Nevada family-law case summaries

This case is about whether a child-welfare agency and the children themselves can appeal when a juvenile court dismisses a petition asking the court to protect the children from a parent. The petition here was filed under NRS Chapter 432B, the Nevada law that governs child-protection proceedings. After a hearing, the juvenile court found the abuse and neglect allegations against the father were not proven and threw the case out. CCDFS and the children tried to appeal that dismissal. The problem was a 2012 Nevada Supreme Court decision called In re A.B., which had said that orders coming out of juvenile proceedings involving child custody are not appealable - meaning the only way to challenge them in the Supreme Court was to file a writ of mandamus (a separate, more limited type of court request). The Supreme Court flagged this issue on its own and asked the parties to explain why the appeal should not be tossed out. The Supreme Court took a fresh look at the question and decided that In re A.B. got it wrong on this point. The court explained that Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 3A(b)(1) allows appeals from a "final judgment" entered by a district court, and that an order completely dismissing a child-protection case fits that definition because it ends the case and leaves nothing further for the court to decide. A juvenile court is part of the district court, so its final orders qualify. The father argued that a different rule, NRAP 3A(b)(7), which addresses appeals from certain child-custody orders that do not arise in juvenile court, blocks appeals from juvenile-court custody orders. The court rejected that reading. NRAP 3A(b)(7) by its terms simply does not cover juvenile-court custody orders; it does not strip away the appeal right that NRAP 3A(b)(1) provides for final judgments. The court therefore overruled In re A.B. in part - specifically, the part holding that all child-custody orders arising from juvenile proceedings are unappealable. The court was careful to limit its ruling: only orders that finally resolve NRS Chapter 432B proceedings are appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Interlocutory (mid-case) child-custody orders entered in those proceedings are still not appealable under this rule. Because the order in this case completely ended the child-protection proceedings, it is a final judgment, and the appeal may go forward. The court gave the appellants 60 days to file their opening brief.

This case involves a baby, A.R., who was removed from her parents in 2022 because of neglect and abuse. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) initially placed her with her paternal aunt, Mary. Over time, A.R. also began spending weekends with her maternal grandmother, Ericka. Both relatives loved A.R., wanted to adopt her, and were considered fit caregivers. After the parents' rights were terminated by the court, the district court had to decide where A.R. should live permanently. Both the aunt and the grandmother were good options, and the district court found them "equally situated" in most respects. To break the tie, the court considered DFS's recommendation. DFS preferred the aunt's home because A.R. had developed a close, sibling-like bond with her cousin (the aunt's child), and DFS believed keeping that bond intact was best for A.R. The court placed A.R. with the aunt for adoption, while preserving the grandmother's role through a Post Adoptive Contact Agreement giving her alternating weekend visits and two weeks of summer vacation each year. The grandmother asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in through a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to perform a duty required by law. She argued the district court placed too much weight on DFS's recommendation, did not make sufficient findings, did not hear enough evidence, and improperly favored a "nuclear family" structure. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and denied the petition. It explained that, after parental rights are terminated, a different statute (NRS 128.110) governs placement, and that statute gives the agency holding the child's custody discretion in deciding placement. The district court is not bound by the agency's preference, but it must consider it as part of figuring out what is in the child's best interest, which always remains the paramount concern. Here, the district court did exactly that: it acknowledged it could override DFS, but found DFS's reasoning - protecting A.R.'s bond with her cousin - persuasive. The Supreme Court also concluded that the district court's findings were sufficient and that its decision was not based on a generic preference for "traditional" families but on the specific facts of A.R.'s relationships. Some of the grandmother's other arguments were treated as waived because she did not raise them in the district court.

This case began as a child custody and support dispute. Rather than going through a normal appeal after a final decision, Tristan Alexander Davis asked the Court of Appeals to step in directly by issuing what is called a writ - an extraordinary order from a higher court. He sought either a writ of mandamus (a court order forcing a lower court or official to do something the law requires) or a writ of prohibition (a court order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its legal authority). He used these tools to challenge several orders that had been entered in his custody and support case. The Court of Appeals explained the limited situations in which these writs are available. A writ of mandamus can be used to compel an official to perform a legal duty, or to correct an exercise of discretion that is arbitrary or capricious. A writ of prohibition is used to stop a court that is acting outside of, or without, its jurisdiction (its legal power to hear and decide a matter). The court also noted that deciding whether to even take up such a petition is entirely within its own discretion, and that the person asking for the writ carries the burden of showing that this kind of relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the documents submitted with it, the court concluded that Davis had not shown that extraordinary relief was warranted. It therefore denied the petition. The order does not explain in detail which specific custody or support orders were challenged, nor does it set out particular factual findings about the underlying dispute.

