqualification. Because rulings a judge makes during a case generally do not show improper bias, and Amber had not shown bias from an outside source or "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism," the court found no abuse of discretion in the chief judge's refusal to disqualify the trial judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed every part of the district court's decision. It also denied Amber's emergency motion to stay the current parenting-time schedule.

Todd and Tracy Elwardt married in 2013. In October 2023, Tracy filed for divorce, asking the court to divide their property and to award her alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other). After a trial, the district court divided the couple's property and gave Tracy support. Among other things, the court awarded Tracy four dogs valued at $2,000, half the equity in the marital home, and half of roughly $400,000 in sales commissions Todd earned during the marriage but had not yet been paid. The court also ordered Todd to pay Tracy $4,000 per month for four years (periodic alimony) and $24,000 over two years (rehabilitative alimony, meant to help her get training or education). Todd appealed and raised several arguments. First, he said two of the dogs, Fiona and Enzo, were gifts to him and therefore his own separate property, or that the court valued the dogs incorrectly. The appeals court explained that property acquired during a marriage is presumed to belong to both spouses (community property) unless someone proves otherwise with strong evidence. Because the dogs were acquired during the marriage, and because Tracy had been caring for them while Todd had limited contact, the court concluded Todd had not proven they were his separate property. On the value, only one dog's cost ($2,000) was proven at trial, so the court accepted that figure. But the appeals court noted the decree did not make clear whether Todd received other property to make up for his share of the dogs' value, and directed the lower court to fix that on remand. Todd's main challenge concerned the connection between the commissions and the alimony. Todd is paid entirely on commission, and those commissions are not paid to him until a client pays the underlying sales contract - which can take up to three years. That means in the years right after the divorce, much of Todd's monthly income could come from commissions he earned during the marriage, half of which the court had already awarded to Tracy. The appeals court agreed the commissions counted as community property, but found the district court did not adequately account for the fact that handing Tracy her share of those commissions would reduce Todd's income while boosting Tracy's finances. Because the court did not make specific findings on how this affected Todd's ability to pay and Tracy's need, the appeals court vacated (canceled) the $4,000-per-month periodic alimony award and sent it back for the district court to reconsider with proper findings. The appeals court rejected Todd's other arguments. On the marital home, Todd argued the money should be traced back to homes he owned before or during the marriage as his separate property. The court explained that when separate property is put into a jointly owned home during marriage, it is presumed to be a gift to the community unless proven otherwise, and Todd had not overcome that presumption - the home was in joint tenancy, mortgage payments came from shared funds, and Todd himself acknowledged Tracy had "earned" being on the title. On rehabilitative alimony, the court found Tracy's testimony about the cost and time to finish her master's degree supported the $24,000 award. Finally, Todd asked that a different judge handle the case on remand, arguing the judge formed negative opinions of him (the decree mentioned Todd spoiling Tracy's medication, writing derogatory notes on support checks, and reducing the functionality of Tracy's Tesla). The court presumed judges are unbiased and found the judge's comments came from what the judge learned during the case, not from an outside source, and did not show deep-seated antagonism. Importantly, the court said the district court did not actually rely on that conduct in deciding alimony or property. So the case did not need to be reassigned.

Vick and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., who was born in Las Vegas in April 2023. About a month after K.G.'s birth, Anjena and the baby traveled to Canada for a funeral. They ended up staying longer than planned, in part because the family's Nevada home had a major water leak and Anjena found temporary work in Canada. Vick remained in regular contact, visited, and the couple even discussed having more children. At some point the marriage broke down. In November 2023, Anjena filed for custody of K.G. in a Canadian court. Vick responded by filing a Hague Convention petition in Canada seeking the child's return to Nevada; the Canadian court denied that petition, finding that K.G.'s "habitual residence" was Canada. Vick lost his appeal of that ruling. In May 2024, Vick filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court for custody and child support. The Nevada district court refused, saying it did not have "home state" jurisdiction over the child and that a lot of litigation had already happened in Canada. Vick appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJEA (Nevada's version is in NRS Chapter 125A), a state is a child's "home state" if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed, and that period includes any "temporary absence" from the state. The Court concluded that K.G.'s time in Canada from May to November 2023 was a temporary absence: Anjena originally went for a funeral intending to return, communicated frequently with Vick, discussed expanding the family, and the prolonged stay was due to a home repair and short-term work. The Hague proceeding itself found that Anjena did not form an intent to remain in Canada until November 2023. So for jurisdictional purposes, K.G. is treated as having lived in Nevada until November 6, 2023 - less than six months before Vick's May 3, 2024 filing. That makes Nevada the home state. However, the Court did not order Nevada to keep the case. It explained that the earlier Hague ruling - finding Canada to be K.G.'s habitual residence - is entitled to "considerable weight" and that international practice generally directs custody decisions to the country of habitual residence. Under NRS 125A.365(1), a Nevada court may decline jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriate. The Court said deferring to Canada "may ultimately be appropriate," but it would be premature to do so now because: (1) the Canadian court has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction; and (2) the parties have not had a chance to brief the issue in Nevada. The Court instructed the district court on remand to try to hold a UCCJEA-style conference with the Canadian court, take briefing, and apply NRS 125A.365 to decide whether Nevada or Canada is the more appropriate forum. On the child support claim, the Court noted that custody and support typically travel together, and instructed the district court to exercise jurisdiction over both pending its decision on whether to defer to Canada. The Court did not consider Vick's separate complaint about attorney fees because the record showed no fee award had actually been entered.

