Nevada family-law case summaries

Cierah Johnson and William Bennett divorced in March 2022 and initially shared joint custody of their two daughters on a week-on/week-off schedule. After Johnson's father died, she moved to Colorado, and the parties signed a court-approved stipulation in May 2022 giving Bennett "primary physical custody" of the girls in Nevada, with a note that the parties would "reevaluate the details" in a year. Johnson moved back to Las Vegas in May 2023, and the parents informally resumed week-on/week-off parenting, but Johnson never filed paperwork to change the custody order on the books. Bennett, an Air Force helicopter mechanic, was then ordered to transfer to a base in Georgia. He filed a petition asking the court for permission to take the children with him. Johnson opposed the move, argued that the parties were really exercising joint custody in practice, and filed her own countermotion asking the court to give her primary physical custody. After a three-day hearing, the district court granted Bennett's relocation request. The Court of Appeals identified two main problems with how the lower court got there. First, the lower court decided Johnson's countermotion for primary custody before deciding Bennett's relocation petition. Because Johnson's countermotion was based entirely on the fact that Bennett wanted to move, deciding it first effectively put the burden on Johnson to stop the move - the opposite of what Nevada's relocation statute requires. Second, the lower court used language suggesting Johnson had to do more than show what was "more likely than not" best for the children - it said she had to "significantly tip the scales" and show the children would be "far better off" with her - while at the same time saying Bennett only had to "equal or slightly exceed" what was available for the children in Nevada. That flipped and watered down the legal standards. On the question Johnson pressed hardest - whether the trial judge should have looked past the written custody order and assessed the parents' actual day-to-day arrangement (the "true nature" of custody under the older Rivero case) - the Court of Appeals sided with Bennett. The court explained that Nevada's relocation statutes were rewritten in 2015, after Rivero. Those statutes (NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065) now key the procedure to whatever custodial arrangement "has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court." Because the 2022 stipulation clearly named Bennett as primary physical custodian and Johnson never moved to modify it, the trial court was right to treat Bennett as the primary custodian for purposes of his relocation petition. The Court of Appeals reversed the relocation order and sent the case back so the district court can reconsider Bennett's petition under the correct burden of proof - preponderance of the evidence - and decide his relocation petition before addressing any contingent countermotion by Johnson.

Alicia and Richard Young divorced after having one child together, born in 2016. Under the divorce decree, they shared joint legal custody (joint decision-making authority), Alicia had primary physical custody (the child lived mainly with her), and Richard had parenting time every other weekend plus a midweek evening on alternating weeks. Richard later filed several motions alleging that Alicia was not following the custody arrangement and was denying him his parenting time, including overnight visits. Before a scheduled evidentiary hearing, the parties reached a new agreement: Alicia would keep primary physical custody, the child would continue seeing her therapist, and a "parenting coordinator" - a court-appointed professional who helps parents resolve day-to-day custody disputes - would be appointed and would aggressively promote expanding Richard's parenting time. The court's appointment order let the coordinator resolve disputes about the custody arrangement but did not permit her to make substantive changes to it, and it told the parties that the coordinator's decisions were not final and could be reviewed by the court. About two months later, the parenting coordinator reported to the court that Alicia had blocked efforts to reunify the child with Richard and refused to bring the child to therapy appointments, and that she believed Alicia's actions had become abusive and neglectful of the child's mental health needs. After further proceedings, the district court temporarily placed the child in Richard's care for 18 days. When the parties tried to resume the prior arrangement, more problems arose, and Richard moved to modify custody, alleging that Alicia interfered with his relationship with the child, withheld the child, coached the child to falsely allege abuse, skipped the child's therapy sessions, and refused to cooperate with the parenting coordinator. Alicia opposed the motion and asked the court to disqualify the parenting coordinator for bias and overstepping her authority. At an evidentiary hearing, Richard, Alicia, and the child's therapist testified. The therapist described the child's anxiety and said, among other things, that Alicia often failed to bring the child to therapy, that the child kept a food log and was weighed before and after her time with Richard, that the child looked to Alicia for confirmation when making statements, and that Alicia's actions had a negative impact on the child. The district court found a substantial change in circumstances - in particular, Alicia's actions causing parental alienation between Richard and the child and interference with the child's therapy - found that several statutory "best interest" factors favored Richard, and awarded Richard primary physical custody while keeping joint legal custody and giving Alicia specified overnight parenting time. The court also declined to disqualify the parenting coordinator. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the district court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence from the hearing testimony. As to Alicia's complaint that the court considered the parenting coordinator's reports, the appellate court noted that the district court did not specifically rely on those reports in its custody findings, and that even assuming it was error to consider them, Alicia did not show the error was prejudicial rather than harmless, given the extensive testimony from Richard and the therapist. The court also rejected the argument that the district court improperly handed its decision-making power to the parenting coordinator, because the court retained ultimate authority over custody and made its own findings. Finally, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the parenting coordinator was not biased and did not overstep her authority.

