Nevada family-law case summaries

Raul and Rosalba Lopez married in May 2014 and have two children. In September 2022, Rosalba filed for divorce. The couple agreed on how to handle custody of their children - they would share joint legal and physical custody, and Rosalba would pay Raul child support. That left only two things for the court to decide: whether Raul should receive alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other after divorce), and whether attorney fees and costs should be awarded. At a hearing in September 2023, both Raul and Rosalba testified about their finances. Rosalba works full-time as an operations supervisor at a freight company. She testified that she supports the parties' daughter, J.L., who turned 18 during the case and continued to live with her, and that she covers her own household and medical costs, including treatment for breast cancer and a skin removal surgery that insurance did not cover. Her position was that she could not afford to pay Raul alimony. Raul testified that he has not worked since 2018 and receives Social Security Disability benefits. He said he wanted alimony so he could move out of his parents' home, where he has lived since the separation, and he argued that Rosalba exaggerated her expenses and could afford to pay him. The district court weighed the factors the law requires it to consider for alimony. It found Rosalba's net monthly income (after tax deductions) to be $5,984.27 and her expenses to be $5,477. It found Raul's gross monthly income from Social Security Disability benefits to be $1,856.90 and noted his expenses were limited. The court also noted that Raul had covered his own living expenses for about a year after moving out without Rosalba's help, and that both parties would receive an equal lump sum from selling the marital home. The court concluded that Raul did not show a need for support that outweighed the burden such payments would place on Rosalba, and that Rosalba did not have the ability to pay alimony. The court denied alimony and indicated Rosalba would be awarded attorney fees and costs, with a separate order to follow on the amount. On appeal, Raul argued that the court should not have counted Rosalba's spending on their adult daughter, that Rosalba's expenses were inflated, and that some of her medical expenses were unnecessary. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the law requires the court to consider each spouse's financial condition, which includes their expenses. Raul did not point to any legal authority showing the court could not consider these particular expenses. The appellate court also explained that Raul was essentially asking it to re-weigh the evidence - to decide which testimony was believable and how much weight it deserved - which is the job of the trial court, not the appellate court. Because the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and Raul identified no legal error, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the denial of alimony. The court also addressed a few side points. It noted that Raul's challenge to the attorney fees award was premature, because the decree contemplated further proceedings to set the fee amount and no final order on fees had been properly appealed. And it treated two mistakes in the decree - a reference to Rosalba obtaining a high school diploma when she did not finish high school, and a statement that the marriage occurred in 2015 instead of 2014 - as harmless clerical errors that did not change the analysis.

This case concerns a long-running custody dispute over one child, PJ, born in December 2018. The parents, Maila Likua and Paulino Gomez, married in 2016, lived together in Mesquite, Nevada, and separated in February 2022. Gomez filed for divorce, and a three-year custody battle followed. Early on, the court split the financial issues from the custody issues. In June 2022, the parents agreed to share legal and physical custody on an alternating three-week schedule until a custody trial could be held. After that trial, the court's first custody order (September 2023) gave the parents joint legal custody but gave Likua primary physical custody and permission to move PJ permanently to Molokai, Hawaii, while Gomez kept substantial parenting time. Gomez asked the court to reconsider; that request was denied, and he appealed. While that appeal was pending, Gomez asked the trial court for permission to change custody again, claiming Likua had taken PJ out of preschool and left Hawaii without telling him from April to mid-May 2024, and had concealed the child's whereabouts. Because of the seriousness of those allegations, the trial court issued what is called an "indicative ruling" (a signal that it would reconsider if given the chance), and with the supreme court's approval, the case was sent back to the trial court to address custody and relocation again. After a second custody hearing in November 2024, the trial court reversed course: it gave Gomez primary physical custody (with Likua keeping substantial parenting time) and allowed PJ to move back to Nevada. The court found that PJ's school attendance had dropped, his academic performance lagged behind his peers, and he had ongoing behavioral and focus problems. It also found that communication between the parents had broken down and that Likua had repeatedly interfered with Gomez's parenting time, including on Father's Day 2024, and had traveled with PJ without telling Gomez. On appeal, Likua first argued that the trial court unfairly placed extra duties and burdens on her as the primary custodial parent, violating her right to a fair process. The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that both parents fully briefed and argued their positions, presented evidence and witnesses, and made closing arguments. The court noted that, because Gomez was the one asking to change custody, he carried the burden of proof, not Likua. The three passages Likua pointed to simply described the ordinary obligations of a parent who shares legal custody — such as keeping the other parent informed of the child's location and honoring scheduled parenting time, including required FaceTime calls. Likua next argued that the trial court got the changed-circumstances and best-interest analyses wrong. The Court of Appeals applied a deferential standard, meaning it would not second-guess factual findings supported by enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept them. It found that PJ's academic decline and Likua's interference with Gomez's parenting time were enough to support a substantial change in circumstances, and that the trial court had made specific findings on each of the twelve best-interest factors, three of which favored modification. On relocation, the Court of Appeals made an unusual observation: the relocation statute technically did not even apply here, because Gomez (the parent seeking the move) was the non-custodial parent already living in Nevada, and the move was back to Nevada rather than away from it. But because no one raised this point and the trial court treated the statute as a guide, the appeals court reviewed the relocation analysis as instructive and found the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Finally, the court declined to address Likua's request for community funds to pay attorney fees, because the orders that actually denied or deferred those fees were not the ones she listed in her notice of appeal. The court also declined to address her claim of judicial bias, finding it moot because the case was being affirmed rather than sent back, and noting that even on the merits the bias claim would fail.