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.

Jon and Melissa Pearson divorced in 2019 and shared their twin sons on a "one week on/one week off" schedule. Both boys have medical needs: one has epilepsy and other conditions, and the other sees a heart specialist for a congenital heart defect. In January 2024, Jon received a job offer from Tesla that required him to move to Austin, Texas. He believed the move offered a significant pay increase, free health insurance, and, based on his research, better schools and medical care for the boys. He asked Melissa to agree to a new custody arrangement so he could relocate with the children; she refused. Jon then filed a motion in court asking to be given primary physical custody so he could move the boys to Texas. When his emergency request was denied, Jon moved to Texas with his current wife and their young son, while the twins stayed in Las Vegas with Melissa pending a full hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Jon's relocation request, awarded Melissa primary physical custody, set a parenting-time schedule for Jon, and ordered Jon to pay monthly child support. The court largely adopted the proposed order that Melissa's attorneys had drafted. Jon appealed. The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's decision for what the law calls an "abuse of discretion" - meaning a decision unsupported by the evidence, clearly wrong, or made by disregarding the controlling legal rules. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court made several connected errors. First, the Court of Appeals held that the district court was wrong to find that Jon's move to Texas was not a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting the children. Because the parents could no longer keep the every-other-week schedule once Jon lived in Texas, the children's lives would be affected no matter what the court decided. Second, the Court of Appeals found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when weighing the move. The court had faulted Jon for not proving that the children's schools and doctors in Las Vegas were "substandard" or inadequate. But under Nevada law, Jon did not have to prove that Las Vegas was bad; he only had to show that the children's needs might be *better* served, or that they would gain an *actual advantage*, by moving to Texas. The district court never made findings on that question. Third, the Court of Appeals held that several of the district court's findings improperly punished Jon for deciding to relocate and for the arguments his lawyers made during the case. Under Nevada law, a court may not use a change of custody as a "sword" to punish a parent's conduct or litigation tactics. Fourth, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court focused too heavily on keeping things exactly as they were for Melissa, rather than seriously considering whether an alternative parenting-time schedule - Jon had proposed one, plus travel contributions and iPads for communication - could preserve Melissa's relationship with the boys. The court also found the district court's suggestion that Jon might try to "replace" Melissa with his new family was speculative and contradicted by the court's own other findings that both parents had cooperated. Because it was unclear whether the district court would have reached the same result without these errors, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals noted that the district court may hold a new hearing to consider the family's current circumstances and the children's wishes, since more than a year had passed and the children would soon turn 13.

This case arises from a family-court dispute over a property settlement agreement—the kind of contract that divides property between spouses. One party, Dipesh S. Banker, asked the Court of Appeals to step in before the family court finished its work. He did this by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. A writ of mandamus is a court order forcing a lower court to perform a duty the law requires; a writ of prohibition is a court order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its authority. Dipesh's argument was that the family court did not have jurisdiction—that is, legal authority—to enforce the property settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals explained that these writs are "extraordinary remedies," meaning they are granted only in unusual situations and only when a person has no other adequate way to fix the problem. The person asking for the writ carries the burden of showing that this kind of extraordinary intervention is justified. The court declined to intervene for two reasons. First, Dipesh did not include a copy of the property settlement agreement—the very document at the center of his petition—in the materials he submitted. Second, the court found that the family court had not yet made a final decision about whether it had jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Instead, the family court had only scheduled an evidentiary hearing, saying it wanted to hear evidence about several things, including what the parties intended when they made the agreement, why they chose not to have the agreement merge into the divorce decree, and what they intended about enforcing the agreement's provisions. Because there was no final ruling to review and because the key document was missing, the court concluded that Dipesh had not shown that writ relief was warranted, and it denied the petition.

