Nevada family-law case summaries

Amber Johnson-Parker and Clevis Parker married in 2019 and had one child that same year. In 2021, Clevis filed for divorce and asked for joint legal and physical custody. Amber wanted joint legal custody but asked to be the child's primary physical custodian. The parties settled many issues, and the divorce decree adopted their agreement. As part of that agreement, they said they would work toward joint physical custody but temporarily gave Clevis primary physical custody because Amber had a pending criminal matter. The agreement listed conditions Amber would need to meet - such as no new criminal charges, no new child-protective-services matters with substantiated allegations, and no new safety concerns for the child - before joint physical custody could be awarded. They also agreed to joint legal custody. After several incidents involving Amber and the child's school, the court temporarily gave Clevis sole legal custody. Amber later asked the court to give her joint physical custody. Clevis opposed that and asked to move to Texas with the child. Amber underwent a psychological assessment, the parties took part in a custody evaluation, and Clevis asked for attorney fees. At trial, the parties presented evidence about the child's well-being and Amber's mental health. Witnesses testified that Amber had been arrested for driving under the influence and had made abuse allegations against Clevis that were not substantiated. Clevis explained why he believed moving to Texas would benefit the child. The district court denied Amber's request, allowed Clevis to relocate, and set a final custody arrangement. It found that Amber's abuse allegations were false and had caused the child mental trauma, that the custody evaluator found Amber exhibited "paranoid and delusional thinking," and that Amber's actions posed a continuous risk of stress and emotional harm to the child. In contrast, it found Clevis provided a stable and supportive environment. The court found relocation was in the child's best interest and gave Clevis primary physical custody, while giving Amber parenting time. It also gave Clevis primary legal custody, finding Amber interfered with the child's schooling and did not support the child's therapy. Finally, the court found Amber's conduct significantly increased litigation costs and later awarded Clevis $45,000 in attorney fees (out of the more than $117,000 he requested), and directed Amber to pay portions of the assessment and evaluation costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the custody, relocation, and fee decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning the appeals court does not decide the case fresh, but only asks whether the trial court's decision was supported by adequate evidence and was reasonable. The court explained that in child custody matters, the only question is what serves the child's best interest. It concluded that although the district court did not specifically cite the statute listing the best-interest factors, the court made extensive findings covering most of those factors and tied them to its decision. The appeals court also noted it is not allowed to re-weigh evidence or second-guess the trial court's credibility findings. The court also addressed Amber's claim that the district court judge was biased. It explained that judges are presumed unbiased and that a party challenging a judge must show real factual grounds for disqualification. Because rulings a judge makes during a case generally do not show improper bias, and Amber had not shown bias from an outside source or "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism," the court found no abuse of discretion in the chief judge's refusal to disqualify the trial judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed every part of the district court's decision. It also denied Amber's emergency motion to stay the current parenting-time schedule.

Vick and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., who was born in Las Vegas in April 2023. About a month after K.G.'s birth, Anjena and the baby traveled to Canada for a funeral. They ended up staying longer than planned, in part because the family's Nevada home had a major water leak and Anjena found temporary work in Canada. Vick remained in regular contact, visited, and the couple even discussed having more children. At some point the marriage broke down. In November 2023, Anjena filed for custody of K.G. in a Canadian court. Vick responded by filing a Hague Convention petition in Canada seeking the child's return to Nevada; the Canadian court denied that petition, finding that K.G.'s "habitual residence" was Canada. Vick lost his appeal of that ruling. In May 2024, Vick filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court for custody and child support. The Nevada district court refused, saying it did not have "home state" jurisdiction over the child and that a lot of litigation had already happened in Canada. Vick appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the UCCJEA (Nevada's version is in NRS Chapter 125A), a state is a child's "home state" if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed, and that period includes any "temporary absence" from the state. The Court concluded that K.G.'s time in Canada from May to November 2023 was a temporary absence: Anjena originally went for a funeral intending to return, communicated frequently with Vick, discussed expanding the family, and the prolonged stay was due to a home repair and short-term work. The Hague proceeding itself found that Anjena did not form an intent to remain in Canada until November 2023. So for jurisdictional purposes, K.G. is treated as having lived in Nevada until November 6, 2023 - less than six months before Vick's May 3, 2024 filing. That makes Nevada the home state. However, the Court did not order Nevada to keep the case. It explained that the earlier Hague ruling - finding Canada to be K.G.'s habitual residence - is entitled to "considerable weight" and that international practice generally directs custody decisions to the country of habitual residence. Under NRS 125A.365(1), a Nevada court may decline jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriate. The Court said deferring to Canada "may ultimately be appropriate," but it would be premature to do so now because: (1) the Canadian court has not yet decided whether it has jurisdiction; and (2) the parties have not had a chance to brief the issue in Nevada. The Court instructed the district court on remand to try to hold a UCCJEA-style conference with the Canadian court, take briefing, and apply NRS 125A.365 to decide whether Nevada or Canada is the more appropriate forum. On the child support claim, the Court noted that custody and support typically travel together, and instructed the district court to exercise jurisdiction over both pending its decision on whether to defer to Canada. The Court did not consider Vick's separate complaint about attorney fees because the record showed no fee award had actually been entered.

