Nevada family-law case summaries

Egan Walker and Laura Latimer divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During the marriage, Walker had worked as a deputy district attorney and earned about 8.54 years of credits in Nevada's Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS). As part of the divorce, the couple signed a marital settlement agreement that gave Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits accrued through June 1, 2001. To secure her share, the agreement called for a "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO) - a court order recognized by retirement plans that directs how benefits are split. The QDRO required Walker to choose "Option 2" at retirement, which is a payment plan where the retiree gets a smaller monthly check during life so that, after death, a designated beneficiary continues receiving the same amount for life. After the divorce, Walker remarried, then later returned to public service as a court master and ultimately as a district court judge. When he became a judge, he had a one-time choice to keep his retirement benefits in PERS or move them into the Judicial Retirement System (JRS). He chose JRS and named his current wife as his beneficiary. Years later, when planning for retirement, Walker discovered that PERS and JRS had historically allowed only one person to be named as an Option 2 beneficiary. That created a problem: Latimer was contractually entitled to be an Option 2 beneficiary for her share, but Walker also wanted his current wife to be an Option 2 beneficiary for the rest. Walker asked the district court to sort it out. The district court agreed Walker could name both his ex-wife and current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries, but it also said Latimer was entitled only to 4.25 years of PERS credits and got nothing from the JRS account. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the relevant Nevada statute does not actually prohibit naming more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court read the statute alongside other Nevada laws protecting a former spouse's interest in retirement benefits, and concluded that allowing two Option 2 beneficiaries best honors what the parties bargained for in the divorce: Latimer keeps her contracted-for share, and the current wife receives the rest. The court was not persuaded by PERS's arguments that federal tax law or actuarial complexity required a single-beneficiary rule. But the Supreme Court disagreed with the part of the order that gave Latimer credits in a PERS account that no longer exists. Because Walker had moved his PERS service credits into JRS, his old PERS account was closed, so awarding Latimer 4.25 years of credits in that closed account was, in the court's words, awarding her "a portion of nothing." The court held that when an ex-spouse has a protected interest in PERS retirement benefits and the member then transfers those benefits to JRS, the ex-spouse's interest follows the money into JRS. The case was sent back to the district court to fix that part of the order.

Dory and Eli Mizrachi divorced in 2012. In their divorce, the court gave both parents joint legal custody (shared authority over major decisions) and joint physical custody (roughly shared parenting time) of their son, J.M., who was born in 2008. In 2020, Eli asked the court to change the custody arrangement so he would have primary physical custody. He said J.M. reported that Dory had physically struck him, used inappropriate language, and had inappropriate conversations with him, and that Dory sometimes left the home at night, leaving J.M. unsupervised. Eli argued this amounted to a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting J.M.'s welfare and that giving him primary physical custody was in J.M.'s best interest. Dory disagreed, denied mistreating J.M., raised claims of domestic violence she said Eli committed during the marriage, and asked to keep the existing shared arrangement. The case moved through several stages. In March 2022, the court entered an order reflecting a temporary agreement letting J.M., who was older by then, use some discretion about how long he stayed with each parent. Later, the judge originally handling the case, Judge Mary Perry, recused herself (stepped aside) after acknowledging she had improperly asked Dory's attorney to help her courtroom clerk with a court issue. Eli asked her to recuse; Dory did not object. The case was reassigned to Judge Dawn Throne, who reviewed the record and video recordings of prior testimony rather than starting the whole hearing over. Neither party wanted to recall witnesses. After hearing evidence, including testimony from J.M. and both parents, Judge Throne found there had been a substantial change in circumstances, chiefly the serious deterioration of the relationship between J.M. and Dory. The court reviewed the statutory "best interest" factors and concluded it was in J.M.'s best interest to give Eli primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody and giving Dory scheduled parenting time. On appeal, Dory made six arguments. The Court of Appeals rejected all of them. It held: the March 2022 order was temporary, not final, so the court could keep holding hearings; Dory waived her complaint about Judge Perry's recusal because she did not object at the time; Judge Throne was sufficiently familiar with the record and did not have to restart the hearing; the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of the court's discretion; even if the court was wrong to exclude testimony about pre-divorce domestic violence, Dory did not show that error affected the outcome (so it was "harmless"); and the exclusion of the child's new therapist's testimony was proper under the "law-of-the-case doctrine" because a prior judge had already decided that issue and Dory did not show a reason to revisit it.