James and Pamela Gabroy were married for eighteen years. Pamela filed for divorce in September 2019, citing incompatibility. James was an internist (a physician) who had owned and operated his own medical practice for years. He had sold that practice for $800,000 in 2016 but kept working there as an independent contractor for three more years. When his contract was not renewed, he set about reopening the office under his own name. On Pamela's recommendation, James hired a woman named Queenie Manuel around June 2019 to help him with the licensing and credentialing process. Manuel presented herself as an experienced medical credentialist with insurance-industry connections. James agreed to pay her $5,000 a month. The marriage was breaking down at the same time. Over Labor Day weekend in 2019, Pamela said James displayed a revolver during an argument. She obtained a temporary protection order and filed for divorce shortly afterward. She also asked the court for a "joint preliminary injunction" (JPI) — an order that would have frozen both spouses from moving money out of shared accounts while the divorce was pending — but the record shows the court never actually issued one. At an October 2019 hearing, the court ordered the couple to figure out a firm cost to reopen James's practice and to release community funds for that purpose. Four days after that hearing, James wrote Manuel a check for $800,000. He said the money was supposed to go toward licensing, medical equipment, and even a dental practice for low-income patients. But Manuel vanished with the money. James reported her to police, and she was never found. Notably, James did not report this $800,000 loss on his federal tax return, even though he reported other, smaller losses. James later sold his practice to another doctor for $180,000 — far less than the $800,000 he had received for it in 2016 and the same $800,000 he had just handed Manuel. In February 2020, James fell down a flight of stairs, fractured his skull, and injured his back. The court suspended his temporary spousal support because of his health, and the parties later stipulated (formally agreed) to that suspension. James spent eighteen months recovering in an assisted living facility. In October 2022, Pamela amended her divorce complaint to allege that James had committed "marital waste" — that is, wrongly wasting or destroying property belonging to the marriage. James denied it and accused Pamela of the same. After a trial, the district court found that James's $800,000 payment to Manuel was indeed marital waste and ordered him to reimburse Pamela for the community's share of that money. The court also awarded Pamela $1,150 per month in alimony for five years (ending sooner if she died or remarried). On appeal, James argued three things. First, he said the $800,000 payment simply followed the court's own order to release community funds to reopen his practice, so it could not be waste. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The trial court had found James's testimony not credible — questioning why he would pay a $5,000-per-month employee an $800,000 lump sum, and pointing out that he first testified he had written off the loss on his taxes but then admitted on cross-examination that he had not. Because appellate courts do not re-weigh a trial judge's assessment of who is believable, and because there was enough evidence to support the finding, the appeals court upheld the waste finding. James also argued the trial court wrongly relied on a violation of a JPI, since no JPI ever existed. Pamela conceded no JPI was issued but argued the mistake did no harm. The appeals court agreed it was "harmless error" — meaning the mistake would not have changed the result — because the waste finding rested on other, sufficient evidence, and because James made this unusually large payment right after Pamela filed for divorce, when the marriage was already broken. Second, James argued the court did not properly weigh the legally required factors before awarding alimony. The appeals court found the trial court had adequately considered the required factors, made findings on most of them, and treated as neutral or inapplicable the factors on which neither party presented evidence. Even while noting that "many courts would not have ordered alimony" given James's age, health, and reduced finances, the appeals court held the award was supported by the evidence and complied with the statute. Third, James argued the court wrongly excluded evidence about Pamela's alleged offshore bank accounts. The appeals court declined to consider this argument because James did not cite the record or provide adequate legal support.

