Nevada family-law case summaries

Samarn and Dorothy Reed were married for about 29 years. Before the divorce, Samarn was an executive-level employee at the United States Postal Service (USPS) earning over $200,000 per year. In 2021 he began a relationship with a coworker whom he had promoted and for whom he had advocated for management training and other benefits. When Dorothy learned of the relationship, she filed for divorce; around the same time, Samarn notified USPS's human relations department about the relationship, triggering an internal investigation. In April 2022, the parties entered a stipulated (agreed-upon) divorce decree requiring Samarn to pay alimony - $1,250 per month at first, rising to $2,500 per month for 10 years once his child support obligation for the parties' youngest child ended. The decree contained no provision making the alimony nonmodifiable. In January 2023, USPS concluded its investigation and terminated Samarn's employment, finding he had promoted an applicant with whom he was romantically or sexually involved and knew his conduct violated USPS's rules of employment and ethical guidelines. Samarn appealed to the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, then settled: instead of termination, he accepted a voluntary demotion to a non-executive position paying $110,000 per year and agreed not to seek a promotion at USPS until February 2025. About two weeks later, Samarn asked the district court to terminate his alimony, arguing his demotion cut his monthly income by 45 percent and he could not afford $2,500 per month. He later argued the court should at least reduce alimony to $557.87 per month to equalize the parties' incomes. Dorothy opposed any change, arguing the income reduction stemmed from Samarn's knowing violation of USPS's rules and that he could still afford the payments. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court declined to terminate or substantially modify alimony. Instead, it narrowly restructured the obligation: $2,000 per month from October 1, 2023, through January 31, 2025 (the period before Samarn could again seek a promotion), returning to $2,500 per month thereafter, with the alimony term extended by three months to roughly offset the temporary reduction. The court found that Samarn's income loss was not beyond his control but resulted from his deliberate, willful, and knowing violation of USPS's rules, that he could maintain a nominal budget surplus if he cut unnecessary expenses, and that there was no evidence Dorothy's finances had improved since the divorce. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It held the district court properly relied on the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, which allows courts to consider whether a spouse's reduced earnings result from the spouse's own intentional or purposeful conduct rather than circumstances beyond the spouse's control. The court rejected Samarn's argument that his demotion was involuntary because USPS imposed it, reasoning that Samarn agreed to the settlement and that the changes were precipitated by his own deliberate conduct. It also rejected his argument that considering that conduct improperly penalized him for "bad behavior" during the marriage, distinguishing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez: the district court was concerned not with marital misconduct but with the violation of USPS's employment rules that caused the demotion. Finally, the court held the district court was not required to walk through the NRS 125.150(9) factors - which govern initial alimony awards - and that the court had in substance considered the parties' financial circumstances anyway, so no abuse of discretion occurred.

This case concerns where a young child, E.R., should live. DFS removed E.R. from her mother's custody when she was one month old because of neglect. After efforts to reunify mother and child failed, the mother's parental rights were terminated in February 2017, and the foster parents who had cared for E.R. since September 2016 began the process of adopting her. About 15 months after E.R. was first removed, a maternal cousin in Georgia (Stephanie R.) contacted DFS and asked to have E.R. placed with her and her husband. After interstate-placement approval and an evidentiary hearing, a court master recommended moving E.R. to Georgia, reasoning that the "family connection is the overriding consideration" even though the child was strongly bonded to the foster parents and another removal would cause her trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. DFS and the foster parents asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court used the wrong statute. While the case was working through reunification, NRS 432B.550(5) governed placement and gave a strong preference to placing the child with relatives. But once parental rights were terminated, a different statute, NRS 128.110(2), took over. That statute uses softer language: the agency "may" prefer relatives, and "shall, if practicable" keep siblings together. So the agency's discretion and the child's best interest carry more weight at that stage. The Court agreed with the lower court on one point: the maternal cousin had a reasonable excuse for coming forward late because she did not know E.R. was in protective custody, and DFS could have located her earlier. So her delay did not eliminate any familial preference she might have. But the Court found two serious problems with the placement order. First, the master and district court did not make written findings about what was actually in E.R.'s best interest beyond acknowledging the move would traumatize her. Second, by using NRS 432B.550(5) instead of NRS 128.110(2), the courts below did not give appropriate weight to DFS's discretion in choosing placement post-termination, and did not develop the facts about whether placing E.R. with a newer sibling (born to the same mother in April 2017) was actually practicable. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate the placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning the court starts fresh rather than just reviewing the master's work) applying the correct statute and making proper findings about E.R.'s best interest.

This case involves a young child, referred to as E.R., who was removed from her mother's custody at one month old in July 2015 because of neglect. DFS placed her in foster care and tried to find relatives to take her, but found none at first. After more than a year, the child was placed with foster parents Philip R. and Regina R., who wanted to adopt her. About 15 months after the child's initial removal, the child's mother's first cousin, Stephanie R., who lives in Georgia with her husband Joey R., contacted DFS and asked to take the child. By that time, DFS was moving toward terminating the mother's parental rights, which the court did in February 2017. The foster parents had begun adopting the child. DFS then asked the district court to decide whether the child should stay with the foster parents (with whom she was strongly bonded) or be moved to live with the maternal relatives in Georgia. After a hearing, a court master recommended sending the child to the maternal relatives, finding that the family connection was the "overriding consideration," even though the move would cause the child trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. The foster parents and DFS asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed to grant the writs and ordered the case redone. The court explained several things. First, once parental rights are terminated, the rules for placing a child change. Before termination, NRS 432B.550(5) governs placement, and that statute uses mandatory language ("preference must be given") in favor of placing a child with a relative. After termination, however, NRS 128.110(2) governs, and it uses softer, more permissive language ("may give preference") and gives the placement agency more discretion. Second, the maternal relatives' delay in coming forward did not disqualify them. Stephanie did not know the child was in protective custody until October 2016, so she had a reasonable excuse for the delay. Third, and most importantly, even when a familial preference applies, the child's best interest is the main consideration. The Supreme Court found that the hearing master and district court did not adequately weigh the child's best interest. They treated the family connection as automatically controlling and did not make written findings about what was best for this particular child, who was deeply bonded with her foster family and would suffer trauma from another move. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate its placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning a fresh hearing), this time applying NRS 128.110(2), giving appropriate weight to the child's best interest, and considering DFS's discretion in deciding placement.