Nevada family-law case summaries

This case is about who can be legally recognized as a parent in Nevada when a child was born through a surrogate arrangement and one of the adults raising the child has no biological connection to the child. Mary Lorenzo and Pierre Gendebien were in a relationship and lived together starting in 2016. In 2017, Gendebien signed a gestational agreement - a contract to have a child through a surrogate (a woman who carries and gives birth to a child for someone else). The child, A.G., was conceived using Gendebien's sperm and an egg from an anonymous donor. The agreement named Gendebien as the only intended parent and left the space for a mother's name blank. Before the child was born, Gendebien obtained a court order establishing himself as the sole parent, and the child's birth certificate left the mother's name blank. A.G. was born in June 2018. Lorenzo and Gendebien raised the child together in their shared home until their relationship ended in November 2021. At first they shared equal time with A.G., but Gendebien gradually reduced Lorenzo's access and eventually cut it off. Lorenzo then went to court in September 2022, asking to be recognized as A.G.'s mother and seeking joint legal and physical custody. She said she and Gendebien had held her out as A.G.'s parent, that they had lived together as a family since before the child's birth, and that Gendebien had promised to add her name to the birth certificate. Gendebien asked the court to throw out her complaint, arguing she had no right to seek parentage because she did not give birth to A.G., did not adopt A.G., was not married to Gendebien, and was not named in the gestational agreement. The district court agreed and dismissed her maternity and custody claims (though it allowed a separate request for nonparent visitation to continue, which was later denied). The Court of Appeals reversed. The court explained that when someone asks a court to dismiss a complaint at the very start of a case, the court must assume the facts the person alleges are true. The question is only whether those alleged facts, if proven, could entitle the person to relief. The court held that Nevada's parentage statutes do not limit motherhood claims only to women who have a biological link to the child. Under NRS 126.231, "any interested party may bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and child relationship," and Nevada's rules about how fatherhood can be presumed apply to motherhood cases "insofar as practicable." The court held that two of the ways a man can be presumed to be a father - living with the child's other natural parent for at least six months before conception and continuing through the period of conception, and receiving the child into his home and openly holding the child out as his own - can apply equally to a woman seeking to be recognized as a mother. Because Lorenzo alleged facts fitting these situations, her case should not have been dismissed at the outset. The court also addressed the surrogacy contract. It held that the contract locked in Gendebien's rights as the intended parent "immediately upon the birth of the child," but did not permanently block other interested people from later trying to establish that they are also a parent - unless they had agreed to be left out. The court noted that the surrogacy statutes were mainly designed to prevent a surrogate from later claiming to be the child's parent, not to forever shut out everyone else. The court sent the case back to the district court with instructions. On remand, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing. Lorenzo must first prove, by a preponderance of the evidence (meaning more likely than not), that she qualifies as a presumptive parent. If she does, Gendebien then gets the chance to rebut - to overcome - that presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence (a higher standard). To decide whether rebuttal is appropriate, the court announced a new three-part test looking at how the family was formed, whether the person voluntarily took on parental responsibilities, and whether anyone else is claiming to be the child's second parent. If Lorenzo's presumptive status is not rebutted, she is recognized as a parent and the court moves on to decide custody based on the child's best interest. If it is rebutted, judgment goes to Gendebien.

This case arises from a family-court dispute over a property settlement agreement—the kind of contract that divides property between spouses. One party, Dipesh S. Banker, asked the Court of Appeals to step in before the family court finished its work. He did this by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. A writ of mandamus is a court order forcing a lower court to perform a duty the law requires; a writ of prohibition is a court order stopping a lower court from acting beyond its authority. Dipesh's argument was that the family court did not have jurisdiction—that is, legal authority—to enforce the property settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals explained that these writs are "extraordinary remedies," meaning they are granted only in unusual situations and only when a person has no other adequate way to fix the problem. The person asking for the writ carries the burden of showing that this kind of extraordinary intervention is justified. The court declined to intervene for two reasons. First, Dipesh did not include a copy of the property settlement agreement—the very document at the center of his petition—in the materials he submitted. Second, the court found that the family court had not yet made a final decision about whether it had jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Instead, the family court had only scheduled an evidentiary hearing, saying it wanted to hear evidence about several things, including what the parties intended when they made the agreement, why they chose not to have the agreement merge into the divorce decree, and what they intended about enforcing the agreement's provisions. Because there was no final ruling to review and because the key document was missing, the court concluded that Dipesh had not shown that writ relief was warranted, and it denied the petition.