Melissa and Paco Horta married in October 2012 and have three minor children. About a decade before the marriage, Paco's father gave him a landscaping business called Silver Lands, Inc. Paco earned a salary from the business and also took money out as company profits. Paco filed for divorce in May 2021, and while the case was pending the district court ordered him to pay temporary spousal support, temporary child support, and some of Melissa's attorney and expert fees. After a trial, the district court issued a divorce decree. It calculated Paco's monthly income, imputed (assigned) an income of $100,000 per year to Melissa based on her earning capacity, awarded her alimony of $3,000 per month for five years and child support of $3,474 per month, and divided the couple's community property. Because of the way it divided property, the court ordered Paco to pay Melissa an "equalization payment" of about $738,000 in monthly installments over ten years. The court declined to award either party additional attorney or expert fees. On appeal, Melissa raised many arguments: that the court miscalculated Paco's income by leaving out a $461,000 "shareholder loan" he took from the business; that the court should not have assumed she could earn $100,000; that it should have awarded more child support and back child support; that Paco wasted $476,000 of marital money on a failed Reno property investment; that she deserved attorney and expert fees; and several other points about parenting time, the family therapist, keeping discovery open on the marital home, and interest on the equalization payment. Paco, in his cross-appeal, argued the court miscalculated the community's interest in Silver Lands. The Court of Appeals rejected almost all of these arguments, finding that the district court acted within its discretion and that its findings were supported by the evidence. On most points, the appeals court explained that it does not re-weigh conflicting evidence or re-judge which witnesses were more believable - that is the trial court's job. The appeals court agreed with Melissa on one narrow point. While the trial court properly found that Melissa had not proven Paco "wasted" the $476,000 Reno investment, the trial court never made findings about whether any of that money still existed. Paco testified he got no return on the investment, but also said the investment home was eventually sold, though he could not recall the sale price. Because some or all of the money might still exist, the appeals court sent the case back (remanded) so the trial court can determine whether any funds remain and, if so, divide them. The court affirmed everything else in the decree.

Tiffany and James Sullivan divorced in 2012 and agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, G.S. Over the following decade, James filed several motions asking the court to give him primary physical custody. The appeal in this case arises from his third such motion, filed in April 2022. James pointed to three alleged changes: an October 2021 domestic violence incident between Tiffany and her then-boyfriend, Martin (who was later convicted of felony aggravated stalking for violating protective orders Tiffany obtained against him); a February 2022 conversation James recorded with G.S., in which the child said Tiffany often left her alone to care for her younger half-sister, did not prepare her meals, and that she would prefer to live with James; and concerns that G.S. was underweight and possibly not eating properly. Before the trial (called an "evidentiary hearing"), the court ordered that G.S. be interviewed by a neutral professional. The parties settled on Dr. Stephanie Holland, who interviewed the child and sent her report to the court. But Tiffany did not formally list Dr. Holland as a witness until after the deadline the parties had agreed to. On the first day of the hearing, James raised no objection—in fact, he agreed to take witnesses out of order so Dr. Holland could testify the next morning. The next morning, however, James objected that Tiffany had disclosed Dr. Holland too late, and the district court agreed, refusing to let Dr. Holland testify or her report come into evidence. After hearing testimony from Martin, a former babysitter, G.S.'s pediatrician, James, and Tiffany, the district court awarded James primary physical custody, finding that five of the statutory "best interest of the child" factors favored James and none favored Tiffany. The Court of Appeals concluded the district court made mistakes—but not mistakes big enough to change the outcome. First, it held that James waited too long to object to Dr. Holland's testimony. Because he participated in the interview process, knew about the late disclosure a month before the hearing, and even agreed on the first day of the hearing to let Dr. Holland testify out of order, he could not spring the objection at the last minute. The court also emphasized that Nevada public policy strongly favors letting courts consider all evidence bearing on a child's best interest; by excluding the court-appointed interviewer's testimony and report, the district court "hindered its own inquiry into G.S.'s best interest" and, in effect, sanctioned the child for her mother's procedural misstep. Second, the appellate court found that two of the district court's best-interest findings were not backed by substantial evidence: the finding that the parents' "ability to cooperate" factor was neutral (the record showed James was the less cooperative co-parent, including never giving Tiffany the number to G.S.'s phone at his house), and the finding that the "relationship with each parent" factor favored James, which rested on the recorded conversation without the expert analysis Dr. Holland would have provided. Even so, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Under Nevada law, an error justifies reversal only if it likely would have changed the result. Here, the remaining best-interest findings were supported by substantial evidence—particularly that James consistently provided G.S. three meals a day, got her to school on time, and offered a stable home—and Tiffany did not include Dr. Holland's report in the appellate record, which limited the court's ability to assess what difference it might have made. Finally, the court rejected Tiffany's claim of judicial bias: judges are presumed impartial, and rulings formed from what a judge learns during the case itself are not evidence of bias.