Leslie and Paul Fassari married in California in 2012 and have no children together. They later moved to South Carolina, separated around June 2, 2024, and Leslie moved to Las Vegas. On November 5, 2024, she filed for divorce in Nevada's family court. In her complaint she asked the court not only to end the marriage but also to divide the couple's property, identify which property each owned before marriage as separate property, decide a claim of "marital waste," award her spousal support (alimony), and award her attorney fees and costs. She served Paul outside Nevada under a court rule allowing service elsewhere in the United States (NRCP 4.3(a)). Paul did not answer the complaint. Instead, he asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing the Nevada court did not have "personal jurisdiction" over him - that is, legal authority over him as an individual. Without that authority, he argued, the court could not decide property division, marital waste, or alimony. He also asked the court for his own attorney fees and costs for having to bring the motion. Leslie responded that Paul had actually submitted himself to Nevada's authority by asking for attorney fees and costs - in legal terms, by seeking "affirmative relief." She also argued that even if the court lacked authority over Paul personally, it could still simply dissolve the marriage based on its "in rem" jurisdiction (authority over the status of the marriage itself, which exists when one spouse genuinely lives in Nevada). She noted that South Carolina law would not let her file for divorce there until one year after separation. The district court dismissed the entire complaint. It found Paul had no ties to Nevada, that requesting attorney fees did not waive his jurisdiction objection, and that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him. It then declined to dissolve the marriage by itself, reasoning that splitting the divorce from the property issues is disfavored in Nevada and would create "numerous problems." The Court of Appeals reached a split result. On the personal-jurisdiction question, it agreed with the district court: Paul's request for attorney fees and costs was not "affirmative relief" and did not submit him to Nevada's authority, so the court correctly found it could not decide the property, waste, and alimony issues. But on the divorce itself, the appellate court disagreed with the dismissal. It explained that a "divisible divorce" - dissolving the marriage now while leaving the money-and-property issues for another court that has authority over both spouses - is different from the "bifurcated divorce" disfavored in older Nevada cases. The court held that if a person meets the statutory requirements for divorce (including living in Nevada at least six weeks), the district court does not have discretion to refuse the divorce. Because the district court never analyzed whether Leslie met those requirements, the appellate court sent that part of the case back for the district court to decide.

This is a custody dispute between two parents, Nereida Cobian and Armando Emmanuel Ramirez, who had a child, L.R., born in Utah in October 2015. Early on, the parents submitted a letter to a Utah court in which Ramirez appeared to give up his parental rights, but the court did not treat it as a full waiver. Instead, the Utah court gave Cobian sole legal and physical custody and gave Ramirez standard parenting time, and it required Ramirez to pay child support. Cobian moved with the child, first to California and later to Las Vegas. Ramirez, who worked for and then as a civilian contractor connected to the Air Force, moved to Las Vegas as well. Over time, conflict grew. According to the district court's findings, Cobian repeatedly restricted Ramirez's time with L.R., moved to California in June 2021 without Ramirez's consent or a court order, and reported Ramirez to California child-welfare authorities for physical and sexual abuse. That investigation ended with the allegations found "unsubstantiated or inconclusive." California, which had briefly taken emergency jurisdiction, gave jurisdiction back to Nevada in July 2022. Ramirez asked the Nevada court to register the Utah order and to change custody. After an evidentiary hearing that was rescheduled four times, the district court awarded Ramirez primary physical custody, gave the parents joint legal custody, ordered L.R. returned to Las Vegas and enrolled in a Las Vegas school for the spring semester, ended Ramirez's child-support obligation, and held Cobian in contempt (with a $500 fine) for blocking Ramirez's parenting time over Thanksgiving 2023. Cobian appealed. On review, the Court of Appeals rejected each of her arguments. It concluded that Nevada was the child's "home state" and that the district court properly had jurisdiction to register the Utah order and decide custody. It found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to keep the case in Nevada rather than transfer it to California, because Ramirez still lived in Nevada and the Nevada court was familiar with the case. It upheld the custody change, noting that the trial judge made detailed findings that circumstances had substantially changed and that the child's best interests favored Ramirez. The appellate court explained that it does not re-weigh evidence or second-guess a trial court's credibility findings, including the trial court's determination that Cobian's abuse allegations were not credible. It upheld the relocation order, the contempt finding, and it declined to order the case reassigned to a different judge, finding that Cobian had not shown bias. The court did not decide certain issues. It declined to address the child-support challenge in detail because that challenge depended on reversing the custody award, which the court affirmed. It found the school-enrollment issue moot because the order concerned only the 2024 spring semester. And it concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the attorney-fees issue because the order under appeal only found that Ramirez was "entitled to" fees rather than actually awarding them.

