Nevada family-law case summaries

Natalie and Doug Gennardo married in 2002 and had three children. Doug filed for divorce in May 2019. After Doug moved out in December 2019, the parents tried to share custody, but there was significant conflict. According to the opinion, Natalie struggled with extreme alcohol abuse and sometimes exhibited violent behavior. After a confrontation between the parents in April 2020, Doug asked the court for primary physical custody. Natalie agreed to attend a 30-day treatment program in Arizona. While she was away, the court put a temporary arrangement in place giving Doug primary physical custody and leaving contact between Natalie and the children at Doug's discretion. A therapist was enlisted to try to repair Natalie's relationship with the children, which had seriously deteriorated. The children reported not wanting to see her. For roughly a year, Natalie could see the children only under the therapist's supervision or when Doug allowed it, and the court did not set a parenting-time schedule or hold a hearing on the temporary arrangement during that time. Because the case had complicated financial issues that delayed the trial, the court eventually decided in February 2021 to resolve custody before the trial on money matters. It held three custody hearings in April and May 2021, heard testimony, and awarded the parents joint legal custody with primary physical custody to Doug. It made findings on each of the statutory factors that guide a child's best interest. Separately, Doug's employer, Marriott, cut his pay early in the pandemic and told him in June 2021 that his Las Vegas position would be eliminated. In July, Marriott offered him a comparable job in Texas. Doug accepted and asked the court to let the children move with him. In August 2021, the court allowed a temporary move ahead of a promised hearing meant to permanently decide the relocation issue. That hearing was never held. Instead, after the trial on the financial matters, the court entered a final decree making the relocation permanent. Natalie asked the court to reconsider because the promised hearing never happened; the court denied her request. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reached different conclusions on the different issues. On custody, the court said the trial judge did not strictly follow Nevada's process favoring joint physical custody and may have shifted the burden of proof onto Natalie, which was an error. But the court concluded the custody decision was still supported by substantial evidence and adequately explained, so it did not reverse the custody award. The court also found that the trial judge had improperly created what amounted to a de facto sole physical custody arrangement — giving Doug complete control over Natalie's time with the children and refusing to set a schedule or a hearing for about a year — and then gave too much weight to that one year while disregarding Natalie's 16 years as the children's primary caretaker. The court called this clearly erroneous but concluded it did not change the custody result because Natalie did not show a different outcome was reasonably likely without the error. On the temporary relocation, the court held the trial judge acted within its discretion in allowing the children to move temporarily before a hearing, given the exigent circumstances of Doug being the family's sole provider and needing to start a job in another state. On the permanent relocation, however, the court held that the trial judge abused its discretion by making it permanent without ever holding the evidentiary hearing it had repeatedly promised. Because no actual evidence was taken, the court's relocation "findings" rested only on lawyers' arguments and motion exhibits, which the appellate court found insufficient. The court further held that this deprived Natalie of her constitutionally protected due process rights, because she was never given the opportunity to challenge Doug's claims and present her own evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the custody decision, reversed the permanent relocation, and sent the case back for a prompt hearing on relocation. It noted the temporary relocation order may remain in effect while that hearing is pending.

Paul Bertuccini and Lisa Esposito have one child together, born in 2011. They divorced in 2014 and agreed to share joint legal custody, with Esposito having primary physical custody. The parenting-time arrangement was modified in 2015 and 2016, ultimately giving Bertuccini roughly ten days a month with the child. In 2021, Bertuccini asked the court for joint physical custody. He argued that circumstances had changed enough to justify revisiting custody. Specifically, he claimed: (1) the child, now approaching puberty and middle school, had changed mental and emotional needs; (2) both parents' work schedules had changed, leaving Esposito with less time and him with more; (3) the parents continued to struggle with custody exchanges, coparenting, school decisions, and extracurricular activities; and (4) Esposito was, in his view, encouraging a negative relationship between the child, Bertuccini, and the child's step-sister. Esposito disagreed with these factual claims and argued that merely more time passing was not enough to require a change in custody. After the written filings and a hearing that did not include the presentation of evidence, the district court issued a six-page order denying the motion. The court reasoned that "the passage of time and/or the age of the child are not factors creating a substantial change of circumstances," and that Bertuccini therefore had not made the preliminary showing (called a "prima facie case") needed to trigger a full hearing where evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals disagreed with how the district court handled the motion. It found that the lower court focused only on the passage-of-time point and never addressed the several other issues Bertuccini raised - the child's schooling and emotional needs, the changed work schedules, the parents' ability to cooperate, and the child's relationship with her step-sibling. Under recent Nevada caselaw, when deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, a court is generally supposed to accept the moving parent's specific factual allegations as true and must explain its reasoning. Because the district court did not address these other allegations, the Court of Appeals concluded it had abused its discretion (used its authority improperly) and had not given an adequate explanation. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial and sent the case back ("remanded") so the district court can make more complete findings, and it directed the lower court to apply the guidance from a case called Myers v. Haskins in any further proceedings.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.