Nevada family-law case summaries

Leslie and Josue Ortiz married in 2016 and Leslie filed for divorce in 2023. A central dispute in the divorce was who owned a condominium on Cardiff Lane that Josue had purchased in December 2018 for $110,000 with a $10,000 down payment. When the condo was purchased, Leslie signed a deed (a "grant, bargain, sale deed") that transferred her interest in the property to Josue, leaving it in his name alone. At trial, Leslie testified that she did not realize she had signed a deed, thought the document was for loan purposes, received no money for signing, and did not intend to give the property to Josue. Josue testified differently: he said the couple had discussed the purchase and agreed he would buy the property in his own name as his own property, and that the couple generally kept their finances, assets, and debts separate. He acknowledged he gave Leslie no money in exchange for the deed and that the couple had no written prenuptial or postnuptial agreement other than the deed itself. The district court decided that the Cardiff property was Josue's separate property. The court found Leslie's testimony not credible on the question of whether she knew the property was being bought as Josue's separate property, and found Josue's testimony credible. The court treated Leslie's signing of the deed as a gift of the property to Josue. The court also ruled that Leslie's cleaning business was her own separate property and ordered each spouse to keep their own bank accounts, debts, and vehicles. The Court of Appeals agreed with part of the district court's decision and disagreed with another part. On the question of whether Leslie had given Josue her interest in the property by signing the deed, the appellate court upheld the district court. Under Nevada law, when one spouse transfers title of property to the other spouse, the law presumes it was a gift, and the spouse who gave it up must prove with strong evidence ("clear and convincing evidence") that it was not. Because the two spouses gave conflicting accounts and the district court chose to believe Josue, and because appellate courts do not re-decide who is telling the truth, the Court of Appeals affirmed that Leslie gifted the title and the $10,000 down payment to Josue. But the appellate court found a gap in the lower court's reasoning. Even though Leslie gave Josue the property, Josue continued to pay the mortgage during the marriage. In Nevada, the wages a spouse earns during marriage generally belong to the "community" - that is, to both spouses jointly. There was no evidence Josue used any separate (non-community) money to pay the mortgage, so the court inferred he paid it with his earnings, which were community funds. When community money is used to pay down a mortgage and improve a property, the community can gain a share of the increased value. Josue also refinanced the property in 2023, pulled out money for home improvements, and the property's value rose to about $220,000. The district court never made findings about whether the use of community funds to pay the mortgage and make improvements gave the community an interest in the increased value of the condo. Because of this missing analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded the decision to award the property entirely to Josue as separate property was not supported by adequate evidence and findings. It sent the case back to the district court to perform a specific calculation (a "Malmquist analysis") to determine how much of the property's value is separate and how much belongs to the community, and to divide the community's share between the parties.

Kassim Carney and Susan Moruri divorced through a stipulated decree of divorce—a divorce judgment the two sides agreed to. That decree divided their shared property and debts, and both parties represented that they had made a "full and fair disclosure" of their assets. Less than six months after the divorce, Moruri asked the court to set aside the decree under a court rule (NRCP 60(b)). She argued, among other things, that Carney had formed a real estate business and had not disclosed it before the divorce was finalized. Carney did not initially file a response, and the court first granted Moruri's request. Carney then filed a combined motion asking the court to reconsider and opposing Moruri's motion, arguing that the business had no value when the decree was entered. The court granted his request to reconsider and scheduled an evidentiary hearing—a hearing where evidence is presented. After that hearing, the district court sided with Moruri on the real estate business. It found that the business was an "omitted asset" because Carney had not disclosed it, that bank statements Moruri submitted showed the business was worth $69,877.12 when the decree was entered, that Carney had not shown he owned less than 100 percent of the business, and that Moruri was therefore entitled to $34,938.56—half the business's value. Carney appealed. On appeal, Carney raised two arguments about the court's power (jurisdiction) to decide the issue and two arguments about the merits. First, he argued the court lost the power to grant relief because it did not resolve Moruri's motion within six months of the decree. The appellate court explained that the deadline depends on when a motion is filed, not when the court rules on it, and that Moruri had also relied on a Nevada statute (NRS 125.150(3)) that gives a party up to three years after discovering fraud or mistake to ask the court to divide an omitted asset. Because Moruri filed within six months, this argument failed. Second, Carney argued the court had no jurisdiction because the parties had moved to Texas after the divorce. The appellate court noted Carney did not dispute that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties from the start of the case, and explained that this jurisdiction continued and allowed the court to decide the parties' interest in the business, even though the business was formed in Texas. On the merits, Carney argued the business was his separate property because it had not made a profit or distributions before the divorce. The appellate court explained that under Nevada law, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community (shared) property unless an exception applies, and Carney did not argue any exception applied or point to clear and convincing evidence that the business was separate property. Finally, Carney argued the court should have relied on a professional appraisal rather than the bank statements Moruri submitted to value the business. The appellate court found that Carney had not raised the valuation or appraisal issue before the district court, and that he had not provided a transcript of the evidentiary hearing showing he raised it there or offered contrary evidence. Because of this, the court presumed the missing record supported the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed.