This case arises from a child-welfare proceeding in Clark County. After 19-month-old K.T. died of head trauma and a leg fracture, the mother's boyfriend was arrested and charged with murder and child abuse. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, told investigators she had witnessed the boyfriend abuse K.T. but did not protect the child. Concerned about Bellamy's ability to protect her surviving 4-year-old daughter, A.T., DFS took protective custody of A.T. and the District Attorney filed a petition alleging A.T. was an abused or neglected child. When the case came before the district court, Bellamy entered a "no-contest" plea to the petition. A no-contest plea means the person does not admit the allegations are true but agrees not to fight them; the court then proceeds as if the allegations were admitted. The District Attorney objected, saying Nevada's child-welfare statute (NRS 432B.530) only allows a parent to either admit or deny the allegations, not plead no contest, unless the prosecutor agrees as part of a negotiation. The district judge accepted the plea anyway, made clear there was no deal attached to it (the District Attorney was not giving up the right to use Bellamy's statements in any future criminal case), and treated the plea as the equivalent of an admission for the dependency case. DFS, the District Attorney, and the child asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in by writ - an extraordinary order used when there is no ordinary appeal available. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because rulings under NRS Chapter 432B are not appealable, and the question of whether courts may accept no-contest pleas in these cases is an important legal issue. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners and denied the writ. The majority concluded that NRS 432B.530 says the court must give parties an "opportunity to admit or deny" the allegations, but does not strictly limit them to only those two responses. The majority found the statute ambiguous and looked to its purpose. Because Nevada's child-protection laws are designed to resolve cases quickly - delays harm children waiting for permanency - the majority held that allowing a no-contest plea serves that goal. A no-contest plea avoids a contested evidentiary hearing, lets DFS move forward with services and a reunification plan, and lets a parent avoid admitting to potentially criminal conduct (which could implicate the parent's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The majority also rejected the argument that accepting the plea over the prosecutor's objection violated separation of powers. Charging decisions and plea negotiations belong to the executive branch, but here the district court was not negotiating, not dropping charges, and not giving Bellamy any assurances about a future criminal case. Bellamy pleaded no contest to the entire petition as filed. Three justices dissented. They read the statute as plainly limiting parents to admitting or denying the allegations - nothing more - and would have granted the writ.

This case arose out of a child welfare proceeding in Clark County. DFS removed two children from their parents because of ongoing domestic violence and placed them with their paternal aunt. For two months, before the aunt became a licensed foster parent, DFS helped her pay rent. Once she became licensed, she began receiving regular foster care subsidies instead. The children's attorney later asked DFS for additional rental help for the aunt. DFS said no, explaining that the agency does not pay rental deposits. During a hearing on a motion to terminate the parents' rights, the aunt asked the judge for financial help. After learning DFS had earlier paid two months of rent, the district court ordered DFS to pay another $1,000 toward the aunt's rent. DFS asked the judge to reconsider; the judge refused. DFS then went to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking it to throw out the order. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case as a writ petition (an extraordinary request asking a higher court to step in) because DFS had no ordinary right to appeal this kind of mid-case order. On the merits, the court held that no Nevada statute gave the district court the power to order DFS to spend money on rent for a foster parent. The Legislature, the court explained, gave child-welfare agencies like DFS broad discretion to decide how to spend the money the state appropriates to them - the statute even says DFS may use block grant money for child welfare services "without restriction." When the district court ordered DFS to pay rent anyway, it stepped outside its role and into the agency's role. The Supreme Court therefore granted the petition and ordered the district court to vacate (cancel) its rental-assistance order. The court did not decide the constitutional separation-of-powers, due process, or local court rule arguments DFS also raised, because the statutory ruling alone resolved the case.