Christopher and Joy Douglas married in 2015 and had one child together. In June 2022, Christopher filed for divorce and asked to be the child's primary caretaker. Joy asked to be primary caretaker as well and to move the child to Iowa, where she was already living. After holding a hearing, the district court sided with Christopher on the major issues: it gave him primary physical custody, denied Joy's request to move the child to Iowa, denied her request for alimony (spousal support), and denied her request that Christopher pay for the child's travel to Iowa for her parenting time. Both sides had asked the court to make the other pay their attorney fees. Christopher asked for fees under a state law (NRS 18.010(2)(b)) that allows a winning party to recover fees when the other side pursued a claim without reasonable grounds or to harass, and under a local court rule (EDCR 5.219) that allows sanctions for things like filing frivolous positions or dragging out a case to run up costs. The district court found that both parties actually won on some issues and lost on others, and — importantly — that neither party had pursued the case without reasonable grounds or to harass the other, and that neither had taken an unwarranted position or needlessly prolonged the litigation. So the court denied fees under those provisions. The court separately found Joy was entitled to fees under a different divorce-fees statute (NRS 125.040), but that part of the case was not before the appellate court. Christopher appealed the denial of his own fee request. He argued that Joy's positions — asking for custody and relocation without meeting the requirements, asking for alimony while (he said) being deliberately underemployed, and asking him to pay travel costs even though she was the one moving — were frivolous, and that because he won on the big issues he should get his fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that whether a claim ultimately loses is not the same as whether it was frivolous or brought without reasonable grounds. Joy had testified at the hearing in support of her requests, and the record did not show her claims lacked any credible support. Because the district court had adequate grounds for its decision, the appellate court could not say the trial judge abused her discretion, and it affirmed (upheld) the denial of Christopher's fees.

Lisa and Thomas Gibson divorced in 2003 and then spent roughly two decades fighting in state and federal courts over money Thomas owed Lisa. By 2015, a Nevada district court had consolidated earlier judgments and determined Thomas owed Lisa about $275,000. Before that 2015 judgment was entered, Thomas filed for bankruptcy. Under his repayment plan he paid $2,200 a month for about two years, and roughly $44,000 accumulated for anticipated payments to creditors. His bankruptcy case was later converted from a Chapter 13 (a repayment plan) to a Chapter 7 (a liquidation). Lisa and Thomas then fought over who owned that $44,000. In 2017, the bankruptcy court ordered the money deposited with the Office of the Ex-Officio Constable and allowed Lisa to pursue a writ of garnishment (a court order that lets a creditor collect money held by a third party) against the trustee. Lisa tried to collect the money using writs of garnishment and execution, but multiple delays got in the way — including her own collection attorney filing a lien for attorney fees against the funds. In June 2021, the 2015 judgment expired because Lisa did not file a required renewal affidavit in time. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld that finding of expiration in a 2023 order. Because the judgment had expired, Lisa's attorney filed an interpleader action — a lawsuit that asks a court to decide who among competing claimants actually owns disputed funds. In 2023, the district court concluded Thomas was entitled to the $44,000 because Lisa no longer had a valid judgment to collect on, and ordered the money paid to him. Lisa appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Lisa's argument that the 2017 bankruptcy order had already decided who owned the money. The court explained that the bankruptcy order only let Lisa file a writ of garnishment; it did not award her the money outright. The later dispute over ownership involved a new situation that arose only after the Nevada Supreme Court confirmed the 2015 judgment had expired — something that could not have been decided back in 2017. The court also rejected Lisa's argument that her 2017 collection efforts extended the life of the judgment. It noted that the Nevada Supreme Court had already decided in the 2023 order that Lisa's collection efforts between 2015 and 2021 did not restart the limitations period, so that question could not be relitigated. The court added that Lisa cited no authority actually supporting the idea that a writ of garnishment extends a judgment's deadline. Finally, because Lisa had no right to the funds, the court found her remaining arguments — about a motion for exemption and about her former attorney's claim to the money — to be moot (no longer presenting a live dispute) and did not address them.