This is a divorced-parents custody fight over an eleven-year-old boy, H.R. The mother (Maggie) and father (Jason) had shared the child equally for years under a 2017 stipulated order. In 2020, Maggie asked the court to give her primary custody, saying H.R. had become aggressive and disrespectful toward her, which she blamed in part on Jason's influence. Jason countered with his own request for primary custody. A court-appointed therapist who evaluated the family thought Jason might be engaging in "parental alienation" - turning the child against the other parent - and recommended keeping the week-on/week-off schedule. The court initially adopted that recommendation. Things then got worse. On two occasions, H.R. was taken into police custody for hitting Maggie - once after Maggie's mother called police, once after Jason called. After those incidents, the district court entered an emergency order giving Jason "sole physical custody" temporarily, restricting Maggie to six hours of parenting time per week and reunification therapy with a specific therapist, Dr. Sunshine Collins. Later, the court tightened the restrictions further: Maggie could have no contact with H.R. except through Dr. Collins's therapy sessions. Because Dr. Collins was outside Maggie's insurance and required individual sessions before any joint sessions with H.R., and because Maggie struggled to afford it, the practical effect was that Maggie had no contact with her son for six months. After a March 2022 evidentiary hearing, the district court labeled its final order "primary physical custody" to Jason but limited Maggie's parenting time to cards, texts, and phone calls - no in-person time at all - with any expansion left to Dr. Collins to decide. The court also ordered Maggie to pay Jason over $11,000 in attorney fees because he was the "prevailing party." The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to change custody (because there was enough evidence of a substantial change in circumstances - the deteriorating relationship and H.R.'s wishes), but reversed the parenting-time portion and vacated the fees. The court used this case to define "sole physical custody" for Nevada law for the first time: it is an arrangement where the child lives with only one parent and the other parent has "no significant in-person parenting time." The court explained that calling something "primary physical custody" does not change what it actually is - if a parent has only cards and phone calls, that is sole physical custody. The court held that before a judge enters a sole physical custody order, the judge must either find the noncustodial parent unfit, or make specific written findings explaining why primary physical custody is not in the child's best interest. The judge must then choose the least restrictive parenting arrangement possible, and if a less restrictive option (like supervised visits) is available but rejected, the judge must explain why on the record. The district court here did none of those things. The court also held that the trial judge improperly delegated decision-making power to Dr. Collins by letting the therapist decide when Maggie's parenting time could be expanded. Under Nevada law, only the court itself can decide substantive custody questions. The opinion further faulted the final order's specificity: it incorporated only an oral mid-hearing statement called "the March 11, 2022, Order," which was never reduced to writing in detail, making the order unenforceable. The attorney-fee award was vacated because being the "prevailing party" alone is not enough to justify fees in a custody case - the court must make additional findings under the relevant statute, and the trial judge did not. Finally, the Court of Appeals took the unusual step of directing that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand. The court pointed to multiple statements by the trial judge that, in the appellate court's view, raised reasonable doubts about her impartiality - including comments that children listen better to men because of "fisticuffs," that being a stepmother is harder than being a biological mother, and statements indicating the judge had made up her mind before Maggie put on her case.