Melinda and Paul Miller divorced in 2016 and share joint physical and joint legal custody of one child. For years, their parenting-time schedule kept changing because of Paul's work as a pilot, and the constant changes led to a lot of litigation. In August 2022, Melinda asked the court to set a permanent schedule. While the case was pending, the court temporarily put in place a week-on/week-off arrangement. In early 2023, Paul asked the court to hold Melinda in contempt - a finding that a person disobeyed a clear court order - because, he said, the divorce decree gave him parenting time on President's Day weekend in odd-numbered years, but Melinda picked the child up from school and took him to a soccer tournament in Utah that weekend without Paul's consent. Melinda responded that Paul knew about the tournament and that his own failure to reliably use his parenting time should excuse her actions. Shortly before the evidentiary hearing, Melinda for the first time asked the court - in her pretrial memorandum - to give her primary physical custody, not just a new schedule. Paul filed his own pretrial memorandum the same day and did not address that request. At the start of the hearing, the court told Melinda it would not consider the primary-custody request because it was raised too late and Paul had not received adequate notice or a chance to defend against it. Melinda's attorney asked to amend the pleadings to match the evidence, but the court declined. After the hearing, the court set a new, more predictable schedule and found Melinda in contempt, concluding she intentionally took the child during Paul's clearly defined parenting time without his written consent. It ordered her to pay a $500 sanction and later awarded Paul $1,800 in attorney fees and costs for the contempt issue. Melinda asked the court to reconsider. In a later ruling, the court found a separate contempt motion by Paul to be frivolous and awarded Melinda $500 in fees for opposing it, reducing what she owed Paul to $1,300 plus the $500 sanction. The court kept the contempt finding and fee award but removed the "floating days" from the schedule. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed on all three points. It held the district court acted within its discretion in finding Melinda in contempt because there was a clear order (the divorce decree), Melinda had notice and the ability to comply, and she intentionally violated it - something she acknowledged in her testimony. The court was not persuaded that Paul's own conduct excused her violation. On the sanction and fees, the court found Melinda's arguments unsupported by relevant authority. On the custody request, the court held the district court properly refused to consider a change to primary custody raised for the first time just before the hearing, because letting it proceed without giving Paul adequate notice and time to prepare would not satisfy due process. The appellate court also noted the district court did not permanently bar Melinda from seeking a custody modification in the future - it simply declined to address it at that hearing.

This case concerns where a young child, E.R., should live. DFS removed E.R. from her mother's custody when she was one month old because of neglect. After efforts to reunify mother and child failed, the mother's parental rights were terminated in February 2017, and the foster parents who had cared for E.R. since September 2016 began the process of adopting her. About 15 months after E.R. was first removed, a maternal cousin in Georgia (Stephanie R.) contacted DFS and asked to have E.R. placed with her and her husband. After interstate-placement approval and an evidentiary hearing, a court master recommended moving E.R. to Georgia, reasoning that the "family connection is the overriding consideration" even though the child was strongly bonded to the foster parents and another removal would cause her trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. DFS and the foster parents asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court used the wrong statute. While the case was working through reunification, NRS 432B.550(5) governed placement and gave a strong preference to placing the child with relatives. But once parental rights were terminated, a different statute, NRS 128.110(2), took over. That statute uses softer language: the agency "may" prefer relatives, and "shall, if practicable" keep siblings together. So the agency's discretion and the child's best interest carry more weight at that stage. The Court agreed with the lower court on one point: the maternal cousin had a reasonable excuse for coming forward late because she did not know E.R. was in protective custody, and DFS could have located her earlier. So her delay did not eliminate any familial preference she might have. But the Court found two serious problems with the placement order. First, the master and district court did not make written findings about what was actually in E.R.'s best interest beyond acknowledging the move would traumatize her. Second, by using NRS 432B.550(5) instead of NRS 128.110(2), the courts below did not give appropriate weight to DFS's discretion in choosing placement post-termination, and did not develop the facts about whether placing E.R. with a newer sibling (born to the same mother in April 2017) was actually practicable. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate the placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning the court starts fresh rather than just reviewing the master's work) applying the correct statute and making proper findings about E.R.'s best interest.

This case involves a young child, referred to as E.R., who was removed from her mother's custody at one month old in July 2015 because of neglect. DFS placed her in foster care and tried to find relatives to take her, but found none at first. After more than a year, the child was placed with foster parents Philip R. and Regina R., who wanted to adopt her. About 15 months after the child's initial removal, the child's mother's first cousin, Stephanie R., who lives in Georgia with her husband Joey R., contacted DFS and asked to take the child. By that time, DFS was moving toward terminating the mother's parental rights, which the court did in February 2017. The foster parents had begun adopting the child. DFS then asked the district court to decide whether the child should stay with the foster parents (with whom she was strongly bonded) or be moved to live with the maternal relatives in Georgia. After a hearing, a court master recommended sending the child to the maternal relatives, finding that the family connection was the "overriding consideration," even though the move would cause the child trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. The foster parents and DFS asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed to grant the writs and ordered the case redone. The court explained several things. First, once parental rights are terminated, the rules for placing a child change. Before termination, NRS 432B.550(5) governs placement, and that statute uses mandatory language ("preference must be given") in favor of placing a child with a relative. After termination, however, NRS 128.110(2) governs, and it uses softer, more permissive language ("may give preference") and gives the placement agency more discretion. Second, the maternal relatives' delay in coming forward did not disqualify them. Stephanie did not know the child was in protective custody until October 2016, so she had a reasonable excuse for the delay. Third, and most importantly, even when a familial preference applies, the child's best interest is the main consideration. The Supreme Court found that the hearing master and district court did not adequately weigh the child's best interest. They treated the family connection as automatically controlling and did not make written findings about what was best for this particular child, who was deeply bonded with her foster family and would suffer trauma from another move. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate its placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning a fresh hearing), this time applying NRS 128.110(2), giving appropriate weight to the child's best interest, and considering DFS's discretion in deciding placement.