Brittany and Joey divorced in 2016 and share three children. Under a 2021 agreement, the parents shared joint legal custody, but Joey had sole authority over schooling, medical, and extracurricular decisions, primary physical custody of the two older children (J.O. and R.O.), and joint physical custody of the youngest (C.O.) with Brittany. In September 2022, Brittany asked the court to give her sole legal and primary physical custody of all three children. In sworn filings, she alleged, among other things, that Joey gave alcohol to J.O., failed to address J.O.'s suicidal thoughts, called their daughter R.O. "fat" and put her on a restrictive diet, screamed at the children and broke things in the home, and created an environment where the children felt they "walk[ed] on eggshells" around him. Joey denied the allegations and filed his own countermotion seeking primary physical custody of C.O., alleging among other things that Brittany had left the children for three months, entered a relationship with an ex-felon who abused her in front of the children, assaulted Joey's girlfriend, skipped most of her parenting time, and tried to unilaterally pull the children out of their schools. At a November 2022 hearing, the district court ordered the children to be interviewed by the Family Mediation Center (FMC), ordered the parents to attempt mediation, and set a December 2022 "return" hearing. The court indicated that the return hearing would focus on the FMC child interview report and mediation - not the children's custody status. But at the December hearing, after reviewing the interview report and hearing argument, the judge placed both parents under oath, questioned only Joey, and then denied both motions on the spot, concluding neither parent had shown enough of a change in circumstances to justify a full evidentiary hearing (a hearing where the parties can present evidence and question witnesses). The Court of Appeals reversed for two reasons. First, the court held that the district court violated Brittany's due process rights - the constitutional guarantee of notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before important rights are affected. Nothing in the district court's written order or oral statements told the parents that the December hearing might end with a final custody decision, and the hearing itself was one-sided: only Joey was allowed to testify under oath, while Brittany never got the same chance. Second, the appellate court held that both parents' sworn allegations - taken as true, as the law requires at this stage - were detailed enough to establish a "prima facie case" (a threshold showing) for modifying custody, which entitled each of them to a full evidentiary hearing. Because neither parent's allegations conclusively proved the other's false, the district court was not allowed to weigh credibility or pick between the competing stories without holding a hearing. The case goes back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether changing custody serves the children's best interests.

Brittany Sheehan and Justin Manty have one child together, T.S. Before this case began, there was no court order in place about who had custody. Brittany filed a case in Nevada asking a court to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. Justin responded by filing his own custody case in California and asking the Nevada court to dismiss Brittany's case for lack of jurisdiction (the court's authority to decide the matter). According to the opinion, Brittany then went to California, took T.S. out of her school, and brought her to Nevada. California criminal charges were filed against Brittany over that incident. After a hearing, the Nevada district court ordered Brittany to return T.S. to Justin and dismissed the Nevada case, finding that California was the more convenient place to handle the dispute because most of the evidence and witnesses were there. On appeal, Brittany made several arguments. First, she said the judge, Dedree Butler, showed bias by saying at the hearing that she "d[id]n't know if [T.S. is] safe right now" and that "for all [she] kn[e]w [T.S. is] . . . somewhere in a basement tied up." The Court of Appeals explained that judges are presumed to be unbiased, and it read the judge's comments—though it described them as "arguably hyperbolic"—as simply stating that the judge did not know where the child was because Brittany would not say. The court found no proof that the judge's rulings were driven by bias. Second, Brittany argued the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. The court rejected this because she did not cite supporting legal authority, did not explain why such a hearing was needed, and did not identify any disputed facts the court would have had to resolve. Third, Brittany argued the court improperly relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements) from Justin. The court said that even if she were right, it would not change the outcome, because she never disputed the core reason for dismissal—that California was the more convenient forum. She also never addressed the specific statute the court used to dismiss the case. Finally, Brittany argued the court was wrong to order the child returned to Justin without weighing the "best interest of the child" factors. The court explained that it acted under its temporary emergency jurisdiction, pointing to how T.S. had been removed from California (with Brittany criminally charged and subject to an active arrest warrant) and to Brittany's refusal to reveal where the child was, which left the court unsure the child was safe. The court found those oral findings sufficient. Because none of Brittany's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Alfonso Estrada, an attorney living in Los Angeles, and Ida Arzola, who worked in Las Vegas, had a child together, A.E., born in May 2019. After the relationship ended, both parents went to court seeking primary physical custody - the arrangement where one parent has the child most of the time. Alfonso asked for primary custody; Ida asked for primary custody and also for child support (regular payments from one parent to help cover the child's needs). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary schedule of joint physical custody, with the parents exchanging the child in Barstow, California, each week. During that temporary period, Alfonso was ordered to pay Ida $1,583 per month in support plus $5,000 in attorney fees, reflecting that Alfonso earns roughly ten times what Ida makes. After a two-day trial, the district court changed course. It awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso, ordered that the child's "habitual residence" stay in Nevada, and directed Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support. It also ruled that Alfonso, as the "prevailing party," could recover attorney fees, and later ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $40,000 in combined fees and costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals split its decision into three parts. On custody, the court sided with Alfonso and left the custody award in place. It rejected Ida's argument that Alfonso had to meet a higher legal bar to "modify" custody, explaining that because no prior custody order existed, this was an initial determination, not a modification. It rejected her argument that the arrangement should have been called joint custody, noting that the best interest of the child is the main consideration and that percentage of time is only one factor. It rejected her argument that the court should have considered joint custody even though neither parent asked for it, in part because Ida herself never requested joint custody as an alternative. And it found the court's detailed analysis of the best-interest factors was supported by the evidence. On the relocation argument, the court declined to overturn the custody order. Ida had not raised the relocation issue in the lower court, cited no legal authority showing the relocation statute applied to her situation, and did not show that considering relocation factors would have changed the result. On child support, the court agreed with Ida. The district court had said "no adjustment evidence was provided" that would justify lowering Ida's payment - but its own findings described a large income gap (Alfonso earning about $250,000 a year while Ida attended community college), plus travel costs and Ida's limited ability to pay. Because that evidence supported considering a downward adjustment, the Court of Appeals reversed the support order and sent it back for the district court to apply the deviation factors. On attorney fees and costs, the court also agreed with Ida. The district court had awarded fees based only on Alfonso being the "prevailing party," without citing a legal basis, without making required findings, and without addressing the income disparity between the parties. The statutes Alfonso relied on did not fit the situation, and the order lumped fees and costs together without saying how much was which, making it impossible to review. The Court of Appeals reversed that award and sent it back as well.