This case asks what happens to a Nevada parent's child-custody rights when she once pleaded guilty to felony child abuse but was later allowed to withdraw that guilty plea after completing probation. Yumila Cardenas-Garcia's six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from her home by Clark County Department of Family Services after the home was found to be unlivable. In a separate criminal case, Cardenas-Garcia pleaded guilty to felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment under NRS 200.508, and a judgment of conviction was entered. Her plea agreement was a so-called "drop-down" agreement: if she successfully completed probation, she could withdraw the felony plea and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor (contributing to the delinquency of a minor). She did complete probation, and the felony plea was withdrawn. A Nevada statute, NRS 432B.555, says that if a court finds a parent has "ever been convicted" of felony child abuse, the court cannot return the child to that parent unless the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child will not suffer physical or psychological harm from being returned. The district court held a hearing while Cardenas-Garcia still had the felony conviction on her record, found she had not met that high burden, and ruled the presumption against reunification applied. After her felony plea was withdrawn, she went back to the district court and asked it to find the statute no longer applied to her. The district court still found she had not rebutted the presumption. Cardenas-Garcia then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - an order from a higher court directing a lower court to do something it is legally required to do. She argued that because her felony conviction had been voided, she should not be treated as ever having been convicted, and the statute's higher burden should not apply. The Supreme Court disagreed and denied the writ. Focusing on the word "ever" in the statute, the majority held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who at any point had a felony child-abuse conviction entered against them, even if that conviction is later withdrawn or voided. The court reasoned that the Legislature's choice of "ever" directs courts to look back at any conviction that was at any point on the record, regardless of its current legal status. The court emphasized, however, that the presumption is not a permanent bar. A parent can keep trying to rebut it as circumstances change, and district courts should "freely grant leave" to present new evidence when a party shows a significant change in circumstances - such as Cardenas-Garcia's successful completion of probation. Justice Bell dissented. She would have held that under existing Nevada precedent, a withdrawn guilty plea is treated as if it never existed, so Cardenas-Garcia legally has no felony conviction at all and the statute should not apply.

This case is about who gets to care for a baby, J.B., whose parents were both incarcerated when he was born. (His parents had been arrested for the homicide of his older sibling.) Because neither parent could care for J.B., Nevada's child-welfare agency had to find someone else to take him in. Shortly after J.B.'s birth, DFS placed him with Becky and Jay Whipple, family friends of J.B.'s grandmother. The Whipples were not licensed foster parents at the time, and the district court signed an order describing them as "Unlicensed Fictive Kin." "Fictive kin," under Nevada law, means a person not related to a child by blood but who has a significant emotional and positive bond with the child. No one objected to that designation when it was made. Months later, after a paternity test confirmed Miles Stano Jr. was J.B.'s father, the father asked that J.B. be sent to live with the paternal grandfather in Illinois. After interstate paperwork was completed (about nine months after J.B. was placed with the Whipples, by which point the Whipples had become licensed foster parents), the district court held a placement hearing. The district court did not take evidence about what was best for J.B. Instead, the judge ruled that, as a matter of law, a blood relative always wins out over an unrelated person in placement decisions, and the judge also reversed course and decided the Whipples were not really fictive kin after all. The court ordered J.B. moved to Illinois. Compounding the issue, J.B.'s court-appointed attorney did not appear at the placement hearing or at the later reconsideration hearing. The Supreme Court noted J.B. was largely without representation throughout the case, even though state law requires that children in these proceedings be represented by counsel. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ and made several rulings. First, it explained that "fictive kin" status is judged from the perspective of both the prospective caregiver and the child. For an infant who cannot yet form relationships, the bond and commitment shown by the adult is what counts; an infant is not excluded from being placed with fictive kin just because the baby has not had time to bond. Second, the Supreme Court held that Nevada law does not put blood relatives ahead of fictive kin. The statute groups them together and prefers either over a foster home, but it does not rank them against each other. The decisive question is the child's best interest, and that requires actual factual findings. Third, the district court should not have proceeded with the placement hearing when J.B.'s attorney was absent and a continuance was being sought. Fourth, the Supreme Court ordered the case reassigned to a different district court judge, citing statements by the original judge that suggested he could not put aside his view that placement with "safe family" is always best. The Supreme Court vacated the placement order, lifted its prior stay, and sent the matter back for new proceedings before a different judge, who must hear evidence and make findings about what is actually in J.B.'s best interest.

Dana DeHesa worked for 14 years as a probation officer at the Clark County juvenile detention center. In August 2018, he was assigned to a unit that included a 15-year-old boy, referred to as J.J., who was on suicide watch. According to the opinion, DeHesa and J.J. engaged in "horseplay" - the two playing at slapping each other. When DeHesa went to close the door to J.J.'s room, J.J. stuck out his arm and tried to slap him. Even though DeHesa saw the boy's arm sticking out, he continued to close the door onto the forearm, pressing the door with both arms and his foot three times before letting J.J. pull his arm away. J.J. was injured. Several days later, J.J. told his parents about the incident during a visit. His parents raised concerns with a probation officer on duty. A report was eventually filed, and DFS investigated and "substantiated" - meaning it officially concluded there was enough evidence to support - an allegation of physical abuse. DeHesa appealed within the agency, lost, and then requested a formal administrative hearing. At that hearing, a hearing officer found DeHesa credible when he said the officers and juveniles engaged in horseplay and that he did not intend to hurt the boy. But the hearing officer concluded that intent to injure did not matter under the applicable state regulation, and that DeHesa's actions were "nonaccidental." The officer upheld the finding of abuse. DeHesa then asked the district court to review the decision. He argued two main things: first, that the hearing officer defined "nonaccidental" incorrectly by not requiring an intent to injure; and second, that his constitutional right to fair procedures (called "procedural due process") was violated because he could not use subpoenas to compel witnesses and documents that, he said, would have shown he properly reported the incident and that J.J. had a reason to lie. The district court rejected these arguments and denied his petition. Although DeHesa has since resigned, his name was placed on the Nevada State Central Registry - a state database of substantiated child abuse or neglect reports - which the opinion notes may adversely affect him. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that under the state regulation defining "nonaccidental," what matters is whether a person responsible for a child could reasonably foresee the harmful event - not whether the person intended to cause harm. Because DeHesa saw the boy's arm in the doorway, pressed the door repeatedly, worried about dislocating a shoulder or elbow, and admitted horseplay could be dangerous, the court concluded the injury was foreseeable and therefore nonaccidental. On the subpoena issue, the court explained that the record showed DeHesa never actually asked the hearing officer to issue a subpoena, so he did not preserve the issue for appeal. The court added that even if he had asked, it would not have changed things: the rule allowing subpoenas in regular court cases does not apply in administrative hearings, and Nevada law does not grant administrative agencies general subpoena power. The court also noted that the witness testimony he wanted would not have mattered because the finding of abuse rested on the injury being foreseeable, not on any failure to report. Finally, the court rejected DeHesa's claim that he was unfairly held to a higher standard than a parent would be. The court found the record showed he failed to follow the procedures required of all probation officers during shift changes, so he was held to the standard applicable to probation officers generally.