Parviz and Fatemeh Eivazi were married in Las Vegas in 2001 (after an earlier marriage in Iran). Fatemeh filed for divorce in 2016. The case was hard-fought, with many motions and a multi-day trial. After trial, the judge asked both spouses to submit proposed final orders. The judge then signed Fatemeh's 61-page proposed decree word-for-word, without changing anything. That decree required Parviz to pay Fatemeh more than $400,000 - including ten years of alimony at $5,000 a month, attorney fees, expert fees, repayment for "wasted" community money, and the proceeds from selling the marital home. Parviz appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals used this case to send a strong message about a common practice: judges sometimes ask the winning party's lawyer to write up the order. The court did not ban the practice. It said adopting a party's proposed order word-for-word is not, by itself, an abuse of discretion - but judges who do so take on the risk that any mistakes in the document will be their mistakes. The court urged judges to read proposed orders carefully and lawyers to make sure those drafts are accurate and legally sound. Turning to the decree itself, the court found a number of problems. On "marital waste" (the idea that one spouse improperly spent community money), the trial court had treated any spending Fatemeh did not know about as waste, and required Parviz to disprove waste by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals said this flipped the burden the wrong way and used too broad a definition of waste. Under Nevada Supreme Court precedent (Kogod), waste generally means using marital money for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage, typically when the marriage is already breaking down. The trial court grouped together years of unexplained checks and cash and called it all waste - that was an abuse of discretion. On alimony, the court found the trial judge had gone through the statutory list of factors only superficially. Among other problems, the judge calculated Parviz's income from a website printout that was never actually admitted into evidence; failed to evaluate Fatemeh's earning capacity (not just her current lack of income); inconsistently described Parviz's ability to pay; and improperly leaned on Parviz's alleged misconduct in the divorce when deciding alimony, which Nevada law forbids. On attorney fees, the trial court had reconsidered an earlier order and awarded Fatemeh all her fees from the very beginning of the case - even fees that had already been ruled on in earlier orders, and costs that Fatemeh had not even asked for in her motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and told the trial court to limit any reconsideration to the fees actually at issue. A separate $59,000 award to "reimburse" Fatemeh for money she borrowed to fund the litigation was reversed because the decree contained no findings explaining it and it appeared to overlap with the attorney fee award. A $7,450 award for translation services as an expert fee was reversed because the trial court did not justify exceeding the statutory cap. The court affirmed two parts of the decree: an award for interim spousal support arrears and the division of insurance proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident. It also affirmed the order to sell the marital home, because Parviz himself had asked the trial court to order the sale - he could not complain on appeal about an outcome he invited. The unequal split of community debt, by contrast, was reversed because the decree gave no reason for the inequality. The case goes back to the trial court to redo the parts that were reversed.