Ryan and Marie are the divorced parents of three young children. After their 2019 separation, Marie was awarded primary physical and sole legal custody, and a psychologist evaluated Ryan, finding him unfit at the time and recommending therapy followed by gradual reunification with the children. Marie was permitted to relocate with the children to California. Ryan briefly had supervised in-person visits and then weekly virtual visits, but the visits stopped in June 2020 after Marie switched to a paid supervision platform that Ryan said he could not afford. In the years that followed, Ryan continued to seek treatment from multiple mental-health providers, several of whom reported he had made progress and recommended reunification. He sent diapers, wipes, money toward a medical procedure for one of the twins, and a pair of custom sneakers. He also emailed Marie's lawyer asking to see his children. He did not, however, formally move the court to modify custody, and he did not pay court-ordered child support, citing financial difficulties tied in part to a prior felony conviction. In late 2022, Marie filed a petition to terminate Ryan's parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court terminated Ryan's rights, finding he had abandoned and neglected the children and made only "token efforts" to be involved in their lives. The court relied on two statutes: NRS 128.107, which lists factors courts must consider in termination cases, and NRS 128.109, which creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for a long time. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that NRS 128.107 does not apply when the children are in the physical custody of a parent (as opposed to foster care, a relative, or a guardian), and that NRS 128.109 applies only in cases brought under NRS Chapter 432B - the chapter governing child welfare cases involving the State. Because this was a private termination proceeding by one parent against the other, neither statute fit. The court also concluded that the evidence did not support any of the three parental-fault grounds. On abandonment, the court reasoned that the statutory presumption did not apply because the children were placed with Marie by court order, and even if it did, Ryan rebutted it by repeatedly requesting visits, sending gifts and support, and pursuing the treatment recommended by the custody evaluator. The court emphasized that financial inability to pay support cannot itself establish abandonment, and that an unrepresented parent's failure to navigate court procedures cannot be held against them in this context. On neglect, the court noted Marie testified the children were thriving in her care, so Ryan's conduct could not be deemed sufficiently harmful. On token efforts, Ryan's documented therapy, requests for visitation, and gifts were enough to defeat the finding. The court reversed the termination order, instructed the district court to order destruction of the amended birth certificates that had been issued (which had changed the children's last names), and sent the case back for further proceedings. Justice Lee concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's reading of NRS 128.107, arguing the statute should apply whenever the parent whose rights are being considered does not have physical custody, even if the other parent does.

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson divorced under a stipulated (agreed-upon) divorce decree. Afterward, disputes arose. Matthew filed a motion asking for several things, including a request to change the school the couple's two minor children attended. Chelsea opposed that motion and made her own requests, including asking to be reimbursed for some of the children's medical expenses. Chelsea then asked the court for summary judgment - a ruling deciding claims without a full trial - on all the claims raised in the parties' motions. Matthew tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court granted summary judgment for Chelsea on those requests anyway, reasoning that Matthew did not withdraw them in time and that Chelsea should not have had to file for summary judgment. The court let the school-selection and medical-expenses issues, which Matthew still contested, go forward to an evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled. They agreed the children would stay in their current school zone and that Matthew would pay Chelsea $700 to resolve the medical expenses. Turning that settlement into a written order proved difficult, with disagreements and delays, so Chelsea eventually asked the court to enter the stipulation and order without Matthew's signature, which the court did without objection from Matthew. Because that order left the question of attorney fees and costs for the court to decide later, Chelsea asked for $54,098.69 in fees and costs. The district court awarded her $45,503.17. On appeal, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. The trial court cited several legal provisions but made only one substantive finding - that Matthew's behavior, especially trying to withdraw requests only after Chelsea moved for summary judgment, multiplied the litigation. The appellate court noted that a fees award used as a sanction is supposed to be proportionate to the misconduct, and it was not clear how a $45,503.17 award (about 84 percent of what Chelsea sought) matched up with the specific conduct the court identified. The court also could not tell whether the trial judge was concerned only with the timing of Matthew's withdrawal or believed the requests were meritless from the start - a distinction that matters because some of the cited provisions require a finding that a claim lacked any reasonable basis when filed, and the district court made no such finding. Because the reasons for the award were unclear, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back (remanded) for the district court to make additional findings. The court also noted that Chelsea had not yet supported her fee request with an affidavit from her counsel confirming the fees were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable.