Nevada family-law case summaries

This case concerns a long-running custody dispute over one child, PJ, born in December 2018. The parents, Maila Likua and Paulino Gomez, married in 2016, lived together in Mesquite, Nevada, and separated in February 2022. Gomez filed for divorce, and a three-year custody battle followed. Early on, the court split the financial issues from the custody issues. In June 2022, the parents agreed to share legal and physical custody on an alternating three-week schedule until a custody trial could be held. After that trial, the court's first custody order (September 2023) gave the parents joint legal custody but gave Likua primary physical custody and permission to move PJ permanently to Molokai, Hawaii, while Gomez kept substantial parenting time. Gomez asked the court to reconsider; that request was denied, and he appealed. While that appeal was pending, Gomez asked the trial court for permission to change custody again, claiming Likua had taken PJ out of preschool and left Hawaii without telling him from April to mid-May 2024, and had concealed the child's whereabouts. Because of the seriousness of those allegations, the trial court issued what is called an "indicative ruling" (a signal that it would reconsider if given the chance), and with the supreme court's approval, the case was sent back to the trial court to address custody and relocation again. After a second custody hearing in November 2024, the trial court reversed course: it gave Gomez primary physical custody (with Likua keeping substantial parenting time) and allowed PJ to move back to Nevada. The court found that PJ's school attendance had dropped, his academic performance lagged behind his peers, and he had ongoing behavioral and focus problems. It also found that communication between the parents had broken down and that Likua had repeatedly interfered with Gomez's parenting time, including on Father's Day 2024, and had traveled with PJ without telling Gomez. On appeal, Likua first argued that the trial court unfairly placed extra duties and burdens on her as the primary custodial parent, violating her right to a fair process. The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that both parents fully briefed and argued their positions, presented evidence and witnesses, and made closing arguments. The court noted that, because Gomez was the one asking to change custody, he carried the burden of proof, not Likua. The three passages Likua pointed to simply described the ordinary obligations of a parent who shares legal custody — such as keeping the other parent informed of the child's location and honoring scheduled parenting time, including required FaceTime calls. Likua next argued that the trial court got the changed-circumstances and best-interest analyses wrong. The Court of Appeals applied a deferential standard, meaning it would not second-guess factual findings supported by enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept them. It found that PJ's academic decline and Likua's interference with Gomez's parenting time were enough to support a substantial change in circumstances, and that the trial court had made specific findings on each of the twelve best-interest factors, three of which favored modification. On relocation, the Court of Appeals made an unusual observation: the relocation statute technically did not even apply here, because Gomez (the parent seeking the move) was the non-custodial parent already living in Nevada, and the move was back to Nevada rather than away from it. But because no one raised this point and the trial court treated the statute as a guide, the appeals court reviewed the relocation analysis as instructive and found the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Finally, the court declined to address Likua's request for community funds to pay attorney fees, because the orders that actually denied or deferred those fees were not the ones she listed in her notice of appeal. The court also declined to address her claim of judicial bias, finding it moot because the case was being affirmed rather than sent back, and noting that even on the merits the bias claim would fail.

Raymond Bell and Nichole Robinson were never married but have one child together, R.R.B., born in March 2013. The two have been fighting over legal and physical custody of the child almost continuously since 2015. Since an August 2022 court order, they had shared joint physical custody. This appeal was only about physical custody. In April 2023, Bell asked the court to give him primary physical custody, claiming Robinson was abusing drugs and neglecting the child. He supported his request with a statement from Robinson's ex-boyfriend, Bradley Hunt. Many of Hunt's statements about Robinson's alleged drug use were vague about timing or described events that happened before the August 2022 custody order that was still in effect. Bell did describe a January 2023 incident in which, after a party, Robinson allegedly behaved aggressively, bit Hunt on the arm, and then took his car from a police station and damaged it. Robinson disputed most of these allegations. She acknowledged driving away in Hunt's car but said she did so to escape Hunt, who she claimed was threatening domestic violence, and she said any biting was in self-defense. She also said Bell was surveilling her, including hiring private investigators and placing GPS trackers on her vehicle. The district court decided Bell had presented enough to justify a hearing and held an evidentiary hearing in August 2023. Robinson testified that she smoked marijuana two to three times a week but not in front of the child, and denied the other allegations. Hunt testified and repeated his account, but on cross-examination he admitted he had sent Robinson flowers in February 2023 and tried to reconcile in March 2023, even though his written statement said he stopped communicating with her the night of the January fight. He also admitted he never reported Robinson to Child Protective Services despite being involved with her on and off for ten years and claiming to have serious concerns about her parenting. Bell testified but offered few specific allegations about events after the August 2022 order. He admitted making decisions without Robinson's input and providing incomplete or incorrect contact information on school forms. The district court found that the most serious allegations against Robinson were not proven and that much of Hunt's testimony was not credible. The court concluded Bell had not shown a "substantial change in circumstances" that would justify changing custody. The court also reviewed the child's best-interest factors and found that keeping joint physical custody served R.R.B.'s best interest. The court denied Bell's motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that to change custody a parent must show both a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child and that the change would serve the child's best interest. The court held that the district court's finding — that Bell did not show a substantial change in circumstances — was supported by the evidence. It noted that Bell admitted the private investigator provided no useful information about Robinson's fitness as a parent, and that the domestic-violence factor did not apply because Hunt was not a parent, was not seeking custody, was not living with Robinson, and the child was not present during the altercation. The court also emphasized that it does not second-guess a trial court's decisions about which witnesses to believe, and the district court had found Hunt not credible. Because Bell failed on the first requirement, the appellate court did not need to decide the best-interest question, though it added that Bell had not shown the district court's best-interest findings lacked support. The order was affirmed.