Noune Davitian-Kostanian and Varoujan Kostanian divorced in 2012 after more than 25 years of marriage. Their stipulated divorce decree required Varoujan to pay Noune alimony for ten years (ending October 1, 2021) and to pay child support for their youngest son, Alex, who has autism, until he turned 18 (or graduated high school at 19). Alex turned 18 in 2015, and child support stopped at that time. One day before Varoujan's last alimony payment was due, Noune filed a motion asking the family court to (1) extend or modify alimony, and (2) restart child support for Alex as a disabled adult. The district court denied both requests. On child support, the court said it had no power to act because Alex was already an adult and support had ended years earlier. On alimony, the court found Noune had not shown a "change in circumstances." The Nevada Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed. On child support, the Court held the district court was wrong to say it lacked jurisdiction. Nevada has a special statute, NRS 125B.110, that requires a parent to keep supporting a handicapped child past age 18 if the handicap arose before adulthood and the child cannot become self-supporting. Nothing in that statute requires the parent seeking support to ask before the child turns 18, and nothing imposes a deadline. The fact that more than five years had passed since Alex's child support ended is just one factor for the lower court to weigh, not a bar. The Court sent the case back so the district court can make findings about whether Alex qualifies for continued support. On alimony, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. NRS 125.150(8) says alimony "may" be modified on a showing of changed circumstances, and a 20-percent change in the paying spouse's gross monthly income triggers a review - but does not force the court to actually change the alimony. The district court considered Noune's arguments and reasonably concluded she had not adequately supported her claim of changed circumstances. That decision was within the trial court's discretion.

Amr and Huriyeh Hosny married in 1989 in Macau and moved to the United States in 2004, where they ran businesses and held assets together. They separated in 2018, and Huriyeh filed for divorce. After a 2020 trial, the family court entered a divorce decree that, among other things, ordered Amr to pay Huriyeh $5,000 per month in lifetime alimony (ongoing financial support), reimburse her $6,000 for an expert witness, pay a $38,000 loan Huriyeh had taken from her sister (in part to cover her attorney and expert fees), and pay off a U.S. Bank credit card. Amr appealed. The Court of Appeals found several problems with how the trial court reached its decisions. On alimony, the appeals court concluded that the trial court's factual findings were "contradictory, unclear, and not supported by substantial evidence." The trial court noted that Amr's income was $120,000 in 2017 but had dropped to $72,000 by 2019, yet it never settled on which income figure it actually used to set the alimony amount. The appeals court said the trial court appeared to assume Amr could keep earning what he historically had, without accounting for the downturn in his business tied in part to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court also divided rental properties between the spouses, which means Amr will collect less rental income going forward — a fact the appeals court said the trial court did not properly factor in when deciding how much support Amr could afford to pay or how much Huriyeh actually needed. The appeals court also identified erroneous findings about how much Amr paid to support the couple's adult children and how much he was already paying Huriyeh during the case. On the demonstrative exhibits (exhibits 5 and 14, which were charts or summaries the trial court relied on), the appeals court held it was error to admit them because the expert who apparently prepared them never testified to establish the foundation for the financial information they contained. The exhibits also contained mathematical errors and information inconsistent with other admitted evidence. Because the trial court leaned on these flawed exhibits in setting alimony and dividing debts, the appeals court found the error prejudicial. On the $6,000 in expert witness fees, the appeals court explained that under Nevada law, an expert generally must testify in order to recover more than $1,500 in fees. Because this expert did not testify, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees above that threshold. The appeals court reversed the district court's judgment and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with its order. On remand, the trial court will need to reassess the full division of community property and debt (including the promissory note, the Bank of America card, and the U.S. Bank card) when deciding alimony, and ensure Huriyeh does not receive a "double recovery" for fees and costs already covered through debts assigned to Amr.

