Nevada family-law case summaries

This is a very short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. Julia Chumak had filed an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court in a family-law matter involving Jose von Buchwald. Before the court reached any questions about the substance of the case, both sides agreed to end the appeal. In legal terms, they filed a "stipulation" - a formal agreement between the parties. Based on that agreement, the court dismissed (ended) the appeal. The court also stated that each side would pay its own costs and attorney fees rather than one side reimbursing the other. The order does not explain what the original dispute was about, what the lower court decided, or why Chumak appealed. It simply records that the parties agreed to stop the appeal and that the court granted that request.

This is a very short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. The two parties in this family-court case agreed between themselves (a "stipulation") that the appeal should end. Because both sides agreed, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, citing NRAP 42, the appellate rule governing voluntary dismissals. The court also ordered that "The parties shall bear theit own costs and attorney fees" - meaning each side pays its own legal expenses rather than one side paying the other's. The order says nothing about what the underlying family-law dispute involved or who would have prevailed; those questions were never decided by the appellate court.

This is a short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. Two parties, Renata Popelkova and Howard Miller, had a case in the family court. One side (Popelkova) appealed and the other side (Miller) filed a cross-appeal - meaning both parties asked the Nevada Supreme Court to review something from the lower court. Before the court decided any of the underlying issues, the two sides reached an agreement to end the appeals. This kind of agreement is called a stipulation - a formal, mutual agreement between the parties that is submitted to the court. Based on that stipulation, the court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The order also states that each side will pay its own costs and attorney fees. Because this is a dismissal by agreement, the opinion does not explain the facts of the underlying family-law dispute, does not resolve any legal question, and does not address who "won." It simply closes out the appellate proceedings.

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson were divorced. After the divorce, they continued to fight in court over issues involving their two minor children, including custody, support, medical expenses, and which school the children would attend. Matthew filed a motion asking the court to address several of these issues. At a September 2018 hearing, Matthew told the court that the only issue he actually wanted to take to an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented) was his request to change the children's school. Even so, according to the opinion, he kept pursuing discovery — the formal process of gathering information and documents — on other issues he no longer intended to litigate. Chelsea eventually asked the court to rule in her favor without a trial (a motion for summary judgment) on all the claims. Matthew then tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court found he had not done so in time, which forced Chelsea to spend money filing her summary judgment motion to get those requests dismissed. The court ruled in Chelsea's favor on those requests but allowed the school-choice issue to go forward to the evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled, and Matthew ultimately agreed to the school Chelsea had wanted. Chelsea then asked the court to make Matthew pay her attorney fees and costs. The court awarded her $45,503.17. Matthew appealed. The first time, the appellate court sent the case back because it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. On remand, the district court explained its reasoning more fully and again awarded the same amount. In this second appeal, Matthew argued the district court made several mistakes: that it wrongly treated Chelsea's summary judgment win as proof his claims were frivolous; that fees to a "prevailing party" are only allowed in cases involving money judgments; that filing his withdrawals late was not the same as frivolous litigation; and that Chelsea's original sworn statement supporting her fee request was defective. The Court of Appeals disagreed with each point and affirmed the fee award.