Natalie and Doug Gennardo married in 2002 and had three children. Doug filed for divorce in May 2019. After Doug moved out in December 2019, the parents tried to share custody, but there was significant conflict. According to the opinion, Natalie struggled with extreme alcohol abuse and sometimes exhibited violent behavior. After a confrontation between the parents in April 2020, Doug asked the court for primary physical custody. Natalie agreed to attend a 30-day treatment program in Arizona. While she was away, the court put a temporary arrangement in place giving Doug primary physical custody and leaving contact between Natalie and the children at Doug's discretion. A therapist was enlisted to try to repair Natalie's relationship with the children, which had seriously deteriorated. The children reported not wanting to see her. For roughly a year, Natalie could see the children only under the therapist's supervision or when Doug allowed it, and the court did not set a parenting-time schedule or hold a hearing on the temporary arrangement during that time. Because the case had complicated financial issues that delayed the trial, the court eventually decided in February 2021 to resolve custody before the trial on money matters. It held three custody hearings in April and May 2021, heard testimony, and awarded the parents joint legal custody with primary physical custody to Doug. It made findings on each of the statutory factors that guide a child's best interest. Separately, Doug's employer, Marriott, cut his pay early in the pandemic and told him in June 2021 that his Las Vegas position would be eliminated. In July, Marriott offered him a comparable job in Texas. Doug accepted and asked the court to let the children move with him. In August 2021, the court allowed a temporary move ahead of a promised hearing meant to permanently decide the relocation issue. That hearing was never held. Instead, after the trial on the financial matters, the court entered a final decree making the relocation permanent. Natalie asked the court to reconsider because the promised hearing never happened; the court denied her request. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reached different conclusions on the different issues. On custody, the court said the trial judge did not strictly follow Nevada's process favoring joint physical custody and may have shifted the burden of proof onto Natalie, which was an error. But the court concluded the custody decision was still supported by substantial evidence and adequately explained, so it did not reverse the custody award. The court also found that the trial judge had improperly created what amounted to a de facto sole physical custody arrangement — giving Doug complete control over Natalie's time with the children and refusing to set a schedule or a hearing for about a year — and then gave too much weight to that one year while disregarding Natalie's 16 years as the children's primary caretaker. The court called this clearly erroneous but concluded it did not change the custody result because Natalie did not show a different outcome was reasonably likely without the error. On the temporary relocation, the court held the trial judge acted within its discretion in allowing the children to move temporarily before a hearing, given the exigent circumstances of Doug being the family's sole provider and needing to start a job in another state. On the permanent relocation, however, the court held that the trial judge abused its discretion by making it permanent without ever holding the evidentiary hearing it had repeatedly promised. Because no actual evidence was taken, the court's relocation "findings" rested only on lawyers' arguments and motion exhibits, which the appellate court found insufficient. The court further held that this deprived Natalie of her constitutionally protected due process rights, because she was never given the opportunity to challenge Doug's claims and present her own evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the custody decision, reversed the permanent relocation, and sent the case back for a prompt hearing on relocation. It noted the temporary relocation order may remain in effect while that hearing is pending.

