Nevada family-law case summaries

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.

James and Pamela Gabroy were married for eighteen years. Pamela filed for divorce in September 2019, citing incompatibility. James was an internist (a physician) who had owned and operated his own medical practice for years. He had sold that practice for $800,000 in 2016 but kept working there as an independent contractor for three more years. When his contract was not renewed, he set about reopening the office under his own name. On Pamela's recommendation, James hired a woman named Queenie Manuel around June 2019 to help him with the licensing and credentialing process. Manuel presented herself as an experienced medical credentialist with insurance-industry connections. James agreed to pay her $5,000 a month. The marriage was breaking down at the same time. Over Labor Day weekend in 2019, Pamela said James displayed a revolver during an argument. She obtained a temporary protection order and filed for divorce shortly afterward. She also asked the court for a "joint preliminary injunction" (JPI) — an order that would have frozen both spouses from moving money out of shared accounts while the divorce was pending — but the record shows the court never actually issued one. At an October 2019 hearing, the court ordered the couple to figure out a firm cost to reopen James's practice and to release community funds for that purpose. Four days after that hearing, James wrote Manuel a check for $800,000. He said the money was supposed to go toward licensing, medical equipment, and even a dental practice for low-income patients. But Manuel vanished with the money. James reported her to police, and she was never found. Notably, James did not report this $800,000 loss on his federal tax return, even though he reported other, smaller losses. James later sold his practice to another doctor for $180,000 — far less than the $800,000 he had received for it in 2016 and the same $800,000 he had just handed Manuel. In February 2020, James fell down a flight of stairs, fractured his skull, and injured his back. The court suspended his temporary spousal support because of his health, and the parties later stipulated (formally agreed) to that suspension. James spent eighteen months recovering in an assisted living facility. In October 2022, Pamela amended her divorce complaint to allege that James had committed "marital waste" — that is, wrongly wasting or destroying property belonging to the marriage. James denied it and accused Pamela of the same. After a trial, the district court found that James's $800,000 payment to Manuel was indeed marital waste and ordered him to reimburse Pamela for the community's share of that money. The court also awarded Pamela $1,150 per month in alimony for five years (ending sooner if she died or remarried). On appeal, James argued three things. First, he said the $800,000 payment simply followed the court's own order to release community funds to reopen his practice, so it could not be waste. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The trial court had found James's testimony not credible — questioning why he would pay a $5,000-per-month employee an $800,000 lump sum, and pointing out that he first testified he had written off the loss on his taxes but then admitted on cross-examination that he had not. Because appellate courts do not re-weigh a trial judge's assessment of who is believable, and because there was enough evidence to support the finding, the appeals court upheld the waste finding. James also argued the trial court wrongly relied on a violation of a JPI, since no JPI ever existed. Pamela conceded no JPI was issued but argued the mistake did no harm. The appeals court agreed it was "harmless error" — meaning the mistake would not have changed the result — because the waste finding rested on other, sufficient evidence, and because James made this unusually large payment right after Pamela filed for divorce, when the marriage was already broken. Second, James argued the court did not properly weigh the legally required factors before awarding alimony. The appeals court found the trial court had adequately considered the required factors, made findings on most of them, and treated as neutral or inapplicable the factors on which neither party presented evidence. Even while noting that "many courts would not have ordered alimony" given James's age, health, and reduced finances, the appeals court held the award was supported by the evidence and complied with the statute. Third, James argued the court wrongly excluded evidence about Pamela's alleged offshore bank accounts. The appeals court declined to consider this argument because James did not cite the record or provide adequate legal support.

Jashawn Prevost and Keilah Gronvold met in 2013 and had a child together in 2014. The family moved to Las Vegas in 2015 and lived there until the parents separated in 2020. After the separation, Gronvold moved to Mississippi while Prevost stayed in Las Vegas with the child. Prevost then filed a court case (representing himself) asking for custody, and Gronvold answered and filed her own counterclaim, also representing herself. The parties could not agree through mediation, so the case went to trial in April 2021. Both appeared virtually for a trial that lasted a single afternoon. Prevost called the child's teacher as a witness, who testified that the child had struggled in school until Gronvold left and that the child improved after Prevost became more involved. Prevost testified that he was the best parent and accused Gronvold's current partner of being a "pedophile and sex trafficker." By his own testimony, however, Prevost based those accusations only on what Gronvold had told him ("per her"). Gronvold testified that she wanted joint physical custody and to be able to see her child in Mississippi. She said she never told Prevost the things he used to support his accusations against her partner. She also described a relationship marked by repeated domestic violence, including beatings that required staples in her head, a black eye, being shot with a pellet gun, and threats to kill her. Neither party formally moved to admit their evidence during the trial. Before closing arguments, the judge asked whether the parties would agree to let her review each side's evidence. Prevost first objected, saying he could not open documents Gronvold sent through an app called OurFamilyWizard and that she should have sent them in another format, such as hard copy. The judge noted his objection but asked again whether he agreed to her reviewing the evidence, and Prevost answered, "Yes, ma'am." A few days later, the district court issued its decision. It found Gronvold credible, noted photographs showing her bruised and bloodied face, and found that Prevost had committed one or more acts of domestic violence proven by clear and convincing evidence resulting in severe injuries. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption (an assumption the law makes unless proven otherwise) that Prevost should not receive joint or primary custody, and it found Prevost did not overcome that presumption. The court awarded primary physical custody to Gronvold and, applying the statutory factors, found the child's move to Mississippi to be in the child's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Prevost's arguments. It found that the record did not show the judge forced or "strongarmed" him into agreeing to the evidence review; she heard his objection, then asked again, and he agreed. The court also concluded that any problem with how Gronvold shared her documents was minor and did not change the outcome, especially because Gronvold's own credible testimony established the domestic violence. The court also held that the district court did not ignore Prevost's accusations against Gronvold's partner. Because those accusations rested entirely on what Prevost said Gronvold told him, and Gronvold denied ever making those statements, the trial judge was entitled to decide whom to believe. Finally, the court declined Prevost's request to reweigh witness credibility, explaining that trial courts, which see and hear the witnesses, are the ones who make those calls, and appellate courts do not second-guess them from a transcript. The court affirmed the custody decree.