Nevada family-law case summaries

This case arose from a divorce. Marlene Salvatierra filed for divorce in January 2020. Walter filed his answer and a counterclaim, and the couple attended a case management conference. Because of allegations that Walter committed domestic violence, the district court initially gave Marlene temporary sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the couple's two children and allowed Walter supervised parenting time at a facility called Donna's House on Saturdays. At a hearing in November 2020, the court expanded Walter's parenting time to Saturdays and Sundays from noon until 6:00 p.m., ordered him to take a random drug test, and scheduled a trial for May 2021. In March 2021, Marlene asked the court to suspend Walter's parenting time, saying he had failed his drug test and had been convicted of battery constituting domestic violence and attempt child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The trial went ahead in May 2021, but Walter did not attend and had no lawyer there. In the resulting divorce decree, the court gave Marlene sole legal and sole physical custody of both children. The court noted that after Walter was released from prison, he could ask to change the parenting schedule and begin reunification with his children if he showed six months of sobriety. The decree also divided the couple's shared property and debts. Walter then appealed. Walter's main argument on appeal was that the decree was unfair and violated his rights because he never got notice of the trial, having been taken into custody in April 2021. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The court explained that the record showed Walter was present at the November 2020 hearing when the trial date was set, and that the written order from that hearing was mailed to his address in January 2021 - well before he was taken into custody in April 2021. The court also said Walter did not clearly explain why this was not enough notice or how his rights were violated. The court added that, to the extent Walter was arguing he could not participate because he was in jail, an appeals court is not the right place to sort out that kind of factual question for the first time. The proper way to challenge a judgment on that basis is to file a motion in the district court under a specific rule (NRCP 60(b)), which is designed for asking a trial court to set aside a judgment. Walter did not do that; he appealed instead, so the district court never had a chance to consider that argument. Because Walter did not show that reversal was warranted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the divorce decree.

Grady and Caterina Byrd divorced in 2014 after a long marriage during which Grady served in the military. Their marital settlement agreement, which was folded into the divorce decree, said neither spouse would pay the other alimony, but Grady would pay Caterina $1,500 per month to help with her mortgage, and Caterina would receive 50 percent of Grady's military retirement pay. For about four years, Grady paid Caterina $3,000 per month total. In 2018 he stopped paying without explanation, and Caterina went back to court to enforce the decree. During that litigation, it came out that before the divorce Grady had waived nearly $3,000 of his monthly military retirement pay in order to receive veteran's disability benefits instead. Because of that waiver, Caterina's 50 percent share of the pension was actually only about $64.20 per month, not the roughly $1,500 she believed she was getting. Caterina argued Grady had misrepresented his retirement income at the time of the divorce and asked the court to reopen the decree. The district court agreed, used NRCP 60(b)(6) - a catch-all rule that allows a court to set aside a judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief" - to set aside parts of the decree, and ordered Grady to pay Caterina lifetime alimony out of his disability benefits. The court also refused to let Grady, who lives in the Philippines and submitted notes from three healthcare providers saying he could not fly internationally, appear at the evidentiary hearing by video. He did not attend, and his side of the story was never heard at the hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed on three points. First, NRCP 60(b)(6) was the wrong tool. That subsection is reserved for "extraordinary circumstances" not already covered by the rule's other, more specific subsections. Caterina's complaint - that Grady misled her about the value of his pension - is exactly the kind of fraud-or-mistake claim that fits under NRCP 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(3). Those subsections come with a six-month deadline, which had long since passed. A party cannot use the catch-all subsection to escape that deadline. Second, federal law forbids what the district court did with the disability money. Under U.S. Supreme Court decisions Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, when a veteran waives part of his retirement pay to receive disability benefits, state courts cannot order him to reimburse or indemnify his former spouse out of those disability benefits - no matter what label (alimony, community property, reimbursement) the state court uses. The district court's order requiring Grady to pay Caterina "from [his] military pension disability" is precisely what federal law prohibits. Third, on the video-appearance issue, Nevada Supreme Court Rules Part IX-B(B) generally favor letting parties appear by audiovisual transmission and require courts to evaluate "good cause" using a list of factors. The district court here did not analyze those factors on the record. However, because the evidentiary hearing was combined with a show-cause hearing on Grady's failure to pay - and the rules require personal appearance at a show-cause hearing - the appellate court could not say the district court abused its discretion in requiring Grady to appear in person on this particular occasion. The Court of Appeals noted that on remand, if Grady asks again, the district court must actually consider the good-cause factors, and it suggested trial courts can split a show-cause hearing from a separate evidentiary hearing so a party can still appear remotely for the latter. The case now goes back to the district court, which is told to reconsider Caterina's enforcement motion under proper authority - including possibly NRS 125.150, which permits modification of alimony in some circumstances - and to handle any future remote-appearance requests by working through the required factors.