Nevada family-law case summaries

Erika and Michael Kragen married in 2016 in San Diego and have three children. In August 2022, the family moved from California to Henderson, Nevada, where they lived with Michael's parents and enrolled the children in a private school. Erika worked at the school as a teacher's aide. In mid-January 2023, Erika told Michael she wanted a separation. According to Erika, Michael responded by grabbing a kitchen knife, threatening suicide, and stabbing it through the children's trampoline; Michael said he threw the knife and accidentally cut the trampoline. Erika did not call the police or seek a protective order at that time. On January 31, 2023, while Michael was at work, Erika took the children to San Diego to live with her family and texted Michael afterward saying they "need[ed] a divorce." Important date: that was just four days short of six months after the family's August 4, 2022, arrival in Nevada. For several weeks after January 31, the children remained enrolled in their Nevada school, Erika remained on the school's payroll, and the couple began marriage counseling. By late February, Erika withdrew the children from the school and stopped communicating with Michael. On February 26, 2023, Michael filed for divorce in Clark County, Nevada. Two days later, Erika filed for legal separation in San Diego County, California. About a month after that, Erika sought an emergency domestic violence restraining order in California. The two states' courts both issued temporary custody orders, then conferred by phone. The California court agreed to defer to Nevada on the question of which state should decide custody. The Nevada district court, after an evidentiary hearing on remand from an earlier writ proceeding, found that Nevada was the children's "home state" under the UCCJEA. The legal puzzle: under the UCCJEA, a state is a child's "home state" only if the child lived there with a parent for at least six consecutive months before the case was filed - but the statute counts "any temporary absence" as part of that six months. The children were physically in Nevada for only about five months and 27 days. Whether Nevada qualified as the home state therefore turned on whether the children's time in San Diego from January 31 to February 26 counted as a "temporary absence." The Court of Appeals used this case to formally adopt the "totality of the circumstances" test for deciding whether an absence is temporary - the same test most other UCCJEA states use. Under that test, courts can weigh many factors, including the parents' intent, the length of the absence, whether one parent wrongfully kept the children away, the circumstances of the children's arrival and continued presence, and when the other parent had reason to know any move was permanent. Applying that test, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court's findings. The district court had credited Michael's testimony over Erika's, found that Erika did not actually leave to escape domestic violence (noting she did not seek a Nevada protective order and waited until after Michael filed for divorce to seek one in California), and pointed to the children's continued school enrollment, Erika's continued employment at the school, and the couple's marriage counseling as evidence supporting an expectation of return. Counting the absence as temporary, the children had effectively lived in Nevada for 206 days - more than six months - so Nevada was the home state. The Court of Appeals therefore denied Erika's writ petition. The court also noted that the district court had referred to Erika's "unjustifiable conduct" in removing the children, citing NRS 125A.375(1). The Court of Appeals clarified that NRS 125A.375(1) lets a court decline jurisdiction based on unjustifiable conduct but does not itself create jurisdiction; to the extent the district court relied on it as an independent basis for jurisdiction, that was error, but harmless because the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis independently supported home state jurisdiction. The court rejected Erika's request to reassign the case to a different judge, finding she had not overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality.

This case is about when grandparents in Nevada can get a court order requiring their grandchildren's parents to let them visit. Nevada law (NRS 125C.050) lets grandparents and certain other people ask a court for visitation, but only if "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child." The grandchildren's parents, Ashley and John Franklin, divorced and were given joint legal and joint physical custody of the two children. During the divorce proceedings, the children had briefly lived with the grandparents under a six-month temporary guardianship. After the children went back to their parents, Ashley and John signed a partial parenting agreement saying that no one else, including the maternal grandparents, would have court-ordered custody or visitation. The grandparents then asked the court for visitation anyway. At the evidentiary hearing, the father (John) testified that, after a roughly five-month period when he had cut off contact based on a mistaken belief about Phillip's role in his fiance's arrest, he allowed the grandparents to see the children regularly during his custodial time - including afternoon visits, school pickups, an overnight on Christmas Eve 2021, a spring-break trip, and several overnight stays. Phillip kept a log showing 196 hours with the children in 2021. The grandmother (Carolyn), by contrast, said Ashley would not arrange visits during her custodial time. The trial judge found Ashley not credible and relied on John's and the grandparents' testimony. The trial judge ruled that, even though Ashley denied contact during her time, the overall amount of contact the grandparents had with the children - through John's parenting time - was enough that the grandparents were not being "denied or unreasonably restricted" from visiting. The petition was denied. The grandparents appealed. They argued the trial court essentially "rubber stamped" Ashley's refusal by ignoring the fact that she gave them no time at all. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The key legal question was how to read the words "a parent" in NRS 125C.050(3). Does it mean the petition can go forward if just one parent denies visits? Or does the court look at the overall picture across both parents in a joint custody situation? The Supreme Court held that, where parents share joint custody and both participate in the case, courts should look at the petitioners' overall access to the children. If one parent is providing reasonable contact, the petition fails - the court does not need to scrutinize what the other parent is doing. The court reasoned this approach better balances two interests: the child's interest in having a relationship with grandparents (which is met if the grandparents are getting regular contact through one parent) and the parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children, recognized in Troxel v. Granville. Reading the statute the other way, the court said, would let petitions proceed even when the child is already getting plenty of grandparent contact, which would intrude on parental rights without serving the child. Applying that rule, the Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The grandparents' factual reports of their visits supported the finding that contact was not unreasonably restricted. The grandparents' worry that their access could disappear in the future - what the court called the "volatility" of family relationships - was not, by itself, an unreasonable restriction. The court also declined to consider arguments the grandparents had not properly preserved below (that Ashley was unfit and that the court should adopt a "functional-parent" theory) and treated as moot their challenge to the order ending their temporary guardianship, since the six-month guardianship had already expired by its own terms.