Dimonaco and Ferrando share joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. After their custody decree was entered, they disagreed about who should watch the child after school on the days when the child is with Dimonaco. Dimonaco works during some of that time, so the question was what happens to the child until he gets off work. Ferrando asked the court for permission to provide after-school care herself — including help with homework — until Dimonaco finished work on his parenting days. She argued it was better for the child to be with a parent than in an after-school program run by the child's school, which is what Dimonaco had proposed and had already enrolled the child in. Dimonaco countered that the program gave the child educational services and chances to socialize, and he argued that having Ferrando provide care on his days would confuse the child, undermine the child's sense of belonging in his home, and force extra child exchanges between two parents who were in significant conflict. The district court sided with Ferrando and ordered that she provide the after-school care on Dimonaco's days. Dimonaco then asked the court to reconsider, requesting an evidentiary hearing — a proceeding where each side presents actual testimony and admitted evidence rather than just written arguments. He pointed out that the court had ruled without taking any evidence and had not made proper findings about what was in the child's best interest. The court denied the hearing request but added findings favoring Ferrando, saying Dimonaco had not shown "adequate cause" for a hearing. The Court of Appeals disagreed with how the district court handled the matter. It held that Ferrando herself had actually shown enough reason ("adequate cause") to justify an evidentiary hearing, because the parties genuinely disputed facts — such as whether the school's program provided beneficial educational services, whether the child needed those services, and how much conflict the additional exchanges would create. The court explained that resolving these questions required an evaluation that could not be done on paper alone. The appellate court also found that the district court had relied on materials that do not legally count as evidence: exhibits attached to motions that were never formally admitted, and the arguments of the attorneys. Because a decision about a child's best interest must rest on substantial evidence, and because the sworn statements in the case only vaguely addressed the key issues, the court concluded the district court did not have enough evidence to make its decision. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the amended order and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing on the after-school care issue.

Leslie and Brett Miller divorced in 2015. They have two minor children. Through mediation they agreed on most issues, including custody: they share joint physical custody of one child, but Leslie has primary physical custody of the other child, who lives with her and stays with Brett every other weekend. They could not agree on child support. The trial judge ordered Brett to pay Leslie $345 per month. When Leslie asked the judge to explain how he reached that number, the judge said he had "run the numbers" using statutory percentages (18% for one child and 25% for two children) along with deviation factors permitted by Nevada law, but did not show the calculations. Leslie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court took the case to answer a question it had never directly answered before: how do you calculate child support when parents share joint physical custody of one child but one parent has primary physical custody of another child? Several different formulas had been proposed by the parties and by the State Bar of Nevada's Family Law Section, producing wildly different numbers from $345 to $832.19 per month. The Court walked through Nevada's child support statutes. NRS 125B.070 sets baseline percentages of a parent's gross monthly income that the parent owes for child support, based on the number of children (18% for one child, 25% for two, etc.). The Court emphasized that this percentage depends on how many children the parents have, not on the custody arrangement. After that obligation is calculated, the custody arrangement determines who pays what to whom. The Court announced this step-by-step formula for the Millers' "split custody" situation: 1. Calculate each parent's support obligation under NRS 125B.070 based on the total number of children (here, 25% of each parent's gross monthly income because there are two children). For Leslie, that was $996.67; for Brett, $1,076.24. 2. Divide each parent's obligation by the number of children to get a per-child amount. Leslie: $498.34 per child; Brett: $538.12 per child. 3. For the child in joint physical custody, offset the per-child amounts (under the Court's prior decision in Wright v. Osburn): the higher earner pays the lower earner the difference. Brett owed Leslie $39.78 for the joint-custody child. 4. For the child in Leslie's primary physical custody, Brett owes the full per-child amount ($538.12) with no offset. 5. Add those two figures together: Brett owes $577.90 per month. 6. Make sure the result does not exceed the presumptive maximum amount per child in NRS 125B.070(2). 7. The district court may then deviate from that amount under NRS 125B.080, but if it does, it must make written findings of fact explaining the deviation and stating what the support amount would have been under the formula. Because the trial court used the wrong starting percentage (18% for one child rather than 25% for two), failed to state the pre-deviation amount, and failed to explain the deviation factors that produced $345, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back with instructions to follow the formula above. The Court also flagged an "anomaly": under its formula, Brett owes $577.90 for two children, but if there were only one child in Leslie's primary physical custody, he would owe $774.80. The Court noted that this is a matter for the legislatively created Committee to Review Child Support Guidelines to consider, since the Legislature in 2017 (through A.B. 278) directed that new guidelines be developed.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.