Maggie Cox and Jason Roe divorced and shared joint custody of their son, H.R. About seven years later, when H.R. was eleven, Maggie asked the court to give her primary physical custody, saying the boy's behavior toward her had become disrespectful and aggressive, which she blamed partly on Jason. Jason opposed and asked for primary custody himself. The court ordered therapy and a "brief focused assessment" by a therapist, Maureen Zelensky. Zelensky's report suggested Jason was likely engaging in "parental alienation" (a dynamic in which a child becomes excessively hostile toward one parent) and that Maggie likely had anxiety and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder. She recommended keeping the shared week-on-week-off schedule and issuing behavior orders for both parents, which the court adopted. The situation then worsened. On two occasions, police took H.R. into custody for battery against Maggie during her parenting time; H.R. was found to be the primary aggressor both times. The opinion notes that Maggie never called the police—her mother called once and Jason called once—and that once police were called, Nevada law generally requires an arrest and a 12-hour detention. Based on those incidents, Jason filed an emergency motion for sole custody. In March 2021, the court granted it, making findings including that "something wrong with the parent who cannot manage an 11-year-old," that Maggie had called the police (which the record contradicts), and that her behavior was "histrionic." The court sharply restricted Maggie's contact with H.R., limited her to reunification therapy with Dr. Sunshine Collins and six hours of parenting time weekly, and appointed a parenting coordinator and a guardian ad litem, with costs split between the parents. Over the following months, contact between Maggie and H.R. was further restricted. Dr. Collins was outside Maggie's insurance network and Maggie fell behind on payments; Dr. Collins required Maggie to complete individual sessions before joint sessions with H.R. In September 2021, the court granted Jason's objection and ordered Maggie to have no contact with H.R. outside of therapy with Dr. Collins—effectively barring all contact between mother and son. This prevented Maggie from contacting H.R. on his birthday and from sending gifts or cards over the holidays. Learning this midway through a later hearing, the court orally modified the order to let Maggie send cards, texts, or calls. At the end of the March 2022 hearing, the court kept joint legal custody but gave Jason "primary physical custody," finding a substantial change in circumstances (the deteriorating relationship between Maggie and H.R.) and that H.R.'s best interests favored living with Jason. In practice, Maggie received no in-person parenting time—only cards, texts, and calls—and any expansion of her time was left to Dr. Collins's discretion. The court also ordered Maggie to pay $11,365 in attorney fees and costs to Jason as the prevailing party. The Court of Appeals reached a split result. It agreed there was substantial evidence supporting the decision that circumstances had substantially changed and that primary physical custody should go to Jason, so it affirmed that part. But it held the district court went too far in limiting Maggie's parenting time—so far that it effectively awarded Jason sole physical custody without adequate justification, cutting off a mother with no criminal history, no substance-abuse history, and no history of domestic violence from any in-person time with her son for over a year. The court also held the district court improperly handed off its own decision-making authority to Dr. Collins by letting her decide when Maggie could see H.R. in person, and that the final parenting-time order was too vague to enforce because it merely referenced an unwritten oral ruling. The Court of Appeals further concluded the case should be reassigned to a different judge on remand, pointing to statements and findings in the record that could cause a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality. Finally, it vacated the attorney-fee award because the required findings were missing and because part of the underlying order was being reversed.

Jordan Cristos and Sarah Tolagson have two young children together and separated in February 2019. After they split up, the case describes several conflicts between them, including physical altercations in 2019 and 2020, and a 2021 incident at a park. Sarah obtained temporary protection orders in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In the 2020 incident, Jordan entered a nolo contendere plea (a plea in which a defendant does not contest a charge without formally admitting guilt) to a misdemeanor battery charge and was convicted. There was also a separate child dependency case alleging abuse and neglect that was eventually closed after Jordan complied with what Child Protective Services (CPS) recommended. Both parents asked the court for primary physical custody and joint legal custody. After a six-day trial, the district court gave Sarah primary physical custody and set up a "hybrid" joint legal custody arrangement: Sarah handles day-to-day decisions, but Jordan gets access to the children's medical and school records and is to be involved in major and moderate decisions about healthcare, education, and religion. Jordan was also ordered to pay $1,985 per month in child support, and he was given parenting time every weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Jordan appealed. He argued the trial court should not have considered three things: his nolo contendere plea, the closed child dependency case, and a CPS report. The appeals court explained that Jordan did not object to this evidence during the trial, which normally means the argument is given up ("waived"). The court can still review for "plain error," but Jordan did not argue plain error, and even looking at the substance of his complaints, the court found the trial judge's decisions were supported by the evidence. The appeals court also emphasized that it does not re-weigh witness credibility or evidence on appeal. On the child dependency case, Jordan argued the doctrine of issue preclusion (a rule that stops a party from re-litigating an issue already decided) barred the court from considering it. The appeals court found he had not shown the required elements—including that he did not even provide the juvenile court records to support his claim that the case was "dismissed." On legal custody, Jordan argued the court effectively gave Sarah sole legal custody and violated his due process rights. The appeals court disagreed, noting that in a joint legal custody arrangement the parent with the child at the time typically makes day-to-day decisions, and that Jordan still participates in major decisions and has access to records. The court looked at the judge's oral statements to interpret the written order. The one point where Jordan succeeded was the child support amount. Both sides agreed the math was wrong: the correct base obligation is $1,895 per month, not $1,985. The appeals court affirmed everything else but sent the case back solely to fix that clerical error.