This case is about whether Nevada's child support enforcement agency followed the required procedures before enforcing a California child support order against a Nevada resident. In 2013, a California court entered an order naming "Jonathan Jace Roosevelt Smith" as the father of a minor child and requiring him to pay $238 per month in child support. In 2017, the Nevada Division of Welfare and Supportive Services filed a document in Nevada that combined a "notice and finding of financial responsibility" with a notice registering the California order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) - a law governing how one state enforces another state's support orders. Documents attached to the filing indicated Smith had not made payments and owed approximately $12,376 in arrears. Smith did not respond to the 2017 notice, but in 2021, after hiring a lawyer, he moved to void enforcement of the order. He alleged he was never served with notice of the California proceedings, the California order, or the 2017 Nevada notice, and that he only learned of the Nevada action when the agency intercepted $19,811.12 out of a $30,000 civil settlement paid to him by the Bureau of Prisons through the federal Treasury Offset Program. He also contended the California order was intended for a different person, as his name is "Jonathan Lee Smith," though the Court of Appeals noted he failed to present any evidence to support these assertions in the district court. The district court denied Smith's motion, reasoning that because the agency had previously notified Smith that his arrears were referred for federal collection, no additional notice was required before offsetting federal payments. But neither the district court nor the agency addressed Smith's argument that he was never served with the 2017 notice. On appeal, the agency admitted in its answering brief that it did not complete service of the Nevada notice on Smith in the manner required by statute, due to his incarceration. The Nevada Court of Appeals concluded the district court abused its discretion by failing to address Smith's non-service arguments. Nevada law requires that a notice and finding of financial responsibility be served on the parent, and that when an out-of-state support order is registered, the nonregistering party must be notified - requirements that protect a person's ability to contest the registration within a short window. Because Smith was never served, the district court effectively confirmed the amount of support and arrears he owed without giving him those protections. The court also concluded that the district court's finding that Smith received notice of the federal offset was not supported by evidence, because the only support for it was the oral argument of the agency's lawyer, and arguments of counsel are not evidence. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order and remanded, directing the district court to strike the 2017 notice. It clarified that this does not prevent continued enforcement of the California order by lawful means or a new registration proceeding, but any future attempt to judicially enforce the order in Nevada must comply with the registration and service requirements of NRS Chapter 130.

This case asks who is allowed to run the trial when the State seeks to permanently sever a parent's legal relationship with her child. In the Eighth Judicial District (Clark County), such trials had often been conducted by a "hearing master" - a court-appointed lawyer (not a judge) who hears evidence, makes findings, and recommends a result to a district judge, who then reviews the record and makes the final decision. The Nevada Supreme Court held that this two-step approach is not allowed for termination of parental rights (TPR) trials. A district judge - not a hearing master - must preside over the trial in the first instance. The underlying facts: Tahja L. was a teenager when she brought her six-month-old daughter L.L.S. to a Department of Family Services (DFS) office, hoping to place her temporarily while Tahja finished high school. DFS instead filed a neglect petition, placed L.L.S. in foster care, and eventually moved to terminate Tahja's parental rights. The case was assigned to a hearing master. L.L.S.'s lawyer objected, arguing that a district judge should hear the trial; Tahja did not join that objection. The juvenile court overruled the objection. After the originally assigned master became a district judge, a different hearing master conducted the trial, recommended termination, and the district judge - after watching the entire video of the trial - terminated Tahja's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, TPR proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B must be conducted by a "court," and although the statutes define "court" to include a hearing master under certain circumstances, that inclusion only works if the master's role is consistent with the Nevada Constitution. The court held that having a master preside over a TPR trial violates a parent's right to procedural due process, because the right at stake - the permanent loss of one's child - is so serious that the parent must present her case directly to the judge who will decide it, not to an intermediary whose findings are then reviewed from a recording. The court applied the three-part federal test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing (1) the parent's interest, (2) the risk that the procedure used will produce a wrong result, and (3) the government's interest in efficiency. The court described a parent's interest in keeping her child as among the strongest interests the law recognizes, comparing termination to a "civil death penalty." It found that having a master, rather than the judge, see witnesses face-to-face increases the risk of error, and that the State's efficiency interests are not significantly served, because the district judge still has to review the entire record. The court also pointed to recent legislative history in which the Eighth Judicial District's Chief Judge told lawmakers the district was specifically seeking new judges to "eliminate the use of hearing masters" in dependency cases. The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back for a new TPR trial before a district judge. Three justices dissented.