Jon and Melissa Pearson divorced in 2019 and shared their twin sons on a "one week on/one week off" schedule. Both boys have medical needs: one has epilepsy and other conditions, and the other sees a heart specialist for a congenital heart defect. In January 2024, Jon received a job offer from Tesla that required him to move to Austin, Texas. He believed the move offered a significant pay increase, free health insurance, and, based on his research, better schools and medical care for the boys. He asked Melissa to agree to a new custody arrangement so he could relocate with the children; she refused. Jon then filed a motion in court asking to be given primary physical custody so he could move the boys to Texas. When his emergency request was denied, Jon moved to Texas with his current wife and their young son, while the twins stayed in Las Vegas with Melissa pending a full hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Jon's relocation request, awarded Melissa primary physical custody, set a parenting-time schedule for Jon, and ordered Jon to pay monthly child support. The court largely adopted the proposed order that Melissa's attorneys had drafted. Jon appealed. The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's decision for what the law calls an "abuse of discretion" - meaning a decision unsupported by the evidence, clearly wrong, or made by disregarding the controlling legal rules. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court made several connected errors. First, the Court of Appeals held that the district court was wrong to find that Jon's move to Texas was not a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting the children. Because the parents could no longer keep the every-other-week schedule once Jon lived in Texas, the children's lives would be affected no matter what the court decided. Second, the Court of Appeals found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when weighing the move. The court had faulted Jon for not proving that the children's schools and doctors in Las Vegas were "substandard" or inadequate. But under Nevada law, Jon did not have to prove that Las Vegas was bad; he only had to show that the children's needs might be *better* served, or that they would gain an *actual advantage*, by moving to Texas. The district court never made findings on that question. Third, the Court of Appeals held that several of the district court's findings improperly punished Jon for deciding to relocate and for the arguments his lawyers made during the case. Under Nevada law, a court may not use a change of custody as a "sword" to punish a parent's conduct or litigation tactics. Fourth, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court focused too heavily on keeping things exactly as they were for Melissa, rather than seriously considering whether an alternative parenting-time schedule - Jon had proposed one, plus travel contributions and iPads for communication - could preserve Melissa's relationship with the boys. The court also found the district court's suggestion that Jon might try to "replace" Melissa with his new family was speculative and contradicted by the court's own other findings that both parents had cooperated. Because it was unclear whether the district court would have reached the same result without these errors, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals noted that the district court may hold a new hearing to consider the family's current circumstances and the children's wishes, since more than a year had passed and the children would soon turn 13.

