Nevada family-law case summaries

Conrad and Heidi Roberson were married, had two children, and divorced in 2018-2021 after extensive litigation. After their divorce was finalized by a stipulated decree in October 2021, Conrad asked the trial court to change the decree and the child-custody arrangement. The trial court said no, and Conrad appealed that decision. While that earlier appeal was still going on, Heidi went back to the trial court and asked it to order Conrad to pay $25,000 to help cover her lawyer costs in fighting the appeal. (This kind of payment is called "pendente lite" attorney fees - fees a court orders during an ongoing case so one party can carry on or defend the suit.) Heidi explained that Conrad was behind on what he owed under the decree, and her lawyer noted that the appeal had been removed from the settlement program, with a briefing schedule already set. The trial court agreed and ordered Conrad to pay the $25,000, pointing to a large gap in the parties' incomes: Heidi earns about "$50,000 a year along with court-ordered child support and alimony," while Conrad earns approximately $500,000 a year. Conrad then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider (a "motion to alter or amend") and to pause the order. He argued that the court did not properly weigh his finances - including the alimony and child support he already pays Heidi - and that the fee award was not actually connected to the future appellate work that still needed to be done. The trial court rejected those arguments. It also found that Conrad had acted in bad faith by refusing to pay and continuing what it described as litigation games, and on that basis awarded Heidi an additional $10,975.32 in attorney fees under a separate statute that allows fees against a party who brings claims without reasonable grounds or to harass. Conrad appealed both fee awards. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Nevada affirmed - meaning it upheld the trial court's decisions. The court explained that because Heidi asked for the fees while the appeal was still pending and before briefing was filed, the award was properly tied to future appellate work. It also concluded the trial court had adequately considered both parties' financial circumstances, including the income gap and Conrad's existing payments. As for the additional fee award, the court found there was enough evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that Conrad's reconsideration motion lacked reasonable grounds and was brought in bad faith. The court also denied Heidi's request for sanctions on appeal.

Christopher Rowan and Heather Walker married in 2004, had two children, and divorced in June 2021 under a stipulated divorce decree (an agreement the divorcing spouses reach themselves that the court then adopts). Under the decree, Rowan was ordered to pay Walker both child support and alimony (ongoing payments to a former spouse). In June 2023, Rowan asked the court to lower both payments, saying his gross monthly income had dropped by more than 20 percent. Walker opposed the request. The district court denied Rowan's motion without holding a hearing. The court acknowledged that Rowan claimed a drop of more than 20 percent in his income, but concluded that his ability to earn had not actually changed and that any decrease resulted from his own voluntary decision to quit his job. The court also said that even if Rowan had shown changed circumstances, lowering child support would not be in the children's best interest, and it denied the alimony request for essentially the same reasons. While this appeal was pending, Rowan filed a second motion to modify support and alimony, claiming his income had fallen even further. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where parties present evidence) on that second motion, but said it would not revisit the earlier denial being appealed. Walker argued that the new hearing made this appeal moot - meaning there was no longer a live dispute for the court to decide. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that any change resulting from the later motion would only affect payments from July 2024 forward and would not change the amounts at issue in this appeal, because payments that have already come due become fixed and cannot later be modified. So the appeal still presented a real controversy. On the merits, the Court of Appeals agreed with Rowan that the district court was required to hold a hearing once he presented preliminary evidence (a "prima facie case") that his income had dropped by more than 20 percent. Under Nevada law, a change of 20 percent or more in gross monthly income is deemed to be changed circumstances that require a review of a support or alimony order. The court emphasized that requiring a review is not the same as requiring a reduction - the judge still gets to decide, after the hearing, whether to actually change the payments. But the judge must hold the hearing first, because that is where evidence is presented and weighed, and skipping it deprived Rowan of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because no hearing was held, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of both the child support and the alimony requests and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing. The court also suggested that the district court could combine that hearing with the one already scheduled on Rowan's second motion, to reduce the burden on everyone, but it took no position on whether discovery would be necessary.

Alexander Posey and Margaret Bond, who were previously married, share a minor son referred to as L.P. Under an earlier custody arrangement they agreed to, the parents shared "joint legal custody" - meaning both parents together make major decisions about the child - except that Bond alone made decisions about the child's religious upbringing. In June 2024, Bond asked the court for permission to take L.P. to a child psychiatrist. According to her motion, in April 2024 the child had made troubling statements such as "I want to die and not go to heaven" and "I don't deserve to be alive," although the next day he said he "wanted to live for a thousand years." Bond said the child's former therapist recommended a child psychiatrist, that a teacher reported the child was struggling to focus in class, and that the child's pediatrician indicated a July 10 psychiatry appointment might be the best option. Posey opposed. He agreed the child should see a mental health provider, but he wanted the child to see a new therapist first and let that therapist decide whether a psychiatrist was needed. He said that if the new therapist recommended a psychiatrist, he would follow that recommendation. Because the parents could not agree, Bond asked the court to "break the tie" - a reference to a Nevada Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Kelley, that lets a court decide a health-care question when parents with joint legal custody disagree. While the motion was pending, the parents temporarily agreed to take L.P. to a therapist, and the child attended five sessions. But the dispute over the psychiatrist continued. The district court then issued an order that went further than resolving the psychiatrist question: it gave Bond sole legal custody over the child's mental health generally, including taking him to a psychiatrist, and it ordered that Posey could not make decisions about the child's mental health treatment or obstruct it. The Court of Appeals split its decision. It upheld the part of the order that let Bond take L.P. to a child psychiatrist and any recommended follow-up appointments, finding the district court acted within its discretion because the evidence - including recommendations from the prior therapist and the pediatrician - supported that this was in the child's best interest, and because Posey did not show why a therapist rather than a psychiatrist was better for the child. But the court found that the broader part of the order - giving Bond sole legal custody over all of the child's mental health decisions - went beyond what Bond had actually asked for. Bond's motion sought only the limited authority to take the child to a psychiatrist and follow-ups; she even acknowledged she never sought to strip Posey of his right to be involved in the child's care. Because the court granted this broader control without warning Posey that a wider change to legal custody was being considered, it deprived him of notice and a chance to be heard, violating his due process rights. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated (canceled) that broader part of the order while keeping the psychiatrist authorization intact.

This case is a dispute between two divorced parents, Tiffany and Christian Olson, over who should have physical custody of their two children, A.O. (born October 2006) and L.O. (born November 2010). When they divorced in 2014, they shared joint legal custody and Tiffany had primary physical custody. Over the following years both parents remarried and Christian's work situation changed. In December 2021, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that circumstances had changed and that it was in the children's best interest for Christian to have primary physical custody. The court later ordered Tiffany to pay approximately $900 per month in child support. Less than four months later, in mid-April 2022, Tiffany filed an emergency motion asking the court to temporarily change custody. She claimed Christian had physically abused A.O. two days earlier during a confrontation over A.O.'s cellphone, and that Christian told A.O. to lie to police about it. The district court denied the emergency (ex parte) request but treated the filing as a request for a change of custody and set a hearing. At the January 2023 hearing, the witnesses told very different stories. A.O. testified that her father grabbed her by the chin, straddled her, pulled her hair, hit her in the face with a closed fist, held his arms around her neck, twisted her arm, and threatened her. Christian testified that after he tried to unlock A.O.'s phone using facial recognition, A.O. grabbed his wrist, he lost his balance and fell on her, and she then punched, kicked, and scratched him; he said he moved her to the floor and pinned her wrists until she calmed down, and he denied striking her or touching her neck. Christian's wife Jennifer, the only eyewitness, said she saw A.O. punching, kicking, and scratching Christian and did not see him strike A.O. or put his hands on her neck. The physical evidence and reports were also inconsistent. A.O.'s first written statement to police, made the night of the incident, described her father grabbing her face and arms but did not mention being punched, choked, or having her arm twisted. A second report, made two days later after A.O. spoke with her mother, described punching, hair-grabbing, choking, and an arm-breaking threat. The deputy who took the second report testified he saw only "minute" bruising and no evidence of choking or a punch to the face. A.O. admitted she did not write and had not fully read the affidavit attached to her mother's motion before signing it. Child Protective Services investigated and found the claims unsubstantiated, and Christian was never arrested or charged. A.O. told the CPS worker she felt safe at her father's home and did not think anything like the incident would happen again, and testified nothing similar had happened in the nine months between the incident and the hearing. The district court denied the motion. It found that although Christian and A.O. did have a physical altercation, Christian did not use unlawful force, the incident did not amount to domestic violence, and it was an isolated event that did not qualify as a "substantial change in circumstances." The court concluded the existing custody arrangement remained in the children's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that trial courts have broad discretion over custody, and appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or reassess who was more believable. Because the district court considered all the evidence, judged the witnesses' credibility, and supported its findings with adequate evidence, the appellate court held there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed.

