Nevada family-law case summaries

Shandell Stanisic and Thomas Shea have a child together, born in 2005. In 2006, while Stanisic was receiving public assistance from Nevada's Division of Welfare and Supportive Services (DWSS), the court found Thomas to be the father and ordered him to pay $100 a month in child support. Thomas was incarcerated at the time and did not try to change that amount. In 2009, Stanisic moved to Arizona. She says she told DWSS her new address but then heard nothing from the agency for eleven years and received no child support payments during that time. In 2021, after Thomas was released from incarceration, she contacted DWSS to enforce the old order, figure out how much back support was owed (called "arrears"), and update Thomas's payment amount because his income had changed. DWSS filed a notice setting a hearing before a "hearing master" (an official who hears certain family cases and recommends decisions to a judge). Oddly, although the notice referred to a "motion to modify," the record shows no such motion was actually filed. DWSS attached records, including an audit of Thomas's payment history. That audit showed that for the period from May 2009 (about when Stanisic moved) to August 2021 (when she got back in touch), Thomas's monthly amount owed was listed as $0 rather than the $100 set by the 2006 order. The hearing master concluded Thomas owed $5,809.97 in total arrears from 2006 to 2021 and set his new monthly support at $516. When Stanisic asked where Thomas's earlier payments had gone, the master told her to take that up with her caseworker. Stanisic objected, arguing the records were inaccurate because they left out roughly $14,700 in support that should have piled up between 2009 and 2021. DWSS responded, without citing any legal authority, that the case had become "recovery only," that arrears might not have accrued if a party was incarcerated, and that Stanisic had "waived" her claim through the "doctrine of Laches" (a legal principle about losing rights by waiting too long) because she lost contact with the agency. The district court affirmed the master without holding a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, once a court orders child support, each payment becomes a judgment by operation of law when it comes due and cannot be reduced after the fact, and there is no time limit on collecting arrears. So unless someone had gotten the 2006 order changed, Thomas's $100 monthly obligation should have kept accruing the entire time, even if Stanisic's case with the agency had closed. The court also found the record too unclear to review: no proper motion was ever filed, and neither DWSS's paperwork, the master's report, nor the district court's order explained how the $5,809.97 figure was calculated, or even in whose favor the judgment was entered. Because it could not tell whether the arrears figure was money DWSS was recovering for public assistance it had paid, or support money owed to Stanisic, the court sent the case back for the district court to sort out the nature and amount of the arrears and Stanisic's entitlement to any further amounts. The court stressed it was taking no position on who is ultimately right about the arrears.

When Nevada child-welfare authorities remove a child from her parents, state law generally requires the agency to make "reasonable efforts" to reunite the family. One Nevada statute, NRS 432B.393(3)(c), creates an exception: if a parent's rights to a different child (a sibling) were already involuntarily terminated, the agency does not have to keep trying to reunify the family with the new child. In this case, WCHSA removed L.S.C. from her parents in August 2020 and asked the district court to find that, because the parents had lost their rights to L.S.C.'s sibling the year before, the agency was off the hook for reunification efforts. The parents objected, arguing the statute violates their constitutional right to raise their child without fair process. A court master agreed with the parents and found the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it effectively presumes a parent is unfit forever based on a past case, and that this presumption could later be used to terminate parental rights as to the new child under a separate statute, NRS 128.105(1). The district court adopted that recommendation. WCHSA then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an extraordinary order (a writ of mandamus) overturning the district court's constitutional ruling. By the time the Supreme Court considered the petition, the dispute over reunification efforts in this particular family had already been resolved on different grounds, making the case technically "moot." The Supreme Court nonetheless decided to address the constitutional question because it is the kind of issue likely to come up repeatedly but resolve too quickly to ever be reviewed in time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that NRS 432B.393(3)(c) does not violate due process. The court explained that, although parents have a fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of their children, that right is implicated when the state removes children or terminates parental rights — not when the state merely relieves an agency of its duty to provide reunification services. Because the statute does no more than excuse the agency from reunification efforts, it does not infringe on a fundamental right. The court applied the more lenient "rational basis" test and concluded that the statute is rationally connected to Nevada's legitimate interest in keeping children out of dangerous homes and out of long-term foster care. The court noted that the district court had focused on a different statute — NRS 128.105(1), which permits termination of parental rights based in part on a finding under NRS 432B.393(3)(c). The Supreme Court explained that any constitutional concern about presuming parental fault belongs in a challenge to NRS 128.105, not to NRS 432B.393(3)(c). Even though the Supreme Court concluded the district court was wrong on the constitutional question, it denied WCHSA's petition because the underlying dispute had become moot — the agency had already been relieved of reunification efforts on a different basis, so there was nothing left to fix.