This case concerns who is legally recognized as the father of a child, A.A., born in 2011, and how custody of A.A. should be divided. Three adults are involved. Rosie is the child's mother. Henry was Rosie's on-and-off partner; when A.A. was born, Henry and Rosie signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity (a sworn statement declaring Henry to be the father), and Henry's name went on the birth certificate. Ignacio was also Rosie's on-and-off partner during the same period and is the biological father of Rosie's second child, J.A., based on earlier paternity testing. For years, Ignacio suspected he might also be A.A.'s biological father. Rosie and Henry told him he was not, and Henry once showed Ignacio a screenshot of a DNA test purporting to confirm Henry's paternity. Ignacio thought the test looked suspicious and obtained his own DNA tests, which showed he was A.A.'s biological father. Rosie continued to deny him regular contact with A.A. Ignacio sued for a paternity determination and custody. The district court initially ruled against him, saying his challenge came too late. Ignacio appealed, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, and on remand the district court ordered formal DNA testing. The testing confirmed Ignacio is A.A.'s biological father. The district court then declared Ignacio the legal father, ordered the birth certificate amended, and awarded Ignacio and Rosie joint physical custody. Henry was reduced to a "third party" who could request visitation similar to a grandparent. Rosie and Henry appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. They argued biology should not automatically determine legal fatherhood once a child is past age three, that the birth certificate should control, and that the trial court failed to properly analyze A.A.'s best interest before ordering joint custody. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed. It held that under Nevada's Parentage Act, a DNA test showing 99% or higher probability of paternity creates a "conclusive presumption" of fatherhood - meaning it cannot be overcome by other evidence. Because Ignacio's test met that threshold, he is A.A.'s legal father, with all the rights that come with being a parent. The court explained that an older Nevada decision, Love v. Love, which had treated DNA evidence as just one factor, no longer controls because the Legislature changed the statute in 2007 to make DNA results conclusive. The court also explained that the birth-certificate statute Rosie and Henry relied on does not make the certificate dispositive when paternity is contested and the listed father was never married to the mother. On custody, the court held that the trial judge did not have to apply the legal test for modifying an existing custody order, because there was no prior custody order for A.A. Nevada law presumes joint physical custody is in a child's best interest, and the trial court found that Rosie and Henry had intentionally kept Ignacio away from A.A. for years - a circumstance that statutorily favors joint custody. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

Sandra Nance and Christopher Ferraro have one child, born in 2008. Sandra lives in Las Vegas; Christopher lives in New York. Before their divorce, Sandra accused Christopher of domestic violence and child abuse, and Child Protective Services investigated. In 2011, the parties agreed that Sandra would be the primary residential parent. After ongoing co-parenting problems, the district court ordered a custody evaluation, required Christopher to exercise his parenting time in Nevada for a period, and required both parties to take parenting classes. In November 2012, the parties signed a stipulation that called their arrangement "joint legal and physical custody," and the child continued to live with Sandra in Nevada. In 2015, Christopher asked the court to give him primary physical custody and to let him move the child to New York. Sandra objected and wanted to bring up Christopher's earlier domestic violence and abuse - including the custody evaluation, CPS reports, and witness testimony - to argue that moving the child to live with him was not in the child's best interest. Christopher asked the court to block all evidence about events before the November 2012 order, citing two Nevada Supreme Court cases, McMonigle and Castle. The district court agreed and barred Sandra's older evidence. It then ruled that the parents had been sharing joint physical custody, granted Christopher primary physical custody, and let him move the child to New York. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that McMonigle and Castle limit when a parent who is trying to change custody can rely on old facts to show that "circumstances have changed" - the threshold a parent must meet before a court can modify primary physical custody. Those cases do not stop a court from looking back at the facts that supported its earlier orders when it decides what is best for the child now. And they do not stop a parent who is opposing a change in custody from pointing to old evidence - including past domestic violence - to argue that changing custody is not in the child's best interest. The court emphasized that Nevada law requires judges to consider domestic violence when deciding the best interest of a child, and that there is a rebuttable presumption against giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence. By blocking Sandra's evidence, the district court could not properly weigh those factors when it decided what kind of custody arrangement existed, whether to modify it, and whether to allow the child to move. The Court of Appeals sent the case back so the district court could consider the previously excluded evidence - though the parties cannot simply re-fight issues the court has already decided.