While married, Luong and Vahey set up college savings accounts (called "529 accounts" after the federal tax provision that governs them) for each of their three children. When the couple divorced, they disagreed about how to split these accounts. After a 2020 hearing where both sides presented evidence, the trial judge concluded that Vahey had put in about 25 percent of the money and Luong (with help from her family) had put in about 75 percent, and divided the accounts accordingly - 25 percent to Vahey, 75 percent to Luong, with each parent managing their share on behalf of the children. About a year after that hearing, Luong hired a financial consultant who calculated slightly different numbers: that Luong and her family contributed 77.11 percent and Vahey 22.89 percent. Based on this new report, Luong asked the court to fix or undo the account-division part of the divorce decree. She used two rules: NRCP 60(a), which lets a court fix simple clerical mistakes, and NRCP 60(b)(1), which lets a court undo a decision because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The trial court refused, finding there was no clerical error, that the request was filed too late, and that it was frivolous because it sought only a tiny adjustment to accounts the parents did not even own themselves but managed for their children. In the same set of filings, Vahey asked the court to order Luong to hand over the children's passports, saying he feared she might leave the country with the children. Luong objected. The trial court decided to split the passports - ordering Luong to surrender two of the three children's passports to Vahey's attorney and letting her keep one - to prevent either parent from taking the children abroad on their own. Luong appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that there was no clerical error to correct under NRCP 60(a), because the judge's percentage finding was a product of weighing the evidence - an exercise of judgment - not a slip of the pen. The appellate court also noted that Luong never provided a transcript of the 2020 hearing, so it presumed that the missing record supported the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals then explained that although Luong labeled her request as an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, its real substance was a request based on "newly discovered evidence," which is governed by a different rule, NRCP 60(b)(2). Courts look at what a motion actually asks for, not what it is called. On timing, the appellate court found the trial court had used the wrong starting date: the six-month deadline runs from when written notice of the decree's entry is served, not from when the decree is entered, and by that measure Luong's motion was filed in time. Even so, the appellate court upheld the denial on the merits, because Luong never explained why she waited about a year to obtain the financial analysis, and evidence that could have been found earlier with reasonable diligence does not qualify as "newly discovered evidence." Finally, on the passports, the appellate court reversed. It explained that a judge has two possible legal routes to decide a passport dispute like this: the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act (found in NRS Chapter 125D), which allows passport restrictions only when there is a credible risk of abduction, or a best-interest-of-the-child analysis. Here the trial court found no evidence that either parent was a flight risk (which ruled out the abduction route), but it split the passports based on an "adverse inference" against both parents without ever analyzing what was in the children's best interest. Because the court could not be sure the decision was made for the correct legal reasons, it sent the passport issue back for further proceedings.

This case concerns who is legally recognized as the father of a child, A.A., born in 2011, and how custody of A.A. should be divided. Three adults are involved. Rosie is the child's mother. Henry was Rosie's on-and-off partner; when A.A. was born, Henry and Rosie signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity (a sworn statement declaring Henry to be the father), and Henry's name went on the birth certificate. Ignacio was also Rosie's on-and-off partner during the same period and is the biological father of Rosie's second child, J.A., based on earlier paternity testing. For years, Ignacio suspected he might also be A.A.'s biological father. Rosie and Henry told him he was not, and Henry once showed Ignacio a screenshot of a DNA test purporting to confirm Henry's paternity. Ignacio thought the test looked suspicious and obtained his own DNA tests, which showed he was A.A.'s biological father. Rosie continued to deny him regular contact with A.A. Ignacio sued for a paternity determination and custody. The district court initially ruled against him, saying his challenge came too late. Ignacio appealed, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, and on remand the district court ordered formal DNA testing. The testing confirmed Ignacio is A.A.'s biological father. The district court then declared Ignacio the legal father, ordered the birth certificate amended, and awarded Ignacio and Rosie joint physical custody. Henry was reduced to a "third party" who could request visitation similar to a grandparent. Rosie and Henry appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. They argued biology should not automatically determine legal fatherhood once a child is past age three, that the birth certificate should control, and that the trial court failed to properly analyze A.A.'s best interest before ordering joint custody. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed. It held that under Nevada's Parentage Act, a DNA test showing 99% or higher probability of paternity creates a "conclusive presumption" of fatherhood - meaning it cannot be overcome by other evidence. Because Ignacio's test met that threshold, he is A.A.'s legal father, with all the rights that come with being a parent. The court explained that an older Nevada decision, Love v. Love, which had treated DNA evidence as just one factor, no longer controls because the Legislature changed the statute in 2007 to make DNA results conclusive. The court also explained that the birth-certificate statute Rosie and Henry relied on does not make the certificate dispositive when paternity is contested and the listed father was never married to the mother. On custody, the court held that the trial judge did not have to apply the legal test for modifying an existing custody order, because there was no prior custody order for A.A. Nevada law presumes joint physical custody is in a child's best interest, and the trial court found that Rosie and Henry had intentionally kept Ignacio away from A.A. for years - a circumstance that statutorily favors joint custody. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