This case involves the State's effort to permanently end a father's legal relationship with his young son. Marcus and the child's mother, Dana, were both incarcerated when the child, T.M.R., was an infant. Marcus had pleaded guilty to felony coercion after an incident in which he hit Dana's 100-year-old great-grandmother, Gladys, and damaged her home. With both parents in custody, Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) placed T.M.R. in foster care and eventually petitioned to terminate the parents' rights so the child could be adopted. At trial, the State surprised Marcus by calling Gladys to testify even though it had never formally listed her as a trial witness in the manner Nevada's civil discovery rules normally require. Marcus asked the court to exclude her testimony because she had not been disclosed at least 45 days before trial as required by NRCP 16.2(e)(4). The trial judge ruled that NRCP 16.2's disclosure rules do not apply to termination of parental rights cases and let Gladys testify. After hearing all the evidence, the court terminated Marcus's parental rights. The Nevada Supreme Court used this appeal to clear up an ambiguity in the civil rules. The Court explained that Nevada has three related rules governing when parties must disclose their witnesses: NRCP 16.1 covers most civil cases (but exempts family-court cases), NRCP 16.2 covers divorces and similar matters, and NRCP 16.205 covers paternity and custody disputes between unmarried parents. None of the rules explicitly says it applies to a case to terminate parental rights. Reading the rules together, however, the Court concluded that NRCP 16.2's witness-disclosure rules do apply in termination cases. The Court reasoned that any other reading would allow "trial by ambush" - a surprise witness used against a parent facing what the Court described as "the equivalent of the civil death penalty." So the trial judge was wrong to admit Gladys's testimony without proper notice. But the Supreme Court went on to hold that the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because, even setting Gladys's testimony aside, there was more than enough other evidence to justify ending Marcus's parental rights. That evidence included: T.M.R. had been out of his parents' home for more than 14 months (which under Nevada law creates a legal presumption that termination is in the child's best interests); T.M.R. had bonded with his foster family, who wanted to adopt him; Marcus had failed to make timely progress on the case plan DFS designed to help him reunify with his son; Marcus minimized his drug use and blamed his relapses on Dana; he refused multiple drug tests; and he denied having anger problems despite the underlying violent incident. Because that evidence amply supported the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Marcus's parental rights.

This case is about whether a baby in foster care should be presumed to belong with her biological sister, even though that sister has already been adopted by another family. Baby Girl W. was born in October 2017 and was quickly placed in foster care as a child in need of protection. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) decided that adoption was the right long-term plan for her. Baby Girl W. has a 3-year-old biological half-sister named Vivian, who was previously adopted by Amy Mulkern in Massachusetts. DFS itself contacted Amy in early 2018 to ask whether she would adopt Baby Girl W. so the sisters could grow up together. Amy went through the interstate placement process and was approved as a possible placement. But DFS ultimately concluded that Baby Girl W. had bonded with her current foster parents - who are also willing to adopt her - and recommended she stay with them. Amy went to the Nevada district court handling the dependency case. The court allowed Amy and the foster parents to participate as "persons with a special interest," meaning they can recommend a placement and testify at the placement hearing. But the district court also ruled that, because Vivian had been adopted, she was no longer legally Baby Girl W.'s sibling for purposes of a Nevada statute - NRS 432B.550(5)(a) - that tells courts to presume placing siblings together is in a foster child's best interest. The district court therefore decided that presumption did not apply. Amy and Vivian asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing the lower court to do something it is required by law to do. They wanted the Supreme Court to make the district court apply the sibling presumption when deciding where Baby Girl W. should live. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Amy and Vivian on that point. The court explained that Nevada law repeatedly emphasizes keeping siblings together - in initial protective placements, in placements after parental rights are terminated, in adoptions, and in custody decisions. No Nevada statute says that adoption erases sibling status for placement purposes. Because the Legislature has stressed sibling relationships so consistently, the court concluded it would not assume - without clearer instruction - that lawmakers wanted the presumption to vanish the moment one sibling is adopted. The court therefore directed the district court to apply the rebuttable sibling presumption in NRS 432B.550(5) when deciding where to place Baby Girl W. "Rebuttable" means the presumption can still be overcome - the district court can still decide, based on evidence, that placement with the sibling is not in the baby's best interest. The court did not order any other relief, noting that the district court had already considered the Mulkerns' arguments, included Amy as a possible placement, and invited her to participate at the upcoming placement hearing. The court also added a footnote making clear that its ruling does not change separate Nevada rules about confidentiality, visitation, or inheritance after adoption, and does not require DFS to do more than its statutory duty to look for relatives.