This case is about a custody, child-support, and attorney-fee dispute between two parents of a young child. Alfonso Estrada is an attorney living in Los Angeles who met Ida Arzola in 2017 at a Las Vegas strip club where she worked as a dancer. They had a relationship, and a child, A.E., was born in May 2019. After the birth, the relationship became contentious. Alfonso asked the court for primary physical custody (meaning the child would live with him most of the time). Ida asked for primary physical custody too, and she also asked for child support. The parents agreed to share legal custody (decision-making about the child). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary arrangement where they shared physical custody, exchanging the child each week in Barstow, California, and temporarily ordered Alfonso to pay Ida $1,583 per month in child support plus $5,000 in attorney fees. By this time, Ida was working as a food server earning about one-tenth of Alfonso's salary and had started nursing school. After a two-day trial, the district court awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso on a three-week-on, two-week-off schedule, with two extra weeks for Alfonso during the year. The court kept Nevada as the child's official home ("habitual residence") and set a status check before the child starts school. It also ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support and awarded Alfonso attorney fees, saying only that he was the "prevailing party." Alfonso later asked for $48,217 in fees and $2,138.77 in costs; the court ultimately ordered Ida to pay a combined $40,000 in fees and costs, without saying how much was fees and how much was costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals reached three main conclusions. First, on custody, the court upheld the district court's decision to give Alfonso primary physical custody. The court rejected Ida's arguments: that this was really a modification of an existing custody arrangement (it was not, because there had been no prior custody determination); that a case called *Bluestein* required treating the arrangement as joint custody (the court explained percentage of time is just one consideration and the child's best interest controls); that the court had to consider joint custody even though neither parent asked for it (Ida had not requested it and could not now complain of an error she helped cause); and that the court misapplied the best-interest factors (the court found the district court's detailed findings were supported by the evidence). Second, on the claim that the court improperly "relocated" the child to California, the court found Ida had not raised this argument below, had not cited supporting authority, and had not shown that a relocation analysis would have changed the outcome. Third, on child support and attorney fees, the court sided with Ida. On child support, the court held the district court should have considered whether to reduce Ida's payment given the large income gap between the parties, and it reversed and sent that issue back. On attorney fees, the court held the award could not stand because the district court gave no legal basis for it and failed to make required findings — including about the income disparity — and because Alfonso's own filings were deficient. The court reversed and remanded the fee-and-cost order.