This is a divorce case between Irina and Douglas Ansell. Before marrying in 2012, the couple signed a prenuptial agreement—a contract that spells out, in advance, how property will be treated as "separate" (belonging to one spouse) or "community" (shared) and how it will be divided if they divorce. Doug's separate property included several businesses (called the Ansell companies) and real estate. The couple married, had one child, and Irina filed for divorce in October 2015. The case took years. The district court split it into three separate trials: one on child custody, one on whether the prenuptial agreement was valid (the court ruled it was and that it would govern the financial issues), and a third on how to divide the couple's assets. That third trial happened in December 2017, but the court did not actually issue the divorce decree until February 2021—more than three years later. The decree gave Irina some alimony, child support, and an "equalization payment" (a lump sum meant to balance out the division of property) of $972,471. After the decree, both sides filed motions. Doug asked the court to give him credit for personal income tax payments he had made, arguing those taxes were a shared community obligation, and he asked for attorney fees. The court agreed with Doug: it credited half his tax payments against what he owed Irina and awarded him attorney fees, which together wiped out his entire equalization payment obligation—reducing Irina's award to essentially zero. The court denied Irina's own late-filed motion as untimely. Irina then appealed. Before reaching the substance, the court had to deal with a technical problem: Irina's notice of appeal named only the November 2021 post-trial order, not the February 2021 decree. Doug argued this meant she could not challenge the decree at all. The court disagreed. It explained that Nevada strongly prefers deciding appeals on their merits rather than on technicalities, that Irina's intent to appeal the decree could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, and that Doug was not misled or harmed. The court did, however, remind Irina's counsel to name every order they intend to appeal in the future. On the substance, the court reached mixed results. It rejected Irina's argument that the district court was required to accept a particular expert's much higher valuation of Doug's businesses (about $9.9 million in appreciation); the court found she had not properly preserved that argument, had not cited the record to support it, and had not cogently explained why the court was bound to adopt that valuation. But the court agreed with Irina on several other points. It held that the district court wrongly refused to give Irina any share of the increase in value of Doug's real estate. Under the plain language of the prenuptial agreement, Irina automatically got a community property interest in the appreciation of Doug's separate property—whether or not she had put personal time or effort into managing the properties. The court also held that the district court wrongly assigned certain of Doug's loans and debts to the community, because the prenuptial agreement said debts became joint only if both spouses signed a document agreeing to be jointly indebted, and no such document existed. The court further held that the district court failed to consider whether Irina received any benefit from Doug's income after the couple separated—income that, under Nevada law, is presumed to remain community property until the divorce is final. On the tax issue, the court found the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous about whether Irina could be liable for tax debt incurred during the marriage without a signed joint-indebtedness document, and the district court had not made the factual findings about the parties' intent needed to resolve that ambiguity. Because of that, and because it was unclear whether Irina received any of Doug's income during the relevant period, the court reversed the tax ruling and sent it back. Finally, because the court reversed parts of the decree, the attorney fee awards no longer rested on solid ground—it was no longer clear that Doug was the "prevailing party" or that he had beaten his settlement offer—so the court vacated (cancelled) the fee awards. The case returns to the district court to redo the affected portions.

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

Amr and Huriyeh Hosny married in 1989 in Macau and moved to the United States in 2004, where they ran businesses and held assets together. They separated in 2018, and Huriyeh filed for divorce. After a 2020 trial, the family court entered a divorce decree that, among other things, ordered Amr to pay Huriyeh $5,000 per month in lifetime alimony (ongoing financial support), reimburse her $6,000 for an expert witness, pay a $38,000 loan Huriyeh had taken from her sister (in part to cover her attorney and expert fees), and pay off a U.S. Bank credit card. Amr appealed. The Court of Appeals found several problems with how the trial court reached its decisions. On alimony, the appeals court concluded that the trial court's factual findings were "contradictory, unclear, and not supported by substantial evidence." The trial court noted that Amr's income was $120,000 in 2017 but had dropped to $72,000 by 2019, yet it never settled on which income figure it actually used to set the alimony amount. The appeals court said the trial court appeared to assume Amr could keep earning what he historically had, without accounting for the downturn in his business tied in part to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court also divided rental properties between the spouses, which means Amr will collect less rental income going forward — a fact the appeals court said the trial court did not properly factor in when deciding how much support Amr could afford to pay or how much Huriyeh actually needed. The appeals court also identified erroneous findings about how much Amr paid to support the couple's adult children and how much he was already paying Huriyeh during the case. On the demonstrative exhibits (exhibits 5 and 14, which were charts or summaries the trial court relied on), the appeals court held it was error to admit them because the expert who apparently prepared them never testified to establish the foundation for the financial information they contained. The exhibits also contained mathematical errors and information inconsistent with other admitted evidence. Because the trial court leaned on these flawed exhibits in setting alimony and dividing debts, the appeals court found the error prejudicial. On the $6,000 in expert witness fees, the appeals court explained that under Nevada law, an expert generally must testify in order to recover more than $1,500 in fees. Because this expert did not testify, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees above that threshold. The appeals court reversed the district court's judgment and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with its order. On remand, the trial court will need to reassess the full division of community property and debt (including the promissory note, the Bank of America card, and the U.S. Bank card) when deciding alimony, and ensure Huriyeh does not receive a "double recovery" for fees and costs already covered through debts assigned to Amr.

