Nevada family-law case summaries

Christopher Rowan and Heather Walker married in 2004, had two children, and divorced in June 2021 under a stipulated divorce decree (an agreement the divorcing spouses reach themselves that the court then adopts). Under the decree, Rowan was ordered to pay Walker both child support and alimony (ongoing payments to a former spouse). In June 2023, Rowan asked the court to lower both payments, saying his gross monthly income had dropped by more than 20 percent. Walker opposed the request. The district court denied Rowan's motion without holding a hearing. The court acknowledged that Rowan claimed a drop of more than 20 percent in his income, but concluded that his ability to earn had not actually changed and that any decrease resulted from his own voluntary decision to quit his job. The court also said that even if Rowan had shown changed circumstances, lowering child support would not be in the children's best interest, and it denied the alimony request for essentially the same reasons. While this appeal was pending, Rowan filed a second motion to modify support and alimony, claiming his income had fallen even further. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where parties present evidence) on that second motion, but said it would not revisit the earlier denial being appealed. Walker argued that the new hearing made this appeal moot - meaning there was no longer a live dispute for the court to decide. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that any change resulting from the later motion would only affect payments from July 2024 forward and would not change the amounts at issue in this appeal, because payments that have already come due become fixed and cannot later be modified. So the appeal still presented a real controversy. On the merits, the Court of Appeals agreed with Rowan that the district court was required to hold a hearing once he presented preliminary evidence (a "prima facie case") that his income had dropped by more than 20 percent. Under Nevada law, a change of 20 percent or more in gross monthly income is deemed to be changed circumstances that require a review of a support or alimony order. The court emphasized that requiring a review is not the same as requiring a reduction - the judge still gets to decide, after the hearing, whether to actually change the payments. But the judge must hold the hearing first, because that is where evidence is presented and weighed, and skipping it deprived Rowan of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because no hearing was held, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of both the child support and the alimony requests and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing. The court also suggested that the district court could combine that hearing with the one already scheduled on Rowan's second motion, to reduce the burden on everyone, but it took no position on whether discovery would be necessary.

Michelle and Elvis Rivero divorced, and their divorce decree said they would share "joint physical custody" of their young child — but the actual schedule gave the child to Ms. Rivero five days a week and Mr. Rivero two days a week. Neither parent was ordered to pay child support. About a year later, Ms. Rivero went back to court asking for primary custody and child support, claiming Mr. Rivero rarely spent time with the child himself and lacked suitable living arrangements. The trial judge, Judge Miley, kept the joint-custody label in place, denied child support, sent the parents to mediation to work out a schedule, and eventually changed the schedule to an even 50/50 split, saying she was "just trying to find a middle ground." Along the way, Ms. Rivero asked Judge Miley to step off the case (a request called recusal), and when the judge refused, formally moved to disqualify her, claiming the judge was biased based on the parties' physical appearance. The chief judge rejected that motion as meritless, and Judge Miley then ordered Ms. Rivero to pay Mr. Rivero's attorney fees for having to fight a frivolous motion. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court used the case to answer a question Nevada law had never resolved: what exactly is "joint physical custody"? The court adopted Missouri's definition — an arrangement giving each parent "significant, but not necessarily equal" time with the child, structured so the child has "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents." In other words, joint custody does not require an exact 50/50 split, but each parent's time must be significant and meaningful. Applying that framework, the supreme court held the trial court went wrong in two ways. First, it labeled the arrangement joint physical custody without making specific factual findings to back that up. Second, it changed the custody schedule to an equal split without making specific findings that the change was in the child's best interest — the touchstone for all custody decisions. Both rulings were sent back for a do-over under the new definition. On child support, the court held that a parent may be entitled to support under Nevada's child-support statutes regardless of what the divorce decree says, and that a court departing from the statutory amounts must explain why in specific factual findings. Because the trial court did neither, that ruling was also reversed. The supreme court also announced a new math formula — a modified version of its earlier Wright v. Osburn approach — for calculating support when parents share joint custody but split time unequally, accounting for both differences in income and differences in time spent caring for the child. Finally, the court sided with the trial judges on the bias claims. A judge is presumed unbiased, and unhappiness with a judge's rulings is not a legally recognized ground for disqualification; the record contained no evidence of bias. The attorney-fee award stood as well: the court rejected Ms. Rivero's argument that a statute shielding parties from contempt punishment for seeking a change of judge also shields them from paying attorney fees for filing a frivolous disqualification motion.