Nevada family-law case summaries

When Nevada child-welfare authorities remove a child from her parents, state law generally requires the agency to make "reasonable efforts" to reunite the family. One Nevada statute, NRS 432B.393(3)(c), creates an exception: if a parent's rights to a different child (a sibling) were already involuntarily terminated, the agency does not have to keep trying to reunify the family with the new child. In this case, WCHSA removed L.S.C. from her parents in August 2020 and asked the district court to find that, because the parents had lost their rights to L.S.C.'s sibling the year before, the agency was off the hook for reunification efforts. The parents objected, arguing the statute violates their constitutional right to raise their child without fair process. A court master agreed with the parents and found the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it effectively presumes a parent is unfit forever based on a past case, and that this presumption could later be used to terminate parental rights as to the new child under a separate statute, NRS 128.105(1). The district court adopted that recommendation. WCHSA then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an extraordinary order (a writ of mandamus) overturning the district court's constitutional ruling. By the time the Supreme Court considered the petition, the dispute over reunification efforts in this particular family had already been resolved on different grounds, making the case technically "moot." The Supreme Court nonetheless decided to address the constitutional question because it is the kind of issue likely to come up repeatedly but resolve too quickly to ever be reviewed in time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that NRS 432B.393(3)(c) does not violate due process. The court explained that, although parents have a fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of their children, that right is implicated when the state removes children or terminates parental rights — not when the state merely relieves an agency of its duty to provide reunification services. Because the statute does no more than excuse the agency from reunification efforts, it does not infringe on a fundamental right. The court applied the more lenient "rational basis" test and concluded that the statute is rationally connected to Nevada's legitimate interest in keeping children out of dangerous homes and out of long-term foster care. The court noted that the district court had focused on a different statute — NRS 128.105(1), which permits termination of parental rights based in part on a finding under NRS 432B.393(3)(c). The Supreme Court explained that any constitutional concern about presuming parental fault belongs in a challenge to NRS 128.105, not to NRS 432B.393(3)(c). Even though the Supreme Court concluded the district court was wrong on the constitutional question, it denied WCHSA's petition because the underlying dispute had become moot — the agency had already been relieved of reunification efforts on a different basis, so there was nothing left to fix.

This case involves a dispute over a guardianship - a legal arrangement in which a court gives one person authority to make decisions for another adult who the court believes cannot manage her own affairs. Eric Wittler filed a petition asking the district court to appoint him as both a temporary and a permanent guardian for his mother, Carmen Gomez Wittler. The district court appointed a temporary guardian almost immediately and later extended that temporary guardianship while a hearing on the permanent guardianship was still pending. Carmen tried to appeal the order that extended the temporary guardianship and refused to dismiss the case. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether the guardianship was justified. Instead, it decided whether it had the power to hear the appeal at all. In Nevada, an appellate court can only hear appeals that a statute or court rule specifically allows. The court walked through each argument Carmen offered for why this particular order could be appealed and rejected all of them. First, Carmen argued the order was a "final judgment" - the type of order that wraps up a case and is therefore appealable. The court disagreed because the underlying petition asked for both a temporary and a permanent guardianship, and the order being appealed only addressed the temporary piece; the permanent guardianship question was still open. Second, Carmen argued the order was effectively a preliminary injunction (a court order requiring or forbidding action while a case is pending), which Nevada rules do allow to be appealed. The court rejected that analogy, explaining that temporary guardianships, like temporary child custody orders, are short-term arrangements that the district court keeps reviewing on a regular basis - and Nevada courts have consistently held that such temporary, periodically reviewed orders are not appealable. Third, Carmen pointed to a statute, NRS 159.375(1), that allows appeals from orders granting or revoking "letters of guardianship." The court explained that the order Carmen was appealing did not itself grant or revoke letters of guardianship; it merely extended a previously created temporary arrangement. Finally, Carmen asked the court to hear the appeal because the case raised important public-policy questions, or alternatively to treat her filing as a petition for a writ (an extraordinary court order). The court said it could not stretch its jurisdiction to reach important issues, but noted Carmen remained free to file a separate writ petition under the appellate rules if she wished. Because none of Carmen's theories established appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court did not need to address a separate question of whether the appeal had become moot when a later order granted a general (permanent) guardianship.