Bart and Bonnie Mahoney married in 2000 and had two children. When Bart filed for divorce in 2016, the couple reached an agreement that was merged into the divorce decree. Under the decree, Bonnie received primary physical custody of the children, and Bart agreed to pay child support, cover the children on his medical insurance, pay monthly alimony for five years, pay Bonnie 25% of his annual bonuses (rising to 35% if he failed to give her his annual W-2 tax forms), and pay her attorney fees and costs from the divorce. According to the opinion, Bart did not pay the child support, alimony, or attorney fees, did not pay Bonnie a share of his bonuses, and did not provide his W-2 forms. In May 2019, Bonnie asked the district court to reduce the arrearages (the unpaid amounts) to a judgment—that is, to convert what Bart owed into an enforceable court judgment—with interest and penalties, and to review child support and award her attorney fees. The case wound its way through several hearings. Bart's attorney withdrew in 2020 because Bart had never formally retained him and had stopped communicating. After that, Bart represented himself. The evidentiary hearing was rescheduled several times and ultimately set for December 3, 2020. Notice of that hearing was mailed to Bart's last-known address on file with the court, and Bonnie's attorney also emailed Bart pretrial filings—containing the hearing's date and time—at the same email address Bart had previously used to correspond with that attorney. Bart did not show up at the December 3, 2020, hearing. The district court proceeded with only Bonnie and her attorney present, took evidence including Bart's income and bonus records obtained by subpoena, and granted Bonnie's motion. It found Bart owed child support, alimony, and attorney fees and costs from the divorce, and—because Bart never provided his W-2 forms—awarded Bonnie 35% of his bonuses. It also awarded Bonnie the attorney fees and costs of bringing the motion, setting the amount in January 2021 after Bonnie filed a detailed memorandum of her fees and costs. Bart then moved to set aside the orders under NRCP 60(b), claiming he was never notified of the hearing, but filed his notice of appeal before the district court ruled on that motion. The appeal was still properly before the Court of Appeals under NRAP 4(a)(6), which treats the premature notice as filed on the date the district court denied the set-aside motion. However, because Bart's briefs did not address the denial of that motion, any challenge to it was waived. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Bart's arguments. First, it held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Bart was properly notified of the hearing: notice was mailed to his last-known address (which under the court rules completes service upon mailing), and he also had actual notice via emails from Bonnie's attorney. Bart pointed to nothing in the record—such as a sworn affidavit—showing he did not actually receive notice, and the onus was on him to keep the court updated with his address. Second, the court held that Bart's challenges to the arrearage findings were waived because he never raised those specific arguments in the district court, despite multiple opportunities to do so. Third, the court held that the fee award was not an abuse of discretion: the award was authorized by statute, and the district court made detailed findings under the four-factor test from Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank for evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees.

Christina and Mitchell divorced in 2008 and had two children together, M.S. (17 at the time of the opinion) and E.S. (14). This appeal concerned only the physical custody of M.S.; the parents continued to share joint legal custody of both children and joint physical custody of E.S., and those arrangements were not challenged. In August 2019, Mitchell asked the court to let the children decide for themselves whether to spend custodial time at Christina's home ("teenage discretion"), saying the children did not want to go there because of fights with Christina. Christina opposed this and asked the court to hold Mitchell in contempt for keeping the children from her. After several hearings, the court ordered the parents back onto a week-on/week-off schedule and directed that custody exchanges happen at a supervised visitation center called "Donna's House." The center and child-interview reports indicated the children refused to participate in exchanges with Christina. The court then found there was enough reason ("adequate cause") to hold an evidentiary hearing - a trial-like proceeding with testimony - to decide whether custody should change. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from both children, Mitchell, and Christina. Both children said they preferred to live with Mitchell because of turmoil when with Christina. M.S. described two physical fights with Christina - one in May 2019 (Christina allegedly tackled her, pulled her hair, and hit her) and one in August 2019 (Christina allegedly scratched her, pulled her hair, and pushed her). E.S. said he saw and heard parts of these altercations. M.S. also testified about hurtful language Christina used about her, her stepmother, and her half-sibling. The district court decided it was in M.S.'s best interest for Mitchell to become her primary physical custodian, largely because of the conflict between M.S. and Christina. The court found that Christina had engaged in acts of domestic violence against M.S. under one of the "best interest" factors listed in the statute, but it noted the incidents were softened by the fact that M.S. was an active participant, that it was hard to tell who started them, and that any injuries were minor. Importantly, the court did not use the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard, did not cite the separate statute that creates a legal presumption against giving custody to a domestic-violence perpetrator, and did not apply any such presumption. On appeal, Christina argued the court should have used the clear-and-convincing standard and allowed her to rebut that presumption. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the district court never applied the domestic-violence presumption against Christina in the first place, so she was not harmed by not being given a chance to rebut it - and she had in fact testified about the incidents. The court also said the ordinary standard for civil child-custody matters is "preponderance of the evidence," not clear and convincing, unless the legislature says otherwise, and Christina cited no authority requiring the higher standard just to consider domestic-violence allegations among the best-interest factors. Finally, the court held that even if the district court had made a mistake about the domestic-violence framework, the error was harmless because the district court gave many other reasons - M.S.'s own wish (at nearly 18) to live with her father, and the fractured relationship between M.S. and Christina - that independently supported the custody change. Because those findings were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Greg and Heidi Pelkola divorced in 2014 and share legal custody of their three children, with Heidi having primary physical custody. After the divorce, Heidi obtained court permission under Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125C.006) to move with the children from Nevada to Arizona. In October 2019, she asked the district court for permission to move again, this time from Arizona to Ohio. Greg did not consent. The district court told Heidi she did not actually need permission for this second move, reasoning that the Nevada statute only governed her original move out of Nevada. The court nevertheless granted permission and made limited findings about how the Ohio move would affect Greg's visitation. Greg appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with him on two points. First, the court read the statute's words literally: NRS 125C.006 requires permission whenever a custodial parent intends to relocate the child "to a place outside of" Nevada, and that language covers a move from one out-of-state location (Arizona) to another (Ohio), not just a move directly out of Nevada. The court noted that the opposite reading would let a parent who had moved with permission to a nearby state then move anywhere in the world - even Japan - without notice to the other parent. Second, because the relocation statute did apply, the district court was required by NRS 125C.007 to make specific findings on a list of factors, including whether there was a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, whether the move served the children's best interests, and whether the move offered an actual advantage to the relocating parent and child. If those threshold factors are met, the court must then weigh additional factors about quality of life, motives, and visitation. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not make the required findings and so abused its discretion by granting the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing and issue specific findings on each applicable factor. The court also reversed the attorney-fee award tied to the relocation petition and instructed the lower court to recalculate it as necessary.

Dennis and Gabrielle Kogod married in New York in 1991 and eventually settled in Las Vegas. Dennis rose to become Chief Operating Officer of a Fortune 500 healthcare company, earning an average of nearly $14 million per year, while Gabrielle worked part-time as a nurse consultant earning about $55,000 per year. Unbeknownst to Gabrielle, Dennis had also formed a long-term second relationship in southern California, fathered twin daughters with another woman, and supported that household with marital funds. Gabrielle filed for divorce in 2013. By the time the district court entered its decree in 2016, the marital estate was worth roughly $47 million, with about $35 million in community property left to divide. The district court did several things in the decree. It found that Dennis had wasted (or "dissipated") community money on his extramarital relationships, on gifts to his family, and on personal spending that exceeded what he had reported on his financial disclosures. Because of that, it gave Gabrielle a larger share of the community property than Dennis. It also awarded Gabrielle alimony in a lump sum of $1,630,292, even while acknowledging Gabrielle did not actually need alimony to support herself. The court further sanctioned Dennis $19,500 for transactions over $10,000 it considered violations of an automatic order forbidding either spouse from spending money "except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life," and required Dennis to pay $75,650 of the cost of Gabrielle's forensic accountant. In the end, Gabrielle received nearly $21 million and Dennis received just under $14 million. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court took up the case en banc and reached several conclusions. On alimony, the court took the opportunity to clarify Nevada law: alimony does not have to be based on financial need; it can also be awarded to compensate a spouse for economic losses caused by the marriage and divorce, such as a lower earning capacity from sacrifices made for the marriage, or the inability to maintain the standard of living the couple shared. But on the facts here, the court reversed the alimony award. Gabrielle had received mostly cash assets in the property division, which she conceded would generate between $500,000 and $800,000 a year in passive income—far more than enough to cover her roughly $16,000 in monthly expenses and to maintain her marital standard of living. With no real economic need and no loss in earning capacity from the marriage (the district court had found her nursing career did not suffer from the moves), the majority held there was no proper basis for awarding alimony. On the unequal property division, the court agreed with the district court that the roughly $1.85 million Dennis spent on extramarital affairs was dissipation justifying an unequal split, and that approximately $72,200 in non-routine gifts to family during the divorce was also dissipation. But it reversed the portion of the unequal split based on $2,162,451 of Dennis's general overspending categorized by Gabrielle's accountant as "potential community waste not elsewhere classified." The court explained that ordinary overconsumption by a high-earning spouse, without evidence the spending was directed against the marriage, is not the same as dissipation. The court also held that the community estate did not end when the judge orally pronounced the parties divorced; under Nevada law, only the written decree (entered six months later) terminated it. The case was sent back so the district court could account for community property accumulated and any waste during that interval. The court reversed the $19,500 in sanctions, explaining that the preliminary injunction's "usual course of business" language was too vague to support contempt-style sanctions for these wealthy parties; if Dennis's spending was excessive, the right remedy was an unequal division of property, not a per-transaction fine. Finally, it reversed the $75,650 in costs awarded to Gabrielle, because the district court had not identified any statute, rule, or contract authorizing the award and had not justified expert fees above the $1,500 statutory cap. Two justices, Hardesty and Stiglich, dissented from the alimony reversal. They would have upheld the alimony award, arguing the district court carefully applied the statutory factors, considered the income-producing assets Gabrielle received, and properly relied on Shydler v. Shydler for the principle that a spouse should not be forced to deplete a community property share for support.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Hony Fernandez and Jennifer Fernandez (now known as Jennifer Rothman) divorced in 1998 after a brief marriage that produced two children. Both worked in the securities industry. The original divorce decree required the father to pay $3,000 per month in child support, plus health insurance, uncovered medical expenses, a housekeeper, and a nanny or day care. In 1999, the parties agreed to raise support to $4,000 per month (effective 2001) and to add private-school tuition. In 2000, after a failed reconciliation, they entered a third stipulation giving both parents joint physical custody — and in that stipulation, both parents "voluntarily waive[d] any right they may have pursuant to Chapter 125B of the Nevada Revised Statutes" to seek modification of the father's child support obligation. By 2007, according to the father's motion, his fortunes had reversed dramatically. He had once earned between $500,000 and more than $4,000,000 a year trading securities, but heavy market losses beginning in 2002 left him earning $3,000 a month selling cars, plus a similar amount in interest — while his child support obligations totaled roughly $80,000 a year. The mother, meanwhile, had remarried; her household income equaled or exceeded his, and the two had comparable net worth. The trial court itself found that if it applied the statutory child support formula to the parties' current incomes, "neither party would be obligated to pay child support to the other." Even so, it refused to modify the order, relying on the parties' waiver and on the fact that the father could still pay from his remaining assets. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that parents cannot, by agreement, strip a court of its statutory power to review and modify child support. Once a support agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree, it becomes a court order, not just a private contract, and Nevada's statutes provide for its periodic review and modification — up or down — as circumstances change. Quoting a California decision, the court concluded that "the court always has the power to modify a child support order, upward or downward, regardless of the parents' agreement to the contrary." The court also rejected the trial court's approach of requiring the father to draw down his assets before modification could be considered, and it rejected the mother's argument that her partial performance of the agreement barred the father from challenging it. One limit remained for the father, however. Under the court's recent decision in Rivero v. Rivero, the mere fact that more than three years had passed since the last review entitled him to a review, but not automatically to a modification: on remand, he must still demonstrate changed circumstances. The court noted that his alleged income drop — more than 80 percent — appears to satisfy the statutory trigger, under which a change of 20 percent or more in the support obligor's gross monthly income is deemed a changed circumstance requiring review for modification.