Tiffany and James Sullivan divorced in 2012 and agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, G.S. Over the following decade, James filed several motions asking the court to give him primary physical custody. The appeal in this case arises from his third such motion, filed in April 2022. James pointed to three alleged changes: an October 2021 domestic violence incident between Tiffany and her then-boyfriend, Martin (who was later convicted of felony aggravated stalking for violating protective orders Tiffany obtained against him); a February 2022 conversation James recorded with G.S., in which the child said Tiffany often left her alone to care for her younger half-sister, did not prepare her meals, and that she would prefer to live with James; and concerns that G.S. was underweight and possibly not eating properly. Before the trial (called an "evidentiary hearing"), the court ordered that G.S. be interviewed by a neutral professional. The parties settled on Dr. Stephanie Holland, who interviewed the child and sent her report to the court. But Tiffany did not formally list Dr. Holland as a witness until after the deadline the parties had agreed to. On the first day of the hearing, James raised no objection—in fact, he agreed to take witnesses out of order so Dr. Holland could testify the next morning. The next morning, however, James objected that Tiffany had disclosed Dr. Holland too late, and the district court agreed, refusing to let Dr. Holland testify or her report come into evidence. After hearing testimony from Martin, a former babysitter, G.S.'s pediatrician, James, and Tiffany, the district court awarded James primary physical custody, finding that five of the statutory "best interest of the child" factors favored James and none favored Tiffany. The Court of Appeals concluded the district court made mistakes—but not mistakes big enough to change the outcome. First, it held that James waited too long to object to Dr. Holland's testimony. Because he participated in the interview process, knew about the late disclosure a month before the hearing, and even agreed on the first day of the hearing to let Dr. Holland testify out of order, he could not spring the objection at the last minute. The court also emphasized that Nevada public policy strongly favors letting courts consider all evidence bearing on a child's best interest; by excluding the court-appointed interviewer's testimony and report, the district court "hindered its own inquiry into G.S.'s best interest" and, in effect, sanctioned the child for her mother's procedural misstep. Second, the appellate court found that two of the district court's best-interest findings were not backed by substantial evidence: the finding that the parents' "ability to cooperate" factor was neutral (the record showed James was the less cooperative co-parent, including never giving Tiffany the number to G.S.'s phone at his house), and the finding that the "relationship with each parent" factor favored James, which rested on the recorded conversation without the expert analysis Dr. Holland would have provided. Even so, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Under Nevada law, an error justifies reversal only if it likely would have changed the result. Here, the remaining best-interest findings were supported by substantial evidence—particularly that James consistently provided G.S. three meals a day, got her to school on time, and offered a stable home—and Tiffany did not include Dr. Holland's report in the appellate record, which limited the court's ability to assess what difference it might have made. Finally, the court rejected Tiffany's claim of judicial bias: judges are presumed impartial, and rulings formed from what a judge learns during the case itself are not evidence of bias.

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

This case concerns a custody dispute between two parents, Magdalena Ocasio and Jonathan Jordan Wirsz, who share a minor child referred to as M.W. In June 2020, Wirsz was granted primary physical custody, joint legal custody, and "tie breaking decision-making authority" - meaning the ability to make the final call when the parents disagree on decisions about the child. In September 2020, the parents agreed to an amended arrangement (called the ASAO) that let Wirsz and the child move to northern Idaho while keeping the same custody structure. That agreement also set a parenting-time schedule and a three-year pause on further court fights, with exceptions for emergencies and serious breaches. After the agreement took effect, Ocasio came to believe that Wirsz should not have primary custody and decision-making power. In August 2021 she asked the court to change the custody arrangement. The district court denied her request without holding an evidentiary hearing - that is, a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented. The court's order essentially stated that Ocasio had not made "a prima facie case of a substantial change in circumstance" affecting the child's welfare. A "prima facie case" means enough of an initial showing, taken as true, to justify a fuller look at the issue. Ocasio raised two main claims. First, she argued the original relocation agreement was based on fraud because Wirsz never took the job that supposedly justified the move to Idaho. The Court of Appeals declined to consider this argument, explaining that Ocasio provided no legal authority showing that discovering alleged fraud counts as a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child, and noting she did not file a motion under the rule that allows setting aside an order for fraud. Second, Ocasio alleged that Wirsz was limiting her parenting time and turning the child against her - including disrupting Skype calls, blocking her from medical information, limiting her access to information about the child's education, refusing to investigate potential medical issues, and scheduling flights to interfere with her parenting time. The Court of Appeals concluded that these allegations were new, not merely repetitive, and could show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare. Because Wirsz had not conclusively disproven these allegations at this stage, the court held that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. The court reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals also addressed Ocasio's request for attorney fees. It concluded she did not raise a new claim for attorney fees in her November 2021 motion, and that her failure to respond to Wirsz's argument on that point was treated as a concession that his argument had merit.

