Nevada family-law case summaries

Richard and Melissa were divorced in 2014 by a stipulated decree - an agreement the parties reached and the court entered as its order. Under that decree, the two shared joint legal custody of their five children, but Melissa had primary physical custody, meaning the children lived mainly with her, while Richard had parenting time on Tuesday nights and alternating weekends. In November 2021, Richard asked the court to change this arrangement. He filed a motion after an argument in September 2021 between Melissa and their oldest son, C.D. According to Richard, when he arrived to pick up the children, Melissa was arguing with C.D. and told him he could not leave with Richard, and that if he did, he could not come back. Richard said Melissa would not let C.D. gather his belongings and later cut off his access to his cell phone and bank accounts. Richard said that, apart from a few exceptions, C.D. had lived with him since then. Richard also claimed Melissa had a history of keeping him from seeing the other children during his weekday parenting time. He asked the court to give him primary physical custody of C.D., to adjust his child support, and to hold an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented) and to interview the children. Melissa disagreed. She said she never prevented C.D. from coming home and that C.D. chose to go with Richard to avoid discipline for not finishing schoolwork and for sneaking out to see his girlfriend. She said the children were doing well in her care and that Richard had not shown enough of a change in circumstances to justify changing custody. She also said C.D. had actually returned to her home at various times, including a two-week period while Richard was on vacation. She asked the court to award her attorney fees, calling Richard's motion frivolous. The district court held a hearing without taking evidence. It denied Richard's request to change custody and to hold an evidentiary hearing, finding he had not made out a "prima facie case" for modification - meaning he had not, on the face of his filings, shown enough to justify a full hearing. Because C.D. was almost 17, the court said it had "no problem granting [C.D.] teenage discretion," letting C.D. choose which parent to live with. The court also denied Richard's request to interview the children and to change child support, and denied Melissa's request for attorney fees. Both parents appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. When someone asks to modify custody, the court generally must assume the moving party's specific factual claims are true unless the other side's evidence conclusively proves them false. Here, Richard's claims - that Melissa tried to prevent C.D. from leaving, that C.D. had been living mainly with Richard since the incident, and that Melissa interfered with his parenting time - were new, were relevant, and, if true, could show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare. Melissa's disagreement might eventually prove correct, but at this early stage she had not conclusively disproven Richard's claims. So the court decided a hearing was required. The Court of Appeals also found a problem with the "teenage discretion" ruling. By giving C.D. unlimited discretion to choose where to live, while not actually changing the custody order, the court created a situation where C.D. was living mainly with Richard, yet Richard was still paying child support as though Melissa had primary custody, and Melissa - though still officially the primary custodian - could not actually exercise that custody. The court concluded this was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing. Because of that, it did not decide the child support and attorney fees questions, leaving those for the district court to revisit on remand.

Aaron and Tracy Romano divorced in 2019. They have seven minor children. Before the divorce decree was entered, they signed a stipulated order resolving custody. Under that arrangement, the three oldest children spend roughly 90 percent of their time with Aaron, and the four youngest spend roughly 95 percent of their time with Tracy. Even though those percentages would not normally count as "joint physical custody" under Nevada law (which generally requires each parent to have the children at least 40 percent of the time), the parties agreed to label the arrangement joint physical custody. They also signed a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) setting Aaron's child-support payments and Tracy's alimony, and providing that the prevailing party in any litigation over the MSA would get attorney fees. About eight months later, Aaron asked the court to officially relabel the arrangement: he wanted the order to say he had primary physical custody of the three older children and Tracy had primary physical custody of the four younger children. He also asked the court to recalculate child support, both because of the actual time-share and because, he said, Tracy's monthly income had jumped from $0 to about $6,018. Tracy responded that nothing had actually changed - the time-share was exactly what they had agreed to, and her income (alimony plus interest on a promissory note Aaron pays) was already known and built into the deal. The district court denied Aaron's motion. It said there was no change in circumstances justifying a custody change, suggested Aaron was really trying to manufacture a change so he could take advantage of new child-support guidelines, and found Tracy's income had not actually changed. It then awarded Tracy attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court used the case to clear up a recurring confusion in its own prior decisions. Earlier cases had suggested that courts use one test to modify "joint" physical custody and a different test to modify "primary" physical custody. The Supreme Court held that there is just one test, regardless of label: the parent asking to change the arrangement must show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children's welfare, and (2) that the change would serve the children's best interest. The Court overruled the part of its earlier Rivero decision that had implied a district court must first figure out which kind of custody actually exists before deciding whether to change it. Applying that single test, the Court agreed with the district court that nothing meaningful had changed in the short time since the parties signed their agreement. The actual time-share was the same one the parties had agreed to. On child support, the Court held that Nevada's new child-support guidelines (in NAC Chapter 425, effective February 2020) do not, by themselves, count as a "change in circumstances" that lets a parent reopen support. A specific regulation, NAC 425.170(3), says exactly that, and the Court ruled the regulation is a valid exercise of the agency's authority. Tracy's income also did not count as a change, because it was already factored into the original agreement. Because Aaron lost on the merits, Tracy was the prevailing party, and the attorney-fees award (based on the MSA's fee-shifting clause and NRS 18.010(2)(b)) was upheld.

Aaron and Tracy Romano divorced in 2019 and have seven minor children together. Before the divorce decree was entered, the couple signed a stipulated order spelling out a complicated custody timeshare: the three oldest children spend roughly 90 percent of their time with Aaron, and the four youngest spend about 95 percent of their time with Tracy. Even though those percentages would not normally qualify as "joint physical custody" under Nevada law (which generally requires each parent to have the child at least 40 percent of the time), the parents agreed to call it joint physical custody anyway. They also signed a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) that set Aaron's child-support payments and other financial terms. About eight months later, Aaron asked the district court to "confirm" that the actual living arrangement was really primary physical custody (not joint), and to recalculate child support accordingly. He argued two things had changed: the actual time-share with the children, and Tracy's monthly income, which he said had risen from $0 to about $6,018. He also argued that Nevada had adopted new child-support guidelines (NAC Chapter 425, effective February 1, 2020) and that the new guidelines were themselves a change of circumstances justifying a recalculation. The district court denied the motion, found Aaron had not shown any change in circumstances, awarded Tracy her attorney fees, and Aaron appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court used the case to clean up an inconsistency in Nevada custody law. For years, courts had applied two different tests depending on whether parents had "joint" or "primary" physical custody. The Court now holds there is just one test: to modify any physical custody arrangement, the parent asking for the change must show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) that the modification serves the child's best interest. The Court overruled portions of its earlier decision in Rivero v. Rivero to the extent that case suggested a district court must first figure out whether the existing arrangement is "really" joint or primary before ruling on a motion to modify. Applied to Aaron's case, the Court held the district court reasonably found nothing had substantially changed in the few months between the stipulated order and Aaron's motion. The custodial timeshare was the same one the parents had agreed to, and Tracy's income reflected payments (alimony and interest on a promissory note from Aaron) that were part of the same global settlement. On child support, the Court held that Tracy's income had not actually increased post-MSA - it was already what the parties used when they set support. As to the new state child-support guidelines, the Court pointed to NAC 425.170(3), a regulation stating that adoption of new guidelines, by itself, is not a change in circumstances sufficient to modify an existing child-support order. The Court held that regulation is a valid exercise of the agency's authority delegated by NRS 425.620 and NRS 425.450(1), and it carves out a narrow exception to the general rule that a change in the law can be a change in circumstances. Finally, because Tracy was the prevailing party and the MSA and NRS 18.010(2)(b) authorized fees, the Court upheld the attorney fees award.