Nevada family-law case summaries

Dory and Eli Mizrachi divorced in 2012. In their divorce, the court gave both parents joint legal custody (shared authority over major decisions) and joint physical custody (roughly shared parenting time) of their son, J.M., who was born in 2008. In 2020, Eli asked the court to change the custody arrangement so he would have primary physical custody. He said J.M. reported that Dory had physically struck him, used inappropriate language, and had inappropriate conversations with him, and that Dory sometimes left the home at night, leaving J.M. unsupervised. Eli argued this amounted to a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting J.M.'s welfare and that giving him primary physical custody was in J.M.'s best interest. Dory disagreed, denied mistreating J.M., raised claims of domestic violence she said Eli committed during the marriage, and asked to keep the existing shared arrangement. The case moved through several stages. In March 2022, the court entered an order reflecting a temporary agreement letting J.M., who was older by then, use some discretion about how long he stayed with each parent. Later, the judge originally handling the case, Judge Mary Perry, recused herself (stepped aside) after acknowledging she had improperly asked Dory's attorney to help her courtroom clerk with a court issue. Eli asked her to recuse; Dory did not object. The case was reassigned to Judge Dawn Throne, who reviewed the record and video recordings of prior testimony rather than starting the whole hearing over. Neither party wanted to recall witnesses. After hearing evidence, including testimony from J.M. and both parents, Judge Throne found there had been a substantial change in circumstances, chiefly the serious deterioration of the relationship between J.M. and Dory. The court reviewed the statutory "best interest" factors and concluded it was in J.M.'s best interest to give Eli primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody and giving Dory scheduled parenting time. On appeal, Dory made six arguments. The Court of Appeals rejected all of them. It held: the March 2022 order was temporary, not final, so the court could keep holding hearings; Dory waived her complaint about Judge Perry's recusal because she did not object at the time; Judge Throne was sufficiently familiar with the record and did not have to restart the hearing; the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of the court's discretion; even if the court was wrong to exclude testimony about pre-divorce domestic violence, Dory did not show that error affected the outcome (so it was "harmless"); and the exclusion of the child's new therapist's testimony was proper under the "law-of-the-case doctrine" because a prior judge had already decided that issue and Dory did not show a reason to revisit it.

Noune Davitian-Kostanian and Varoujan Kostanian divorced in 2012 after more than 25 years of marriage. Their stipulated divorce decree required Varoujan to pay Noune alimony for ten years (ending October 1, 2021) and to pay child support for their youngest son, Alex, who has autism, until he turned 18 (or graduated high school at 19). Alex turned 18 in 2015, and child support stopped at that time. One day before Varoujan's last alimony payment was due, Noune filed a motion asking the family court to (1) extend or modify alimony, and (2) restart child support for Alex as a disabled adult. The district court denied both requests. On child support, the court said it had no power to act because Alex was already an adult and support had ended years earlier. On alimony, the court found Noune had not shown a "change in circumstances." The Nevada Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed. On child support, the Court held the district court was wrong to say it lacked jurisdiction. Nevada has a special statute, NRS 125B.110, that requires a parent to keep supporting a handicapped child past age 18 if the handicap arose before adulthood and the child cannot become self-supporting. Nothing in that statute requires the parent seeking support to ask before the child turns 18, and nothing imposes a deadline. The fact that more than five years had passed since Alex's child support ended is just one factor for the lower court to weigh, not a bar. The Court sent the case back so the district court can make findings about whether Alex qualifies for continued support. On alimony, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. NRS 125.150(8) says alimony "may" be modified on a showing of changed circumstances, and a 20-percent change in the paying spouse's gross monthly income triggers a review - but does not force the court to actually change the alimony. The district court considered Noune's arguments and reasonably concluded she had not adequately supported her claim of changed circumstances. That decision was within the trial court's discretion.

Christina and Mitchell divorced in 2008 and had two children together, M.S. (17 at the time of the opinion) and E.S. (14). This appeal concerned only the physical custody of M.S.; the parents continued to share joint legal custody of both children and joint physical custody of E.S., and those arrangements were not challenged. In August 2019, Mitchell asked the court to let the children decide for themselves whether to spend custodial time at Christina's home ("teenage discretion"), saying the children did not want to go there because of fights with Christina. Christina opposed this and asked the court to hold Mitchell in contempt for keeping the children from her. After several hearings, the court ordered the parents back onto a week-on/week-off schedule and directed that custody exchanges happen at a supervised visitation center called "Donna's House." The center and child-interview reports indicated the children refused to participate in exchanges with Christina. The court then found there was enough reason ("adequate cause") to hold an evidentiary hearing - a trial-like proceeding with testimony - to decide whether custody should change. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from both children, Mitchell, and Christina. Both children said they preferred to live with Mitchell because of turmoil when with Christina. M.S. described two physical fights with Christina - one in May 2019 (Christina allegedly tackled her, pulled her hair, and hit her) and one in August 2019 (Christina allegedly scratched her, pulled her hair, and pushed her). E.S. said he saw and heard parts of these altercations. M.S. also testified about hurtful language Christina used about her, her stepmother, and her half-sibling. The district court decided it was in M.S.'s best interest for Mitchell to become her primary physical custodian, largely because of the conflict between M.S. and Christina. The court found that Christina had engaged in acts of domestic violence against M.S. under one of the "best interest" factors listed in the statute, but it noted the incidents were softened by the fact that M.S. was an active participant, that it was hard to tell who started them, and that any injuries were minor. Importantly, the court did not use the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard, did not cite the separate statute that creates a legal presumption against giving custody to a domestic-violence perpetrator, and did not apply any such presumption. On appeal, Christina argued the court should have used the clear-and-convincing standard and allowed her to rebut that presumption. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the district court never applied the domestic-violence presumption against Christina in the first place, so she was not harmed by not being given a chance to rebut it - and she had in fact testified about the incidents. The court also said the ordinary standard for civil child-custody matters is "preponderance of the evidence," not clear and convincing, unless the legislature says otherwise, and Christina cited no authority requiring the higher standard just to consider domestic-violence allegations among the best-interest factors. Finally, the court held that even if the district court had made a mistake about the domestic-violence framework, the error was harmless because the district court gave many other reasons - M.S.'s own wish (at nearly 18) to live with her father, and the fractured relationship between M.S. and Christina - that independently supported the custody change. Because those findings were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.