Jashawn Prevost and Keilah Gronvold met in 2013 and had a child together in 2014. The family moved to Las Vegas in 2015 and lived there until the parents separated in 2020. After the separation, Gronvold moved to Mississippi while Prevost stayed in Las Vegas with the child. Prevost then filed a court case (representing himself) asking for custody, and Gronvold answered and filed her own counterclaim, also representing herself. The parties could not agree through mediation, so the case went to trial in April 2021. Both appeared virtually for a trial that lasted a single afternoon. Prevost called the child's teacher as a witness, who testified that the child had struggled in school until Gronvold left and that the child improved after Prevost became more involved. Prevost testified that he was the best parent and accused Gronvold's current partner of being a "pedophile and sex trafficker." By his own testimony, however, Prevost based those accusations only on what Gronvold had told him ("per her"). Gronvold testified that she wanted joint physical custody and to be able to see her child in Mississippi. She said she never told Prevost the things he used to support his accusations against her partner. She also described a relationship marked by repeated domestic violence, including beatings that required staples in her head, a black eye, being shot with a pellet gun, and threats to kill her. Neither party formally moved to admit their evidence during the trial. Before closing arguments, the judge asked whether the parties would agree to let her review each side's evidence. Prevost first objected, saying he could not open documents Gronvold sent through an app called OurFamilyWizard and that she should have sent them in another format, such as hard copy. The judge noted his objection but asked again whether he agreed to her reviewing the evidence, and Prevost answered, "Yes, ma'am." A few days later, the district court issued its decision. It found Gronvold credible, noted photographs showing her bruised and bloodied face, and found that Prevost had committed one or more acts of domestic violence proven by clear and convincing evidence resulting in severe injuries. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption (an assumption the law makes unless proven otherwise) that Prevost should not receive joint or primary custody, and it found Prevost did not overcome that presumption. The court awarded primary physical custody to Gronvold and, applying the statutory factors, found the child's move to Mississippi to be in the child's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Prevost's arguments. It found that the record did not show the judge forced or "strongarmed" him into agreeing to the evidence review; she heard his objection, then asked again, and he agreed. The court also concluded that any problem with how Gronvold shared her documents was minor and did not change the outcome, especially because Gronvold's own credible testimony established the domestic violence. The court also held that the district court did not ignore Prevost's accusations against Gronvold's partner. Because those accusations rested entirely on what Prevost said Gronvold told him, and Gronvold denied ever making those statements, the trial judge was entitled to decide whom to believe. Finally, the court declined Prevost's request to reweigh witness credibility, explaining that trial courts, which see and hear the witnesses, are the ones who make those calls, and appellate courts do not second-guess them from a transcript. The court affirmed the custody decree.