This case arose after the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) received an anonymous hotline call in April 2010 alleging that Keaundra D.'s infant son, C.L.B., Jr., had been burned on the face. Keaundra told investigators that the burn occurred when her two-year-old daughter, A.D.L., reported that C.L.B., Jr. had "tried to kiss" a hot iron that fell off a dresser while Keaundra was in another room. DFS removed both children from Keaundra's care. One physician who examined the child in person, Dr. Neuman, found "no evidence of abuse." A different doctor, Dr. Mehta, who reviewed only photographs, opined the burn was deliberate. The juvenile court found the injury was nonaccidental and ordered Keaundra to follow a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to get her children back. She maintained housing and a job, kept in touch with DFS, completed parenting classes, and finished a physical-abuse assessment and therapy. Her therapist testified that her risk of reoffending was low and that she showed none of the signs typical of an abusive parent. DFS itself reported that she had "successfully completed her case plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children." But DFS still wanted her parental rights terminated, and the district court still terminated them, for one reason: Keaundra would not admit that she had deliberately held the iron to her son's face. Her case plan required her to "articulate" the "sequence of events" leading to the abuse "as sustained by the Court." Because she insisted the burn was accidental, the court treated her as out of compliance. DFS confirmed at trial that, had Keaundra admitted intentional abuse, it would not have sought termination. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves, not just in criminal trials but in any proceeding where their answers might be used against them in a future criminal case. Admitting that one held a hot iron to a child's face would expose a person to prosecution for child abuse under Nevada law (NRS 200.508). The court held that a parent cannot be forced to choose between admitting a crime and losing her children - that choice is unconstitutionally coercive. The court drew a line: a juvenile court may require a parent to participate in meaningful therapy, even if therapy works better when a parent acknowledges past conduct, and a parent who refuses meaningful therapy may face consequences. But a court cannot require, as a condition of keeping parental rights, that the parent expressly admit to a crime. The court also held that the evidence did not support termination on its own merits. Nevada law presumes termination is in a child's best interest when the child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 consecutive months, and presumes a parent has made only "token efforts" in similar circumstances. The court found Keaundra rebutted both presumptions: she stayed in regular phone contact, her mother brought the children to visit, A.D.L. cried and begged to go home to her mother, Keaundra helped support the children financially, and after the first termination order the children waited 17 months in foster care before being placed with relatives. Without the presumptions, there was not substantial evidence to terminate.

This case asks a question that Nevada's appellate courts had not previously answered head-on: can a court terminate a parent's rights to her child when the parent is so mentally ill that she would not be considered competent to stand trial in a criminal case? The Nevada Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances here, yes - the trial may go forward. The mother in this case had been diagnosed with schizoaffective bipolar disorder. Shortly after her son was born, hospital staff alerted the Department of Family Services because the mother insisted the baby was not hers and tried to take a different child. Two months later she brought the baby to the hospital claiming the infant had told her, in full sentences, that he had an earache. The child was placed in protective custody, adjudicated neglected, and made a ward of the court. The mother received a case plan focused on her mental health, but DFS observed that her condition did not improve. While the termination case was pending, she was arrested for allegedly boarding a bus and trying to take another child she believed was hers, and she was repeatedly found incompetent to stand trial in that criminal case. The district court did several things to protect the mother's interests. It appointed a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to look after the legal interests of someone who cannot represent themselves) under Rule 17(c) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. It granted multiple continuances - delays - hoping the mother would regain competence. When that did not happen, the court ultimately conducted the termination trial without her present in September 2015, with her guardian ad litem in attendance, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the mother argued that proceeding without her violated her constitutional right to due process. She pointed to a U.S. Supreme Court case, Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires courts to balance the private interest, the risk of an inaccurate result, and the government's interest before depriving someone of an important right. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that challenge. It explained that, unlike criminal cases, civil cases - including termination cases - do not require a court to wait indefinitely for a party to regain mental competence. Nevada law actually allows mental illness itself to be a basis for finding parental fault, so it would be inconsistent to also require the court to halt the case forever because of that same illness. The court noted that children have a powerful interest in stability and permanency, and that holding a child "in limbo" until a parent might one day be well enough to participate is not what Nevada law contemplates. The district court had given the mother many chances and had effectively considered all the factors that due process required. The mother also argued that the State had improperly served her by publication (publishing notice in a newspaper rather than handing it to her directly) when it actually knew or could have known where she was. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the State's conduct was proper, but ruled that the mother's lawyer never raised this objection in the district court, so the issue was waived and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court therefore affirmed the order terminating her parental rights.