Nevada family-law case summaries

Ryan and Marie are the divorced parents of three young children. After their 2019 separation, Marie was awarded primary physical and sole legal custody, and a psychologist evaluated Ryan, finding him unfit at the time and recommending therapy followed by gradual reunification with the children. Marie was permitted to relocate with the children to California. Ryan briefly had supervised in-person visits and then weekly virtual visits, but the visits stopped in June 2020 after Marie switched to a paid supervision platform that Ryan said he could not afford. In the years that followed, Ryan continued to seek treatment from multiple mental-health providers, several of whom reported he had made progress and recommended reunification. He sent diapers, wipes, money toward a medical procedure for one of the twins, and a pair of custom sneakers. He also emailed Marie's lawyer asking to see his children. He did not, however, formally move the court to modify custody, and he did not pay court-ordered child support, citing financial difficulties tied in part to a prior felony conviction. In late 2022, Marie filed a petition to terminate Ryan's parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court terminated Ryan's rights, finding he had abandoned and neglected the children and made only "token efforts" to be involved in their lives. The court relied on two statutes: NRS 128.107, which lists factors courts must consider in termination cases, and NRS 128.109, which creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for a long time. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that NRS 128.107 does not apply when the children are in the physical custody of a parent (as opposed to foster care, a relative, or a guardian), and that NRS 128.109 applies only in cases brought under NRS Chapter 432B - the chapter governing child welfare cases involving the State. Because this was a private termination proceeding by one parent against the other, neither statute fit. The court also concluded that the evidence did not support any of the three parental-fault grounds. On abandonment, the court reasoned that the statutory presumption did not apply because the children were placed with Marie by court order, and even if it did, Ryan rebutted it by repeatedly requesting visits, sending gifts and support, and pursuing the treatment recommended by the custody evaluator. The court emphasized that financial inability to pay support cannot itself establish abandonment, and that an unrepresented parent's failure to navigate court procedures cannot be held against them in this context. On neglect, the court noted Marie testified the children were thriving in her care, so Ryan's conduct could not be deemed sufficiently harmful. On token efforts, Ryan's documented therapy, requests for visitation, and gifts were enough to defeat the finding. The court reversed the termination order, instructed the district court to order destruction of the amended birth certificates that had been issued (which had changed the children's last names), and sent the case back for further proceedings. Justice Lee concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's reading of NRS 128.107, arguing the statute should apply whenever the parent whose rights are being considered does not have physical custody, even if the other parent does.