Lyudmyla Abid and Sean Abid divorced in 2010 and originally agreed to share custody of their child. In 2016, after a hearing, the district court gave Sean primary physical custody, and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal in 2017. In September 2019, Lyudmyla went back to court asking to change custody again. She claimed that since getting primary custody, Sean had been undermining and trying to alienate her relationship with the child, and had not properly cared for the child. The district court denied her motion at a November 2019 hearing, though it ordered the child into therapy and a child interview at the Family Medication Center (FMC). The court did not put its written order on file until November 2020. In that order, the court said that even if Lyudmyla's allegations were true, they did not amount to a "prima facie case" — a preliminary showing strong enough to justify a full evidentiary hearing — and it found the child was doing well in Sean's care and that CPS records she cited were unsubstantiated. Meanwhile, in October 2020, Lyudmyla filed additional motions asking the court to make findings from the FMC child interview and to modify custody based on the child's best interest, including the child's stated desire to spend equal time with both parents. After the written order was entered, she also asked the court to reconsider. The district court denied all of these requests, concluding among other things that the 12-year-old child was too young for his custody preference to be given weight and that Lyudmyla appeared to be relitigating issues already decided. The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, a parent asking to change custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing — a proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is formally admitted — if the parent makes a preliminary showing of facts that, if true, could justify a custody change. The court concluded that Lyudmyla's allegations (that Sean was not properly caring for the child, was not using all of his custodial time, and was interfering with her parenting time) were relevant to modification and, if proven at a hearing, could warrant a change. The appeals court also pointed out a problem with how the district court reached its findings: it appeared to decide the merits based on the parties' arguments and filings, but arguments of lawyers are not evidence — factual findings must rest on evidence actually presented. Because no evidentiary hearing was held, the findings lacked an evidentiary basis. The appeals court also reversed the later order, because the district court appeared to review only whether its earlier order was correct, without addressing Lyudmyla's separate arguments that events occurring after the November 2019 hearing justified modification or at least additional findings. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings. The appeals court declined to revisit the original custody modification itself, explaining that those issues either were or could have been raised in the earlier appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Sean and Lyudmyla Abid divorced in 2010 and shared joint custody of their young son. In 2015, Sean asked the family court to give him primary physical custody. To support that request, Sean hid a recording device in the child's backpack on at least two occasions to capture conversations between the child and his mother when the child was at her home. Neither the mother nor the child knew about the device or consented to being recorded. Sean later edited the recordings, deleted what he considered irrelevant, and destroyed the originals. The district court found that Sean had likely violated NRS 200.650, a Nevada statute that prohibits secretly recording private conversations without the consent of at least one participant. The judge refused to admit the recordings into evidence at the custody hearing. However, the judge gave the recordings to Dr. Holland, a psychologist the court had appointed to interview and evaluate the child. Dr. Holland used the recordings, along with interviews and other materials, to form her professional opinion that the mother's behavior was "creating confusion, distress, and divided loyalty" in the child. Relying in part on Dr. Holland's testimony, the family court awarded Sean primary physical custody. The mother appealed, arguing that the psychologist should not have been allowed to consider evidence Sean obtained illegally. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. The court explained that under NRS 50.285(2), expert witnesses may consider evidence that would not itself be admissible at trial, as long as the type of evidence is something experts in the field would reasonably rely on. Recordings of a parent's interactions with a child are exactly the kind of information a child psychologist would consult. The court also pointed out that NRS 200.650, unlike the federal wiretap statute, does not contain its own rule barring such recordings from being used as evidence in civil cases. The court emphasized that a child custody case is different from an ordinary lawsuit between two adversaries because the child's best interests are at stake, and the child is not at fault for a parent's misconduct. Suppressing useful evidence would punish the child for the parent's act. The court stressed that it was not endorsing Sean's behavior - he could potentially be prosecuted for a category D felony under NRS 200.690(1)(a), be sued civilly by his ex-wife and child under NRS 200.690(1)(b), face other litigation sanctions, and may have his judgment as a parent questioned by the court. The court also rejected any blanket rule that illegally obtained evidence is automatically inadmissible in a child custody case, leaving admissibility to the trial court's discretion. Justice Douglas concurred in the result only, without explanation.

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. They shared joint legal custody of their two children, but Kerstan had primary physical custody. Their daughter I.M. struggled in Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to dyslexia. The parents agreed I.M. should attend private school in Reno and live during the school year with her paternal grandparents there, returning to Kerstan in the summers. I.M. moved to her grandparents' home in August 2013. In 2014, Michael asked the family court to give him primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed the change. Instead of choosing between the two parents, the district court awarded primary physical custody to the grandparents - even though the grandparents had never asked to be part of the case and neither parent had been told the judge was considering that option. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that custody award. The Court explained that a court generally cannot enter a judgment for or against someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. To get custody, a non-parent (like a grandparent) must either file their own custody case or formally join (intervene in) the existing one. Beyond that, before a Nevada court can take custody away from a fit parent and give it to a non-parent, it must make specific findings that giving custody to either parent would be detrimental to the child and that placing the child with the non-parent is necessary to serve the child's best interest. None of that happened here. The Court also held that giving custody to the grandparents without warning violated the parents' due process rights - their right to fair notice and a chance to be heard - because both parents had been arguing only about which of them should have custody, not about whether the grandparents should. The Court left undisturbed the portion of the order dealing with child support arrearages, because Kerstan did not include the hearing transcript needed to review that ruling. The case was sent back to the district court. On remand, the district court was directed to consider Kerstan's argument - which she had raised only in a reconsideration motion below - that no change in custody is warranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live elsewhere for educational reasons.