This case concerns a custody dispute between two parents, Magdalena Ocasio and Jonathan Jordan Wirsz, who share a minor child referred to as M.W. In June 2020, Wirsz was granted primary physical custody, joint legal custody, and "tie breaking decision-making authority" - meaning the ability to make the final call when the parents disagree on decisions about the child. In September 2020, the parents agreed to an amended arrangement (called the ASAO) that let Wirsz and the child move to northern Idaho while keeping the same custody structure. That agreement also set a parenting-time schedule and a three-year pause on further court fights, with exceptions for emergencies and serious breaches. After the agreement took effect, Ocasio came to believe that Wirsz should not have primary custody and decision-making power. In August 2021 she asked the court to change the custody arrangement. The district court denied her request without holding an evidentiary hearing - that is, a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented. The court's order essentially stated that Ocasio had not made "a prima facie case of a substantial change in circumstance" affecting the child's welfare. A "prima facie case" means enough of an initial showing, taken as true, to justify a fuller look at the issue. Ocasio raised two main claims. First, she argued the original relocation agreement was based on fraud because Wirsz never took the job that supposedly justified the move to Idaho. The Court of Appeals declined to consider this argument, explaining that Ocasio provided no legal authority showing that discovering alleged fraud counts as a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child, and noting she did not file a motion under the rule that allows setting aside an order for fraud. Second, Ocasio alleged that Wirsz was limiting her parenting time and turning the child against her - including disrupting Skype calls, blocking her from medical information, limiting her access to information about the child's education, refusing to investigate potential medical issues, and scheduling flights to interfere with her parenting time. The Court of Appeals concluded that these allegations were new, not merely repetitive, and could show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare. Because Wirsz had not conclusively disproven these allegations at this stage, the court held that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. The court reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals also addressed Ocasio's request for attorney fees. It concluded she did not raise a new claim for attorney fees in her November 2021 motion, and that her failure to respond to Wirsz's argument on that point was treated as a concession that his argument had merit.

Jashawn Prevost and Keilah Gronvold met in 2013 and had a child together in 2014. The family moved to Las Vegas in 2015 and lived there until the parents separated in 2020. After the separation, Gronvold moved to Mississippi while Prevost stayed in Las Vegas with the child. Prevost then filed a court case (representing himself) asking for custody, and Gronvold answered and filed her own counterclaim, also representing herself. The parties could not agree through mediation, so the case went to trial in April 2021. Both appeared virtually for a trial that lasted a single afternoon. Prevost called the child's teacher as a witness, who testified that the child had struggled in school until Gronvold left and that the child improved after Prevost became more involved. Prevost testified that he was the best parent and accused Gronvold's current partner of being a "pedophile and sex trafficker." By his own testimony, however, Prevost based those accusations only on what Gronvold had told him ("per her"). Gronvold testified that she wanted joint physical custody and to be able to see her child in Mississippi. She said she never told Prevost the things he used to support his accusations against her partner. She also described a relationship marked by repeated domestic violence, including beatings that required staples in her head, a black eye, being shot with a pellet gun, and threats to kill her. Neither party formally moved to admit their evidence during the trial. Before closing arguments, the judge asked whether the parties would agree to let her review each side's evidence. Prevost first objected, saying he could not open documents Gronvold sent through an app called OurFamilyWizard and that she should have sent them in another format, such as hard copy. The judge noted his objection but asked again whether he agreed to her reviewing the evidence, and Prevost answered, "Yes, ma'am." A few days later, the district court issued its decision. It found Gronvold credible, noted photographs showing her bruised and bloodied face, and found that Prevost had committed one or more acts of domestic violence proven by clear and convincing evidence resulting in severe injuries. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption (an assumption the law makes unless proven otherwise) that Prevost should not receive joint or primary custody, and it found Prevost did not overcome that presumption. The court awarded primary physical custody to Gronvold and, applying the statutory factors, found the child's move to Mississippi to be in the child's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Prevost's arguments. It found that the record did not show the judge forced or "strongarmed" him into agreeing to the evidence review; she heard his objection, then asked again, and he agreed. The court also concluded that any problem with how Gronvold shared her documents was minor and did not change the outcome, especially because Gronvold's own credible testimony established the domestic violence. The court also held that the district court did not ignore Prevost's accusations against Gronvold's partner. Because those accusations rested entirely on what Prevost said Gronvold told him, and Gronvold denied ever making those statements, the trial judge was entitled to decide whom to believe. Finally, the court declined Prevost's request to reweigh witness credibility, explaining that trial courts, which see and hear the witnesses, are the ones who make those calls, and appellate courts do not second-guess them from a transcript. The court affirmed the custody decree.