Conrad and Heidi Roberson divorced after Heidi filed in 2018. They have two children, G.R. (born 2006) and J.R. (born 2010). Their case went to trial in 2021, but on the fourth day of trial they reached what they called a "full and final" settlement and read the terms into the record. Part of the deal was that Heidi would move to Arizona with the children, and they agreed this relocation was in the children's best interest. The parties agreed that Heidi's attorney would write the proposed divorce decree, Conrad's attorney would suggest edits, and the judge would settle any disagreements. Early in the settlement hearing, Conrad's attorney had said relocation was agreed "so long as the children are okay with it," but later in the same hearing both parties agreed—without any such condition—that Heidi would move to Arizona with the children. The court entered the divorce decree in October 2021. Conrad did not appeal it or object at the time. Just days before Heidi's planned December 2021 move, Conrad filed motions arguing that the children's consent to relocation was a required condition (a "condition precedent") that had been left out of the decree, and that the older child, G.R., did not want to move. Heidi moved to Arizona with the younger child, J.R., but G.R. refused to get into the car. The parties agreed G.R. could finish the school year in Nevada. Later disputes led the district court to grant Heidi's emergency motion, and G.R. was sent to live with her in Arizona. The district court denied Conrad's motions. It found the decree did not leave out any essential term, that it did not have to analyze the "best interest" factors because the parties had stipulated their agreement was in the children's best interest, and that Conrad had not made a preliminary ("prima facie") case that circumstances had changed enough to justify modifying custody of G.R. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reached two different results. First, it agreed with the district court that the children's consent was never actually part of the parties' agreement. The court noted Conrad relied on a single sentence taken out of context and that Conrad himself never proposed adding a consent-condition to the decree while the parties were exchanging drafts—the only real dispute was over the timing of the move. So the court affirmed the refusal to change the decree. Second, the court disagreed with how the district court handled the request to modify custody of G.R. Conrad had alleged that G.R., then 15, refused to relocate and wanted to stay in Nevada through high school, and he supported those allegations with a declaration. Under the governing standard, a court must accept such specific allegations as true when deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. The court concluded these allegations, if proven, could show a substantial change in circumstances, and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing and considered G.R.'s wishes (G.R. was available to testify). The court stressed it was expressing no opinion on whether Conrad should ultimately win—only that a hearing was required first. It left the current custody arrangement in place pending further proceedings.

Michelle and Elvis Rivero divorced, and their divorce decree said they would share "joint physical custody" of their young child — but the actual schedule gave the child to Ms. Rivero five days a week and Mr. Rivero two days a week. Neither parent was ordered to pay child support. About a year later, Ms. Rivero went back to court asking for primary custody and child support, claiming Mr. Rivero rarely spent time with the child himself and lacked suitable living arrangements. The trial judge, Judge Miley, kept the joint-custody label in place, denied child support, sent the parents to mediation to work out a schedule, and eventually changed the schedule to an even 50/50 split, saying she was "just trying to find a middle ground." Along the way, Ms. Rivero asked Judge Miley to step off the case (a request called recusal), and when the judge refused, formally moved to disqualify her, claiming the judge was biased based on the parties' physical appearance. The chief judge rejected that motion as meritless, and Judge Miley then ordered Ms. Rivero to pay Mr. Rivero's attorney fees for having to fight a frivolous motion. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court used the case to answer a question Nevada law had never resolved: what exactly is "joint physical custody"? The court adopted Missouri's definition — an arrangement giving each parent "significant, but not necessarily equal" time with the child, structured so the child has "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents." In other words, joint custody does not require an exact 50/50 split, but each parent's time must be significant and meaningful. Applying that framework, the supreme court held the trial court went wrong in two ways. First, it labeled the arrangement joint physical custody without making specific factual findings to back that up. Second, it changed the custody schedule to an equal split without making specific findings that the change was in the child's best interest — the touchstone for all custody decisions. Both rulings were sent back for a do-over under the new definition. On child support, the court held that a parent may be entitled to support under Nevada's child-support statutes regardless of what the divorce decree says, and that a court departing from the statutory amounts must explain why in specific factual findings. Because the trial court did neither, that ruling was also reversed. The supreme court also announced a new math formula — a modified version of its earlier Wright v. Osburn approach — for calculating support when parents share joint custody but split time unequally, accounting for both differences in income and differences in time spent caring for the child. Finally, the court sided with the trial judges on the bias claims. A judge is presumed unbiased, and unhappiness with a judge's rulings is not a legally recognized ground for disqualification; the record contained no evidence of bias. The attorney-fee award stood as well: the court rejected Ms. Rivero's argument that a statute shielding parties from contempt punishment for seeking a change of judge also shields them from paying attorney fees for filing a frivolous disqualification motion.