David and Christie Stucke entered a domestic partnership in May 2015, married in May 2016, and have two children together. After about two and a half years of marriage, David filed for divorce. The case was, in the district court's words, "hotly contested and litigated," with a five-day trial that included testimony from both spouses and a jointly retained custody expert, psychologist Dr. John Paglini. Both sides asked the appeals court to review parts of the final divorce decree. The disputes fell into two groups: how property was split, and how the children's custody and support were handled. On property, David argued that a house on West Maule Avenue should not have been divided equally. He said he had used his own money — poker winnings earned before the domestic partnership — for the down payment and for repairs, and that the house was meant to stay his. Because the parties acquired the house after entering their domestic partnership, the law presumed it was community property (property both partners own together). David wanted the court to use a formula from an older Nevada case, called Malmquist, to give him credit for his separate contributions. The appeals court explained that this formula only applies when separate property increased in value through community effort, or community property increased in value because of separate contributions. David never argued that his contributions increased the home's value, and he did not provide the supporting evidence needed to run that calculation. So the court upheld the equal division. Christie, in turn, challenged the district court's decision to give David all the sale proceeds from two other houses — one on Birkland Court and one on Grandview Place — as his separate property. For the Birkland property, David had bought it with separate funds and set up a rental business through an LLC; Christie had signed paperwork acknowledging the house was David's separate property. The law says that once property is separate, turning it into community property ("transmutation") must be proven by clear and convincing evidence — a high standard. Christie did not point to anything in the record meeting that standard, so the appeals court upheld that award. For the Grandview property, Christie had signed a quitclaim deed giving up any interest, David had used pre-marriage retirement funds, and there was no evidence community funds paid the mortgage. Nevada law treats a spouse-to-spouse transfer of real estate as a presumed gift that also requires clear and convincing evidence to undo. The appeals court upheld that award too. David also asked that Christie repay the community for "marital waste" — money he claimed she wasted, mostly through gambling and by allegedly devaluing her businesses. The district court found Christie's credibility about her finances "questionable" but also found it "impossible" to figure out how much money, if any, was actually wasted, partly because David's financial summaries were incomplete and he had no accounting background. Because the court could not determine an actual amount of waste, it declined to order reimbursement (though it did make Christie responsible for the businesses' expenses and taxes). The appeals court found this supported by the evidence and upheld it. On custody, David argued that he should not have to share joint physical custody, pointing out that several of the district court's findings were unfavorable to Christie. The expert, Dr. Paglini, had spent extensive time with the family, produced an 88-page report, found both parents fit, and recommended joint physical custody with roughly a 60/40 split in David's favor. Dr. Paglini noted Christie's unsubstantiated allegations that David had raped her and molested their daughter, and said that if the court found she fabricated those claims for advantage in the divorce, David should get primary custody — but Dr. Paglini himself did not reach a conclusion that she had fabricated them. The district court found the allegations unsubstantiated but also could not conclude Christie had fabricated them. It went through each statutory "best interest" factor and adopted Dr. Paglini's recommendation. The appeals court noted that "a different court may have reached a different conclusion," but concluded this was not an abuse of discretion, and it upheld the joint-custody award. It also upheld the label "joint physical custody" for the roughly 60/40 schedule, because Christie had the children at least 40 percent of the time and more than 146 days per year. Finally, David argued the district court should have imputed more income to Christie and ordered her to pay child support. The court found Christie had not accurately reported her income and that her actual income was "almost impossible to discern." It concluded she could earn at least as much as David, set both incomes at David's monthly figure of $8,333, and ordered equal child support, netting to zero. The appeals court pointed out that the district court had actually imputed income to Christie — the opposite of what David claimed — and that David never provided figures showing what the correct amount should have been. Finding the decision supported by the evidence, the court affirmed the entire judgment.