Lyudmyla Abid and Sean Abid divorced in 2010 and originally agreed to share custody of their child. In 2016, after a hearing, the district court gave Sean primary physical custody, and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal in 2017. In September 2019, Lyudmyla went back to court asking to change custody again. She claimed that since getting primary custody, Sean had been undermining and trying to alienate her relationship with the child, and had not properly cared for the child. The district court denied her motion at a November 2019 hearing, though it ordered the child into therapy and a child interview at the Family Medication Center (FMC). The court did not put its written order on file until November 2020. In that order, the court said that even if Lyudmyla's allegations were true, they did not amount to a "prima facie case" — a preliminary showing strong enough to justify a full evidentiary hearing — and it found the child was doing well in Sean's care and that CPS records she cited were unsubstantiated. Meanwhile, in October 2020, Lyudmyla filed additional motions asking the court to make findings from the FMC child interview and to modify custody based on the child's best interest, including the child's stated desire to spend equal time with both parents. After the written order was entered, she also asked the court to reconsider. The district court denied all of these requests, concluding among other things that the 12-year-old child was too young for his custody preference to be given weight and that Lyudmyla appeared to be relitigating issues already decided. The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, a parent asking to change custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing — a proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is formally admitted — if the parent makes a preliminary showing of facts that, if true, could justify a custody change. The court concluded that Lyudmyla's allegations (that Sean was not properly caring for the child, was not using all of his custodial time, and was interfering with her parenting time) were relevant to modification and, if proven at a hearing, could warrant a change. The appeals court also pointed out a problem with how the district court reached its findings: it appeared to decide the merits based on the parties' arguments and filings, but arguments of lawyers are not evidence — factual findings must rest on evidence actually presented. Because no evidentiary hearing was held, the findings lacked an evidentiary basis. The appeals court also reversed the later order, because the district court appeared to review only whether its earlier order was correct, without addressing Lyudmyla's separate arguments that events occurring after the November 2019 hearing justified modification or at least additional findings. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings. The appeals court declined to revisit the original custody modification itself, explaining that those issues either were or could have been raised in the earlier appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Sean and Lyudmyla Abid divorced in 2010 and shared joint custody of their young son. In 2015, Sean asked the family court to give him primary physical custody. To support that request, Sean hid a recording device in the child's backpack on at least two occasions to capture conversations between the child and his mother when the child was at her home. Neither the mother nor the child knew about the device or consented to being recorded. Sean later edited the recordings, deleted what he considered irrelevant, and destroyed the originals. The district court found that Sean had likely violated NRS 200.650, a Nevada statute that prohibits secretly recording private conversations without the consent of at least one participant. The judge refused to admit the recordings into evidence at the custody hearing. However, the judge gave the recordings to Dr. Holland, a psychologist the court had appointed to interview and evaluate the child. Dr. Holland used the recordings, along with interviews and other materials, to form her professional opinion that the mother's behavior was "creating confusion, distress, and divided loyalty" in the child. Relying in part on Dr. Holland's testimony, the family court awarded Sean primary physical custody. The mother appealed, arguing that the psychologist should not have been allowed to consider evidence Sean obtained illegally. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court explained that under NRS 50.285(2), expert witnesses may consider evidence that would not itself be admissible at trial, as long as the type of evidence is something experts in the field would reasonably rely on. Recordings of a parent's interactions with a child are exactly the kind of information a child psychologist would consult. The court also pointed out that NRS 200.650, unlike the federal wiretap statute, does not contain its own rule barring such recordings from being used as evidence in civil cases. The court emphasized that a child custody case is different from an ordinary lawsuit between two adversaries because the child's best interests are at stake, and the child is not at fault for a parent's misconduct. Suppressing useful evidence would punish the child for the parent's act. The court stressed that it was not endorsing Sean's behavior - he could potentially be prosecuted for a category D felony under NRS 200.690(1)(a), be sued civilly by his ex-wife and child under NRS 200.690(1)(b), face other litigation sanctions, and may have his judgment as a parent questioned by the court. The court also rejected any blanket rule that illegally obtained evidence is automatically inadmissible in a child custody case, leaving admissibility to the trial court's discretion. Justice Douglas concurred in the result only, without explanation.