This case asks whether a Nevada court can take away a parent's legal rights to her children because she is poor. The Nevada Supreme Court answers clearly that poverty alone is not, and never has been, a permissible reason to terminate parental rights. But the Court also holds that the trial judge in this case did not, in fact, terminate the mother's rights because she was poor. He terminated them because, even with substantial help from the State and a nonprofit, she did not follow through on the steps required to be reunited with her children. Jacqueline G. is the mother of four children. Beginning in late 2012, child-welfare authorities received reports that she did not have stable housing. She moved frequently, was evicted, and had used up local housing resources. Three of her children were removed from her custody in April 2013. Her fourth child, E.H.-T., was born in January 2014 and was removed later after a caseworker found a motel room with animal feces, urine, dirty diapers, and significant clutter that posed a safety risk to the now-mobile baby. WCDSS gave Jacqueline a written "case plan" - a list of things she needed to do to get her children back. The plan required her to find and keep housing, obtain stable income (through work or welfare), and show she could meet her children's basic needs. WCDSS and a nonprofit called the Children's Cabinet then provided extensive help: referrals to the Reno Housing Authority and Section 8 housing, victim-assistance programs, low-income energy assistance, job-search help, resume help, mental-health referrals, hotel funds, diapers, donated furniture, bus passes, clothing for job interviews, and more. Despite this assistance, Jacqueline lived in roughly 15 different shelters, apartments, and motels between October 2012 and July 2015. She quit or was fired from nearly every job within a month. She did not complete therapy with any of three referred therapists. She did not use a Section 8 voucher she received, did not apply for Victims of Crime Act funds, and did not submit paperwork for low-income energy assistance. After a six-day trial with 21 witnesses, the district court terminated her parental rights, finding that she had made only "token efforts" toward reunification and that termination served the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirms. Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Parraguirre uses the case to make a clear public statement: under Nevada law, a parent cannot be found neglectful or unfit simply because she lacks money. The relevant statutes themselves require the parent to be "financially able" before failing to provide basic care counts against her. But that protection does not shield a parent who fails to use the resources she is given. The Court concludes there was substantial evidence that Jacqueline's failure to reunite with her children was not caused by poverty, but by her not following through on the help offered. The Court also rejects Jacqueline's argument that the district court was required to find "serious harm" to the children before terminating her rights. Nevada law lists several possible grounds for parental fault, and the trial court only needs to find one of them.

This case asks whether a parent facing the loss of his parental rights in Nevada is entitled to have a jury -- rather than a judge -- decide the case. The Nevada Supreme Court answered no. The Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) removed Jesus F.'s six children from his home in January 2010, citing drug use, safety hazards, and inadequate supervision. The children were placed in protective custody under NRS 432B.330 and lived in various out-of-home placements over the next four years. After the three older children reached adulthood, WCDSS petitioned to terminate Jesus F.'s parental rights as to the three remaining minor children. Jesus F. demanded a jury trial. The district court denied that demand, held a bench trial, and terminated his parental rights. On appeal, Jesus F. argued that both the U.S. Constitution and the Nevada Constitution gave him a right to a jury. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. As to the federal constitution, the Seventh Amendment's civil jury-trial right does not apply to the states, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that due process requires a jury in termination cases. Applying the due-process balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concluded that a bench trial here posed only a minimal risk of an erroneous decision because Jesus F. received notice, appointed counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, and the right to appeal. As to the Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 preserves the right to jury trial as it existed when Nevada's Constitution was adopted in 1864. Termination of parental rights actions did not exist in 1864 -- they were created by the Nevada Legislature in 1975 -- and the Legislature has not granted a jury-trial right in such proceedings. The court also noted that requiring jury trials would slow family courts, undermine the children's anonymity, and require structural changes that several Nevada family courts are not equipped to make. The court observed that the majority of states deny jury trials in termination cases. The court also upheld the termination on the merits. Under NRS 128.109, when a child has been placed outside the home for 14 of any consecutive 20 months, the law presumes that the parent has made only token efforts and that termination is in the child's best interest. The district court found that Jesus F. did not rebut the presumption and that there were five separate grounds of parental fault. The Supreme Court held those findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.

After Larry Major was arrested in 2012 for child abuse, the State placed his daughter in the custody of Washoe County Social Services, which housed her at a facility called Kids Kottage for about seven months. Two different courts then got involved in the question of who pays for her care. First, a family court ordered Major to pay child support of $100 per month directly to Social Services. Later, after Major pleaded guilty to one felony count of child abuse, the criminal court (the district court) was asked to order restitution - a payment a convicted defendant makes to compensate a crime victim for costs caused by the crime. Social Services asked for $20,362.07, based on the rate it charges other agencies for care at Kids Kottage. Major objected. His main argument was that because the family court had already told him what to pay for his daughter's care, the criminal court had no authority - no "jurisdiction" - to order a much larger payment for the same thing. The district court disagreed and ordered restitution of $19,662.07, which was the amount Social Services sought minus a $700 credit for what Major owed under the family court's support order over the seven months. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the two orders serve different purposes and come from different sources of authority. Family courts handle child support, which is calculated from a parent's income and is designed to keep a child out of poverty. But only a criminal sentencing court has the statutory power to award restitution to a crime victim - and the family court had no power to compensate the State for the costs Major's criminal acts imposed on it. Because the two obligations overlapped for the same seven months of care, however, the court noted with approval that the district court subtracted the $700 support obligation from the restitution figure. The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to award restitution to the extent its order did not overlap with the existing family court support obligation. Major also argued that the restitution amount was not properly proven, in part because Social Services might have received federal reimbursement of up to 56 percent of the cost of care for eligible children. A Social Services fiscal compliance officer, Ida Peeks, testified about how the rate was calculated but did not know whether Major's daughter qualified for that reimbursement or whether any was received. The Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient, noting that Major made no showing that a reimbursement was actually received and that the district court required Social Services to notify it if a reimbursement came in, so the restitution order could be revised. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.