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. They shared joint legal custody of their two children, but Kerstan had primary physical custody. Their daughter I.M. struggled in Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to dyslexia. The parents agreed I.M. should attend private school in Reno and live during the school year with her paternal grandparents there, returning to Kerstan in the summers. I.M. moved to her grandparents' home in August 2013. In 2014, Michael asked the family court to give him primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed the change. Instead of choosing between the two parents, the district court awarded primary physical custody to the grandparents - even though the grandparents had never asked to be part of the case and neither parent had been told the judge was considering that option. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that custody award. The Court explained that a court generally cannot enter a judgment for or against someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. To get custody, a non-parent (like a grandparent) must either file their own custody case or formally join (intervene in) the existing one. Beyond that, before a Nevada court can take custody away from a fit parent and give it to a non-parent, it must make specific findings that giving custody to either parent would be detrimental to the child and that placing the child with the non-parent is necessary to serve the child's best interest. None of that happened here. The Court also held that giving custody to the grandparents without warning violated the parents' due process rights - their right to fair notice and a chance to be heard - because both parents had been arguing only about which of them should have custody, not about whether the grandparents should. The Court left undisturbed the portion of the order dealing with child support arrearages, because Kerstan did not include the hearing transcript needed to review that ruling. The case was sent back to the district court. On remand, the district court was directed to consider Kerstan's argument - which she had raised only in a reconsideration motion below - that no change in custody is warranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live elsewhere for educational reasons.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.

Shinichi and Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997 and moved several times between Japan and the United States, buying a home in Henderson, Nevada. Their three children were all born in Japan. In June 2004, the children traveled from Nevada to Japan. The parents told very different stories about that trip: Yoko said it was only a summer vacation and that Shinichi refused to send the children back in August 2004; Shinichi said the whole family had planned to live in Japan permanently. Either way, the children stayed in Japan with Shinichi. About eight months after the children left, in February 2005, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court to order the children's immediate return, calling their retention in Japan an international abduction. The Nevada court agreed with Yoko, ordered the children returned, later held Shinichi in contempt when they were not returned, and ultimately - after a hearing at which Shinichi's lawyer appeared but Shinichi personally did not - entered a "default" divorce decree. That decree gave Yoko sole legal and physical custody with "no contact" for Shinichi, all of the community property (including a share of a house in Japan), spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court decided three questions. First, did the Nevada court have power to decide custody at all, given that the children had been out of Nevada for eight months when the case was filed? Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a law that generally gives custody-deciding authority to a child's "home state" - a child's temporary absences from a state do not break the required six-month residency period. Because the evidence supported the district court's finding that the children left Nevada in June 2004 for a temporary three-month vacation, Nevada remained their home state, and the Nevada court properly had jurisdiction. Second, was the order sending the children back to the U.S. proper? The district court had relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty designed to ensure the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their home country. But Japan has not signed that treaty, so the Convention and its U.S. implementing statute provide no remedy here. Even so, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not need the treaty: because it had custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, it had authority to order the children's return as part of the custody case. So the return order stood, even though the Hague Convention did not apply. Third, was the default divorce decree proper? A "default" is what happens when a party fails to respond to a lawsuit. Here, Shinichi had filed an answer and a countercomplaint for divorce, and his lawyer appeared at the divorce hearing - only Shinichi himself was absent. The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances a default was inappropriate, and that the district court erred by treating the hearing as a one-sided "prove-up," awarding Yoko everything she asked for, cutting off meaningful cross-examination, and never deciding the case on its merits. The court reversed the decree's awards of custody, property, support, and fees, and sent the case back for a hearing on the merits. It denied Shinichi's request that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand, because he cited no record support or legal authority showing reassignment was necessary.